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**EXTRACTS FROM A SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT OF
ZAMBIA, H.E. DR. K.D. KAUNDA, AT THE 5TH NON-ALIGNED
SUMMIT CONFERENCE, COLOMBO, SRI LANKA, 11-19
AUGUST 1976**

I wish to take this opportunity to extend a warm welcome to the people of Angola, Guinea Bissau, the Comoros, Cape Verde – Mozambique, Seychelles, Sao Tome and Principe from the continent of Africa, who are now full members of the Non-Aligned Movement. We congratulate all of them on their heroic and successful struggle against colonialism and fascism. Their presence in our midst is not only a consummation of the irresistible force which the Non-Aligned Movement represents, but also an inspiration to all those others who are still struggling to achieve their inalienable rights.

Many of our colleagues in their appraisal of the present international political and economic situation have noted some of the most fundamental elements that must be emphasized on the need to give positive meaning to the objectives, aspirations and purposes of the Non-Aligned Movement. Some of these are: unity amongst ourselves; co-operation among ourselves; the imperative need to strictly adhere to our principles; and our preparedness to move away from declarations to real action.

We chose non-alignment consciously and deliberately; we were motivated by a common yearning for a better world for men and women of all races, colour and creed. We recognised the real needs of man to live in an environment of freedom, peace and security. Our commitment to human equality and dignity and the freedom of all peoples to make decisions affecting their lives, has continued to reflect our behaviour in this movement of equal and non-aligned countries. It is only natural, therefore, that we should constantly remind ourselves of the instruments we must build in order to make our movement a more positive and effective tool for the realisation of our objectives and goals.

It is against this background and the continuing challenges to non-alignment that I would like to review the prevailing international situation.

Southern Africa

The first of these challenges is the serious situation in Southern Africa. The problem of Southern Africa stems from the persistent refusal by the racist white minority regimes to accede to the just demands of the oppressed people to independence, freedom, peace and justice. The struggling masses in Zimbabwe, Namibia

and South Africa remain the victims of some of the worst forms of oppression.

In Zimbabwe the heroic struggle of the oppressed people has reached a decisive turning point. The military success by the gallant and patriotic forces of the oppressed people has forced the minority regime of Ian Smith into a state of total panic and uncertainty. This uncertainty of the illegal regime manifests itself in various cases of desperation such as mass arrests and detention of innocent Zimbabweans; recourse to chemical warfare and poisoning of lakes and rivers in order to wipe out the indigenous population; the rounding up and regrouping of Africans into concentration camps; the kidnapping of authentic leaders of the oppressed and the cold-blooded murders of Zimbabwean Nationalist leaders.

The illegal Smith Regime has gone further by committing acts of aggression against front-line independent countries, such as the recent unprovoked attacks against the Mozambican people – which resulted in barbaric murders and injustices. These crimes included the murders on Mozambican soil of refugees from Zimbabwe. I submit that these atrocious acts of international gangsterism will not prevent us from giving our total support to the struggling masses in Zimbabwe.

With regard to Namibia, the South African apartheid regime has continued with its diabolic and illegal occupation of this international territory. The central issue in Namibia is South Africa's persistent and arrogant refusal to withdraw from that territory so that our brothers and sisters in SWAPO, who are the authentic representatives of the people of Namibia, can exercise their right to independence. South Africa has continued to use the international territory of Namibia as a base to launch acts of aggression against Angola and Zambia; over which acts the two States have complained to the United Nations Security Council. Namibia is a straightforward case of South African colonialism. South Africa has defied with impunity the many resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. The international community must bring pressure to bear on it to withdraw forthwith from this territory.

Under the Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa we tried negotiations as an instrument for change. The racist regimes refused the peaceful approach to change by the Organisation of African Unity. Now the Organisation of African Unity, together with the gallant people of Southern Africa, have decided irrevocably to continue with intensified armed struggle. There is no turning back. Majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia must be decided on the battle-field. In the fight for justice, freedom and independence for the people of Southern Africa, the countries of the Non-

Aligned Movement should now individually or collectively increase their contribution to the armed struggle of the people of this part of the world. Assistance is urgently required in the following fields: arms and ammunition; transport; food and medical facilities and personnel.

These requirements are most urgently needed because of the increase in the number of militants who are coming forward to participate in the intensified armed struggle.

In the struggle for human rights in Southern Africa special attention must be paid to front-line states. Zambia has suffered considerably in human, financial and material terms. The cost to Zambia of implementing sanctions against the rebel regime of Ian Smith is in excess of US \$450 million over the past three years. We have borne this heavy burden because assisting our struggling brothers and sisters is our international commitment. Whilst in the case of Zambia, the response from the international community to offset the cost to us of implementing sanctions has been negligible, it is our hope that the Non-Aligned countries will not by default, put the other front-line countries in a similar position.

In this connection, this conference must go beyond the expression of mere solidarity with frontline countries. It must consider the provision of direct financial assistance to Angola, Botswana and Mozambique. The Non-Aligned Movement should create a fund for assistance in these countries. These countries must be strengthened both materially and financially in order that they may serve as durable rear bases for the prosecution of the liberation struggle. Front-line states bear a lot of local costs of men and money. Their development programmes are often disrupted because of their priority on the liberation struggle. In this respect, however, we are most grateful to those Non-Aligned countries that have already taken the initiatives to render financial assistance to front-line countries and Liberation Movements.

With regard to the situation in South Africa itself, the riots in Soweto and other black townships have more than ever before demonstrated the fallacy of apartheid while rekindling the fires of revolution. We are pleased that the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement have been in the forefront at the United Nations and other international conferences in exposing the inhumanity of apartheid and the urgent need for its destruction. The riots in South Africa have now demonstrated that the situation will resolve itself by an internal revolution. The Non-Aligned countries should assist in hastening the road to that goal by ostracizing South Africa as they have done in the past and by marshalling their news media in a psychological warfare against the apartheid regime.

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Indian Ocean

The other challenge facing us and which will continue to command the attention and vigilance of the Non-Aligned Movement is the important question of the security of the Indian Ocean. The intensification of superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean poses a real and immediate danger to the peace and security of the littoral and hinterland states in the region. The countries of the Non-Aligned Movement have a special responsibility in the struggle to transform the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. Zambia condemns unreservedly superpower machinations which jeopardize the peace and tranquility of the countries in and adjacent to the Indian Ocean. We call upon these powers to refrain from allowing this region into becoming yet another hot pressure centre that merely increases tension in the world. We call upon them to serve the cause of peace by dismantling their bases and withdrawing, without delay, from the Indian Ocean.

**UITTREKSELS UIT 'N TOESPRAAK DEUR DIE SUID-
AFRIKAANSE EERSTE MINISTER, SY EDELE B.J. VORSTER,
TYDENS DIE NASIONALE PARTY-KONGRES VAN
TRANSVAAL, TE PRETORIA, OP 13 SEPTEMBER 1976**

Ek het my beywer dat ons aanvaar moet word as synde van Afrika. Vanaand is daar nie tywfel oor dat vriend en vyand dit onherroeplik aanvaar, dat ons nie alleen reg het om in Afrika te wees nie, maar dat ons inderdaad in ons eie naam en in ons eie reg die kaart en transport hou van daardie deel van Suid-Afrika wat aan ons behoort. Die verwyf wat oor die jare gemaak is en waarteen ons hier en in die buiteland moet stry – dat ons kolonialiste is – word vandag nie meer gemaak nie. Immers, vandag besef nie alleen ons vriende in die wêreld daarbuite nie, maar ook ons opponente en ons vyande dat Suid-Afrika inderdaad die eerste Afrika-land was wat hom verset het teen Britse kolonialisme in Afrika.

I dedicated myself from the very first moment I was elected to this position to fostering good and better relations, not only between Afrikaans and English-speaking in South Africa, but also between Whites and non-Whites. There were those over the past decade – and unfortunately they are still with us tonight and perhaps more so than ever before – there are those who were, and are, trying their best to create hostility not only between Afrikaans-speaker and English-speaker, but also between White and non-White. After ten years in this office, I want to say tonight they will not succeed. They will not succeed because I find evidence every day that Afrikaans and English-speakers want to stand together . . .

In spite of what is happening, in spite of what may happen in the future, I have no doubt in my mind whatsoever that there is a broad basis of understanding and of goodwill between White and non-White in this country. It is true there are those who don't like it, it is true that there are those who will do their utmost to effect polarisation between the colour groups in South Africa, but I will refer to that again later.

I dedicated myself to do my best to normalise relations between South Africa and African countries, as well as countries elsewhere in the world. Practically at the beginning of taking office, I realised that if ever we want to achieve something in the Western World, if ever we want to come to an understanding with those who should understand us – with the other nations of the West of which we are part and parcel, we must not only adopt the stand that we are of Africa, but we must also show our willingness to come to peace with Africa. Right from the outset – and I will refer to this, too,

This text is an official transcription from a recording, with minor editorial amendments. As is the usual practice, it was delivered partly in Afrikaans and partly in English.

later this evening – I was prepared to accept them as peoples in their own right, and I was prepared to talk to them on an equal footing. Furthermore, it was clear to me, from the beginning, that the way back to the West, who refused to understand it; was through Africa. Always, however, on the condition that whilst we would not meddle in their affairs we similarly wouldn't tolerate anybody meddling in our's.

You referred to the fact that I went into Africa. I went in there not only to normalise relations but to put South Africa's case to the peoples and to the leaders of Africa. If I am proud of anything, here tonight, then it is that whenever I talk to these leaders, to those people, I talk to them as I would to people of Pretoria or to the people of Lichtenburg or to the people of Kroonstad or to any other town or city in South Africa.

Die vraag kan gevra word hoe ver ons daarin geslaag het om aanvaar te word as deel van Afrika; hoe ver het ons daarin geslaag om aanvaar te word as 'n Afrika-staat wat 'n bydrae kan lewer tot die vrede en die bestendiging van Afrika? Dan kan ek nie – en ek doen dit vir die doeleindes van die rekord – beter doen as om vanaand vir u te kwoteer wat dr. Kissinger self oor hierdie aangeleentheid tydens sy perskonferensie te Zürich¹ gesê het. Ek kwoteer hom:

Now to the talks that have been taking place here in the last two days. The purpose of these talks has not been to develop a joint American/South African programme. The evolution of these talks and what has brought us to this point is as follows: On my visit to Africa in April all African leaders urged a solution to the problems of Southern Africa through quiet discussions with the Prime Minister of South Africa. For many of these problems the policies of his Government held the key if a peaceful solution was to be achieved. Based on these views we initiated contact with the Government of South Africa.

Na dertig jaar het daar vir die eerste maal weer 'n ontmoeting gekom tussen die Staatsekretaris van die grootste land in die wêreld en Suid-Afrika se Eerste Minister. . . .

Nou kan u vanaand vir my vra, waar staan Suid-Afrika nou met die Weste? Waar staan ons met die VSA? Het u gemerk dat nadat ons samesprekings in Zürich beëindig is, het dr. Kissinger dieselfde dag oorgevlieg om verslag aan mnr. Callaghan te doen? Hy het die volgende dag, volgens sy eie segging, verslag aan die President van Frankryk gedoen, daardie middag aan die Kanselier van Wes-Duitsland en daardie aand aan die President van Amerika. Daar was tye wat die Weste, wat Europa, wat die Verenigde State ons totaal ignoreer het; wat dit nie vir hulle saak gemaak het of ons bestaan en of ons nie bestaan nie. Hulle het dit beskou dat ons geen rol te speel het nie en eintlik was ons net 'n oorlas en in die pad

1. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 6, 1976, p85

Vandag luister ons na die radio in die oggend en dan hoor ons dat die Ministers van Buitelandse Sake van die Euromarklande bymekaar gekom het om hulle houding teenoor hierdie onderhandelings, wat op die oomblik plaasvind, te formuleer.

Ek wil nie vir u sê dat die Westerse Wêreld, waarvan ons part en deel is, ons beleid onderskrywe nie; ek sal u mislei as ek dit vir u sê; Ek kan nie vanaand vir u sê dat hulle eers van ons beleid hou nie; ek sal u mislei as ek dit vir u sê. Maar ek kan wel vanaand vir u sê dat ons die stadium bereik het waar die Westerse Wêreld notisie neem as Afrikastate vir hulle sê Suid-Afrika hou die sleutel tot baie van die vraagstukke van Afrika wat tergend en kwellend is en was oor die laaste aantal jare. Dan is ek bly en dankbaar, al is daardie verskille daar – en hulle draai geen doekies om wanneer hulle met my praat om vir my te sê hulle hou nie van hierdie beleid en daardie beleid nie – maar daar is mos baie dinge by hulle wat ek ook nie van hou nie en dan sê ek dit ook. Dit gaan nie vir my daaroor of hulle van my beleid hou en of hulle nie van my beleid hou nie; en in elk geval is my beleid nie vir hulle gemaak nie – dit is gemaak vir Suid-Afrika en vir Suid-Afrika alleen. Daar is baie dinge wat ons wil uitvoer; ons besef ons moet baie dinge uitvoer, maar ons het nog nooit ons beleid aan iemand te koop aangebied nie. Ons beleid is in die lewe geroep om die Suid-Afrikaanse situasie te dien en om die beste vir alle mense in Suid-Afrika te probeer daargestel, soos wat ek aanstons vir u sal probeer aantoon.

Maar wie van ons weet dit nie en besef dit nie, dat dit steeds die oogmerk van die Kommunisme is om die wêreld te oorheers? Wêreldoorheersing is nog altyd onbeskaamd en in sy volle naaktheid deur hulle verkondig en gepropageer. Die halfhartige Europa alleen kan dit nie teënstaan nie. Dit is mos die feit van die geskiedenis van ons taak dat Europa hom nie alleen kan verweer teen Kommunistiese Rusland nie; dat hy dit alleen kan doen met die steun van die VSA.

Laat ons nou geen illusies daaroor hê nie – baie mense in die VSA hou nie van ons nie en hulle hou nie van ons beleid nie, maar feit bly – en daarmee moet ons rekening hou – dat die Verenigde State van Amerika in sy wese anti-Kommunisties is. As ons dit nie sou glo nie dan sou die toekoms, nie net vir ons nie, maar vir die hele Europa en vir die hele Westerse Wêreld so duister wees dat 'n mens kan wanhoop aan die toekoms. Weer maak dit nie saak of die VSA van ons hou nie en weer maak die nie saak of ons van hulle hou nie, maar die feit van ons dag is dat die VSA nie alleen die grootste Westerse demokrasie is nie, maar die VSA is die leier van die Westerse Wêreld; en omdat ons as anti-Kommuniste part en deel van die Westerse Wêreld is, daarom – ten spyte van daardie verskille, ten spyte van antipatieë – is die VSA vir daardie doelinde ook die leier van Suid-Afrika. Want sy optrede teenoor die

Kommunisme of sy gebrek aan optrede teen die Kommuniste, dit gaan ook u en my toekoms as 'n klein Westerse land raak. Daarom het ek dit my plig geag dat toe hierdie deur oopgegaan het en hierdie uitnodiging gekom het om met die VSA samesprekings te voer, ek daardie uitnodiging aangeneem het – nie een maal nie maar twee maal. En daarom sal die spreekbuis van die Verenigde State van Amerika ook hierdie week vir die eerste maal in ons geskiedenis samesprekings met Suid-Afrika en op Suid-Afrikaanse bodem kom voer.

Dit wil nie sê dat ons nou noodwendig ten opsigte van alle dinge met mekaar saamstem nie; dit wil nog minder sê dat Suid-Afrika aan hom in hierdie proses laat voorskrywe. My standpunt ook in hierdie saak is op dieselfde grondslag as waarop ek normalisering van betrekkinge in Afrika gesoek het. Op daardie selfde grondslag soek ek ook normalisering van betrekkinge op hierdie front. Die Verenigde State van Amerika se belangstelling in die sake van Suider-Afrika spruit voort uit sy vrese – en daardie vrese is opreg – dat die Kommuniste dit miskien in hulle kop kan kry om Suidelike Afrika in te palm vir hulle eie doeleindes. Daardie vrese is nie denkbeeldig nie; maar ek sê, toe daardie vrese by die Verenigde State van Amerika posgevat het, toe het daar 'n belangstelling gekom in die sake van Suidelike Afrika en het hulle besluit om te kyk of dit nie moontlik is om 'n politieke oplossing vir die vraagstukke van Suidelike Afrika te vind nie.

Ek het daardie inisiatief verwelkom, maar nie net ek het dit verwelkom nie; ook die Eerste Minister van Rhodesië en sy Regering het dit verwelkom dat die VSA hierdie inisiatief geneem het. Trouens, enige mens wat die toekoms van sy land op die hart dra, sal so 'n inisiatief verwelkom; en as jy dit nie verwelkom nie en as jy dit afslaan of jy luister na onsinnige advies, wat is die alternatief? U weet en ek weet wat die alternatief is. Maar wat meer is, u en ek weet dat as ons misluk dan moet ons in die bresse gaan intree; dan is daar nie 'n ander opsie nie. Maar ek het so 'n idee dat as daardie dag aanbreek en ek kyk om my rond dan sal ek sekere mense nie daar sien nie – en ek dink u weet dit ook. Ek sê ek het die inisiatief van die Verenigde State verwelkom; wie verwelkom dit nie? Die Kommuniste uit die aard van die saak verwelkom dit nie; die swart militantes in Afrika, die verwelkom dit nie; sekere liberale geestelikes hier in Suid-Afrika het gesê ek doen die verkeerde ding om te gaan en dr. Albert Hertzog dink dit is uit die bouse.

Ek het my dit ten doel gestel toe ek hierdie amp aanvaar het, dat ek te alle tye en onder alle omstandighede en so dikwels as die geleentheid hom voordoen en waar hy hom voordoen, Suid-Afrika se saak sal stel – want Suid-Afrika het 'n saak om te stel. Dit was my voorreg in die afgelope tien jaar om daardie saak te stel ten opsigte van ons eie binnelandse beleid en wat ons daarmee wil be-

reik; ten opsigte van die tergende vraagstuk van Suidwes-Afrika; ten opsigte van ons houding en standpunt teenoor Rhodesië – want dit is die brandende vraagstukke sover as wat dit Suid-Afrika betref.

And in spite of what I said at Bloemfontein, in spite of what I said at my press conference in Zürich, in spite of what I said from platform to platform in South Africa; I read certain press reports which make it imperative that for the purpose of the record I again, tonight, state South Africa's point of view clearly and succinctly as far as South West Africa is concerned. More particularly as far as the adventurer Sam Nujoma is concerned and as far as his organisation SWAPO is concerned. And I think I can do no better for the purposes of the record once again to repeat what I said in Parliament on Monday the 17th of May of this year.² I then had occasion to make the following statement and I quote:

On the 23rd of April 1976 I had an interview with Senator Charles Percy (USA), at his request. Senator Percy asked me whether I was prepared to invite SWAPO to participate in the Constitutional Conference in South West Africa, to which I replied that South Africa was not arranging the Conference and did not invite anybody to participate in, nor excluded anybody from it. The Conference was being arranged by the representatives of the various peoples without any interference by, or directives from, South Africa. He, thereupon, asked me whether I would be opposed to SWAPO being invited by the Conference itself. My reply was that I would not like it since I would not negotiate with SWAPO, because SWAPO, as far as I was concerned had been conceived and born in communistic sin in Cape Town in the late fifties. What can be plainer than that? Because it had been founded by four White communists, because SWAPO did not represent South West Africa and because its leader, Sam Nujoma, was neither an elected nor a natural leader of South West Africa or any of its peoples. He thereupon asked me whether, in the event of the Conference deciding of its own accord to invite SWAPO, I would nevertheless forbid its participation. In reply I reiterated that the Conference decided upon its own procedure, that whom it invited was its own business and that I would not interfere even if it acted in a manner with which I did not agree, since I consistently adhered to the standpoint that the various peoples should work out their own future without any interference from South Africa, the United Nations or anybody else. I also pointed out to him that SWAPO was but one of many political parties in South West Africa and that it was for the Conference itself to decide whether it wished to invite political parties to participate in the talks. He thereupon asked me whether I would have any objections to his saying that that was my standpoint and I told him that I would have no objection, provided he gave my standpoint on the matter in full and not only the last part of it. In addition I informed him that as long as it was our responsibility to ensure public peace in South West Africa, to

2. South Africa (Republic) House of Assembly Debates, no. 16, 1976

maintain law and order, to protect property and people's lives we would do so.

In regard to Rhodesia, I referred Senator Percy to a statement I had made in this House on the previous day, namely the 22nd of April, 1976³ and informed him *that South Africa was not involved in the internal dispute between White and Black Rhodesians, that South Africa had moreover not been requested by Rhodesia to involve herself in it and that it was of fundamental interest to Southern Africa that no one should fan the fires that could lead to an escalation of violence in Southern Africa.*

Ek het Suid-Afrika se standpunt by hierdie geleentheid baie duidelik gestel sodat daar nie misverstand daaroor kan wees nie. Sedert die vroeë sestigerjare – en veral sedert 1967 toe ons die *South West Africa Survey* uitgegee het – was dit die beleid van die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering soos hy dit uitgespel het op bladsy 49 van daardie stuk. Ons het vir die wêreld daarbuite gesê dat die volkere van Suidwes-Afrika die reg het om hulle eie toekoms te beslis; hulle sal hulle eie toekoms beslis, en Suid-Afrika sal hom nie daarmee inmeng nie, maar Suid-Afrika sal ook nie toelaat dat die VVO of enigiemand anders inmeng of aan die volkere van Suidwes-Afrika voorskrywe wat hulle moet doen nie. Noudat Suidwes-Afrika dit gedoen het – noudat hulle, omdat hulle met die beleid van Suid-Afrika se Regering saamgestem het, die nodige stappe in daardie verband as volkere geneem het – word die verwyte gemaak; nou word die soort van taal gebruik wat daar die afgelope tyd gebruik word.

Dieselfde geld ten opsigte van Rhodesië – en ek moet dit selfs op die voorraand van my samesprekings môre met my gewaardeerde Kollega, die Eerste Minister van Rhodesië, baie duidelik aan u as Kongres stel, want dit is die feite. Die beleid van die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering oor die jare heen is nie dieselfde as die beleid van die Rhodesiese Regering nie. Daar is 'n groot beginselverskil in opvatting tussen Rhodesië aan die eenkant en Suid-Afrika aan die anderkant. Om die waarheid te sê, in baie opsigte staan Rhodesië se beleid teenoorgestel met dié van Suid-Afrika. Maar getrou aan ons beleid en getrou aan ons standpunt dat verskil in binnelandse beleid geen beletsel is op goeie samewerking nie, dat goeie buurskap nie benadeel moet word omdat regerings beleidsaspekte van verskillende kante benader en verskillende standpunte oor sake het nie, het ons vir die afgelope tien jaar by Rhodesië gestaan. Die Eerste Minister van Rhodesië het dit nog weer op die 24ste Mei 1976 gestel dat *majority rule remains the ultimate goal* van Rhodesië; en hy het gesê daar is twee voorwaardes aan verbonde: dit moet kom langs die evolusionêre weg en dit moet verantwoordelike *majority rule* wees. Ten spyte van daardie wesenlike verskil in beleid

3. South Africa (Republic) House of Assembly Debates, no. 12, 1976

het Suid-Afrika hom op die standpunt gestel dat hy weier om sanksies en boikotte teen Rhodesië in te stel toe die VVO en die res van die wêreld hom wou dwing om dit te doen. Ten spyte van daardie wesenlike verskil in beleid het Suid-Afrika geweier om sy grense met Rhodesië te sluit toe dié eise in die jongste tyd aan hom gestel was.

Suid-Afrika kon – en dit is nodig dat dit vanaand gesê moet word – vir hom groot populariteit in die wêreld gekoop het as hy in die jare wat verby was 'n ander standpunt teen Rhodesië ingeneem het. Suid-Afrika kon vir hom groot populariteit gekoop het as hy 'n ander standpunt oor Suidwes-Afrika wou inneem. Maar Suid-Afrika koop nie populariteit met standpunte nie; hy neem standpunte in as gevolg van beginseloorwegings wat hom motiveer en om geen ander rede nie. Ek het oor die jare heen – en met die oog op die samesprekings môre en die propaganda wat daar gemaak word, is dit nodig dat ek dit weer vanaand herhaal – Suid-Afrika het oor die jare heen nie vir Rhodesië gesê wat sy oplossing moet wees nie: Suid-Afrika het nie vir Rhodesië besluit nie.

South Africa gave no orders to Rhodesia, the Rhodesians are a proud people; they won't accept orders from South Africa or anybody else for that matter. They will make their own decisions and as far as South Africa is concerned – and I stated that all over the world where I went – I am not prepared to prescribe to any of my neighbours what their policy should be.

Ek praat met my bure en my Kollegas praat saam met my. Suid-Afrika se standpunt is dat ons raadgee; ons gee advies, ons wys alternatiewe uit, maar ons het nog nooit voorgeskrywe en ons is nie van plan om voor te skrywe nie – en wat kan billiker wees dan dat 'n land hierdie standpunt teenoor sy buurland inneem. Dit is in daardie gees, ten opsigte van Suidwes-Afrika en ten opsigte van Rhodesië, wat ek samesprekings gevoer het in die verlede; wat ek samesprekings sal voer in hierdie week wat kom, in die hoop en in die vertroue dat met hierdie belangstelling wat daar gekom het, nie alleen van die kant van die Verenigde State nie, maar ook van die kant van die Weste, dat daar oplossings, politieke oplossings, vir die vraagstukke van Suidelike Afrika gevind kan word.

As die Staatsekretaris van die Verenigde State met sodanige oplossings voor 'n dag kan kom, dan sal hy vind dat Suid-Afrika heelhartig met hom in daardie verband sal saamwerk. Dan kan hy ver wag dat Suid-Afrika heelhartig met hom en die Westerse Wêreld sal saamwerk; dan kan hy die wete hê dat waar Suid-Afrika hom altyd op die standpunt gestel het dat al sou hy alleen staan, sal hy die suidpunt van Afrika met die laaste kragte verdedig teen Kommunistiese oorheersing. Dan kan die Verenigde State en Europa ver wag dat daar 'n nuwe gees in Suidelike Afrika sal ontbrand.

Maar laastens, was dit nie alleen my taak om betrekkinge te probeer normaliseer met lande in Afrika en daarbuite nie; was dit nie alleen my taak om vrede te soek in Afrika en in die res van die wêreld nie; maar dit was ook my en my Kollegas se taak om die bloudruk van afsonderlike ontwikkeling in die praktyk toe te pas. As u terugdink aan tien jaar gelede dan sal u onthou dat ons toe by die tydsgewrig gekom het dat ons die era van praktiese politiek binnegegaan het. As jy polities oor Suid-Afrika wil praat en wil meepraat dan is daar immers 'n paar gedagtes, 'n paar feite wat hulle aan jou opdwing – jy kan dit eenvoudig nie miskyk nie.

Die eerste daarvan is dat daar in die geografiese eenheid Suid-Afrika, verskillende volkere, bevolkingsgroepe of gemeenskappe is. Dit is 'n feit wat jy nie kan wegredeneer nie; dit is 'n feit wat jy moet aanvaar as jy 'n beleid vir Suid-Afrika wil ontwerp. In die tweede instansie het ek aan afsonderlike ontwikkeling geglo, saam met my Kollegas, en glo ons vandag aan afsonderlike ontwikkeling, nie net omdat dit met die feitlike situasie in Suidelike Afrika rekening hou nie, maar omdat ons waaragtig glo dat dit die enigste beleid is wat elkeen van daardie volkere, bevolkingsgroepe of gemeenskappe tot hulle reg sal laat kom en wrywing tussen daardie groepe tot 'n minimum sal beperk. Jy kan nie, veral in hierdie wêreld waarin ons nou leef, die bestaan van afsonderlike gemeenskappe, volkere of groepe ignoreer nie.

.....

Ek is bereid om om 'n tafel te gaan sit en saam met die mense te besin, want dit is hulle toekoms en hulle kinders se toekoms net soos my eie, maar ek is nie bereid om na die ou bedeling terug te gaan dat ons in dieselfde Parlement saamgegooi moet word om die grootste onmin in Suid-Afrika te skep nie. Ek is nie bereid om na die ou bedeling terug te gaan dat ek nie die reg het om dit te beskerm wat my eie is nie en wat vir my geld, geld vir die ander man. Ek is nie bereid om mag oor my eie mense en myself te deel met enige ander bevolkingsgroep of gemeenskap, hoe goedgesind hy ookal mag wees en wie hy ookal mag wees nie. Daarom staan elkeen in sy eie Parlement.

Maar in alle billikheid; waar die Parlement oor die jare heen sekere magte van hom gedelegeer het aan rade en kommissies en waar die besluite van daardie rade en kommissies nie alleen die alledaagse lewe van die Witman affekteer nie en nie alleen daarop effek het nie, maar ook effek het op die alledaagse lewe van die Bruinman en op die alledaagse lewe van die Indiër, daar is ek bereid om vir hom te sê: kom sit in hierdie kommissies en rade; kom beskerm die belange van jou eie mense in daardie rade. Kom kla daar, as jy dink dat jou mense veronreg word en as jy nie daar gelyk kry nie, dan het jy nog die geleentheid om dit nog weer by die Kabinetsraad teenoor my en my senior Kollegas te opper dat jou

mense nie regverdig behandel word nie. Die bedeling wat ek uit-hou vir hierdie mense is 'n bedeling wat tot groot voorspoed en tot baie groot tevredenheid van alle redelike mense behoort te wees; maar ongelukkig is daar baie mense wat nie redelike voorspoed wil sien nie, wat nie evolusionêre ontwikkeling in Suid-Afrika wil sien nie, maar wat vir hulle eie doeleindes Suid-Afrika omgekeer wil sien.

Aan die voerpunt van daardie mense is die Kommuniste wat wêreldoorheersing soek en as jy die bewind in Suid-Afrika langs daardie weg omver kan werp, dan sal dit mos vir jou soveel makliker wees om Suidelike Afrika oor te neem en vir jou eie doeleindes aan te wend. Nie alleen omdat jy kan kry wat jy uit Suid-Afrika kan haal nie, maar ook omdat jy dan strategies teenoor die Westerse Wêreld in 'n posisie geplaas sal word waarin jy die Weste kapot kan maak as dit by 'n konvensionele oorlog kom.

In hierdie verband staan die Nasionale Party nie alleen daar as beskermmer van die Witman, die Bruinman, die Indiër en die Swartman hier in Suid-Afrika nie, maar die Nasionale Party wil ook daar staan as beskermmer van hierdie deel van die wêreld, sover as dit die belange van die Vrye Wêreld en die Weste aangaan. In daardie proses soek ons bondgenote, soek ons verstandhouding en ons sal baie dankbaar wees as ons dit kry. Maar selfs al sou ons dit nie kry nie, selfs al sou ons geroepe word om alleen te staan, dan sal die Nasionale Party nog hierdie standpunt inneem; en wanneer ek die beleid van die Nasionale Party verkondig ten opsigte van die verskillende kleurgroepe in Suid-Afrika, dan doen ek dit nie omdat ek die wêreld daarmee wil probeer tevrede stel nie. Dan doen ek dit nie omdat ek onder druk verkeer nie. Dan doen ek dit omdat dit reg en billik is dat dit gedoen moet word. Dan doen ek dit omdat daardie beleid aan die vereistes van moraliteit en van Christelikheid beantwoord.

Maklik sal ons pad nie wees nie; taai en moeilik sal die same-sprekings wees wat ons moet voer om oplossings vir hierdie probleme te probeer vind. My Kollegas en ek sal swaar dra aan daardie verantwoordelikheid, maar ons sal gestaal word deur die wete dat ons op u ondersteuning, u trou en u lojaliteit en u gebede kan staatmaak.

EXTRACTS FROM SPEECHES BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DR. THE HON. HILGARD MULLER

1. South Africa/Britain Trade Association (SABRITA) Johannesburg, 4 August 1976 ¹

South Africa probably represents the greatest repository of economic and industrial power on the African continent. It is in fact the only really viable self-sustaining community on the African continent with any claim to sophistication. South Africa earnestly wishes to use its power and potential for the good of Southern Africa and thus, indirectly, to the advantage of the West. We furthermore believe that the existence of our nation in Southern Africa is not inimical to the interests of our Black neighbours and of the West, because of the stability and the economic, social, technical and scientific dynamism which South African skills alone in Africa can contribute under present circumstances. Within this context we are prepared to provide economic, technological and other assistance to our neighbours in Africa, and to work toward the creation of an association of independent, prosperous and stable Black and White states in Southern Africa.

The West's and therefore the United Kingdom's, best hope of maintaining its interests in Africa lies in an association of moderate African states including South Africa, which espouses Western values and standards. The common interests necessary for such an association already exist. The West's interests could best be served by supporting South Africa's détente drive, and by doing all it can to reassure, aid and bolster moderate African states in a constructive sense. To this end the West should expand its commercial and financial ties with South Africa. In the final analysis a strong South African economy is the best guarantee for stability in Southern Africa and for the social and political progress of all the peoples of the sub-continent.

.....
Southern Africa, to which South Africa is inextricably linked, has seen a startling quickening of the pace of political developments in the past number of years. In considering the present situation and the future of our subcontinent, the following salient points emerge:

- Firstly, the nations of the West have in their own interest a continuing and unavoidable responsibility towards the peoples of the African sub-continent. One is constantly surprised by the arguments produced in Europe and in the United States which attempt to justify Western reluctance to thwart Soviet designs

¹ The extracts reproduced here do not include the sections dealing exclusively with British/South African economic relations.

in Africa. There is an even greater reluctance among Western nations to face the fact that a greater Soviet expansionist plan must eventually include at least the control of Europe in addition to Africa.

- Secondly, there can be no doubt in any impartial observer's mind that South Africa is an integral part of Africa and that the country's Whites are not a transient phenomenon, settlers or colonists, but a group of Africans of European descent. We know that this point of view is accepted by a considerable number of responsible African leaders.

I think that the right of existence of the White minority as well as of the Black majority in South Africa is a self-evident principle. In a recent article on South Africa, the British weekly, *The Economist*, wrote, *inter alia*:

"It is desirable that an efficiently run economy should continue to exist in Southern Africa. This is not because of the trade the West does with South Africa, or the investment it owns there; . . . It is because the Black countries of Southern Africa need an efficiently run economy in South Africa."

.....

As all present here know South Africa's first independent Black homeland becomes a reality in October of this year. The Transkei is to be followed into independence, at intervals, by other homelands, an historic development which will affect the lives and living patterns of many millions in these areas. It is the conviction of my Government that, with their increasing commercial sophistication, economic awareness and buying power, these homelands constitute ideal markets for consumer goods and will repay investment, irrespective of its nature, most handsomely.

The West should understand that although it may disagree with South Africa about the implementation of our policies, it need have no inhibitions about supporting the principle of national self-determination, an essential feature of our policies. This after all, is one of the central tenets of the western democratic political creed. Moreover, the political and economic emancipation of our Bantu peoples in their historic homelands should be seen as a form of decolonisation. Had the Transkei, for instance, not been incorporated in the Union of South Africa it would have continued as a British colony and would probably also have achieved its independence. The West should accordingly recognise the independence of the Transkei and encourage others to do the same.

2. Lentedag-Vieringe van die Universiteit van Pretoria, 15 September 1976

Rhodesië

Daar bestaan heelwat wanbegrippe, onder andere dat Suid-Afrika en die VSA saam die oplossing vir Rhodesië uitgewerk het en wat ons nou op Rhodesië wil afdwing. Ons strewende was deurgaans en sal deurgaans dieselfde bly: om eskalasië van geweld te verhoed; om 'n klimaat te skep vir onderhandelings; om raad te gee waar ons kan en om te wys op alternatiewe en die gevare daaraan verbonde. Die finale besluit sal egter deur die Rhodesiërs self geneem moet word; Rhodesiërs – blank en nie-blank. Met die oog op die ernstige gevare wat Suider-Afrika bedreig, het ek nie die minste twyfel nie dat almal wat die belange van hierdie gebied en sy mense op die hart dra met my sal saamstem dat die tyd nou aangebreek het om 'n finale oplossing vir hierdie brandende vraagstuk te vind. Versuim om dit te doen kan rampspoedig wees.

Suidwes-Afrika

Daar behoort geen twyfel te bestaan dat die Regering dit eerlik en opreg bedoel wanneer ons die versekering gee dat die mense van Suidwes-Afrika self oor hulle toekoms moet besluit – en dat alle opsies vir hulle oop is. Dis geen nuwe beleid aan die kant van Suid-Afrika nie; dis reeds in 1967 geboekstaaf in die *South West Africa Survey*, waarin dit gestel word dat: "The peoples themselves will ultimately decide about the political pattern of the territory." Suid-Afrika het nie die Turnhalle-beraad gereël nie; die Regering is nie op die beraad verteenwoordig nie. Die mense van Suidwes-Afrika moet self oor hulle toekoms besluit, sowel as oor die prosedures en oor sake soos byvoorbeeld SWAPO en ander politieke partye en 'n tydtafel vir onafhanklikheid wat reeds aangekondig is. Die beraad het reeds goeie vordering gemaak. Ek vertrou dit sal so aanhou, mits die beraad nie in die wiede gery word deur faktore waaroor hulle en ons geen beheer het nie.

Suid-Afrika

Tyd laat my nie toe om volledig stil te staan by binnelandse probleme wat ons op die oomblik ondervind nie. Ek wil egter kortliks net enkele aspekte noem.

- Dit is belangrik dat die onluste in die nie-blanke woonbuurtes nie in isolasie gesien moet word nie, maar in die regte perspektief; dit moet beskou word binne die raamwerk van die verskerpte aanslae teen ons deur ons vyande in Suid-Afrika en die wêreld. Dit was nie 'n verrassing dat die wêreldwye veldtog teen Suid-Afrika in felheid toegeneem het nie, as gevolg van die vordering wat ons op soveel terreine gemaak het en die sukses wat ons besig is om te behaal. Ek het dit onder andere

self oor die afgelope dertien jaar voorspel. Dit kan eenvoudig nie blote toeval wees dat die jongste onluste juis plaasvind op hierdie besondere tydstip nie; terwyl ons besig is met baie belangrike samesprekings; terwyl ons ontspanningsbeleid resultate begin oplewer en op die vooraand van die onafhanklikheid van die Transkei. Eintlik kom dit daarop neer dat ons die slagoffers geword het van ons eie sukses.

- Hoe dit ookal sy; ek kan u verseker die Regering sal voortgaan om wet en orde te handhaaf. Ons sal ons nie laat intimideer nie. Regter Cilliers se ondersoek is reeds aan die gang en sy bevindings en aanbevelings sal ernstige aandag geniet. Intussen word alles moontlik gedoen om 'n herhaling te voorkom, onder andere deur, waar enigszins moontlik, wrywingspunte uit te skakel. Ek kan u verseker die Regering het die situasie goed onder beheer en skenk voortdurend dringende aandag daaraan.

Suider-Afrika

Die situasie is baie gekompliseerd, maar ook baie gevaarlik, veral as gevolg van 'n nuwe bedreiging op die Suider-Afrikaanse toneel in die vorm van Russies-Kubaanse imperialisme, gerugsteun deur militêre aggressie. Met die oog hierop is die huidige vredes pogings in verband met die vraagstukke van Suider-Afrika van die allergrootste belang. Die inisiatief kan alleen slaag as al die state in Suider-Afrika hulle onderlinge verskille ignoreer en hulle gewig ingooi by 'n gesamentlike poging om daardie probleme op te los wat die vrede kan bedreig – en wat ons almal se lot ten nouste raak.

Dat so 'n gesamentlike poging nie onmoontlik is nie, is bewys deur die samewerking wat gelei het tot die sogenaamde brugberaad. Dat die Rhodesiërs nie daarin geslaag het om mekaar te vind nie, was nie die skuld van Suid-Afrika of dr. Kaunda en sy kollegas nie. Dis egter nog nie te laat om weer te probeer nie, veral noudat die VSA – die leier van die vrye wêreld – hom beywer vir vrede in Suider-Afrika en ander Westerse moondhede hulle ondersteuning aan die VSA toegesê het. As ons en ander Afrikastate ook bereid is om ons volle gewig in te gooi – en Suid-Afrika is bereid om dit te doen – glo ek dat die vredesoffensief kan slaag, en dat Suider-Afrika in die toekoms ook op die samewerking en ondersteuning van die vrye wêreld in die stryd teen die Kommunistiese gevaar sal kan reken. As dit gebeur, wag daar 'n mooi toekoms op ons en dan kan u die toekoms met vertroue tegemoet gaan.

3. Constantia-Klub, Pretoria, 22 Oktober 1976

Ek en my Departement het nog nooit so 'n bedrywige tyd deur-gemaak as die afgelope jaar of twee nie. Tot met die Brugberaad

in Augustus 1975 was daar vrugbare samewerking tussen Suid-Afrika en die sogenaamde front-linie presidente. Nadat die Beraad misluk het, moes ons alleen voortgaan terwyl dr. Kaunda en sy kollegas hulle al meer vereenselwig het met die militante voorstanders van geweld.

Dit het ook baie onwaarskynlik gelyk dat ons enige hulp en samewerking van die Weste sou kry om die vraagstukke van Suider-Afrika op te los. Al ons beroepe in die verband het blykbaar op dowe ore geval. Dit was inderdaad 'n laagtepunt en die vooruitsigte vir die toekoms was alles behalwe rooskleurig. Gedurende Mei het ek byvoorbeeld in die Senaat 'n dringende pleidooi gelewer:

- Dat die Weste moet besef hoe gevaarlik die posisie in Suider-Afrika is – ook vir die vrye wêreld;
- Dat hulle moet help om vreedsame oplossings te soek – veral vir die Rhodesiese vraagstuk. . . .

Die Weste het wel lank geneem om wakker te skrik, maar dit lyk of dit wel gebeur het want dr. Kissinger het ook met Brittanje en die E E G geskakel en hul openlike ondersteuning verkry vir sy beoogde optrede. Dit het die VSA en Brittanje in staat gestel om sekere voorstelle uit te werk wat kon dien as basis vir 'n oplossing vir die Rhodesiese vraagstuk.

Ek wil beklemtoon dat Suid-Afrika nie vir die voorstelle verantwoordelik was nie. Dit is wel aan ons voorgelê en dit was vir ons moontlik om kommentaar te lewer. Die voorstelle is nie deur Suid-Afrika en die VSA saam opgestel soos in sommige kringe geglo word nie, maar ons is wel gevra om dit aan mnr. Smith oor te dra, wat ons dan ook gedoen het.

.....

Tydens die ontmoetings wat ons met dr. Kissinger gehad het, was Suidwes-Afrika ook een van die onderwerpe van bespreking. U sal besef dat ek nie op hierdie stadium besonderhede van die samesprekings kan openbaar nie. Soos almal van u weet, is verteenwoordigers van al die bevolkingsgroepe van Suidwes-Afrika reeds 'n jaar lank besig om oor hulle toekoms te beraadslaag en is daar reeds betekenisvolle vordering gemaak. As dit nie gebeur het nie sou dit nie moontlik gewees het om weer 'n keer die bedreiging van verpligte sanksies teen Suid-Afrika, deur 'n driedigige veto in die Veiligheidsraad, af te weer nie. Ons moet egter nie hiervan aplei dat die toenemende druk van alle kante op ons – om sonder versuim 'n oplossing te vind – as gevolg hiervan sal afneem nie.

Die vraag ontstaan onmiddellik: hoe lyk dit vorentoe? Ek wil u verseker dat die Regering feitlik alles gedoen het wat binne sy vermoë was om vreedsame oplossings moontlik te maak vir die twee

brandende vraagstukke in Suider-Afrika, naamlik Rhodesië en Suidwes-Afrika. Vraagstukke wat kan lei tot ernstige konfrontasie oor 'n wye front en wat terloops ons strewe om Suid-Afrika se posisie in Afrika en in die wêreld te normaliseer, baie bemoeilik.

Daar is bloedweinig wat ons op hierdie stadium nog kan doen. Ons taak is voorlopig afgehandel. Ons het in ons hoofdoel geslaag, naamlik om dit vir diegene wat direk by die twee vraagstukke betrokke is – d.w.s. die mense van Rhodesië en Suidwes-Afrika, blankes en nie-blankes – moontlik te maak om deur onderhandelinge vreedsame oplossings vir hulle vraagstukke te vind en om self hulle toekoms te bepaal. Alhoewel die twee situasies van mekaar verskil, is daar ook belangrike punte van ooreenkoms. Die situasie in albei gevalle word gesien as die laaste oorblyfsels van kolonialisme in Afrika wat so gou moontlik en teen enige prys uitgewis moet word. Die buitewêreld en die meeste swart leiers in Rhodesië het tot dusver botweg geweier om mnr. Smith se versekerings te aanvaar dat meerderheidsregering inherent is in sy party se beleid. Netso het niemand ons geglo nie toe ons deur die jare verklaar het dat die Regering selfbeskikking vir die volke van Suidwes-Afrika nastreef – dat hulle self oor hulle toekoms moet besluit en dat alle opsies vir hulle oop is.

Maar nou het 'n totaal nuwe situasie ontstaan. Eerstens, as gevolg van die verklaring van die Grondwetkomitee van die Beraad in Suidwes-Afrika op 18 Augustus 1976,² dat almal dit eens is dat 31 Desember 1978 met redelike veiligheid gestel kan word as die datum vir onafhanklikheid van Suidwes-Afrika; en tweedens, deur die verklaring van mnr. Smith op 24 September.³ Hierdie twee verklarings behoort eens en vir altyd alle onsekerheid en agterdog uit die weg te ruim en by niemand enige twyfel te laat dat in albei gevalle die vernaamste struikelblok verwyder is – dat die finale doelwit nie meer in dispuut is nie.

Daar is egter magte in die wêreld wat nie vrede in Suider-Afrika wil hê nie en wat hemel en aarde probeer beweeg om die vredes pogings te verongeluk. 'n Mens kan alleen hoop en vertrou dat die partye in Rhodesië en Suidwes-Afrika nie in hulle hande sal speel nie deur die gulde geleentheid – miskien die laaste geleentheid wat aan hulle gebied word – nie ten volle te benut nie. Hoe vinniger daar met Rhodesië en Suidwes-Afrika op die ingeslane weg gevorder word, hoemeer sal hulle kan staatmaak op die ondersteuning en samewerking van die gematigde elemente in die wêreld en hoe makliker sal dit word om die bedreiging van Russies-Kubaanse imperialisme effektief af te weer.

Daar rus dus 'n groot verantwoordelikheid op al die Rhodesiese

² See: *Southern Africa Record*, no. 6, September 1976, p.48

³ *Op. Cit.*, no. 7, December 1976, p.39-44

partye wat hopelik binnekort in Genève sal vergader en die van Suidwes-Afrika wat reeds besig is om in die Turnhalle te beraadslag. As hulle nie aan die hoë verwattinge wat gekoester word voldoen nie, moet niemand verbaas wees as die welwillendheid en morele steun wat hulle besig is om in toenemende mate in gematigde kringe in die buitewêreld en ook in Afrika te verwerf, verflou en selfs plek maak vir teleurstelling en afsydigheid nie. . . .

As die samesprekings in Genève en die Turnhalle misluk, sal die hele situasie ingrypend verander. Die jongste samewerking met Suid-Afrika was omdat die VSA en andere sodoende hulle eie belange wou behartig; dit is 'n poging om die Sowjet-Unie in Suider-Afrika te stuit en nie omdat hulle 'n groot liefde vir ons het of ons binnelandse beleid goedkeur nie. Intendeel: die moondhede wat die veto uitgeoefen het of buite stemming gebly het, het in hulle verklaarings in die Veiligheidsraad uit hulle pad gegaan om ons beleid te veroordeel.

Ek herhaal: ons en andere het feitlik reeds alles gedoen wat ons kon. Die Rhodesiërs en die Suidwesters moet nou self die mas opkom. Slaag hulle nie, kan die gevolge nie net rampspoedig wees vir hulleself nie maar kan dit wyer uitkring en verreikende gevolge hê – selfs buite die grense van Suider-Afrika. Die stelling word dikwels gemaak dat as Rhodesië en Suidwes-Afrika se vraagstukke opgelos word, Suid-Afrika die volgende aan die beurt sal kom; dat ons dan onder groot druk geplaas sal word en verplig sal word om ons verhoudingsbeleid prys te gee.

Dit sou onrealisties wees om te verwag dat die aanslae teen ons meteens gestaak sal word. Ongelukkig is daar invloedryke magte en instansies in die wêreld wat nie vreedsame naasbestaan tussen blank en nie-blank in die Republiek van Suid-Afrika en in Afrika begeer en sal duld nie. Die voortou word hierin geneem deur die Russiese imperialisme wat strewe na wêreldoorheersing, asook hulle handlangers en medereisigers. Hulle sal eenvoudig nooit tevrede gestel kan word nie. Ten spyte daarvan is ek oortuig dat blank en nie-blank mekaar in die Republiek en in Suider-Afrika sal vind; glo ek dat ons daartoe in staat is om self ons vraagstukke onderling op te los en dat die ideaal waaroor ons so lank gedroom het, in die lig van die jongste gebeure, werklikheid kan word: 'n konstellasië van state in Suider-Afrika wat in vrede met mekaar saamwerk en mekaar aanvul tot heil van elkeen se burgers. Die alternatief is 'n nagmerrie van geweld en verwoesting.

Die volke van Suider-Afrika staan meer as ooit op die brandpunt van hierdie kruispad. Ons vertrou dat die ander volke van Suider-Afrika dieselfde pad sal kies. Die geleentheid daarvoor is geskep – miskien is dit die laaste geleentheid.

STATEMENT ON RHODESIA BY THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY, THE RT. HON. JAMES CALLAGHAN, IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 22 MARCH 1976

The news that negotiations between Mr Nkomo and Mr Smith were broken off on Friday is a matter of deep concern. Yet another attempt to find a solution to Rhodesia's problem by peaceful means has been thrown away because of Mr Smith's refusal to accept the principle of majority rule at an early date.

This effort has failed, like its predecessor that was launched by the four Presidents and Mr Vorster in December 1974, because of Mr Smith's prevarications. His purpose has not been to negotiate a constitutional settlement but to buy time in order to remove the pressures on him.

When Mr Nkomo took his decision to begin fresh discussions with Mr Smith it was made clear that while Her Majesty's Government had no wish to take sides in the internal differences of the African National Council we welcomed his initiative and wished it success. He and his colleagues have shown patience and determination in recent months and I believe when the account of the negotiations is published it will be seen that the demands put forward by Mr Nkomo were both reasonable and moderate. It seemed likely in mid-February that the talks might founder and I then heard from a number of sources, as the House knows, that Mr Smith wished Britain to become involved. I therefore asked Lord Greenhill to visit Salisbury to assess Mr Smith's position in order that I might consider whether there was any real prospect of Britain being able to promote a settlement. Lord Greenhill's report did not give an indication that there was a sufficient change in Mr Smith's attitude to make it useful for Britain to assume a role in those talks then going on.

More recently he sent word to me that he would like the British Government to appoint a commission of wise men to put forward the terms of a settlement. In the absence of any commitment by him to majority rule this seemed to me to be re-treading old ground and I made clear to Mr Smith that I rejected the proposal.

Last week Mr Smith made a fresh proposal to the Honourable Member for Bury St Edmonds which incorporated the original idea of the three wise men but proposed that they should take part in a round table conference to be attended by representatives of the Rhodesian Front, other representatives of the European community, of Mr Nkomo's ANC and selected leaders of the external wing of the ANC. The Honourable Member was good enough to communicate this proposal to my Right Honour-

able Friend the Minister of State as soon as he returned but by then the talks were on the point of breaking down. In my view they were designed to do no more than buy even more time for Mr Smith's regime. He does not seem to realise that he no longer has much time to buy.

During recent months I have been giving a great deal of thought to the ways in which Britain could help to secure an orderly transfer of power in Rhodesia, and during this period I have kept in touch with the African nationalist leaders and also with the four presidents whose advice I greatly value. It is my understanding that the four presidents, despite their belief that the armed struggle may now be inevitable, still sincerely wish to see a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia.

If their hopes and wishes and ours are to be fulfilled there must be a two stage operation. First there must be prior agreement by all the principal parties to a number of pre-conditions. These are as follows. First, acceptance of the principle of majority rule. Second, elections for majority rule to take place in eighteen months to two years. Third, agreement that there will be no independence before majority rule. Fourth, the negotiations must not be long drawn out. There would also need to be assurances that the transition to majority rule and to an independent Rhodesia would not be thwarted, and would be orderly, if these pre-conditions were accepted it would then become possible for the second stage to begin, namely the negotiation of the actual terms of a constitution for independence.

We should also need to ensure that the settlement provided a background in which both communities could live and work together in an independent Rhodesia. Many African leaders have reiterated their strong desire that those Europeans who are prepared to put their faith in Rhodesia should remain in that country and that their presence will help to ensure the country's development. Her Majesty's Government would be willing to consider financial and other means to assist this end.

Given the acceptance of the principle of early majority rule, it is in my view possible to reach a settlement which would go a very long way towards reconciling African aspirations and European fears. Britain would be prepared to play a constructive part in any negotiations in which these pre-conditions have been accepted, and would be willing to sit down with representatives of all shades of Rhodesian opinion inside and out.

An independent Rhodesia will need development assistance and aid for educational and other purposes on a significant scale. Britain would play her part but I hope that members of the Commonwealth, the European Communities and others would also be willing to help.

In a final settlement achieved along these lines all should be ready to agree that guerrilla activity should cease and that an approach should be made to the United Nations with a view to lifting the economic sanctions now in force. I am ready to discuss this approach with all concerned, if it meets with any reaction, but no agreement would be worth anything until the principle of majority rule opens the door to new negotiations.

As things are Mr Smith is leading his country on the path of death and destruction. Even at this late stage I ask the European population of Rhodesia to believe that there is an alternative path. It is still just possible for Mr Smith to follow it. If not, I hope other leaders will emerge who recognise the realities of the hour and that the time is here when the legitimate aspirations of the African people can be met and reconciled with the desires of the European population. Only in this way can there be hope for a peaceful future for Rhodesia.

**EXTRACT ON RHODESIA FROM A SPEECH BY THE BRITISH
PRIME MINISTER, THE RT. HON. JAMES CALLAGHAN, TO
THE LABOUR PARTY CONFERENCE IN BLACKPOOL ON 28
SEPTEMBER 1976**

The announcement on Friday evening by Mr Smith of his acceptance of the principle of majority rule within the two years time scale that I laid down on 22 March last, could be an historic turning point in the future of the sub-continent. For Britain, a solution in Rhodesia on the basis of majority rule is a debt of honour. For Africa, the Rhodesian problem unsolved is a constant threat to peace and stability.

I would like to put on record my thanks to Secretary Kissinger for his characteristic and remarkable contribution to recent developments. Without the decisive intervention of the United States I do not believe there would have been a turnabout in the attitude of Mr Smith.

In the last few days I have been in contact with the four African Presidents who have themselves made a massive contribution to the search for a peaceful settlement. Their response to Mr Smith's broadcast of Friday last has been a tough one. That is not surprising but the prize within our grasp is an interim government with a Black majority and majority rule within two years. That must be preferable to an increasingly violent armed struggle.

The Labour Government wants to see the interim government set up rapidly, say within four to six weeks, and we will play a full and active part in promoting such an end. The meeting to negotiate the interim government need not necessarily be held in Salisbury or elsewhere in Rhodesia. We are prepared to back the convening of negotiations in any other place convenient to the parties concerned.

But the essential ingredient is the rapid establishment of the interim government. Once that has happened there can be no going back for the Smith Regime. The die will be cast. There will be difficulties in the months ahead, but if the forthcoming negotiations can be seen through to a successful conclusion, then Britain will have discharged her last colonial responsibility in Africa with honour. . . .

STATEMENTS ON RHODESIA BY THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY, THE RT. HON. ANTHONY CROSLAND, IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

12 October 1976

On 22 March my Right Honourable Friend, now Prime Minister, told the House that no settlement in Rhodesia was possible until all the parties concerned accepted the principle of majority rule, to be attained within eighteen months to two years; and that only when that principle had been accepted would Her Majesty's Government be prepared to play a constructive part in any negotiations.

During the summer months, a number of ministerial visits to Southern Africa took place, both British and American. These included two by my Honourable Friend the Minister of State, and in particular a prolonged and crucial tour by Dr. Kissinger to whose forceful diplomacy I now pay tribute. The Prime Minister and I saw Dr. Kissinger both before and after his shuttle, and I have been in almost continuous touch with him during the whole of this period.

On 24 September Mr. Smith announced that his regime now accepted the principle of majority rule within two years.¹ This long-awaited development demonstrated at last a realistic understanding of the true situation in Southern Africa, and has presented us with a real opportunity of achieving a rapid and peaceful transfer of power in Rhodesia.

The next step was to organise a meeting between the Smith regime and the African Nationalists to discuss the formation of an interim government. Accordingly I announced on 29 September that I would convene an early Conference for this purpose, and that the Chairman would be Mr. Ivor Richard QC acting as the Government's special representative. Last Friday, as the House will be aware, I announced my intention that the Conference would assemble in Geneva on 21 October with a view to a formal opening on 25 October.

I have decided to invite to this Conference, on behalf of the Nationalist interests, Mr. Robert Mugabe, Bishop (Abel) Muzorewa and Mr. Joshua Nkomo. I am asking them to nominate additional delegates. I have invited Mr. Smith to nominate representatives of the Rhodesia Front. These invitations were despatched this morning.

There have been many statements by many people in the last few days about the forthcoming Conference. I hope the House will not press me to comment on these statements, nor on the

¹ See *Southern Africa Record* no. 7, 1976. p39-44

negotiating positions of the parties to the Conference. It would not be helpful to become embroiled, before the Conference has opened, in a public discussion of issues which can only be decided at the Conference itself.

I am of course most anxious to do everything within my power to ensure a successful outcome to the Conference. I have had most useful exchanges of views in New York and in London with a number of African foreign ministers in the last few days; and I have sent my special adviser on African affairs, Mr. Dennis Grennan, to Lusaka, to assist the process of liaison during the run-up to the Conference. The prize within our grasp is a free, prosperous and multi-racial Zimbabwe. Her Majesty's Government are determined to do all in their power to bring a peace to Zimbabwe which is firmly rooted in majority rule and thus in equality and social justice.

20 October 1976 (Rhodesian Sanctions Debate)

I beg to move that the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (Continuation) Order 1976, a Draft of which was laid before this House on 14 October, be approved.

The Order extends for a further twelve months Section II of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965. This is the eleventh time that successive Governments have asked the House to renew Section II. I profoundly hope that it will be the last time the Government have to ask Honourable Members to maintain sanctions against an illegal regime in Rhodesia. For eleven years the House has been almost unanimous in maintaining an uncompromising attitude towards the Rhodesian regime. Both Labour and Conservative Governments have consistently refused to consider a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia until basic human rights and conditions of democracy were first established.

After the many disappointments and frustrations which successive Governments experienced in dealing with Mr. Smith since 1965, this Government thought it right to lay down specific pre-conditions for a negotiated settlement and the terms on which the British Government would be prepared to take part in any negotiations.

My Right Honourable Friend the Prime Minister set out these pre-conditions on 22 March. He said:

“... There must be prior agreement by all the principal parties to a number of pre-conditions. These are as follows: first, acceptance of the principle of majority rule; secondly, elections for majority rule to take place in eighteen months to two years; thirdly, agreement that there will be no independence before majority rule; fourthly, the negotiations must not be long drawn out. There would also need to be assurance that the transition

to majority rule and to an independent Rhodesia would not be thwarted and would be orderly.”

All parties in the House – I think it is right to say – warmly endorsed these principles; so did the frontline African Presidents, and they are still today the cornerstone of British policy.

On 24 September, as the House well knows, Mr. Smith announced that the illegal regime accepted the principle of majority rule within two years. This announcement, reflecting at long last a realistic understanding of Rhodesia’s position in Southern Africa, opened the way for a negotiated settlement within the framework of these pre-conditions and, therefore, fulfilled the conditions which Her Majesty’s Government has laid down for participating in any negotiations.

Since the Statement of 22 March it has not, therefore, been the position of the British Government that has changed but that of the illegal regime in Rhodesia. As Mr. Smith himself made very plain in his broadcast, no one has miraculously converted him to liberal views, but the acceptance of the principle of early majority rule was forced on him by a steady shift in the balance of power in Southern Africa. This reflects the collapse of Portuguese power in Angola and Mozambique; the growing pressure of the Nationalist forces inside Rhodesia; and the slow but steady weakening of the Rhodesian economy brought about by sanctions.

Finally, Dr. Kissinger’s intervention was decisive in persuading Mr. Smith to accept the principle of early majority rule. The writing was already on the wall for the rest of the world to read, but it needed American intervention to compel Mr. Smith and his colleagues to read it. Dr. Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy was based firmly on the principles laid down by the Prime Minister on 22 March; and the visits to Southern Africa of my Honourable Friend the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs provided indispensable support for his efforts.

After Mr. Smith’s broadcast, it was vital to mobilise as quickly as possible on the momentum created by this breakthrough. The African Presidents shared this sense of urgency. I accordingly decided, as the House knows, to convene a Conference in Geneva under the Chairmanship of Mr. Ivor Richard to discuss the formation of an interim administration. I invited Mr. Nkomo, Mr. Mugabe and Bishop Muzorewa, accompanied by their respective delegations, to attend on behalf of the Nationalists, and sent a similar invitation to Mr. Smith.

Since my Statement last week there have been two further developments affecting the organisation of the Conference. First, I have decided, after consultation with those concerned, to invite the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole to attend with a delegation.

Secondly, I decided to delay the opening of the Conference until 28 October, although it is still my intention that delegates should assemble in Geneva from tomorrow onwards, and some of them are of course assembling now. The delay will give some of the delegates more time to make adequate preparations for the Conference and will also usefully extend the period for preliminary talks between Mr. Richard and the delegations.

We have heard in recent days a great deal from both sides about further pre-conditions. Nevertheless, the Rhodesian Nationalists and Mr Smith have agreed to sit round a table in Geneva and to talk on the basis of a transfer of power to the majority within a period not exceeding two years.

In the Government's view this development, which when the House last debated Section II would have seemed to belong to the realms of fantasy, fulfils the only pre-conditions that can properly apply: namely, those laid down in the Statement of 22 March. I am sure that the House will agree that this is the main—the historic—achievement of the last few weeks, in comparison with which everything else pales into insignificance. It is in this perspective that we should view some of the other issues that have been recently raised.

This leads me to the status of the proposals put to Mr. Smith and announced by him on 24 September. This was the subject of heated exchanges in the House last Tuesday during which I was, in effect, accused of duplicity. Mr. Smith has apparently stated that any agreement on an interim Government must correspond to the five points set out in his broadcast of 24 September, but both Dr. Kissinger and I had already gone on the record before Mr. Smith's broadcast as saying that the details of the interim arrangements were bound to be a matter for negotiation.

As to whether this difference of interpretation was or was not due to a misunderstanding I do not propose to speculate. In the course of five separate Anglo-American Ministerial visits to six or seven separate countries in Southern Africa many people have given different accounts about what was said by whom to whom. I prefer to treat all these accounts as being given in good faith. I am not disposed to challenge in public all the current interpretations being given to these discussions, especially as for quite understandable reasons the parties directly concerned are taking up negotiating positions.

I make only one comment on this. When he made his broadcast, an assessment of the situation could not have left Mr. Smith in the slightest doubt that the five points could in no sense be pledges or promises or guarantees on the part of the British Government, for the simple reason that the British Government had no power, even if they had the wish, to impose such terms on the

African Nationalists or the frontline Presidents. Indeed, Mr. Smith understands that probably better than anyone in the world.

We have consistently held that the five points are a reasonable basis for discussion and it was on this understanding that my Honourable Friend the Minister of State held talks with Mr. Smith on his recent visit to Rhodesia. Beyond this, I am not prepared to go. As is normal in these matters, I cannot, without prejudicing the success of the whole endeavour, reveal the details of what were confidential diplomatic exchanges, and still less speak on behalf of the American Secretary of State.

14 December 1976

The early weeks of the Geneva Conference were spent in discussing the date by which Rhodesia would achieve independence as the new sovereign state of Zimbabwe. This discussion, while it absorbed a great deal of time, was helpful in demonstrating conclusively to all the participants that the object of the Conference really is to launch Rhodesia on the road to independence under majority rule.

For the past fortnight, the discussions have focused on the central issue – the structure and functions of the transitional government. While no agreement has been reached, good progress has been made in identifying and clarifying the views of the different parties, and the points that must be settled before a transitional Government can be established. After consulting Mr. Ivor Richard last week, I have concluded that the stage has now been reached where Britain should attempt to give a fresh impetus to the search for a solution. But it is clear to me that this process is more likely to be successful if it is not initiated during the normal meetings of the Conference. We now need a further period of intensive consultations, in Southern Africa, to enable us to lay the foundations for an agreement on this fundamental question. I have therefore authorised the Chairman to adjourn the Conference to permit such consultations to take place.

The Conference will go into recess today and will resume in Geneva on 17 January. I have asked Mr. Richard, as the Government's Special Representative, to leave for Africa immediately after Christmas in order to consult with all the parties concerned. He will develop our positive ideas for a settlement, which would include in particular the direct role which Britain would be ready to play in the transitional period. If, at the end of his consultations, it proves necessary or desirable, I would myself go either to Africa or to the resumed Conference at Geneva.

The House will understand that I must refrain from setting out our ideas in detail today. I would say only that our intention will be to meet the concern of the Nationalists that the process

of transition to independence should be rapid and guaranteed, and the anxieties of the Europeans that it should be orderly.

It is the general feeling amongst the delegates at Geneva that an adjournment of some weeks would now be the best way of carrying forward our work to a successful conclusion. I may add that Dr. Kissinger, whom I consulted over the weekend, also strongly supports the proposed procedure. For all the angry statements which are made from time to time, we have, in my view, a good chance of achieving a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia.

ADDRESS TO THE NATION BY THE RHODESIAN PRIME MINISTER, THE HON. IAN D. SMITH, ON 24 JANUARY 1977

I would like to talk to you this evening about the crucial question of our constitutional future. To give you the background, I must remind you that following my meeting with Dr. Kissinger in Pretoria last September, my Government accepted the proposals for a settlement which he had put to me. I stress again this evening, as I stressed then, that they were not our proposals. They were based on a paper which had been prepared by the *British* Government and discussed with the American and South African Governments before we knew anything about them. I was assured that the British Government was fully in the picture. Before I announced our acceptance in my broadcast of 24th September,¹ I was informed by Dr. Kissinger that they had been agreed by Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda on behalf of their colleagues and of the Rhodesian nationalist leaders. In the light of his discussions with them, and to avoid any possible misunderstandings, Dr. Kissinger gave me the exact wording which I should use in detailing the agreement in my broadcast.

Because memories are short and to enable you to understand fully the present situation, I now repeat the five points of the Anglo-American agreement as I read them out on 24th September:

- 1 Rhodesia agrees to majority rule within two years.
- 2 Representatives of the Rhodesian Government will meet immediately at a mutually agreed place with African leaders to organize an interim government to function until majority rule is implemented.
- 3 The interim government should consist of a Council of State, half of whose members will be black and half white with a white chairman without a special vote. The European and African sides would nominate their representatives. Its function will include—
legislation
general supervisory responsibilities; and
supervision of the process of drafting the constitution.

The interim government should also have a Council of Ministers with a majority of Africans and an African First Minister. For the period of the interim government the Ministers of Defence and of Law and Order would be white. Decisions of the Council of Ministers to be taken by two-thirds majority. Its function should include—
delegated legislative authority; and
executive responsibility.

¹ See *Southern Africa Record* no. 7, December 1976, p.39-44

- 4 The United Kingdom will enact enabling legislation for this process to majority rule. Upon enactment of that legislation, Rhodesia will also enact such legislation as may be necessary to the process.
- 5 Upon the establishment of the interim government sanctions will be lifted and all acts of war, including guerilla warfare, will cease.

It has been suggested in some quarters that Dr. Kissinger played a confidence trick on me and deliberately misled me into believing the black presidents had accepted the five points in order to persuade me to go ahead with my broadcast. I do not believe there is any truth in this malicious story. From the signals I received, both directly and indirectly, from Dr. Kissinger before and after my broadcast, I am quite satisfied that he had obtained broad agreement on the proposed structure of the interim government from both Nyerere and Kaunda. This included in particular the Council of State with parity between black and white members and with one of the latter acting as chairman.

My speech of 24 September was warmly commended by both the British and American Governments and there was *no* suggestion from any quarter that I had misrepresented the Anglo-American proposals in *any* way.

However, it was not long before the attitude of the black presidents led me to doubt whether they would honour the agreement. Dr. Kissinger had warned me that the Russians would do their best to wreck it as they did not want a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia. How right he was. The Communist influence was clearly to be seen at that time and it has persisted behind the scenes ever since, both through the black presidents and directly with Mugabe and Nkomo.

It was at this stage that the British Government came openly into the picture and offered to convene the conference. Being anxious to get on and put the agreement into effect, I accepted on the clearly stated understanding that the purpose of the conference would be to implement the third of the five Anglo-American proposals, namely the setting-up of the two-tier interim government. I had accepted this proposed structure because it represented a true sharing of power and contained, in the words of its British originators, checks and balances which would ensure an orderly transitional period. Above all, the agreement provided that the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, and of the security of the state, which I have always said was the prime responsibility and concern of my Government, would remain under white ministers during the interim period. This was a cardinal feature of my discussions with Dr. Kissinger, who repeatedly

stressed the importance of maintaining stability and retaining the confidence of the Whites during this period.

In the discussions prior to the convening of the conference I urged that attendance should be confined to white and black Rhodesians without any outside observers or representatives of foreign countries. I was *assured* that this *would* be the case but when I arrived in Geneva I found that there were to be observers, not only from the so-called front line states, but from other states further north and from the OAU., which is not a body noted for its dedication to a peaceful solution in Rhodesia. In those circumstances, how could any African delegate at Geneva dare to be less extreme than his fellows?

The Patriotic Front, that seemingly strange alliance between Nkomo and Mugabe, came into being at the *direction* of the black presidents, who have *controlled* its tactics ever since. You will recall that at the insistence of the Patriotic Front, most of the time at Geneva was devoted to arguments between the Patriotic Front and the chairman about a fixed date for independence. It is no secret that this was done on the orders of the presidents. Taking Mozambique as a precedent, the black delegates were advised that once that date was immutably fixed, they could cause as much delay as they liked because on that day the country would be taken over willy-nilly, whether or not the proper constitutional and electoral processes had been completed.

More recently still the black presidents have declared their exclusive support for the Patriotic Front with its terrorist connotations. This action has been widely and adversely commented upon, but it appears to have had no effect on the extent to which the British Government has become beholden to these black presidents in relation to the Rhodesian issue.

I shall return to this point later, but having given you the background I wish to refer now to the new proposals which Mr Ivor Richard brought to Salisbury. They are as different as chalk and cheese from the original British proposals that formed the basis of the Anglo-American agreement which I accepted last September. The original proposals, in keeping with the concept of a transitional Government, involved true power sharing and ensured an orderly progression to majority rule. The new proposals are radically different. In deference to the demands of the Patriotic Front, they entail immediate black rule, which would be imposed from outside and would in no way represent the views of the majority of black Rhodesians. It would come into being, not in two years time or when the agreed constitutional and electoral processes have been completed, but immediately. It would in no sense be an elected government. In fact, the only element that would be there by right of victory at the ballot box would be the representatives

of my Government and they would number a mere one-sixth of the Cabinet. This is a further extension of the trend which developed at Geneva. Although the Government delegation, in the words used by the Chairman last night, formed half the conference, we were in all respects regarded as merely one of the five delegations.

The African nationalist leader who, it seems to be generally agreed, commands the greatest measure of support among Africans within Rhodesia, would likewise have only one-sixth of the seats in this Council of Ministers. If the total number of ministers were to be thirty, ten would be white, including five from the present Government, and five nominated by the British. Despite the fact that my Government has won every seat in the last three general elections, I would not have any representatives among these five nominated white ministers. The twenty black ministers would comprise five from each of the groups who were invited to the Geneva Conference. Two of these leaders have no following of any consequence within Rhodesia. They were at Geneva merely because they had been nominated by the black presidents and, I need hardly add, against our advice. My own requests for moderate black opinion to be represented at Geneva were rejected, hence it will be unrepresented in the interim government.

This Council of Ministers, with its two-thirds black majority, would have full executive and legislative authority in most fields. The restraining influence of the Council of State, which was a cardinal feature of the original proposals, would disappear. Instead, there would be a Commissioner, nominated and appointed by the British Government, who would have a limited power of veto. Except in certain specified fields, he would not vote in the Council of Ministers. In these fields, if all ten white ministers voted against a measure and the Commissioner abstained or voted with them, the measure would be blocked. If he, or for that matter, any one of the white ministers, voted with the black majority, the measure would be carried. In all other matters the Commissioner would act on the advice of the Council of Ministers who, with its built-in two-thirds black majority, would have complete control. This is a far cry from the protection that would have been afforded by the Council of State during the transitional period.

In the vital area of defence and law and order the new proposals are quite unacceptable. They envisage a Security Council comprising the four leaders of the black delegations at Geneva, the three commanders, and myself, with the Commissioner in the Chair with a casting vote. The Commissioner would be empowered to dismiss the commanders and senior officers and replace with his own nominees. The National Security Council would be responsible for reorganizing the Army and the British South Afr-

ica Police. I shall not enlarge on the implications of this arrangement, except to say that it bears no resemblance to the proposals I accepted in Pretoria which provided the kind of reassurances I mentioned earlier, including the retention of these portfolios in white hands.

This reluctant British Commissioner would be in an unenviable position, for as I have remarked, outside the security field, he would have no real power and very little authority. I say "reluctant" advisedly, because the British Government have made it clear that they do not wish to get involved. Indeed, they say that if the parties to the agreement do not continue to abide by it, they would withdraw him. As one of the vital elements of the agreement will be the undertaking that terrorism will cease, the implications of this proviso are clear. Yet I am being asked to surrender my responsibilities, and the sovereignty of our country, and repose them in this reluctant Commissioner, whose own Government would in no circumstances intervene physically to support him if the security of the interim state were imperilled. To put it in a nutshell: the British Government wish to impose upon us an interim government recommended to them by the front line presidents working in collusion with the terrorist-orientated Patriotic Front. If it misfires, and consequently things become ugly in Rhodesia, the British representative would retreat to Britain and leave the rest of us to sort things out to the best of our ability!

From what I have told you of these new proposals, it will not come as a surprise when I say that, after full consideration of all the implications, I have thanked Mr. Richard for his offer, but informed him that on the evidence before us it will be in the best interests of Rhodesia to adhere to the original Anglo-American agreement of September last year. In doing so I have not broken off negotiations. On the contrary, I have urged that we continue to negotiate on the basis of the original agreement to which the British, American and Rhodesian Governments were all party. I have assured him that within that basic framework I am prepared to negotiate with flexibility.

I recall that in Pretoria Dr. Kissinger told me he had been warned against making an agreement with me as I would renege on it. It is ironic that the British, having acclaimed the agreement when I announced it, are the ones who are now attempting to break it. Dr. Kissinger told me I must accept it in its entirety or reject it. I did accept it in its entirety and I abide by it today. He also said that if the Africans reject it, they would be shown up. I make no comment on that.

I have also urged the British Government to change their approach – which has clearly been a failure – and to deal with the Africans in Rhodesia rather than the terrorists and their hosts

and sponsors in neighbouring countries. Why should a few thousand terrorists, the majority of them mere schoolboys, call the tune to six million basically peaceful and peace-loving Africans? Mr. Richard has told me that a settlement will only be viable if it is acceptable to the front line presidents. Why should these black presidents be accorded a power to veto over a settlement in Rhodesia? What has happened to the much vaunted British "fifth principle" regarding acceptability to the people of Rhodesia as a whole?

For years past, the front line presidents have been calling for majority rule in Rhodesia, urging that the Rhodesians themselves must make the decision within Rhodesia. Yet last weekend they, the front line presidents, took it upon themselves to choose the new Rhodesian leader, and their choice was someone who does not represent majority rule in Rhodesia. In other words, instead of encouraging Rhodesians to get on themselves and produce the genuine article, the front line presidents are now attempting to foist a bogus solution on Rhodesia. What right have they to decide Rhodesia's future? There is overwhelming evidence available today to show that their solution is not acceptable to the majority of black Rhodesians. Clearly, this external interference is Machiavellian. Not only would it result in a false majority government, it would produce a Rhodesian Government which would depend on, and therefore be beholden to, some external power. At the moment, and on the surface at any rate, that power is the front line presidents. But in the long term, and under the surface, we know that the real power is Russia.

We have been more than patient with all these outside forces interfering in our internal affairs. The time has come for us to set about doing what black and white Rhodesians have been requesting for some time now – instead of looking over our shoulders for outside assistance, let Rhodesians come together and dedicate themselves to finding a peaceful solution to our problem.

The agreement which I made with Dr. Kissinger in Pretoria in September last, was the most dramatic decision ever made affecting Rhodesia – the acceptance of majority rule within two years. Our most ardent critics were taken aback, and were full of praise for this magnanimous gesture on the part of Rhodesians. Not only was it applauded and welcomed by the President of the United States and by the British Prime Minister, it also met the desires and aspirations of Rhodesian blacks. I am still of the opinion that the Anglo-American agreement is our best way forward. The rejection of this agreement by the black delegations at Geneva came as a shock to white Rhodesians, who had made such a bold and generous decision to go along with the package deal. The cry of a lack of trust in the Rhodesian Government from the black poli-

ticians rang hollow, and was clearly a Communist inspired gimmick. After the rejection of the agreement by the black delegations in Geneva, it is the white section of the Rhodesian public which could justifiably accuse others of a breach of faith. However, no useful purpose is served by recrimination over the past. Let us look to the future, and try to bring about an agreement and peace in our country. If there is a lack of understanding and trust, the only way to solve this is by bringing people together to discuss the problems.

Many people are calling for greater effort in the field of removing racial discrimination. Let me assure you that my Government goes along with this sentiment. But it is more complicated than it appears on the surface. For example, in some of the discussions which I have had with black political leaders in recent years, they asked me to hold my hand on certain measures to remove discrimination, as they believed it would be advantageous to use these as part of a package deal. However, one of the good things which has resulted from the inclusion of Chiefs in my Cabinet, is that we have had many opportunities of discussing this vexed and complicated problem. They convinced us of the desirability of acting immediately to remove racial discrimination. We have acted in certain fields, and legislation is being prepared to introduce further changes. However, the whole subject is fraught with difficulties and is taking longer than we anticipated. At present we are preparing for changes in keeping with the recommendations of the Quenet Report. Needless to say, it would be a fruitless exercise tackling changes such as those dealing with the franchise and parliament because these will be subjects for consideration by the interim government. To those who advocate sweeping changes removing all discrimination, I would say that the problem is far too complex for such a facile solution. The most obvious example which comes to mind in support of my claim is the Tribal Trust Lands. If we were to remove from these that protection and security which our black Rhodesians enjoy, I doubt whether that would help or solve our problem. Accordingly, I believe that there are a few such cases which require very careful consideration. In spite of this, I repeat what I said a short while ago, namely, that my Government is committed to creating a non-racial society in Rhodesia. I will go further and say that we have made decisions to remove discrimination even beyond the recommendations of the Quenet Commission. However, because of the kind of complication which I have mentioned, concerning Tribal Trust Lands, it is vital for black and white leaders to discuss this whole question and come to the correct solution

To those who still doubt my Government's sincerity in accepting the Anglo-American agreement, I ask them to analyse this conten-

tion. If this Government, or any Rhodesian Government, attempted to renege on such a solemn undertaking, not only their enemies, but their friends as well would turn on them. There could be no surer way of Rhodesia committing suicide. Therefore, I sincerely believe that we can discard any thought along those lines – it simply does not make sense – to put it bluntly, it is unintelligent thinking. We Rhodesians will have to go on living with the decisions we make, and this provides the outside world with the surest guarantee possible. Let me spell it out once and for all, we have accepted and are prepared to implement, the Anglo-American agreement.

I put it to black Rhodesians that they have this choice: they either endorse the decision of the front line presidents, supported by the British Government, that we accept the Patriotic Front as the new leaders of Rhodesia. In other words, to invite into Rhodesia a situation comparable to that in Mozambique or Angola. This is the best that the outside world can offer. The alternative is that Rhodesians come together within their own country, and solve the problem amongst themselves. My office has been inundated with requests from black Rhodesians to adopt this course. It will mean that past bitterness and suspicion must be forgotten. If we are not big enough to accept this, it is a sad reflection in our sincerity of purpose. Those of us who claim to be leaders in Rhodesia, must be prepared to lead, and in particular to give a lead in re-establishing faith and trust amongst ourselves. As the leader of your Government, I have committed myself to this task, and I have issued invitations to the black leaders to join me. Let me make it clear that I exclude from this exercise anyone who supports terrorism.

On the terrorist front, things continue to be tough and we must be realistic and honest enough to admit that it will continue this way until we reach an internal agreement amongst ourselves. However, I am pleased to be able to give you the reassurance that the security commanders have informed me that the morale and fighting spirit of our Security Forces is excellent, and they continue to exact retribution from the terrorists. I know that in some quarters there is a certain amount of defeatist talk. However, this has no place in official thinking, and Government is at this moment implementing measures to increase our fighting effort. There are additional plans in the pipe-line, and speaking in general terms, a new and tougher line is being considered for our security effort. We are making preparations to ensure that we are in a position to counter any increase in terrorism resulting from the front line president's decision.

Let me reiterate and re-emphasize that the Rhodesian nation has no intention of reducing their effort or their determination in

the fight to resist a Communist take-over of their country. After all of our efforts, and the sacrifices which have been made, there can be no question of surrender. If we were to give way now, it would not be to majority rule, it would be to a Marxist indoctrinated minority. There can be absolutely no shadow of doubt that that is exactly what the latest British proposals would bring to Rhodesia. In such a country, not only would there be no place for the white Rhodesian, moderate black Rhodesians would find themselves an enslaved and persecuted people.

In view of certain comments made by Mr. Richard during his visit, it is worth reiterating especially to the outside world, that the conflict in Rhodesia is not between black and white, it is between those who believe in peace and freedom, and those who do not.

In reply to his claim that acceptance of these new proposals would mean a lifting of sanctions, an end of terrorism, and the creation of a Trust Fund, let me point out that these same concessions apply equally to the Kissinger proposals, which as I have already stated, were accepted by the British and American Governments.

At the conclusion of our meeting this morning I stressed to Mr. Richard that as far as we were concerned, the negotiations would continue in order to find a just settlement. I hope that the British Government feels the same way.

In conclusion, I would say this to all Rhodesians: we have reached a crisis in our history which demands our immediate attention. The proposals put to us in Pretoria last year by Dr. Kissinger created a precedent – for the first time ever, the United States Government intervened in the Rhodesian political scene. Their initiative has been set back – not destroyed – by British participation. With our great knowledge of the local situation, your Government is convinced that the Kissinger proposals which led to the Anglo-American agreement present us with the best working base for a settlement. The interest and participation of the United States – the most powerful and influential nation on this earth, and the leader of the Free World – is something worth retaining. For this reason alone, we should consider seriously before departing from the Kissinger proposals. At the same time, as I have stated on previous occasions, we accept that there must be latitude for manoeuvre within the principles of the agreement. Clearly, there is a challenge before Rhodesians which invites us to take the initiative to come to grips with our problems. All great problems, such as the one which now confronts us, require courage and leadership if they are to be solved. Should our leaders fail to rise to the occasion; should they evade the issue which so clearly confronts them, then they will have forfeited the right to lead. A

challenging, optimistic future is clearly something which is within our reach. If we fail to grasp the opportunity, then in all honesty the future looks bleak. The thought of going on year after year, as we are doing now, with this senseless slaughter of one Rhodesian by another Rhodesian, this artificial and destructive constriction on our economy, is a situation which we must not be prepared to tolerate. Accordingly, are we not duty bound to terminate this state of affairs forthwith? If those who claim to lead today fail in this crucial mission, then they should be removed from office, in order to enable others to be given an opportunity. Let us dedicate ourselves to uniting all Rhodesians so that we can go forward together and provide the answer which will confound our critics, and prove to the rest of the world that we are not the kind of people who have to rely on others to solve our problems for us. Indeed, had others resisted meddling in our affairs, we would have solved them long ago. I believe that vital decisions are about to be made in the immediate future. Let us have the faith to believe that, with God's guidance, we will win through.

STATEMENT ON RHODESIA BY THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY, THE RT. HON. ANTHONY CROSLAND, IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 25 JANUARY 1977

As I told the House on 14 December, I authorised Mr Richard to adjourn the Geneva Conference and to undertake intensive consultations in Southern Africa with a view to laying the foundations for an agreement on an interim government. In particular, I asked him to develop with the parties some new and positive ideas, including our ideas on the direct role which Britain would be ready to play in the transitional period.

Following Mr Richard's first round of consultations, we set out what we had in mind in a document, copies of which have been placed in the Library. This document was given to each of the Geneva Delegations, the four African front line presidents and Mr Vorster.

The suggestions in the paper did not constitute a cut and dried British plan. Nor were they presented on a 'take it or leave it' basis. They were intended to provide a serious and detailed basis for negotiations, and were open to amendment and modification in the light of those negotiations.

But in our view these proposals represented a reasonable way forward. They were designed to meet the concern of the Nationalists that the transfer to majority rule should be rapid and irreversible, and of the White Rhodesians that it should be peaceful and orderly. They would have led to the ending of the war and the lifting of economic sanctions. They were supported by the American Government and would have set the stage for an international trust fund to help develop the Rhodesian economy and give financial reassurance to Rhodesian Europeans. They would have provided a basis for a prosperous, independent and non-racial Rhodesia. It was therefore with a deep sense of disappointment that we learnt yesterday that Mr Smith, alone of the parties, had rejected the ideas which we had put to him, even as a basis for further negotiation. Mr Smith claims to have left the door open for further negotiation by expressing his readiness to implement 'five points' put to him by Dr Kissinger in September last year. But it was clear from an early stage of the Geneva Conference that the Nationalist Delegations could not agree to accept these proposals as a basis for negotiation. That was why we put forward our own ideas which we believed offered a reasonable way of bridging the gap between the parties.

Mr Smith has claimed that our proposals would have led to chaos and Marxist rule. But if there is such a risk, it is much more

likely to be created by his rejection of these proposals. He has once more shown his inability to face reality.

We have to accept that this present round of discussions is at an end. We now need – all of us – to take stock and to make a cool appraisal of the new situation. I have instructed Mr Richard to remain in Southern Africa for a few more days to discuss these latest developments with some of the parties. He will then return and report to me with a full assessment of the attitudes and expectations of those concerned.

Yesterday's events represent a serious setback to all our hopes for peace in Rhodesia. We must now give intensive study to any options which may be open to us in this new situation. For our goal remains a peaceful and orderly transfer to majority rule in Rhodesia.

STATEMENT ON RHODESIA BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER, THE HON. B.J. VORSTER, IN THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY ON 28 JANUARY 1977

I have already said that the demand is being made that we should close our borders and that we should participate in boycotts, but that we cannot comply with that demand because it is contrary to the policy of this Government and, I take it, also to the policy of Hon. Members on the other side of the House.

(Question by the Leader of the Opposition, Sir de Villiers Graaf: "By whom has this demand been made?")

Such a demand has been made on us repeatedly in recent times. It is made by speakers in the UNO and it has just been made again in certain Senate circles in the USA. It has been urged, amongst other things, that South Africa should bring pressure to bear on the Smith Government. For very good reasons I do not want to mention any names now, but this demand is in fact being made on South Africa.

It is known – Mr. Ian Smith has said so himself – that his policy is one of majority government. In order to set the record straight, he said on 24 May 1976 what his policy was. This question was put to him: "Do you rule out any negotiations leading to an eventual transfer of power to the Blacks under the principle of majority control?" To this he replied –

"I think our approach to the question of majority rule is clear and consistent. Majority rule remains the ultimate goal of our Constitution. This has been Rhodesia's constant position since 1923, when we received the right to govern ourselves – self-government – under our first Constitution. But it must be responsible majority rule as opposed to irresponsible majority rule. Our aim is the best possible government irrespective of colour, and we believe in the ideal of change being based on orderly evolutionary progress."

Therefore, the question of majority rule is not at issue in Rhodesia. This has been said by its own leader to be the policy of the Rhodesian Government.

Over the years there have been negotiations with various governments in Britain, negotiations which have failed. There have been negotiations with various Black leaders in Rhodesia, negotiations which have also failed, and in April last year the Americans first showed an interest – a close interest – in African affairs, and the Secretary of State of the USA visited certain African States.

Statement made during the debate on the Leader of the Opposition's annual "no-confidence" motion, as reported in Hansard, no. 1, 1977.

During his Press Conference on 6 September 1976 at Zurich¹, the American Secretary of State outlined the position as follows – and this is of basic importance for evaluating the position in future –

“Now, to the talks that have been taking place here in the last two days. The purpose of these talks has not been to develop a joint American-South African programme. The evolution of these talks, and what has brought us to this point, is as follows: On my visit to Africa in April, all African leaders urged a solution to the problems of Southern Africa through quiet discussions with the Prime Minister of South Africa, that for many of these problems, the policies of his Government held the key if a peaceful solution was to be achieved. Based on these views we initiated contact with the Government of South Africa. Prior to my meeting with the Prime Minister in Germany in June, we solicited the views of the Black African Governments as to the subjects to be discussed and as to the conditions under which they believe a peaceful solution to the problems of Southern Africa was achievable. We presented their considerations to the South African Prime Minister in June.”

That was in Bonn. I read further –

“Those discussions led to a certain amount of progress. After those discussions the United States sent two missions to the Black African States. The United Kingdom whose role is crucial in all these actions, who has a historic responsibility for Rhodesia and to whose co-operation and wisdom in this matter I should like to pay tribute, also sent two missions to Africa. On the basis of these two American and two British missions, a new set of considerations was developed which formed the basis for my discussions with the South African Prime Minister over the last two days. Those discussions have been fruitful. I believe that progress towards the objectives which have been jointly developed by the United States, the United Kingdom and the States of Black Africa have been made.”

I want Hon. Members to listen carefully to his statement in this regard and to note that, in fact, it was jointly developed by the United States, the United Kingdom and the States of Black Africa. The statement reads further –

“It is our view that a basis for further negotiations exists though work still remains to be done. In assessing the prospects, you have to keep in mind that we are dealing with a negotiation of extraordinary complexity in terms of the issues involved and in terms of the parties involved. In attempting mediation, there is first of all the United States and the United Kingdom. We have worked together in close harmony and with no significant differences.”

¹ See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 6, September 1976, p.35–41

These words are very, very important in view of what happened later. Before going to Bonn, I had a discussion with the Prime Minister of Rhodesia. Amongst others, the Prime Minister of Rhodesia requested me to do everything in my power to get him an interview with Dr. Kissinger so that he personally could put Rhodesia's case to the Secretary of State of the United States. I put these requests, again when we met in Zürich and, for the purposes of the record, it is interesting to note that in Zürich I received the following telegram from the Prime Minister of Rhodesia –

“Godspeed and best wishes in your forthcoming talks in Zürich. I am conscious of the heavy responsibilities you bear at a time when severe pressures are being exerted on the Whites of Southern Africa. I hope that you will be able to convince Dr. Kissinger that in regard to the Rhodesian situation, early and direct participation by my Government in his discussions is essential if a peaceful solution is to be found.”

In spite of that there are people who say that it was the South African Prime Minister who dragged Mr. Smith in to see Dr. Kissinger, who forced Mr. Smith into these talks.

And then it so happened that Dr. Kissinger came to Pretoria and granted Mr. Smith's request again on my intervention. He granted his request to see him and they had a discussion which lasted a whole morning. Later that afternoon a document was given to Mr. Smith and it was understood, as between the parties, that Mr. Smith would go back and put the various principles first of all to his Cabinet and secondly to his Caucus, and that if his Cabinet and his Caucus agreed with him, he would make a certain pronouncement on Friday, 24 September. But when the document was handed to him in Pretoria, there were three things which had not been cleared up at that stage, when he left that Sunday. Firstly, there was the question of a White Chairman, secondly, there was the question of White Ministers of Defence and Law and Order, and thirdly there was the question of a two-thirds majority in the Ministerial Council. Those things were not cleared up; they were still hanging in the air when he left. Subsequently a message was sent to Mr. Smith, through South Africa, that he could include these matters in his speech as a basis for settlement discussions.

(Question by the Leader of the Progressive Reform Party, Mr. C.W. Eglin: At what stage was that message given to Mr. Smith?)

That message was given before Mr. Smith spoke on that Friday. The five points, as they then stood after this message was received, were the following—

- 1 Rhodesia agrees to majority rule within two years.
- 2 Representatives of the Rhodesian authorities will meet immediately at a mutually-agreed place with African leaders to organise an interim Government to function until majority rule is implemented.
- 3 The interim Government should consist of a Council of State, half of whose members should be African and half should be European, with a European Chairman without a special vote.

This was put in not in Pretoria, but subsequently, before that Friday.

The European and African sides should nominate their representatives. Its functions should include (1) legislation; (2) general supervisory responsibilities; and (3) supervision of the process of drafting the Constitution.

The interim Government should also have a Council of Ministers with a majority of Africans and an African First Minister, decisions of the Council of Ministers to be taken by a two-thirds majority.

That was put in later.

For the period of the interim Government the Defence and Law and Order Ministers would be European. Its functions should include delegated legislative authority and executive responsibility.

- 4 The United Kingdom will enact enabling legislation for this process to majority rule. Upon enactment of that legislation, Rhodesia will also enact such legislation as may be necessary to the process.
- 5 Upon the establishment of the interim Government, sanctions will be lifted and all acts of war, including guerrilla warfare, will cease.

That was the understanding arrived at, and you will recall that Mr. Smith made his speech on that Friday. It was widely reported and widely distributed and brought to the attention of all Governments. Apart from that, on 28 September, four days after Mr. Smith spoke in Salisbury, Dr. Kissinger held a Press Conference which was televised. He was asked this question on television by a Mr. Brokaw:

"Mr. Secretary, you worked out the details of a two-year transition to Black majority rule in Rhodesia."

Mr. Smith stated the conditions in a speech to Rhodesians last Friday. Now the Black Presidents who have been participating in these negotiations are very critical of at least an element of those conditions. What has happened?"

Secretary Kissinger: The basic proposals that were put forward were for majority rule in two years, a transitional Government to be established immediately, a constitutional conference to work out the constitution at the end of two years, and those points have been accepted.

Then follows this very remarkable statement—

“Secondly it is not correct to say that Smith made these proposals. The proposals that Smith put forward were the result of discussions between the United States, Great Britain and the African Presidents prior to my meeting with Smith.”

If words have any meaning, it is not necessary for me to elaborate on what this means. Today an attempt is being made – and this is why I am discussing the matter – to discredit Dr. Kissinger in this regard. I am obliged to inform this House that Dr. Kissinger received me very correctly and very courteously at all times. We discussed all matters honestly and candidly and I want to make it very clear that if Dr. Kissinger says he had the co-operation of certain States, I have no reasons whatsoever to doubt his word. I am saying this because I consider him to be an honourable person, and in the negotiations which I had with him he acted extremely honourably in all respects. If it should subsequently appear that accusations are being made against him as far as these matters are concerned, I want to state now that I reject those accusations.

I did not receive any instructions from Rhodesia to debate or argue their case here, but if stones are being thrown, those people who are doing so should first look to their own glass houses in this regard. Rhodesia is a democracy as far as the Whites are concerned. Mr. Smith cannot adopt this standpoint today and another standpoint tomorrow, because he has a Cabinet, a Caucus and a Party to whom he is answerable. Nkomo, Mugabe and people like them can chop and change as much as they like, for they are not responsible to anyone. I find it a great pity that this position is not appreciated. That is why I was compelled to say in a calm, collected and very diplomatic manner that Mr. Smith should not be condemned out of hand. If one wishes to condemn him, one has to take these facts into consideration. Then one must first investigate the matter to find out what the immediate causes were and why certain agreements had been reached.

I want to make it very clear that I spent many hours, days and even months of my time in the past in an effort to be of assistance in

the search for peace in Southern Africa. I want to say with assurance to this House and to the outside world that South Africa will continue to be of assistance in seeking peace, and that South Africa will give its assistance as frequently as may be necessary to try to achieve peace in Southern Africa. I shall go as far out of my way as I am able, and I shall not consider my own comfort for a single moment, but I am not prepared to do anything dishonourable. Hon. Members do not expect this of me either, and I am very grateful to know that I have the support of Hon. Members on the opposite side of this House in this regard. I am not prepared to exert pressure and I am saying this now in advance to Hon. Members that an increasing degree of pressure is being exerted on South Africa to exert pressure on others. I prefer to bear the consequences rather than give way under the pressure, for it is wrong in principle to make use of that kind of power to force another person to something against his will. Above all it is wrong in view of the facts which I have given to Hon. Members in this House today.

**STATEMENT ON RHODESIA BY THE US SECRETARY
OF STATE, CYRUS VANCE, IN WASHINGTON
ON 31 JANUARY 1977**

We very much regret that efforts to reach a satisfactory negotiated settlement to the Rhodesian problem have, for the moment at least, been dealt a serious blow. The position announced by Ian Smith has resulted in a new and more dangerous situation regarding the prospects for peace in Southern Rhodesia.

We remain dedicated to a peaceful resolution of the Rhodesian issue leading to majority rule. We are conferring with the British Government, and are continuing to consult with the African leaders most directly concerned with this problem, as well as the South African Government. The British proposal remains, in our view, a valid basis for negotiations.

The Rhodesian authorities should understand clearly that under no circumstances can they count on any form of American assistance in their effort to prevent majority rule in Rhodesia or to enter into negotiations which exclude leaders of the nationalist movements. The so-called "internal solution" will not produce a peaceful settlement and therefore will not have the support of the United States. To re-emphasize our opposition to the maintenance of the illegal minority-imposed control of government in Rhodesia, this Administration will vigorously support the repeal of the Byrd Amendment. We do this in conformity with our international obligations and also because we believe it represents a step toward a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia.

We call on all parties to act with flexibility and restraint and give support to a negotiated solution that can bring both peace and majority rule to Rhodesia.

**STATEMENT CONCERNING NAMIBIA BY THE US
AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS, WILLIAM W.
SCRANTON, DURING THE 31ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, ON 2 DECEMBER 1976**

This year has been crucial for Southern Africa. It has also been an important year in the relations of my country with that region of the world. As members of this Assembly know, at Lusaka in April¹, Secretary of State Kissinger launched a major diplomatic initiative to encourage positive change in Southern Africa. He offered to assist the nations of the region in negotiating solutions to the dangerous problems of Southern Rhodesia and Namibia. As a result of intensive consultations among the front-line states of Southern Africa, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States, consideration of the Rhodesian problem has now shifted to the conference table in Geneva. While very difficult problems, very serious problems, remain to be resolved, the important fact is that independence and majority rule in Rhodesia are closer today as a result of British and American efforts than many would have expected at the beginning of the year.

This year has also witnessed extensive consultations to bring the Namibian problem to the conference table. The United States has made a concerted and vigorous effort to persuade the interested parties to resolve the problem of Namibia by negotiations and not bloodshed. Although formal talks have not yet begun, progress has been made and diplomatic consultations continue. The United States is dedicated to ending the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa and to bringing about majority rule and independence for Namibia as a single unitary state. Secretary Kissinger outlined the main elements of a negotiated solution to the Namibian problem in his speech to the General Assembly on September 30. The United States favors the following elements:

- Independence for Namibia within a fixed short time limit;
- The calling of a constitutional conference at a neutral location under the United Nations aegis, and
- Participation in the conference of all authentic national forces including specifically SWAPO.

In a meeting the day before his speech, the Secretary underlined to Mr. Sam Nujoma, the President of SWAPO, the importance which the United States attaches to the participation of SWAPO.

Progress toward all these objectives has been made in negotiations with the Government of South Africa. But we must also be realistic. There are other genuine Namibian interests and voices which must be heard on the future of the territory. The United

¹ See *Southern Africa Record* no. 5, 1976, p.1-10

States believes that the place to resolve the differences between the parties to the Namibian problem is the conference table. We will exert every effort to bring the parties to undertake a process of negotiations. At the same time, candor requires me to state that there are governments and individuals who appear determined to raise barriers to a peaceful settlement and to create an atmosphere in which it will become increasingly difficult for the United States to assist the parties. Demagoguery has been employed and unfounded allegations have been propagated, clearly intended to diminish the chances of bringing about the negotiated settlement which this organization has been seeking. There are also, unfortunately, those who, while proposing no constructive solutions of their own, seek through their words and actions to impede the efforts of others.

There have recently been absurd stories in the world press about alleged United States policy on Namibia. Accusatory fabrications have been issued – that the United States plans to create an army in Namibia – that the United States has already chosen a candidate to lead an independent Namibia. These attacks can only be to discredit efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement. However we will not be deterred in our search for a peaceful and realistic path to genuine freedom and independence for Namibia. But we do wish to point out that constant calumnies can only impede progress toward a solution.

There are several other aspects of my Government's policy toward Namibia which I would like to bring to your attention:

In addition to the major diplomatic effort which the United States has made during the past year, my Government has also been active in providing educational assistance to young Namibians. In the past year the United States has provided \$300,000 for training of Namibian students to help prepare them to assume the obligations of building and administering an independent Namibia. The United States has contributed \$250,000 to the United Nations Institute for Namibia in Lusaka and \$50,000 to the United Nations Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa, specially earmarked for Namibians. These contributions also reflect the importance the United States places in the United Nations as the legitimate authority for Namibia.

The United States also remains seriously concerned over the application of South African legislation in the territory. We have protested to the South African authorities the enforcement of the Terrorism Act in Namibia. In May we protested against a particular application of the Act against four Namibians, two of whom were sentenced to death.

In conclusion, I would like to reaffirm the commitment of the United States to achieving self-determination and independence

in Namibia in accordance with Security Council Resolution 385. Our support for these principles remains as strong today as any time in past years. The United States has worked hard to advance the process leading to Namibian independence; actions to impede our efforts do not help this process. The United States strongly urges all the parties concerned with Namibia to resolve their differences and work out at the conference table the transition to a free and independent nation. As Secretary Kissinger said on September 30, the United States "pledges our continued solicitude for the independence of Namibia so that it may, in the end, be a proud achievement of the United Nations and a symbol of international cooperation.

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