

**SOUTH AFRICAN
AFRICA RECORD**

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THE S.A. INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

**RESEARCH
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NUMBER 9

**DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHED
THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

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SOUTHERN AFRICA RECORD

NUMBER NINE

JULY/JULIE 1977

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**EXTRACTS FROM THE 1977 NEW YEAR MESSAGE
OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER,
THE HON. B. J. VORSTER**

What has this year 1977 in store for us and what will it bring? These questions I think have been asked more persistently at the end of 1976 all over the world than at the same time in previous years . . .

We now actually live in three worlds – a weak-willed highly technocratic free world in which freedom borders on licence; a Marxist world in which the same technocratic skills are used to keep people in bondage and subjugation; and a third world which deep down blames the free world for its lack of development, and tries to imitate the Marxist world with a show of force in world councils where its representatives are in the majority, and by maintaining one party states at home.

To the free world South Africa is on occasions an embarrassment and even a source of anger because no one likes to be forced to act contrary to what he knows is right and no one really takes pride in applying double standards under duress. To the Marxist world South Africa is a stumbling block in its aim to dominate the whole of the southern tip of Africa, and must therefore ultimately be liquidated. To the third world South Africa is still a convenient whipping boy serving at all times as a catalyst to promote its vital unity.

In addition, however, lately certain members of the third world, such as Lesotho, have found that South Africa could be used as a convenient excuse for requesting aid from foreign countries through the United Nations, as an alternative to begging for handouts and soft loans from individual states. The recent debate in the Security Council on the alleged closure of certain border posts between Lesotho and the Republic of Transkei¹ makes very interesting reading. Not only were the posts not closed but even if they were closed it could not have affected Lesotho's economy as alleged. This debate has proved conclusively that as far as South Africa is concerned you can pass off lies as facts without any fear that they will be investigated or that the allegations will be queried, even by the Western countries who should know, and who indeed do know the facts. When reading this it is difficult to avoid becoming entirely cynical.

The debate in question, as well as a previous one giving the green light to terrorism, has not only opened the door wide for attacks and resolutions against South Africa on the flimsiest of excuses, unsupported by any evidence, but also gives cause for the

1. See: p. 36.

belief that the Western powers have decided that their only chance of weaning the third world from the Marxists is to accede to their every wish. We must therefore accept that if ultimately South Africa's head is demanded on a dish, the UN, with the odd vote against and a few abstentions, will provide the dish. We, however, are certainly not prepared to provide the head. I have given this matter a great deal of thought and I do not talk about it lightly as it affects our whole future and existence.

On behalf of our country and all its peoples I have not spared myself for one moment in the search for peace. The record is there and speaks for itself. Our willingness to live in peace and harmony with all nations cannot be doubted; our readiness to help solve problems cannot be faulted, but the fact remains that with these decisions all militants and Marxists will feel themselves free and even invited to launch aggressive escapades against us in the coming year. Let the world know now that we are not to be had for free, that we desire nothing that belongs to others but that we will protect and defend our rights, our property and country with all the means at our disposal.

Having said this I do not necessarily mean that we will experience more than the accustomed violence on our borders or perhaps sporadic disorders internally, but we will be extremely foolish if we disregard the signs, fail to take the necessary precautions and condition ourselves for what might happen. There is no sign whatsoever that the Communists have abandoned their grand strategy of world domination. On the contrary, all authorities and strategists are convinced that their conventional power, especially on land, but also in the air, on and under the sea, outstrips that of the free world. Fifth columns are actively at work in all free world countries. Economic difficulties, problems of lack of growth and resulting unemployment in these countries are skillfully used to their advantage. The West has not only lost the initiative, is not only on the defensive everywhere, but what is saddest of all, it has lost the will to take a firm stand against the ever-increasing menace. Talk to any authority in Europe today and you will find naught for your comfort.

In our part of the world the Communists have made an experiment in the case of Angola. They risked quite a lot in making it but today they know the answer. They know that, on the Angolan pattern, they can subdue or attack any country in any part of Africa, including Southern Africa, just as they did with Hungary, voices will be raised in protest and perhaps even threats will be made but nothing else will be done about it. I have had opportunities to test out this theory in many talks in the course of the year and it is my duty to tell you that this is my firm conclusion. If, therefore, a Communist onslaught should be made against South

Africa directly or under camouflage, then South Africa will have to face it alone and certain countries who profess to be anti-communist will even refuse to sell arms to South Africa to beat off the attack. This is the reality of our situation.

.....

Southern Africa

Substantial progress has been made by the leaders of the peoples of South West Africa to find an acceptable solution for a constitution for the territory before becoming independent, but it seems that the same can hardly be said of the Geneva talks between the Rhodesian Government and certain Black Rhodesian leaders. The hopes that were raised as result of the Kissinger talks seem to have suffered a severe setback as a result of an apparent refusal of some delegates to negotiate a settlement within the framwork of the plan devised by the British and Americans, and with the essentials of which it was said the frontline presidents had concurred. At the moment a solution is difficult to foresee, but it is best to withhold comment in view of the impending visit of the British negotiator and the possibility that the talks will be resumed in January.

.....

Perhaps I have shocked you, but it will serve no purpose to refuse to recognise our adversities and generally one is more afraid when tracking the lion than on meeting up with it. The storm has not struck yet; we are only experiencing the whirlwinds that go before it. It can pass us or it can even spend itself before it strikes us in all its fury. Who can foretell? But our house is not built on sand and, even if the signs point towards its striking us, we must not fear. On our flight I do say to you to fasten your seat belts, but I have no doubt that we will land safely at our destination. I have faith in our cause and our people. We, so I believe, have the determination, the courage and the faith, and if we must face the storm we will receive the strength and mercy from God our Father who controls the destinies of countries and peoples. We still have a long way to go to fulfill our calling and God in His mercy will not cripple us before we have walked the road which He has ordained for us.

UITTREKSELS UIT DIE 1977 NUWEJAARSBOODSKAP VAN DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE MINISTER VAN VERDEDIGING, SY EDELE P. W. BOTHA

Dit is 'n oppervlakkige houding wat sommige sogenaamde leiers in Suid-Afrika openbaar, wanneer hulle politiek bedryf asof daar nie 'n totale aanslag teen Suider-Afrika en veral ons land voorberei word nie. Wie dit ignoreer kan ons politieke taak nie reg beskou nie. Hierdie aanslag het ten doel die uitbreiding van Marxisme en rewolusie in Suider-Afrika.

Voorts, word beoog die onderwerping van die staatsgesag, ten einde die weg vir sogenaamde Pan-Afrikanisme te baan en uiteindelik die daarstelling van swart meerderheidsregering. Hierdie blatante pogings tot inmenging in Suider-Afrika is onlangs weer bewys deur die besluite van die VVO om geweld teen ons te steun en die huigelagtige besluit oor die grens tussen Transkei en Lesotho. Het die wêreld nou besluit om die leuen op die troon te plaas? Die huiwerende Westerse Wêreld is so betower deur die sagte musiek van détente uit Moskou, dat sy strategie ten opsigte van Suider-Afrika óf nie bestaan nie, óf 'n verregaande onkunde openbaar.

Ons kan niks doen wat die hongerige dier van Marxistiese militarisme tot vreedsame oogmerke teenoor ons sal stem nie. Ons kan niks doen in die vorm van swak toegee-politiek om die huidige prys wat die onsekere en verdeelde Weste vra, te bevredig nie. Suid-Afrika se heil sal nie bewerkstellig word deur wat die groot wêreldpolitiek van Washington of Moskou van ons verg nie.

Ons kan 'n keuse maak wat 'n keuse van swakkelingte sal wees. Ons kan verkies om 'n protektoraat van een van die grotes te wees met verlies van ons eie karakter en verraad teenoor ons historiese roeping. Of ons kan kies om gevaarlik te lewe, die pad van offering te bewandel met behoud van ons selfrespek en geloof in ons toekoms. Dit is die moeite werd om ons eie pad van selfstandigheid en selfrespek te bewandel. Miskien het ons toegelaat dat die Weste te seker is van ons.

Ons land verkeer in 'n leiersposisie insoverre dit ons minerale reserwes en produksie betref. Sommige van die mees unieke strategiese minerale kom in Suid-Afrika in groot hoeveelhede voor. Ons het 'n historiese taak om as een van die belangrikste bewakers van die seeroete om die Kaap van Goeie Hoop op te tree. As daardie vermoë ons ontnem word, sal die wêreld in twee gesny word en sal Rusland in effek beheer kry oor Europa, Afrika en groot dele van Asië. Geen opportunistiese ontkenning van hierdie feit of geen gebrek aan Westerse strategie kan hierdie feit vernietig nie.

Soms hoor ons dowwe stemme van vriendskap wat dit erken,

maar dan aan ons voorhou dat ons eers ons binnelandse volkere-verhoudings moet regstel. Ons is daarmee besig sedert ons onself ontworstel het aan Britse koloniale politiek, wat soveel armoede en onheil in Afrika nagelaat het

Waarom kan Mosambiek se ekonomie nie voortgaan sonder die hulp uit Suid-Afrika nie? Waarom soek tienduisende vlugtlinge uit Angola beskerming en voedsel in Suidwes-Afrika?

Ons is besig om ons volkereverhoudings op die pad van ordelike en goeie buurskap te verbeter. In die Republiek van Suid-Afrika bestaan meer burgerlike vryhede as in die meeste Afrika-state en die state agter die Ystergordyn. In die Republiek van Suid-Afrika leef die meeste mense onder beter gesondheidstoestande en op 'n hoër lewenspeil as die meeste van die lande uit die Derde Wêreld, wat soveel oor ons te sé het. In ons land bou ons aan 'n staatsregtelike bestel wat meer vryheid waarborg as wat daar onder die dwingelandy van 'n landjie soos Lesotho se dikta-tor bestaan.

Die Afrikaner, tesame met tienduisende van ons Engelstalige medeburgers, sal in toenemende mate vasstrap teen enige poging om ons van ons land en sy ordelike vooruitgang te ontnem. Ons sal handel volgens ons Christelike gewetes om 'n beleid van regverdigheid te laat ontplooi En as geweld teen ons gebruik word, sal ons dit met 'n vaste tred en wil afslaan.

**STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT CARTER OF
THE UNITED STATES, CONCERNING REPEAL OF THE
"BYRD AMENDMENT" ON IMPORTATION OF CHROME
AND OTHER MINERALS FROM RHODESIA, IN
WASHINGTON ON 18 MARCH 1977**

I have today signed HR 1746, which restores Executive authority to enforce sanctions against Rhodesian chrome.

This measure is a central element in our African policy. Members of my Administration have supported it with one voice. With it, we are bringing the United States back in line with the decisions of the Security Council and with our obligations under the United Nations Charter.

HR 1746 effectively reinstates an embargo against the importation of Rhodesian chrome and other minerals, as well as any steel mill product containing Rhodesian chromium. As a matter of equity, however, I am issuing an Executive Order which authorizes the Secretary of Treasury to exempt shipments now in transit to the United States.

Our country is committed to the concept of rapid transition to majority rule in Rhodesia under non-violent conditions. I view this measure today as an appropriate and positive step toward that goal. We have constantly stated our belief that a peaceful solution in Rhodesia depends upon negotiations that involve a full spectrum of opinion among its leaders, both black and white. With the enactment of this measure, there can be no mistake about our support for that principle.

I hope that the present Rhodesian authorities, as well as the black African nationalist leaders, will accurately assess the vote of the Congress and this Administration's stand on Rhodesia. The solution rests in their hands, not our's. Further delay in negotiations will invite more violence and increase the prospect of outside intervention — an outcome which every person of good will wishes to avoid.

With the co-operation of the Congress, we have taken a step of great importance in our Southern African policy. I want to thank the leadership of both Houses for their initiative in bringing about this encouraging development.

Further remarks by President Carter

Somebody said it is such a short Bill that was passed; but it took so long to get done. I am very grateful this morning to have a chance to sign House Resolution 1746, which gives me the authority to re-establish the embargo against the purchase of chrome from Rhodesia.

This legislation probably has as high a symbolic importance in international affairs as anything that I will do this year. It is some-

thing that I sign with gratitude and appreciation on the one hand, and regret on the other. Gratitude and appreciation because the Congress and I have demonstrated vividly that we are deeply concerned with our own abandonment of a unanimous decision made by the United Nations, in which our country participated in effect on its word of honor, and then later, because of pressing circumstances, revoked.

I think it puts us on the side of what is right and proper. I believe that this resolution can lead to help in resolving the Southern African questions, particularly relating to Rhodesia.

The regret is that we have not been able to work harmoniously with a legitimate government in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. As you know, there is an illegal government there. They have not been willing yet to come forward and negotiate effectively between the white and black citizens of Rhodesia and this is something that all of us regret. Our country is playing a strong but secondary role in the Rhodesian question. Britain legally still has dominion over this territory. They are the top persons who have participated in trying to bring the disputing parties together. We have negotiated constantly with them and I think we will continue to play this secondary but important role.

The only nation, I believe, that recognizes the Smith government is South Africa, and we have been working closely with them. This puts us back on the side of support with the United Nations. It puts us in the strategic position to help with the resolution of the Rhodesian question, and the attendance here of the labor leaders, for instance, who are involved in the steel industry, is indicative of the fact that we do have adequate supplies of chrome on hand or in shipment to tide us over in this period that is immediately ahead of us. I am also instructing that the embargo be reinstated but permitting shipments that are en route to come into our country and, of course, under the Congressional decision that was made this week, I would have the authority to re-open purchases of Rhodesian chrome in the future if it becomes appropriate.

So it is with a great deal of gratitude to the Congress and to others who have helped make this decision that I sign this very important legislation. I want to thank again the Members of the Congress who were so effective in finally passing the Bill. It was a matter of great interest last night when I visited the United Nations. Many of the delegates to the UN who came by to speak to me expressed deep appreciation for this move. I think it is going to help us not only in the South African question, Rhodesian question, Namibian question, but also throughout the world.

**EXTRACT FROM A STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT
BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER, THE
HON. B. J. VORSTER, ON 20 APRIL 1977**

I do not visualize that a direct Russian attack on South Africa will take place. It would be irresponsible of me to say that I visualized anything of this nature happening in the foreseeable future. What I can say, however, is that if it should occur, it goes without saying that South Africa will defend itself, and I am grateful that the Defence Force with its Minister, its officers and its men is there to do this in the best possible way. I do not for a moment want to say that we have all the equipment in the world which is necessary for that task, but what I can say is that with the means at our disposal, South Africa will defend itself against any attack which is made on it, regardless of by whom. However, what we can in fact expect – I am not saying that it is going to happen tomorrow or the day after – is the Angola and Zaïre type of invasion and the kind of thing which is happening in Rhodesia. We shall deal with that as well. The hon. member charged me with having said that we would have to stand alone. Surely we are not the only people who stand alone. When Israel was attacked, apart from weapons from America, it did not receive any assistance from other States which became actively engaged in its struggle. It had to stand alone and fight its war alone. They did receive weapons, but for the rest it was thrown back on its own resources When it comes to this kind of attack, the Defence Force will deal with the attacks, and I want to maintain at this early stage already that I have enough confidence in the Defence Force to know that they will be able to deal with such attacks effectively. It causes one concern – it ought not only to cause me concern but also the hon. members on that side of the House – that it is the grand strategy of the Russians to appropriate the southernmost point of Africa for themselves. Apart from the spheres of influence which they have already acquired, the events which are at present taking place in Zaïre, give cause for concern. Of Zaïre Mao Tse-tung said: "He who controls Zaïre, controls Africa." One need only look at the map of Africa to see that Zaïre is situated in such a way that it borders on nine other states and to realize how much truth is in fact contained in that statement. What can happen to Zaïre, can happen to any other African State, and therefore we are all watching with close attention to see whether the Free World or the friends of Zaïre are going to come to its aid, or are going to come to its aid to a sufficient extent against the attack which is now being made on Zaïre. South Africa has, taking into account the means at its disposal, taken as many precautions as it possibly can. South Africa has not only taken precautions in respect of the acquisition of weapons –

hon. members know the circumstances just as well as I do and therefore I need not discuss them again now – but has also made provision to the best of its ability in regard to the stockpiling of strategic material, and I shall say nothing further about that. We must bear in mind that the Russians have not stationed Solodovnikov in Lusaka for nothing. We note that the President of Zambia who, only a short while ago, was still referring contemptuously to the Bear and its cubs, has fallen into the clutches of the Bear and its cubs. This situation gives rise to concern, and it goes without saying that these events are going to have an effect on South Africa. That is why it is so necessary that we should speak with one accord from this Parliament – Government and Opposition, all who put South Africa's interests first and who love South Africa.

The nature of the onslaught on South Africa is not only going to be military. It also has a political side. A political onslaught will also be made on South Africa, and let no one sitting in front of me here today have any illusions about that. What is demanded and what will be demanded from South Africa is not concessions in one sphere or another, not the final abolition of discrimination of one kind or another. The demand which will eventually be placed at South Africa's door is Black majority rule over the whole of South Africa, over that part which belongs to us as well. This is the demand which will be made on us. I know and I am grateful that when that demand is made, it will be rejected not only by this side of the House but also by my hon. friend the Leader of the Opposition and his followers. I am not doing the hon. the Leader of the PRP an injustice if I tell him candidly that I do not know where he is going to stand when that demand is made on us.

If the hon. the Leader of the Opposition therefore asks me how matters stand with South Africa, I tell him frankly that the events in Angola, in South West Africa, in Rhodesia and in Zaïre have in fact had a prejudicial effect on South Africa. People who do not take the trouble to look at the map or do not know where these places are situated, think these places are in the heart of the Karroo and that the events are therefore taking place right here in the heart of South Africa. Apart from that, even people who are in the know are, in the nature of things, concerned. They are concerned about whether there will be stability in Southern Africa when they make investments. They are concerned about whether or not the Russians are going to appropriate Southern Africa for themselves. Surely it is only human that they will be concerned about this. It goes without saying that because this is the case, it will have an effect on the acquisition of investment and loan capital. But to say that our investment and loan capital has dried up, is surely not true. On the contrary. Not only am I holding

talks; I am convinced that hon. members opposite, too, hold talks from time to time. Hardly a week goes by in which I do not hold four or five discussions with people who have already invested in South Africa or who intend investing in South Africa.

From those discussions it becomes apparent that they have confidence in South Africa. They have confidence in the people of South Africa. They have confidence in the stability of South Africa. They have confidence in the prospects of South Africa. Our loan and investment capital has not dried up. As the hon. the Minister of Finance indicated, it has diminished in certain respects, but eventually our stability will prove to be the decisive factor in whether we are going to receive loan and investment capital. The man who wants to do business is in the end going to apply only one criterion, i.e. what measure of stability is there in South Africa? Whether hon. members agree with me or not, there is, thank God, political stability in South Africa and there are stable people here, whether they belong to my party or not.

The events in neighbouring countries will, in the nature of things, have an effect. Angola is a seething cauldron, and will remain one for as far as one can see into the future. This will have its effect. Then there is the Rhodesian matter. From time to time efforts have been made to solve the problem of Rhodesia, but they have failed. At the moment another initiative in this regard is in progress. I do not, on this occasion want to state the standpoint of the Government in regard to Rhodesia again – it is on record and it is there for all to read. I merely want to state it as my conviction that the initiative of the British Foreign Secretary has a chance. It is not an initiative which one should write off; it has a chance. That chance will, however, depend on the reasonableness and fairness of people. That chance will depend on whether people really want to reach a settlement in a peaceful way or wish to resort to violence. I know that I am perhaps sticking my neck out a long way now – but I must say this because it is my conviction – when I inform this House and state it as my opinion that as the position exists there at present, the Whites of Rhodesia will not be to blame if this initiative fails. I am saying this on the basis of the knowledge which I have of this matter. Naturally I cannot take the matter any further.

There is also the question of South West Africa. That conference has succeeded. The beginning of that conference resulted from the agreement which I concluded with Mr Alfred Escher when I brought the population groups together. I am pleased that hon. members are all pleased now that the conference has succeeded. However, I can still remember how they ridiculed it, how sceptical they were of it and how many obstacles they tried to place in its way. At present talks on the Rhodesian problem, as well as in

regard to the South West Africa matter and related matters as far as they may affect South Africa, are taking place on a very high level between South Africa and several Western countries. Hon. members will understand that I do not consequently wish to go into details about this, except to say that after the first talks I made South Africa's standpoint very clear by saying that we were prepared to hold discussions and that we welcomed them.

We also welcome discussions on South West Africa. But I stated it as our standpoint that South West Africa belongs to the people of South West Africa and those who have to take a decision on their future are the people of South West Africa themselves. The standpoint of the Government in this regard has been placed on record very clearly. In respect of all these matters South Africa was not only willing to play a role; South Africa did in fact play a role. What is far more important to me, however, is the recognition throughout the entire world that South Africa has a role to play in this regard and that one cannot discuss the affairs of Southern Africa without taking cognizance of the South African standpoint and without discussing the matter with South Africa. Accuse me of having failed in all respects, accuse me of being worthless and meaningless, but I claim the credit of having achieved this for South Africa in the past few years, and I am very grateful that I have been able to achieve this, with the co-operation of all my colleagues who were involved in these matters. South Africa is in favour of discussions and of sitting down around a conference table to discuss these matters. But I have stated from the outset – and I want to repeat it in this House – that South Africa has certain limits and that it cannot go beyond those limits, whatever demands are made on it. Sir – I may say this as well for the sake of history – hon. members asked me what progress we had made in this regard. We would have made more if there had not been a change of government in the USA. We arrived at certain understandings with the Republican Government of the USA. However, there has now been a change. It goes without saying that, as in the case of America, we must also begin all over again to arrive at an understanding with the Democratic Government. However I have every confidence, in spite of all the things that are being said, that we are in fact able to arrive at an understanding, and I want to give this House the assurance that I will not have been the cause if we do not arrive at an understanding.

It may be asked whether there is still confidence in South Africa at present. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition wanted to know this. I have already stated that confidence in South Africa has to a certain extent been influenced and prejudiced by the events which have taken place around us. But apart from that, the

amount of confidence which there will be in South Africa depends upon ourselves, upon you and me. If we ourselves do not have confidence, how can we expect others to have confidence in us? However, it does not depend upon ourselves only. Unfortunately, as things are in this world, it also depends on the sensational type of reporting on South Africa which occurs in and outside South Africa. I want to express the hope and trust that, considering what is at stake, people will not exploit and hurt South Africa for the sake of sensation.

Sir, if you ask me what my impression is, I want to state unequivocally, once again having regard to the fact that I have during the past few months discussed matters with many industrialists and financiers, that I have gained the impression that there is still confidence in South Africa owing to the fact that South Africa has become known as a country which honours its contracts and pays its debts. You need only talk to financiers and industrialists, Sir. They will tell you that it is a rarity, particularly as far as Africa is concerned, to find a country which honours its contracts in time and pays its debts regularly.

I want to state frankly, on the basis of conversations which I have had and reports I have read, that the confidence in the future of South Africa on the part of existing investors who own industries in South Africa has not been shaken. I have spoken to so many of them who said that not only were they pleased that they had invested here, but had also increased their investments or intended doing so. They did not allow themselves to be deterred.

**STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES VICE-PRESIDENT,
WALTER MONDALE, AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN VIENNA
ON 20 MAY 1977, FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WITH
THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER**

With me today are the members of our negotiating team, Tony Lake, Director of Policy Planning of the State Department; Ambassador Don McHenry; David Aaron, Deputy Director of the National Security Council; and Bill Bowdler, our Ambassador to the Government of South Africa.

I have been meeting with South African Minister Vorster and his Government at the request of President Carter to convey the new policies of our Administration regarding Southern Africa, specifically Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa itself.

We had a day and a half of very frank and candid discussions. Both sides were aware before the meetings began of possible fundamental differences and yet we pursued these discussions in a constructive spirit in order to improve the possibility of mutual understanding and progress.

Put most simply, the policy which the President wished me to convey was that there was need for progress on all three issues: majority rule for Rhodesia and Namibia and a progressive transformation of South African society to the same end.

We believed it was particularly important to convey the depth of our convictions. There has been a transformation in American society of which we are very proud. It affects not only our domestic life, but our foreign policy as well. We cannot accept, let alone defend, the government that rejects the basic principle of full human rights, economic opportunity and political participation for all its people regardless of race.

This basic mission was accomplished during these talks. I believe our policy is clear, and I believe the South African Government now appreciates that it is deeply rooted in American experience and values.

I do not know how or whether this will affect the decisions that confront South Africa, particularly in regard to its own system, but I made it clear that without evident progress that provides full political participation and an end to discrimination, the press of international events would require us to take actions based on our policy and to the detriment of the constructive relations we would prefer with South Africa.

As for Rhodesia and Namibia, I believe we registered some useful progress but the significance of this progress will depend on future developments. Prime Minister Vorster agreed to support British/American efforts to get the directly interested parties to agree to an independence constitution and the necessary transi-

tional arrangements including the holding of elections in which all can take part equally so that Zimbabwe can achieve independence during 1978, and peace. Likewise every effort will be made to bring about a de-escalation of violence and it is believed that the negotiating process will be the best way to achieve this end. We believe this is an encouraging step in a positive direction. Hopefully we will work together to bring the interested parties to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Rhodesia. The extent to which this pays off will, of course, remain to be seen as we pursue the British initiative. In this connection I made clear our support for these efforts and the closest collaboration with them.

In this connection I explained that our concept of the Zimbabwe development fund is different from that of the previous American Administration. Instead of being a fund aimed at buying out the white settlers in Rhodesia, we want to re-orientate that fund to a development fund; one which will help build a strong economy and one that will encourage the continued participation of the white population in an independent Zimbabwe.

I emphasized that the US would support a constitution for Zimbabwe that would contain guarantees of individual rights such as freedom of speech, religion, assemblage, due process of law, and an independent judiciary, and that we believe these are essential to a democratic system of government.

On Namibia, I made clear that we supported the efforts of the so-called *contact group* which consists of the United States, West Germany, Britain, France and Canada, in their efforts to implement Security Council Resolution 385. In some respects the position of the South African Government as reflected in the earlier talks was encouraging. In those talks they agreed to free elections to be held on a nation-wide basis for a constituent assembly which would develop a national constitution for an independent Namibia.

They agreed that all Namibians inside and outside the country could participate including SWAPO. They agreed that the UN could be involved in the electoral process to assure that it was fair and internationally acceptable. However, potentially important differences over the structure and character of the interim administrative authority that would run Namibia while this process takes place became much clearer in the process of our talks. South Africa wants an administrative arrangement that draws upon the structure developed at the Turnhalle conference.

This structure in the conference that proposed it is based on ethnic and tribal lines and as it stands it is unacceptable to us. We emphasize that any interim administrative arrangement must be impartial as to the ultimate structure of the Namibian Government. Moreover, it must be broadly representative in order to be

acceptable to all Namibians and to the international community. For his part Mr Vorster felt quite strongly that any such structure should be based on the work of the Turnhalle conference.

We agreed to propose that the five nation contact group meet with the South African Government before the end of the month in Cape Town at a time to be determined if the other members of the group agree to hear South Africa's views and the details of the proposed interim administrative authority, to see if an impartial broadly based and internationally acceptable structure can be found. We hope that it can be.

It is my view that the South African position in Namibia is involved in a positive direction in certain important respects, but unless this last issue can be satisfactorily resolved by the South African Government, fair free elections will be difficult if not impossible. I hope that the most serious effort will be made to find a solution that provides an impartial, broadly representative and internationally acceptable interim authority in Namibia.

I also raised the question of political prisoners with regard to Namibia. I said the United States believes that all political prisoners should be released. Mr Vorster said he believes that what he called political detainees, some of which are held in other African countries, should be released. He said he would favourably consider our suggestion that all Namibian political prisoners be turned over to Namibia and that in the event of a difference in view of whether a particular prisoner was political or criminal, a body of international jurors review the case and make a determination. This suggestion will be pursued as well when the contact group meets in Cape Town.

South African prospects are much less bright for progress toward the change of course which we believe is essential to provide justice, stability and peace in that country. We hope that South Africa will carefully review the implications of our policy and the changing circumstances which it creates. We hope that South Africans will not rely on any illusions that the US will in the end intervene to save South Africa from the policies it is pursuing, for we will not do so.

I think the message is now clear to the South African Government. They know that we believe that perpetuating an unjust system is the surest incentive to increase Soviet influence and even racial war but quite apart from that it is unjustified on its own grounds.

They know that we will not defend such a system and in all honesty, however, I do not know what conclusions the South African Government will draw. It is my hope that it will lead to a reassessment, to a change of course which enables us to be helpful and supportive in the difficult times that change inevitably entails.

But I cannot rule out the possibility that the South African Government will not change, that our paths will diverge and our policies come into conflict should the South African Government so decide.

In that event we would take steps true to our beliefs and values. We hope to be able to see progress in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa, but the alternative is real, much as we dislike it. For a failure to make progress will lead to a tragedy of human history.

Q. Mr. Vice President, I wonder if you would tell us if these talks which appear indeed to have been extremely tough, what the atmosphere was, whether it was acrimonious or whether you could tell us that it really wasn't as tough as it seemed to be.

A. We were very anxious as I indicated earlier to conduct these talks in a constructive environment, in a non-confrontational environment. We were anxious at the same time that this meeting be one in which we could very clearly define American policy and further make clear the depth and the permanence of our commitment to human rights as a central element in our relations with the Government of South Africa, and as a policy guiding our affairs in Southern Africa. The talks were candid and they were frank and I think they were non-confrontational. We think there may be some progress in Rhodesia. We think the statement indicated today indicates hope. We are hopeful that the talks surrounding the details which I mentioned in Namibia will produce results that are effective and will permit the independence of Namibia within the outline and framework of UN Resolution 385 and that the upcoming talks in Cape Town will bring that result about. On the issue of South African policies, it is our position that separateness and apartheid are inherently discriminatory and that the policy of apartheid cannot be acceptable to us. We also are of the opinion strongly held that full political participation by all the citizens of South Africa — equal participation in the election of its national government and its political affairs is essential to a healthy, stable and secure South Africa. South Africans take the view that their apartheid policies are not discriminatory. There is a basic and fundamental disagreement. They take the position that they have different nations within South Africa and that the full participation that we discussed is irrelevant. There is a fundamental and a profound disagreement and what we had hoped to do in these talks was to make it clear to the South African leadership the profound commitment that my nation has to human rights, to the elimination of discrimination and to full political participation and to explain to them how our nation went through essentially the same dispute and the elimination of discrimination, and the achievement of full political parti-

cipation has contributed enormously to the health, vitality, the stability, the economic growth, the social health and the spiritual health of our country and we are convinced that those same policies will have the same effect in other societies. That was the nature of the discussion; it was very frank, it was very candid.

Mr Vice President, were you afraid at any time that the talks might break down?

No, at no time. As a matter of fact, the talks went on longer than scheduled. We added an hour to the discussion this morning, we added some extra time yesterday, there were points when it was quite difficult, but there was no point when there was a breakdown. As a matter of fact, the basic civility of the meeting was there at all times.

What steps would you take in South Africa if it doesn't go along with our policy?

The purpose of this meeting was not to provide a list of remedies that this nation, that is the United States, might take by itself or in co-operation with the others through the United Nations or in other ways, to pursue its values as I have described them, of human rights. We did, however, make it clear. First of all, we hope that there would be progress in these areas that would permit an improved relationship. In other words, our basic objective is not to have a confrontation, but to have an understanding that will lead to progress and that we hope for improved relations. We also said that these values that we hold, and these objectives for an independent Rhodesia, with an independent constitution, with a freely elected government, and a Namibian Government established under the general outlines of UN Resolution 385 with a freely elected government, and the social transformation of the South African Government as we described it, were important objectives, crucial objectives, affecting the relationship of our two countries. Any progress will be helpful, but we need progress in all three categories and the failure to achieve it will lead to several elements: we think, increasing instability, increasing violence and bitterness, increasing opportunity for international caprice, and a worsening of US relations with the Government of South Africa and of relations between that government and the international communities. We did not go into what those steps would be because it is our hope that we can have progress and that that will not be necessary and there will be other occasions on which that policy in the case of deteriorating relations will be described.

In regard to the transformation or progress that you speak of with South Africa itself, how is that to be measured and specifically, did you suggest or outline any possible things that you would like to see done there on a step by

step basis or are you leaving this to the South Africans to ponder? And the second part of the question is, did they give any sign during these talks that they would possibly modify such elements that would permit the joint participation and unify South Africa politically?

Let me answer the last part of your question first: The answer was that they did not intend to do so. What I said was that we see two fundamental principles as essential: The elimination of discrimination, and we think apartheid is discriminatory, and full political participation by all of its citizens on an equal basis were essential to the transformation that would be the prerequisite to a stable South Africa and to the best possible relations with this country. We also talked about steps, but not in detail, because we did not want to get into the position of prescribing what particular steps they should be taking. We said any progress would be helpful. For example, I said if the Pass Laws were repealed so that the citizens of South Africa could travel in and around South Africa as they chose, that would be helpful. We mentioned the detaining of political dissidents, Mrs Mandela, and the intimidation of political dissidents as an example. I did not get into a specific list of particular laws and schools, the set-aside of certain jobs, I forget the exact name, that can only be held by certain people of certain race. There is a long list that we could get into, but I did not want to do that because I wanted to get the emphasis on the principles, the long-term objectives that we see crucial to fundamental reform in South Africa.

You pointed out that apartheid and full participation were two separate matters. Now you said that the Prime Minister offered you no hope on full participation politically. You said he did not want to get into detail on questions of apartheid. But did he tell you that he plans any progress at all on certain race discrimination?

He will be here shortly to describe his position. He went into some detail about the number of black Africans within South Africa now going to school. The income of South African minorities compared to the income elsewhere in Africa, the meetings that they have had with certain black leaders. One of the proposals I made in response, I should have made this point to the earlier question, was that they should meet early with a broad range of the legitimate non-white leaders of South Africa to hear from them as to the process and the approach and the steps to be taken. His answer to that was that they had already had such meetings. But it is our opinion that many of the legitimate leaders of the non-white community have not engaged in such a conference, and that such a conference would be very helpful. That was the nature of his discussion, but I would have to be very candid, that on the issue of apartheid and on the issue of full

political participation in the sense we are talking, namely, voting for the national government, they were very direct in its rejection.

He offered you nothing new in the area of positive participation?

He talked generally along the lines that I discussed.

If there is no progress on full participation, would that produce the deterioration in our relations that you had spoken of? Even if there had been some progress on apartheid or on Namibia and Rhodesia?

We see all three issues of basic importance. We don't think progress on one issue excuses no progress on another. But any progress of significance will be appreciated, will be valuable, and will have to be recognized as such. If we are able to create a healthy, independent Rhodesia based on majority rule, that's something that is very important. If we are able to achieve the objectives of an independent Namibia based on the principles of UN Resolution 385, that's a very important objective. If the South African Government helps achieve those objectives they should be commended for it. If there is progress within South Africa to remove laws such as the Pass Laws, discrimination laws, these job set-aside laws, laws to permit active political expression without intimidation; those things should be encouraged and appreciated. But I thought it was important and I believe it to be fundamental, that the basis of the problems in South Africa stem from two fundamental principles, discrimination, and the absence of full political participation, rights available to all their citizens.

Did you come to agreement on a time-table on the independence of Namibia and Rhodesia and did you come to an agreement on a specific next step on Rhodesia as you did on Namibia?

On Rhodesia, and I think I'll read this again if I might because it spells out the terms of our agreement: Prime Minister Vorster agreed to support British-American efforts to get the directly interested parties to agree to an independence constitution and the necessary transitional arrangements, including the holding of elections in which all can take part equally, so that Zimbabwe can achieve independence during 1978, and peace. And then it goes on . . . In other words, the objective in support of the Owen mission is for the establishment of a constitution which will provide for elections and independence in 1978.

And in Namibia?

In Namibia, the only specific time frame agreed on there was the prospective meeting with the contact group in South Africa, hopefully by the end of this month, to see if we can resolve most problems to which I made reference. If those problems are solved, then the other elements of a free election, national election,

in which all can participate, to establish a constituent assembly to develop a constitution with a UN presence, will be in place and I think the prospects of peaceful transformation of UN Resolution 385 are very hopeful, and the progress could come quite quickly. So there is an element of hope here that it all depends upon the success in resolving what could be major differences of the kind that I discussed in my earlier remarks.

Have you specifically discussed the possibility of withdrawing South African troops from Namibia before the coming of elections in that part?

One of the matters that would be discussed at Cape Town is the phased withdrawal of the South African Government instrumentalities within Namibia. There is not a schedule for that yet. It would be hoped that terms and the phasing of that process could be more particularly discussed at that meeting.

Is there any possibility of a further meeting between yourself and Mr Vorster or between President Carter and Mr Vorster?

We have no plans for such a meeting.

Mr Vice-President, could you possibly go into slightly more detail on your concept of full participation as opposed to one man one vote? Do you see some kind of compromise?

No, No. It's the same thing. Every citizen should have the right to vote and every vote should be equally weighted.

**EXTRACTS FROM A STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT BY
THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER, THE HON.
B. J. VORSTER, ON 27 MAY 1977, CONCERNING HIS
MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE IVORY COAST IN
GENEVA, AND WITH THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES IN VIENNA**

I spoke to the President of the Ivory Coast. We had a very long discussion. We were together from 09h30 to 14h00. The President of the Ivory Coast is as concerned about Southern Africa. We do not stand alone, for there are many other African States which feel the same way towards us and which are extremely alarmed at Russian imperialism and Russian colonialism in Africa. The alarm which is awakening among responsible African States will, so I believe, lead to those African States that feel the same way, gravitating closer to one another, to the progressive formulation of a collective standpoint in that regard. This is also apparent from the communiqué which was issued after my talks with the President of the Ivory Coast.

The hon. the Leader of the Opposition asked me whether we had decided to establish diplomatic relations. I want to tell him very candidly that we discussed the problems of Africa so exhaustively and in such depth that not one of us raised this subject. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition knows that the relations between South African and the Ivory Coast are firm and that a good understanding exists between the two states. This is of course the case because the Ivory Coast takes up the position that it does not allow the emphasis to be placed on the matters on which we do not agree.

The Ivory Coast does in fact experience problems with our policy. This is something which we have already thrashed out on previous occasions. However, we do not allow the emphasis to be placed on the matters on which we differ; we do the right thing by allowing what carries most weight to weigh most heavily and to talk about the things that are threatening Africa, the things that are threatening every African State.

I cannot sufficiently emphasize that it is Russian imperialism and naked colonialism that has to be fought. I can foresee that day when this matter will cause such a stir in Africa and will become so prominent that the states which see a danger in it will be brought closer and closer together. All in all, we had very good talks.

As far as the talks with Mr Mondale are concerned, I can say that we began on the morning of 19 May and discussed the Rhodesian matter until lunch-time. The afternoon we devoted to the South West African question. Unfortunately very little time remained to discuss South Africa/USA relations. Apart from

approximately ten minutes on the 19th, we would only have had an hour the next morning to discuss South Africa/USA relations.

At my suggestion we met the next morning at 08h00 instead of 09h00, in order to have more time for that. Because the Rhodesian issue was then mooted once again, we were unable to utilize the two full hours, as I shall indicate later. In general, therefore, we unfortunately had less time than one would have liked. I am not reproaching anyone in this regard; it was the way the programme developed. It is a vast subject, as my hon friend will be able to understand, a subject to which one cannot, on that level, do justice in one and a half or two hours.

The hon the Leader of the Opposition asked me what we discussed in regard to Rhodesia. We agreed –

That the South African Government agrees to support British and American efforts to get the directly interested parties to agree to an independence constitution.

I could agree to that because it has always been the policy of the South African Government that the parties in Rhodesia should settle their own case, that the various sides in Rhodesia should themselves reach an agreement. That is why I could go along with that and with what followed. At my insistence – we had to argue for quite some time to get this included as well – it was also said –

Likewise every effort will be made to bring about a de-escalation of violence . . . and what follows.

I was not prepared to support the first part if the second part was not added.

The hon. the Leader also wanted to know whether I was requested to exert pressure on Rhodesia, and what my reaction was. I have been requested on many occasions to exert such pressure. Mr Mondale also used the word “pressure” again, and I told him immediately that I was not in favour of that word.

Among other things I made South Africa’s standpoint very clear once again that we shall under no circumstances participate in a boycott and a closing of borders, and that I am not prepared to pressurize Rhodesia in any respect. Once again I made the standpoint which I have frequently stated in this House very clear. There can be no misunderstanding whatsoever about that.

As far as the “trust fund” is concerned, we were informed that it was being seen in a different light. That was news to us. We expressed our astonishment on that score very clearly, and we warned against the consequences which could flow from it.

We also discussed South West Africa. I pointed out the problem which exists, that there is in fact an initiative in progress in that

regard, and that the talks between the five Western powers and our country in fact run parallel to that initiative. It was agreed that the talks would be resumed at the earliest possible opportunity. In Vienna we visualized that we would meet before the end of the month. But the month has passed, and we have not done so. Those gentlemen must come here. It is an aspect which my colleague, the hon. the Minister of Foreign Affairs, will deal with further. I do not know precisely when a discussion will now take place.

In regard to South West Africa, various problems were discussed. We have already discussed them with the representatives of the five Western powers, but I am not going into detail about it now, because the matter has not yet been finalized.

I told Mr Mondale that I and my Government were absolutely committed to introduce into South West Africa what is at this stage called "a central administrative authority". I told the five Western powers, and Mr Mondale, that during this session legislation would have to be passed by Parliament to empower the State President to institute such an authority. I also warned them that at the request of the Damaras and the Hereros I was committed to give them local self-government. They understand very well that I and my Government are committed in this regard. I am informing hon. members now that such a Bill will still come before the House. The Bill will also deal with the question of Walvis Bay.

As far as the talks with Mr Mondale are concerned, I must unfortunately say that although I hoped and trusted that there would be an acceptance of the Turnhalle conference and the resolutions adopted there, that was unfortunately not the case. I greatly regret this. I argued very strenuously in favour of it, but Mr Mondale's standpoint was that the Turnhalle was not representative of the people of South West Africa. I, in my turn, argued equally strenuously that nowhere in the world would one find a more representative body, a body which would be able to speak on behalf of all the people, than the Turnhalle in fact was.

I am now going to speak very frankly to this House. Although it was not said, we had to contend with the problem that the General Assembly of the UNO had adopted a resolution to the effect that South Africa should get out of South West Africa and hand it over to the adventurer Sam Nujoma and to Swapo. Hon. members know that my standpoint in that regard is that South Africa will never, under any circumstances, do that, that we will never even contemplate doing that. Therefore we differ radically in regard to this matter. It was put to us that although there was a measure of appreciation for the Turnhalle, it could not, unfortunately, be accepted. In fact, Mr Mondale also referred to this matter at his

press conference¹ and said that I had put the case with regard to the Turnhalle equally strenuously. He used the following words –

This structure in the conference that proposed it, is based on ethnic and tribal lines, and as it stands, it is unacceptable to us. We emphasize that any interim administrative arrangement must be impartial as to the ultimate structure of the Namibian Government. Moreover, it must be broadly representative in order to be acceptable to all Namibians and to the international community. For his part Mr Vorster felt quite strongly that any such structure should be based on the work of the Turnhalle conference.

In any event, this matter has not yet been disposed of and it will be discussed with the representatives of the five Western powers again. I put the standpoint of the South African Government to Mr Mondale in no uncertain terms.

We also discussed other matters pertaining to South West Africa, *inter alia*, the release of detainees. Mr Mondale does not draw any distinction between detainees. He regards them all as "political prisoners".

My standpoint is: There is a difference between detainees and those sentenced by the proper courts for criminal offences which they committed.

We discussed this matter, but failed to reach an agreement. However, we did hold out the prospect that we could speak of a commission of jurists, and so on, but I made my standpoint very clear that I did in fact distinguish between those two types. I told Mr Mondale that as far as detainees were concerned, I had no objection whatsoever to their being released, if there were any.

However, I pointed out to him that it would not only be in South West Africa and South Africa that one would find such detainees. In this connection I pointed out to him that in Zambia and Tanzania there were between 500 and 700 prisoners who were members of Swapo and whose only offence had been that they had questioned the leadership of Nujoma and had demanded that he render an account in connection with Swapo funds. I pointed out to him that there were reports indicating that these people were going to be executed by firing squad. I then told him that if prisoners had to be released and if people had to return to South West Africa to participate in the political process there, it went without saying that, in the first place, they should return in peace. They are not going to return to South West Africa with weapons in order to intimidate people. But I also told him that those detainees would consequently have to be released. They

1. See: p. 13.

must come to South West Africa to tell their story as well there. He admitted to me that his Government was aware that there were such people and that his Government knew about the camps in which they were being detained. My standpoint was that I could do nothing in that regard, but that the onus rested on the American Government to bring about the release of those people. I pointed out that I, on my part, did not see my way clear to taking any action if no action was taken by the other side. Mr Mondale thought it was unfair of me. He said I should set the good example. Well, my good example does not extend that far. Unfortunately I cannot go that far.

I repeated to Mr Mondale what I had said in public, *viz.* that all exiles may return to South West Africa so that they may all participate in the process provided, of course, they come in peace. I mentioned to him the names of Kerina, Kozonguizi, Appolus and dozens of others who had returned. They are not friends of this Government but enemies, and were petitioners at the UNO. However, they returned and no one lifted a finger against them because we were honest when we invited them to return to participate in the political process. I also explained to him that Swapo had had an opportunity to participate in elections and that they had not availed themselves of the opportunity.

I repeat – I am not saying this with reference to my discussion with Mr Mondale; I am saying this in general – that the problem in regard to a solution for South West Africa is that there are too many people at the UNO who are committed *vis-à-vis* Nujoma and Swapo. Nor are they only partially, they are fully committed to South West Africa being handed over to them. Only yesterday I was talking to a very prominent person. He told me that he had spoken to members of Swapo. They admitted to him that they were Marxists and that they wanted to create a Marxist State in South West Africa. In full realization of my responsibility I say that as far as this Government is concerned, it will under no circumstances be a partner to any action which will create a Marxist State in South West Africa.

The hon. the Leader of the Opposition asked me about the UNO. There have been attempts – I am speaking merely in general now, for this did not come up in the talks with Mr Mondale – to persuade South Africa to accept the “supervision and control” of the UNO. We said that we could not agree to that. We admit that there should be what we prefer to call “United Nations involvement”. This is so in terms of the character of the territory. However, I explained once again to Mr Mondale as well that we had in the past been prepared to hold talks with the Secretary-General of the UNO and that we had invited Messrs Hammarskjöld, Carpio and De Alva as well as Dr Waldheim himself, and

that we had also met his personal envoy, Dr Escher. I told him that we had come to a written understanding. However, that understanding was simply shelved at the UNO, and to this day they have not even told us officially what their standpoint in regard to it is. I mentioned all these things.

We are again prepared to receive a representative of the Secretary-General and we are prepared to allow him to ensure that, whatever elections may take place in South West Africa, they do so fairly and justly, because we have nothing to hide in that regard. Those things we are prepared to do, but the surrender of South West Africa and its people – that we are not prepared to do! I repeat: I repeatedly stated South Africa's policy that it is ultimately the people of South West Africa themselves who have to decide on their future, and pointed out again that South Africa is not going to take it upon itself to make decisions on behalf of those people. It was also stated very clearly to the representatives of the five Western powers that we cannot give conclusive replies; we must first hold talks with the representatives of the people of South West Africa before a final reply can be given. After all is said and done, it is they and their future that is at stake. I have replied in regard to the Damaras and the Hereros, and also in respect of Walvis Bay.

If you were to ask me today what the basic difference is between the outlook of the United States and that of South Africa, then, Sir, I must say immediately that it stems unfortunately from the fact that the United States Government wants to equate the situation and the position of the American Negro with the South African Black. I argued strenuously that one could not equate the two. I argued that I regarded the American Black man as an American, purely and simply; as a Black who was divested of his African personality, language, culture and traditions, and who is therefore in every sense of the word a full-blooded American . . . I said that the South African Black was in the first place never a slave and, secondly, had always been a member of a nation with its own language, its own culture, its own traditions and its own way of life.

We argued about this matter for a long time. I adopted the standpoint and if one wanted to compare and equate, one could perhaps compare the position of the Red Indian to that of the South African Black. Mr Mondale told me that their behaviour in respect of the Black man and the Red Indian – I shall use his own word – had been shameful. I did not reproach him for this. It is not I who said it. That is the standpoint which he himself adopted in that regard. However, I emphasized very strongly that our situation was not a multiracial situation, but that it was a multinational situation, and that that had to be taken into account. In

the short time at my disposal I sketched to him what our policy was in regard to the independence of the Black nations.

The hon. the Leader of the Opposition had a great deal to say about his policy and how it would supposedly be acceptable. I want to tell him what my experience in this regard was. Again I am not referring specifically to Mr Mondale, but to my experiences in general.

My experience has been that the world outside is not concerned about the three-quarter million Indians in the country, nor about the Coloureds. The debate does not concern them. The debate concerns the Black people. I want to make it very clear to the hon. the Leader of the Opposition that the outside world is not interested in his policy and does not accept my policy either, for what do they want? During the discussions Mr Mondale put it to us that what he wanted was "full participation" of the Black people in the political process. During our talks he either could not or would not spell this out. He left it at that. I then put this specific question to him –

You are finding fault with my Government and me. The policy my Government is following may even lead to a souring of relations between our two countries. You have good relations with African States. You do not find the same fault with them. Tell me: On which African State should I model my policy?

His reply to me was –

The US does not accept the proposition that the existence of an injustice in one country justifies injustice in others.

That is how far we got in that connection. After the talks and at the press conference, Mr Mondale said that he had put it to me that they adopted certain values and that they expected us to comply with those values. He also said that he had made his standpoint very clear to us. I quote him –

There is a fundamental and profound disagreement, and what we had hoped to do in these talks was to make clear to the South African leadership the profound commitment that my nation has to human rights, to the elimination of discrimination and to full political participation and to explain how our nation went through essentially the same dispute, and that the elimination of discrimination and the achievement of full political participation has contributed enormously to the health, vitality, the stability, the economic growth, the social health and the spiritual health of our country, and we are convinced that those same policies will have the same effect in other societies. That was the nature of the discussion. It was very frank, it was very candid.

I made my side of the case very clear to him, as I have done on many occasions here in this House, and I am not going to bore hon. members by doing so once again. However, I must point out that when Mr Mondale held his press conference, the final question which was put to him, was the following –

Mr Vice-President, could you possibly go into slightly more detail on your concept of full participation as opposed to “one man, one vote”. Do you see some kind of compromise?

His reply was –

No, no. It is the same thing. Every citizen should have the right to vote and every vote should be equally weighted.

In other words, here he was personally adopting the standpoint of “one man, one vote”. I, in my turn, made South Africa’s standpoint very clear. I said that I was not aware of any political party in South Africa in whose programme of principles it had been recorded that they advocated “one man, one vote” for South Africa, and that this situation was totally unacceptable to us.

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We may or we may not like it, but there is this gulf between the USA and South Africa. Their standpoint is “one man, one vote”, and we in this Parliament reject it. I made this very clear when I was asked about it in Vienna. I said that it was a fool who would not listen to what other people had to say about his policy and his standpoint, but that a country must ultimately be governed by its own Government and in the best interests, as it sees them, of its people in terms of the mandate it has received from its electorate.

It is in that spirit that we shall continue. We did not quarrel. Nor do I believe that it is necessary for us to quarrel with the USA over this matter. I stated the standpoint, calmly and collectedly, that we are not in favour of accepting those policies. I trust – in fact I should like to believe this – that the American Government will realize that one Government cannot dictate to another what its policy should be and that no Government with any self respect can allow itself to be dictated to as to what its policy should be.

Furthermore, I also want to make it very clear that I am not seeking confrontation with the USA. In fact, I shall go out of my way to avoid confrontation, I believe that it is in the interests of South Africa that the best relations should exist between the USA and South Africa. I have said on many occasions that the USA is the leader of the West, of which we are also a part.

Whereas the President of the Ivory Coast and so many other African States are concerned about Russian imperialism, about Russian infiltration and colonialism, I regret to say that unfor-

tunately – I hope I am reading it incorrectly; in fact, I shall be delighted if the American Government were to correct me immediately – that I do not observe the same concern at these matters in the American Government. I do not observe it in certain prominent members of the American Government. I do not observe in them the same concern in regard to this matter.

It is we who have to live here. We, and other African States have to live with this matter in Africa. I am not saying this because of any delusions of grandeur or for any other reason, but simply because it had to be said. If we are eventually confronted by an accomplished fact, we and those countries of Africa that are concerned about these things, must stand together and fight against it. We have to do this, even if we eventually stand all alone. In that case we shall have no other choice. I believe that this will be not only my standpoint, but also that of hon. members opposite. However, I exclude the PRP. I have told them on a previous occasion that I do not know precisely where they stand. They must, however, speak for themselves. Since I am discussing these matters I feel that I do have the right – I do not want to debate this matter now – to address a few words to the spiritual father of the PRP, Mr Harry Oppenheimer, on this occasion. It is time he tells South Africa where he stands and what he is doing. I shall leave it at that. I shall not take it any further.

Finally, then, I cannot say what the outcome of these matters will be. As far as I am concerned, I am at all times prepared to have frank discussions. I expect to discuss South West Africa further with the representatives of the five Western powers. If the USA, in view of the little time which was available to us in Vienna, wishes to hold further talks with me on South Africa/USA relations, I am prepared to hold such talks. I am prepared to state South Africa's standpoint. Before I left I said – and I do not believe that they will take it amiss of me if I repeat what I said – that I could not take orders from anyone in this regard. I can take orders only from you Mr Speaker, and from this Parliament.

WESTERN STATEMENTS AT U N CONFERENCE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA AT MAPUTO, MOZAMBIQUE, MAY 1977

A. Statement on Zimbabwe and Namibia by the UK Minister of State on behalf of the nine members of the EEC, on 17 May 1977

I should like first to speak as a representative of the Government currently exercising the Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the European Community. I wish to reaffirm emphatically that the nine countries of the European Community will do everything possible to promote democratic majority rule and an end to racism and racial discrimination in both Zimbabwe and Namibia. We uphold the rights of the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia to self determination and independence and to the enjoyment of the basic rights set out in the universal declaration of human rights.

Our countries are committed to an energetic and urgent search for peaceful change in both the countries being considered by this Conference. In the case of Rhodesia we are convinced that the illegal minority regime in Salisbury must take up the chance that remains to achieve a peaceful transition to majority rule. The alternative would be a further escalation of violence, which would have tragic consequences. The nine countries of the European Community believe that the illegal regime must accept unambiguously that Rhodesia should come to independence as Zimbabwe on a basis of majority rule in 1978, and that Mr Smith should negotiate to this end without further delay. We have noted with appreciation the willingness of the nationalist movements of Zimbabwe to join in negotiations and we hope that they will recognise the need to reassure all elements of the population that there is a place for them in the country after independence.

The Nine reiterate that Mr Smith's illegal regime can expect no assistance of any kind from them and reconfirm that they are continuing to comply strictly with their obligations relating to sanctions. Our partners in the European Community continue to offer full support to all the efforts being made by the United Kingdom and others to produce an early negotiated settlement.

The views of the nine governments of the European Community on the question of Namibia are well known and were stated in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly on 24 November last year. The Nine believed that South Africa should withdraw from Namibia at an early date and that the inhabitants of Namibia should exercise their right to self determination and independence. The exercise of this right should consist of the

opportunity of expressing their views on the political and constitutional future of the territory as a whole, through a fully democratic process under the supervision of the United Nations. All political groups in Namibia including notably SWAPO should be given full freedom to engage in peaceful political activities throughout the territory during the process of self determination, which should include a single election or referendum organised on a territory-wide basis and with full respect for the territorial integrity of Namibia. To this end all political prisoners should be released and exiles permitted to return.

The nine governments conveyed their views to the South African Government in a demarche on 7 February. They did so because of reports that some form of internal self government might shortly be established in Namibia, based on recommendations of the Turnhalle Conference. The Turnhalle Conference is no substitute for the necessary involvement of all political groups in Namibia, including SWAPO. The nine governments renew their appeal to all parties, including the Government of South Africa and SWAPO to explore all possibilities which might lead to an internationally acceptable solution. In their view any such solution must be based upon the provisions of Security Council Resolution 385 and they welcome any initiatives designed to achieve that end.

B. Extracts from a statement by the UK Minister of State on 17 May 1977

First

Britain must stand up for and be counted as a nation that upholds and backs the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of people in Southern Africa. There can be no equivocation, no temporising on that principle. It is *no part* of our policy to defend the rule of a small minority in Rhodesia or elsewhere. Britain has stood absolutely firm these last 11 years on the principle of no independence before majority rule. I want to tell the Conference that the British Government have endeavoured to uphold and enforce sanctions and shall continue to do so until majority rule and independence is achieved in Zimbabwe. We too, like Mozambique and Zambia, and other neighbouring countries, have made sacrifices.

Second

These must not be allowed to become issues of super power politics. We are not cold war warriors – strategists who talk of the peoples of Southern Africa as pawns in some sort of great international chess match. Our sole concern is the real interests and wishes of the people. Those interests, those wishes should be our

only guide. There should be no place in Africa for those who pursue other aims, other objectives, seeking to carve out new spheres of influence. The British Government believes in genuine non-alignment.

Third

Britain in conjunction with its European partners and the international community must play its full part in bridging the gap between the developed and developing world. This is of great significance in the context of Southern Africa. The Lomé Convention ensured a meaningful economic relationship between the poorest in Southern Africa and the EEC. Through the important fora of UNCTAD and CIEC we shall seek to ensure that the policies of the developed world give meaningful consideration to the needs of Southern Africa. Through bilateral aid we have sought to alleviate some of the heavy burden of enforcing sanctions. We shall continue to do so.

Fourth

We believe that ways must be found to resolve the remaining problems of Rhodesia and Namibia (as well as the racial conflict in South Africa) by negotiation. This is the heart of our policy. Southern Africa represents the greatest challenge to the approach we now uphold. Our whole policy is based on the belief that freedom can and should be established by negotiation rather than by the gun; that the aspirations and wishes of the people of these two countries can and should be determined by consent and not by dictation. Many in Africa in recent years despairing of the long and arduous process of negotiation have turned increasingly to the armed struggle.

We fully recognise the frustrations and the repression which drive people to the armed struggle. But for us there can be only one way to assist in freeing the suppressed majority, to ensure that in their freedom they have a choice as to what sort of society they wish to create. For it is not for any of us here today or for some unrepresentative white minority to determine who is truly representative of the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia – it is for the peoples of those countries themselves to decide. To decide by still the best method of divining the wishes of people – by their vote. We firmly believe in the negotiated settlement as a feasible and indeed the right way to achieve independence – and a way which will guarantee a solution which will achieve the aspirations of all the people.

.....

Despite the setbacks and disappointments – particularly of the last 12 months – we believe that the new initiative launched by David Owen, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, could achieve the goal we all seek.

- Let me spell out the nature of the initiative: our aim is majority rule and independence in 1978 following free and fair elections to choose the Government of an independent Zimbabwe;
- My Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has just despatched a special representative to the area to begin a round of intensive consultations with all the parties concerned. These consultations will be carried out in close co-operation with the United States Government. Following these consultations a Constitution will be drafted and presented to the British Parliament;
- That Constitution will ensure majority rule and safeguard the fundamental human rights of all Zimbabweans of whatever race;
- The Constitution duly authorised by the British Parliament will, we hope, receive the full backing and support of our friends in Africa, the United States and our EEC partners.

If the full weight of Africa, Europe and the United States is thrown behind it, I do not believe it will be possible for any small unrepresentative minority to stand in the way of its implementation. We believe that majority rule and independence can be achieved in 1978. Let there be no doubt that this process will be irrevocable and irreversible.

Just as we believe that we can achieve majority rule and independence for Zimbabwe in 1978 by negotiation, so also we believe it is possible to achieve freedom in Namibia too.

Let me remind the Conference of where we stand. Along with other members of the Security Council, Britain endorses the principles of Security Council Resolution 385. The Resolution lays down the fundamental principles which must underline any process by which Namibia achieves independence. Those principles include:

- Territory wide elections under UN supervision and control;
- The free participation of all political groups including in particular SWAPO;
- The release of all political prisoners.

Our efforts – the efforts of the five Western powers and members of the Security Council in recent weeks – have been directed to ensuring that any steps towards establishing an independent Namibia must agree with these principles. It is difficult to assess

whether we are going to be successful. But we believe it may be possible to reach agreement on the basis of genuinely free elections to set up a constituent assembly which can decide upon an independence constitution. We must press on with this. The prize of a peaceful and genuinely democratic process to establish a free and independent Namibia is too great to jeopardise. How much more can be achieved if the people of Namibia were to sit down together in a real representative and democratic constituent assembly.

Mr President, Britain cares, Britain will work urgently for a negotiated settlement – for a free and independent Zimbabwe and Namibia by the end of 1978. The British Government accepts a special responsibility for Rhodesia. The British Government will not, has never walked away from the great responsibility on seeking justice, liberty and independence for Zimbabwe. We are no Pontius Pilates – seeking to wash our hands of the problems of Southern Africa, shrugging off our responsibility to Zimbabwe. It is as Jim Callaghan has said – a debt of honour to bring to an end the illegal Smith regime – to establish a truly independent Zimbabwe based on that fundamental principle – majority rule, a Zimbabwe in which all its people irrespective of race can work together to build a new future for their country ...

C. Statement made on behalf of the five Western members of the Security Council by the US delegation at the final session of the Conference on 21 May 1977

1. The Western members of the Security Council – Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, the UK and the US – came to this Conference for three reasons:

- (a) We wanted to show solidarity with African states on these two key issues of Namibia and Zimbabwe.
- (b) We wanted to seize this unique opportunity to explain our African policies. Since any African policy must begin with Southern Africa, we wanted the opportunity to explain to the countries and movements most directly concerned the initiatives we have taken and the strategy we have followed.
- (c) Finally, we wanted to listen to and understand African views on these critical subjects. We recognise that our assistance will not be effective unless the parties most directly involved understand our purpose and feel free to convey their reactions.

From all three points of view we assess the Conference as remarkably successful. The Conference marks a new stage in the liberation of Namibia and Zimbabwe. More than 90 countries

came to declare their solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe and Namibia. This collective expression of international determination is a sign that the process of liberation is moving to a new and culminating phase. We have found others willing to listen to our point of view and we have benefited from theirs. We see ourselves working for the same goals, even when we choose different means from those preferred by others.

2. As you all know, over the past several weeks the five Western members of the Security Council have together advanced an initiative to resolve the Namibia problem. The Western members of the Security Council informed the South African Government that any settlement in Namibia must be consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 385. We left no doubt that an absence of progress towards an internationally acceptable solution would have serious consequences for South Africa.

3. In the case of the United States, President Carter confirmed the US's own policy in more detail. In a statement made in Los Angeles on 18 May 1977, he stated that unless there was progress on Namibia, the United States would be compelled to take strong action in the United Nations.

4. The position of the Western members of the Security Council is therefore clear. In the light of the initiative we have taken, we find ourselves unable to associate ourselves with a number of the provisions of the draft declaration and of the programme of action. To do so would prejudice the results of negotiations which have brought about the most promising start in years of effort to resolve the Namibian problem. We take a similar position regarding the co-operative negotiation effort of the British and the US on Zimbabwe. The bulk of the draft declaration however, represents our views, it also represents a remarkable effort to convey to those who have blocked progress in the past that there is a degree of commitment and a depth of solidarity on this issue which are unprecedented.

5. We recognise that progress must be made urgently on these problems, we understand that the issues of Namibia and Zimbabwe are entering a new and final stage where one path leads to increased violence and the other to peaceful settlement.

6. So while we cannot associate ourselves with a number of the provisions of the declaration, we regard it as an important mark in history, one which helps us understand our own responsibilities as members of the Security Council and powers interested in peaceful change and racial progress in Southern Africa. We commend its authors and we praise the organisers of this Conference. Both have helped bring the day of freedom closer than it has ever been.

ISSUE OF LESOTHO/TRANSKEI BORDER

A. Letter dated 12 November 1976 to the UN Secretary-General from the Chairman of the African Group and Permanent Representative of Libya

I have the honour, on behalf of the African Group at the United Nations, to draw your attention to the explosive situation created by the recent closure by the South African racist régime of the border between South Africa and the southern border of Lesotho adjacent to the so-called independent Transkei.

The closure of the border on 26 October 1976 is calculated to arm-twist Lesotho into according recognition to the bantustan Transkei which is an appendage of the apartheid Government of South Africa.

The African Group views with the greatest concern the serious adverse economic effects which this action taken by the racist régime in Pretoria has on Lesotho. If the situation is allowed to continue for any length of time, over a third of the population of Lesotho will be deprived of its basic needs such as food and medical supplies. Moreover, export commodities could not be sent out owing to the mountain ranges that separate the area affected from the rest of the country and render communication impossible.

South Africa's action is a flagrant breach of international law which stipulates safe passage of transit goods to and from land-locked countries.

The situation in that area does not only pose a serious economic problem to the people of Lesotho but constitutes a threat to the peace and security in that region.

The African Group strongly maintains that the international community must assume its responsibility to give every support required by Lesotho for its existence and the welfare of its people. The Government of that country should not be left alone to be cowed down by the Pretoria régime because of Lesotho's abhorrence of the policy of apartheid in South Africa and its full support of all United Nations resolutions, in particular General Assembly resolution 31/6 A of 26 October 1976 in which the Assembly rejected the so-called independence granted by the racist régime in South Africa and called upon all governments to deny any form of recognition to the so-called independent Transkei and to refrain from having any dealings with the so-called independent Transkei.

B. Letter dated 16 November 1976 to the UN Secretary-General from the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr The Hon. Hilgard Muller

The African Group at the United Nations has alleged that South Africa has closed the border of Lesotho adjacent to the Republic of Transkei and that this constitutes "a flagrant breach of international law which stipulates safe passage of transit goods to and from landlocked countries" (A/31/329, S/12227).

The Republic of Transkei has already denied that it has closed the borders between Lesotho and Transkei, but merely insists, as is its right, on valid travel documents for people crossing the border into Transkei.

The allegation that South Africa has breached international law is completely without foundation. The South African Government has taken no action of any kind to interfere in any way with the safe passage either of transit goods or of persons crossing the borders between the Republic of South Africa and Lesotho. This continues to flow normally at all established points of entry on the border between South Africa and Lesotho.

It is also pointed out that, as a land-locked country, Lesotho's normal access to the sea lies through the Republic of South Africa along existing road and rail routes and not through the Republic of Transkei. There has been no interference of any kind with Lesotho's use of access along these routes.

A/31/332

**C. Resolution 402 (1976)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 1982nd meeting,
on 22 December 1976**

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Lesotho on 21 December 1976,

Gravely concerned at the serious situation created by South Africa's closure of certain border posts between South Africa and Lesotho aimed at coercing Lesotho into according recognition to the bantustan Transkei,

Recalling relevant General Assembly resolutions, in particular resolution 3411 D (XXX), condemning the establishment of bantustans and calling on all Governments not to recognize the bantustans,

Recalling further General Assembly resolution 31/6 A on the so-called independent Transkei and other bantustans, which,

inter alia, calls upon all Governments to deny any form of recognition to the so-called independent Transkei and to refrain from having any dealings with the so-called independent Transkei or other bantustans,

Noting with appreciation the decision of the Government of Lesotho not to recognize the Transkei bantustan in compliance with United Nations decisions,

Considering that the decision of Lesotho constitutes an important contribution to the realization of United Nations objectives in southern Africa in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations,

Taking note of the urgent and special economic needs of Lesotho arising from the closure of the border posts,

1. *Endorses* General Assembly resolution 31/6 A, which, *inter alia*, calls upon all Governments to deny any form of recognition to the so-called independent Transkei and to refrain from having any dealings with the so-called independent Transkei or other bantustans;

2. *Commends* the Government of Lesotho for its decision not to recognize the so-called independence of Transkei;

3. *Condemns* any action by South Africa intended to coerce Lesotho into according recognition to the bantustan Transkei;

4. *Calls upon* South Africa to take immediately all necessary steps to reopen those border posts;

5. *Appeals* to all States to provide immediate financial, technical and material assistance to Lesotho so that it can carry out its economic development programmes and enhance its capacity to implement fully the United Nations resolutions on apartheid and bantustans;

6. *Requests* the United Nations and the organizations and programmes concerned, in particular the United Nations Development Programme, the World Food Programme and all the United Nations specialized agencies, to assist Lesotho in the present situation and to consider periodically the question of economic assistance to Lesotho as envisaged in the present resolution;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in collaboration with the appropriate organizations of the United Nations system, to organize, with immediate effect, all forms of financial, technical and material assistance to the Kingdom of Lesotho to enable it to overcome the economic difficulties arising from the closure of the border posts by South Africa due to the refusal of Lesotho to recognize the so-called independence of Transkei;

8. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to keep the situation under constant review to maintain close liaison with Member States, regional and other intergovernmental organizations, the

specialized agencies and international financial institutions, and to report to the Security Council at its subsequent meeting on the question;

9. *Decides* to remain seized of the question.

**STATEMENT TO THE SENATE BY THE RHODESIAN
PRIME MINISTER, THE HON. IAN D. SMITH,
ON 9 DECEMBER 1975**

It is a year almost to the day since my statement¹ to the nation describing Rhodesia's participation in what had become known as *détente* in Southern Africa. I consider it appropriate that I should take advantage of this opportunity to review some of the events since that statement was made, and to give an indication of likely future developments.

It will be recalled that in that statement I referred to serious difficulties which had arisen after the content of the discussions in Lusaka the previous week had been conveyed to me. These, as you are aware, were subsequently resolved.

The problem was caused mainly by the introduction of the pre-condition that any agreement reached must provide an immediate black majority in Rhodesia and that no other settlement would be supported. This was quite unacceptable to us, and was contrary to the agreement which had been made. Therefore, I had no compunction in rejecting this approach from Lusaka.

As I stated, I then received assurances to the effect, firstly, that terrorist activity in Rhodesia would cease immediately and, secondly, that the proposed constitutional conference would take place without any pre-conditions.

I turn now to the meeting which took place in Pretoria on August 9 1975. At this meeting a document was signed by the representatives of the Rhodesian, South African and Zambian Governments. This document, which became known as the Pretoria Agreement, paved the way for the historic Victoria Falls meeting on August 25.

It specified, amongst other things, that the constitutional conference would take place without any pre-conditions. Despite the clear terms of this agreement a further attempt was made at the Victoria Falls meeting to introduce the pre-condition of immediate majority rule. This was done in total disregard of the warning to both parties given by the South African Prime Minister to the effect that any departure from the terms of the Pretoria Agreement and, in particular, any attempt to introduce pre-conditions, would lead to failure of the conference. His prognostication proved to be correct. However, in keeping with the record of this Government we never ceased in our efforts to bring Rhodesians together at the conference table.

In the past six weeks I have had a series of meetings with the President of the ANC culminating in the signing, last Monday, of

¹) See *Southern Africa Record*, No. 4, February 1976

an agreement covering procedural aspects of the constitutional discussions.

The terms, which have been made public, are in keeping with the letter and spirit of the Pretoria Agreement. They should make it possible for us to proceed now with meaningful constitutional discussions which we, for our part, have been endeavouring to get under way since last year.

These discussions will, of course, be without pre-conditions but I regret to say that I have noted, in the recently reported remarks of some leaders in and outside Rhodesia, a further attempt to introduce this particular pre-condition of immediate majority rule. I therefore find it necessary once again to reassure the people of Rhodesia on this score, and to state categorically that any such solution is quite unacceptable.

I and my colleagues will go into these constitutional talks determined to do our best to reach a solution that will provide stability and security for our country as a whole and will safeguard the rights and the interests of all the people and all the population groups which comprise our country.

This will be no easy task and I do not anticipate a quick result. There will be many conflicting interests and opposing points of view to be reconciled. They will only be resolved if both sides show restraint, patience and goodwill.

The prospects of success will be diminished by the activities of the many enemies who have a vested interest in trying to ensure that the negotiations fail. There are some, in particular certain Rhodesian Africans outside the country, who see a terrorist victory in Rhodesia as the only means whereby their particular group could achieve its aim of gaining control over the country.

There are others – shadowy Marxist figures in the background – who regard the subjugation of Rhodesia as a prime and essential prerequisite to the attainment of their ultimate objective, which is the domination of the entire sub-continent including, finally the Republic of South Africa herself.

Recent events in Angola have illustrated only too clearly the eagerness of the Communists to capitalise on chaos, on weakness, on lack of determination and on lack of preparedness. Let me assure you that we have no intention whatever of allowing such conditions to develop in Rhodesia.

It passes my understanding, however, that the countries of the West should apparently be so blind to the strategic implications of the Communist intervention in Angola.

In Rhodesia we have been subjected to threats and propaganda for so many years that we have grown accustomed to them. Today we are again being subjected to threats that unless we capitulate and hand over to black majority rule a fresh terrorist campaign

will be mounted against our country, and that whereas in the past terrorists came in by the hundred, in any future campaign they will come in by the thousand.

I have no wish to meet threat with counter-threat but I believe that our achievements in the anti-terrorist campaign, during the last three years, should leave all concerned in no doubt whatever regarding both our determination to strike back and our ability to do so.

There are those who propagate the theory that it is impossible to defeat terrorism and therefore the sooner one gives in to the demands of terrorism the easier life will be for all concerned. There is no place in Rhodesia for such defeatism, which is based on the course of events in Moçambique, Angola and such other countries. It is necessary for us to keep reminding those who may be misled that the circumstances in Rhodesia are very different.

Here there is no metropolitan power to surrender on our behalf; here we have a determined people who have a real stake in the country and who are prepared to fight if necessary, not only to defend their own homes and farms, but also to protect the tribes-people who are the principal victims of terrorism.

The latest atrocity committed against innocent Africans must be almost unrivalled for sheer bestiality, but I am afraid it is too much to expect that it will have any effect on those misguided people – churchmen and others – who give the terrorists financial and moral support.

Lest there should be any misunderstanding, let me repeat very clearly that in drawing attention to our determination to defend our country, I am threatening nobody. On the contrary, we have extended the hand of friendship not only to the African people of Rhodesia, but also to our neighbouring countries.

As I said a year ago, it is clearly to the mutual advantage of all of us to co-operate where we can without any political strings being attached. Nevertheless, there are people in this world who should be warned against the folly of misinterpreting our reasonableness and desire for fair play, as a sign of weakness.

Judging from the extravagant and boastful claims which are being made about future terrorist incursions, I believe it pertinent to remind them of past history, and of how others before them have misjudged the situation in Rhodesia. For more than ten years now Rhodesians have listened to a constant stream of bragging as to what terrorists were planning to do in Rhodesia.

But what are the facts? In the past when terrorists entered Rhodesia by the hundred, they were killed by the hundred – as the record shows, many hundreds have died. If in the future they decide to come in by the thousand, then they will be killed by the thousand.

Let me now turn to the Commission on Racial Discrimination, on which two Hon. Senator Chiefs are serving. This has aroused considerable interest, and I am pleased to note that evidence is coming forward from a wide spectrum of political opinion.

Some African politicians have seen fit to sneer at the Commission, but I would ask them to think again, because this Commission is an expression of the Government's sincerity in implementing the call which I made last December for all Rhodesians to put behind us the differences and recriminations of the past, and to look to the future. It is a genuine attempt to find answers to some of our problems, the complexity of which is illustrated by the wide range of evidence presented to the Commission.

With a view to setting the tone for the forthcoming talks, let me urge once again that we should all do our best to establish a climate of mutual respect in which constitutional matters can be discussed calmly and objectively in the hope that we shall be able to reach a settlement which will be in the interests of all Rhodesians.

Contrary to a great deal of local speculation, there has not been one word of negotiation on the terms of a new constitution. It is incredible to me how the mass communications media insist on misrepresenting the true position. My attention was drawn recently to a local paper, noted for its alarmist reports which seldom bear any resemblance to the true facts, where the whole issue was based on speculation as to what had taken place so far in the meetings between Government and the ANC. The whole issue was a complete travesty of the truth.

At all of these meetings members of the Cabinet secretarial staff have been present and minutes of the meetings have been taken. These will be published at the correct time and the record will substantiate what I have said, and clearly show the mischievous distortions perpetrated by certain publications in what can only be described as an attempt to misdirect the public of Rhodesia.

In conclusion, Hon. Senator Chiefs will be deeply interested and concerned in what takes place because they bear a heavy responsibility for the tribesmen of whom they are traditional leaders. Let me reassure them that they and their colleagues on the Council of Chiefs will be kept informed about the progress of the talks and will be consulted in regard to any constitutional decisions which may be taken.

RHODESIAN STATEMENT OF INTENT ISSUED IN SALISBURY ON 29 MARCH 1977

Since the Pretoria Agreement was accepted in September, 1976, an erroneous belief has grown up that the Government has accepted that there will be majority rule within two years. This belief is wrong.

The position is that the Government accepted majority rule within a period of two years but only as part of a comprehensive package deal. This period would only start after an interim government had been set up in terms of the Anglo-American Agreement.

There is no commitment to unqualified majority rule in isolation.

Recent developments in Southern Africa, in particular the concentrated Russian expansion which has been made clear by the presence of the Cubans in Angola and the establishment of a Marxist/Leninist State in Mozambique, have made a peaceful solution to the internal Rhodesian issue essential. The stated aims of these States, of their diabolical mission to bring communism to Africa and especially to subjugate the whole of the sub-continent of Southern Africa, more than ever make imperative a political settlement which will maintain the stability of sound government in Rhodesia in the interests of all Rhodesians. The Government's objectives are therefore quite clear:

1. To negotiate a Constitution which must effectively guarantee the rights of minority groups in such a way that they cannot be abolished or rendered ineffective, as has been the case in other parts of Africa and elsewhere.
2. To guarantee the safety of all citizens by ensuring that a Police Force acting directly within the terms of the law will be maintained.
3. To ensure the independence of the judiciary.
4. That the security of the State will be guaranteed by armed forces who owe allegiance to the State only and not to a political party or individual.
5. To guarantee that the rights of individuals will always be respected.
6. To preserve the Administration in the form of the Civil Service which must continue in office and that the terms under which its members are employed be honoured by any future government.
7. To ensure economic stability and progress by means of private enterprise and the right to private property.

Text from *Focus on Rhodesia* vol. 2 no. 4, published by the Rhodesian Ministry of Information.

8. To provide equal opportunities for all.
9. To agree on a Constitution in which the representation of the views of all Rhodesians will be democratically and fairly expressed.

We are, moreover, irrevocably determined that the country will not be surrendered to the forces of chaos and revolution.

The war will be pursued with the utmost vigour until we have destroyed the terrorists.