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**WHAT DO
WE THINK?**

A survey of white opinion
on foreign policy issues

No. 3

DEON GELDENHUYS

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The first two surveys of white opinion on foreign policy issues, also entitled What Do We Think?, were published by the SAIIA in 1982 and 1984. The present Paper is the third in what is intended to be a biennial series of similar surveys.

It should be noted that any opinions expressed in this Paper are the responsibility of the author and not of the SAIIA.

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CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. SURVEY METHOD	3
3. CARRY A BIG STICK IN A DANGEROUS WORLD: PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT AND COUNTER-MEASURES	5
3.1 Some still like us (just the way we are)	5
3.2 The threat that can never be taken too seriously ... Reagan's efforts notwithstanding	7
3.3 The threat from across the Limpopo	9
3.4 Marxists were among our best friends	10
3.5 On sanctions, retaliation and reform	12
3.6 The hottest pursuit	13
3.7 Don't feed the hand that bites	14
3.8 SWAPO: jaw, jaw or war, war	15
3.9 Cross-tabulation: checking on consistency	18
4. DARK TIMES AHEAD: PERCEPTIONS OF DOMESTIC CONFLICT	20
4.1 The "terros" are coming	20
4.2 The power is still ours	21
4.3 'We have the happiest Africans in the world ... but we cannot trust them'	21
4.4 Don't give the generals more money	24
5. VERKRAMPTE HAWKS AND VERLIGTE DOVES: CORRELATIONS OF OPINIONS ON DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN ISSUES	26
6. CONCLUSION	32

ANNEXURE

1. INTRODUCTION

This is the third in a series of surveys of white South African opinion on foreign policy issues. Commissioned by the South African Institute of International Affairs, the first survey was conducted in 1982 and the second two years later. It is the only series of its kind in South Africa, measuring the opinion of white South Africans primarily on foreign policy issues.

From the outset, the intention has been to repeat the survey at regular intervals of approximately two years. Only in this way can one try to establish trends in public opinion. This being our third survey, we are already in a position to identify some significant consistencies and shifts in white opinion on key foreign policy issues.

All three surveys have been conducted for the SAIIA by Market and Opinion Surveys (Pty) Ltd (M & M) of Durbarville, Cape.

As the title of our series indicates, the surveys have all been confined to the opinion of Whites. The reasons for this limitation - which may be open to criticism - are explained in some detail in the 1984 survey. Because the same considerations by and large still apply today, we will not repeat that discussion here.

Because of recent political developments affecting South Africa's foreign relations and also its domestic situation, we decided to amend or omit some questions that appeared in the 1984 survey in preparing the present study. We have also added a number of new questions. Twelve basic questions - constituting the core of our surveys - have however remained unchanged throughout. This will enable us to compare respondents' threat perceptions and their 'hawkish' or 'doveish' inclinations over a period of years. We will again be able to examine correlations between opinion on foreign policy issues and on certain contentious domestic political matters.

In the two year interval between our first and second surveys, a number of political developments occurred that seemed to have had an impact on white opinion (or perhaps changes in opinion influenced events to some extent). On the domestic front, the major development was the new constitutional arrangement for Whites, Coloureds and Indians. Externally, South Africans were preoccupied with events in their immediate region. The turbulent years of 'destabilisation' appeared to give way to a new climate of peace, highlighted in the Nkomati Accord signed between South Africa and Mozambique in March 1984.

By comparison, the last two years (between surveys two and three) have probably witnessed even more profound changes affecting South Africa's fortunes at home and abroad. Domestically, the dominant issue has been the protracted racial unrest and violence, following in the wake of the new constitutional deal. The South African economy has been taking a battering with an unprecedented drop in the rand's value against most major currencies and a soaring inflation rate. On top of this, South Africa has been plunged into a foreign debt crisis, forcing Pretoria to declare a unilateral standstill on debt repayments (since agreed to by the major foreign creditor banks). The debt crisis was triggered by decisions of foreign banks not to roll over existing loans to South Africa - moves heavily influenced by concern over prospects for political stability in the Republic. Politically inspired economic pressure also manifested itself in the mounting disinvestment campaign in the United States. Although the US government has not (yet)

imposed official restrictions on American investment in South Africa, the Administration has banned loans by US financial institutions to the South African government or its agencies (with certain exceptions). A number of other governments, including the French and Swedish, have recently placed restrictions on investment in South Africa.

Inside the Southern African region, the Republic experienced mixed fortunes. The Nkomati Accord was at one stage placed in severe jeopardy by Pretoria's admitted violations of the agreement. Since then, relations between South Africa and Mozambique seem to have improved sufficiently to give Nkomati a new lease of life. There were also severe tensions in the Republic's relations with Botswana and Lesotho, caused by Pretoria's concern over the alleged presence of ANC insurgents in these countries. In June 1985, South African commandos raided ANC targets in Gaborone. Lesotho in December 1985-January 1986 found itself the target of a virtual economic blockade imposed by South Africa, the object clearly being to force the Jonathan government to expel ANC members from the country. Pretoria in the end probably got more than it had bargained for: a new policy and a new government in Maseru.

It is against this background that the findings of our latest survey should be judged. On the whole, the 1986 results are more consistent with those of 1982 than of 1984. This means some strengthening in threat perceptions over the past two years, returning to the levels of 1982. Yet at the same time there are strong conciliatory elements too, notably in talks with SWAPO and even with the ANC. Furthermore, the verligte trend in domestic political issues already evident in our second survey, has been maintained in the third. So external threat consciousness cum hawkishness exist side by side with domestic verligtheid cum doveishness.

2. SURVEY METHOD

All three surveys were conducted by means of self-completion questionnaires sent to M & M's nationally representative white consumer panel. The panel for the 1986 survey consisted of approximately 2 000 members, of whom 1 799 or 90% returned their questionnaires. As in the second survey, it was necessary to apply a slight weighting procedure to ensure that the demographic characteristics of the sample corresponded with those of the total white population. The weighting has a negligible effect on the results of the survey.

The questionnaires for the latest survey were sent out in late December 1985, nearly two years after the previous study. The bulk of the responses were received in January 1986. (We will therefore refer to this as the 1986 survey.)

Criticism can admittedly be levelled against the use of both an existing consumer panel (instead of a sample drawn specifically for our survey) and postal questionnaires (as opposed to personal interviews). In our report on the 1984 survey, we addressed these questions, showing that M & M's own political surveys have over the years proved the reliability of this particular survey method.

A final note of explanation about the method used on our surveys concerns the composition of M & M's panel of respondents. Approximately one-third of the panel members is replaced each year. This means that, at the very most, half the members on the 1984 panel would still have been on the panel for the present survey.

The composition of the 1986 sample according to standard population characteristics is as follows:

<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
	1 799	100
<u>SEX</u>		
Male	912	50,7
Female	887	49,3
<u>AGE (years)</u>		
16-24	396	22,0
25-34	430	23,9
35-49	460	25,6
50 and older	513	28,5
<u>LANGUAGE</u>		
Afrikaans	1 013	56,3
English	785	43,7
<u>HOUSEHOLD INCOME (p.m.)</u>		
A R2 500 and above	367	20,4
B R1 400-R2 499	590	32,8
C R600-R1 399	590	32,8
D R599 and below	252	14,0
<u>GEOGRAPHIC SPREAD</u>		
Cape Province	495	27,5
Transvaal	943	52,4
Orange Free State	124	6,9
Natal	237	13,2

A party political breakdown of the present sample - based on responses to a question on how respondents would vote if a general election were held now (i.e. December 1985) - produces the following figures:

N = 1 433*

<u>PARTY</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
National Party (NP)	802	56,0
Progressive Federal Party (PFP)	336	23,4
Conservative Party (CP)	199	13,9
Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP)	61	4,3
New Republic Party (NRP)	35	2,4

* Of the total sample of 1 799 respondents, 89,4% were registered voters, but 9,7% of them indicated that they would not vote - thus the figure of 1 433.

As far as the questionnaire itself is concerned (see annexure), it has already been mentioned that a dozen key questions from our two earlier surveys were repeated in the present study. Certain changes were made to the 1986 questionnaire in an effort to make it as topical as possible, without making the questionnaire significantly longer (since that would have financial implications for the sponsor). Probably the major omission from the third survey is the first section of the earlier questionnaires, which was designed to measure respondents' knowledge of foreign affairs. We found the responses to the questions highly conventional and predictable and thus hardly instructive. It was therefore decided to substitute these general knowledge questions with a set of questions on the perceived disposition of some foreign leaders vis-à-vis South Africa. We have also inserted questions, or rather statements, on such topical foreign policy issues as sanctions against South Africa and Soviet involvement in Southern Africa.

As in our previous surveys, the present study also includes a number of statements on contentious domestic political issues. Except for one minor change - referring to black representation in Parliament - we repeated all the 1984 questions on internal policies. We have also added statements on two crucial issues, viz. the authorities' ability to control the unrest situation and the need for talks between the government and the ANC. In our surveys, we are not so much interested in the responses to statements on domestic issues per se. The object of the exercise is rather to try to find correlations between opinions on domestic and foreign policy issues.

3. CARRY A BIG STICK IN A DANGEROUS WORLD: PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT AND COUNTER-MEASURES

Respondents were presented with a total of 21 statements, of which seven did not appear in either of the earlier surveys. They could again choose any one of four response options: 'definitely agree', 'inclined to agree', 'inclined to disagree' and 'definitely disagree'. In the subsequent discussion, the terms 'agree' and 'disagree' will mostly be used, each being a combination of the 'inclined to' and 'definitely' agree/disagree responses. The very small 'no response'/'unsure' percentages are not indicated in any of the following tables, but they can be calculated from the figures given.

3.1 Some still like us (just the way we are)

In a new set of questions, respondents were asked to indicate agreement or disagreement with the statement that a number of foreign leaders 'are favourably disposed towards South Africa'. In order of favour - based on the percentage agreement with the statement - the five leaders were rated as follows:

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher	86,3
President Ronald Reagan	86,0
President Kenneth Kaunda	13,2
President Francois Mitterand	7,7
Prime Minister Bob Hawke	6,8

Of those agreeing that Mrs Thatcher was favourably disposed towards the Republic, only about 29% indicated definite agreement - a marginally higher proportion than in the case of President Reagan. This would suggest at least some measure of doubt in respondents' minds as to whether these two leaders are in fact so friendly towards South Africa. (In the case of President Reagan, his announcement in September 1985 of limited economic sanctions against South Africa may have influenced some respondents' views.) There were far fewer doubts about Mr Hawke's attitude towards South Africa. Of the 90,8% of the respondents who disagreed with the statement above, a full 50,8% expressed definite disagreement - by far the highest proportion of respondents to select a 'definite' response option to any of the five questions.

Perhaps the only surprise among these findings is that President Kaunda is rated higher than both the French and Australian leaders. Although white South Africans are overwhelmingly of the opinion that he does not mean well with the Republic, they apparently regard him as less of a villain than the leaders of two countries with which South Africa has fairly extensive historical, cultural and economic ties. This rather astonishing response is difficult to explain, considering that President Kaunda is an old and outspoken critic of South Africa's domestic and regional policies and moreover openly hosts the ANC in his country. Perhaps white South Africans have become accustomed to the Zambian leader's utterances and do not take them too seriously. The other two leaders' views on South Africa do not quite fit the traditional pattern and are probably not what white South Africans would expect them to be. So it might be that respondents were rather painfully aware of a sharp deterioration in both Paris' and Canberra's relations with Pretoria, a fact they attribute to the leaders in power in France and Australia.

There are some interesting variations of opinion among the different sub-groups. More male than female respondents agreed that both Mrs Thatcher

and President Reagan were favourably disposed towards South Africa - in each case a difference of roughly 10%. As far as the language groups are concerned, their responses to only two of the questions show notable differences. Nearly 90% of the English-speaking respondents agreed that Prime Minister Thatcher was favourably oriented towards South Africa - 6% more than Afrikaans-speakers. English-speakers by contrast took a dimmer view of Mr Hawke's position on South Africa: a mere 4,8% of them agreed with our statement, compared to 8,2% of the Afrikaans-speaking respondents.

The variable of age produced few meaningful differences in response. We need only note that the oldest of the four age groups (50 and over) registered the highest measure of agreement with the statement on both President Reagan's and Mrs Thatcher's attitude towards South Africa (88,1% and 90,5% respectively).

The responses of the highest income group (R2 500 p.m. and above) to four of the five questions under consideration, are readily distinguishable from those of the three remaining income groups. The most affluent group showed the greatest degree of support for the statement on the British and American leaders' position on the Republic (88,9% and 89,3% respectively), and also the lowest level of agreement regarding Mr Hawke (3,8%) and President Mitterand (3,3%).

The remarkable overall consistency in the responses of the various sub-groups was maintained in the case of their geographic location. Only two particular responses were 'deviant' enough to deserve mention. Although fully 75,8% of respondents in the Orange Free State agreed that President Reagan was favourably disposed towards South Africa, this figure is considerably lower than the measure of agreement registered in the other provinces and is also 10% below the overall level of agreement on this particular question (86,0%). Natal respondents were somehow not quite as convinced as those of the other provinces of President Mitterand's animosity towards South Africa. Whereas a mere 7,7% of all respondents supported our statement on the French leader's favourable disposition, nearly double that number of Natalians indicated agreement. Perhaps we could add that the provincial responses to the statement on President Kaunda's attitude revealed minimal variations; only the Transvaal respondents returned a lower percentage agreement (12,1) than the national average (13,2).

It is only among supporters of the various political parties that we find sharp differences of opinion regarding the foreign leaders' stances on South Africa. The most revealing variations of opinion are found between HNP supporters on the one hand and followers of the four other parties on the other hand. Consider the following table showing the number of party supporters expressing agreement with the statement that the five foreign leaders 'are favourably disposed towards South Africa':

	NP	PFPP	CP	NRP	HNP
Mrs Thatcher	90,3%	89,3%	76,3%	91,4%	70,5%
President Reagan	92,3%	84,5%	83,4%	97,1%	49,2%
President Kaunda	12,8%	11,3%	12,1%	11,4%	17,7%
President Mitterand	7,0%	5,1%	12,6%	2,9%	16,4%
Mr Hawke	7,9%	3,5%	9,5%	0,0%	3,2%

Perhaps the most striking feature of HNP responses, is the severe scepticism about President Reagan's bona fides; exactly the same proportion of HNP followers (49,2%) in fact disagreed with our statement concerning the American leader. Afrikaner right-wingers have traditionally harboured deep

suspicions about American liberalism cum capitalism, seeing it as a conspiracy aimed at undermining white rule (synonymous with white survival) in South Africa. These right-wingers seem to believe that President Reagan, while not part of the sinister plot, is at least an unwitting accomplice. Such sentiments were forcefully expressed at a volkskongres on 'Afrikaanse kultuur en Amerikaanse liberalisme' arranged by several right-wing organisations in Pretoria in May 1985. Since these views on the US are widely held in reactionary circles, it is rather surprising that such a large proportion of CP followers supported the statement on President Reagan. A lower number, albeit still the vast majority of CP supporters, accepted Mrs Thatcher's good intentions vis-à-vis South Africa. Again, HNP followers had the greatest doubts about her attitude towards the Republic.

The HNP respondents' opinions on Presidents Mitterand and Kaunda are difficult to reconcile with their views on the other three leaders. The fact that over 16% of them thought the French leader was favourably disposed towards South Africa (compared with the overall average of 7,7%), might be the result of ignorance or wishful thinking. France has, as mentioned, traditionally maintained fairly warm relations with South Africa and has also been far less meddlesome in South African affairs than the Anglo-Saxon nations. Also, France's policy towards the Republic receives far less local publicity than either American or British policy. So perhaps little news is regarded as not particularly bad news. These explanations are admittedly based on the challengeable assumption that HNP followers were either more ignorant or unrealistic in their views than supporters of the other parties. It is however difficult to find other reasons for HNP views on President Mitterand.

As regards the relatively favourable - or relatively less unfavourable - rating that HNP respondents gave President Kaunda, it seems safe to say that this is not actually meant as a compliment for the South African government. Instead, the HNP supporters may well believe that President FW Botha's policy of 'selling out' Whites in South Africa (through power sharing) and Namibia (through UN Resolution 435), have endeared him to some extent to President Kaunda.

It can be remarked in passing that NRP supporters were most convinced of, on the one hand, the American and British leaders' positive leanings towards South Africa and, on the other, Mr Hawke's animosity.

Finally, we should point out that respondents were in this first set of questions merely asked how they thought the five foreign leaders were disposed towards the Republic. They were not asked to express any opinion on the merits of the perceived positions. It is nonetheless more than likely that the vast majority of white South Africans would deplore the attitudes believed to be adopted by the leaders of France, Australia and Zambia. Their antagonism towards South Africa would probably be regarded as both unfair and unhelpful. If black South Africans were asked similar questions, their answers on the foreign leaders' basic dispositions might to a large extent correspond with those of white respondents. Blacks' assessments of the merits of these attitudes are, however, bound to be quite different.

3.2 The threat that can never be taken too seriously ... Reagan's efforts notwithstanding

In view of the South African government's longstanding preoccupation with a communist threat to the country, respondents were asked to react to the following statement: 'The communist threat against South Africa is

exaggerated by the government.' The overall responses have been virtually identical in all three surveys: the proportion of those agreeing with the statement ranged only between 18,2% and 18,8%, whereas the percentage disagreement remained more or less steady at 80%. The vast majority of white South Africans clearly share the government's perception of a serious communist threat and they do not believe that the danger has diminished over the past four years. This is also borne out in the intensity of disagreement with the statement: in 1986, 40,5% definitely disagreed and 44,8% in each of the earlier surveys.

A breakdown of these aggregate figures again reveals significant variations of opinion between the two language groups and also between supporters of various political parties. Differences of opinion were far less pronounced among the other sub-groups based on sex, age, income and geography.

In the 1984 survey, 87,8% of the Afrikaans respondents disagreed that the government exaggerated the communist threat, against 69,1% of the English-speakers; the 1982 figures closely corresponded. Now the gap has been narrowed. In the latest survey, the respective figures for Afrikaans and English-speaking respondents are 85,3% and 73,2%. The one community seems to have become fractionally less convinced and the other marginally more convinced of Pretoria's views on a communist danger. However, the overall level of support for the government's reading of the situation remains unshakeably high.

The percentages of party followers disagreeing with our statement in the three surveys are as follows:

	1986	1984	1982
NP	89,7	90,6	93,6
PPP	57,7	48,0	56,1
CP	81,4	87,5	(NCP) 89,6
HNP	75,4	84,4	81,8
NRP	88,6	75,0	77,7

Let us briefly consider these findings per party. NP supporters' level of disagreement has remained fairly consistent and very high. PFP respondents are in 1986 considerably more threat conscious than in 1984; the latest figure approximates to that of 1982. CP followers, although still overwhelmingly endorsing the government's perception of the communist threat, have apparently developed some doubts, particularly of late. The same tendency seems to have occurred among HNP supporters between 1984 and 1986. It is highly unlikely that the followers of the two right-wing parties have serious doubts about a communist threat to the Republic. They may well have growing reservations about the government's motives in emphasising a 'red menace'. Thus they may suspect the government of using a communist threat as a pretext to 'force' white South Africans into making far-reaching political concessions to Blacks, the rationale being that political reform could undercut the appeal of communism and keep communist powers from interfering in South African affairs. Another factor may be that the right-wing parties are as suspicious of British and particularly American motives in South Africa, as they are of communist intentions. Finally, NRP supporters seem to have become acutely aware of a communist threat over the past two years, with a 1986 figure approximating that of NP respondents.

White South Africans' suspicions about the Soviet Union found further expression in their responses to a statement on the results of the Reagan-

Gorbachev summit in late 1985. It was formulated as follows:

Angola was reportedly on the agenda at the recent summit meeting between President Reagan of the USA and Mr Gorbachev of the Soviet Union. How do you respond to the following statement:

The meeting between President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev will lead to the Soviet Union abandoning its active involvement in Southern Africa?

Not surprisingly, 90,5% of the respondents disputed the statement, half of them definitely disagreeing. Among the various sub-groups, the greatest degree of disagreement with our statement - 97,2% - came from NRP supporters (with Natal respondents running a close second at 96,6%); the lowest percentage disagreement - no less than 80,3 - was found among followers of the FNP. The only other party sub-group to return a level of disagreement of under 90% was, interestingly, CP supporters with 88,5%. It seems strange that we should find such a degree of support in right-wing circles for the implied notion that President Reagan has managed to persuade Mr Gorbachev to stop active Soviet involvement in Southern Africa. For one thing, FNP supporters in particular harbour strong suspicions about American intentions in the region. And anti-communism has traditionally featured prominently in all right-wing politics in South Africa. In absolute terms, however, both FNP and CP supporters overwhelmingly share the general white view on the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting.

3.3 The threat from across the Limpopo

The latest response to the statement, 'The government of Mr Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe constitutes a threat to South Africa's safety', is more or less identical to that in our very first survey. The intensity of agreement with the statement in 1982 and 1986 is also very similar. On this issue, white South Africans have returned to the earlier high level of threat consciousness.

The following table shows the number of respondents agreeing that the Zimbabwe government threatens South Africa's security (the figures in brackets indicating the proportion expressing definite agreement):

1986	1984	1982
70,9% (23,4%)	62,7% (14,9%)	70,5% (22,7%)

The decline in threat consciousness between 1982 and 1984 was evident among the various sub-groups too. Now the reverse has happened. For example, the number of Afrikaans-speakers seeing Zimbabwe as a threat rose from 67,2% in 1984 to 74,2% in 1986 (76,7% in 1982). The non-partisan groups that registered the highest level of agreement with our statement in 1986, are the two lower income groups, D (80,2%) and C (75,0%), females (75,5%), the 16-24 year olds (74,5%) and Afrikaans-speakers (74,2%).

These figures suggest interesting variations of opinion within sub-groups. In 1986 7,5% more Afrikaans-speakers than English-speakers agreed with the statement on a Zimbabwean threat; the corresponding figures for 1984 and 1982 are 10,8% and 14,5%. The gap between the two groups is thus consistently narrowing - a tendency also evident in responses to the previous statement on a communist threat. Male respondents in 1986 registered a 66,4% agreement with our statement on Zimbabwe, 9,1% lower than the figure for women. A more striking difference in opinion is to be found among the income groups where the A (highest) category registered the lowest level of

agreement of only 61,0%. As regards provincial sub-groups, support for our statement ranged from a high of 72,5% among Natalians to a low of 65,3% among Free Staters. The latter figures represent a surprising shift from our earlier findings. In both 1982 and 1984 Free State respondents were strongest in their agreement, with figures of 81% and 75,5% respectively. The corresponding figures for Natal were under 60%. One possible explanation for Natalians' far higher threat consciousness might be the spate of ANC bomb attacks in Natal. Perhaps the respondents' anxieties over security influenced their judgement of the Zimbabwean government - despite Harare's consistent refusal to provide sanctuary to ANC insurgents.

Each of our surveys also found considerable variation of opinion between supporters of the five political parties. The percentage agreement with the statement that Zimbabwe threatens South Africa's security, is set out below:

	1986	1984	1982
NP	71,5	63,3	78,8
PFP	59,2	52,4	55,4
CP	76,4	83,1	(NCP) 88,3
HNP	95,1	87,5	89,3
NRP	80,0	56,0	62,5

PFP supporters have consistently been considerably less threat conscious (on this specific issue) than followers of the four other parties. At the other end of the spectrum, HNP respondents have maintained a very high level of threat awareness. In line with the overall tendency, supporters of all five parties returned lower levels of agreement in 1984 than in 1982, and - with the exception of CP followers - a greater measure of agreement in 1986 than in 1984. PFP respondents' relatively low level of support for the statement on Zimbabwe can be related to their degree of disagreement with the earlier statement on an exaggerated communist threat. It would therefore appear that the most liberal respondents are the least threat conscious. Conversely, the most *verkrampte* residents (HNP supporters) displayed the highest level of threat consciousness. HNP respondents however seem to regard the threat from Zimbabwe as considerably more serious than the communist danger. To put it crudely, these white reactionaries are more concerned about a black peril than a red menace.

Finally, some interesting comparisons can be drawn between the overall responses to the questions on communism and Zimbabwe. In all three surveys, eight out of every ten respondents in effect agreed with the government's assessment of a communist threat against South Africa. Considerably fewer respondents have over the years regarded the Zimbabwean government as a threat to South African safety. This does not detract from a significant shift in opinion on Zimbabwe, with 8% more respondents agreeing with our statement in 1986 than in 1984. A likely explanation for this greater threat consciousness is the series of landmine explosions on South African farms bordering Zimbabwe. White South Africans may well suspect some official Zimbabwean complicity in these acts presumably perpetrated by the ANC.

3.4 Marxists were among our best friends

Our second opinion survey was undertaken only a month after South Africa and Mozambique signed the Accord of Nkomati in March 1984. To get an indication of white South Africans' opinion on the agreement, the survey included this statement: 'Mozambique can be trusted to carry out the terms of the recent non-aggression treaty with South Africa'. The fact that nearly

two-thirds of the respondents agreed with the statement, prompted the caption, 'Some of our best friends are Marxists'. The response to this same statement in our latest survey has made it necessary to revise the sub-heading.

In 1984, 65,6% of the respondents thought that Mozambique would honour the Nkomati Accord; the latest figure is a mere 30,6%. Those disagreeing with the statement now represent a full two-thirds of the respondents. A mere 2% of respondents supporting the statement in 1986, expressed definite agreement. In 1984 the corresponding figure was 8,8%.

Nearly all the non-party sub-groups registered disagreement of over 60% in 1986; the only exceptions were English-speakers and Natal respondents, but both their levels of disagreement were only fractionally under 60%. The degree of disagreement nonetheless varies considerably within these sub-groups: 72,9% for female respondents against 60,7% for males; 72,1% and 59,6% for Afrikaans and English-speaking respondents respectively; from a high of 70,4% for the 25-34 year olds to a low of 62,1% for the 50 and older group; between 70% for the C income group and 60,8% for the A group; and among provincial respondents the figures range from 78,2% for the Free State to 58,2% for Natal. In 1984, the Free Staters were the only non-party group to return a percentage disagreement of over 40.

The responses of party followers in 1984 and 1986 are set out below:

	1986		1984	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
NP	33,8%	63,6%	73,9%	24,2%
FPF	41,4%	56,2%	71,3%	26,5%
CP	10,0%	88,5%	31,9%	68,2%
HNP	8,2%	91,8%	18,8%	84,4%
NRP	28,6%	65,7%	72,7%	25,0%

The table reveals highly significant shifts in opinion among supporters of the NP, FPF, NRP and CP. The numbers disagreeing with our statement rose by between 30% and 40% in the cases of NP, FPF and NRP respondents. Roughly 20% more CP followers disputed the statement in 1986. The smallest change occurred among HNP supporters, who from the outset had very strong reservations about Mozambique's good faith.

To summarise, there have been profound shifts of opinion across the board, involving all the different sub-groups. These include FPF supporters who may have been thought to be less threat conscious or less suspicious about black governments. The findings are all the more significant when we consider that it is the South African government that has publicly admitted to 'technical' violations of the Nkomati Accord. Mozambique, by contrast, has apparently always honoured its side of the bargain. So why then do white South Africans display such widespread distrust of the Prelimo government's intentions?

Grave doubts about Maputo's *bona fides* may well be another manifestation of Whites' heightened threat consciousness. The same tendency is evident in the latest responses to the statement on Zimbabwe. The greater awareness of threat is probably the direct result of South Africa's security situation. Despite Nkomati and the consequent expulsion of ANC insurgents from Mozambique, the organisation has still managed to stage numerous acts of terror (notably bomb and landmine blasts). The spiralling unrest and violence in black townships across the Republic could only have added to Whites' sense of foreboding.

In our 1984 survey we remarked that President Samora Machel, by signing a non-aggression pact with Mr FW Botha, had been 'transform(ed) ... virtually overnight from a villain of the peace to a responsible statesman' in the eyes of white South Africans. He is clearly no longer white South Africans' favourite Marxist but his fall from grace has, ironically, little to do with his own actions.

3.5 On sanctions, retaliation and reform

Given the salience of the issue of international sanctions against South Africa, our latest survey for the first time included a number of statements on sanctions.

In the first instance, respondents were reminded that 'an increasing number of states are busy introducing some form of economic sanctions against South Africa'. They were then asked to respond to this statement: 'The South African economy is strong enough to prevent economic sanctions hurting our country'. Perhaps surprisingly, no less than 71% of the respondents disagreed, thus by implication believing that sanctions could indeed have damaging effects. Only 27,3% of the respondents supported the contention.

Although none of the sub-groups returned a level of disagreement of under 50%, there was considerable variation of opinion among them. This was most noticeable among followers of the various political parties, as our table shows:

NP	66,5%
PFP	90,2%
CP	54,8%
HNP	50,8%
NRP	88,6%

Supporters of the two right-wing parties have the greatest faith in the South African economy's ability to withstand the harmful effects of sanctions. They are the least likely to be impressed or intimidated by sanctions (or at least by the threat of sanctions) - and their racial policies are the farthest removed from the international norms of the day. At the other end of the spectrum, PFP and NRP followers are overwhelmingly convinced of the damage that sanctions could inflict on the South African economy. NP respondents find themselves somewhere between these poles.

As regards the non-party sub-groups, it is instructive that the greatest measure of disagreement with our statement was to be found among the highest income group, the lowest age group and Natalians, each with a figure of some 78%. The lowest levels of disagreement came from the 50 plus age group (62,2%) and the D income group (60,4%). Ironically, those Whites who could financially least afford the consequences of sanctions, seem least convinced of the economic harm of such measures, but on the other hand, the figures also show that those most likely to be affected financially by such sanctions, i.e. English-speaking PFP supporters, are the most aware of their potentially damaging effect.

In a subsequent statement, it was suggested that 'South Africa should refuse to sell its minerals to states that apply economic sanctions against it'. Of the 1 799 respondents, 56,8% supported the idea, with 40,4% opposing it. Respondents endorsing the statement were fairly evenly divided between those who definitely agreed and those who were inclined to agree. Considering the widespread acknowledgement of the serious economic consequences of sanctions, it is remarkable that not many more Whites

favoured the retaliatory action mentioned. Perhaps those opposing an embargo on mineral exports fear that this would only add to the economic damage; such a view of course assumes that South Africa would, despite sanctions, still find foreign markets for its natural resources.

A breakdown of these aggregate figures by sub-group reveals marked differences of opinion. Variations in the percentage agreement with our statement on mineral exports were most pronounced between Afrikaans and English-speaking respondents (63,7 and 48,3 respectively), the D and A income groups (64,7 and 50,1 respectively), OFS and Natal respondents (60,4 and 51,0 respectively), and among supporters of the various parties. Consider these levels of agreement:

NP	61,5%
PFP	36,6%
CP	68,8%
HNP	75,4%
NRP	57,2%

PFP supporters were the only sub-group in which a majority - 58,3% - disagreed with a ban on mineral exports, probably because they understand the costs which would accrue from such action. HNP and CP responses suggest some correlation between what we might conveniently label domestic *verkramptheid* and external hawkishness or militancy. There were already indications of such a connection in HNP and CP supporters' responses to some of the earlier statements.

Our final statement on the sanctions issue read: 'The only way in which South Africa can in the long run avoid tougher economic sanctions is by granting equal political rights to Blacks'. A significant majority of 54,3% supported this view, while 44,1% expressed disagreement. This is a highly divisive issue, as the conflicting responses of followers of the various political parties confirm. PFP supporters not unexpectedly indicated the greatest measure of support - 86,7% - for the statement, followed way behind by NRP supporters with 62,9%. The level of agreement among NP followers was identical to the average percentage of 54,3%. The vast majority of HNP and CP supporters were, by contrast, opposed to our statement: 88,5% and 89,0% respectively. The latter figures tend to support our earlier observation that white right-wingers are least amenable to foreign pressure.

In several of the other sub-groups, a majority disagreed with the statement on equal political rights as the only way to avoid tougher sanctions. These were Afrikaans-speakers (56,3%), the C and D income groups (52,2% and 50,3% respectively) and OFS respondents (60,6%). It is particularly in the ranks of these groups that one would expect to find right-wing political sympathies.

Although an overall majority of respondents supported the latter statement, this in itself does not tell us whether these respondents also think that South Africa should grant Blacks political rights to prevent more serious sanctions. One possible pointer is the response to statements on domestic politics (see section 5, below), which will later also be cross-tabulated with responses to the sanctions questions.

3.6 The hottest pursuit

South Africa has in recent years resorted to what has variously been termed a forward or offensive regional strategy, or regional destabilisation. Pretoria has used both military and economic pressure

against suspected 'terrorists' - whether of SWAPO or the ANC - and their hosts in adjacent countries.

Our three surveys produced virtually identical overall responses to the following statement: 'South Africa should militarily attack terrorist/guerrilla bases in its neighbouring states'. In the first survey, 81,1% of the respondents agreed; the other two returned an identical figure of 81,6%. The percentage disagreement remained constant at roughly 17%. The intensity of agreement has nonetheless changed. In the 1982 and 1984 surveys, 60% of those supporting the statement expressed 'definite' agreement; in the latest survey the figure has dropped to 43,7%. The latter is however a marginal shift.

Not one of the sub-groups based on sex, language, age, province and party support returned a level of agreement of under 60% in any of the surveys. In 1986, variation in the extent of agreement was most pronounced between Afrikaans and English-speakers (89,0% and 72,2% respectively) and between followers of the five political parties. Our earlier surveys also found varying degrees of agreement among party supporters:

	1986	1984	1982
NP	89,5%	83,4%	86,2%
PFP	61,3%	70,9%	73,2%
CP	92,4%	96,5%	(NCP) 96,9%
HNP	95,1%	96,9%	93,8%
NRP	88,5%	79,9%	84,6%

The table shows that HNP followers have been highly consistent in their support for military strikes against terrorist/guerrilla bases, with their fellow right-wingers in the CP marginally less so. NP and NRP respondents, who in 1984 slightly moderated their earlier views, have now registered their highest degree of militancy. Supporters of the PFP have, by contrast, displayed a marked drop in support for the use of force against foreign terrorist/guerrilla centres. PFP followers' views on this issue are today further removed from white mainstream thinking than in either 1984 or 1982.

3.7 Don't feed the hand that bites

The Republic's export of food to black states which are believed to harbour insurgents operating inside South Africa, became a controversial issue in white politics in the early 1980s. The HNP charged the government with indirectly feeding 'terrorists'. Since then, the issue has lost much of its earlier prominence. Towards the end of 1985 however, it again featured as part of the wider question of economic pressure against neighbouring states suspected of harbouring ANC insurgents. South Africa then imposed a virtual blockade against Lesotho - which among other things severely affected vital food exports to the tiny kingdom - on precisely these grounds.

In our three surveys, we included the statement: 'South Africa should not export food to black states which support or harbour terrorists/guerrillas'. In all the surveys, respondents were notably less militant in their reaction to this statement than to the previous one. There was considerably more overall support for strong military action than for a non-violent embargo on food exports. The level of agreement with our statement on refusing food sales to hostile states, remained fairly consistent: 72,4% (1982), 68,4% (1984) and 69,9% (1986). The percentage disagreement ranged between 30% and 25,4%. On this issue, the militancy

(1982)-slight moderation (1984)-militancy (1986) pattern discernible in responses to some earlier statements is far less evident.

Comparing the responses of party followers over the years, it is even more difficult to find a general pattern. Consider the following table showing their percentage agreement with our statement on food exports:

	1986	1984	1982
NP	72,3	66,9	75,7
PFP	54,8	54,9	59,8
CP	87,4	89,6	(NCP) 79,0
FNP	75,4	100,0	92,2
NRP	74,2	67,9	76,9

Only NP and NRP supporters followed the militancy-slight moderation-militancy cycle. PFP respondents were as moderate in 1986 as in 1984, and were throughout far less militant than followers of any of the other parties. The puzzling feature of these figures is the major drop in FNP support for the statement in 1986. Given their pronounced militancy on other issues, it is inconceivable that they could regard a suspension of food exports as too drastic an action. If anything, they may have considerable doubts as to whether it is in fact a strong enough measure against suspected hosts of 'terrorists'.

3.8 SWAPO: jaw, jaw or war, war

One of the most remarkable shifts of white opinion revealed in our 1984 survey, concerned the issue of Pretoria talking to SWAPO. In 1982, only about a third of the respondents supported the statement, 'South Africa should negotiate directly with SWAPO to reach a settlement in SWA/Namibia'. In 1984, the figure had increased to just over 50%. Our latest survey has found a marginal increase in the level of agreement to 52,7%. The percentage disagreement in 1984 and 1986 remained constant at roughly 45%, a sharp drop from 60% opposing such talks in 1982. In 1984, 13,8% of the respondents endorsing our statement expressed 'definite' agreement; the 1986 figure was marginally lower at 12,7%.

The overall change of opinion we measured in 1984 was also evident among the various sub-groups. The greatest shifts in favour of negotiation with SWAPO occurred among supporters of all five political parties. Our latest survey reveals a rather mixed picture.

We begin with a comparison of the percentage agreement of the two language groups:

	1986	1984	1982
Afrikaans-speakers	41,8	45,7	30,9
English-speakers	66,7	57,8	46,9

The margin of difference in the two groups' support for talks with SWAPO was far greater in 1986 (24,9%) than in either of the earlier studies. Whereas the extent of English-speakers' agreement with the statement steadily increased over the four year period, Afrikaner support at first increased considerably but has dropped by 4% since 1984. This slight hardening of Afrikaner opinion is in line with the growth in threat perception and militancy that we have already found among these respondents since 1984.

All but the 50 and older age group in 1986 returned a higher measure of agreement with our statement than in either 1982 or 1984. The greatest increase was to be found among the 16-24 year olds, with 68,9% supporting talks with SWAPO in 1986, compared with 57,9% in 1984. Way behind in their support for negotiations were the 25-34 year age category, with 53,0% in 1986 and 48,0% in 1984.

The response of the 16-24 year age group should be read together with the finding that roughly half the male respondents (51,9% in 1984 and 50,7% in 1986, compared with only 34,9% in 1982) agreed with the idea of negotiating with SWAPO. These two sub-groups' views are politically highly significant, considering that the bulk of South Africa's (male) military conscripts - a great many of whom see service in the Namibian war-zone - are drawn from the 16-24 year olds.

Our surveys show considerable variation of opinion among the four income groups. In the latest survey, the highest level of support for the statement - 61,6% - came from the top income earners, and the lowest - 48,5% - from the C group. In 1984, greatest support as found among the D income group - 63,4% - followed by the A group with 53,4%.

There was not much to choose among the responses of panellists in the four provinces in 1982 or in 1984. All were decidedly uncompromising in the first survey, but greatly moderated their views in 1984. The more accommodating opinion prevailed largely in 1986. Consider these levels of agreement (percentages) with our statement:

	1986	1984	1982
Cape	51,9	55,7	38,9
Transvaal	51,7	47,8	38,3
Orange Free State	41,2	53,2	26,6
Natal	63,7	52,0	38,9

The most striking difference between the 1984 and 1986 responses, is the contradictory shifts of opinion between OFS and Natal respondents. The latter group became notably more conciliatory, with an 11,7% increase in the percentage agreement, whereas the Free Staters' level of agreement dropped by roughly the same margin. Only among the latter group do we now find a majority opposing direct talks with SWAPO.

Among party followers, only PFP supporters in 1986 returned a level of agreement higher than the overall figure of 52,7%. They are also the only group to register a higher measure of support for our statement in 1986 than in 1984. The following table shows the percentage agreement of party supporters in the three surveys:

	1986	1984	1982
NP	43,7	47,8	30,0
PFP	83,7	67,6	51,6
CP	26,1	38,8	(NCP) 16,8
HNP	24,6	43,8	24,1
NRP	45,7	56,0	35,6

The followers of the NP, CP and HNP were initially (1982) highly uncompromising towards SWAPO, with the vast majority in each case opposing direct talks between Pretoria and SWAPO. These respondents then (1984) significantly moderated their views. Now (1986) there has been a hardening of opinion, but - with the exception of HNP supporters - the latest militancy

falls well short of the initial views. This pattern nonetheless corresponds with the militancy-slight moderation-militancy cycle identified earlier.

Such changes should however be set against the overall finding that more than 50% of the respondents in both 1984 and 1986 favoured direct talks between the South African government and SWAPO. It is indeed highly significant that the 1986 figure is slightly higher than that for 1984, considering the increased militancy we measured on some of the earlier questions.

Despite the substantial body of support for 'jaw, jaw' with SWAPO, white South Africans' confidence in the 'war, war' option remains unshakeable. Presented with the statement, 'South Africa cannot win the military struggle against SWAPO in the long run', 73,7% of the respondents disagreed and 23,4% agreed in our latest survey. These figures are virtually identical to those in the two earlier surveys. Respondents opposing the statement were also throughout fairly evenly divided between those who 'definitely' disagreed and others who were 'inclined' to agree.

The strong consistency of opinion over time was also upheld among various sub-groups. A closer look at these findings however reveals widely differing views particularly among the language groups and party supporters. The following table shows the percentages of respondents disagreeing with our statement, thus by implication believing that South Africa can ultimately win the war against SWAPO:

	1986	1984	1982
Afrikaans-speakers	82,5	82,1	81,9
English-speakers	62,5	63,1	59,5
NP supporters	82,9	81,1	84,9
PFM supporters	45,2	44,4	47,3
CP supporters	85,4	82,1	(NCP) 87,9
HNP supporters	91,8	90,6	84,8
NRP supporters	57,1	81,0	73,0

The only two sub-groups that have consistently displayed considerable doubt about South Africa's chances of defeating SWAPO, were PFM followers and English-speakers - groups of which membership of course overlaps to a large extent. These views are clearly related to the high levels of support that English-speakers and particularly PFM followers have throughout expressed for talks with SWAPO. The drastic drop in the number of NRP followers disputing our contention in 1986, is difficult to explain. Given this small party's dwindling political relevance, there seems little need to speculate on the reasons for the curious views of its supporters on the particular issue. More important, from a policy-making perspective, are the opinions expressed by Afrikaners and NP supporters. On the one hand these two overlapping groups remain supremely confident about an eventual South African military victory over SWAPO, while on the other, there is substantial (albeit still minority) support for direct talks between the South African government and SWAPO. These respondents, we suggested in the previous survey, may argue that Pretoria can negotiate with SWAPO from a position of strength and thus demand unilateral concessions. Should it prove impossible to resolve the Namibian independence issue through direct negotiations with SWAPO, the respondents would probably favour a 'fight to the finish', believing that there can be only one possible outcome. In this regard it is instructive that only 32,8% of the 947 respondents (overall) favouring direct talks with SWAPO, also believed that South Africa cannot defeat SWAPO by military means in the long run.

3.9 Cross-tabulation: checking on consistency

In the preceding discussion, we have already suggested some correlations between certain responses. In other words, the reaction of the overall panel or of a sub-group to a particular statement seemed in line with the same respondents' views on another statement. Through a process of cross-tabulation, we can draw accurate correlations between responses to various statements. We will at this stage confine the cross-tabulation to the statements already considered. The following selections of cross-tabulations confirm consistencies in the views of the more militantly-minded respondents in 1986:

- Of the 1 257 respondents who supported a ban on food exports to countries harbouring terrorists/guerrillas, 86,5% also favoured military attacks on insurgents' foreign bases;
- Of the 1 200 respondents who believed that Mozambique cannot be trusted to honour the Nkomati Accord, 81,2% also disputed the contention that Pretoria exaggerated the communist threat against South Africa;
- Taking these same 1 200 respondents again, 76,5% of them suggested that South Africa could indeed win the war against SWAPO in the long run;
- Of the 1 024 panellists agreeing that South Africa should not export minerals to states applying sanctions against it, 85,4% also wanted to see an embargo on food exports to black states supporting or harbouring insurgents against South Africa;
- 87,1% of the same 1 024 respondents also expressed support for South African cross-border military strikes against terrorist/guerrilla bases;
- Of the 1 276 respondents who regarded the Zimbabwean government as a threat to South Africa's security, 84,9% also agreed with military attacks against terrorist/guerrilla targets in the neighbouring states.

Similarly strong positive correlations in the views of 'moderate' respondents were hard to find. For example:

- 68% of the 947 respondents who supported direct talks between the South African government and SWAPO, also held the view that the Republic could only escape tougher economic sanctions by granting Blacks equal political rights;
- Of the 725 respondents who were in disagreement with a ban on South African mineral exports against states subjecting it to sanctions, 50,1% also came out against an embargo on South African food exports to hostile neighbouring states;
- Only 21,1% of the 551 panellists who thought Mozambique can be trusted with Nkomati, also maintained that the South African government exaggerated the communist threat;
- Of the 517 respondents who opposed the use of the food weapon against black states supporting anti-South African insurgents, a mere 28,4% were also against the use of military force against terrorist/guerrilla bases in adjacent states.

We are therefore left with the conclusion that hawkish respondents were far more consistent in their views on foreign policy issues than were the more moderate or doveish panellists. In a later section, we will cross-tabulate these two groups' views on external issues with their opinions on domestic political questions.

4. DARK TIMES AHEAD: PERCEPTIONS OF DOMESTIC CONFLICT

All three of our surveys have contained a number of statements designed to gauge respondents' views on likely internal developments in South Africa. The latest survey features three of the statements included in the earlier studies. The statement on defence expenditure has been dropped from the 1986 survey, because the responses were not particularly revealing. Instead, we have now added a new statement on internal unrest.

4.1 The 'terros' are coming

Responses to the statement, 'A terrorist/guerrilla war as in SWA/Namibia will in time also develop in South Africa', corresponded with the pattern identified earlier as militancy-slight moderation-militancy. In this particular case, it may however be more appropriate to refer to high (1982), moderate (1984) and high (1986) levels of threat perception *cum* pessimism. The table provides the percentage agreement and disagreement with our statement in the three surveys:

<u>1986</u>		<u>1984</u>		<u>1982</u>	
<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
71,1	27,9	62,8	35,4	75,3	22,8

In the 1984 survey, we attributed the 12,5% drop in the level of agreement registered in 1982 to a combination of internal and external factors. 'The Nkomati Accord and the new constitution', it was argued, 'may have led more Whites to believe that these actions on the diplomatic and constitutional fronts improve the chances of a peaceful resolution of South Africa's racial problems'. (However, we also noted that over 60% of the respondents in 1984 still agreed with the statement, thus showing 'that the gloomy view of South Africa's future is still predominant'.) Now the pendulum has swung back, albeit not fully to the original position. This change can in turn probably also be explained in terms of domestic and foreign developments. One thinks particularly of the chronic racial unrest and violence in South Africa and the conflicts with several neighbouring states over their alleged complicity in ANC insurgency.

The overall shifts in opinion between our three surveys were also reflected among all the different sub-groups. Another feature is that variations of opinion within sub-groups were not as pronounced on this issue as on many of those already discussed. Taking the level of agreement with the statement, we find, for example, a margin of difference of only 1,8% between males and females in 1986 (1984: 5,4% and 1982: 0,2%) and 3,3% between Afrikaans- and English-speakers (1984: 9,4% and 1982: 0,8%). Among respondents in the four provinces, agreement in 1986 ranged between 75,8% for Free Staters and 68,6% for those in the Cape. Our latest survey however recorded considerable differences of opinion among the age groups. Greatest support for our statement came from the 25-34 year olds (82,1%), with the over-50s least convinced of the inevitability of a terrorist/guerrilla war (61,6% agreement). These two age groups also returned the highest and lowest measure of support, respectively, for this statement in the earlier surveys but the margin of difference was not as wide as in 1986.

The percentage agreement of party supporters with the statement on a future civil war in South Africa is set out below:

	1986	1984	1982
NP	64,6	59,5	71,2
PFPP	78,3	68,0	81,0
CP	78,9	78,2	(NCP) 83,5
HNP	88,5	87,5	84,8
NRP	62,9	51,2	76,9

It is no coincidence that parties on the right and left of the political spectrum - assuming that the NP (and NRP) occupy the middle ground - were throughout most convinced that a Namibia-style conflict will eventually develop in South Africa. The PFPP, on the one hand, and the CP and HNP on the other, no doubt blame NP policies for the unavoidable racial conflagration. Even NP followers were decidedly pessimistic on this score, but they would probably attribute South Africa's grim prospects to the machinations of all kinds of hostile domestic and foreign forces, rather than see the government's policies as bringing about conflict.

Some indication of Whites' views on the outcome of a violent conflict can be found in responses to our next statement.

4.2 The power is still ours

In view of the protracted unrest in numerous parts of South Africa, we added a new statement to our latest survey: 'The South African Police and Defence Force are strong enough to control internal unrest indefinitely.' The percentage agreement was 67,8 and disagreement 31,2. It is probably significant that only 26,3% of those supporting the statement, expressed 'definite' agreement. The latter finding, together with the percentage disagreement, points to considerable doubts among Whites about the security forces' long-term ability to control the unrest situation. Nevertheless, a clear two-thirds majority is confident about the capacity of the security forces to control the unrest, now and in the future.

Not unexpectedly, some sub-groups were far more confident than others that the SAP and SADF could stay on top of the unrest situation. Roughly 85% of supporters of both the CP and HNP agreed with the statement, followed by NP respondents with 78,3%. At the other end of the spectrum, 62,2% of PFPP followers disagreed, thus believing that the internal unrest will become uncontrollable. This great divergence in opinion is to some extent reflected in the wide margin of difference between the views of Afrikaans- and English-speakers: 80,1% and 52,1% respectively agreed with our statement. Although the percentage agreement between the four age groups ranged only between 64,4 and 70,8, it is significant that the 25-34 year olds recorded the lowest figure and the over 50s the highest. Greater diversity of opinion was measured among income groups, with the A group at the low end of the scale (52,3% agreement) and the C group at the other end (76,8%). Among the provincial sub-groups, the Natalians had the greatest doubts about our statement with only 57,0% supporting it; respondents in each of the other three provinces registered roughly 70% agreement.

4.3 'We have the happiest Africans in the world ... but we cannot trust them'

Given that the vast majority of white South Africans regard a Namibia-style terrorist/guerrilla war as inevitable in South Africa, it is important to try to establish their views on the likely causes of such a conflict and on how Whites believe Blacks will respond in the event of war.

Our three surveys featured this assertion: 'South Africa's Blacks have good reason to take up arms against the government.' ('Blacks' in this context refers to black Africans only.) The extent of agreement never exceeded 30%. But here too we find a now familiar tendency: the percentage agreement in 1982, 1984 and 1986 was, respectively, 26,9, 21,3 and 28,5. Conversely, the levels of disagreement in these years were 71,4%, 77,4% and 70,4% respectively. Where we had earlier found this type of response pattern, we suggested that the 1984 figures represented a degree of moderation in opinion, or of moderate threat perception cum pessimism. With regard to the statement under consideration, the surveys show that in 1984 fewer Whites than in previous or subsequent years thought that Blacks had reason to stage a violent uprising. To put it differently, when Whites were more conciliatory and less pessimistic in their political outlook, they believed that Blacks had even less reason than ever to resort to arms. The political significance of this fluctuation in the overall response should however not be exaggerated: over 70% of the respondents have consistently disputed our statement.

There were wide differences of opinion within the language and party sub-groups in each of the three surveys. The table shows the percentage agreement with the statement on a black uprising:

	<u>1986</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1982</u>
Afrikaans-speakers	20,0	11,3	13,9
English-speakers	39,4	34,8	44,9
NP supporters	19,1	11,9	9,8
PFM supporters	61,9	59,6	69,5
CP supporters	11,5	6,5	(NCP) 2,9
HNP supporters	11,5	11,9	28,8
NRP supporters	28,6	6,3	5,4

Although there has throughout been a wide margin of difference between the views of Afrikaans- and English-speakers, it has consistently been narrowing. The same applies to the opinions of NP and PFM followers, although here the gap has always been much greater than between the two language groups. Even so, NP supporters still overwhelmingly reject the idea that Blacks have reason to take up arms against the (NP) government. This may be a manifestation of these respondents' belief in the correctness of the government's policies towards Blacks. The strength of this conviction seems to be borne out in the intensity of NP followers' opposition to our statement: in each survey over half the respondents who disagreed expressed 'definite' disagreement. Right-wing opponents of the NP were even more convinced that Blacks had no cause to turn to violent opposition. PFM supporters, in sharp contrast, clearly believed that the government's policies gave Blacks good reason to take up arms.

In our latest survey, 80,1% of NP supporters maintained that Blacks had no reason to resort to violence. Yet earlier over 60% of this group thought that a Namibia-style terrorist/guerrilla war would develop in South Africa. These opinions may not be as contradictory as they appear at first sight. Nationalists may well believe that a terrorist/guerrilla war will originate not in legitimate black grievances, but will instead be instigated by hostile extraneous forces, specifically communist agitators. The observations may in fact be applicable to the majority of white South Africans, who on both issues shared the views of NP respondents.

This leads us on to the next issue, viz. how Whites thought Blacks would behave in the event of war. Our statement read: 'White South Africans cannot

depend on the loyalty of black South Africans in the case of war against South Africa.' (Again the reference was to black Africans.) The overall responses in our three surveys were as follows:

	1986	1984	1982
Agree	56,2%	59,2%	61,6%
Disagree	42,0%	39,1%	36,8%

The figures show a consistent, albeit small, drop in the number of Whites supporting the statement. This trend is mirrored in a slight, but consistent increase in the percentage disagreement. These findings do not fit the pattern identified earlier as high, moderate and high levels of threat perception cum pessimism. The fact that more than one-third of the respondents each time by implication thought that Blacks would join Whites in the event of war against South Africa may also be difficult to reconcile with the earlier clear majorities believing in an inevitable terrorist/guerrilla war in South Africa. Against that, one could argue that the responses to this statement were in line with the findings that over 70% of Whites (in each survey) in effect maintained that Blacks did not have reason to rise against the government. In other words, because Blacks are content, they can be expected to take up arms alongside Whites to defend South Africa.

A satisfactory explanation for these apparent contradictions would require probing - something we might be able to do in our next survey.

In all three surveys, differences in responses among various sub-groups were considerably narrower on this issue than on most of the previous statements. For example, in 1986 the margin of difference between English- and Afrikaans-speaking respondents' level of agreement with our statement on Blacks' loyalty in a war, was only 2,2%. Among the non-party sub-groups, the only anomalous opinion in 1986 came from Natal respondents, of whom only 45,1% agreed with the statement. Might it be that the white Natalians' relations with the Zulus led over half of them to believe that Blacks and Whites would join forces to defend the country?

Party followers responded as follows (percentage agreement):

	1986	1984	1982
NP	52,6	52,1	52,7
FFP	55,9	75,6	74,6
CP	61,8	67,2	(NCP) 69,5
HNP	64,0	87,5	69,2
NRP	71,4	54,8	72,1

The relatively low level of agreement consistently returned by NP followers could reflect a belief that Blacks shared their perceptions of threat and were moreover willing to defend the existing political system - thus assuming that Blacks were reasonably content with it. CP supporters were the only other group to maintain reasonable consistency in their views.

The fluctuations in opinion among followers of the other three parties are difficult to explain. Why would some 20% fewer supporters of each of the FFP and HNP - parties at the two opposite 'extremes' of the political spectrum - in 1986, compared with 1984, doubt Blacks' loyalty in a war? In the case of HNP respondents, it can still be argued that they have in the latest survey reverted to more or less their initial stance, and thereby also come into line with the views of their fellow right-wingers in the CP. Also as regards NRP supporters, it could be remarked that in 1986 they returned to

their original opinion. There is no such explanation for the shift in PFP opinion. It is rather unlikely that PFP followers could have been swayed by the government's reform policies. Perhaps the next survey will indicate whether this was some kind of aberration or whether it represented the beginning of a significant shift in PFP opinion.

4.4 Don't give the generals more money

In view of white South Africans' pronounced perceptions of threat, we thought it appropriate to find out whether they believed the Defence Force had sufficient financial resources to protect South Africa's security. Respondents were accordingly presented with the statement: 'The government does not yet spend enough money on defence'.

The overall responses in the three surveys were as follows:

	1986	1984	1982
Agree	33,0%	38,4%	41,6%
Disagree	63,1%	59,2%	56,0%

The figures show a steady drop in the number of people who regard defence expenditure as too low; in 1986 only one-third of the respondents took this view. Conversely, we see a consistent increase in the number of respondents maintaining that enough is already being spent on defence.

In our 1982 survey we noted with some surprise that a majority of white South Africans, their deep sense of threat notwithstanding, saw no need to increase defence expenditure. The 1984 figures were not difficult to explain. In line with a general reduction of threat consciousness among white South Africans, there would be even less cause for raising expenditure on the military. The 1986 survey has found a further growth in the number of Whites opposing greater defence spending - despite an overall increase in threat consciousness. There are two possible explanations for the latest findings. First, those disagreeing with our statement believe that the Defence Force is already strong enough to meet all conceivable internal and external threats to South Africa's security. Second, South Africa's dire financial situation may have weighed heavily with the respondents, leading them to think that the country (read: taxpayers) cannot afford to allocate more money to the military. The intensity of disagreement with the statement, although low in all three surveys, has consistently grown: in 1982, 8,6% of the respondents 'definitely' disagreed, compared with 10,7% in 1984 and 16,2% in 1986. This tendency, together with the overall increase in the number of Whites who consider defence spending high enough, could lead one to believe that the government may find it difficult to justify substantial increases in military expenditure to the white electorate. White South Africans' concern with their security may, however, override reservations about additional financial burdens.

All three of our surveys revealed marked differences of opinion among the various sub-groups. In the latest survey, 75% of the English-speakers disagreed with our statement, against only 53,8% of the Afrikaans respondents. Among the age groups, the percentage disagreement in 1986 ranged between 70,2% for the 16-24 group to 53,8% for the over-50s. The A and B income groups each registered roughly 70% disagreement, with D group at the other end of the scale with 53,6%. Turning to provincial sub-groups, the highest level of disagreement in 1986 - 70% - came from the Natalians, and the Free Staters were lowest with 59,6%.

Party supporters' percentage disagreement with the statement - by implication the numbers saying enough (perhaps even too much) is already being spent on defence - was as follows:

	1986	1984	1982
NP	47,3	52,1	48,2
PFPP	85,5	80,4	79,0
CP	35,1	44,0	(NCP) 30,3
HNP	39,4	42,9	38,4
NRP	60,0	36,9	61,5

Only PFPP followers' responses conformed to the overall pattern; viz. a consistent increase in the number of people disagreeing with the statement. The PFPP respondents' views on this issue were also in line with their doveish opinions on some earlier questions. The responses of NP, CP and HNP supporters all followed a similar pattern, which corresponds with the familiar trend of militancy (1982)-slight moderation (1984)-militancy (1986). Thus, in 1984 when South Africa's fortunes at home and abroad appeared brighter (or not as bleak) as in either 1982 or 1986, we found a relatively high number of their supporters taking the view that defence spending was sufficient. The NRP responses show a reverse pattern, which is difficult to explain.

5. VERKRAMPTE HAWKS AND VERLIGTE DOVES: CORRELATIONS OF OPINIONS ON DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN ISSUES

It is evident from our discussion in chapter 3 above that party political loyalty is an important determinant of respondents' views on foreign policy issues. On the basis of party identification, one could draw broad correlations between respondents' opinions on domestic and foreign policy issues. Thus we have already noted that right-wingers tend to be quite militant in their views on some foreign policy questions, whereas liberally-inclined respondents tend to adopt a more conciliatory position on external issues.

In this final section we explore further the correlation by measuring the white public's opinions on specific domestic issues and cross-tabulating these with their known opinions on certain external issues. The four domestic issues we have chosen will give an indication of what we will for convenience refer to as the verligte or verkrampte orientations of the respondents. As in the earlier surveys, we are not following the conventional use of restricting these terms to Afrikaners only. They will be applied to all Whites holding either 'liberal' or 'conservative' views. The responses to these four statements will be related specifically to those foreign policy issues that reveal respondents' militancy or moderation. We will not be repeating the two earlier surveys' cross-tabulations here, but will confine ourselves to the 1986 findings.

For the purposes of cross-tabulation, we are only interested in the overall responses to the statements on domestic issues. But, because of the political topicality of the four statements, a breakdown of responses by language and party groups will also be given.

The first statement concerns parliamentary representation. In the 1982 survey it read: 'The time has arrived for Coloureds and Indians to sit with Whites in the same Parliament'. Because Coloureds and Indians were then about to enter Parliament, we rephrased the statement in our 1984 survey: 'It is to be welcomed that Coloureds and Indians will serve with Whites in the same Parliament'. For the latest survey, we again amended the statement to reflect the current political debate: 'Blacks should serve with Whites, Coloureds and Indians in the same Parliament'. While due allowance should be made for the fact that the three surveys measured responses to three different, albeit related statements on parliamentary representation, it is nonetheless instructive to compare the percentage agreement:

	1986	1984	1982
TOTAL	67,7	74,9	61,0
Afrikaans-speakers	53,3	63,6	41,4
English-speakers	86,4	90,1	87,8
NP supporters	71,3	85,2	41,4
PFP supporters	95,0	95,6	98,3
CP supporters	14,5	11,9	(NCP) 13,5
HNP supporters	23,0	6,3	9,8
NRP supporters	94,3	92,9	76,9

For the later cross-tabulation, we will regard the overall positive response of 67,7% (1 218 respondents out of 1 799 in 1986) as representing a verligte view, and the 30,5% (549 respondents) as taking a verkrampte position.

The second statement, identical in all three surveys, was: 'White school children should not participate in sports meetings with children of other population groups.' The percentage disagreement with the contention - those by implication supporting racially mixed school sport - was as follows:

	<u>1986</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1982</u>
TOTAL	81,4	76,9	75,1
Afrikaans-speakers	71,7	66,4	61,8
English-speakers	94,3	91,2	93,2
NP supporters	88,8	83,4	69,4
PFP supporters	96,4	96,4	99,0
CP supporters	33,7	28,4	(NCP) 21,1
HNP supporters	27,9	28,1	34,4
NRP supporters	94,3	85,7	87,5

Again verligtes were consistently in an overall majority. In 1986, 1 466 (81,4%) of the respondents adopted the verligte view in favour of inter-racial sport at school level, and 320 (17,8%) took a verkrampete line.

The next statement also appeared in all our surveys: 'Cinemas should be open to all population groups'. The following table lists the percentage agreement with the statement:

	<u>1986</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1982</u>
TOTAL	67,6	42,8	43,8
Afrikaans-speakers	54,5	27,2	26,7
English-speakers	84,6	62,6	67,1
NP supporters	73,3	39,5	29,2
PFP supporters	96,4	83,6	84,1
CP supporters	15,6	4,0	(NCP) 12,6
HNP supporters	9,8	0,0	7,9
NRP supporters	88,5	50,0	59,6

In 1986, for the first time, the verligte position on the desegregation of cinemas gained majority support. A total of 1 217 respondents (67,6%) endorsed our statement, against the 574 (32,0%) opposing it.

The final statement on domestic politics appeared only in our latest survey. It read: 'The government should negotiate directly with the African National Congress (ANC) to try to find a solution to South Africa's racial problems'. The language and party sub-groups responded as follows:

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
TOTAL	40,1%	58,0%
Afrikaans-speakers	25,4%	71,7%
English-speakers	59,2%	40,5%
NP supporters	43,7%	54,6%
PFP supporters	83,7%	15,5%
CP supporters	26,1%	72,4%
HNP supporters	24,6%	63,9%
NRP supporters	45,7%	57,1%

On this issue, the verkrampste view prevailed by a margin of 18%. (It is worth recalling that in 1982 support for talks with SWAPO was even smaller than the present level of support for negotiations with the ANC.) Of the total of 1 799 respondents, 1 043 (58,0%) disagreed with our statement, whereas 722 (40,1%) favoured talks with the ANC.

The following table cross-tabulates both verligte and verkrampste responses - identified respectively by the letters L(iberal) and C(onservative) - to the four statements above, with both hawkish (H) and doveish (D) opinions on six foreign policy issues:

FOREIGN ISSUES	DOMESTIC ISSUES	Blacks in Parliament		No mixed school sport		Talk to ANC		Open cinemas	
		L Agree (N=1218)	C Disagree (N=549)	L Disagree (N=1466)	C Agree (N=320)	L Agree (N=722)	C Disagree (N=1043)	L Agree (N=1217)	C Disagree (N=574)
Communist threat exaggerated	D Agree	21,3	11,8	19,1	14,7	32,3	8,8	21,0	12,4
	H Disagree	77,0	86,3	79,2	82,5	66,1	89,5	77,2	85,5
Zimbabwe threat	D Disagree	32,1	18,8	29,7	18,1	32,4	25,2	32,8	17,6
	H Agree	66,9	80,3	68,8	80,6	66,5	73,7	65,7	81,7
Attack terror bases	D Disagree	20,0	10,7	19,1	8,1	27,4	10,3	20,9	9,6
	H Agree	79,4	88,2	80,0	89,7	71,3	89,4	78,4	89,2
Ban food exports	D Disagree	34,7	16,4	32,4	12,2	34,8	24,7	34,1	17,2
	H Agree	64,7	83,1	66,8	85,9	64,5	74,2	64,8	81,5
Cannot win SWA war	D Agree	29,8	9,7	26,4	10,3	39,0	13,1	28,8	12,2
	H Disagree	67,4	89,1	71,0	88,1	58,9	84,9	68,3	86,1
Stop mineral exports	D Disagree	46,6	27,5	44,1	24,1	49,7	34,3	45,8	28,9
	H Agree	51,1	70,9	53,3	74,4	49,2	62,5	51,5	69,0

Percentages of 'verligtes' (L) and of 'verkrampes' (C) on domestic issues who support 'dovetish' (D) and 'hawkish' (H) positions on foreign issues

The table shows, for example, that:

- of the 1 218 respondents in favour of black representation in Parliament, 77% disagreed that the government exaggerated the communist threat against South Africa;
- 89,7% of the 320 respondents opposing racially mixed school sport, expressed themselves in favour of South African attacks on terrorist/guerrilla bases in neighbouring states;
- of the 722 respondents who supported talks between Pretoria and the ANC, 49,2% also agreed with an embargo on South African mineral exports to states applying sanctions against the Republic; and
- 86,1% of the 574 panellists disagreeing with the statement on the desegregation of cinemas, also disputed the contention that South Africans cannot win the war against SWAPO in Namibia.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the cross-tabulated responses is that verkramptes (C) as well as verligtes (L) were strongly militant (H) in their views on foreign policy issues. This is of course in line with the pronounced hawkishness of respondents in general. When the verligte and verkrampte responses to the six foreign policy issues are however compared with those of all (1 799) panellists, we not unexpectedly find that verligtes were consistently less hawkish and verkramptes more hawkish than the white public as a whole.

On most of the selected foreign policy issues, over 80% of the verkrampte respondents adopted militant views. In terms of numbers, verkramptes were most hawkish on the question of military strikes against suspected terrorist/guerrilla targets in adjacent states; they were least militant on the issue of stopping mineral exports in retaliation for sanctions against South Africa. On five of the six foreign issues, a clear majority of verligtes (over 60%) expressed militant opinions. Only on the question of an embargo on mineral sales were verligtes fairly evenly divided between a militant and moderate approach. The statement that elicited the strongest hawkish response from verligtes, too, was that on attacking foreign terrorist/guerrilla bases.

The table therefore suggests a positive correlation between domestic verkramptheid and external hawkishness. The connection is however overshadowed by the fact that verligte respondents generally also displayed decidedly hawkish views on foreign policy issues; the difference in the two groups' militancy is a matter of degree rather than substance.

(A revealing dove-verligte correlation not recorded in the table, is that 66,6% of the 947 respondents supporting talks with SWAPO, also favoured negotiations with the ANC.)

These findings correspond with the cross-tabulations done in our earlier surveys. There are no significant shifts over time to report on the correlations between opinions on domestic and foreign policy concerns.

As previously, the latest survey's cross-tabulations (not featured in the table) also reveal that doveish respondents were not always consistent in their views. This was manifested above all in their support for military attacks against terrorist/guerrilla bases. In each case, well over 70% of the respondents who expressed doveish views on the issues of talking to

SWAPO, a Zimbabwe threat and Mozambique's commitment to the Nkomati Accord, nonetheless agreed with such military action. Another example is that of the 551 respondents who thought Mozambique would honour Nkomati, 77,1% nevertheless implicitly agreed with the South African government's assessment of the communist threat.

Hawkish respondents, by comparison, seemed more consistent in their militant opinions on foreign policy issues:

- 81,2% of the 1 200 panellists who disagreed that Mozambique would carry out the terms of its non-aggression pact with South Africa, also disputed our statement about an exaggerated Communist threat;
- in all, 1 438 respondents thought the government did not exaggerate the communist threat; of them, 79,2% also took issue with the assertion that South Africa cannot defeat SWAPO militarily;
- of the 1 257 respondents in favour of an embargo on food exports to black states supporting insurgents against South Africa, 86,5% also agreed with military strikes against these insurgents in their foreign hide-outs; and well over 80% of the 1 024 respondents who supported an embargo on mineral exports to countries applying sanctions against South Africa, also expressed support for a ban on food exports to hostile black states.

6. CONCLUSION

Having compared the results of our first and second opinion surveys, the 1984 study concluded with the observation that white South African opinion, whether on domestic or foreign issues, was neither static nor insensitive to changes in the political environment. The shifts in opinion measured in the second survey were a reflection of the dynamics of domestic and regional politics. These changes involved a significant mellowing of opinion on foreign policy issues, matched by a strengthening of verligte opinion on the key domestic issue of a multiracial (albeit 'non-black') Parliament. The overall impression left by the 1984 survey was that of greater moderation or accommodation (or, conversely, less militancy and intransigence) among white South Africans on both internal and external issues.

Our 1986 survey presents a more mixed picture. Taking foreign policy issues as a whole, the latest survey has found no meaningful further moderation in white opinion, compared with 1984. A rough categorisation shows that responses to three of the statements were largely the same - singularly hawkish - as in the earlier surveys. On two others, opinions reverted back to the strongly militant views of 1982. On a sixth issue, there was a strong swing to hawkishness in 1986. Responses to only one statement registered a continuous move towards moderation. The remaining five statements on foreign issues were new, featuring for the first time in the 1986 survey. Of these, three dealt with the question of sanctions. The responses suggested considerable doubts among Whites about South Africa's ability to absorb such measures and also revealed profound divisions about the ways in which the Republic ought to respond to sanctions. The established hawkish tendencies were only weakly reflected in respondents' views on sanctions issues.

As regards domestic issues, the 1986 survey found a return to the highly pessimistic views of 1982 on two questions. Steady moves towards greater verligtheid were evident in the latest responses to three other statements. A new statement found Whites deeply divided, with the verkrampte view prevailing. The three remaining issues produced responses that are more difficult to classify as either moderate/liberal or militant/conservative.

More important than such a statistical summary, is the nature of the statements that produced the various kinds of responses. The most dramatic change of opinion in 1986 concerned the question of Mozambique's commitment to the Nkomati Accord. This hardening of opinion was also reflected in the latest responses to the statement on a Zimbabwe threat and a ban on food exports to hostile neighbouring states. On some other key questions - a communist threat, attacks on terrorist bases and the outcome of the Namibian war - white militancy has remained consistently high. Set against these manifestations of hawkishness is the steady increase in support for talks between the South African government and SWAPO. This expression of doveishness is strikingly anomalous in the overall climate of white opinion on external issues. Whites remain deeply conscious of threats to South Africa's (read: white) security and favour tough measures to combat the perceived dangers.

Turning again to domestic matters, Whites generally were in 1986 taking a decidedly dim view of South Africa's future, seeing large-scale internal violence and upheavals ahead. White South Africans have nonetheless in the past two years become notably more verlig than previously on domestic political issues. This not only relates to such peripheral (ie. non-power) matters as racially mixed school sport and the desegregation of cinemas. It

is also reflected in the major issues of black representation in Parliament. The level of support for such a development - roughly 60% - is higher than it was for Coloured and Indian representation in Parliament in 1982 (61%). Another significant finding was that 40% of the respondents (in 1986) favoured direct negotiations between the South African government and the ANC to try to resolve the country's racial problems. Although a clear majority - 58% - opposed the contention, it is worth recalling that in 1982 only 37,6% of Whites supported talks between Pretoria and SWAPO; in the two later surveys, a (small) majority favoured such negotiations over Namibia's future.

These findings raise an important question: To what extent do White South Africans 'adjust' their opinions in the wake of changes in government policies? On the issues of parliamentary representation for race groups other than Whites and negotiating with SWAPO, it would seem that public opinion followed the government's lead. If true, this phenomenon obviously holds far-reaching implications for the government in introducing further political reforms - including perhaps, the thorny question of negotiating with the ANC.

Already in our first survey, we observed that the majority of Whites adopted a notably verligte domestic posture, coupled with a decidedly hawkish external orientation. The second and third surveys essentially confirmed this combination. This firm pattern means that a majority of white South Africans do not regard external militancy and (growing) domestic moderation as mutually exclusive orientations. The hawkish views on foreign policy issues seem well-tuned to Whites' strong external threat perceptions. What is perhaps remarkable, is that the extent of verligtheid on internal political issues has been growing in the face of the high level of domestic threat consciousness and the gloomy views of South Africa's future. This is a feature calling for further study: What is the connection between domestic moderation on the one hand and threat awareness cum pessimism on the other?

The fact that a strong majority of respondents all along took hardline positions on most of the foreign policy issues, points to the consensus-building qualities of external threats. However, this feature should not obscure the divisive effects of party political loyalty in particular and of language. These two are far clearer determinants of Whites' hawkishness or doveishness on foreign issues than is the verlig-verkramp dichotomy as we used it. In several cases, geography, income and age also had a material bearing on respondents' views.

Finally, we might try to provide thumb-nail profiles of fairly typical hawkish and doveish white South Africans. The moderate is likely to be a middle-aged, 'upper-class' (in terms of income), English-speaking Natalian supporting the PPP. The typical militant on external issues may well be a 'lower class' Free State Afrikaner of any age, supporting either the CP or HNP. Perhaps surprisingly, the chances are that the hawk will be a female and the dove a male.

ANNEXURE

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. PLEASE INDICATE THE DEGREE TO WHICH YOU DIFFER OR AGREE WITH EACH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS (NUMBERED (a) TO (p)) BY CIRCLING THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER ON THE SCALE, e.g. ② :

	Definitely agree	Inclined to agree	Inclined to disagree	Definitely disagree
(a) A terrorist/guerrilla war as in South West Africa/Namibia will in time also develop in South Africa.....	11-1	2	3	4
(b) The South African Police and Defence Force are strong enough to control internal unrest indefinitely.....	12-1	2	3	4
(c) The communist threat against South Africa is exaggerated by the Government.....	13-1	2	3	4
(d) Mozambique can be trusted to carry out the terms of the Nkomati non-aggression treaty with South Africa.....	14-1	2	3	4
(e) The Government of Mr Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe constitutes a threat to South Africa's safety.....	15-1	2	3	4
(f) Angola was reportedly on the agenda at the recent summit meeting between President Reagan of the USA and Mr Gorbachev of the Soviet Union. How do you respond to the following statement:- The meeting between President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev will lead to the Soviet Union abandoning its active involvement in Southern Africa?	16-1	2	3	4
(g) The following foreign leaders are favourably disposed towards South Africa:- ◦ President Reagan of America..... ◦ Prime Minister Hawke of Australia..... ◦ Prime Minister Thatcher of Britain..... ◦ President Mitterand of France..... ◦ President Kaunda of Zambia.....	17-1 18-1 19-1 20-1 21-1	2 2 2 2 2	3 3 3 3 3	4 4 4 4 4
(h) An increasing number of states are busy introducing some form of economic sanctions against S.A. How do you respond to the following statement:- The S.A. economy is strong enough to prevent economic sanctions hurting our country?	22-1	2	3	4
(i) South Africa's Blacks have good reason to take up arms against the Government.....	23-1	2	3	4
(j) S.A. should refuse to sell its minerals to states that apply economic sanctions against it.....	24-1	2	3	4
(k) S.A. should negotiate directly with SWAPO to reach a settlement in South West Africa/Namibia.....	25-1	2	3	4
(l) White South Africans cannot depend on the loyalty of black South Africans in the case of war against South Africa.....	26-1	2	3	4
(m) S.A. should not export food to black states that support or harbour terrorists/guerrillas.....	27-1	2	3	4
(n) The only way in which S.A. can in the long run avoid tougher economic sanctions is by granting equal political rights to Blacks.....	28-1	2	3	4
(o) S.A. should militarily attack terrorist/guerrilla bases in its neighbouring states.....	29-1	2	3	4
(p) Blacks should serve with Whites, Coloureds and Indians in the same Parliament.....	30-1	2	3	4

CONTINUES/(q)...

	Definitely agree	Inclined to agree	Inclined to disagree	Definitely disagree
(q) White school children should not participate in sports meetings with children of other population groups.....	31-1	2	3	4
(r) S.A. cannot win the military struggle against SWAPO in the long run.....	32-1	2	3	4
(s) The Government does not yet spend enough on Defence.....	33-1	2	3	4
(t) The Government should negotiate directly with the African National Congress (ANC) to try to find a solution to South Africa's racial problems.....	34-1	2	3	4
(u) Cinemas should be open to all population groups.....	35-1	2	3	4