

Securitisation of migration in Africa

The case of Agadez in Niger

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Intra-African migration is increasingly securitised due to European Union policies implemented on the continent that aim to stem African migration to Europe. Some African countries' policies also contribute towards the securitisation of migration. Drawing on experience from Agadez in Niger, this report discusses the unintended consequences of the securitisation of intra-African migration. This includes growing insecurity for Agadez residents, more smuggling, eroded citizen-government relations, and rising regional instability.

Key findings

- ▶ Securitisation of migration occurs when migration is seen as a security threat to a state or society.
- ▶ Securitisation happens through enhancing border controls and tightening visa policies. Although the military and security industries have contributed significantly to the securitised perspective of migration, other stakeholders have also played a role, including journalists, providers of technology of surveillance, and experts on risk assessment.
- ▶ European Union (EU) policies developed after migration was framed as a ‘crisis’ in 2015–16 and implemented in Africa, have contributed to the increased securitisation of intra-African migration. Examples are the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy, the Joint Valletta Action Plan and the EU Emergency Trust Fund, along with related operational mechanisms (Frontex and the deployment of European troops in African countries).
- ▶ Increased securitisation of migration is evident in Africa. Upper-middle-income countries tend to follow stricter visa policies for fear of a major influx of people from low-income countries and increased job competition. Increased border control has also been seen between African states, such as the borders between Algeria and Morocco.
- ▶ The securitisation of migration in Agadez has led to five unintended consequences: increased insecurity among residents; the adaptation and continuation of the human smuggling industry; exposure of migrants to greater risks; greater chances of destabilisation of the region; and eroded citizen-government relations.

Recommendations

- ▶ Existing migration agreements between European states, the EU, African states and the African Union (AU) should be revised to reflect mutual priorities and interests. African states especially should ensure that Europe’s short-term objective of stemming migration from Africa should not infringe on the long-term objectives of achieving Africa’s development, peace and security.
- ▶ The Africa-Europe migration narrative doesn’t reflect the reality and provides the basis for migration to be securitised. Fifty-three percent of African migration is intra-continental and African migrants constitute only 12.9% of the migrant population in Europe. The African migration ‘invasion’ narrative must change. Research organisations, the media and civil society organisations should be engaged in achieving this.
- ▶ African countries should ensure that migrant agreements and related support is at all times aligned with their national interests and their agenda for development, peace and security.
- ▶ African countries should work towards expanding legal pathways between African countries, and with EU member states. For the former, the implementation of the AU’s Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment, and the African Continental Free Trade Area provide opportunities. In the case of the latter, the need for labour in the context of ageing populations in Europe can provide a good entry point for negotiations with EU member states.

Introduction

This report discusses the securitisation of intra-African migration and its unintended consequences. It has four sections. The first provides a conceptual overview of the securitisation of migration and sheds light on its practical manifestations on the ground. The second discusses securitised migration policies, including the European Union (EU) migration policies implemented in Africa to stem migration from the continent.

Drawing from the experience from Agadez in Niger, the third section showcases the unintended consequences of securitisation of migration including increasing the insecurity of Agadez residents, enhancing smuggling, increasing the chances of further destabilisation of the Sahel region, eroding citizens' and government relations, and exposing migrants to greater risks. The report concludes with policy recommendations.

What is the securitisation of migration?

The 'securitisation of migration' refers to the framing of 'migration' as a security threat to a state or society,¹ leading governments to limit regular migration pathways as governments respond by instituting more restrictive policies against migrants, such as greater surveillance, detention and deportation.

This in turn has a devastating impact on the personal security of migrants. It encourages them to use more dangerous routes, and to use migrant smugglers and human traffickers to whom they pay inflated fees to reach their intended destinations.

The concept of securitisation originated from the Copenhagen School of security studies,² which has expanded the landscape of security threats. It argues that it is not only the military aspect that constitutes a security threat, but also societal, environmental, economic and political dimensions.³ It also states that security threats are socially constructed when the issue is framed in a discursive manner.

Policy implications of securitised discourses provide justifications for extraordinary responses outside the normal bounds of political procedures.⁴ The fact that a migrant figure represents an outsider who comes from a different context serves as a critical entry point for narratives such as the 'invasion'⁵ of a society. It also forms the basis for the current focus on fighting irregular migration, painting a picture that all migration is irregular.

While discussing migration, the concept of 'a migrant' is essential. A migrant is someone who crosses international borders to move to another country. Regular migration entails movement by an individual after obtaining the necessary documents and permission and the use of formal ports of entry of the host country.

Securitisation of migration is about framing 'migration' as a security threat to a state or society

Irregular migration involves movement when one or more of the above factors are not fulfilled. Opportunities for regular migration are growing more limited – a trend that forces many to take irregular paths. The growing irregularity of movement of people has been used as an entry point for the securitisation of migration.

Smuggling plays a big role in facilitating the movements of irregular migrants. A considerable number of migrants use smugglers.⁶ Smuggling, as well as the trafficking of persons, is considered illegal under international law, thus securitising the movement of people is justified as fighting the illegality of trafficking and smuggling.⁷

However, the securitised approach not only focuses on smugglers, but also on individuals who choose to support migrants and refugees. In Italy and France, hundreds of people, including priests and the elderly, have been arrested, investigated or threatened with prison or fines over the past five years in an attempt to criminalise 'solidarity' with migrants.⁸

How migration securitisation manifests

The securitisation of migration is mostly demonstrated through enhancing border controls and tightening visa policies in countries of origin or transit. In destination countries, migrants also face 'detention and deportation, as well as a hostile environment that undermines integration and acceptance'.⁹ Accordingly, migration securitisation is a process that encompasses four different aspects – socio-economic, securitarian, identitarian and political.¹⁰

The socio-economic aspect refers to job competition with nationals, the burden on the welfare system, and health threats relating to new and old viruses brought in by migrants.¹¹ Securitisation also covers threats related

to sovereignty, borders, and both internal and external security.¹² This aspect is behind profiling migrants as importers of external threats through supporting terrorism from abroad and being involved in other forms of crime.¹³

The identitarian aspect entails considering migrants as a threat to the host society's national identity and demographic symmetry,¹⁴ which leads to identifying borders between migrants and 'nationals'.¹⁵ The political aspect refers to anti-immigrant and xenophobic discourse,¹⁶ which is built through the transaction of the other three dimensions – socio-economic, identitarian and securitarian. Providing the basis for policymaking, the political aspect is the most significant.

Although the military and security industry contributed significantly to the development of securitised perspectives of migration,¹⁷ the landscape of migration securitisation involves wider stakeholders. It includes journalists and surveillance technology providers and risk-assessment experts. These actors' relevance is derived through justifying their protection role to the public from threats posed by outsiders through migration.¹⁸

Increased tendencies to view refugees as a security concern are also seen in Africa

Global political discourse around the 'securitisation of migration' played a significant role in shaping public opinion in the 2016 election of Donald Trump in the United States and in the 2016 referendum in the United Kingdom that approved Brexit.¹⁹ In both cases, migration dominated the political debate and was presented as a leading threat to those nations' well-being and existence.

The securitisation of migration has also been central in elections, especially in Europe. In polls conducted in 2018, migration was a dominant subject of political debate, where anti-migrant parties gained significant electoral ground. This was vividly symbolised in Italy, where Matteo Salvini, the leader of the right-wing League party, enjoyed an electoral victory after running a campaign that presented migrants as a threat. Despite Italy's progressive history of welcoming migrants, the current government then adopted an anti-migrant decree in September 2018 that made migrants' expulsion easier.²⁰

Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is another example of a politician who has secured a landslide victory, for his third term in office, by construing immigrants as Hungary's leading existential threat and invoking a sense of nationalist protectionism. In the wake of his victory, he claimed that the victory gave Hungarians 'the opportunity to defend themselves and to defend Hungary.'²¹ In Sweden, along a bastion of multiculturalism, the anti-immigration Sweden Democrats also won 18% of the votes in the national election, up from 12.9% in the previous election.²²

African countries' policies

Increased securitisation of migration is also evident in Africa. Africa's upper-middle-income countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, South Africa and Botswana tend to follow stricter visa rules towards African travellers. The fear of a major influx of people from low-income countries, job market competition and security issues are some reasons given for stricter policies.

In some cases, these concerns have led to xenophobic tendencies and violent attacks that have taken the lives of migrants and destroyed their properties – for example, the attacks seen in South Africa in 2008, 2015 and 2019.²³

Increased tendencies to view refugees as a security concern are also seen in Africa. This is affecting responses to refugees, despite African states' generosity in hosting large numbers. For example Tanzania and Kenya have been on the front lines of protecting refugees for years. During the Julius Nyerere period (1964–1985), refugees residing in Tanzania were considered an economic asset.²⁴

But refugees are now seen as a national security threat.²⁵ In 2019, Tanzania announced its plan to repatriate Burundian refugees.²⁶ Kenya's repeated declaration about shutting the Dadaab refugee camp has also been linked to the view that refugees are a security threat.²⁷

Africa's fragile peace and security environment with its multitude of threats offers an entry point for justifying the securitisation of migration. In this respect, non-state actors including al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, and Islamic State West Africa Province pose serious security threats.

The fact that these groups operate in parts of Africa where high levels of movement occur makes the issue complicated. This is despite the largely anecdotal evidence on the common narrative linking migration and security threats.

Al-Shabaab is active in the Horn of Africa and East Africa – an epicentre of the movement of people in and outside Africa. Over four million of the 7.4 million refugees and over eight million of the 17.8 million internally displaced people live in the area. Similarly, a number of militant groups are active in West Africa (including in the Lake Chad basin, the Sahel and Sahara), a zone where high levels of intra-Africa migration take place.²⁸

Experiences of African countries that have applied relaxed visa rules don't show a direct link between migration and security threats

The tendency to enhance border control between African states is also evident. For example, border control by Algeria and Morocco has been intensified. To address smuggling and trafficking, in 2016 Algeria built a trench along its border with Morocco. Morocco also started building a security fence with electronic sensors in 2014.²⁹

But experiences of African countries that have applied relaxed visa rules don't show a direct link between migration and security threats. For example the Economic Community of West African States and East African Community have achieved 100% and 90% reciprocal open visa policies between their respective member states.³⁰ Ghana, Rwanda, Benin, Seychelles and Mauritius have also applied relaxed visa rules, and haven't faced serious security threats.

Securitised migration policies

This section discusses the security implications of major EU migration policies on intra-African migration. It specifically covers policies spearheaded by the EU after migration was framed as a 'crisis' in 2015–16. Operational mechanisms of the securitisation, such as Frontex and the deployment of military operations, are also discussed.

4th EU-Africa Summit

During 2014's 4th EU-Africa Summit, the EU-Africa joint declaration on migration and mobility was the only agreement signed.³¹ To address migration-related issues, the agreement highlights the importance of facilitating employment opportunities at a regional level. It also includes strengthening border management to fight the smuggling of migrants and facilitation of readmissions.³²

European Neighbourhood Policy

The securitisation of migration in Africa is also clearly reflected in the 2015 revised European Neighbourhood Policy, where seven African countries take



part: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and Western Sahara.³³ The policy outlines migration and security among the EU's major areas of cooperation.³⁴ Policing, border security and counter-terrorism are highlighted as key issues of focus in this policy.³⁵

Joint Valletta Action Plan

In 2015, the Joint Valletta Action Plan was developed during the Valletta Summit on Migration, where 35 African and European heads of state and government took part.³⁶ Its key objectives were addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement; the prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings; and return, readmission and reintegration.³⁷

The plan also includes proposals to step up military and security cooperation and assistance, including equipment provision, information and intelligence sharing and the development of communication networks for maritime surveillance, such as the European Border Surveillance system (EUROSUR) and the Seahorse Network.³⁸ This provides many commercial opportunities for the military and security industry.³⁹

EU Emergency Trust Fund

The Valletta Summit led to the launch of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), which serves as its financial and implementation wing. Implementation of the EUTF concentrates on fighting migrant smuggling and trafficking through enhanced border control focusing on the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, the Horn of Africa and North Africa.

With funding of €3.6 billion for a five-year period,⁴⁰ the EUTF has established itself as the most noticeable tool of EU's migration partnership policy. It has also become a sign of a closer alignment between EU's migration policy, security and development.⁴¹ This takes the focus away from long-term development solutions, setting migration among key topics in European diplomacy.⁴²

EU Partnership Framework on Migration

The EU Partnership Framework on Migration is a follow-up initiative to the Valletta Summit. It sets out a framework for cooperation with third party countries, mainly in Africa. It identifies five priority countries (Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal).⁴³ The framework offers more responsibility to the European External Action Service, under the auspices of the EU's

High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Consequently, this enhances migration among key topics in European diplomacy.⁴⁴

Frontex

Frontex was established in 2004 and serves as the EU agency for the protection of the external borders. Its main task is coordinating border security efforts of the EU member states. From 2011, Frontex was mandated to 'proactively monitor and contribute to the developments in research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders.'

EU member states have also deployed soldiers in African countries to deter migration

As the focus for border externalisation and return support increases from time to time, the role of Frontex in migration grows equally. Frontex's budget also increased 3 688% between 2005 and 2016 (from €6.3 million to €238.7m).^{45, 46}

Frontex also takes part in the EU's external migration processes, such as the Khartoum and Rabat processes and the Joint Valletta Action Plan implementation.⁴⁷ It operates in different African countries for purposes of information exchange and research and development of new technologies for border control.⁴⁸ It also appointed a liaison officer in Niger, the only one so far in Africa. Besides this, Frontex trains Libyan Coast Guard and Navy officers as part of Operation Sophia.⁴⁹

Military deployment in Africa

The other face of migration securitisation is EU member state ground-level military deployment in African countries to deter migration. The British government for example sent troops to Sierra Leone for training and joint exercises at the beginning of 2017.

Explaining the reason, a UK government source told journalists, 'We want to do more than pull migrants out of the water, we want to stop them before they get there.' Another British mission trains Tunisian armed forces in border security to achieve similar results.⁵⁰

In December 2017, the Italian government also announced that it had deployed some troops to North

Africa to stop migration.⁵¹ On a similar note, French president Emmanuel Macron offered to increase France's military presence in Niger but in the context of the war on terror.⁵²

The presence of foreign troops in Africa to deter migration further complicates the already troubled peace and security dynamics of the continent. Already Africa is highly affected by conflict, which has been the leading cause of forced displacement, which refers to refugees and internally displaced people over the past 50 years.⁵³ It also undermines the continent's effort of demilitarisation through African Union (AU) initiatives such as 'silencing the guns by 2020'.

Consequences of securitisation: the Agadez case

Agadez is the north-eastern administration unit of the Nigerien state, sitting on a key route between West Africa and the Sahel and the Maghreb region. It is estimated that a third of all migrants travelling through Agadez eventually end up on a boat to Europe.⁵⁴ As a result, EU policymakers have focused on Agadez since 2015–16 to stem migration to Europe, especially as the instability and lack of a unified government in Libya made collaboration with that country difficult.

The EU's practical intervention in Agadez includes supporting the government of Niger in adopting the

new Law Against the Illicit Smuggling of Migrants which criminalises smuggling migrants outside Agadez.⁵⁵ While the law clearly states criminalising smuggling of migrants outside Agadez, practical implementation starts in Agadez.

About a third of all migrants travelling through Agadez end up on a boat to Europe

This is manifested by militarising Agadez to stem migration. In this respect, Frontex has also appointed a liaison officer in Niger, as explained above. Further the EU extended the mandate of the European Union Capacity Building Mission in Niger (EUCAP – Niger), which is a civilian mission that supports the security force's capability to better control migration flows and associated criminal activity.⁵⁶ As part of this exercise, the Nigerien police have also been provided with training to counter human smuggling, which has led to significant arrests of smugglers and seizure of their vehicles.

The overriding objective of this securitised intervention was to decrease arrival numbers en route to Europe. However, this approach overlooks three important points. First, restrictive policies don't stop irregular migration flows. Second, these measures have played a role in

Figure 1: Agadez in Niger



further complicating the security situation in Agadez. Third, they undermine efforts to address the root causes of migration, being focused too much on the decrease in numbers as the leading indicator of success.^{57, 58}

Accordingly, the securitisation of migration in Agadez has resulted in five major unintended consequences: it has increased the insecurity of residents, allowed the human smuggling industry to adapt and continue, exposed migrants to greater risks, enhanced the destabilisation possibilities of the region, and eroded citizen-government relations.

Increased insecurity of residents

The securitisation of migration in Agadez drives another type of human security challenge by infringing on the livelihoods of local residents. The EU's interventions started dismantling Agadez's 'migration industry', without putting in place alternative means of income generation for residents.⁵⁹

A third of respondents in a study conducted by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations indicated that they earned some form of income through provision of goods and services to migrants including through selling food and water and operating call shops.⁶⁰ Income from the migration industry has served as a substitute for residents since the major economic sectors of Agadez such as tourism, mining and agriculture have declined over the past decade.^{61, 62}

Recognising the importance of improving the livelihoods of residents, the EUTF reserves considerable funding for long-term socio-economic development, including €243 million from 2016 to 2020, to support agricultural projects. However, implementation of these projects is too slow⁶³ to cope with the dismantling of the migration industry.⁶⁴ This indicates that the very efforts to address migration through securitised approaches overlooked the role of the migration industry in supplementing the local poor economy.

Human smuggling industry adapts and continues

Since the increased securitisation of migration wasn't accompanied by measures to address root causes, it has unwittingly contributed to a rise in human smuggling which responds to the existing demand for people to move.⁶⁵ The increased securitisation of migration in Agadez has affected individual front-line Nigerien smugglers but not the key actors.

The major actors in the Agadez smuggling business haven't been impacted significantly due to their strong connection with high-level officials.⁶⁶ This shows that the whole project of dismantling the 'migration industry' doesn't get the buy-in from the government itself, which leads to a bigger question of its sustainability.

Accordingly, the human smuggling industry has adopted new strategies to adapt to the situation, emergence of new actors and new routes. In terms of actors, Sudanese smugglers have filled the vacuum created by dismantling the front-line actors of Nigerien smugglers on the ground. These smugglers are organising transit routes to Libya through Chad and Sudan (Darfur). These new routes are longer, more dangerous, and pass through less-travelled areas, exposing migrants to further risks including active conflicts.⁶⁷ The journey is five times more expensive.⁶⁸

Migrants exposed to greater risks

The securitisation of migration and its impact on making travel more complicated exposes migrants to more human rights abuse and hardship.⁶⁹ The growth of risks to migrants and the dramatic increase in fatalities at Europe's borders are linked to the reinforced border control measures. The EU's increased investment in border control in Agadez, for instance, together with its pledging of €90 million to Libya for enhanced migration management, contributed towards the slavery issue in Libya.⁷⁰

Securitisating migration in Agadez has affected individual Nigerien smugglers but not the key actors

Policies for securitisation therefore can increase migrants' vulnerability, and the risks they're exposed to in transit countries, particularly violations of their fundamental rights, while ultimately expanding the smuggling business.

Increased risk of regional destabilisation

The disruption of residents' livelihoods due to the securitised approach can lead to further destabilisation not only in Niger, but also the wider Sahel region. Already many armed young men have taken to banditry to respond to their immediate economic needs.⁷¹

The danger of disrupting the livelihoods of the residents could drive them towards radicalisation – creating a fertile recruitment ground for extremist groups. In this context, it is also important to note that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operates in the Sahel region, including in Niger. In fact, the disruption of livelihoods could drive many more people from Agadez itself to migrate in search of better opportunities.

Further, the presence of new foreign facilitators in Agadez in a context where locals are out of business could exacerbate tensions between the two groups.⁷² The overall approach of focusing on enhancing security to stem migration also affects building stronger and functioning security institutions in Niger as the experience of Libya shows.⁷³

Eroded citizen-government relations

The securitisation of migration has led to erosion of the already low public trust in government officials in Agadez.⁷⁴ The officials confess, ‘They ask us why we work for the EU rather than for them, the people who got us elected.’⁷⁵ Indeed it shouldn’t be expected that African governments’ cooperation to stem migration be viewed positively by citizens.

A focus on enhancing security to stem migration creates fertile recruitment ground for violent extremist groups like AQIM

Migration is considered one of the means to achieve economic and social security among African societies, as remittances outweigh official development aid. In 2018, for example, a World Bank report indicated that Africa received \$46 billion in remittances.⁷⁶

Thus implementation of securitised approaches by African governments can backfire on them, complicating their already poor relations with their public for failing to address poverty and access to basic services, the very issue that drives migration. The hostile demonstration in reaction to the agreement signed by Mali with the Netherlands in December 2016 is a case in point. The agreement aimed to facilitate the readmission of Malian nationals with irregular status in exchange for project support equivalent to €145 million.⁷⁷

Even if African governments wanted to influence migration agreements in favour of their citizens with EU countries, they are not in a position to do so. Current trends show that African countries are excluded from decision-making processes in planning projects to be implemented in their territories.

EUTF projects, for example, are reviewed and adopted by an operational committee in Brussels, chaired by the European Commission and made up of donor countries that have paid an ‘entry ticket’ of at least €3 million. This enables African countries to participate only as observers without voting rights.⁷⁸ It is not only difficult to justify paying the entry ticket for a country like Niger as the poorest country in the world but also on the grounds that migration is not its priority – which is the case for many African states.

\$46 billion

AMOUNT AFRICA RECEIVED
IN REMITTANCES IN 2018

Conclusion and recommendations

Securitisation of migration plays a significant role in shaping the migration narrative and influencing related policies. The current narrative over-emphasises the link between migration and organised crime, which ultimately creates a sense of fear regarding migrants without putting into perspective their positive contributions. Accordingly, it justifies securitised responses including those heavily focused on border control and anti-smuggling networks, putting aside development-related projects that address migration's root causes.

The implementation of securitised responses without improving local communities' livelihood opportunities leads to human insecurity of residents as the experience of Agadez indicates. It also increases revenues of the smuggling industry through creating longer, more dangerous roads for migrants, which creates fertile ground for even worse abuse of migrants' rights.

The erosion of livelihood opportunities due to securitised approaches in areas such as Agadez that are already highly militarised will further complicate the peace and security dynamics of the region. This includes encouraging those affected by the dismantled migration industry to be easy recruit targets for extremist groups operating in the area, such as AQIM.

The securitisation of migration can blur the future of migration management through providing reactive and short-term strategies to stem departures from Africa to Europe. This is a context where human security threats to migrants far outweigh the national security threats that they may create.⁷⁹

The following policy recommendations should be considered in order to build a holistic migration management system, away from a focus on securitising migration.

Changing the Africa-to-Europe migration narrative

The Africa-to-Europe migration narrative is driven by perceptions that Africans are on the move to the West, especially to Europe. This is despite the fact that 53.2% of African migration is intra-continental and sub-Saharan African migration constitutes only 12.9% of Europe's migrant population.

This biased narrative provides a strong basis for the securitisation of migration through framing African

migration to Europe as an 'invasion'. Evidence on African migration and security is also anecdotal. Most discussions on securitisation are driven by perceptions related to threats formed by speeches or arguments mainly by the rightist elite in Europe.

As a result, building an evidence-based migration narrative is important. The EU and its member states should exert more effort regarding correct public perception. In this respect, engaging research organisations, especially those working in migration management, migration and security, is important. The media and civil society organisations should also be engaged.

Reconciling priorities and interests

The EU and African countries should focus on reconciling their short- and long-term priorities and interests. Migration falls among short-term priorities especially from European perspectives. Having a stable and economically dynamic network of partner nations in Africa falls under long-term priorities. Currently trends show that short-term priorities (detering migration) risk subverting those longer-term objectives (development, peace and security).

Europe's short-term priorities risk subverting Africa's development, peace and security goals

The current policies and practices between the EU and Africa are conflicting. EU countries are interested in stemming African migration, seeking better cooperation with African countries on the return of irregular migrants, and enhanced border control. African countries on the other hand would like to explore opportunities for legal migration channels to the EU.⁸⁰

Remittances are one major source of income for African countries. On the other hand, European states increasingly view migration as a threat to their society, despite their need for labour as their population ages.

To reconcile the priorities and interests of the two continents, African and European states as well as related continental organisations such as the AU and European Union should take part.

Revising migration agreements

Existing migration agreements between Africa and Europe should be revisited from a perspective of

enhancing African development. African countries should ensure that migration agreements and related support are at all times aligned with their national interests, not counter to their development, peace and security agendas. One major way to transform African development is by enhancing intra-African movement of people and intra-African trade.

African countries must ensure that migration agreements align with rather than oppose their national interests

In this respect, the EU should support the implementation of the AU's Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment, and the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement. This would help Africa to achieve sustainable development through enhancing intra-continental trade. In fact, the expansion of trade is one way to address the drivers of migration, creating more employment opportunities.

For Africa to realise its integration agenda, Europe's support including sharing its successful experience in creating the EU zone would be significant. Building an integrated Africa, where its citizens move and trade better, would enable the continent to benefit more from the migration dividend.

In this respect, the EU, its member states, African states and relevant institutions such as the AU and regional

economic communities (RECs) should work together. African states should also forge alliances to strike a balance between what is valued most among their constituencies and in the EU countries. Prioritising joint interests could provide a good starting point.

More efficient border control

African countries need to build integrated border management systems to better facilitate movement of people. Building integrated border management systems involves national intelligence, security services of AU member states and law enforcement agencies. Investment to advance information and communication technology (ICT) and the training of personnel should also be considered.

In this respect, the EUTF can play a critical role in building a robust border management system among African member states to facilitate the movement of people, and not to deter them. African states, RECs, the AU and relevant EU institutions should work together.

Expanding legal pathways

African countries should work towards expanding legal pathways in two ways. First, they should find ways to put in place intra-African legal pathways. In this respect, the effective and full implementation of the free movement of people regime is critical. Second, African states should negotiate with their partners such as the EU to expand opportunities for legal pathways. Further to enhancing migration governance through building an orderly and regular movement of people, this approach would make smugglers increasingly irrelevant.

Notes


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This report is funded by the Hanns Seidel Foundation. The ISS is also grateful for support from the members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the Hanns Seidel Foundation, the European Union and the governments of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the USA.

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