

SIERRA LEONE AFTER ELECTIONS:

POLITICS AS USUAL?

12 July 2002



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SIERRA LEONE AFTER ELECTIONS: POLITICS AS USUAL?

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Sierra Leone continues to make remarkable progress in ending its eleven-year civil war. There is no longer active fighting, and the army and police are fully deployed across the country. The battlefield capacity of the insurgents, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), has been significantly diminished, and their political arm, the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUF-P), fared poorly in the May 2002 elections that saw President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah re-elected in a landslide with just over 70 per cent of the vote and his party win an overwhelming majority of seats in parliament. Those elections were the first major test for the country following completion of the disarmament process and the official declaration of the end of the war in January 2002.

This was the first truly non-violent vote in the country's history, in large part because of the substantial international peacekeeping presence. However, a number of concerns are on the horizon that could threaten long term peace prospects. First, there were many questions about the fairness of the electoral process and the level of fraud and coercion that shrouded it.

Secondly, the returns revealed potentially dangerous divisions between the army and President Kabbah's ruling Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP). A large majority of the security forces voted for Kabbah's opponents, indicating there is at least some animosity between the executive branch and the armed forces.

Thirdly, the elections also demonstrated that ethnic tensions between Temne in the North and Mende in the South and in the central part of the

country remain significant. These underscore the need for a more inclusive government in Freetown. President Kabbah's SLPP party swept votes across the South and East while its main rival, the All People's Congress party (APC), maintained its stronghold in the North. The results left Sierra Leone dangerously close to single party rule, with an executive branch and a parliament heavily dominated by the SLPP.

Regrettably, President Kabbah appears to have emerged from his victory with diminished commitment to the peace process. He has done little to establish a cabinet that is broad based, inclusive and designed to promote the goals of national reconciliation.

The international community has expended time, effort, and approximately U.S.\$2 billion in an expensive but so far successful peacekeeping mission. This investment made the election possible, but it is still too soon to declare victory. Many root causes of the war, particularly the culture of "winner-take-all politics", have not been eliminated.

The election will only be significant if accompanied by fundamental reforms that begin to change Sierra Leone's political landscape. The international community needs to use the post-election period to work hard at consolidating the peace process.

The newly elected government has six months before the start of the dry season – when conflict could resume – to tackle problems. Reform of the security forces must continue. Aside from the

divisions revealed by the vote, there are still considerable question marks concerning the capability of the security forces to secure the country and the capacity of local militias to challenge their authority.

Renewed conflict in neighbouring Liberia reinforces the need for the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the British military and police training teams to remain. President Charles Taylor of Liberia retains destabilising regional ambitions and the tools to pursue them, despite his current domestic difficulties, including elements of the RUF insurgents and Kamajor militias now inside Liberia that he can redirect against Sierra Leone's still fragile peace structures.

The Kabbah administration must also tackle the corruption that permeates all levels of government and society. The international community has assisted in developing accountability systems, but other measures are still needed, such as increasing the independence of the judiciary and making the Anti-Corruption Commission more independent.

Finally, measures must be taken to promote reconciliation among combatants and civilians. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court provide the main venues for healing wounds. The international community, especially the United States, has pushed hard for the creation of the Special Court, and the success of these instruments of justice will depend on continued international support, scrutiny and funding.

The international community's priority has so far been to ensure "security first", but now it has to be as rigorous in demanding better governance and accountability from the government. It must not see these goals as mutually exclusive. Overlooking corrupt practices by the ruling SLPP would only produce fertile ground for renewed conflict.

RECOMMENDATIONS

TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL:

1. Keep UNAMSIL's mandate robust and focused on the strategic and at-risk parts of the country while taking advantage of increased stability and the improved

capacity of Sierra Leone's army and police to downsize over the next year.

2. Take into careful account the increased instability in Liberia and its implications for Sierra Leone while carrying out UNAMSIL downsizing.
3. Encourage the creation of a contact group, including Nigeria, the UK, France and the U.S., to align positions on the interlocking crises engulfing the Manu River region, and in particular to bring all stakeholders in Liberia's civil war to the peace table.

TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMONWEALTH:

4. Continue efforts to ensure unity among the different factions that have been newly integrated into the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces.
5. Facilitate the disbanding of the Kamajor Civil Defence Forces and continue to ensure that security services are not polarised along ethnic, regional or political lines.
6. Create, in cooperation with the government, an International Police Assistance Team to develop a more robust and consistent program of training in Sierra Leone in conjunction with opportunities for police officers to gain experience with professional national police forces overseas.

TO INTERNATIONAL DONORS:

7. Make the fight against corruption a priority, including by pressing the new government to make the Anti-Corruption Commission an independent body free from political interference, by conditioning aid for reconstruction to governance reforms, by supporting civil society groups that help in the investigation of corrupt practices, and by strengthening the research capacity of reformers in parliament willing to tackle corruption across all sections of government.
8. Assist the Special Court to develop procedural rules including those covering how indictments will be brought, fair discovery and use of evidence, and, in particular, that do not permit the government of Sierra Leone to veto

witnesses or determine who from its ranks might be prosecuted.

9. Make greater effort to raise the necessary operational funds for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
10. Provide funds immediately to complete, in conjunction with efforts to aid the victims of the war, the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants – particularly with regard to training and employment programs.

TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT:

11. Play a strong leadership role in the Special Court, the chief prosecutor of which is a U.S. citizen.

TO ECOWAS LEADERS AND OTHER FRIENDS OF SIERRA LEONE:

12. Make clear to President Kabbah that his new government will only be supported if political reforms are implemented and a more inclusive style of politics is developed.

TO THE GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT OF SIERRA LEONE:

13. Separate the office of the attorney general from that of the minister of justice in order to limit political influence in prosecutorial decisions.

Freetown/Brussels, 12 July 2002

SIERRA LEONE AFTER ELECTIONS: POLITICS AS USUAL?

I. INTRODUCTION

After eleven years of fighting, President Kabbah officially declared Sierra Leone's war over on 18 January 2002. The hard won peace culminated in presidential and parliamentary elections on 10 and 14 May 2002¹ that were largely without violent incidents but were marred by serious irregularities.

The results and statistics speak volumes. Over 2.3 million citizens (about 85 per cent of the eligible population) registered to vote, a significant increase over the 1.5 million who registered in 1996. Some 81 per cent of the eligible population voted, producing a resounding victory for President Kabbah, who received just over 70 per cent of the ballots, and his SLPP, which gained 83 of the 112 seats in parliament. The main opposition party, the All People's Congress, gained only 27 seats, and its leader, Ernest Koroma, polled slightly over 22 per cent of the presidential votes. As a whole, new and smaller parties performed poorly.

The RUF-P, the political wing of the RUF insurgents, was overwhelmingly rejected, receiving only 1.7 per cent. The rebel movement fragmented sharply during the UN-driven disarmament process and its transition to a political party, and it remains to be seen whether the RUF-P will survive in the post-election environment.

In a worrying development, the one-time junta leader of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council,

Johnny Paul Koroma,² showed surprising strength, although his absolute numbers were still quite low. Koroma, now a born again Christian and self-proclaimed "angel", polled 3 per cent of the presidential votes – drawing significant support from the armed forces – and won two seats in parliament for his People's Liberation Party.

For a country that has endured more than a decade of bitter civil war marked by at least 50,000 deaths and appalling violence against civilians, the first peaceful elections in the 41 years of independence seemed to usher in a new and welcome era. There is widespread war fatigue, and the general atmosphere has stabilised. All political parties have pledged to pursue change through political and non-violent means.

The international community over the last eighteen months deserves credit for reversing the disastrously ineffective approach to Sierra Leone of the second half of the 1990s. As ICG argued in the run-up to elections, a "security first" approach was a key component of the strategy.³ This aimed at the complete disarmament of all armed groups and especially the RUF, the full deployment of some 17,000 UNAMSIL peacekeepers across Sierra Leone, the restoration of government authority in the countryside, and a clearer understanding of the threats posed by regional insecurity. These efforts, while neither universally successful nor without significant complications, contributed to the dramatic turnaround. The

¹ Security forces voted on a special polling day, 10 May 2002. The rest of the population voted four days later.

² There is no familial relationship between Johnny Paul Koroma and Ernest Koroma, the leader of the All People's Congress.

³ ICG Africa Report No. 35, *Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty*, 24 October 2001, p. i.

completion of the disarmament program before the elections was particularly important.

There are also positive signs that indicate a broader national commitment in Sierra Leone to the ongoing peace process. The government has increased its efforts to extend legal authority into the provinces. This includes not only the deployment of the police and the armed forces to ensure physical security, but also the extension of local governance and the provision of basic services to the population. However, in many areas this extension of authority remains quite shallow, and much remains to be done.

The election results also made clear that some dangerous fault lines still lurk just beneath the surface, and that if the international community rushes to disengage, the country could again lurch toward war. Several troubling trends were immediately apparent. First, Sierra Leone now has a government overwhelmingly dominated by the SLPP, and little in the way of an active or viable opposition. Such a skewed balance of power could soon lead to the kind of regional and ethnic inequities and abuses that fuelled the civil war in the early 1990s. President Kabbah has made very few gestures toward including a broader array of voices within his cabinet, much less considering any kind of government of national reconciliation.

Also disturbingly, the security forces overwhelmingly voted for Kabbah's opponents, mainly the People's Liberation Party and All People's Congress. This may well deepen animosity between the armed forces and the SLPP and push the president toward continued reliance on local militia groups especially the Kamajor Civil Defence Forces that he deems more loyal. The possible rift between the SLPP and the military also makes clear that the proper handling of demobilisation and disarmament issues will be vital for maintaining stability.

The elections also underscored that the North-South divide remains serious. It largely replicates ethnic lines, with the North dominated by Temne and the South (as well as the central part of the country) being largely Mende. President Kabbah's SLPP party swept votes across the South and East while the All People's Congress drew the majority of its support in the North. These divisions further highlight the need to establish a more inclusive

government in Freetown that can provide broader public services across the nation as a whole.

Against this backdrop of new and shallow stability, flecked with warning signs, the international community and Sierra Leone face important institutional hurdles in the months ahead. These include the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court (headed by a U.S. citizen) that will investigate and charge those involved in crimes against humanity. The operation of both bodies will be crucial in setting the tone for justice and reconciliation in Sierra Leone and will likely impact the broader security situation in the West African region. The mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) will be reviewed in September 2002.

The progress has been heartening, but the election must not become a pretext for the international community to take its eyes off Sierra Leone. The country's history is replete with false starts in the peace process, and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Sierra Leone, Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, was right to conclude that "Elections themselves do not mean the end or consolidation of peace".⁴ Rather, the hard work of focusing on the unfinished aspects of the peace process and peace building starts now.

It is also important to note that the situation in Sierra Leone also remains closely linked to the regional security picture, particularly the events unfolding in Liberia where the government of Charles Taylor is engaged in increasingly intense fighting against the rebel Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). President Taylor has often actively exported instability to Sierra Leone, and his continued willingness to back militias engaged in regional adventurism is of continuing concern.

The greatest threat to peace, however, comes from the government's waning commitment to the peace process. While President Kabbah has always been regarded as a leading reformer, several incidents of corruption in the last few months have tarnished that image and reminded the international community that closer scrutiny is

⁴ Press Briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, UNAMSIL Headquarters, Freetown, 14 May 2002.

needed of key members of his cabinet. Moreover, that newly formed body is neither broad-based nor designed to promote reconciliation. It is overwhelmingly SLPP in character, with Kabbah electoral allies holding the key posts. While Kabbah did remove seven ministers during the transition, five were non-SLPP members, and the other two were dropped because they were not viewed as competent.

The cabinet falls well short of the president's promise to conduct a "clean sweep" of ministers accused of corruption. Allegations of corruption have been made against ministers including: Okere Adams, who retained his position as minister of marine resources, energy and power; and Momodu Koroma the minister of foreign affairs. The government has not launched investigations of either, making the merit of the charges difficult to ascertain. Both civil society groups and international donors are understandably disappointed with a cabinet formed largely along lines of patronage and political loyalty at a time when reconciliation is fundamental to stability.⁵

The international community will need to focus on the government's handling of accountability and reconciliation issues in the coming months. High levels of corruption contributed significantly to fuelling the conflict and could spawn renewed violence unless the international community takes the bull by the horns and demands a cleaner and more accountable government. While corruption is obviously a deep-rooted, systemic problem, donors, in particular Britain, have considerable leverage to demand better governance and better accountability. President Kabbah's survival has largely been dependent on the intervention of various international actors, and he will likely continue to need this kind of support to navigate still troubled political waters. Citizens will rightly demand significant dividends from peace, and the president's honeymoon will be short-lived.

II. THE ELECTIONS: "IF KABBAH GO, WHITE MAN GO, UN GO, MONEY GO!"

A more detailed analysis of the election process and results helps in the assessment of potential security threats.

A. PEACEFUL ELECTIONS

The electoral process was largely free of the violence that has all too often been a hallmark of elections in Sierra Leone. The dignity and calm with which ordinary citizens lined the streets of Freetown and the surrounding provinces to vote marked a significant milestone. The number of political rallies, the establishment of new parties, as well as popular engagement in the political process were encouraging signs of widespread popular commitment to peace. Violence was minimal and localised leading up to election day, although there were a few cases of voter intimidation or coercion, predominantly involving the ruling SLPP.⁶

The UN deserves much credit. UNAMSIL troops supported the police in providing a comprehensive security umbrella that included a highly visible armed presence throughout the country. UNAMSIL's logistical support also went a long way to minimise the administrative challenges confronting the National Electoral Commission. With just over 5,000 polling stations, the elections were a major logistical exercise that could not have been accomplished otherwise in such a short time.

B. SOME FLAWS IN THE PROCESS

While the elections were largely free of violence, there are lingering questions about their fairness. The international community, which pushed for

⁵ ICG interviews with civil society and journalists, and reports from local newspapers, May 2002.

⁶ ICG was informed of two cases of voter intimidation in the lead up to elections. In one, five soldiers were attacked by SLPP supporters on different occasions in Freetown in mid-April. In the second, volunteers and candidates from two opposition groups faced harassment and intimidation by SLPP supporters in their stronghold of Kono and Kenema. ICG interview with senior Sierra Leone army officer and staff of an opposition group, April 2002.

an early vote, muted its criticism, especially of the many administrative shortcomings of the National Electoral Commission. While the desire to declare the elections an unequivocal success is understandable, failing to speak candidly about the problems that did occur will only encourage perpetuation of the old style politics and corruption that have characterised Sierra Leone's political landscape for several decades.

Since it began monitoring the electoral process in November 2001, ICG has received numerous complaints from opposition groups and has conducted many private consultations about flaws in the electoral procedures. The elections were billed as a new beginning for Sierra Leone but the activities of the ruling SLPP party during the process sound a cautionary note and suggest that government manipulation at the ballot box should be addressed.

As early as December 2001, the Anti-Corruption Commission warned donors that allegations in local newspapers that the National Election Commission had misappropriated government funds were well founded. One particularly noteworthy case involved the reported deposit of 140 million Leones (approximately U.S.\$65,000), originally intended to buy government vehicles, into the bank account of the National Election Commission Chairman, Walter Nicol.⁷ At the start of 2002, the Anti-Corruption Commission had indicted three of the five National Election Commissioners, including the chairman, but Attorney General Solomon Berewa, who later became President Kabbah's running mate, blocked prosecutions. Instead, the government used the indictments as a pretext to take more direct control of the National Election Commission, leading to suspicions that the body was effectively defending the SLPP's interests throughout the election.⁸

The international community was extremely reluctant to address the indictments issued by the National Election Commission for fear of

jeopardising the electoral timetable.⁹ The quick organisation of the elections was aimed at blocking the RUF's call for an interim government.¹⁰ The Commissioners could and should have been promptly replaced, with parliamentary consent, in December 2001.

A significant area of concern echoed by two local organisations, the Campaign for Good Governance and the National Electoral Watch, centred on the voter registration process.¹¹ Many of the logistical problems – such as poor communication, a lack of funding and a lack of supplies such as registration forms, ink and photographic equipment – are unsurprising given the difficulty of doing business in Sierra Leone. However, in hindsight, many problems also seem to have stemmed from a broader effort by the government to bolster registration in SLPP strongholds and depress it in opposition strongholds.

The example of the Western District, including Freetown area, is illuminating. Traditionally a swing district not dominated by the SLPP, this was the most contested in the country, with all ten parties running. After repeated complaints by opposition groups and others about low registration numbers here, the figures were changed several times. The final figure of 404,000 registered voters in the highly populated area remains contentious. Concerns about close collaboration between the SLPP and the National Election Commission can also be seen in the reportedly large number of under-age voters registered in the South and East.¹²

The traditional practice of using party bosses and paramount chiefs to mobilise, and in some cases

⁷ ICG Africa Briefing, *Sierra Leone: Ripe for Elections?*, 19 December 2001, p. 5. ICG interviews with civil society representatives and senior Sierra Leone official, February-May 2002.

⁸ Also see "Sierra Leone: Kabbah's Cabal", *Africa Confidential*, 31 May 2002, p. 2.

⁹ ICG interviews with various Sierra Leone officials, local journalists, civil society actors and a Western official between December-May 2002.

¹⁰ ICG Africa Briefing, *Ripe for Elections?*, op. cit., p. 2.

¹¹ The Voter Registration Process, a report by the Monitor Project of the Campaign for Good Governance, 22 February 2002. The report can be found at www.sierra-leone.org. National Election Watch (NEW) Report on Domestic Observation of Voter Registration, January 2002.

¹² ICG interviews with civil society and journalists, May 2002. Also reported in the January 2002 National Election Watch Report on Domestic Observation of Voter Registration, as well as post-election reports from the European Union, the Carter Centre, and Sierra Leone political parties (Movement for Progress, All People's Congress).

coerce, voters was also notable in the eastern and southern regions where the SLPP has a strong presence. In a population with illiteracy rates up to 80 per cent, the opinion of the chief often prevails, leaving little room for individual choice.¹³

Many logistical problems were widely expected and can be traced directly to the lack of voter education, poor training for polling station administrators, and a general lack of understanding of the voting process. Although most of the more than 5,000 polling stations opened on time, not all had appropriate materials, and some were missing ballot boxes, tallying sheets or sufficient ballots. Most issues were remedied by the National Election Commission and the UN by the end of the day, but many voters seemed uncertain how physically to vote. The general confusion also contributed to relatively high numbers of spoiled ballots.

The geographic distribution of spoiled ballots raised opposition suspicions, particularly since they seemed to concentrate in the northern and western areas of the country. This left many to question the effectiveness of the National Election Commission's voter education program. The National Election Commission has subsequently struggled to answer numerous queries from opposition groups.

The presence of party agents (legal observers from the political parties) also added to the general confusion. While these did provide some useful assistance, their activities also raised concerns that they were attempting to sway voters. The layout of the polling stations often led to overcrowding in voting areas, thereby decreasing the secrecy of the ballot. While such problems are not indicative of systematic or intentional tampering, they have provided dissatisfied parties a further reason for criticising the results. These areas will need improvement in future elections. A major concern for opposition candidates in the South was the fact that a number of the National Election Commission presiding officers at polling stations were recruited through the SLPP.¹⁴

The conduct of the National Election Commission on election day was of serious concern.¹⁵ The changing of voter eligibility rules over the course of the day was particularly troubling. Initially, voters who held voter identification cards, but whose names did not appear on polling station registration lists, were allowed to vote at that polling station.¹⁶ Polling stations recorded the person's name and voter identification number and then allowed the person to cast a ballot. This information enabled the National Election Commission to cross check to ensure that voters did not vote twice. However, since the ballots used by these voters were not separated from the other ballots, there was no way of recovering the invalid ones.

Later on election day the National Election Commission changed this rule. Voters who held voter identification cards but were not on the registers of their assigned polling station were allowed to vote at any polling station, provided they did not have ink on their thumb – the one remaining protection against double voting. It remains unclear why this rule was changed. One explanation was that the National Election Commission wanted to ensure that all voting could be concluded by the five p.m. deadline. The whole process resulted in tremendous confusion in several polling stations, especially where officials could not communicate with the National Election Commission, leading to varying interpretations of the rules.

The interesting point to note, however, is that "transfer" voters were not given the same flexibility. Voters who held voter identification cards but not transfer slips – which enabled them to vote in a new district rather than where originally registered – were not allowed to vote in most cases. Without a proper transfer slip, they either had to return to the district where originally registered or go to the National Election Commission to obtain the transfer slip and then proceed to the voting stations. Unfortunately, a number of voters did not understand this or could

¹⁵ The complaints of the All People's Congress were published in the local newspaper, *For Di People*, 21 May 2002.

¹⁶ The identification number of the polling station at which voters were supposed to vote was on the voter identification card.

¹³ ICG interview with INGO official, May 2002.

¹⁴ ICG interview with leading opposition party, June 2002.

not meet the travel requirements and thus were unable to vote.

The issue of transfer slips was the main complaint in the northern region, home of the All People's Congress. Many people claimed they had been forced by security concerns to leave Kono and travel to Bombali and Tonkolili districts and had not been able to obtain the necessary transfer slips. A special election station was set up in Makeni to enable some 500 to 600 transfer voters to vote. This special treatment raised additional problems. A group of 150 to 200 young men who had moved to Makeni from Pujehun, Bo and Port Loko and who possessed voter identification cards but not the required transfer slips also wanted to vote in Makeni. They attempted to use the special voting station but were turned away and told to return to their districts of registration. After this group moved from polling station to polling station, congregated in a park to protest, and allegedly threatened violence, the UN Special Representative Adeniji, in discussions with the National Election Commission, agreed to allow them to vote.¹⁷

Not all transfer voters were this lucky, and many were simply turned away from the polls with reprimands that they had been warned of the need to complete the voter transfer process. Unfortunately, this event in Makeni reinforced the perception that ex-combatants can continue to threaten violence as a means to achieving results.

A factor that remains largely unexplained by the National Election Commission is why the votes of party agents or opposition candidates in many southern and eastern districts were not accounted for in these areas. The large number of "zero" votes recorded for parties in these districts left many wondering how it was possible that, particularly in major towns like Bo and Kenema, opposition leaders "forgot" to vote for their own parties.¹⁸ In addition, one has to wonder whether the families of opposition members in these areas chose not to vote for them.

A final point of concern was the excessive voter turn out reported in several SLPP districts, for example, 104 per cent in Pujehun District.

C. A PREDICTABLE VICTORY

The international community admitted to low expectations for the ability of the government and the National Election Commission to deliver a fair election because of the short preparation time. Unfortunately, these low expectations also led the international community to avoid criticism of cases of manipulation and fraud that favoured the SLPP. It is certainly true that even without manipulation, the results would likely have favoured President Kabbah and the SLLP,¹⁹ leading to the natural question of why they perpetrated abuses. One explanation can be found in President Kabbah's desire to avoid a second round²⁰ for fear that the opposition would unite and cut substantially into the SLPP majority – just as occurred in the 1996 elections.²¹

A second round of voting would certainly have been preferable to lingering questions about fairness,²² and most believe that even then President Kabbah would still have won because many viewed a vote for him as a vote for peace. The international community reinforced this message by widely suggesting that a Kabbah victory would mean stability and continued assistance, and the SLPP campaigned on this platform.

Kabbah's large victory has important implications for donors. First, he now enjoys a two-thirds SLPP majority in parliament that will allow him broad leeway to pass legislation and make constitutional revisions.²³ Secondly, and more worrisome, Kabbah has reneged on earlier calls for a broad-based, inclusive government. Instead, the cabinet

¹⁷ Press Briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, UNAMSIL Headquarters, Freetown, 14 May 2002.

¹⁸ "Sierra Leone: Kabbah's Cabal", *Africa Confidential*, 31 May 2002, p. 2.

¹⁹ U.S. and UK officials largely rejected the complaints made by opposition groups in a meeting with these parties in Freetown on 16 May 2002.

²⁰ A second round of voting would have been necessary if he had secured less than 50 per cent of the ballots.

²¹ ICG interview with leading opposition candidate, May 2002.

²² ICG interviews with Western diplomats and officials, April-May 2002.

²³ This does not give the president the power to seek a third term in office, which can only be achieved through a national referendum.

is largely SLPP-dominated, undermining efforts at national reconciliation, particularly with the northern parts of the country. This unfortunate decision will only deepen the country's natural cleavages. It led one local paper to argue that the SLPP's slogan of "One country! One People!" should be revised to "One Country, Two Peoples".²⁴

Much of the blame for the weak showing of opposition parties must fall squarely on their own shoulders. As a whole, the opposition performed dismally, leaving the legislature and executive firmly under the dominance of the SLPP. The opposition was in disarray and fielded generally weak candidates. Several groups squabbled internally about presidential candidates, neglected to inform their supporters of procedures for election day, and failed to campaign effectively.

Much campaigning focussed on little more than patronage, with parties giving out rice and money and saying what people expected and wanted to hear. Given that the SLPP possessed the most resources, it was able to live up to its election chant of *wu-teh-teh*, abundance or plenty in the Mende language.

The elections exposed the harsh reality that political parties in Sierra Leone rarely persist after elections, and therefore play little role in daily politics. Most parties lack the organisational structure, political vision, skills, training, knowledge and financing to survive let alone influence policy day-by-day.²⁵ These persistent problems are a direct outgrowth of the legacy of one-party rule.

With the SLPP bestriding the political landscape, parliamentary democracy may prove to be only a shadow of real democracy. Since the governing party dominates the parliament, legislative oversight of Kabbah policies may well have to come from the SLPP's own parliamentarians. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that this will happen in the near future. Kabbah has minimised divisions within the SLPP, some of which came to the forefront during the campaign, and with the president's strong mandate, few in the party are willing to challenge his authority. Instead,

members of parliament are more likely to continue voting along party lines.

While local election pundits have argued that the All People's Congress is a new party under Ernest Koroma,²⁶ its inability to put forward a united front has reduced its strength as an opposition force. There are low expectations that the APC will provide a venue for constructive engagement for change. Instead, the more likely parliamentary scenario is that the All People's Congress will create antagonism while the SLPP rubber stamps government actions. As one Western diplomatic put it, "It would be easy to perceive parliament as being important if it had a vibrant opposition, but parliament is not going to be significant over the next two years".²⁷

²⁴ "One Country: Two Peoples: Only Mature Politics can Heal Deep Divisions", *PEEP*, 21 May 2002.

²⁵ ICG interview with Western official, May 2002.

²⁶ ICG interviews with local journalists, April-May 2002.

²⁷ ICG interview with Western diplomat, May 2002.

III. SECURITY CHALLENGES

A number of actors maintain their ability to seriously undermine the momentum for peace.

A. THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT: A SPENT FORCE?

Apart from the absence of serious violence, the most positive outcome was that the election clearly indicated that the RUF has no popular support. The RUF-P had little success even in its strongholds of Makeni or Kailahun.

The short time in which to prepare for the elections placed immense pressure on the RUF to transition into a political party. It did not do this well, and lack of leadership, disintegrating military structure, lack of funds and weak party structure all combined to leave the party deeply divided. Consequently, the RUF has splintered into a handful of factions, and its public rifts directly contributed to the poor showing at the polls.

Ironically, the encouragement of the RUF, particularly by the UN and the West African regional organisation, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to transform into a political party – as recommended under Article III of the 1999 Lomé Agreement²⁸— did more to disrupt than unify the group.²⁹

²⁸ In the Article III of the Lomé agreement, the transformation of the RUF/SL into a political party states that: “ 1. The Government of Sierra Leone shall accord every facility to the RUF/SL to transform itself into a political party and enter the mainstream of the democratic process. To that end: 2. Immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, the RUF/SL shall commence to organise itself to function as a political movement, with the rights, privileges and duties accorded to all political parties in Sierra Leone. These include the freedom to publish, unhindered access to the media, freedom of association, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and the right to mobilise and associate freely. 3. Within a period of thirty days, following the signing of the present Agreement, the necessary legal steps shall be taken by the Government of Sierra Leone to enable the RUF/SL to register as a political party. 4. The Parties shall approach the International Community with a view to mobilising resources for the purposes of enabling the RUF/SL to function as a political party. These resources may include but shall not be limited to: (i) Setting up a trust fund; (ii)

The sharpest splits occurred in the run-up to the elections. On 1 April 2002, many former RUF fighters demanded that either jailed leader Foday Sankoh be released or the RUF-P should boycott the election. Others wanted to select a new leader, while still others suggested that only a parliamentary slate should be put forward. After the National Election Commission granted a 24-hour extension of the nomination deadline, the party put up parliamentary candidates. Many still hoped to free Sankoh, and internal tensions remained high. These divisions were further stoked by the former RUF spokesman, Gibril Massaquoi, who joined the ruling SLPP and actively attempted to undermine the RUF-P. On 7 April 2002, Paolo Bangura was named the RUF-P presidential candidate, sharpening the split with pro-Sankoh loyalists.

The RUF's internal difficulties hastened an exodus among its rank and file, many of whom complain about unpaid salaries, corruption of senior leaders and what they view as unfulfilled promises. The RUF fighters disarmed expecting to receive benefits. However, these have been slow in coming, and many former RUF fighters are now in the streets with little money and few prospects amid a community that is understandably hostile. This stands in sharp contrast to many RUF leaders who have remained in Sierra Leone and live in relative comfort. Many rank and file are no longer prepared to receive orders from their commanders³⁰

Instead of supporting the RUF-P, many rank and file simply defected to their traditional party allegiances, seeing this as their only viable option. This has again highlighted the North-South and Temne-Mende split in Sierra Leone's politics. There is a history of blood ties between the RUF and SLPP in the South, and ex-combatants there

Training for RUF/SL membership in party organisation and functions; and (iii) Providing any other assistance necessary for achieving the goals of this section”.

²⁹ ICG interview with former RUF member, April 2002.

³⁰ Signs of frustration among RUF rank and file could be seen on 12 June 2002 when RUF commander Maurice Kallon was beaten up in Tongo Fields. It is not entirely clear why he was attacked but various UNAMSIL personnel suggest that it related either to attempts to mobilise forces for Liberia for \$500 per recruit or create a rebellion against Sesay for not sharing money from diamond mining. Either way, it illustrates tensions in the RUF.

aligned with the southern-based SLPP. In many ways, this shift is hardly surprising given that at least 80 per cent of the RUF fighters are Mende³¹. In the North, most ex-RUF shifted to the All People's Congress, the traditional local party, while a minority gravitated toward the SLPP.

There is also a possibility of RUF hard-liners who are still in Sierra Leone collaborating with those RUF fighters who moved to Liberia when the war ended. The latter are operating under commander Sam Bockarie, the former RUF commander in Sierra Leone, and fighting Charles Taylor's war against the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). This reinforces the view that the RUF could still potentially threaten the peace,³² especially where the reintegration process goes slowly.

Finally, some former RUF combatants also continue to be deeply angry that Foday Sankoh remains in jail. His trial began on 5 June 2002, but the presiding judge granted a five-week adjournment to allow the prosecution further time to develop its case. Fortunately, there is little evidence that this trial will spark violence.

B. THE ARMY: HOW LOYAL?

The role of the armed forces continues to be crucial for stability. On a positive note, Britain deserves credit for training the new Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF). This has been an important deterrent for keeping the military from intervening in the political process. Since completion of the British program last October, the International Military Assistance Training Team (IMATT) has been providing the core of longer-term training. The newly constituted army includes former RUF fighters, former soldiers from the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council military junta, demobilised Civil Defence Forces and

loyalists who stayed in uniform throughout the war. The army is currently larger than Sierra Leone needs, with some 14,500 soldiers, including about 500 officers. Ultimately, the goal is to reduce it to a level of 10,000 to 11,000, although there is no plan for achieving this downsizing in the near future.

One important element of British training was the Military Reintegration Program (MRP) for former combatants, which recruited and instructed former members of the RUF and Civil Defence Forces. It began in the middle of 2001 and continued through May 2002, with the last new recruits having been taken in March. However, only roughly 3,000 former combatants indicated interest in the MRP during the disarmament process, surprisingly few given that over 72,000 combatants registered with the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, the government body responsible for issuing guidelines on demobilisation. Of the 3,000 registered, roughly 2,350 were trained and posted into the new army after completing a nine-week course. About two-thirds of these came from the RUF, the rest from the Civil Defence Forces.

Despite British efforts, urgent concerns still surround the army's unity and loyalty, a fact underscored by election statistics. The security forces voted on a different day from the rest of the population and gave strong support to Johnny Paul Koroma's People's Liberation Party (PLP), in some areas an estimated 80 per cent, although exact figures remain unavailable. Johnny Paul and the PLP polled just under 16 per cent of the parliamentary vote in the western region of Freetown, which won them their two seats.

While Johnny Paul only received 3 per cent nationally in the presidential election, his support is nevertheless both surprising and alarming. It is all the more disturbing given that he was a central figure in a coup plot uncovered by British military officers in April 2002.³³ Overall, the 10 May 2002 balloting by the security services – including the military, police, fire department, and certain civil servants – demonstrated the potential for sharp division between the SLPP leadership and the security forces. The majority of the police, including the Operation Support Division (OSD), appear to have thrown their support behind the All

³¹ Several Sierra Leone citizens have told ICG that key SLPP politicians were also critical in the early formation of the RUF movement.

³² The UN panel report on sanctions in Liberia mentioned that a group called the Independent RUF, or RUF-I, remains relatively well organised, trained and equipped, though it went added that it posed no immediate threat to Sierra Leone. See Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1395 (2002), paragraph 4, in relation to Liberia, April 2002, para. 24, p. 7.

³³ ICG interviews with international journalist and senior Sierra Leone military officer, April 2002.

People's Congress. Many OSD are from the Limba tribe in the North. At one level, the fact that the bulk of Sierra Leone's security sector voted for the opposition demonstrates the democratic nature of the elections. However, this trend also raises questions about their loyalty to the president.

President Kabbah's pep talks at military barracks soon after the elections were an attempt to reassure soldiers that there would be no reprisals but many within the military (and even the police) are clearly dissatisfied with the election outcome. They also question why President Kabbah chose to have the security forces vote on a distinct day. ICG understands from various sources that this was not a customary practice in Sierra Leone.

Part of Johnny Paul Koroma's strong showing can be explained by the fact that he directly targeted his campaign at former combatants and the military, knowing that he lacked broader public support. Koroma promised the military salary increases and improvements in living conditions, his message was well received. His campaign was also boosted by the fact that no other candidates courted the security services. In addition, Johnny Paul drew support from the born-again Christian population, following his claims to have found Christ.

It is a major concern that Johnny Paul's weak position in parliament and his likely indictment by the Special Court for wartime activities may drive him to use his support among the military to destabilise the government. However, the military's willingness to embrace such provocative steps remains unknown.

There also appears to be something of a split emerging between the "loyalists" who stayed in the army throughout the war and later supported Kabbah and "rebel" factions, who have recently integrated into the new army.³⁴ In part this is due to the war and old divisions, but there is also a great deal of suspicion and jealousy between older elements and new recruits. Much discontent stems from the training received by the new recruits, and their upward career mobility in contrast to the old soldiers who are not as well trained and have fewer promotion prospects.

While much of this tension is expected to dissipate over the coming months, the program will be

judged when the officer and non-commissioned officer candidates come up for review. These promotions will be a good indicator of the tolerance of the "old" army for the new recruits.³⁵

The strongest part of the new army is its middle ranks, which have been retrained by the British in an effort to develop a more professional military with greater respect for civilian oversight. More senior officers tend to have a different vision of the role of the military and its relationship to government. The expected downsizing and pensioning of older officers will also likely exacerbate tensions.

Efforts to make the military more professional have increased calls for greater accountability and threatened the ability of some officers to enjoy the fruits of corruption. The army now has to live on official salaries, and enlisted privates, for example, are paid roughly U.S.\$55-60 a month. Captains make roughly double this amount. These salaries are slightly higher than a few years ago, but they are still considered quite low.³⁶

A final concern, shared by British and Sierra Leone army officials alike, is the army's ability to provide security on the border with Liberia. One positive sign is that the army has deployed to Kailahun District, the RUF's traditional stronghold and a key strategic area. The potential for combat in Liberia to spill over into Sierra Leone remains serious.³⁷

Efforts to monitor the border have been hampered by lack of manpower. For example, in the Southeast, the army mans only 32 of the 150 border crossing points.³⁸ While it would be impossible to seal this border, having the military at barely one-fifth of the crossings is a recipe for continued instability. While UNAMSIL provides backup support to the military in the event of incursions, it does not patrol the borders, and its assistance will not last indefinitely.

³⁵ Many discontented with the new recruits are the same forces who were about to be disbanded before the 2 May 2001 Abuja agreement excluded them from the demobilisation process. ICG interview with senior Sierra Leone army officer, May 2002.

³⁶ ICG interview with senior Sierra Leone army officer, May 2002.

³⁷ ICG interviews with senior British and Sierra Leone military personnel, April-May 2002.

³⁸ ICG interview with UNAMSIL Military Observer (MILOBS), May 2002.

³⁴ ICG interview, April 2002.

The true test will come when UNAMSIL begins to draw down its forces, which is likely in 2003, and the army will be required to fill the vacuum. This will test both the capacity and the loyalty of the newly constructed RSLAF. Should the UN leave prematurely, before the armed forces can effectively handle national security, other groups will likely flex their muscles. While few organised groups currently exist to play this role, the most likely candidates are those who feel disenfranchised by the election or groups looking to exploit opportunities for wealth in the diamond districts. The other possibility is the last remaining Civil Defence Forces group in the South, the Kamajors. While other Civil Defence Forces have demobilised and disbanded, it remains relatively well organised, militarily capable, and unwilling to disband.

C. THE CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES

It remains unclear who exactly was behind the decision to release the results of the 10 May Special voting day separately. One theory is that President Kabbah did this as part of an effort to paint the army as disloyal and promote the influence of the Civil Defence Forces, in particular the Kamajors. The alternative theory is that these tallies were released by the Kamajors to pressure the president to maintain the Civil Defence Forces as a protective shield. Indeed, Kabbah was reluctant to disband the Kamajors prior to elections because he needed their electoral support in the South.³⁹

It remains to be seen exactly what fate awaits the Kamajors. They are virtually a third security force in the country, alongside the army and the police. Unlike other Civil Defence Forces that have disbanded, the Kamajors remain well organised and intent on being a part of the national security plan. Their close association to the ruling SLPP and their refusal to disband before elections leave many feeling uneasy.

There are tensions between Kabbah and the Kamajors, largely stemming from internal SLPP politics. In the fall of 2001, Kabbah's leadership was threatened by a powerful group of Mende tribalists within the party (the president is a Mandingo), who also command the loyalty of the Kamajor militia forces. The November 2001

corruption indictment of Transportation Minister Momoh Pujeh, an important Kamajor financier, was a clear message to this group from the president. Kabbah also worked to sideline a powerful group of Kamajor militia leaders after the party convention in mid-March 2002, including then Vice President Joe Demby and Kamajor Chief Sam Hinga-Norman.⁴⁰ The president's refusal to select Demby as his running mate was another blow to the Kamajors.

There have been widespread reports of Kamajor disgruntlement, and a Gerihun-based element called "Special-K" was said to be agitating against the government. Since the election, President Kabbah has tried to heal some rifts by maintaining the former deputy defence minister, Chief Hinga Norman, as minister of internal affairs. The president has also pressured the Anti-Corruption Commission to stop its investigation of Momoh Pujeh. Kabbah's moves indicate that he is making a strong effort to keep the Kamajors in his camp by offering patronage, rice, money and possible army positions for Kamajor former combatants.

The potential for the Civil Defence Forces and the Kamajors to threaten the peace means that there remains a need to find a positive role for these militias. While the Civil Defence Forces offices were officially closed on 27 April 2002, and the national ceremony marking their disbandment is scheduled for July, there is clear evidence that the Kamajor chain of command remains in place.

A key problem remains the proposed creation of a Territorial Defence Force (TDF). In fall 2001, ICG was informed that the government would propose creation of a TDF soon after the election, but plans have apparently been shelved for the foreseeable future.⁴¹ The original idea entailed creating a reserve security force of some 7,500 to provide backup for the police and military. This force was originally to be created within six to twelve months after the Civil Defence Forces were disarmed and disbanded in order to ensure a clear distinction. Applications would be available to all interested parties, not just the Civil Defence Forces, and individuals would be selected on their qualifications. The program was put on hold due

³⁹ ICG interviews with civil society groups, opposition activists and journalists, May 2002.

⁴⁰ See "Sierra Leone: Heading for the door", *Africa Confidential*, 5 April 2002, p. 3.

⁴¹ ICG interview with senior government adviser, October 2001.

to lack of funding as well as the failure of the Civil Defence Forces, in particular the Kamajors, to disband fully.

The British, the broader international community and the government of Sierra Leone have made it clear that they do not want to see the Civil Defence Forces simply change name and be branded as the Territorial Defence Force. In 2003, if funding is available and the Kamajors have disbanded, however, the government will again approach the issue of creating the new force.

Ultimately, the Kamajors are important because of their role in defending their communities from the RUF in the war years, but they are also a potentially destabilising force, and tensions are likely to increase between the government and military if they do not disband. President Kabbah's decision to place their leader, Chief Hinga Norman, at the helm of the ministry of internal affairs raises further concern about whether the Kamajors might be given a role within the police structure on day-to-day law and order issues. That police allegiance is not fully trusted might further fuel SLPP desire to turn the Kamajors gradually to internal security.⁴²

D. THE POLICE

As Sierra Leone tries to consolidate its hard won peace, one aspect that will be critical is reform of the national police force. Unfortunately, the capacity of the police to tackle law and order is perhaps the most worrisome aspect of Sierra Leone's security sector. Two problems confront the police: lack of resources and the pace of reform.

The police are just over 7,000 strong, roughly two-thirds the size of the pre-war force. The intention is to increase this by at least 2,000 over the next two to three years. However, it is questionable whether the police have the funds and trained individuals to meet this goal. Even at current levels, the police lack the resources to operate effectively. For example, in Kailahun district, a police station has only one vehicle and two radios. This not only hampers fulfilment of local duties, but also limits

the ability to inform the government of major security threats or to call for reinforcements.⁴³

Such operational shortcomings will be exacerbated as force levels increase unless more funding becomes available. The government has received assistance from the British government and from the UN Civilian Police Project for reforming and improving its infrastructure and capacity. However, other donors such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund remain reluctant to contribute because they associate the police with the military, and wish to avoid any perception that they are funding national security services.⁴⁴

A second key concern is the pace of police reform. Britain and the Commonwealth have led the initiative since 1998, but over the past two years, efforts to redesign and plan core reform requirements have lagged.⁴⁵ This has had an impact on resource allocation, availability of training, and ultimately the capacity of the police to maintain internal security. While the level of foreign assistance for police reform needs to be increased, the strategy for international engagement needs to be reformulated.

The Commonwealth has used short-term consultants who travel to Sierra Leone for six-week visits. They lack the control and authority to effect necessary changes. This model also reduces the continuity of the reform program, something the core International Military Assistance Training Team achieved with the military. There are at least two long-term police consultants, but this appears insufficient to embed consistency in the chain of command to manage day-to-day tasks, to build long-term institutional ethos or to put effective recruitment and training in place.

The approach of the British Department for International Development team has emphasised local ownership and an advisory role for the

⁴² ICG interview with opposition leader, June 2002.

⁴³ ICG interview with UNAMSIL MILOBS personnel, May 2002.

⁴⁴ The only paramilitary element in the police, the Special Security Division, is now called the Operation Support. It has been demilitarised and retrained to create a highly skilled police team for specialized security tasks. Nevertheless, even with these changes, few donors are offering funds for retraining and expanding the police force. ICG interview with senior Sierra Leone police officer, May 2002.

⁴⁵ ICG interview with Western official, April 2000.

international community. While local ownership and capacity are indeed important, the police cannot accomplish these goals on their own. Furthermore, the lack of involvement of the international community in the actual internal restructuring process enables the police to stall reforms that might run counter to their personal interests. In many cases, officers continue to use their positions to augment their low salaries through corruption and nepotism.

At the heart of the problem is the lack of professional training. The police lack the funding, training sites, instructors and managerial skills to train new recruits effectively, retrain current officers and run an efficient national force. One possibility is that instead of using advisers on the ground, Sierra Leone police officers could be sent abroad to learn by example from highly skilled and disciplined police forces.⁴⁶ These opportunities for training are not available in Sierra Leone, where there are few strong role models. These small groups could then return to Sierra Leone to assist in training their fellow officers. Overall, retraining the police is estimated to take roughly ten to twelve years, during which the force will continue to need donor assistance, both financial and professional.

E. DEMOBILISING AND REINTEGRATING FORMER COMBATANTS

The largely successful disarmament of former fighters poses new challenges for the government and the international community. Almost 72,500 combatants completed the disarmament program, including more than 24,000 RUF and 37,000 Civil Defence Forces (CDF). Although these former fighters have turned in their weapons, they have not yet dispersed and returned home. This is true of both the RUF and the CDF, and the decision to go home for most will continue to hinge on the internal security situation.

For the RUF, the decision to demobilise will largely depend on whether they can return to their communities without fear of reprisal. Many soldiers remain concentrated in their former strongholds, such as Makeni and Magburaka in the North, and in the eastern districts. Demobilisation remains key to breaking the RUF's chain of

command, discouraging any thoughts of regrouping for violence, and encouraging the reintegration of former fighters as productive members of society. Successful demobilisation will also be closely linked to what value former fighters see in reintegrating into their former communities. Many still have something of a crisis of expectations, particularly among the RUF rank and file, who believe that they conceded much by disarming and received little in return.⁴⁷

Reintegration programs are designed to provide six months of training and a small monthly stipend (60,000 Leones, or U.S.\$28) to former combatants who are actively involved in training. But rising concerns over the viability of the reintegration fund has already led to clashes. Unless the program receives a rapid infusion of donor money soon it will likely be bankrupt by August 2002.⁴⁸ This would leave roughly two-thirds of those who disarmed without the possibility of completing the demobilisation and reintegration phases of the program and could lead many to conclude that they have no alternative but to join one of the groups fighting in Liberia. Additional funding would help to avoid further dangers in the situation the government already faces of having large numbers of disgruntled and unemployed former combatants walking the streets of larger towns.

Some disputes between former combatants and the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in the lead up to elections stemmed from slow administrative responses. However, others resulted from the lack of resources and training programs available due to minimal funding. Given the RUF's record during the war, many donors have been unwilling to fund a program perceived as providing benefits for those who committed atrocities. Instead, the approach taken by donors has been to fund community development programs aimed at community projects, such as building schools, rather than projects targeted directly at former fighters.

The drawback to this is that many former fighters are not necessarily part of these communities – even if they live within a town's borders. Many traditional communal networks were destroyed

⁴⁶ ICG interview with senior Sierra Leone police officer, May 2002.

⁴⁷ ICG Report, *Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty*, op. cit., p. 15.

⁴⁸ Currently the program faces a U.S.\$13.4 million shortfall in funding.

during the war, and those that survived usually exclude former combatants. Thus, ex-fighters often return to villages without communal ties or support structures and with no way to reintegrate. They react by forming their own groups, producing a situation that promotes neither community development nor reintegration.

Despite this, many communities believe that the majority of international development aid benefits former fighters at the expense of those who suffered at the hands of the rebels. In reality this is not the case; most development assistance funds community projects. Of an estimated U.S.\$90 million in development money used by the National Commission for Social Action, only about U.S.\$7 million has gone to programs for former combatants. However, the perception persists because the latter programs are highly visible and target a specific group. The visibility, impact, and benefits of community development programs, on the other hand, are far more diffuse. This has produced lingering discontent and made communities more reluctant to welcome back former fighters.

Ultimately, the success of the reintegration program will depend on the willingness of the population to accept former fighters back into their communities and the ability of the retrained combatants to find gainful employment. The likelihood individuals will be accepted back will also depend on the ability of the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to be seen as effective in delivering justice.

Without employment opportunities, the government faces a steep challenge in assimilating former combatants. Already, reports of rising crime rates bode ill for a population increasingly desperate to eke out a living and for the stability of the country as a whole.

F. CHARLES TAYLOR'S UNFINISHED WAR

No peace in Sierra Leone will be fully secure until the international community deals more forcefully with Liberia's internal situation.⁴⁹ The threat of Liberia's conflict spilling back into Sierra Leone remains very real. The extension of sanctions by

the UN Security Council on the government of President Charles Taylor on 7 May 2002 is a welcome recognition that Sierra Leone's peace remains tenuous as long as Taylor continues to provide support to the RUF. More robust steps to secure a comprehensive ceasefire in Liberia that brings all stakeholders together to solve the conflict would be welcome.

With daily reports of deteriorating conditions in Liberia, the international community cannot afford to underestimate the impact of continued fighting on Sierra Leone.⁵⁰ As Sierra Leoneans celebrate the end of their war, the military situation next door has worsened with the gains made by the rebel Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), who reportedly advanced within 25 kilometres of Monrovia in mid-May 2002. This would be consistent with the LURD's stated objective of moving on the capital before the rainy season began in June.

The key unknown variable is the degree of support the LURD may enjoy inside Monrovia. Any threat from within the capital will surely elicit a harsh response from Taylor in the form of arrests, torture and extra-judicial killings of suspected LURD sympathisers. The extension in May of the 8 February 2002 state of emergency also gave Taylor further leeway to round up suspected LURD supporters and made the prospect for free and fair elections in October 2003 increasingly remote.

G. UNAMSIL'S EXIT STRATEGY

The situation on the ground suggests that any sudden international disengagement could undermine security. UN representatives claim that they will not use the elections as a pretext for a hasty exit, and will continue to emphasise the need for a UN presence to ensure the consolidation of

⁴⁹ See ICG Africa Report No. 43, *Liberia: The Key to Ending Regional Instability*, 24 April 2002.

⁵⁰ A number of events in April 2002 confirmed the increasingly bellicose attitude of President Taylor. A leading human rights lawyer, Tiawon Gongloe, was arrested, imprisoned and beaten by police officers for a speech he delivered in Guinea in March 2002. The *Analyst* Newspaper was closed for printing Gongloe's speech. A political dissident from the Krahn tribe, General Alfred T. Glay, was assassinated by Taylor's security forces. This is reminiscent of political killings in the earlier part of Taylor's presidency, and ICG was informed that Taylor is planning to assassinate a number of other political opponents. Taylor has also banned political rallies.

peace. A UN representative also noted that the UN mandate is not limited to peacekeeping and includes assisting the government in extending state authority throughout the provinces and reviving the security forces to ensure safety and stability.⁵¹ The UN would like to shift from a peacekeeping to a peace building force, and increasingly emphasise social, economic and agricultural programs and the rebuilding of primary institutions such as health care centres and schools. The key to this reconstruction, as the UN has stressed, will be progress on good governance. Senior UN officials are concerned that the government will remain dependent on donor assistance and not take responsibility for its sovereignty.⁵²

The planned review of UNAMSIL by the Security Council and Secretary General Kofi Annan's recommendation on the future of the force, are expected in September 2002. The review will be based on an assessment of Sierra Leone's security needs. There remains the possibility that UNAMSIL will maintain a military presence deep into 2003. In order to be useful and accurate, this review of UNAMSIL must assess not only the security situation in Sierra Leone, but also the ongoing conflict in Liberia and its threat to the region as a whole.

While UNAMSIL need not maintain its full deployment of 17,500, its future mandate should ensure that troops are strategically deployed in key regions of Sierra Leone, particularly the Eastern districts of Kailahun and Kono, as well as the southern border near Zimmi – all points at which armed forces have crossed from Liberia into Sierra Leone.

IV. AN UNFINISHED PEACE PROCESS

Even assuming that UNAMSIL stays in Sierra Leone until late into 2003 and continues to provide the necessary stopgap support to the national security services, much still needs to be done to protect the peace that has been so expensively achieved. In a very real sense, the conditions that spawned the war and inflicted gruesome casualties on Sierra Leone's citizens have not disappeared – both because one-party rule has been essentially restored and because regional instability has not been eliminated. The many disgruntled soldiers and disenfranchised youth lingering in Freetown and the provinces are also a potential source of renewed conflict. Unless these issues are tackled in seriously, there is little hope for lasting peace.

A. DEEP ROOTED CORRUPTION

Managing corruption remains at the heart of keeping the peace. While it was encouraging to see President Kabbah address the issue in his inaugural speech on 19 May 2002, it will take much more than rhetoric in the months ahead. Unfortunately, corruption is endemic. Indeed, the patronage system is so well entrenched that most people know no alternative. Most simply want to see public services delivered in some fashion, and are less concerned with how. As ICG is continually reminded, most ordinary people are not even familiar with the ethos of responsible government.⁵³

It is only when the patronage system breaks down that citizens perceive a real problem. Given this, tackling corruption is a matter not only of government reform but of societal change as well. While donors have few resources to implement the latter, they do have important leverage to encourage the former.⁵⁴

Donors have been aware from the outset that reducing the level of corruption in government and across the various state ministries is a fundamental

⁵¹ Press Briefing by the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Behrooz Sadry, UNAMSIL Headquarters, Freetown, 16 May 2002.

⁵² ICG interview, senior UN official, Freetown, June 2002.

⁵³ ICG interviews with local journalist and INGO representative, April-May 2002.

⁵⁴ ICG interviews with civil society groups, May 2002.

aspect of securing peace. To this end, donors have assisted in development of a number of control mechanisms to ensure more accountability. The European Union has played a major role in establishing accountability mechanisms within the ministry of finance. These make it easier to monitor the inflow and outflow of funds and more difficult to divert them. Accounting systems for salaries and budgets have reduced the number of “ghost” employees and decreased the opportunities for padding budgets and siphoning funds. However, layers of bureaucracy continue to provide numerous opportunities for graft.

While some efforts have been made to deal with corruption, mainly through the activities of the Anti-Corruption Commission, a great deal remains to be done. For example, donors are frustrated with the numerous obstacles that confront their work and the projects of various local and international NGOs that they fund. Government officials continue to try to skim off the top of such projects. One donor official was forced to admit that reforms instituted over the last twelve months are a “façade because of the perpetual tendency of individual politicians and high-level civil servants to continually undermine the structures and mechanisms that have been set up to improve transparency and accountability”.⁵⁵

The British Department for International Development has led the drive to end corrupt practices through its funding of the Anti-Corruption Commission. The government, with international backing, established the Commission in 2000 to investigate and punish those found guilty of breaking anti-corruption laws.⁵⁶ While this was much needed, questions remain about the Commission’s effectiveness and impartiality.

The daily operation has been less than satisfactory, and there have been allegations that several government ministers have used the Commission more as a tool to deter and punish political opponents than for unbiased investigation. The Commission is largely hamstrung by lack of independence from the government and the broader judicial system. The government determines appointments, and while the

Commission has the power to investigate cases and arrest suspects, it lacks the mandate to prosecute. All suspects are handed over to the attorney general, who is also minister of justice, who then determines which cases proceed through the judicial process.

Many problems confronting the Anti-Corruption Commission resulted in part from the controversial influence of the former attorney general, now vice president and close ally of President Kabbah, Solomon Berewa. While there is some guarded optimism that the new attorney general, Eke Halloway, will do more to free the Anti-Corruption Commission from governmental interference, Halloway is also quite close to both Berewa and President Kabbah.⁵⁷ Further, the fact that the posts of attorney general and minister of justice remain linked is still deeply problematic.⁵⁸

Members of the Anti-Corruption Commission expressed their frustration with government interference in investigations in late 2001.⁵⁹ A number of individuals and governments, including Britain, privately expressed concern about the constitutional provisions that allow the same person to simultaneously serve as attorney general and minister of justice. UK Secretary of State for International Development Clare Short signalled her frustrations at this and the concerns raised by the Anti-Corruption Commission in a February 2002 speech in Freetown in which she effectively declared war on corruption. Unfortunately, the government has been less than responsive to these calls for change.⁶⁰

With President Kabbah’s comfortable re-election, he may be even less inclined to tackle the corruption issue, and donors may have missed an important opportunity to make the Commission

⁵⁵ ICG interviews with several donor officials, April-May 2002.

⁵⁶ The Anti-Corruption Commission was established under The Anti-Corruption Act, 3 February 2000.

⁵⁷ ICG interviews with Sierra Leone human rights activists and opposition and civil society groups, May 2002. The Bar Association is currently challenging the appointment of Eke Halloway on the grounds that it is unconstitutional for the president to make ministerial appointments without parliament’s final approval of all candidates.

⁵⁸ ICG interviews with senior Sierra Leone official, civil society groups and human right lawyers, December 2000 and March-May 2002.

⁵⁹ ICG interview with British government official, May 2002.

⁶⁰ Speech by the Rt. Honourable Clare Short MP, British Council Auditorium, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 27 February 2002.

more effective. ICG learned that President Kabbah personally pressured the Commission to drop the case against former Minister of Transport, Momoh Pujeh, even though the president was instrumental in the initial indictment when Pujeh and other hard-line SLPP stalwarts threatened his party leadership in the fall of 2001.

At a cabinet meeting in April 2002, ministers claimed that the Anti-Corruption Commission was embarrassing the government and proposed that a more sympathetic lawyer be appointed to handle all prosecutions.⁶¹ The Commission continues to be used as a political tool by President Kabbah's inner circle, privately known as "The Untouchables". The government has also largely failed to implement a National Anti-Corruption Strategy, which it agreed to initiate with the Anti-Corruption Commission in 2000.⁶²

The international community, eager for an ally to help lead Sierra Leone out of conflict, has been reluctant to paint President Kabbah with the brush of corruption. Kabbah has shrewdly avoided any scandals that could be traced back to him. In the post-election environment, a more nuanced view will be needed by the international community that has been all too willing to portray President Kabbah and his entourage of dynamic advisers as a "dream team".⁶³ The president will almost certainly use his landslide victory to protect his presidency and his allies further. While some token lower level officials will likely be paraded before the Anti-Corruption Commission to give an impression that corruption is being tackled, cases involving high profile individuals are likely to be kept to the bare minimum. At least 35 cases brought to the Attorney General by the Anti-Corruption Commission in 2001 have been effectively ignored, the files locked away in a drawer.

There is little evidence to suggest that President Kabbah will tackle the pervasive culture of

corruption. Many in the SLPP view their time in power as a chance to enjoy the spoils in the same way that the All People's Congress did during its twenty-year reign. Given the overwhelming SLPP majority in parliament, the legislative branch can be expected to provide little oversight.

While the government does remain dependent on foreign aid, which gives donors some leverage, President Kabbah's recent overtures to Libya may be meant to diversify sources of financial support and provide insurance should the West seek to impose too many constraints.

B. SELECTIVE JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION?

The accountability mechanisms of the peace process – the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) – face three major concerns: funding, sequencing and government interference.

The international community, especially the United States, has pushed hard for creation of the Special Court, which will be in operation by the end of summer 2002. David Crane, an American, has been appointed special prosecutor. The Court has funding for the first year, with additional money pledged but not yet delivered for the second and third years.

Most agree that the Court's time and budget constraints will lead it to pursue indictments against a relatively few individuals, probably about two dozen. However, it remains unclear whether these indictments will focus on the RUF solely or whether other groups – including the Kabbah government, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, the Civil Defence Forces and soldiers from the Economic Community of West Africa Observer Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) – will also be targeted. Given the RUF's dominant role in a large number of atrocities, it will be the largest target of indictments. However, some have suggested that there should be some balance in indictments to ensure that all groups that committed atrocities are held accountable.

If the Court focuses on only the top perpetrators, then the Truth and Reconciliation Commission will be the only other venue, outside street justice,

⁶¹ See "Need for a review of the Anti-Corruption Commission Investigating Strategy - Extracts from the 8th Cabinet meeting - 20/3/2003", *PEEP*, 12 April 2002.

⁶² ICG interviews with Western and Sierra Leone officials, May 2002.

⁶³ This view of Kabbah's circle of advisers has been continually presented in interviews and discussions that ICG has had with Western officials between September 2001 and May 2002.

for accountability. It is in the start-up phase and is scheduled to begin hearings in late summer, but its future program of activities is not yet known. A large concern for the TRC however is the lack of financial backing. Currently, it has only roughly 10 per cent of the budget it needs for its planned eighteen months of operation. Many believe that donors will open their purses once the TRC starts operating, as has happened with similar ventures elsewhere. However, lack of funds could severely hamper its capacity to produce anything of value.

There are tensions between the two institutions derived from the primacy of the Special Court and its potential to access TRC proceedings, including sensitive and potentially incriminating information. If TRC testimony is admissible in the Special Court, the RUF ex-combatants are likely to be discouraged from telling their stories. With hindsight the Special Court should have come before the TRC to ensure that people testify freely to the latter.

The government rammed implementing legislation for the Special Court through parliament in less than a day on 7 March 2002. This placed the attorney general in a pivotal and politically powerful role. Section 14 gives that official extraordinarily broad power to defer or discontinue any proceedings “if in his opinion there are sufficient grounds for him to do so”. Further, Section 21 (2) directs that, “Notwithstanding any other law, every natural person, corporation, or other body created by or under Sierra Leone law shall comply with any direction specified in an order of the Special Court”.⁶⁴ Both UNAMSIL and civil society groups strongly protested the legislation and the measures that give the Special Court direct primacy over the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.⁶⁵

Local and international human rights experts are deeply troubled by signs that the government has meddled with the development of both institutions

in order to limit embarrassing disclosures of its own activities. Several incidents stand out. First, the government blocked efforts by human rights lawyers to have the activities of the Court cover the period dating back to 1991 (rather than its present remit only to 30 November 1996), raising concerns that it was trying to cover up abuses in those “missing” years. Some of this may also be driven by persistent suggestions that SLPP politicians were closely involved in the formation of the RUF.⁶⁶

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is dominated by commissioners with strong and direct ties to the SLPP. The presence of these SLPP supporters is likely to discourage individuals from coming forward and speaking against members of the SLPP. Nonetheless, officials with the TRC maintain that while the commission is officially an organ of government, as instituted through an Act of Parliament in February 2000, the founding statute also establishes its independence. While it is true that the government has no binding authority over the TRC, it has been in a key position to influence the selection of commissioners and, broadly, its decision-making.⁶⁷

A number of groups complained in writing to the attorney general that neither justice nor reconciliation would be achieved “if both institutions are seen as politically-motivated forums for targeting potential political rivals and challengers and blocking the indictment of key government officials for their role in the war”.⁶⁸

The burden will fall on the U.S., through the special prosecutor, to ensure that government bias does not undermine the Court’s operations. Given the U.S. government’s missteps in helping forge

⁶⁴ See “The Special Court Agreement, 2002 (Ratification) Act”, 7 March 2002.

⁶⁵ Officials of the TRC refute the suggestion that the Special Court has primacy over their body. They cite Article 8 of the Special Court Statute stating that it only has primacy over Sierra Leone’s national courts. There is however a strong perception, based on the wording of the implementing legislation of the Special Court, that the Special Court could use information from the TRC. ICG interview with senior TRC official, July 2002.

⁶⁶ ICG interviews with senior Sierra Leone official, historians and civil society activists, April-May 2002.

⁶⁷ ICG was also informed that concern over government manipulation was more apparent at the very end of the selection process for national commissioners when extra names were added to the list by the government without consulting the selection commission. ICG interviews with local human rights advocates, May 2002.

⁶⁸ Letters were submitted by three local groups to the office of the attorney general between 15-18 March 2002: the Campaign for Good Governance, the National Forum for Human Rights, and the Post-Conflict Reintegration for Development and Empowerment (PRIDE) group, a local NGO working with ex-combatants.

the 7 July 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement that gave the RUF a prominent role, Washington should have a strong interest in making the Special Court work and for pushing hard for indictments of both RUF leader Foday Sankoh and Liberian President Charles Taylor. The creation of the Special Court as a unique hybrid between national and international justice systems stems from U.S. objections to the new International Criminal Court. The downside of this hybrid approach is that the government of Sierra Leone will have considerable influence over the daily operations of the Court through the deputy prosecutor it appoints and national judges and in deciding which cases should be advanced – including some in which its own officials may be involved.

The Special Court will face some stark choices. If it allows the government a de facto veto over its operations, few within Sierra Leone will see it as a viable mechanism for achieving either justice or reconciliation. Nevertheless, even with these potential problems, the Special Court can be an effective tool for addressing national and regional instability.

In terms of the latter, an indictment of Liberian President Charles Taylor for his role in sparking Sierra Leone's long civil war seems both warranted and well within the Court's mandate. However, since the Court does not have UN Charter Chapter 7 authority, it does not have the power to compel his apprehension. The odds that Taylor would willingly submit to trial are quite slim, but the Security Council could conceivably authorise Chapter 7 authority if an indictment is delivered and not complied with voluntarily.

V. CONCLUSION

Sierra Leone has made great strides toward peace and stability. When the peace process collapsed in May 2000, many held out little hope for the country. But just slightly more than two years later, the population seems eager to embrace peace genuinely. However, as this report has emphasised, there are clear and present dangers to this fragile peace. If the international community hopes to be able to point to Sierra Leone as a model of effective intervention and peacekeeping, it must not declare victory and move on to the next crisis prematurely. Without intensified efforts to finish the overhaul of Sierra Leone's security services and to initiate broader reform in the country, progress may prove painfully illusory. Several areas are particularly important:

More efforts to improve the national security forces. While the government is in firm control of the countryside, confidence in both the army and police remains low. The divisions exposed by the election results also make clear that British military trainers still have much to do before the loyalty of the army can be guaranteed and the primacy of civilian command is assured. The international community needs to press the government to ensure that the Kamajor Civil Defence Forces disband and to work rapidly on creating the proposed Territorial Defence Force that will not simply represent the Kamajors operating under a new name.

The pace of police reform needs to be accelerated. It is not too late for the government, in conjunction with the British, to replicate the more rigorous International Military Assistance Training Team model for use with the police. This model would provide a more consistent and hands-on approach to police reform, reduce opportunities for corruption and continue to provide rigorous training.

More funding and targeted programs for reintegration of former combatants. Donors need to respond more aggressively during the donor conference scheduled for July 2002 and turn pledges into actual assistance. Reintegration programs should be targeted to those in need and who pose a threat to stability, mainly former combatants. Further, community development programs should better take into account the needs

of local populations and the divisions that exist in these communities.

Focus more forcefully on the deteriorating situation in Liberia. The international community must pay greater attention to events in the region as a whole. Many sources of conflict in Sierra Leone have always had regional roots. The regional conflict has not ended, nor has the threat of future instability, casualties, and chaos – along with attendant diamond-smuggling, money-laundering and other criminal activity. The international community will need to bring all parties to the negotiating table in Liberia or risk seeing its large investment in Sierra Leone slip down a sinkhole. One way to facilitate this, and to coordinate approaches to the interlocking crises of the Mano River region, would be to establish (ideally with informal Security Council concurrence) a contact group of key countries including Nigeria, the UK, France and the U.S.

Maintain an international security presence. Maintaining a part of UNAMSIL's military presence in key border and other strategic areas will be essential to keeping the peace over the next eighteen months. But the stability obtained in Sierra Leone will only be sustainable if the fundamental domestic root causes of the conflict are tackled in the same robust manner that characterised the military and diplomatic efforts of the last two years. The government of Sierra Leone must become more responsible and must drive the reform process.

Address corruption. International donors need to maintain unwavering focus on monitoring the government's willingness to reform. Corruption cannot be rooted out in a day; it is a long-term process that if left unattended will drive the nation back toward conflict. UNSAMIL and donors must avoid looking the other way on corruption in hopes that things will work out. Minister Short's blunt message of "no reform, no aid" should be turned into a reality.

The international community possesses a number of carrots (aid, training programs, infrastructure investment) and sticks (withdrawal of aid) to use in encouraging the government to reform. There will be "hard days and tough fights" ahead between the international community, in particular the British, and the government of Sierra Leone in completing various aspects of the peace process.

London should continue to take a tough approach to governmental reform.

Free the Anti-Corruption Commission from governmental interference. One partial answer to corruption is to give the Anti-Corruption Commission independence from the government, including the resources of lawyers, police and judges necessary to pursue, prosecute and punish those guilty of corruption. However, even if politically feasible, which is doubtful, removing the Anti-Corruption Commission from the current legal structure may not resolve these problems entirely. The judicial system as a whole lacks independence, which further contributes to the environment of impunity in which corruption takes place.

Pressure parliament to press for constitutional change to tackle corruption. The constitutional provision that allows one individual to hold the posts of attorney general and minister of justice should be revised. This will only occur only under pressure from donors. With more than a two-thirds majority for the SLPP ruling government, donors will find it hard to identify friends in this parliament to tackle a problem, which cuts so close to home. Pressing parliament into understanding its role as a check on the government is an important part of the battle for good governance. The government of Sierra Leone depends on international aid to ensure that the country functions; roughly 60 to 70 per cent of the budget comes from this source. Donors would be smart to leverage their aid to produce change from government and parliament. For example, donors could withhold funding from the office of the attorney general until it works in a way that furthers the ideals of the Anti-Corruption Commission.

Create a more robust and advocacy-oriented civil society. Anti-corruption measures will be more effective if backed by a broader and more active civil society. Donors cannot tackle corruption alone – they need an army of public-spirited individuals prepared to act as catalysts for change. Donors need to be aware of the importance of fostering change from within by targeting civil society and credible opposition groups as necessary vehicles for tackling corruption. But Sierra Leone does not have enough advocacy and policy-oriented organisations that can challenge the government, and the few it has are often

poorly trained, operate in fear, and are vulnerable to bribery and intimidation and unprepared to expose institutional corruption.

Sierra Leone needs watch dog committees to work in closer partnership with the Anti-Corruption Commission as effective checks on the government. The concept of building partnerships with various associations and local civil society groups is included in the Anti-Corruption Act, and donors should focus more rigorously on working with the Anti-Corruption Commission to bring such collaboration into existence. The creation of a National Accountability Group (NAG) in June to assist the Anti-Corruption Commission is a good first step. The international community should not forget that it was essentially a few brave individuals in civil society who pushed for elections in February 1996 to remove the military junta and that these same individuals challenged the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council junta that emerged in May 1997.

Work to take the mechanisms of accountability and reconciliation out of the government's hands. There are still possibilities to limit the opportunities for government interference with the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, especially the latter, and human rights activists will have to work hard at this. The U.S. wants the Court to succeed, but there are growing concerns that it might compromise with the government in order to deliver quick prosecutions. The lack of substantial funding may wreck the potential of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to become a forum for national healing. It is imperative that donors not inadvertently reduce the significance of this institution by assuming that elections have served as a substitute for reconciliation. They need to turn their pledges of support into genuine financing.

Freetown/Brussels, 12 July 2002

APPENDIX A

MAP OF SIERRA LEONE



General Staff Map Section, GSGS 11187 (CAD), Edition 3-GSGS, August 1998 67298

Produced by Military Survey, MOD UK 1998

Users should note that this map has been designed for briefing purposes only and it should not be used for determining the precise location of places or features. This map should not be considered an authority on the delimitation of international boundaries nor on the spelling of place and feature names. Maps produced by Military Survey (UK) are not to be taken as necessarily representing the views of the UK government on boundaries or political status. © Crown copyright 1998

APPENDIX B

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a private, multinational organisation committed to strengthening the capacity of the international community to anticipate, understand and act to prevent and contain conflict.

ICG's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, ICG produces regular analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers.

ICG's reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign ministries and international organisations and made generally available at the same time via the organisation's Internet site, www.crisisweb.org. ICG works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The ICG Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring ICG reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. ICG is chaired by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari; and its President and Chief Executive since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

ICG's international headquarters are at Brussels, with advocacy offices in Washington DC, New York and Paris and a media liaison office in London. The organisation currently operates eleven field offices with analysts working in nearly 30 crisis-affected countries and territories and across four continents.

In *Africa*, those locations include Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo,

Sierra Leone-Liberia-Guinea, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe; in *Asia*, Indonesia, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan; in *Europe*, Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia; in the *Middle East*, Algeria and the whole region from Egypt to Iran; and in *Latin America*, Colombia.

ICG raises funds from governments, charitable foundations, companies and individual donors. The following governments currently provide funding: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

Foundation and private sector donors include The Ansary Foundation, The Atlantic Philanthropies, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Ford Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, John Merck Fund, Open Society Institute, Ploughshares Fund, Ruben and Elisabeth Rausing Trust, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, and William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

July 2002

APPENDIX C

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* The Algeria project was transferred from the Africa Program in January 2002.

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