

SOFT TARGETS:
XENOPHOBIA, PUBLIC VIOLENCE
AND CHANGING ATTITUDES TO
MIGRANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The post-apartheid history of antipathy towards migrants and refugees is pronounced and well documented. A study by SAMP in 2006 of citizens' attitudes to migrants reached the gloomy conclusion that South Africa continued to be a society in which xenophobia remained well entrenched. Previous SAMP surveys on citizens' views and perceptions painted a similarly grim picture. The results showed that many South Africans wanted to give few or little rights to migrants, even benefits they were legitimately entitled to. Citizens' beliefs about migration and migrants were informed largely if not exclusively by stereotypes, myths and unverified biases. Inter-personal contact and social interaction with migrants was similarly limited, though on the rise from previous years. The World Values Survey, a global longitudinal study of people's beliefs and values, reinforced SAMP's findings by indicating that South Africans were more hostile and resistant to migrants and refugees than citizens of any other country.

To date, the fiercest expression of this tendency was the May 2008 attacks that rocked South Africa with their sheer scale and intensity. Some commentators would characterize it as a "pogrom" and "ethnic cleansing" to underscore its tragic consequences and the needless devastation wreaked in affected areas. While the world reacted with disgust, the events of May 2008 led South Africans to seriously debate the grave consequences of unfettered bigotry against those perceived as "outsiders" and seen not to belong. This visible expression of xenophobia affected at least some South African civil society groups and organizations who found the violence unacceptable. Such groups also rallied actively in July 2010 when fresh warnings of impending xenophobic violence were reported.

The magnitude of violence witnessed in 2008 has not been repeated. The risks of a re-occurrence appeared very high in the aftermath of the 2010 World Cup tournament, but when large-scale violence failed to materialize, some observers maintained that the threats did not exist in the first place. Anti-migrant violence in South Africa was explained by government as the work of criminal and anti-social elements. South Africans, it was emphasized, were not opposed to migrants and refugees or xenophobic. But, has violence directed at migrants and refugees really disappeared from South Africa since the paroxysm of mid-2008? And has prejudice and intolerance against them experienced a similar decline?

In late 2010, a few months after the World Cup tournament had ended, SAMP undertook a new nationally representative survey of citizen attitudes on migration and xenophobia. The survey was administered in urban areas in South Africa where many of the violent attacks on migrants have concentrated. The exercise to document citizens' views on migration over time is critical especially given South Africa's extended record of extreme xenophobia. The research allows us to gauge public sentiments at

a particular point in time, identify possible areas of concern in which intervention may be necessary and indicate changes in these views. The main objective of this survey was to understand shifts in views and perceptions of migration, migrants and refugees since 2006. The survey attempted to address these questions:

- How accurate is the official view that xenophobia is not present in South Africa?
- Have South African attitudes towards migration, migrants and refugees changed since 2008?
- Have the violent events of May 2008 had a sobering influence on public sentiments on migration?
- Are there any differences in citizens' views in 'hot spot' areas (affected areas that witnessed violence in mid-2008) and non-affected areas?
- Are citizens still willing to engage in collective action against migrants and refugees in their communities?

The detailed timeline provided with the 2006 Survey analysis showed that violent episodes involving migrants and refugees as easy targets were growing. The survey results also reflected this hardening of beliefs and views across a number of indicators. In 2006, a greater number wanted to prohibit immigration completely (35%, up from 25% in 1999). Nearly 85% felt that South Africa was letting in "too many" immigrants. There was strong support for the deportation of all migrants, including those who had not flouted any immigration rules. In other words, they wanted the forced expulsion of legal migrants too. One in two South Africans backed this policy and less than 20% opposed it. Fewer than 20% wanted migrants to come to South Africa with their families. The share of South Africans who wanted electrified border fences grew (to 76% in 2006 from 66% in 1999). Sixty-seven percent thought migrants consume South African resources like housing and the same percentage thought migrants engage in criminal activity. One in two South Africans agreed that migrants were carriers of diseases compared to 24% in 1999.

South Africans showed a feeble commitment to their humanitarian obligations to protect refugees and asylum-seekers fleeing risky circumstances in their home countries. Although nearly half of all South Africans accepted the need for refugee protection, another 30% were not in favour of providing it. Some three-quarters of South Africans did not want to increase the number of refugees residing in South Africa. One in two wanted all refugees to live in segregated camps in border areas. Two-thirds did not want to grant permanent residence to refugees residing in South Africa for more than five years. A small number (30%) were in favour of giving refugees the right to work in South Africa, a right necessary to meet basic needs and survive. Some 60% supported compulsory HIV testing of refugees.

How do the results of the 2010 SAMP Survey compare with those from 2006? Strikingly, there were several positive developments since 2006 including:

- Although South Africans still have a poor opinion of irregular migrants, refugees and African migrants, there has been a drop in the negative assessment of these three groups.
- Attitudes to migrants from African countries have improved, with greater “favourable” and fewer “unfavourable” assessments.
- In 2006, some 75% did not want to increase the number of refugees living in South Africa. The comparable figure for 2010 is 57%.
- In 2010, close to one-third want refugees to live in border camps. Support for this discriminatory policy has dropped from nearly 50% in the previous survey.
- Some 41% want mandatory HIV testing of refugees as compared to 60% in 2006.
- Fewer South Africans believe that migrants enter the country to engage in criminal activity (50% down from 64% in 2006).
- South Africans are somewhat more willing to extend rights to migrants. Police protection for refugees saw a positive growth from 28% to 36%. For irregular migrants, there was a similar change from 14% to 22%.
- Backing for access to social services by migrants grew too from 14% to 28% and 6% to 16% for refugees and irregular migrants respectively.
- The percentage of those who associated migrants with crime fell from 49% to 39%.
- One in three thought migrants contribute to skills development, an increase from 25% in 2006.
- Contact between South Africans and migrants from SADC as well as non-SADC countries is increasing in different social settings and this interaction is assessed favourably. Positive interactions grew (from 32% in 2006 to 39%) and negative ones shrank (26% to 14% in 2010).

The SAMP Xenophobia Index (SXI) corroborated the diminution of negative beliefs between 2006 and 2010. This index was calculated using answers to 15 different questions for every participant and those with higher scores were assessed as being more xenophobic than those with lower ones. The important findings here are:

- Between 2006 and 2010, there was a noticeable reduction in the intensity of xenophobic sentiments among several groups in South Africa including Coloured South Africans, Afrikaans-speakers, South Africans who speak the same languages as migrants, the less educated and lower income citizens.
- There was a perceptible decline in levels of xenophobia across three racial groups: Coloureds down 0.7, Blacks and Whites (down 0.3).
- Unlike in 2006, when the xenophobia scores declined with higher levels

of education, by 2010 they had fallen for all groups and at a faster rate for less educated citizens.

- In 2006, xenophobia was inversely tied to income: the higher the income, the lower the xenophobia scores. But by 2010, levels of xenophobia increased with increasing income. Those in the lowest income groups were the least xenophobic.
- Black South Africans were less xenophobic compared to other racial groups.
- Citizens who had no contact or interaction with migrants whatsoever were the most opposed to them, suggesting that increased contact between migrants and citizens has a beneficial effect on tolerance and prejudicial views.
- On a policy note, a comparison of results from the 2006 and 2010 surveys shows a small decline in support for highly restrictive immigration policies. However, while the numbers of those who favour a complete ban or strong restrictions on immigration declined somewhat, so did support for employment-related immigration.

While we see some reason for optimism, South Africa cannot afford to become complacent about xenophobia and its pernicious outcomes. Globally, South Africa is still the country most opposed to immigration where nearly 80% of citizens either support prohibition on the entry of migrants or would like to place strict limits on it. South Africans want very few migrants even when jobs are available for them. These attitudes are far more negative compared even to countries that are generally perceived as “anti-immigration” with draconian immigration policies.

- South Africans continue to see immigration in an unfavourable light and desire strict measures to prevent it. Some 63% want electrified fences on the country’s borders, a policy last adopted during the apartheid era.
- Just as many would like the army to patrol the border areas, linking migration directly and in a negative manner to issues of national security.
- One in two South Africans want migrants to carry their identity documents on them at all times, similar to policies during apartheid.
- Despite a fall in support from 2006, one-quarter of South Africans continue to want all migrants to be deported, irrespective of their status.
- Half of all South Africans feel that irregular migrants should “never” receive police protection. And only 18% want to give them legal protection. Refugees fared marginally better with 36% wanting to give them protection through the police. The recognized vulnerability of such migrants to poor treatment, extortion by state officials, and to xenophobic violence makes this a disturbing fact.
- There has been a decline in beliefs about migrants and criminal activity

(67% to 55% in 2010) though the level is markedly higher than seen in 1999 (45%).

- Although more people agree that migrants arrive in South Africa for a variety of different reasons, those who think migrants mainly come to commit crime has increased (14% from 8% in 2006).

It is evident that South African views on migration are shaped by uninformed ideas and these beliefs are largely unchanged over time. Although the Census shows that less than 5% of the country's residents were born in another country, more than 50% of South Africans believe that foreigners constitute a great majority of the country's population. As in 2006, close to 20% still think that each and every migrant living in South Africa entered the country illegally and in violation of immigration rules. The evaluation of migrant numbers is similarly bleak. A massive 90% of South Africans feel that there are too many migrants (89% in 2006). Only a small minority agrees that the numbers of migrants are "right" for South Africa (5% from 7% in 2006).

Like the numbers of foreigners, the perceived effects of migration are weighed largely in the negative. While there has been an improvement from opinions in 2006, those with adverse assessments are higher than seen in 1999. In 1999, 59% thought migrants use up resources like water, housing, electricity, which increased to 63% in 2010. Some 41% of Blacks and Whites think migrants are carriers of diseases. More than 60% of Black, White, and Indian/Asian South Africans think that migrants take jobs from citizens.

The 2010 Survey included questions on refugee protection and rights. What do South Africans think of refugees and asylum-seekers who have fled persecution and grave danger in their home countries where they were seriously affected by armed conflict, civil war or severe human rights violations?

- More than one-third do not want to provide refuge to asylum-seekers at all. Support for refugee protection has fallen from 47% to 38% in 2010.
- Only 14% want government resources to be used to help refugees and nearly half actively oppose such a policy.
- More than half of all South Africans think refugees should only be given temporary refuge in the country.

In the assessment of who should benefit from immigration, citizenship and nationality retain an important role. Although these perceptions have weakened slightly from 2006, many South Africans believe that the two most important indicators of being "truly South African" are individuals' birth and/or parents' birth in the country. By this rationale, those born elsewhere cannot really be seen as being a part of South Africa. For instance, 82% think that a person must be born in South Africa to be judged a South African. The ranking of groups follows a parallel trend with every South African group favoured over migrants. The lowest and most negative rank

is assigned to migrants in irregular situations followed by refugees.

The unambiguous linkages between citizenship and rights are clearly observed in the survey. Citizens are believed and expected to enjoy a larger set of rights compared to migrants, irrespective of their standing in South Africa. So while 87% think that citizens should always have access to legal protection and only 2% disagree with it, the comparable figures for refugees are 31% and 25%. Likewise, migrants entering South Africa for short periods are to be given fewer rights. Some 38% agreed that they should be given the right to free speech while the comparable figure for citizens is 88%. The opinion of many South Africans diverges significantly from the country's Constitution and Bill of Rights in this respect. As in 2006, South Africans were asked to evaluate migrants by their country of origin. Nigerians received the most unfavourable assessments in both 2006 and 2010. Migrants from Zimbabwe and Mozambique were not perceived as favourably as those from other SADC countries. Those from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were seen most favourably in both years.

The violence of May 2008 may not have recurred on the same scale but it is certainly continuing. The proportion of those willing to transform their negative attitudes into forceful action, individual and collective, against migrants, remains constant. This is especially true for those willing to use violence to exclude or expel migrants from communities and join with others to achieve this end. The fact that this group's convictions remain fixed and unchanged despite other positive shifts should be a cause for concern. For this cohort, the violence of May 2008 has had no immediate effect on their thinking and perception. There are some disturbing signals here:

- The number of South Africans ready to remove migrants violently increased slightly from 2006 to 2010.
- South Africans unwilling to engage or participate in such actions actually declined in 2010.
- The proportion of those prepared to unite with others in collective action against migrants remains unchanged from 2006.
- One in four South Africans is ready to jointly prevent migrants from neighbouring countries from operating a business. This too is a troubling indicator because of the escalation of attacks on migrant-owned businesses in recent years.
- Almost a similar number are willing to prevent them from moving into their neighbourhood.
- Some 20% would take action to prevent the enrolment of children from migrant families in the same schools as their own.

The 2010 Survey also asked new questions about citizen reactions to the violence of May 2008. Respondents were asked to identify what they felt were the underlying reasons. Close to half felt personally guilty over the violence, 54% agreed that migrants did not deserve such treatment and

a similar proportion indicated that they would not endorse such actions. However, another one-third was unmoved by the violence and a minority showed their approval. These differences are erased when it comes to offering reasons for the violence. Most accepted popular explanations or were apathetic. For instance, more than 60% thought the violence occurred because of migrants' involvement in crime or because they take jobs from South Africans or are culturally different. So, while South Africans expressed their discomfort with the violence, they held migrants and refugees responsible for it, falling back on migrant stereotypes and falsehoods to justify it.

The marginal urban locations in which violence occurred in May 2008 inevitably led to the idea that poverty, economic deprivation of residents, competition for resources, poor service delivery, and the presence of large numbers of migrants were predisposing factors. In other words, it was argued that these affected or hotspot areas possessed traits "different" from non-affected areas that made them more susceptible to the violence. It also implied that hostility to migrants would be markedly stronger in such areas. Other research has shown that these communities were not markedly different socio-economically from communities where violence did not occur. Using the 2010 Survey results, we have attempted to assess how dissimilar attitudes are in affected areas.

Our results show that significant dissimilarities are absent between affected and unaffected areas on a variety of indices in spite of a higher concentration of low-income earners and higher numbers of working class members in the 'hotspot' areas. Some important patterns that emerge include:

- Although levels of personal and general economic satisfaction in hotspot areas were marginally lower than in non-affected areas, close to half of respondents in these areas said that they were satisfied on both indices.
- The SXI shows that the affected areas are not significantly more xenophobic than non-affected ones.
- The SXI scores for affected areas are actually lower than those for White, Coloured and Indian/Asian South Africans, and higher-income groups.
- Hotspots residents were less accepting of the violence as compared to other South Africans, but fewer felt guilty about it or wanted to do something to repair it.
- Migrant stereotypes played a stronger role in affected areas in respondents' considerations of reasons for the violence.
- While respondents in affected areas were more likely to prevent migrants from moving into their neighborhood and running a business there, they were less likely to engage in other forms of collective action.

In fact, they were slightly less likely to engage in violence against them (9% versus 11% in unaffected areas).

- Despite a perception that contact would be higher in affected areas (due to the higher presence of migrants), the results were similar for both locations.
- Assessment of these interactions with migrants is generally positive in affected areas.

Finally, the 2010 Survey included a question on the World Cup tournament and its perceived effects. As the venue of Africa's first competition, it was anticipated by some that it would deepen intra-African unity. One in two South Africans agreed that the tournament had a positive impact, by enhancing their interest in other countries and 58% felt they could learn from people of other countries. One in three South Africans also said that they had a more positive attitude towards migrants, thanks to the World Cup. At the same time, 41% thought that all migrants should have left South Africa after the World Cup was over.

Overall, these results create a mixed picture, with some hopeful developments and others that are deeply discouraging. On the optimistic side, it is clear that the intensity of xenophobic sentiment declined between 2006 and 2010. Future studies will confirm whether this is really due to a progressive, deep-seated change or is simply an anomaly. We are doubtful whether these changes were shaped by the effects of the May 2008 violence, the World Cup tournament, or for that matter, government efforts to reduce xenophobia. However, the report certainly shows that growing contact between South Africans and migrants has had a positive effect in softening attitudes.

The other conclusion is much more pessimistic. South Africans continue to feel threatened by the presence of migrants and want to handle these anxieties by limiting migrants' numbers, deterring their entry into South Africa and making conditions difficult for their existence here by restricting the rights and entitlements they can enjoy. The presence of an unyielding cohort that is ready to deploy violence to manage such anxieties is the most disturbing finding. Unless there is a concerted effort by citizens and the state to change these realities, migrants and refugees will continue to be "soft targets" of xenophobic discrimination in South Africa.

INTRODUCTION

Xenophobia has been endemic in South African society since at least 1994.¹ Successive SAMP surveys revealed growing levels of intolerance towards migrants and refugees and considerable willingness to resort to violence against non-citizens.² In May 2008, a wave of xenophobic violence unprecedented in scale and ferocity swept the country.³ The xenophobic pogrom prompted a strong counter-reaction from within South African civil society. Numerous organizations publicly protested against the violence and assisted the victims and their families.⁴ In some local media, condemnation of the violence was uncharacteristically vociferous, particularly on the op-ed and letters pages, and many South Africans seemed outraged and shamed by the events. Others were more skeptical. An inquest into the brutal “necklacing” of Mozambican Ernesto Nhmuave in May 2008 prompted journalist Justice Malala to call South Africans xenophobic monsters: “We have to call this spade by its name. We are xenophobic... Xenophobia is our own terrorism. We must stop the attacks before they overwhelm us.”⁵ Another noted that xenophobia had become “as much a part of the South African way of life as *braai*leis or *chiskop*.”⁶ The obvious question, five years on, is whether May 2008 marked a turning point in South African attitudes towards the strangers in their midst or whether it is now xenophobic business as usual.

The celebration of Africa’s first FIFA World Cup in South Africa in July 2010 had the unanticipated effect of raising fresh threats of mass xenophobic violence.⁷ By the time the World Cup kicked off, civil society groups were underscoring the “climate of threat” against migrants and criticising the government for its failure to mitigate the risks.⁸ The Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa urged “strong and preventative action by the government and other institutions,” noting with concern that “some of those making these threats believe that they have the support of senior political leaders.”⁹ The prospect of a renewed xenophobic pogrom was magnified when South Africa’s national team was ousted from the tournament and migrant groups received further warnings of extreme belligerence. The possibility that the World Cup – with its fan walks, street parties and passionate brandishing of flags, *vuvuzelas* and *makarapas* – had invigorated the chauvinist elements of South African nationalism was raised.¹⁰ Jonathan Jansen, Vice-Chancellor of the University of the Free State, observed:

We South Africans need to look in the mirror after this World Cup and ask ourselves the uncomfortable question: Why do we celebrate Ghanaians and other Africans on the soccer pitch but persecute them in the townships... This was always my fear about the wave of nationalistic fever that spread

across the land during the World Cup; there is a dark side (if you will forgive the pun) to such passionate love of country – it excludes.¹¹

With international attention centred on South Africa, the government deployed the army and organized heavy policing to avert the embarrassment of a second large-scale humanitarian disaster.¹²

The official South African response to May 2008 was to deny that xenophobia was involved or even that it existed at all. Former President Thabo Mbeki even argued that those who claimed that South Africans were xenophobic were themselves guilty of xenophobia:

As many were killed or maimed during the dark days of May, thousands displaced, businesses and homes looted, and homes and businesses destroyed by arson, I heard it said insistently that my people have turned or have become xenophobic. The word xenophobia means a deep antipathy towards or hatred of foreigners. When I heard some accuse my people of xenophobia, of hatred of foreigners, I wondered what the accusers knew about my people, which I did not know. Everything I know about my people tells me that [they] are not xenophobic. These masses are neither antipathetic towards, nor do they hate foreigners. And this I must also say - none in our society has any right to encourage or incite xenophobia by trying to explain naked criminal activity by cloaking it in the garb of xenophobia.¹³

Mbeki's arguments were again articulated in 2010. In response to the threats of renewed violence, the Minister of Police, for example, declared that "xenophobia is not going to happen... *There is no such systematic thing as xenophobia in the country* [emphasis ours]."¹⁴ He dismissed reports of people fleeing the Western Cape as "hysteria", proposing that they were actually seasonal workers returning to their homes.¹⁵ After violence broke out, he termed it "so-called xenophobia" and issued a statement asserting that "criminal elements, which disguise themselves as xenophobia," would be firmly dealt with.¹⁶ He also characterized attacks on migrants and refugees as "crimes of opportunity" perpetrated by criminal or anti-social elements.¹⁷ After a Zimbabwean man was stoned to death by local residents in Seshego, Limpopo, in June 2011, a police ministry spokesperson echoed this view: "Once you start talking about xenophobia and Afrophobia, you are talking about semantics. *It is crime disguised under xenophobia* [emphasis ours]."¹⁸

The government's attitude was contested in 2011 by the African Union's African Peer Review Mechanism, an initiative to enhance governance and accountability in Africa.¹⁹ The Review unambiguously

underscored “an element of denialism” with regard to xenophobia by some officials and stated that the government “was not doing enough to address the issue.”²⁰ A United Nations report had also identified xenophobia as a “serious concern” for the country.²¹ The country report (prepared after an official visit to document the situation of migrants and refugees by Jorge Bustamante, then United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants), advised the South African government to treat the social integration of all migrants and the protection of their human rights as a requisite feature of their immigration policy and, as a priority, to adopt measures to make such integration and social cohesion a reality.²² Migrant Special Rapporteur country visits are generally requested by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights only after concerns are raised from many different quarters about migrant insecurity and vulnerability in a national context.

The threatened post-World Cup ethnic cleansing did not materialize. Does this mean that xenophobic violence has disappeared or is on the wane? The available evidence suggests not, as smaller-scale attacks on foreign migrants and refugees continue to the present. From May to July 2010, at least 50 incidents of violence targeting migrants were recorded in the Western Cape alone. On 11 July 2010, for example, shops run by migrants were attacked in Nyanga, Philippi East and Khayelitsha on the Cape Flats, Wellington, Paarl East, Mbekweni, Franschoek and Klapmuts in Western Cape province.²³ Zimbabwean Reason Wandu was thrown off a moving train in Cape Town after being subjected to verbal abuse by other passengers.²⁴ In another incident, 16 people were attacked at the Kya Sands settlement near Johannesburg, many of them migrants from Mozambique and Zimbabwe.²⁵ Eyewitness accounts suggested that the perpetrators led the attacks with chants of “We don’t want foreigners here, they must all go back home.”²⁶

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees noted that 500 xenophobic incidents were confirmed and reported to the South African Police Services in 2011, despite a centralized early warning system that alerts the police to such episodes. Close to 100 foreign migrants were killed in assaults in 2011 (more than in the violence of May 2008) and another 100 received serious injuries.²⁷ In 2011, 1,000 people were temporarily displaced by xenophobic violence, while some 120 migrant-owned stores were temporarily or permanently closed as a result of threats or intimidation.²⁸ Between late 2011 and late 2012, some 300 migrants were reportedly killed, including 120 Somalis and 50 Bangladeshi shopkeepers in townships.²⁹ The Somali Community Board of South Africa estimates that 45 Somalis were murdered in Cape Town alone during 2012. In 2012, recorded xenophobic attacks included the following:

- More than 100 shops belonging to Bangladeshi and Pakistani migrants

were attacked and looted in Thabong, Welkom and Kutloanong in Free State province over three days in February. Police moved migrants to other areas for safety.

- Also in February 2012, 88 shops belonging to Somali and Ethiopian migrants were looted during a strike at the Impala Platinum Mine in Phokeng near Rustenburg, North West province, and more than 100 migrants fled the area.
- In the same month, members of the Zanokhanyo Business Association forced more than five Somali traders to close their shops permanently in Khayelitsha (Western Cape), insisting that this was part of an agreement reached after the May 2008 riots.
- In Braamfischerville (Soweto) in February 2012, some 400 youths returning from a funeral ransacked a grocery store belonging to three Bangladeshi migrants.
- During a service delivery protest in March, angry residents of Ratanda informal settlement near Heidelberg in Gauteng emptied the contents of migrant-run stores.
- A few days later, and in a bizarre twist, at a protest march against the moving of Human Rights Day celebrations to neighbouring Kliptown, Sharpeville residents plundered migrant-run shops, while many migrants fled the area.
- In May 2012, two days after two Pakistani migrants were implicated in the death of a local woman in Modimolle Township, Limpopo province, residents attacked migrant businesses, affecting Pakistani, Somali and Ethiopian migrants.
- Residents of Ekurhuleni, Gauteng, damaged shops belonging to migrants and municipal property during service delivery protests in May 2012.
- Angered by the government's decision not to build a university in their area as previously pledged, residents of eMjindini township and Sincobile village, Mpumalanga province, in June 2012 organized a violent protest lasting several days, during which shops belonging to Pakistani migrants were targeted.
- In June, Somali community groups said that attacks on Somali refugees were intensifying, with more than 10 shopkeepers killed in less than one week and another 20 violently assaulted.
- During a protest march in June to demand better living conditions, residents of Botrivier, a town in the Western Cape, plundered stores run by migrants.
- After Mangaung Municipality, Free State, moved South African informal street traders from a shopping centre in Botshabelo, residents looted and destroyed 70 shops belonging to Ethiopian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi migrants.³⁰ Three stores were incinerated and 500 migrants were displaced.

- Eight spaza shops (informal convenience stores) on the Cape Flats, Western Cape, run by Somali, Bangladeshi and Pakistani migrants were firebombed in July 2012 after they refused to pay protection money to a local gang.³¹
- In August, the police closed over 500 spaza shops in Limpopo in “Operation Hard Stick.” The Somali Community Board of South Africa estimated that over 200 Somali-owned shops were closed and that, in most cases, goods were confiscated and not returned.
- A group calling itself the South African Blacks Association made graphic threats of violence against foreigners in Mayfair, Johannesburg, and encouraged others to do the same. The organization distributed pamphlets in the area “declaring war” against refugees and warning foreigners that “we are coming for you.” The pamphlets warned that “we will burn your houses, your so-called luxury cars, we will kill your fucken (sic) puppies (children) and burn down your shops” and threatened to rape and kill foreign women.
- Following the strike at Marikana platinum mine in Rustenburg, there were attacks on Somali, Chinese and other migrant-owned stores in the town’s settlements in October 2012, including hurling petrol bombs at and pillaging of these establishments.³²

In addition to these incidents, there were numerous attacks on migrants and their property by small groups and individuals throughout the country, their xenophobic content rendered largely invisible by their official description as crimes of murder, robbery and physical assault (see Appendix).

Against this backdrop, the persistent official denial that xenophobia exists in South Africa seems misplaced in the extreme.³³ A great deal of post-2008 case-study evidence has accumulated to show that migrants and refugees are subjected to poor treatment, verbal abuse and exclusion from services by South African citizens and state employees.³⁴ The death in custody of Mozambican migrant Emidio Macia in late February 2013 after being handcuffed by several officers to a police vehicle and dragged down the street is simply its latest public expression.³⁵ However, these “incidents” can always be written off by xenophobia-denialists as atypical and unrepresentative of the South African population at large. This report therefore seeks to examine whether South Africans in general display attitudes and perceptions that are xenophobic in nature. The national attitudinal survey undertaken by SAMP in late 2010 allows us to assess general levels of xenophobia and identify which groups are most xenophobic. In discussing the results, comparisons are made with earlier SAMP surveys (particularly the 2006 survey) to assess whether xenophobia has intensified or waned. The report addresses three key questions:

- Are South African government officials and politicians correct in their assertions that xenophobia does not exist in South Africa?

- Do South Africans harbour negative views towards migrants and refugees and what would they like to see happen to migrants in the country?
- Have there been any shifts in attitudes towards migrants since the xenophobic violence of May 2008?

SURVEY METHODOLOGY

The most recent SAMP xenophobia survey was conducted in November and December 2010. Census enumeration areas were used for household selection and respondent selection was randomized. Due to resource constraints, the 2010 survey was conducted in urban/metro areas (large and small cities, large and small towns) in all nine provinces. Interviews took place in a variety of settings, depending on where the randomly-selected dwellings were located. Respondents were all South African citizens who gave their informed consent to be interviewed. The 2010 survey used the same questions and indices as the SAMP survey in 2006, with additional questions about xenophobic violence and the World Cup.³⁶ The questionnaire was translated and administered in five South African languages: English, Afrikaans, Xhosa, Zulu and Tswana. Fieldworkers were fluent in the languages in which interviews were conducted and survey participants were able to select one of the above as the preferred language for the interview. The final 2010 sample of 2,400 citizens was weighted to make it nationally representative. All results reported are percentages using the weighted dataset. To compare the results with those from 2006, a new dataset was created from the earlier results by deleting all rural respondents from the survey file. A total of 2,600 respondents were included in the 2006 urban dataset. Areas where xenophobic violence occurred in 2008 were also identified in the 2010 dataset in order to make comparisons with areas where violence did not occur.

PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS

Before comparing the attitudes of South Africans in 2006 and 2010, it is important to assess how comparable the two sampled groups are in terms of various demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Table 1 compares the two on a variety of indicators and shows a number of similarities. The sex breakdown in 2006 and 2010 is very similar with roughly half of the respondents being male and half female. The breakdown by race is also very close with a maximum variance of 1%. In both years, around two-thirds of the sample was Black African, just under 20% were White and around 14% were Coloured. Indians/Asians were in a small minority (3%). The first language breakdown is similar, with marginally more Afrikaans, English and Sotho speakers in 2010 and marginally fewer Zulu and Xhosa

speakers. Finally, the respondents resided in comparable housing and settlement types in 2006 and 2010. Some comparative data is also included from the latest South African Census (which includes the rural areas and therefore has a higher proportion of Blacks than the urban sample).

Table 1: Characteristics of Survey Respondents, 2006 and 2010			
	2006 (%)	2010 (%)	Census 2011 (%)
Sex			
Male	49	50	49
Female	51	50	51
Race			
Black	66	65	79
White	17	18	9
Coloured	13	14	9
Indian/Asian	3	3	3
First language			
Zulu	24	22	23
Afrikaans	20	21	13
Xhosa	16	14	16
English	14	16	10
Sotho	14	15	8
Tswana	7	7	8
Other	5	5	12
Type of accommodation			
House (free-standing)	69	67	
House (attached)	8	8	
RDP house	7	10	
Apartment/flat	4	5	
Shack	11	8	
Other	1	2	
Type of settlement			
Formal	73	69	
Informal	11	12	
Mixed	16	19	

In terms of economic and occupational profile, both groups have roughly equal proportions in various self-assigned class categories with the majority (around 55% in both years) describing themselves as lower and working class and a third as middle class. As expected, there is a clear racial dimension to the class composition. In 2010, for example, 59% of the Black respondents were lower and working class and 33% were middle class. The comparable figures for White respondents were 28% and 59%.

	2006 (%)	2010 (%)
Economic class		
Lower/Working	56	55
Middle	32	32
Upper middle	5	6
Upper	2	3
Don't know	5	4
Monthly income		
<R3,000	46	30
R3,000–R5,999	16	16
R6,000–R8,999	8	9
R9,000–R11,999	4	5
R12,000–R15,999	3	3
R16,000–R19,999	2	4
>R20,000	3	3
No answer	18	29
Employment status		
Employed full-time	29	36
Employed part-time	11	13
Unemployed (looking for work)	26	24
Unemployed (not looking)	9	7
Self-employed (formal sector)	5	4
Self-employed (informal sector)	2	1
Retired	9	5
Other	9	10

There is a difference in the income profile of the two samples with 46% earning less than R3,000 per month in 2006 compared with only 30% in 2010. Since the same sampling methodology was used in both 2006 and 2010, this could represent a shift for the better in urban employment and income levels for the urban poor over the four-year period. Regardless, there is a clear relationship between income and race (Table 3). In the 2010 sample, 38% of Black South Africans earned less than R3,000 per month compared with only 4% of Whites. And 55% of Blacks earned less than R6,000 per month compared with just 9% of Whites. Consistent with the finding of an improvement in income between 2006 and 2010, there was also a change in the full- or part-time employment profile (Table 2). Employment levels were higher in 2010 than 2006 (49% versus 40%) and the proportion of unemployed was concomitantly lower (31% in 2010 versus 35% in 2006).

Income levels	Black (%)	Coloured (%)	Indian/Asian (%)	White (%)
>R3,000	38	29	6	4
R3,000–R5,999	17	29	12	5
R6,000–R8,999	8	10	19	11
R9,000–R11,999	4	4	13	7
R12,000–R15,999	2	3	15	7
R16,000–R19,999	2	1	12	13
R20,000+	<1	2	9	14
No answer	29	22	14	39

The occupational profile of the two samples is extremely diverse, which validates our attempt to survey as broad a cross-section of South Africans as possible. Interestingly, the only two occupations in which there was a drop between 2006 and 2010 were service work (6% to 1%) and domestic work (8% to 5%) (Table 4). Migrants are certainly employed in growing numbers in both occupations, which could partially account for the reduction.

	2006 (%)	2010 (%)
Low-skilled		
Service worker	6	1
Domestic worker	8	5
Security	2	2
Informal sector	3	3
Sub-total	19	11
Semi-skilled		
Office worker	6	5
Miner	1	1
Police/security	2	2
Nurse	2	2
Driver	3	2
Retail/sales	4	5
Sub-total	18	17
Skilled		
Employer/manager	4	4
Professional	2	2
Teacher	3	3
Office manager/supervisor	3	5
Sub-total	12	14
Never worked	24	28

SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY

The 2010 respondents demonstrated high levels of personal affinity with an imagined South African identity. As many as 85% of respondents agreed that “being South African” was an important part of how they viewed themselves (Table 5). A majority (82%) said that they were proud to be South African and a similar number said they wanted their children to identify themselves as South African as well. The strong levels of national identification varied somewhat by race, with Coloured respondents expressing consistently lower levels of personal affinity with a South African identity.

	Black (%)	Coloured (%)	Indian/Asian (%)	White (%)	Total (%)
Being South African is an important part of how I see myself	86	69	87	84	83
I want my children to think of themselves as South African	86	64	86	81	82
It makes me proud to be South African	87	64	86	80	82
<i>*Percentage who agree/strongly agree</i>					

These findings demonstrate the value and significance of national identity for most South Africans. But what is a South African? The two strongest indicators were birth-related: some 82% of respondents felt that being born in South Africa was the most important criterion for being South African and 78% indicated that having parents born in South Africa was a necessary condition. Working and contributing to the South African economy was viewed as a key indicator of a true South African by 69%. Speaking an African language was cited by 64% and being Black by 63%. Around 40% felt that a true South African should not hold dual citizenship. These views are tied to the notion that native groups, i.e. people born within South African territory, have a much stronger and possibly exclusivist claim to South Africa compared to those who were born outside the country. Migrants and refugees, by virtue of their birth outside the country, can never be accepted as truly South African. In a broader sense, these assertions of South African identity are directly connected to the kinds of rights and entitlements accorded to different groups in South Africa.

Citizenship and nationality are clearly strong factors shaping public attitudes towards the inclusion and exclusion of various communities living in South Africa. In terms of general attitude to their own racial group and to migrant groups, the ratings follow a predictable pattern with all of the South African groups receiving much higher positive evaluations

(Table 7). The strongest negative judgments against non-nationals are reserved for irregular migrants, followed by refugees as well as migrants from other African countries. However, there has been an observable decline in unfavourable assessments of all three groups since 2006. Irregular migrants experienced the biggest drop in unfavourable ratings and the largest increase in favourable ratings (16% and 6% respectively). The improvement in ratings of refugees/asylum seekers and migrants from the rest of Africa was virtually identical. Migrants from Southern Africa elicited a bigger improvement than either of these groups (6% drop in negative appraisals and 5% increase in positive appraisals). Migrants from Europe and North America were the only group whose favourability rating did not change. In 2006, they were rated more favourably than any other group. In 2010, they had fallen into second place behind migrants from other Southern African countries.

	%
Being born in South Africa	82
Having parents born in South Africa	78
Working and contributing to the South African economy	69
Speaking an African language	64
Being Black	63
Willing to give up claims of citizenship in another country	42
<i>*Percentage who agree/strongly agree</i>	

	Completely favourable (%)		Completely unfavourable (%)	
	2006	2010	2006	2010
South African groups				
Blacks	70	65	5	5
Whites	55	56	7	4
Coloureds	45	49	12	7
Indians/Asians	38	42	20	12
Migrant groups				
Southern Africans	20	25	27	21
Europeans/North Americans	21	21	24	18
Rest of Africa	15	17	33	26
Refugees/asylum-seekers	19	21	32	27
Irregular migrants	6	12	65	49

One common explanation for the escalation of xenophobia is the deteriorating economic and social standing of citizens.³⁷ This ought to be reflected in high levels of economic dissatisfaction among South Africans.

However, the survey found that only a small percentage of respondents were dissatisfied with their personal economic circumstances as well as overall economic conditions in the country (Table 8). Far more were satisfied than dissatisfied with their personal economic situation (45% versus 14%) and general economic conditions (47% satisfied, 13% dissatisfied). The number of dissatisfied actually fell by several percentage points between 2006 and 2010. The respondents were also relatively optimistic about the future. The proportion of those who felt they would be satisfied with their personal economic circumstances in 2015 rose slightly from 55% to 56% and those who thought they would be dissatisfied fell from 11% to 7%. Similar changes in levels of optimism surrounded views about future economic conditions in the country.

	2006 % Satisfied	2006 % Dissatisfied	2010 % Satisfied	2010 % Dissatisfied
How satisfied are you with your personal economic conditions?	48	19	45	14
How satisfied are you with overall economic conditions in South Africa?	54	14	47	13
How satisfied do you think you will be with your personal economic conditions in five years' time?	55	11	56	7
How satisfied do you think you will be with overall economic conditions in South Africa in five years' time?	58	10	57	7

BELIEFS ABOUT MIGRATION

South Africans continue to hold distorted and exaggerated beliefs about the numbers of non-South Africans in the country (Table 9). These views remain virtually unchanged from 2006. More than half of the respondents felt that “many people” living in the country are foreigners. Another 7% said that “almost everyone” in South Africa is a foreigner. The vast majority (90%) believe that there are “too many” migrants in the country. These perceptions of a country overrun with foreign migrants contrast sharply with the finding of the 2011 Census that only 4% of the country’s population was born outside the country. As many as two-thirds also believe that “many/almost” all migrants are in South Africa illegally.

	2006 (%)	2010 (%)
Many people living in South Africa are foreigners	53	52
Almost everyone living in South Africa is a foreigner	9	7
Many foreigners living in South Africa are illegal	45	44
Almost all foreigners living in South Africa are illegal	21	19
There are too many foreigners living in South Africa	89	90
The right number of foreigners are living in South Africa	7	5

**Percentage who agree/strongly agree*

Overall, South African perceptions of the reasons for migration to the country remain unchanged since 2006 except in two crucial categories (Table 10). First, there is a decline in the numbers of those who believe that migrants come with the intention of engaging in criminal activity, from 64% to 50%. This belief remains strongest amongst Black South Africans (at 56%). Second, the numbers who believe that migrants come to look for work increased from 47% to 54%. There is also a widespread belief that migrants come to South Africa to access medical services (around 40%). This perception is of interest because it is consistent with recent research that shows that there is considerable short-term movement across borders to access healthcare as a result of the collapse of public health systems in neighbouring countries.³⁸

	2006 (%)	2010 (%)
Migrants come to look for work	47	54
Migrants come for jobs in South Africa	69	70
Migrants come do business in South Africa	66	66
Migrants come to access medical services	40	39
Migrants come to attend schools/universities	43	45
Migrants come to commit crime	64	50

**Percentage who agree/strongly agree*
Note: Multiple response questions

Asked about the main reason why migrants come to South Africa, a more diverse picture emerges (Table 11). The primary driver is seen as the search for employment (mentioned by 37%). Other “pull” factors include having a better life (15%), doing business (8%) and making money (4%). Amongst the “push” factors are escaping poverty (13%) and war (8%) at home, and food insecurity (3%). Job-seeking is clearly seen as the main reason for migration.

	2006 (%)	2010 (%)
Pull factors		
To look for work	33	37
Have a better life	12	15
Come to do business	13	8
Come to make money	8	4
Because the South African economy is strong	4	3
To study	3	2
To earn a living	1	2
For citizenship	1	1
Push factors		
Run away from poverty	10	13
Escape war in their countries	7	8
They are hungry/no food in their country	4	3
Other		
To commit crime	8	14
To corrupt South Africa	2	1

Most South Africans continue to believe that migrants and refugees pose a real danger to the country's economic and social security. The intensity of these views has shifted over time (Table 12). For example, there was a considerable growth in negative perceptions between 1999 and 2006. By 2006, around two-thirds of South Africans felt that migrants used up resources, committed crimes and took jobs from South Africans. Only 25% felt that migrants brought skills needed by South Africa (down from 58% in 1999). Between 2006 and 2010, there was a small decline in negative sentiment, with the numbers who feel that crime was a major impact of migration falling by 12% and those who feel that migrants bring disease dropping by 10%. There was a 9% increase in those who feel that migrants bring needed skills and a 5% increase in those who think they create jobs for South Africans.

Although there has been a slight positive movement in attitudes since 2006, negative associations are still higher than they were in 1999. Over 60% of the respondents feel that migrants use up resources and take jobs from South Africans. Over half (55%) still associate migration with crime and over two-thirds feel that migrants do not bring needed skills or create jobs for South Africans. Over 60% believe that migrants take jobs from South Africans. Black South Africans hold the most negative views on virtually all these indicators and Coloured South Africans the least negative (Table 13). Fully 70% of Black South Africans believe that migrants use up resources (compared with 37% of Coloured and 58% of White South

Africans). A much larger proportion also associates migrants with “job stealing.” While Black South Africans have the most negative associations, they are also much more willing than other groups to accept that migrants bring needed skills and create jobs.

	1999 (%)	2006 (%)	2010 (%)
Social impacts			
Use up resources (e.g. water, electricity, housing)	59	67	63
Commit crime	45	67	55
Bring disease	24	49	39
Economic impacts			
Take jobs	56	62	60
Bring needed skills	58	25	34
Create jobs for South Africans	–	22	27

**Percentage who agree/strongly agree*

	Black (%)	Coloured (%)	Indian/Asian (%)	White (%)
Social impacts				
Use up resources	70	37	51	58
Commit crimes	64	26	44	45
Bring diseases	41	27	35	41
Economic impacts				
Bring needed skills	39	23	27	26
Take jobs	63	41	61	61
Create jobs for South Africans	31	16	27	22

**Percentage who agree/strongly agree*

As in 2006, respondents were asked about their impressions of migrants from different countries. Migrants from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland continue to have the best ratings (31-33% favourable) and the lowest unfavourable ratings (27-28%) (Table 14). Migrants from neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique were not viewed nearly as favourably (40-44% unfavourable and 15% favourable). In other words, spatial proximity does not in and of itself lead to favourable outcomes. Zimbabweans continue to be amongst the least-liked migrants, although they are preferred to those from other African countries such as Angola, DRC, Somalia and, especially, Nigeria. As in 2006, Nigerians have the highest unfavourable ratings (59%) and lowest favourable ratings (7%).

Table 14: Impressions of Migrants by Country of Origin, 2006 and 2010

	Unfavourable (%)		Favourable (%)	
	2006	2010	2006	2010
Neighbouring countries				
Zimbabwe	52	44	12	15
Mozambique	47	40	14	15
Botswana	28	24	32	31
Swaziland	28	23	36	33
Lesotho	27	23	38	32
Other African countries				
Nigeria	66	59	7	7
Angola	54	48	9	9
DRC	54	51	8	9
Somalia	53	50	10	9
Ghana	50	45	11	11

IS XENOPHOBIA ON THE WANE?

The previous sections suggest that there was a slight easing of negative sentiment towards migrants between 2006 and 2010. This impression is confirmed by the use of the SAMP Xenophobia Index (SXI), which is calculated for each individual based on their answers to 15 separate survey questions. The SXI scores every individual on a 10-point scale where 0 = not xenophobic at all and 10 = extremely xenophobic. This section cross-tabulates the SXI against a number of key variables including race, language, income and employment for both 2006 and 2010.


XENOPHOBIA, RACE AND LANGUAGE

In 2006, there were marked racial differences in levels of xenophobia: Coloured South Africans had the highest SXI score (6.6) followed by Whites (6.3), Blacks (6.0) and Indians/Asians (5.9) (Figure 1). By 2010, there were significant drops amongst three of the racial groups: Coloureds (down 0.7 to 5.9), Blacks and Whites (both down 0.3). Amongst Indians/Asians, however, there was a 0.3 increase on the SXI. Black South Africans had the lowest SXI score in 2010 (at 5.7), indicating that they are less xenophobic than the other racial groups.

There was a significant reduction in the SXI in most language groups between 2006 and 2010, with the exception of English- and Xhosa-speakers whose scores remained the same (Table 15). There was a dramatic fall in levels of xenophobia amongst those who speak minority South African languages. Of the major language groups, SiSwati (4.8), SeTswana (5.4)

and SeSotho speakers (5.6) have the lowest SXI scores. These three languages, as well as many of the minority languages, are spoken both in South Africa and neighbouring states, suggesting that there is a greater sense of affinity with migrants who speak a “South African” language. It is quite possible that this is also a “rebound effect” from May 2008. Otherwise it is hard to explain why there was little or no movement amongst Zulu and Xhosa-speakers. In 2006 the gap between English- and Afrikaans-speakers was 0.7. This had fallen to 0.2 by 2010 as there was a clear downward shift in the SXI of the latter.

Figure 1: Racial Groups and Levels of Xenophobia



	2006 (SXI)	2010 (SXI)	Change
Afrikaans	6.6	6.1	-0.5
Xhosa	6.0	6.0	0.0
English	5.9	5.9	0.0
Zulu	6.0	5.7	-0.3
Ndebele	6.6	5.7	-0.9
Sotho	6.2	5.6	-0.6
Tswana	5.9	5.4	-0.5
Tsonga/Shangaan	5.9	5.2	-0.7
Venda	7.0	5.2	-1.8
Swazi	6.2	4.8	-1.4

XENOPHOBIA AND LEVELS OF EDUCATION

Another observable shift between 2006 and 2010 is in the relationship between education and levels of xenophobia (Table 16). In 2006, there was a notable decline in xenophobia with increasing levels of education; from 7.4 for those with no education to 5.9 amongst those with a post-secondary qualification. By 2010, the SXI had fallen for all educational groups but at variable rates, dropping faster amongst the less educated. The net result is that level of education is no longer a good predictor of xenophobia. With the exception of those with no education (who still have the highest SXI), all educational groups had very similar scores in 2010.

Education	2006 (SXI)	2010 (SXI)	Change
None	7.4	6.8	-0.6
Grades 1–7	6.5	5.7	-0.8
Grades 8–12	6.1	5.8	-0.3
University/diploma	5.9	5.7	-0.2

XENOPHOBIA, EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME

In 2006, SXI scores were clearly related to type and security of employment (Table 17). Those employed by others in the informal economy had the highest SXI, higher even than the unemployed. The unemployed, in turn, had higher SXI scores than those in full- or part-time employment. By 2010, the SXI had fallen in all categories of employment except amongst the self-employed in the informal economy, who now had the highest SXI score of all. Given heightened competition from migrants within the sector (and the growth of violent assaults on foreign-owned businesses), this is perhaps unsurprising. The earlier distinction between the employed and

the unemployed is no longer as clear cut, with similar SXI scores for both. In both 2006 and 2010, the least xenophobic were those employed part-time. This is a counter-intuitive finding since unstable employment might be thought to increase anxiety and blame.

	2006 (SXI)	2010 (SXI)	Change
Employed full-time	5.7	5.5	-0.2
Employed part-time	5.6	5.2	-0.4
Unemployed (looking for work)	5.8	5.4	-0.4
Unemployed (not looking)	5.9	5.5	-0.4
Self-employed (formal sector)	5.5	5.3	-0.2
Self-employed (informal sector)	5.9	5.9	0.0
Employed (informal sector)	6.5	5.5	-1.0


In the past, South African fears about job competition and loss have been based primarily on hearsay with very few having personal experience of being denied a job by a migrant.³⁹ In 2006, for example, 86% of respondents had never been denied employment and only 8% had had this happen to them once (Table 18). As many as 70% did not know another South African who had been denied employment by a migrant. In 2010, the number who had never been denied employment had dropped by 8% to 78%. And the number who did not know anyone who had been denied employment dropped by 9% to 61%. Still, it is clear that the vast majority of people who feel that migrants “steal jobs” have no personal experience of this. Ironically then, despite personal experience/knowledge of job loss increasing slightly, levels of xenophobia amongst all employment categories fell. This suggests that the fall in the SXI in all categories is part of the broader shift in attitudes rather than being related specifically to labour-market conditions.

	2006 (%)	2010 (%)
Personal experience of being denied employment		
Never	86	78
Once	6	8
More than once	3	8
Don't know	5	6
Know someone who was denied employment		
Never	69	61
Once	8	14
More than once	7	11
Don't know	16	14

If the violence of May 2008 was purely a reflection of economic hardship and resentment, we might expect levels of xenophobia to have risen amongst the poorer sections of the South African population. In fact, the opposite is the case. Levels of xenophobia fell amongst nearly all low-income groups between 2006 and 2010 and increased amongst high-income groups (Table 19). The greatest drop in the SXI is amongst those earning less than R3,000 per month and less than R6,000 per month. In other words, in just four years, the relationship between income and xenophobia was almost completely reversed. In 2006, the relationship was very clear: as incomes increased, xenophobia tended to decrease. By 2010, the opposite was the case: levels of xenophobia show a consistent increase with increasing income (Figure 2).

Monthly household income	2006 (SXI)	2010 (SXI)	Change
<R3,000	6.3	5.6	-0.7
R3,000–R5,999	6.1	5.6	-0.5
R6,000–R8,999	6.0	5.8	-0.2
R9,000–R11,999	5.9	5.9	0.0
R12,000–R15,999	6.2	5.8	-0.4
R16,000–R19,999	5.5	5.9	+0.4
=>R20,000	5.7	6.1	+0.4

Figure 2: Household Income and Levels of Xenophobia



While levels of xenophobia rose steadily between 1999 and 2006 across South African society, this trend seems to have stopped and even reversed in the case of some groups of South Africans by 2010. In other words, the general positive shift in levels of xenophobia between 2006 and 2010 was not universal. Rather, there were significant declines amongst a number of different groups: Coloured South Africans, Afrikaans-speakers, South Africans who share a common language with migrants, the less-educated and, most significantly, lower-income South Africans. Levels of xenophobia increased amongst Indians/Asians and better-off South Africans.

XENOPHOBIA AND INTERACTION WITH MIGRANTS

Zimbabwean colleagues say that they rarely heard Shona being spoken in Cape Town 10 years ago; now they hear it every day. While the numbers of migrants in South Africa are much lower than the popular imagination suggests, there have been significant increases in migration from countries in crisis such as Zimbabwe and Somalia.⁴⁰ Zimbabweans, in particular, come from all socio-economic strata and are therefore more likely to come into contact with a broad range of South Africans. In 1997, when SAMP conducted its first xenophobia survey, over 80% of the respondents said that they had no or little contact with migrants from neighbouring countries. Xenophobic attitudes were clearly being formed in a vacuum devoid of interaction with people from outside the country.⁴¹

By 2006, the number who said that they had some or a lot of contact with migrants from neighbouring countries had increased from 19% to 51% and the number who had little or no contact had dropped from 80% to 49% (Table 20). Given that xenophobic attitudes became much more intense during this period, it seemed that interaction was either increasing levels of intolerance or not mitigating it in any significant manner.⁴² Between 2006 and 2010, the trend of greater interaction continued, with the number of South Africans reporting some/a lot of contact increasing again from 51% to 60% and the number reporting little/no contact dropping from 49% to 40%. In 2010, respondents were also asked about their degree of contact with migrants from non-neighbouring African countries. The number of South Africans reporting some/a lot of contact with these migrants was surprisingly high (at 56%), with only 24% saying they had no contact at all. In other words, while South Africans have more contact with migrants from neighbouring countries, their interaction with other African migrants is also relatively significant.

South Africans are also interacting with migrants in a wider variety of settings (Table 21). The number who have some/a lot of contact with migrants in the workplace increased from 31% to 40% between 2006 and 2010. Similarly, levels of contact in the community increased from 55% to 60% and in social settings from 42% to 49%.

Table 20: Degree of Personal Contact with Migrants			
	1999 (%)	2006 (%)	2010 (%)
From neighbouring countries			
A lot of contact	4	18	24
Some contact	15	33	36
Little contact	20	22	20
No contact	60	27	20
From other African countries			
A lot of contact			21
Some contact			35
Little contact			21
No contact			24

Table 21: Locations of Personal Contact with Migrants		
	2006 (%)	2010 (%)
In the workplace		
A lot of contact	12	15
Some contact	18	26
Little contact	14	19
No contact	56	39
In the community		
A lot of contact	25	26
Some contact	30	34
Little contact	21	22
No contact	25	18
In social settings		
A lot of contact	15	19
Some contact	27	30
Little contact	21	22
No contact	39	33
In shops		
A lot of contact	39	42
Some contact	28	28
Little contact	14	14
No contact	20	16


Where South Africans and migrants interact is probably less important than the nature of that interaction. If increased contact led directly to increased hostility, then we would expect negative attitudes to have intensified between 2006 and 2010. However, the number of respondents reporting positive interactions increased from 32% in 2006 to 39% in 2010 (Table 22). Negative interactions declined from 26% to 14%. This suggests

that increased interaction may be having a positive rather than negative impact on levels of xenophobia.

	2006 (%)	2010 (%)
Extremely positive	5	8
Positive	27	31
Neutral	42	47
Negative	20	11
Extremely negative	6	3

Confirmation of the hypothesis that increased contact decreases xenophobia is found in an analysis of SXI scores by amount of contact. The highest levels of xenophobic sentiment are found amongst South Africans who have no contact with migrants. As the amount of contact increases, the level of xenophobia decreases (Figure 3). With regard to contact with migrants from neighbouring countries, the SXI falls from 6.3 for those with no contact to 4.9 for those with a great deal of contact. A similar drop is observable with reference to contact with migrants from the rest of Africa.

Figure 3: Levels of Xenophobia by Amount of Contact



To this point, the report has suggested that there has been a positive shift in attitudes towards migrants between 2006 and 2010 and that this has led to a softening of xenophobia. At the same time, it would be incorrect to conclude that xenophobia is inevitably on the wane and therefore need not be a continued source of concern. While a comparison of 2006 and 2010 data provides some reason for optimism, it is also true that South Africans remain extremely intolerant and that xenophobia is far from being a thing of the past. The following sections of the report therefore focus on the 2010 results and, in particular, current South African attitudes towards rights for migrants, violence against migrants and policy preferences about migration.

RIGHTS FOR MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES

South Africans fundamentally disagree with their own Constitution when it comes to basic rights for migrants and refugees. They also distinguish between different types of migrant when deciding what rights they think should be enjoyed or denied (Table 23). They overwhelmingly believe that citizens should have a much fuller and extended set of rights and privileges compared to migrants, irrespective of their legal status. The vast majority of citizens feel that South African citizens should always enjoy freedom of speech (88%), the right to vote (93%), legal protection (87%), police protection (90%), access to social services (92%) and antiretroviral therapy for HIV and AIDS (93%).

Type of right	When granted	Citizens (%)	Temporary workers (%)	Refugees (%)	Irregular migrants (%)
Freedom of speech	Always	88	38	20	8
	Never	2	21	42	68
Voting rights	Always	93	30	13	7
	Never	2	37	61	79
Right to legal protection	Always	87	48	31	18
	Never	2	12	25	55
Protection by police	Always	90	54	36	22
	Never	2	12	25	51
Access to social services	Always	92	50	28	16
	Never	2	14	33	58
Treatment for HIV	Always	93	65	55	44
	Never	2	9	18	34

Most South Africans think that these basic rights should never be extended to irregular migrants in the country. Only a small minority believe that they deserve legal protection (18%) and police protection (20%). And more than half think that they should not be given these rights at all. This is a disturbing fact considering that migrants in irregular situations in South Africa already face systematic harassment and discrimination from the police. The partial exception some are willing to make is to allow irregular migrants to access antiretrovirals for HIV. More than one-third of South Africans are willing to make this concession though another one-third are completely opposed. Attitudes towards rights for refugees are more generous but still very restricted. Just 31% thought refugees should always enjoy legal protection and 36% that they should always enjoy police protection. As many as a quarter felt that refugees should never be entitled to protection. While half thought refugees should always have access to HIV treatment, only 28% thought they should always be entitled to social services. South Africans are willing to be slightly more generous to migrants who are living in the country legally and on a short-term basis. Only 12% of respondents oppose legal and police protection for them. One in two are willing to give them access to social services and two-thirds are willing to grant them access to treatment for HIV. Nevertheless, less than 40% feel that legal migrants are entitled to freedom of speech.

Between 2006 and 2010, there were slight positive shifts in willingness to accord some rights to migrants (Table 24). For example, the proportion who felt that refugees and irregular migrants should always have the right to freedom of speech increased from 10% to 20% and 3% to 8% respectively. When it came to the right to legal protection, the increases were from 26% to 31% and 13% to 18% respectively. The increases with regard to police protection were from 28% to 36% for refugees and 14% to 22% for irregular migrants. Most surprising was the increase in the numbers who thought that refugees and irregular migrants should always be entitled to social services, which more than doubled (from 14% to 28% and 6% to 16%). While these shifts are positive, it is still the case that the majority of South Africans do not see why any of these rights should always be granted to these two groups.

Table 24: Changes in Attitudes to Rights for Migrants*

		Temporary residents (%)	Refugees (%)	Irregular migrants (%)
Freedom of speech	2006	34	10	3
	2010	38	20	8
Voting rights	2006	31	7	2
	2010	30	13	7
Right to legal protection	2006	50	26	13
	2010	48	31	18
Protection by police	2006	50	28	14
	2010	54	36	22
Access to social services	2006	25	14	6
	2010	50	28	16
Treatment for HIV	2006	67	53	42
	2010	65	55	44

**Percentage "Should always be granted"*

IMMIGRATION POLICY PREFERENCES

Do the positive shifts in xenophobic sentiment between 2006 and 2010 translate into a softening of previous preferences for draconian restrictions on migration and migrants? The Fifth Wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) asked a representative sample of the citizens of a large number of countries how the government should respond to migrants who wish to come and work there. The survey found that 30% of South Africans wanted a total ban on all migration to the country for work (Table 25). This was higher than any other country surveyed. Nearly 80% wanted a total ban or strict limits, again considerably higher than other country surveyed. South Africa also had by far the lowest number of people who wanted a migration policy linked to the availability of jobs in the country.

The equivalent data for other countries, including major immigrant-receiving countries, is much lower. In countries such as the United States, Germany and Australia, which regularly allow migrants into their territory and have long histories of immigration, support for an immigration ban was apparent in less than 10% of respondents. Even in a country like Japan that is considered to be anti-immigration, respondents showed much lower levels of opposition to immigration and migrants. India was the only other country that showed similar levels of support to South Africa for a complete prohibition on immigration. However, a much larger number of Indians were open to letting anyone enter their country (23%). In South Africa, there is very little support for an open-door policy to immigration with only 6% of the population endorsing such a policy. South Africans stand out as one of the most exclusionary populations in the world. No

other country polled in the WVS, in either the North or the South, has a citizenry so opposed to immigration.⁴³

Table 25: Attitudes Towards Immigration in Comparative Perspective

Country	Prohibit immigration (%)	Place strict limits on entry (%)	Let people in as long as jobs are available (%)	Let in anyone who wants to enter (%)
South				
South Africa	30	48	16	6
India	23	23	25	30
Ghana	18	39	36	7
Zambia	11	30	44	15
Brazil	11	33	47	9
China	8	21	51	20
Indonesia	6	15	72	8
Thailand	5	16	65	14
Malaysia	2	8	72	18
North				
Italy	8	49	37	6
United States	7	37	49	8
Germany	7	43	45	5
Australia	3	54	41	2
Canada	2	39	51	8

Source: World Values Survey

The SAMP survey broadens the WVS question to ask what the South African government should do about migration in general and uses a five-point scale for each of four options (Table 26). In general, the findings are consistent with the WVS with strong support for restrictionist policies and little interest in more open policies, including those based on job availability. Comparing the findings for 2006 and 2010, there was a slight easing of support for restrictionist policies (a drop of 3% in those wanting a total ban on immigration and strict limits on entry). However, there was little change in the small numbers favouring a more open approach. Indeed, the proportion who agree with a jobs-related policy dropped from 17% to 15%.

The majority of South Africans continue to find migrants and refugees threatening. They are also fearful of the prospect of higher flows of migrants. As a result, there is general support for policies and practices that they imagine will deter the entry of migrants (Table 27). For example, 62% are in favour of electrifying the country's borders, a policy last seen in the apartheid era. There is even more support (63%) for deploying the South African army to patrol the borders, which connects migrants and migration directly to questions of national security. One in two South Africans

want more resources to be expended by the South African government on border enforcement but only a quarter are willing to accept tax increases to fund increased policing. Nearly half want it to be compulsory for migrants to carry identity documents with them at all times, again a requirement not seen since apartheid. While there is less support for fining employers of foreign nationals (32%), as many as 45% favour compulsory HIV testing for all migrants. A minority of South Africans are actively opposed to these measures. For example, only 28% oppose mandatory HIV testing, 20% oppose migrants having to carry identity documents with them at all times and 18% oppose electrification of borders.

	Prohibit immigration (%)	Place strict limits on entry (%)	Let people in as long as jobs are available (%)	Let in anyone who wants to enter (%)
2010				
Strongly agree/Agree	36	63	15	8
Neutral	32	22	30	15
Disagree/Strongly disagree	32	15	55	77
Total	100	100	100	100
2006				
Strongly agree/Agree	39	68	17	8
Neutral	30	17	27	14
Disagree/Strongly disagree	31	15	56	78
Total	100	100	100	100

	Support (%)	Oppose (%)
Army should patrol borders	63	10
Electrify fences on South Africa's borders	62	18
Allocate more money for border protection	53	17
Foreigners must carry ID at all times	49	20
Require mandatory HIV testing for foreigners	45	28
Penalize South Africans employing foreigners	33	33
Increase taxes to support tighter border controls	26	41

Since the end of apartheid, South Africa's primary response to migration has been a nationwide policy of deportation of suspected irregular migrants with a minimum of due process. Considerable financial and human resources have been devoted to this effort, which is usually reported as "crime-fighting" in official statistics. Over 2 million migrants have been deported from the country in the last two decades. The numbers would

be much higher if migrants' claims are correct that the police engage in systematic extortion of bribes in exchange for their freedom. Despite the ineffectiveness of the deportation policy in achieving its stated ends, it enjoys wide support amongst the South African population. Nearly a quarter of South Africans support the expulsion of all foreign nationals from the country (Table 28). The percentages of those who strongly support the deportation of migrants who are not contributing to the South African economy or have committed crimes are as high as 62% and 74% respectively. A third support the expulsion of HIV-positive migrants. More than half of the citizens oppose the issuing of IDs to irregular migrants. Active opposition to all of these policies is low by comparison.

	Support (%)	Oppose (%)
Control-oriented policies		
Deport all migrants who commit serious crimes	74	8
Deport all migrants not contributing to SA economy	62	18
Deport all migrants who have HIV and AIDS	35	28
Deport all migrants even if legally in South Africa	27	47
Facilitation policies		
Make it easier for families of migrants to come to South Africa	21	44
Make it easier for migrants to establish small businesses	21	40
Legalise status of all irregular migrants	20	55
Make it easier for migrant traders to do buy/sell	20	39
Make it easier for migrants to obtain South African citizenship	16	47

Policies that would make life easier for migrants in South Africa are rejected by the majority. Around 20% or fewer support policies such as legalizing the status of irregular migrants, making it easier for families to join migrants in South Africa, making it easier for migrants to trade or establish small businesses in the country, and making it easier to obtain South African citizenship. More than twice as many oppose these policy options as support them. Insofar as South Africans are prepared to countenance allowing migrants into the country, they prefer them to be temporary rather than permanent immigrants, have skill sets not possessed by South Africans and invest and create jobs. They also prefer migrants from Europe and North America than those from other African countries.

Although some 38% of South Africans support granting asylum policies that allow refugee protection (and only 23% are opposed), the actual practice of these humanitarian principles does not find favour (Table 29). Most South Africans do not want to increase the number of people who are granted refugee status in the country. Close to half do not want to provide a permanent safe haven to refugees. In fact, at least one in two

South Africans want to send refugees back to their country of origin when the conditions improve there. South Africans clearly want to take in a very small number of refugees and only in the short-term. A quarter approves the right to employment for refugees, though more than 35% are opposed. The desire for controls on entry and residence are starkly apparent with 41% supporting mandatory HIV tests for refugees and 31% arguing that refugees should be corralled in camps near the border (with 32% opposed).

	Support (%)	Oppose (%)
Grant asylum to those escaping war and persecution	38	23
Increase refugee intake in South Africa	11	57
Grant permanent residence to refugees in South Africa for > 5 years	18	44
Send refugees back when they are no longer at risk	56	13
Refugees must live in special camps near the border	31	32
Use government budget to look after refugees	14	46
Allow refugees can work in South Africa	25	35
Test refugees for HIV	41	29

ATTITUDES TOWARDS VIOLENCE AGAINST MIGRANTS

WILLINGNESS TO USE VIOLENCE

In the past, a significant minority of South Africans have expressed willingness to take the law into their own hands when they are aware of irregular migrants in the country.⁴⁴ The 2010 survey results suggest this is still the case. The numbers who are likely/very likely to report a suspected irregular migrant are still significant: more than a third said they would report the person to the police and a quarter would report them to employers and local community associations (Table 30). As many as 15% said they would combine with others to force the person to leave the area and 11% would be prepared to use violence against the person. The numbers willing to use violence actually increased between 2006 and 2010 and the proportion of those unlikely to use violence declined. These findings suggest that the events of May 2008 have had very little impact on those South Africans who are prepared to use violence against migrants. Given the opportunity and motivation, they would act again.

	% Likely		% Unlikely	
	2006	2010	2006	2010
Report them to police	40	36	41	39
Report them to employer	31	27	46	45
Report them to community association	34	27	45	45
Combine to force them to leave	15	15	61	73
Use violence against them	9	11	77	72

The respondents were also asked whether they would take part in actions against migrants from other Southern African countries. Around one in four South Africans said it was likely/very likely that they would combine with others to stop migrants moving into their neighbourhood and operating a business in the area (Table 31). Given the upsurge in attacks on migrant businesses in the last five years, the willingness of a significant minority of South Africans to prevent them operating is alarming. These hostile attitudes pertain to migrant entrepreneurs from neighbouring countries who are generally perceived more favourably than migrants from elsewhere in Africa. Hence the willingness to stop small entrepreneurs from other African countries may well be even higher. One in five are willing to take action to stop the children of migrants being in the same classroom as their own children. The other point to note is that the proportion of South Africans unlikely to take part in these actions fell across the board between 2006 and 2010.

	% Likely/Very likely		% Unlikely/Very unlikely	
	2006	2010	2006	2010
How likely would you be to take part in action to prevent migrants from doing the following in your area?				
Moving into the neighbourhood	24	23	51	45
Operating a business	28	25	49	46
Enrolling children in same schools	20	20	49	46
Becoming a co-worker	15	15	50	47

EXPLANATIONS FOR MAY 2008

The unprecedented scope and scale of xenophobic violence in May 2008 has been the subject of much commentary.⁴⁵ While the mobilization of civil society suggests that many South Africans were outraged by what happened, there is not a great deal of evidence that it has precipitated a significant rethink by South Africans. Levels of xenophobia remain high and an alarming number of respondents are still willing to engage in

violence against migrants. How, then, do South Africans think about May 2008? To what do they attribute the violence? Do they feel that it was justifiable?

Many respondents said they were disturbed by the scale and intensity of violence and felt it was excessive and unjustified. Close to half (44%) said they personally feel guilty about the violence. Just over half (54%) believe that migrants do not deserve the destructive and aggressive actions they experience in South Africa. The same number said they oppose the use of violence against migrants and 43% felt the violence was unjustified. In other words, around half of the respondents had a negative response to the attacks as expressed in feelings of guilt and opposition to the violence. This leaves the other half.

While the world at large was outraged by the xenophobic attacks, the same cannot be said of half of the South African population. Around a third seemed indifferent to what had happened and a minority thought of it in positive terms. For example, 28% said they did not feel any guilt, while 14% felt that migrants deserved this treatment. Eleven percent said they supported the use of violence against migrants, and the same number said they would personally resort to violent methods to rid their communities of migrants.

Among the different racial groups, Coloured and Indian/Asian respondents expressed the strongest opposition to the exclusionary violence. Only 4% of Indian/Asian respondents felt that foreign migrants deserved the aggressive acts against them. Similarly, only 4% were in favour of xenophobic acts directed at migrants, while 13% and 8% of Black and White respondents respectively supported them. Sixteen percent of White and 15% of Black respondents thought the violence was justified compared to 7% and 11% of Indian/Asian and Coloured respondents.

However, racial differences in reactions to the violence of May 2008 disappear when South Africans are asked to identify the causes. The findings here are much more uniform and pessimistic as more than half accept the commonly-held views about the violence or are indifferent to its causes. Nearly two-thirds of the respondents (64%) agreed that a primary cause was that migrants are involved in crime. Other prominent explanations for the attacks were that migrants take jobs from South Africans (62%), that they are “culturally different” (60%), that they “cheat” South Africans (56%), that they use health services for free (55%), that they take RDP houses (52%) and that they “steal” South African women (52%) (the last referring to a common complaint by South African men that South African women prefer foreign men). What this indicates is that when South Africans try to explain the reasons behind the attacks, they resort to “blaming the victim” and drawing on the reservoir of stereotypical public attitudes towards migrants as criminals, job-stealers, cheats, thieves and being culturally different.

LIVING IN THE HOTSPOTS

One analysis of 138 wards affected by the May 2008 violence found that they shared certain common characteristics (based on 2001 Census data), including high levels of economic deprivation, above average percentages of males, high levels of informal housing and high levels of language diversity (including different South African and foreign languages).⁴⁶ However, these wards did not have exceptional levels of unemployment, a higher proportion of residents in absolute poverty, a higher proportion of youth, lower educational levels, or a higher percentage of foreign residents. The researchers therefore concluded that “violence is not adequately explained by poverty, unemployment or the presence of large numbers of migrants.” In addition, the violence could not be attributed to “poor economic conditions, competition for resources or poor service delivery, as these factors were also present in many communities where violence was not perpetrated or where it was prevented.”

The 2010 survey allows us to build on this analysis of affected wards (“hotspots”) by examining the attitudinal profile of residents of these areas and contrasting that profile with South Africans living in unaffected areas. Our analysis does not explain the reasons for the violence nor is it a picture of attitudes at the time of the violence itself. However, it does provide important insights into the state of these communities in its aftermath: Why do residents think it happened? Who do they blame? And will it happen again?

In terms of the socio-economic profile of respondents, the hotspots had a greater concentration of “lower/working class” members (62% versus 52% in non-hotspot areas) and low-income earners (37% earning less than R3,000 per month and 55% earning less than R6,000 per month compared with 26% and 42% in non-hotspots) (Table 32). Employment levels were actually slightly higher in the hotspot communities (54% versus 47% employed full or part time) and unemployment marginally lower (26% versus 23%). The hotspots tended to have more informal settlement (20% of respondents versus 7% nationally) and mixed formal/informal settlement (22% versus 18%) and more shack-dwellers (16% versus 5%). In other words, the picture of the affected communities that emerged from the survey was not dissimilar from that based on the 2001 Census data.

Do these poorer-than-average residents of hotspots perceive their economic situation and prospects to be significantly worse than the rest of the population? In other words, are they also hotspots of economic pessimism and despair? While the hotspot respondents were slightly less satisfied with personal and general economic circumstances than the general population, nearly half said they were satisfied with both (Table 32). Fewer hotspots residents said they were dissatisfied and more said they were optimistic

about their personal economic conditions five years hence (57% versus 54%). The hotspot profile is not identical to the general population but nor is it significantly worse.

	Hotspots (%)	Other areas (%)
Economic class		
Lower/working	62	52
Middle	31	42
Upper	2	3
Don't know	5	3
Monthly income		
<R3,000	37	26
R3,000–R5,999	18	16
R6,000–R8,999	11	9
R9,000–R11,999	4	5
R12,000–R15,999	2	4
R16,000–R19,999	1	7
>R20,000	1	5
No answer	26	28
Employment status		
Employed full-time	38	36
Employed part-time	16	11
Unemployed (looking for work)	19	22
Unemployed (not looking)	4	4
Self-employed (formal sector)	3	5
Self-employed (informal sector)	1	3

	Hotspots % satisfied	Hotspots % dissatisfied	Other areas % satisfied	Other areas % dissatisfied
How satisfied are you with your personal economic conditions?	45	14	48	19
How satisfied are you with overall economic conditions in South Africa?	47	12	54	14
How satisfied do you think you will be with your personal economic conditions in five years' time?	57	6	54	8
How satisfied do you think you will be with overall economic conditions in South Africa in five years' time?	54	6	56	7

Cross-tabulating hotspot and non-hotspot areas with a variety of variables, including perceptions of why migrants come to South Africa, whether migrants from some countries are preferred to those from others, rights for migrants and attitudes to policies to control migration, shows only minor differences of opinion. The SXI confirms that these areas are not significantly more xenophobic. The scores (to two decimal places) are 5.82 (hotspots) and 5.76 (non-hotspots). Rounded to one decimal place (as in the rest of this report) the scores would be an identical 5.8. For purposes of comparison, a score of 5.8 is lower than the White and Coloured and Indian/Asian populations as a whole, and lower than all income groups over R9,000 per month. In other words, two years after May 2008 the communities that experienced the violence were certainly no more xenophobic than the population at large and were actually less xenophobic than other large groups of South Africans.

Significant numbers of hotspot residents (57% of the total) said they opposed the violence of May 2008 while only 12% said they supported it. Half thought it was unjustified compared to 10% who said it was justified (Table 34). The hotspot residents were actually slightly less supportive of the violence than the general population. But, in something of a contradiction, fewer said they felt guilty about the violence (38% versus 47%) or that they felt they should help migrants repair the damage done to them (26% versus 36%).

	Hotspots (%)	Other areas (%)
I oppose the violence against migrants	57	52
I feel guilty about the violence against migrants	38	47
I should help repair the damage to migrants	26	36
Migrants deserve the negative things that happen to them	16	13
Violence against migrants was justified	10	17

When it came to explanations for the violence, however, the hotspot residents had stronger opinions than the rest of the population that migrants brought it upon themselves through participation in criminal activity, cheating South Africans, using health services for free, taking RDP houses and stealing South African women (Table 35). More hotspot residents also felt the violence was a result of cultural differences and that migrants did not belong in South Africa. Only 31% said that South African criminals were to blame, a proportion similar to the rest of the population. In other words, the majority of those on the frontline also reject the Mbeki hypothesis that criminal elements were to blame for May 2008. Finally, although a significant number (58%) felt that job losses to migrants were responsible, this figure was no different to that of the general population. This

data does not mean that these were the actual causes of the violence but does suggest that myths and stereotypes about migrants were, and remain, strong in these communities and that these myths fuel a culture of blaming the victim for the events of May 2008.

Table 35: Explanations for May 2008 by Hotspot Residents

	Hotspots (%)	Other areas (%)
Migrants cause crimes in South Africa	70	61
Migrants take jobs from South Africans	58	59
Migrants are culturally different	64	58
Migrants cheat South Africans	66	51
Migrants use health services for free	63	51
Migrants take RDP houses	57	50
Migrants steal South African women	57	50
Migrants do not belong in South Africa	62	54
The police do not protect migrants	23	29
South African criminals are to blame	31	33

The most relevant question is what residents of hotspots said they would do about migrants in their communities. Just over a quarter said they would be prepared to take part in action to stop migrants from moving into the neighbourhood and operating a business in the area (Table 36). These were both a few percentage points higher than the rest of the population. When it came to taking action against irregular migrants, however, the proportion that would report them to the authorities was lower. So too was the proportion that said they would likely combine with others to force irregular migrants to leave (15% versus 16%) or use violence against them (9% versus 11%) (Table 37). What this indicates is that the communities that were in the frontline of the violence in May 2008 do not have an unusually high propensity to resort to violence in the future. However, despite the carnage of 2008, there is a hard core who are quite willing to resort to violence again to drive out migrants.

Table 36: Likelihood of Future Action Against Migrants*

	Hotspots (%)	Other areas (%)
How likely would you be to take part in action to prevent migrants from doing the following in your area:		
Moving into the neighbourhood	27	21
Operating a business	27	24
Enrolling children in schools	18	21
Becoming a co-worker	14	21

**Percentage likely/very likely*

	Hotspots %	Other areas %
Report them to police	34	36
Report them to employer	26	28
Report them to community association	24	29
Combine to force them to leave	15	16
Use violence against them	9	11

**Percentage likely/very likely*

Finally, there is the issue of how much interaction people in the hotspots have with migrants. We might expect that residents of hotspots come into contact with migrants more often than those not in hotspots, simply because there has been an assumption that the hotspot areas included large numbers of foreign migrants. In fact, when it comes to migrants from neighbouring countries, an identical proportion of the hotspot and non-hotspot populations (40%) said they had little or no contact (Table 38). The hotspot residents have less contact with migrants from elsewhere in Africa than the non-hotspot residents (48% versus 43% with little/no contact and 19% versus 22% for quite a lot/a great deal of contact).

	Contact with migrants from neighbouring countries		Contact with migrants from other African countries	
	Hotspots (%)	Other areas (%)	Hotspots (%)	Other areas (%)
No contact	17	21	25	23
Little contact	23	19	23	20
Some contact	39	36	33	35
Quite a lot of contact	18	18	17	17
A great deal of contact	3	6	2	5

The vast majority in the hotspots who interact with migrants do not view these transactions negatively. Only 14% said their interactions were negative/extremely negative (versus 13% in non-hotspot communities) and 39% said they were positive/extremely positive in both hotspot and non-hotspot communities (the remainder said the interactions were neither positive nor negative) (Table 39). Given our argument that interaction decreases xenophobia, it might well be argued that the problem with the hotspots is that they do not have enough foreign migrants rather than that they have too many.

	Hotspots (%)	Other areas (%)
Extremely positive	7	8
Positive	32	31
Neutral	47	48
Negative	12	10
Extremely negative	2	3

BACK TO THE WORLD CUP

This report began with references to the meaning of the World Cup and the Jansen argument that it promoted the worst kind of chauvinistic nationalism. The 2010 survey included a question on the World Cup and its perceived impact. The question simply attempted to gauge whether this tournament had a positive impact on citizens and their attitudes towards other groups, including people from other countries and migrants from African countries. Over half (58%) of the respondents said that since the World Cup they felt that they could learn from people from other countries and 51% said that they had become more interested in other countries (Table 40). As many as a third said that because of the World Cup they now had a more positive attitude towards migrants in South Africa. Despite the positive impacts of the World Cup on attitudes towards outsiders, a total of 41% of the respondents said they thought that all migrants in South Africa should have gone home afterwards.

	%
I can learn from people from other countries	58
I am now more interested in other countries	51
I have a more positive attitude towards migrants in South Africa	35
I think all migrants in South Africa should go home	41

**Percentage who agree/strongly agree*

CONCLUSION

The 2010 SAMP survey of South African attitudes to migrants and refugees reaches two major conclusions; one encouraging, the other deeply discouraging. First, in comparison with attitudes in 2006 it is clear that across a wide range of attitudinal questions and variables, levels of ignorance, intolerance and hostility in South Africa were not as intense in 2010 as they were in 2006. This is a very positive sign. A follow-up survey in the next year or so would confirm whether this was simply an aberration or part of a positive trend. Several possible reasons could be suggested

for the shift in attitudes: the legacy of the appalling violence of May 2008 itself, the leavening impact of the World Cup and positive experiences of interaction with the outside world, and political leadership that owns the problem and comes down heavily on any evidence of xenophobia. All three explanations are unconvincing. While half of the respondents had feelings of guilt about May 2008 and thought it was unacceptable, the other half were either indifferent or would not be bothered if the same thing happened again. While many South Africans felt that the World Cup had made them more aware of and interested in other countries, 41% still felt that all migrants should leave once the event itself was over. And the third explanation is a complete non-starter. There has been a singular failure of political leadership to “own” the problem and take any ameliorative action. Mbeki set the tone in his extraordinary denial of xenophobia in a commemoration of the victims of the May 2008 violence. Xenophobia-denialism seems to have hardened into an orthodoxy in the ruling party.

There are two plausible reasons for the softening of attitudes between 2006 and 2010. One is the violence itself, and the widespread (if temporary) mobilization of civil society against xenophobia that it precipitated. In addition, with so many South Africans feeling guilty about the events, this could have a mitigating impact on the attitudes of some. Further analysis of the data would be necessary to see if there was a correlation between levels of guilt and opposition to the violence and individual SXI scores. What the data does confirm is that the softening in attitudes between 2006 and 2010 comes from what is commonly known as the “contact” hypothesis: that is, the argument that more, and more positive, interaction with migrants tends to lower levels of hostility towards them. The basic premise is that it is a great deal easier to stereotype and demonize people one does not know. The survey makes clear that there is a broader trend towards greater interaction with migrants in the community, in the workplace and in social settings. These interactions are generally viewed in a positive light and there is a strong statistical correlation between amount of interaction and favourable attitudes towards migrants.

The second general conclusion from the Survey is more depressing. Despite the positive shifts, South Africans remain amongst the most anti-foreign and xenophobic populations in the world. Across a wide range of variables, they still display high levels of ignorance, intolerance and hostility. They feel threatened by the presence of migrants and refugees, want to deny them various basic rights and prefer draconian policy options such as electrifying all borders, requiring migrants to carry identity documents with them at all times and (in the case of a third) forcing refugees to live in border camps. These views are not consistently held across the population: for example, Black South Africans tend to be less xenophobic than Whites but are more xenophobic than Coloureds. Or again, low-income South Africans are less xenophobic than higher-income South Africans.

Indeed, the counter-intuitive picture here is clear: the more you earn, the more intolerant and threatened you are by migrants and refugees. And at the centre are a hard core more than willing to put their attitudes into action. Twenty-seven percent said they are likely to take part in actions to prevent migrants from moving into their neighbourhood or operating a business in the area. Fifteen percent would combine to force an irregular migrant to leave the community and 9% would resort to violence to do so. With this level of willingness to take violent action against migrants and refugees, it is perhaps not surprising that attacks and assaults have continued throughout the country since 2008 and are certainly not confined to those hotspots that exploded in an orgy of violence back then. As long as migrants are blamed for what happens to them, as long as the police victimize and extort rather than offer protection, as long as South Africans do not feel migrants are entitled to police and legal protection, and as long as Ministers continue to deny the reality of xenophobia in the country, migrants will remain “soft targets.”

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APPENDIX: XENOPHOBIA TIMELINE

2008

July

- Ramaphosa, Ekurhuleni: Mozambican migrant Francisco Nobunga is hacked to death and set on fire when he returns to his South African wife and children. Incident occurs close to where Nhamuave was “necklaced” in May.
- Durban: City police in riot helmets forcibly relocate refugees from City Hall to Central Police Station, and later to Albert Park. Migrants say they do not feel safe to return to their homes without adequate protection.
- Gauteng: Some 800 people are arrested by armed police in riot gear and taken from Glenanda camp to Lindela Centre where they refuse to provide personal details to officials prior to deportation.
- Amnesty International says that treatment of refugees at Glenanda camp violates country’s obligations under international law.

August

- Safety and Security Ministry announces 421 criminal cases are pending across South Africa in connection with May’s xenophobia attacks, including Northwestern province (7), KwaZulu-Natal (52), Free State (15), Gauteng (139), Western Cape (164), Eastern Cape (43) and Northern Cape (1). A total of 1 446 charges have been laid.
- Bokfontein, North West Province: Shacks of two Zimbabwean migrants are burned down.
- Khayelitsha, Cape Town: Somali shop owner, Mahad Abukar Alasow, is shot dead after returning from Soetwater safety camp. Somali community says he is eighth Somali migrant to be killed since returning to the community.
- Port Alfred, Eastern Cape: Two Tanzanians are shot dead in Nemato township.
- MSF criticizes government for not providing camp residents adequate information about reintegration, especially after closure.
- SAMP releases report, *The Perfect Storm*, showing that xenophobic attitudes are pervasive throughout South Africa and have intensified since 1999.

September

- Government announces irregular migrants will be deported by end of September and six camps set up for victims of May’s violence dismantled.
- Khayelitsha, Western Cape: Zankhanyo Retailers’ Association sends Somali shopkeepers letters asking them to close their businesses within a week.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SA High Commission in Dar Es Salaam deny that two Zanzibari men killed in South Africa were victims of xenophobic violence.
- Delft, Cape Town: Somali shop assistant is shot dead.
- Khayelitsha: Eleven persons arrested after shops of five Somali traders are looted.
- Constitutional Court delays closure of xenophobia victims’ camps.
- Pretoria: Tshwane Council demolishes Klerksoord refugee camp. Action is sharply criticized by human rights organizations, including UNHCR, MSF and LHR. UNHCR calls it “unacceptable actions” and “there was no warning.”

October

- Jeffreys Bay, Eastern Cape: Crowd of 200 people loot Somali-owned shops and set 20 stores on fire.

- Eastern Cape: Sahra Omar Farah, Somali mother and her three children are stabbed and bludgeoned to death.
- UN Human Rights Commissioner Pillay condemns brutal killing of Farah and her children. She observes: "There appears to be a dangerous pattern of targeted attacks on foreigners, especially, but not exclusively involving Somalis."
- Kwanobuhle, Eastern Cape: Six men enter Mohammed Abdi's shop and shoot him dead.
- Western Cape: Somali shopkeepers in Mitchells Plain Town Centre receive anonymous letters demanding they close their shops or face another bout of violence.
- Masiphumelele, Western Cape: After a child is murdered, local residents clash with immigrants believing they are responsible. Twelve shops are looted and damaged while many migrants are forced from their homes. Police later confirm suspect is South African.
- Cape Town: City denies permission to People's Health Movement to organize seven-day walk to raise awareness about xenophobia.
- UNHCR announces inquiry into actions of South African office after sharp criticism from human rights groups over UNHCR's slow response to May violence.
- Mitchell's Plain: A Somali refugee living in Blue Water Camp miscarries after Community Health Centre refuses to treat her.
- Harmony Park, Strand: Fresh outbreak of violence in Masiphumelele increases migrant insecurity in safe sites; say they are terrified of becoming victims of violence again.
- HSRC report on May violence urges government to engage "seriously with sentiment being expressed by ordinary citizens that foreign nationals should leave the country". Claims underlying causes as "dissatisfaction over migration policy", competition over housing, jobs, and "influx of immigrants".

November

- Masiphumelele: Some 200 persons attack chairperson of local community housing organization Amakhaya Ngoku and threaten its migrant fundraiser, alleging "makwerekwere" development will displace them.
- Masiphumelele: Ethiopian migrant Abdi Sirej, who had sought refuge at Soetwater Camp, is murdered after he returns to his home.

2009

January

- Albert Park, Durban: Two migrants jump to their death from a high-rise building to escape mob that attacks them with bush knives. Ten others suffer serious injuries. Police say it is not clear if incident was motivated by xenophobia. But Chairperson of International Refugee Service Osman says attackers said: "we want amakwerekwere".

February

- CoRMSA and Wits FMP report on May 2008 violence highlights chaos and disorganization, including lack of preparation, co-ordination and communication between various agencies and between civil society and state structures, in government's humanitarian response. Poor living conditions in camps for large numbers of displaced persons is revealed.
- eThekweni Ward Councillor Vusi Khoza is charged with four others for inciting xenophobic violence, resulting in two deaths.
- Stofland, Western Cape: Seven Zimbabwean migrants are killed when they are locked in shack, which is then deliberately set on fire. Four others manage to escape but flee to community hall, as they are too scared to return home.

March

- Klerksoord Camp, Akasia: Somali refugees forcibly evicted from camp after city officials burn their shacks ask to be “repatriated to Somalia or to a different country” because they “don’t feel safe in South Africa anymore”.
- Worcester, Boland: Migrant-owned shops are looted.
- Wits FMS report on May 2008 violence suggests that local leaders and groups played important role by instigating or failing to stop violence.

April

- Home Affairs announces “special dispensation permits” for Zimbabwean migrants for six months, allowing them to seek employment, education and health care legally in South Africa. Also announces moratorium on deportation of Zimbabwean migrants.
- Human Rights Watch urges government to end detention and deportation of Zimbabweans. Says despite official suspension, police are detaining thousands of Zimbabweans in extremely poor conditions at Musina military base.
- Deported migrants are refused entry by Zimbabwe because they cannot prove their nationality. They are returned to South African military base in Musina and detained again.

May

- CoRMSA criticizes government for doing little to tackle root cause of xenophobic attacks more than a year after episode of large-scale violence. It is revealed threat of violence against migrants remains high in many communities. South African Human Rights Commission is castigated for “doing nothing” during the mid-2008 attacks.
- Lawyers for Human Rights reveals that of 469 criminal cases against perpetrators of May 2008 attacks, only 70 have been finalized with guilty verdict. Says no proactive measures or inquiries have been set up to prevent repeat of such episodes.
- Delft (near Cape Town): In two separate incidents, people open fire on Bangladeshi migrants, killing one and injuring two others. Witnesses say assailants did not loot shop or demand any money.
- Delft (near Cape Town): Bangladeshi spaza owner Mohamed Samir Khan is shot in leg.
- Darling, Boland: Two Somali spaza owners die when their store is set alight.

June

- Samora Machel and Gugulethu, Cape Town: Traders send threatening letters to Somali shop owners advising them to leave within seven days. Seven shops are forcibly closed.
- Cape Town: Angolan refugee Sebastian Santana is stabbed to death outside Nyanga Refugee Centre after unidentified men accost him telling him to return to his country.
- Cape Town: Eleven migrant shopkeepers from Zwelethemba Township in Worcester appear before Equality Court to seek financial compensation and apology from police for failing to protect them during violent attacks in March 2008.
- Gugulethu: Following meetings between Somali and local shopkeepers, migrants are forced to increase prices similar to local traders.
- Khayelitsha: Two Somali shop assistants are burned to death.
- Khayelitsha: A Zimbabwean and Bangladeshi migrant are murdered.
- Delft: Three shop assistants sustain injuries from gunshots.
- Khayelitsha: A shop owned by Somali immigrant is set on fire.
- Franschhoek, Western Cape: Hundreds of local residents gather outside shops owned by Somali traders and pelt stones to force them to increase their food prices. Four shops are damaged in Langrug and Mooiwater informal settlements and one migrant injured.

July

- Rustenburg: Four Malawian migrants are seriously injured after they are attacked with pangas. Local police say attack not motivated by xenophobia but believe it to be a robbery attempt.
- Balfour, Eastern Mpumalanga: Shops owned by Ethiopian and Pakistani immigrants are looted and burned during protests against poor government service delivery. Thirty migrants seek refuge at local police station. Some 100 migrants are displaced.
- Delft: Somali Action Group's Omar Sabdi says they continue to be targeted because they are vulnerable and live in high-risk areas.

August

- CoRMSA says xenophobic violence still continuing on lower scale and no official investigation has been carried out.

September

- Khayelitsha: Three men are arrested after body of Somali trader is found.
- Amnesty International expresses concern to Home Affairs about continuing intimidation of refugees attacked and displaced during service delivery protests in July.

October

- Blikkiesdorp: Somali refugees moved from Blue Waters safe site to Blikkiesdorp camp say they are threatened by local residents to leave or face dire consequences.
- Diepsloot: Local residents kill Zimbabwean migrant after three Zimbabweans are accused of robbing South Africans.

November

- De Doorns, Western Cape: Residents armed with sticks and stones destroy Zimbabwean and Basotho migrants' shacks, accusing them of accepting lower wages and stealing jobs from citizens. Some 3,000 migrants flee informal settlements like Ekuphumleni, Stofland, Hasie Square, Maseru, and take refuge in local sports field and community hall. Freedom Front Plus Party says violence is due to "poor border controls". Displaced migrants describe South Africans as "very rough" and say "they treat us like shit".
- De Doorns, Western Cape: Police arrest 23 persons after several thousand Zimbabwean migrants are forcibly evicted.
- Deputy Minister of Home Affairs Malusi Gigaba declares department will conduct investigation into conduct of farmers and labour brokers in De Doorns.

December

- De Doorns, Western Cape: Local residents threaten to expel residents who provide police information on anti-migrant attacks.
- Human Rights Watch report says migrants regularly and illegally denied access to health services in South Africa.
- Westernburg, Polokwane: Six Zimbabwean migrants receive life-threatening injuries after being attacked by mob looking for "rapists and murderers" following death in area.
- UN Commissioner for Human Rights observes: "new forms of xenophobia are on the rise, particularly against refugees and migrants. Attacks against non-nationals in South Africa are gravely alarming." Urges government to ratify Convention on Protection of Migrants and Their Families. Justice Minister describes attacks as "matter of shame" for all South Africans.
- On Reconciliation Day, President Zuma urges citizens to "embrace especially our African brothers and sisters, who usually bear the brunt of ill-treatment more than foreigners from other

countries.” He says Home Affairs is working on immigration framework that will treat migrants more humanely.

- Wits FMP study reveals South African labour brokers or “spanners” played key role in inciting violence against migrants in De Doorns. Concludes that Zimbabweans were not accepting lower wages and there were really labour shortages (and not employment ones as had been speculated).
- Delft, Cape Town: Four men are arrested after a Somali shopkeeper is stabbed to death and store looted. Migrants allege local traders are instigating attacks to force them to close their businesses.

2010

January

- Capricorn, Western Cape: Two Malawians are killed after their shack is deliberately set on fire.
- Itireleng, Gauteng: After “Red Ant” security demolish illegal structures, residents threaten to attack migrants and forcibly occupy their homes.
- Riviersonderend, Western Cape: When body of local man is discovered last seen in company of Somalis, some 400 residents attack and loot shops owned by migrants.
- De Doorns, Western Cape: Stofland and Ekuphumleni residents say they do not want their Zimbabwean migrant neighbours to return two months after they were violently chased away.
- Crossroads, Western Cape: A Somali shopkeeper dies and another is injured when petrol bomb is hurled at their store. Somali Association of South Africa complains that xenophobic attacks are getting worse.

February

- De Doorns, Western Cape: Some 1,000 Zimbabwean migrants displaced in November continue to live in squalid conditions in makeshift refugee camp. Say they are routinely harassed if they step outside it.
- Cape Town: Rwandan-born rugby player Deo Kaitesi says that two policemen tortured him with cattle prods, telling him that South Africa is “not your land”.
- Siyathemba Township/Balfour, Mpumalanga: During service delivery protests, several hundred local residents loot and burn migrant-owned shops, forcing them to flee area for second time in eight months. Some victims have been affected by xenophobic violence three times since 2008 and “lost everything again.”
- Amnesty International declares migrants are being attacked “with impunity” in South Africa.
- CoRMSA notes that “issues of governance” often contribute to community-based tensions, which can result in attacks on migrants. Civil society groups and South African police are said to be working on an early warning system for xenophobic violence and government is supposedly planning to create National Action Plan to address xenophobia to be monitored by Justice Department.
- After wave of violent demonstrations in Reiger Park, Atteridgeville, Ennerdale, Dobsonville, Daveyton, Sharpeville and Orange Farm, HSRC cautions country may witness repeat of large-scale xenophobic violence if service delivery issue is not resolved. Migrant-owned stores in several areas are targeted for looting and damage during protests.
- Samora Machel, Nyanga: Migrants receive threatening pamphlets from “Youth Leaders of Samora” asking them to abandon area or “face wrath of community.”
- South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) report argues that “government inertia” contributed to violence in May 2008. Government institutions reacted slowly to initial bout of

attacks, lacked contingency plans, and episode was “climax” of serious social issue neglected for 14 years.

- Johannesburg: SAHRC sends legal summons to National Intelligence Agency (NIA) after it fails to provide mid-2008 violence report along with information about early warning system. NIA says it is not yet fully developed and only includes desk in office of National Commissioner. Commission cautions xenophobia likely to worsen.

March

- Worcester, Boland: Shops owned by migrants are looted.
- Moreesburg: Letters are sent to Somali traders directing them to close their stores. Gathering of some 50 persons later attacks traders and loots their stores. Four Somali refugees are hurt. Migrants say they are regular targets and that authorities are not “meeting expectations” despite “ongoing efforts”.
- Soshanguve, Pretoria: A Somali trader is robbed and murdered in his store.
- Muizenberg, Cape Town: A Somali shopkeeper is shot to death in his spaza shop.
- New Eesterus, Hammanskraal: A Bangladeshi trader is shot and killed during robbery.
- Mhluzu, Mpumalanga: South African Municipal Workers’ Union organizes protest against Pakistani traders and demands they leave area. Later, union members and locals vandalize and raid stores. Two shops are completely destroyed by fire.

April

- Wallacedene, Kraaifontein: Zimbabwean migrant Sergeant Kanyimo is attacked with hammers and bludgeoned to death. Local ANC leader allegedly instigated attack.
- Cape Town: Somali traders reveal they do not feel safe trading in city’s numerous townships due to regular threats. Somali Community Board maintains 17 immigrants have died in xenophobic attacks this year.
- Malmesbury, Western Cape: During protest against poor school conditions, students assault several Somali traders, raiding their stores and destroying property.
- Wolseley, Western Cape: Local residents attack shop owned by Ethiopian migrant. Two persons, including migrant, receive injuries.

May

- Near Sasolburg, Free State: After altercation between South African and Somali migrant, more than 1,000 persons raid migrant-owned businesses. Some 11 shops are looted. Affected migrants say they been targets on more than three occasions and recently relocated to Sasolburg.
- Cape Town: Somali shopkeeper Mahomed Ahmed is injured when three men attack him in his store and decamp with money.
- CoRMSA expresses concern about “widespread reports” of imminent xenophobic violence after FIFA World Cup tournament; urges “strong and preventative action by government and other institutions”.
- Survey by Gauteng City Region Observatory reveals seven out of ten participants believe migrants and refugees are stealing South African resources.
- Cape Town: Inquest into death of Mozambican migrant Ernesto Alfabeto Nhamuave finds no progress has been made in counteracting xenophobia.

June

- Government announces formation of Inter-Ministerial Committee headed by Police Minister to deal with episodes and risks of violence toward migrants. The committee is expected to work closely with civil society groups.

- Police Commissioner Cele accuses foreigners of engaging in criminal activities to discredit South Africa's image during World Cup: "We have observed a trend where foreigners commit crime – taking advantage of fact that we have an unacceptable crime level – to tarnish our credibility and image."
- Deputy Police Minister says reports of new xenophobic attacks are unfounded.
- Human rights groups highlight "climate of threats"; say more than fifty messages of intimidation and harassment have been received from migrants.
- Tembisa, Gauteng: After receiving threats from customers, traders begin to temporarily close shops.
- Civil society groups criticize government passiveness in face of growing risks of violence. They question role of IMC and its failure to respond to current wave of threats.
- Khayelitsha, Cape Town: Immigrant communities receive new threats of expulsion after South Africa is eliminated from tournament. Social Justice Coalition reports that Somalians have been threatened with violence if they fail to leave after tournament ends.
- Makhaza: Residents intervene on migrants' behalf when some persons attack Somali spaza shops after South African team exits tournament.
- Du Noon, Cape Town: After persistent rumours of outbreak of xenophobic aggression after World Cup, army and local police carry out intensive operation, searching house to house to discourage violence.
- Anti-xenophobia campaign is established under Disaster Management Department, which will investigate rumours of violence and act on them with help of police.
- Kraaifontein, Cape Town: Two South African shop owners at Bloekombos are detained for trying to incite violence against Somali traders. More violence is directed at immigrants after some men are arrested.
- Khayelitsha, Cape Town: Local residents in Site C form Action Committee Against Xenophobia, which plans to organize community education programmes, including a rally to promote peace and harmony on July 10 at Blue Wall.

July

- Inter-Ministerial Committee on xenophobia meets as "pro-active approach" to address growing threats of violence after World Cup, including ministers of Police, Home Affairs, Social Development, State Security, Basic Education, Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Arts and Culture, and International Relations and Cooperation.
- Khayelitsha: Somali Retailers' Association confirms that a Somali shopkeeper is killed in Site C.
- Du Noon, Cape Town: Several migrants receive threats after community meeting over government cleaning jobs results in dispute over preferential treatment. Migrants are told to "leave South Africa or we would be killed like in 2008."
- Thembani, Cape Town: Somali shopkeeper is seriously injured after armed men break into his shop.
- Cape Town: Migrants begin to leave city and Somali traders keep stocks at low levels to avoid looting.
- Western Cape government reconvenes safety forum and urges civil society groups to allay fears.
- Western Cape: Police say no evidence exists that large-scale violence will be repeated. Migrants leave areas like Du Noon, Phillipi, Phillipi East, Malmesbury and Grabouw. Some Zimbabwean migrants say their neighbours have told them to leave, while others indicate their landlords have asked them to vacate premises for fear their homes may be damaged.
- Western Cape Premier urges President to issue public announcement urging tolerance and peace; suggestion is directed to Inter-Ministerial Committee on xenophobia.

- Outside Cape Town: Zimbabwean migrant Reason Wandu is pushed from moving train after being called “makwerekwere”, telling him to go home because “we were taking jobs.”
- Cape Town: Six migrants are admitted to hospital as result of xenophobic attacks, including Wandu. Three are assaulted and two shot.
- Western Cape: Some 45 NGO and groups hold meeting with provincial government to prevent large-scale outbreak of violence.
- Ramaphosa Informal Settlement, East Rand: Army is called out after reports of impending xenophobic attacks are received in areas around Ekurhuleni and Johannesburg. Local police station holds urgent meeting with settlements’ leaders and residents.
- ANC, police and Nelson Mandela Foundation make public statements condemning xenophobia. Nathi says government “will not tolerate any threat or act of violence against individuals or sector of society, no matter what reasons are given to justify such threats or actions.”
- Cape Town: Zimbabwean migrants gathering at petrol station on highway to leave the area are robbed of meager possessions. “We all live in different areas. We have all been threatened. It sucks staying here. How can they turn on us like wild animals? We’re not coming back”.
- Masiphumelele: Some 400 South Africans congregate in community hall to demand meeting with employers to insist they not employ “foreigners” for low wages. Ward Councillor says residents want “illegal foreigners” to be incarcerated or deported. They also want elected representatives to explain why foreigners are being allowed to take jobs.
- Johannesburg: Knife-wielding neighbour threatens two Tanzanian migrants, ordering them to leave immediately or face death.
- Atlantic Philanthropies releases 500 page report with Strategy & Tactics written by leading social and political scientists and civil society activists. Report demonstrates that despite state indifference, civil society mobilised across the country to denounce xenophobia and to assist victims of May 2008 violence.
- Wellington, outside Cape Town: Some 100 immigrants seek shelter at campsite following fresh violence in province. Some migrants say threat is worse than experienced in May 2008. Ibrahim Mursal, whose face was slashed with a panga in 2008, observes: “The first time I was in Mitchells Plain, but this is worse. Now you even see coloured people attacking. Before it was only the blacks. Maybe now the whites are also coming.”
- Drakenstein, Western Cape: Local official says three incidents reported in Silverton, Phillipi, Langa, Cape Town and Mbekweni. Many involve looting of migrant-owned shops.
- Outside Cape Town: Group of some Zimbabweans gather at truck stop attempting to find ride back to Harare. They say: “its xenophobia that is chasing us away. We came here...after people from there chased us like dogs.”
- ANC releases a statement condemning xenophobia: “Xenophobia is a crime against humanity and its perpetrators should be isolated.”
- Khayelitsha: Some 200 persons raid Somali-owned shops short distance away from where National Police Commissioner is giving anti-xenophobia speech. Several Somali shopkeepers close their stores and leave with belongings: “these people called us makwerekwere and said we must go home. They said no one from another land is going to stay here.”
- Cape Flats, Western Cape: Immigrants seek refuge at police station in Paarl, Wellington and Phillipi after shops are looted and scorched. Provincial authorities say there have been “sporadic” attacks on shops and “some incidents of looting” in areas like Mbekweni, Paarl East, Wellington, and Nyanga.
- Nyanga, Cape Flats: Reportedly, police advise immigrants, especially Somalis, to leave area and escort them to safety elsewhere.
- Nyanga: Malawian migrant Peter Chavura is found murdered and castrated. Police say crime is not xenophobia-related. Six Malawian migrants are displaced after locals chase them out of their homes. Fifty three migrants are reported to be taking shelter in local church.

- Franschhoek: Police say that all migrant-owned stores in two informal settlements are closed.
- Western Cape: Police and Defense Minister visit province and warn “harsh action” will be taken against perpetrators.
- Provincial and municipal governments establish contingency plans to tackle any outbreak of violence, announces Disaster Management Unit.
- Heavy police patrols are deployed in farming towns of Franschhoek and Paarl. Area police say peace has been restored to areas, using police and army patrols.
- President Zuma accepts growing threat of large-scale xenophobic violence. He says people “should not have fears” and government has established ministerial commission to control situation.
- Council of Churches establishes emergency phone number to support people affected by xenophobic violence as part of rapid response mechanism.
- CoRMSA states that various levels of government have shown “greater preparedness” for possibility of another large-scale attack.
- Musina: Large numbers of Zimbabwean migrants arrive because “they don’t want something to happen to them, or experience something again.”
- SAIRR urges government and ANC leaders to make “concerted public statements” against xenophobia and work to change biased attitudes of South Africans towards African immigrants. This is because environment and conditions that led to May 2008 attacks remain “largely unchanged”.
- Johannesburg: Zimbabwean MDC spokesperson for South Africa says they have received more than 200 phone calls from fearful Zimbabwean migrants, many of them from Western Cape. Dube expresses “limited faith” in South African police: “Scores of youth are reportedly looting and threatening foreigners in full view of police officers”; urges government to set up special courts to tackle these threats.
- Gugulethu: A Ghanaian migrant is shot dead.
- Western Cape: More than 20 Zimbabwean migrants are seen squatting along highway near Huguenot Tunnel, trying to find way out of province. Say they have been camping there for past three days after they being kicked out of their homes.
- Ministry of Defense declares SANDF soldiers will continue to patrol flashpoint areas for xenophobic violence for as long as required.
- Social Justice Coalition, Equal Education and Treatment Action Campaign say more than 15 episodes of “xenophobic criminal activity” involving roaming gangs of 10 to 30 persons going around raiding Somali-owned shops have taken place in Khayelitsha alone over past three days. They urge government to acknowledge that these incidents are rooted in xenophobia in which “persons around Cape Town and the Western Cape are being targeted on the basis of their nationality.”
- Police spokesperson Mnisi describes violent incidents in Western Cape and Gauteng as “just acts of criminality” and notes: “today it’s called xenophobia, tomorrow it could be called racism or sexism.”
- Humanitarian Network of South Africa (HANSA) meet to finalize details of coordinated response in event of large-scale violence. An “Anti-Xenophobic Action” (AXA) national toll-free phone line is established. HANSA volunteers will forward information to relevant authorities and humanitarian organizations.
- Lawyers for Human Rights meets with eight other legal organizations to provide urgent legal assistance to migrants in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal. Lawyers will help migrants register cases of harassment and intimidation with police and judicial system.
- Protection Working Group, a collaborative effort between human rights groups and United Nations agencies is formed, which creates extensive emergency plan “in event of large-scale human displacement.”

- Some 100 civil society groups participate in meetings organized by South African Council of Churches to discuss impending threat of large-scale violence.
- Reports state large numbers of migrants are returning to their countries. Other migrants say they left after witnessing fresh violence.
- Police Minister insists criminality has been crucial aspect of recent violence.
- Walmer, Port Elizabeth: Two Ethiopian migrants are shot fatally in their spaza shops.
- Western Cape: Premier Zille says plans to prevent xenophobic violence, including identification of flashpoints, use of mediators, and extensive work by police, have worked: "What could have been mass displacement is minimal displacement."
- Outside Johannesburg, Gauteng: Sixteen migrants are attacked at Kya Sands informal settlement in 11 incidents involving physical assault, vandalism and theft. Six victims are migrants from Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Minister for Community Safety Mosunkutu describes events as "criminal activities" and "not xenophobia-related": "It's just a group of people carrying out criminal activities; they are failing because we have arrested most of them." Army and police are deployed.
- Kugya Informal Settlement, Port Elizabeth: Somali trader Ibrahim Ali is shot and killed in his store.
- Beitbridge: Zimbabwean government says it has set up tents for migrants fleeing violence in South Africa.
- Du Noon, Cape Town: Somali traders re-open their stores after one week.
- Western Cape: Western Cape facilitator on anti-xenophobia in poor communities reveals police stood "chatting to other residents" when migrants' shops were being raided. But some civic groups like the Social Justice Coalition, the TAC and Equal Education praise SAPS efforts. They criticize government for refusing to link violence to xenophobia.
- Outside Johannesburg, Gauteng: Violence breaks out again at Kya Sands settlement and is quelled with heavy police presence. At least five persons are believed to have sustained injuries. A South African resident mistakenly identified as an immigrant is also attacked. Witnesses say migrants are attacked with axes. Provincial police denies it is xenophobia: "We are not saying it is xenophobia because South Africans were also victims there. We are treating it as criminal acts."
- African Christian Democratic Party condemns the "xenophobic violence and intimidation" at Kya Sands and warns: "xenophobia will continue to re-surface unless and until government finds long-term solutions to this very serious problem which seems to be the result of some poor, desperate and unemployed taking matters of government into their own hands."
- Kya Sands Settlement: Gauteng Community Safety MEC visits area and assures that attacks will not recur. But several migrants prepare to abandon area as they strongly feel that more violence is likely to happen.
- Commissioner Mushwana recommends that government set up special courts to deal with xenophobia-related cases. Informs Parliament of problems encountered by SAHRC in obtaining information on May 2008 violence from government and their efforts to avoid repeat scenario. Some departments, he points out, informed the SAHRC that it had nothing to do with them.
- Randburg: Ten persons arrested for violence at Kya Sands appear at Magistrate's Court and face charges of assault, housebreaking and inciting violence.
- Cape Flats: Two community leaders say they have received threats after openly opposing xenophobic violence.
- Wallacedene, Cape Town: Petrol bomb is hurled at Somali-owned store, injuring three. Armed assailants shoot Somali migrant in his shop in different incident.
- Cape Town: ANC National Executive Committee statement describes threat of renewed violence as "nothing but exaggeration and sensationalism", while applauding security forces for their role in containing threat.

- Zinyoka Township near Motherwell: A Somali businessman is shot and injured in his shop.
- SAHRC notes that despite lodging formal case in his death, no records are available on May 2008 necklacing victim Ernesto Nhamuave's case at Reiger Park Police Station or National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) Roll. NPA says criminal cases from May 2008 violence that "were prosecutable" have been sent to court.
- Claremont, Cape Town: Passengers attack migrants on train. Burundian refugee Albert Mugabe is violently assaulted near Claremont and later succumbs to his injuries. Witness states perpetrators were chanting "makwerkwere hamba (get out foreigner)".
- Pietermaritzburg, Kwazulu-Natal: Three Ethiopian migrants are treated for injuries after violent altercation; local police describe event as "resembling xenophobia."

August

- Western Cape: Community Safety MEC states 55 incidents of xenophobia have been recorded between 1 May and July 30. Forty persons have been arrested and charged with arson, intimidation, vandalism, attempted murder, assault, public violence, and theft/looting. Incidents have occurred in areas like Delft, Philippi, Lwandle, Kraiifontein, Paarl, Paarl East, Franschhoek, Grabouw, Wellington, Da Gammaskop, Mossel Bay, Gugulethu, Langa, Atlantis and Khayelitsha.
- Government says will take "any threat of violence, whether perceived or real, very seriously", and "not hesitate to take action against the perpetrators of any kind of violence". Nevertheless, it notes "incidents of violence and looting if property reported thus far points to criminality more than xenophobia".
- Justice Department informs that Prohibition of Racism, Xenophobia, Hate Speech and Related Intolerance Bill will be tabled in Parliament "soon".

September

- Cape Town: Somali shopkeepers say migrant antipathy remains at high levels: "Xenophobia is part of life. We do not live easy here. We only survive."
- Government decides to end special dispensation for Zimbabwean migrants. Human rights groups sharply criticize move as "policy of mass deportation" which could result in "[South African] communities being more xenophobic and on-going witch hunt to determine who has documents".
- High Court orders Home Affairs offices in Cape Town to renew permits for asylum seekers and refugee status documents irrespective of where application was originally submitted. Order comes after Legal Resources Center petitions court, arguing it is "cumbersome burden", forcing asylum-seekers to journey to other provinces to renew permits.
- Johannesburg: COSATU announces it will organize counter xenophobia campaign in provinces worst hit by 2008 violence (Gauteng, Western Cape, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal).

October

- Cape Town: Three migrant business owners, two from Somalia and a third from Ethiopia, are shot to death, while three other migrants are injured. Somalian community says 30 traders have been victims of targeted attacks since August.
- Du Noon, Cape Town: Congolese Nyangoma Etasha is repeatedly stabbed after he refuses to buy beer for several South Africans at tavern. Witnesses say attackers told Etasha: "South Africa is ours".

November

- Khayelitsha: Somali trader Cyrix Man is shot fatally outside his shop. Somali migrants say they are "living in fear now. We're wondering who's going to be next. We came to South to survive

not die.” Local Somali Association states more than 22 Somali migrants have been killed in the area over past three months.

- Hillbrow, Berea and Yeoville: During anti-crime campaign “Operation Duty Calls”, some 1,000 police led by National Police Commissioner Cele and Police Minister Mthethwa along with Home Affairs and Revenue Service officers arrest many migrants, particularly Zimbabweans. Migrants without documents and those with criminal records are detained. Migrant rights groups censure actions saying it contradicts amnesty for Zimbabweans.

December

- Freedom Park, Johannesburg: Local business owners forcibly close migrant-run shops. Four persons are killed and stores raided.
- Migrant groups say end of special dispensation for Zimbabweans will result in “fruitless mass deportations.”
- CoRMSA says procedure for applying for permits for Zimbabwean migrants has been poorly managed and lacks uniformity: “There are no clear guidelines on what is required and different offices have different requirements. There is no certainty in the process.”

2011

January

- Diepsloot, Johannesburg: Zimbabwean Farai Kujirichita is bludgeoned to death.
- Samora Machel Township, Western Cape: A Somali trader burns to death after his shop is attacked by armed gang.
- Freedom Park, Johannesburg: Gauteng MEC for local government and housing establishes taskforce to examine tensions between locals and migrants. Shops belonging to migrants are to remain closed during investigation. Local ward councillor says only 12 migrant-owned stores are to be allowed to remain locally.

February

- Ramaphosa, East Rand: After renewed threats against Somali traders, police patrol area. Residents say they are “not ready to go back to xenophobia”, but insist migrants steal their jobs.
- Delft, Outside Cape Town: Somali Idiris Haji is killed and petrol bomb is thrown at his store, which is extensively damaged. A second migrant receives injuries.
- Limpopo: During service delivery protests, thousands of people raid Somalis’ shops. Migrants say only their shops are looted and police refuse to help, telling them to return to their country.
- Freedom Park, Gauteng: Somali-owned businesses open after three months when local community supports their presence at meeting attended by Gauteng Housing MEC Mmemezi.

March

- National Assembly approves Immigration Amendment Bill, despite widespread opposition to its various provisions. Critics call Bill “inhumane”, “ill-conceived”, and “draconian”. Pre-screening at border of asylum seekers, they say, makes refugees more vulnerable to “being immediately deported to countries where they may be tortured or killed” and violate countries’ international human rights obligations. Other aspects, including reducing reporting times to seek asylum and access to airlines’ passenger lists, are deemed harsh and a violation of privacy rights.
- Motherwell, Port Elizabeth: Somali trader Ahmed Nur Sheikh Ali is robbed and fatally shot.

April

- Katlehong, Gauteng: 71 persons are arrested for sending intimidating letters to migrant-owned shops on behalf of Gauteng Business Forum.
- Lebowakgomo, Limpopo: After a migrant is accused of raping a 13-year-old girl, local residents attack Ethiopian immigrants and damage their homes, shops and vehicles. Four migrants are injured and some 150 migrants flee area.

May

- Report by UN Special Rapporteur on Migrants urges South Africa to adopt immigration policies that “respects human rights of migrants and ensures their integration into South African society”.
- Lebowakgomo, Limpopo: Police launch door-to-door campaign to avert possibility of xenophobic aggression and ask residents to “stop attacking foreign nationals.” Campaign is to be continued in local schools and surrounding areas.
- Soweto: Greater Gauteng Business Forum members are arrested after protest march demanding Somali and Pakistani traders close their stores.
- Tshiwelo, Soweto: Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry Thabethe tells small business owners to stop complaining about foreign traders: “you guys give these foreigners places to stay and places to do business because you love money.” Gauteng Business Forum Chairperson Mhlanga criticizes Minister’s remarks. “These people [migrants] are molesting our economy”, he says.
- Limpopo: Some 500 temporary workers employed at Medupi Power Station set fire to four houses, two offices, bus, and police vehicle while demanding that all foreign labour be removed. Reportedly, workers block gates and demand Korean and Chinese workers leave immediately “in peace before they left in pieces.” Damage is estimated at R500, 000.
- Gaphasha Village near Burgersfort, Limpopo: Local residents accuse migrants of stealing their jobs at local mine and chase several hundred out of area. They also set the local secondary school on fire for enrolling children from migrant households.
- Motherwell, Eastern Cape: Fourteen shops owned by Somali traders are raided and set on fire. Two stores are completely destroyed in Kamvelihle and Ramaphosa. Other Somali traders abandon area.
- Eldorado Park, Gauteng: 80 members of Greater Gauteng Business Forum are arrested and nine charged for organizing illegal gathering to campaign to shut selected migrant-owned businesses.
- Port Elizabeth, Eastern Cape: Four Somali-owned stores are set on fire and more than 50 others are raided in Motherwell and KwaDwesi. Some 200 Somali migrants flee but police rule out xenophobia and attribute it to business rivalry between local and migrant traders.
- Port Elizabeth, Eastern Cape: Some 20 Somali traders seek shelter at Motherwell Police Station after their stores are set on fire.

June

- Ramaphosa Settlement, Outside Johannesburg: While trying to forcibly oust Somali traders, Greater Gauteng Business Forum members are confronted by local women who urge them to leave the migrants alone. The Forum organizes a march in defiance of a court order and some 80 members are arrested.
- NIA looks into connections between various “business forums” in Eastern Cape and Gauteng and their role in inciting xenophobic aggression. Greater Gauteng Business Forum reveals that they have been asked to set up similar structures in areas like Limpopo, Kwazulu-Natal, Port Elizabeth and Western Cape.

- Diepsloot, Northern Johannesburg: Two Zimbabweans migrants are beaten to death after being accused of theft.
- Seshego, Limpopo: Godfrey Sibanda, a Zimbabwean migrant is stoned to death. Six Zimbabwean migrants' homes are burned down and four others are vandalized. Police say there are "groups" harassing and threatening migrants. Violence occurs after locals accuse migrants of killing two South Africans and occupying RDP houses. Police say there is no record of these supposed crimes. Around 3,000 Zimbabweans flee to the local police station and other places.
- Limpopo: Provincial ANC expresses their "shock and disgust" and condemn attack on Sibanda and other Zimbabwean migrants. Young Communist League of South Africa calls this vigilante justice "deplorable".
- Seshego, Limpopo: ANC Councilor Mojapelo is arrested for her suspected involvement in Sibanda's death. She denies any role even as police assert that she openly urged locals to "kick out" Zimbabweans. ANC says councilor "is innocent until proven guilty."
- Belmont Park, Cape Town: A Zimbabwean man is stabbed to death.
- Rothenburg, Free State: At least ten shops belonging to Somali migrants are raided and three are set on fire.
- Port Elizabeth, Eastern Cape: Two Somali traders are shot to death in their stores after refusing to hand over cash.
- Cape Town: Four Somali traders are injured after thieves attack and rob a large migrant-owned store.
- Commission for Promotion and Protection of Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities expresses concern about "ongoing violent victimization of African refugees" in South Africa, especially recent attacks in Limpopo.
- Khayelitsha: Somali trader's shop is attacked and one man stabbed.
- Seshego, Limpopo: Zimbabwean migrants displaced by violence say that they would "rather die in South Africa" than "go back to hell on earth."
- Delft, Cape Town: Two Somali migrants die after unidentified persons shoot them in the face.

July

- Parliament Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs Chair Maunye argues that migrants be refused entry because they pose a burden, using up resources: "Really, this intake, for how long are we going to continue with this as South Africans? Is it not going to affect our resources, the economy of the country?" She later apologizes after ANC accepts that her comments "may be construed to be xenophobic."
- Burgersfort, Limpopo: A Mozambican migrant is stoned to death by group of youths.

August

- Lenasia South, Gauteng: Two Zimbabwean women are raped and stoned to death at Hospital Hills.
- Polokwane, Limpopo: A Bangladeshi shopkeeper is robbed and set on fire in Dennilton.
- Cape Town: Somali businessman Ahmedey Mohamed is shot dead by armed assailants.
- Duncan Village, Eastern Cape: A prominent Somali cleric and businessman is shot and killed.
- Blikkiesdorp, Delft: Ten-year-old old Somali Binti Sidaw, whose family relocated there after May 2008 violence, is found strangled outside her house.
- Seshego: 19 persons, including ANC councilor appear before Magistrate's Court for hearing on xenophobic violence in mid-June.
- After document appears on Home Affairs' website suggesting agreement with Zimbabwe to prevent entry of Somali and Ethiopian refugees through their territories into South Africa, government issues a denial.

September

- Middelburg, Mpumalanga: Somali Refugee Forum says some 50 tuck shops belonging to Somali, Ethiopian and other migrant communities have been closed since June because municipality will not issue them licenses. Municipality denies discrimination and insists that only landowners can apply for such licenses. Middleburg Small Business Community Forum, representing South African traders, says it helped to mobilize local government for closures. Forum says they “are a non-violent organization”, while highlighting “problems” associated with migrants: “Why should townships become dumping sites where foreign people come to promote lawlessness?”
- Institute for Security Studies notes that police statistics do not record hate crimes, such as those motivated by xenophobia, which remain invisible.

October

- Atteridgeville, outside Pretoria: Local residents hold violent protest, attacking and raiding Somali-owned stores.
- Gauteng: Economic Development MEC urges people not to attack migrant traders and says: “violent acts are an embarrassment to the country.” He emphasizes that perpetrators would be severely punished.
- Alexandra, Gauteng: Alexandra Bonafides’ group sends notices demanding that migrants leave RDP homes otherwise they will be “pushed like animals or aliens.”
- Itireleng, Gauteng: Migrants are driven out of their homes and businesses. Some 40 displaced migrants are housed temporarily at Laudium community center.
- Alexandra, Gauteng: Criminal charges are filed against Duma Kulashe, leader of Alexandra Bonafides group for threatening to attack migrants, though he is not arrested.
- CoRMSA urges police and migrant rights groups to address xenophobic tensions in Alexandra and Itireleng; say that violence may spread to other areas.
- Johannesburg: After meeting with Alexandra stakeholders, local government and housing MEC says citizens have contributed to housing crisis: “The problem is not with foreigners, the problem is with South Africans...foreigners find that they were sold houses by South Africans.”
- Khayelitsha: Speaking to officers at a meeting, National Police Commissioner Cele says migrants arriving in large numbers and illegally in South Africa cause xenophobic violence. “We can’t have a country run by people who jump the borders.”

November

- Ekurhuleni, East Rand: Some 100 residents march to Gauteng Premier’s office and hand over memorandum urging strict action against illegal migrant-owned businesses. Organized by Ekurhuleni Concerned Residents, Business and Enterprise Forum, participants accuse migrant traders of evading municipal by-laws and some migrants of selling drugs. Forum spokesperson says they do not want to take law into their own hands, but adds: “what do you expect people to do if they are going hungry because foreigners are running down their businesses.” This situation, he asserts, provides “fertile ground for xenophobic attacks to happen here in Ekurhuleni.” He says they are seeking “positive response within fourteen days, failing which we will take drastic steps.” Migrant businesses remain closed during protests.
- Thabong, Free State: Two Bangladeshi men are stabbed to death and robbed in a shop.

December

- Supreme Court criticizes conduct of High Court Acting Judge Nasva for his “disturbingly peculiar” handling of case involving 19 Ethiopian asylum seekers that could lead to “creating and heightening tensions between nationals and foreigners.”

- In case against Safety and Security (now Police) Ministry, Judge Erasmus rules police “failed” to protect migrant shopkeepers from Zwelethemba who were assaulted in March 2008 and their shops looted; but traders failed to prove police discriminated against them.

2012

January

- East Rand, Gauteng: Two Bangladeshis are killed after petrol-bomb is hurled at their shop in Thokoza Township. The attack happens after local residents insist that migrant traders must leave area. Victims’ families say police did not help them.
- Dornkuil, Johannesburg: Eight Zimbabwean and Malawian migrants are killed after being assaulted in their shack by five men carrying knobkerries and clubs.

February

- UNHCR reports that “there are three serious xenophobic incidents per week, 99 deaths per year and about 1,000 persons displaced permanently or temporarily per annum” by xenophobic violence.
- Welkom, Free State: Over 100 shops owned by Bangladeshi and Pakistani migrants are attacked and looted in Thabong, Welkom and Odendaalsrus for three days. Some migrants are attacked and injured. Attacks happen after local youth take to streets when discussions with local mines stall over preferential employment for South Africans.
- Western Cape: Provincial Commissioner inform Parliament’s Police Committee that irregular migrants running small businesses are most prone to being targeted by criminals because they cannot report crime or access banking services. MPs express concern that situation is “bordering on xenophobia”.
- Phokeng, North West Province: During strike at Impala Platinum Mine, 88 shops migrant-run shops are looted and burned down in Freedom Park and Segwaelane Village. Some 100 migrants, mostly Somalis and Ethiopians, leave afterwards. Around 130 persons are arrested.
- Khayelitsha, Western Cape: Members of Zanokhanyo Business Association strong-arm more than five Somali traders to close their shops permanently. Two Somali-owned shops are looted and several shops destroyed.
- Soweto, Gauteng: Some 400 youths returning from funeral ransack grocery store belonging to three Bangladeshi migrants.

March

- ANC’s peace and stability policy discussion report recommends foreign nationals with spaza shops be subjected to stricter by-laws. Human rights groups condemn move as “worrying and dangerous”.
- Heidelberg, Gauteng: Residents of Ratanda informal settlement ransack stores belonging to migrants during service delivery protest.
- Johannesburg: Some 70 migrants from Nigeria and Ethiopia riot at Lindela Center for having been detained unlawfully for more than nine months.
- Sharpeville, Gauteng: Residents hold protest march after Human Rights Day celebrations are moved elsewhere, during which spaza shops belonging to foreign nationals are ransacked, while migrants flee for safety.

April

- Pretoria: Refugees at Home Affairs offices stage protest after they are asked to return tgeh following week to renew their permits, complaining about demands for bribes and expiry of permits leaving them vulnerable to harassment and deportation.

- Kuils River: Somali migrant Salaat Hussein is killed at his store during robbery. Somali traders say they are being targeted in townships because of business rivalry and that community leaders and local traders are inciting the violence.

May

- Modimolle township, Limpopo: Residents attack and ransack stores belonging to Pakistani immigrants. Incident happens two days after two Pakistanis are implicated in death of local woman. Many traders seek refuge in neighbouring townships.
- Modimolle, Limpopo: 104 persons appear in court for participating in violent attacks in Phagemeng township. Twenty juveniles participants are asked to attend rehabilitative programmes and the rest are released with a warning.
- PASSOP reports that refugees and migrants are increasingly been denied work in the growing security industry by Private Security Industry and Regulation Authority.
- Khayelitsha, Western Cape: Zanokhanyo Retailers' Association threatens to burn down and demolish Somali-owned stores. Police watch as members go from store to store and forcibly close 15 shops. Residents say they do not support association's actions.
- Ekurhuleni, Gauteng: During violent service delivery protests, residents attack municipal property and shops belonging to migrants.
- Masiphumelele, Western Cape: Somali traders say they are terrified after series of brutal attacks, which left several injured.

June

- South Africa urged by other countries to strengthen efforts to curb xenophobia and racism during its Universal Periodic Review.
- Riot breaks out at Lindela after detainees accuse Home Affairs of holding them for more than 120 days violating terms of Immigration Act. They also protest poor conditions at centre. Home Affairs denies riot and claims migrants were trying to force centre to release them early.
- Solidarity Peace Trust and PASSOP report highlights arbitrariness, misapplication, and rampant corruption entrenched in migrant deportation process.
- Viljoenskroon, Free State: Residents stone, loot and burn down 20 shops belonging to Pakistani migrants.
- Nelson Mandela Bay: Six policemen from Tactical Response Team (TRT) appear in court for violently assaulting a Somali migrant.
- Somali migrants say that xenophobia is on rise again with more than ten Somali shop owners assaulted and killed in less than one week.
- Gauteng: SAHRC reports receiving many reports of poor treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers.
- Western Cape: ANC Provincial Secretary Mjongile says foreign spaza shops need to be limited because they contribute to tensions between locals and migrants and could lead to more xenophobic violence.
- Botriver, Western Cape: During protest to demand better housing and living conditions, local residents attack migrant-run shops. Police urge traders to press charges against perpetrators.
- Malmesbury Township, Cape Town: Somali businessman is shot dead, reported to be seventh Somali to be shot dead that week.

July

- Botshabelo, Free State: After unregistered street vendors are evicted, businesses owned by Somali, Chinese, Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Ethiopian migrants are attacked, raided and some houses are set on fire. Nearly 600 persons are displaced.
- Cape Town: Twenty-nine migrant-run shops are attacked in Valhalla, Bishops Lavis and

Mitchells Plain. Nine shops are gutted and 20 looted over several days. Somali, Pakistani and Bangladeshi migrants are affected.

- PASSOP blames violence against foreign shopowners on ANC's new "Peace and Stability" document, saying it unfairly targets migrant businesses and demonizes refugees.

August

- Limpopo: Police organize "Operation Hard Stick" during which many migrant-run spaza stores are raided and closed for operating without trading licenses. Migrant rights' groups say selective enforcement of laws sets "dangerous precedent".
- IOM says that the Inter-Ministerial Committee headed by the Minister of Police to deal with cases of xenophobia established after May 2008 "is only active when there is a prominent case of xenophobia. Otherwise it remains invisible."

September

- Johannesburg: Mayfair residents receive threatening notes from South African Blacks Association "declaring war" on migrants.
- African Centre for Migration and Society states illegal detention practices of government has cost taxpayers R4.7 million.

October

- Amnesty International says refugees' livelihood being jeopardized by forced closures of spaza shops.
- Rustenburg, North West Province: Heavily armed persons loot and burn shops belonging to Portuguese and Chinese migrants (Boitekong and near Jabula Hostel).

November

- Durban: Ex-Councilor Khoza receives three years sentence, suspended for five years, for his role in violent attack in January 2009. Co-accused faces ten years in jail. Magistrate says it was clearly xenophobic and pre-planned: "no civilized society should tolerate barbaric conduct".

December

- ANC National Conference adopts resolution to impose stronger immigration controls to offset "threats" by irregular migrants and economic competition from migrants.

2013

- Mitchells Plain, Cape Town: Four Pakistani nationals are gunned down.
- Port Elizabeth: More than 50 Somali-owned shops are raided and razed in March.
- Daveyton, Gauteng: Mozambican national Emidio Macia dies after being dragged behind a police van and violently assaulted in custody.
- Pretoria: Somali shopkeepers in Mamelodi area are forced to leave area after a two-day attack on their stores. More than 25 shops are looted.
- UNHCR says that though South Africa receives largest numbers of refugees, it actually grants this status to very few of them. Acceptance rates are less than half of the global average and it ranks 36th globally for refugee population size.

Compiled by Sujata Ramachandran and Sachil Singh using various resources: ANC Daily News Briefs, SAPA, CoRMSA, Human Rights Watch, Lawyers for Human Rights, Legal Briefs Online, SAHRC, SAMP, Scalabrini Centre, African Centre for Migration and Society, Xenophobia.org, Mail & Guardian Online and other online news sources.

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