

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

SOUTH AFRICA, BRITAIN

AND

RHODESIA

by

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WARNING

Members are reminded that this address was given in a private meeting and that any statements or declarations made by the Speaker may be repeated but must not be linked with the Speaker's name nor with the name of the Institute.

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JOHANNESBURG

13th September 1966

W A R N I N G

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SOUTH AFRICA, BRITAIN AND RHODESIA

SOUTH AFRICA

1. The Difficulties of a Successor

Any analysis of the events of the past six weeks in relation to Rhodesia must begin with the event which shocked every Rhodesian as it did all South Africans - the assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. We refused to believe that John F. Kennedy could have been shot down in a street in Dallas; how much more difficult it was for many in South Africa to believe that the Prime Minister - already the victim of a would-be assassin - could have been killed by another in Parliament Building and within the House of Assembly. Both assassinations destroyed leaders who had come to symbolise their countries not only to their own people but to the outside world. Of the two I think that the loss which South Africa has suffered may prove to have been the greater.

Some of you may have read an article which appeared two weeks ago in 'Time'. It was hostile to Dr. Verwoerd and to South Africa, but what I now remember of it is the description of Dr. Verwoerd as a 'man of iron', unswerving in pursuit of the objectives which he had worked out for himself, undeterred by world-wide criticism, creating - as it were - his country in his own image. Such an image is a tremendous asset to a country, particularly a country subject to external threats. The greatest danger to such a country can come from the belief abroad that the Government may be bluffing in their refusal to consider any modifications in their internal policy, and therefore that the bluff can be called. Friends may be tempted to exercise pressure, while enemies are encouraged to increase their demands. Risks are then taken, incidents multiply and escalation starts. Where, from a strong prime minister, a mere courtesy can take on an appearance of significance or prove a useful bargaining counter, from an unknown prime minister, or one whose position has not been established, even major concessions may be interpreted as evidence of weakness to be exploited immediately.

In our own time we have seen a successor endowed with long experience and every expertise in international affairs, respected universally, devoted to principle as Anthony Eden was, driven to try to prove, immediately and once-for-all, that he was a man of action possessed of the strength of his

predecessor, Churchill, and then to fail catastrophically at Suez in his own chosen field. We have seen a minister, Dr. Erhard, credited with the main responsibility for the economic resurgence of his country, not merely fail to maintain the dynamism of the nonagenarian Adenauer, but apparently unable to cope with increasing threats to Germany's prosperity. We have seen Krushchev follow Stalin, and overthrow his other henchmen, Beria and Malenkov, but driven to gamble externally in Cuba, and internally with the harvests of the newly-cultivated lands, only to lose over both and be quietly rusticated by his own assistants.

Even where the successor proves to possess the necessary qualities of leadership and to stand comparison with men whom, at the time of their deaths, it seemed impossible to follow, the successor has needed time to do so. In the United States President Truman proved to be a worthy successor to Franklin Roosevelt; in India Mr. Nehru to Mahatma Gandhi, and in South Africa, General Smuts to General Botha, to mention only the first in a long succession of strong Prime Ministers. But the failure of the Potsdam Conference, the million dead in the Punjab and Bengal, the 1922 fighting on the Rand, were the prices which had to be paid. We can only hope that the price South Africa may have to pay in the course of the next year or two may not prove to be equally high.

2. Dr. Verwoerd as a Foreign Minister

Dr. Verwoerd had, in a sense, to be his own foreign minister, because it was South Africa's internal policies which were at issue in the outside world. The Prime Minister, as the minister mainly responsible for those policies, had to be the minister who justified them and who decided how they should be defended. This is no reflection on Dr. Hilgard Muller, who played his part with admirable restraint, as Minister of Foreign Affairs; indeed, it is to be hoped that his experience will continue to be available to Dr. Verwoerd's successor in that ministry and that his advice may even be offered more freely than may in the past have been necessary, for Dr. Verwoerd possessed to a very high degree, that 'sense of the possible' which has been defined as the quality of the great foreign minister, but is also the quality of a great Prime Minister.

In trying to outline here each month the course of the struggle for independence in Rhodesia, I have had to study carefully all Dr. Verwoerd's statements about Rhodesia, and such of his actions as have been made public, and I was constantly impressed with the evidence of his possession of this particular quality. In March I said that -

"Dr. Verwoerd has been extremely skilful in the attitude which he has adopted of non-interference in the dispute between Britain and Rhodesia. He said that South Africa was opposed to boycotts of any sort, and would continue normal trade with both and he has prevented so far the Rhodesian question from developing into an all-out attack on South Africa by the rest of Africa and a good many other countries. When it appeared to be necessary, early

in February, to give some further encouragement to Rhodesia, he said that there would be no interference by the Government if individuals wished, for example, to make gifts of petrol to Rhodesia. When these escalated, and much greater supplies were reported to be crossing the border than could be accounted for by gifts, he explained quietly that normal trade did not exclude better trade."

At Durban, on the 4th March, he warned however that -

"South Africa could not afford to export certain products to Rhodesia. Impediments would be introduced, because it was the Government's duty to look after South Africa's interests first."

In May I drew attention to the fact that Mr. Wilson's Senior Private Secretary from the Foreign Office, Mr. O. Wright, had visited Pretoria twice, and paid a visit to Salisbury in between, and that as a result of his reports it had been agreed between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith that discussions should take place about the time, place and level of talks which might cover the questions at issue between the two countries, discussions which have not yet been finally concluded. Dr. Verwoerd would appear to have been at least partly responsible for this development by the advice which he had given to both Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith. I also drew attention to the fact that when it had been suggested that the South African Government might have made some response to British pressure for a reduction of the assistance which Rhodesia was receiving in the way of oil and otherwise, and that it was knowledge of this that had persuaded Mr. Smith to agree to talks, Die Transvaler had, on the 29th April, published a very careful report from its Pretoria correspondent to the effect that the South African Government had in no way submitted to threats or pressure, nor would it do so. The statement continued that the facts would prove the reverse, although the South African Government had not said so because of its determination to maintain its correct diplomatic position of non-intervention in boycotts. The report also contained a disclaimer that Dr. Verwoerd would be prepared to act as mediator, since to do so would be not only to intervene, but to seek a solution in some form of multi-racial partnership contrary to basic South African policy. Indeed, Dr. Verwoerd knew when not to act just as he knew when to act, and by refusing to be used by any country, he could make inaction an effective instrument of policy. The London Times, reporting the assassination, made the same point:

"One of Dr. Verwoerd's most notable characteristics was his massive ability to maintain silence and preserve discretion until he deemed the time was ripe for the disclosure of his policy."

I concluded a more recent analysis by saying that -

"Dr. Verwoerd has not put a foot wrong. His influence has steadily increased and South Africa can hope with reason that he will choose the right moment to exercise all of it."

There is no question that it has been his decisions which were the main reason why, a month ago, Rhodesia seemed to have turned the corner.

3. Will South Africa's Foreign Policy and Prospects be changed?

If it is going to be difficult for any successor to Dr. Verwoerd to achieve, at any rate for some time, the same 'sense of the possible' in the complicated world of international negotiation, and to acquire the experience which will enable decisions to be taken quickly and without hesitation, and so achieve their maximum effect, I should perhaps begin by considering whether Dr. Verwoerd's death is likely to cause any fundamental change in South African policy.

(a) Over South West Africa On the face of it this would seem to be unlikely. It had not been decided, ten days ago, by whom South Africa should be represented at the United Nations, but there had been no indication that Dr. Verwoerd was considering either that South Africa should not be represented at this Assembly or that a decision would have to be taken in advance of the Assembly as to the possibility of South Africa leaving the United Nations. On the contrary there were good reasons, in particular the judgement of the International Court over South West Africa, why South Africa should be strongly represented this year, and it has now been announced that Dr. Muller will lead a strong delegation. The judgement considerably strengthened South Africa's position, in that it made much more remote any prospect of mandatory sanctions in connection with South West Africa, but it made certain that attacks at the United Nations will instead focus on South Africa's policy of apartheid and South Africa's support for Rhodesia. These are political issues which arouse the maximum emotional support.

It is quite certain that, in view of the judgement, it would be almost unthinkable for Dr. Verwoerd's successor to envisage any surrender of the mandate. A greater potential risk, for reasons already indicated, is the possibility that a less experienced Prime Minister might be tempted to take some step, such as proclaiming South West Africa to be an integral part of the Republic, which would make it possible for South Africa's opponents at the United Nations to argue that South Africa had itself been guilty of bringing about a unilateral change in the situation in South West Africa. This would, however, so obviously weaken the legal arguments which South Africa has so far been able to put forward in support of her thesis that it has been other members of the United Nations, and even organs of the United Nations, not South Africa, which have been seeking to bring about changes in the status of the territory by unilateral action, that it is likely that the temptation will be resisted.

(b) Over Rhodesia It is clear that the strength and support of South Africa have been and will continue to be vital to the continued existence of Rhodesia. I have already drawn attention to the skill with which Dr. Verwoerd gave all necessary support to Rhodesia by allowing oil to go there in transit, by supplying other vital requirements (including possibly arms for the Rhodesia Forces) and by facilitating non-governmental financial

and economic arrangements for the sale of at least a vital proportion of Rhodesia's exports. Indeed, it has become obvious during the past six months that the economic and financial sanctions imposed by Britain, and supported by the majority of other countries at her request, have been frustrated in their operation by the other threatened states, Portugal and South Africa. The existence of a White government in Rhodesia is vital to South Africa strategically (because Rhodesia keeps any combination of African forces north of the Zambezi), security-wise (because it almost ensures the existence of a friendly Bechuanaland, and because the continued existence of Moçambique, and after Moçambique, of Angola, would otherwise be seriously threatened). The group of Southern African states are much stronger as a group than the sum total of their individual strengths, and the basis of the present arrangements between South Africa and Rhodesia is that each is essential to the other. It was not a coincidence that Mr. Smith was the only Prime Minister to attend Dr. Verwoerd's funeral.

(c) Over Co-operation in Southern Africa Dr. Verwoerd took a most important initiative very shortly before his death in having discussions with Chief Jonathan of Basutoland. It appeared from these discussions, from the very sympathetic message sent by Paramount Chief Sobhuza of Swaziland on the occasion of Dr. Verwoerd's assassination, and from Chief Seretse Khama's statements that Bechuanaland must, for geographical reasons, live within the South African economic sphere, that Dr. Verwoerd was moving magisterially towards his objective of achieving a degree of co-operation between all the countries of Southern Africa which might well have led to that economic and even political co-operation which is associated with the concept of a common market. Here, Dr. Verwoerd's prestige would have been of immense value in the development of a Southern African organisation which would have included European and African, apartheid and multi-racialism, and which would have immensely strengthened the position of all the participants. It will be a test of the statesmanship of his successor whether this seed can be persuaded to develop.

BRITAIN

At the beginning of August Mr. Wilson was faced with two problems as serious, perhaps, as any which have faced a British Prime Minister in peace-time.

(1) The Sterling Crisis

There had in July been a run on sterling which was reflected in the official announcement of a loss of £25 million, but the month has subsequently been estimated to have cost the British reserves, or the credits available, between £200 and £300 million. In order to obtain a renewal of the short-term credits, and so to gain three months' delay, Mr. Callaghan had introduced a drastic deflationary budget estimated to take £500 million out of the taxpayers' pockets, and to increase the number of unemployed officially to 400,000 but in the opinion of some economists up to 1,000,000. This was accompanied by a wage and price freeze, the former anathema to the trade unions, the latter probably impossible of enforcement. Mr. Cousins had resigned and although the Executive Committee of the T.U.C. had accepted the necessity of the freeze, it was by no means sure that the Council would do so. Mr. Wilson met them immediately prior to the current meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, but in spite of his emphasising that the alternative would be devaluation, and escalating this, less plausibly, into the likelihood of a subsequent economic crisis on the scale of the Great Depression, he obtained approval by the narrowest of margins. It is quite possible that when the T.U.C. itself meets at the end of this month the decision will be reversed. Mr. Wilson could then take the alternative of legislative enforcement of the wages freeze, but he would, by so doing, antagonise even more of the unions which are the Labour Party's strongest support. If the freeze is watered down to avoid this then such conviction as it may have carried in international banking circles would cease, and a further renewal of credits would become much more problematical. In August the Treasury announced a loss of £5 million which the London Times contemptuously reported under the heading 'Evasion over the Reserves' as having no relation to the real loss, and added "there is not much to admire in this kind of clumsy evasion."

(2) The Rhodesian Crisis and the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers

(a) Sanctions I called my analysis of the Rhodesian problem a month ago: 'Rhodesia - the Tide Turns', because it seemed to be clear that the economic and financial sanctions which Britain had imposed, and persuaded other governments to assist in enforcing, would not bring about the overthrow of Mr. Smith's Government in the near future, and possibly at no time. On 9th August the New York Times commented that sanctions against Rhodesia were 'an utter failure' in their avowed purpose of persuading Rhodesians to abandon independence. German, French and Italian salesmen were already replacing British. Subsequently, West German imports from Rhodesia, including tobacco, coffee and asbestos, were reported to have increased by over one-sixth in 1966, and West German exports by 50%. On the 13th, trade with Norway was reported to have increased 70% so far in 1966. The President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia said the same day that "commerce

had got over the worst effect of sanctions ... new sources of supply for raw materials were being established ... and the effect on British Industry would be substantial in future years." On 14th August the London 'Sunday Express' commented that 'the British people are utterly disenchanted with Mr. Wilson's sterile sanctions policy.' And Colin Legum, one of Rhodesia's bitterest critics, added on 17th August that 'there is, as yet, no real evidence of British policies succeeding against Mr. Smith.' He continued that 'this view is accepted unquestionably by the British Conservative leadership, now convinced that only a deal with Mr. Smith offers a way out' and that even Mr. Wilson's colleagues say 'the British Government may not be able to win ... The only real difference between official Conservative and Labour policy is that the former favours a settlement now while Labour prefers to postpone it for as long as possible.'

This situation was quite as obvious to the leaders of the African Commonwealth countries as to the British leaders. Mr. Kapwepwe, Mr. Kaunda's Foreign Minister, on 10th August, scornfully referred to Mr. Wilson's 'objectives, time scales and so forth' as 'merely catchpenny dreams' ... soon 'the rebels will be able to toast in champagne their first anniversary of the entrenchment of White rule for all time'. His Government 'doubted completely British intentions in Rhodesia. Sanctions had only united all the Europeans there behind Mr. Smith. The betrayal of Rhodesia's African people was highly probable.' Mr. Kaunda said that Zambia's final decision whether or not to leave the Commonwealth would be taken after the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers but that he would not attend the meeting. The Prime Ministers of Kenya and Tanzania also announced that they would not be represented. For other reasons the Prime Ministers of Nigeria and Ghana appeared unlikely to attend.

Mr. Wilson showed all his cleverness in his attempts to weaken the opposition and strengthen his own hand in advance of the Conference. He quieted the Conservatives by giving Mr. Heath a categorical promise that Britain had no intention of using force, though he hedged when pressed as to whether this meant that he would in no circumstances throw the whole Rhodesia issue to the United Nations, by pointing out that any other Commonwealth country (indeed, any member of the United Nations) could raise it there at any time. He promised, however, that Britain would not do so without Parliament having had a chance to discuss this. Mr. Malcolm Macdonald, his roving High Commissioner in East Africa, was sent to Lusaka to try to renew the discussions which had proved too much for the Minister of State, Mrs. Judith Hart. The Secretary of State, Mr. Bottomley, who had not shown sufficient dexterity vis-à-vis the African countries to reap the reward of his rigidity towards Rhodesia, was moved, in a Cabinet reshuffle, to the Department of Overseas Aid. Mr. Wright and Mr. Watson were sent back to Salisbury to add verisimilitude to Mr. Wilson's contention that the 'talks about talks' were still going on and that nothing should be done at the Prime Ministers' meeting to destroy the chance of agreement being reached, on, of course, Mr. Wilson's six principles. Then in the last week of August, when the Rhodesian

Government announced their intention to introduce certain bills making minor amendments in some of the entrenched provisions of the 1961 Constitution, they were abruptly recalled to strengthen Mr. Wilson's claim that, while ready to negotiate, he was not ready to surrender any principle and therefore that the decision as to future policy could safely be left in his hands. It was suggested that, since South Africa was obviously the key to the success or failure of sanctions, the British Ambassador had been instructed to seek Dr. Verwoerd's agreement to a reduction of the assistance being given, and then, after Dr. Verwoerd's assassination, that the new South African Government should be given time to consider a possible further approach. The bitterness of some African criticism of Britain was used to rally older members of the Commonwealth against Britain being put in the dock at the Prime Ministers' meeting. And the resignation of U Thant formed the basis for the argument that it would be unwise to press for United Nations action while the United Nations lacked even a Secretary-General.

But Mr. Wilson failed to prevent the Commonwealth Committee (of High Commissioners) on Sanctions reporting that sanctions had failed to topple Mr. Smith's Government. From the British point of view this is merely recording the situation as of now; but from the African point of view it was an admission by a Commonwealth Committee that the whole policy of sanctions as applied and requested by Britain had failed. And Mr. Wilson also failed in his effort to reduce the temperature of the discussion on Rhodesia by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers by persuading them to agree in advance that the first item of the (non-existent) agenda should be a general review, as usual, of the international situation and that Rhodesia should be considered in the light of this. So many wanted Rhodesia to be discussed first that Mr. Wilson had, at almost the last moment, to agree.

The combination of opportunism and pyrotechnics proved, however, to have had some effect by facilitating a reaction when some of the African and Asian Ministers badly overplayed their hand. Sir Albert Margai, the Prime Minister of Sierra Leone, by speaking for 2½ hours, left little time for others, and so blunted the first attack, while his exaggerated personal criticism of Mr. Wilson came unconvincingly from the head of a corrupt government which had just been hauled over the coals for failure to account for substantial sums received in aid from Britain. Mr. Lee Kwan Yu's suggestions for guerrilla action against Rhodesia could scarcely have failed to remind his listeners that he had fellow Chinese terrorists in Malaya more in mind than Africans in Zambia. And both led to acid interventions in support of Mr. Wilson from Mr. Holt of Australia and the Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaysia.

It had appeared early last week that there was wide support for a Commonwealth decision either calling upon Britain to promise not to grant independence to Rhodesia without immediate majority (i.e. African) rule, or for a Commonwealth initiative at the United Nations to strengthen mandatory sanctions, or both. The latter represented the greater danger to Mr. Wilson, for any strengthening of sanctions would be likely to involve, at some stage, action against South Africa, with probable South African retaliation

against Britain, which might finally topple Mr. Wilson's financial house of cards, and, at the weekend it looked as if he might avoid joint Commonwealth action to this end, although some of the African Commonwealth countries are likely to propose or support such action at New York after the Assembly meets. Without a joint Commonwealth recommendation, however, it would be much easier to defeat any proposals for mandatory action in the Security Council. This is the more important because those countries, such as the United States and France, which have hitherto supported the U.K. in the Security Council, might find it difficult to do so, at least to the extent of a veto, if they appeared to be going against world-wide opinion. The U.S. administration will be under considerable pressure from their own negro population to support the African states at the U.N. wherever possible, and will wish to do so in order to avoid adding fuel to the flames of racial conflict in the big American cities. And General de Gaulle will have just returned from a world tour designed to restore France's influence, particularly in African and Asia, in the course of which he has had a warm welcome from Ethiopia which was one of the two states to appeal to the International Court against South Africa over South West Africa. Whether Mr. Wilson will be able to prevent a majority demand for a pledge not to grant independence without majority rule is more doubtful. He has the knowledge that Australia and New Zealand would be opposed and that Canada and Malaysia, and perhaps others, would support him with them. He is reported to have fortified himself on Saturday with full Cabinet backing for keeping his hands free for further negotiation with Mr. Smith without a condition which would obviously make this impossible. How events this week will influence the decision is hard to forecast; even the choice of South Africa's next Prime Minister might sway one or more Commonwealth ministers.

The paradoxical situation continues that willy-nilly Mr. Wilson has to be, from time to time, if not Mr. Smith's best friend, at least his involuntary ally.

RHODESIA

Within Rhodesia Mr. Smith's position was, during August, much more relaxed than Mr. Wilson's in Britain: "we do not," he said, on the 20th, "have to face the embarrassing position of trying to avoid concealing foolish errors, changing course, and at the same time, through the use of words, produce a smokescreen in an attempt to conceal from the rest of the world the exercise which we are carrying out." "Britain was in a corner over Rhodesia, and trying to get out of it."

He wisely did not build up expectations of the outcome of what the London Daily Telegraph called "merely exploratory seances with disembodied Rhodesian officials."

He was able to note with satisfaction the letter which Sir Douglas Logan, the Principal of London University (with which the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is linked for the maintenance of academic standards) wrote to the Times pointing out that there was no justification for the claim made by the dismissed lecturers that academic freedom had been impinged by their arrest. Sir Douglas quoted the late Sir Hector Hetherington's classic definition of academic freedom and concluded -

"If we apply this definition of academic freedom to the University College in Salisbury the following questions arise:

1. Has the Rhodesian Government ever interfered with the right of the College to choose its teachers?
2. Has the Rhodesian Government ever interfered with the organisation of the College's courses or with the standard of instruction?

Others may be better informed than I am but, to the best of my knowledge, the answer to both questions is in the negative", and he added that "appointment to an university post does not confer the kind of immunity (from the ordinary law of the land) which diplomats traditionally enjoy."

Mr. Harper, the Minister of the Interior, was able to announce that every group of infiltrators had been rounded up and the majority shot in the course of the operations, and although Mr. Wilson seized upon the announcement of the forthcoming introduction of Bills to amend the 1961 Constitution to provide, inter alia, for preventive detention without the Proclamation of a State of Emergency to recall Messrs. Wright and Watson from the talks in Salisbury, it would appear that the object of the Bills was simply to reinforce internal security and that Mr. Smith may have been justified in implying that the denunciation in London of the Rhodesian Government's intentions was a storm in a teacup.

The month also saw the continued collapse of Zambia's attempts to bring down Mr. Smith's Government by cutting off trade with and through Rhodesia. It was reported that they had given permits for a further 20,000 tons of copper to be despatched

over the Rhodesia Railways, bringing the total for August up to 40,000 tons. This, it has been suggested, with such exports as are being sent by other routes, is likely to cope with the current production, but not to reduce the stockpile which has been estimated to be about 60,000 tons. The strike of the Zambian copper miners, who have been claiming the distribution to them of their contributions over recent years to a Company's pension fund (of R8 million) before the introduction of a new Government pension scheme, may have enabled some of the stockpile to be exported in substitution for lost production during the ten days during which the strike was effective, but the report of a further likely increase in the price of copper can only confirm the Zambian Government in their decision to continue to make use of the Rhodesia Railways in order not to prejudice the revenue which they obtain from their share of the sales of copper. Their decision has re-established the operating financial position of Rhodesia Railways. The report that a vital bridge on the road route to Dar-es-Salaam has collapsed and that there are long queues of trucks piled up on either side has re-emphasised the unreliability of that route, and there have been no reports that either the Congo Railway or the Benguela Railway will be able to increase their tonnages of copper from Zambia. Zambia faces the further problem that the recent concentration of trucks on the export of copper has reduced the number available for the import of coal from Wankie. This, in turn, must mean that coal stocks are being run down at the mines, and it may be necessary for temporary priority to be given in the near future to the import of coal over the export of copper. It has also been reported that 800 of the 1,400 white railwaymen in Zambia have exercised their option to return to Rhodesia in October (and that a number of them will be re-assigned to the section of the Railway through Bechuanaland, the operation of which the Rhodesia Railways have now taken over from the South African Railways) and there is a shortage of 600 white miners on the Copper Belt. The Zambian Government is now trying to prevent the exodus of both miners and railwaymen by offering special concessions for the transfer of part of their income to Rhodesia. The break-up of the Central African Airways is likely to result in the departure of yet more expatriate technicians, with a consequent reduction in the efficient operation of the airways, and this, coupled with the departure of the RAF Squadron, and the ground personnel which accompanied the arrival of the latter in Zambia, will reduce the carrying capacity of the airways as an alternative to road, railways and river transport.

On balance Mr. Smith's Government would also appear to have been strengthened by the decision last week of the Supreme Court of Rhodesia that while it was an illegal regime, it was in de facto control of the country, and that the Courts must therefore carry out the laws provided they would have been legal if passed before U.D.I. The detainees who were the complainants would therefore not be released. This has been referred to as a judgement of Solomon but would appear to share the claim of the latter to be as bad in law as in ethics. It would simply appear to mean that if Mr. Smith's Government

can hang on long enough, the Courts will eventually recognise it as the legal government of Rhodesia. Mr. Smith was probably justified, therefore, in claiming the judgement as a victory.

It is, I think, a fair deduction that, if Rhodesia turned the economic corner in July, it has now begun to turn the political corner. I have suggested on previous occasions that sanctions would never succeed, and that Rhodesia would eventually secure its independence, provided morale did not break. It would be foolish to expect a speedy, or necessarily, complete, success, but it would now seem that morale is unlikely to collapse in anything like present conditions and therefore that eventually success will come. The death of Dr. Verwoerd has introduced another uncertainty and there will be gloomy days ahead. But it is steadily becoming more likely that Rhodesia will secure independent without much change in the 1965 Constitution. If it does then there is no doubt that "We," in Mr. Smith's words, "will have pulled off one of the most fantastic operations in the last 100 or 200 years."