

SOUTH AFRICAN RECORD

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SOUTHERN AFRICA RECORD

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THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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**SPEECH ON ANGOLA BY H.E. DR K.D. KAUNDA, PRESIDENT
OF ZAMBIA, TO THE OAU IN ADDIS ABABA ON 12 JANUARY
1976**

Since the birth of the OAU, this is the most serious and tragic crisis the continent has ever faced. Angola is serious and tragic to the people of that country; it is tragic in its implications for the unity and security of Africa. Angola is an emotional issue. It could divide Africa without ending the war. It is an emotional issue because people, as I am speaking now, are dying. Men, women and children, the sick and the poor, are being mowed down like animals by weapons from countries whose own nationals are enjoying peace and progress in their own countries.

Angolans suffered from colonialism for centuries and fought a war of liberation in the last fourteen years from Portuguese colonial and fascist rule and for full national independence. Today they live in the shadow of death, day in, day out. Today in vast areas of independent and sovereign Angola, dying is more sure than living. Men and women, old and young, live only one step ahead of the disaster that dogs them at every turning. Africa has failed them.

Angolans are dying now while we are discussing ideology. The people of Angola are suffering — refugees without homes. I live near Angola and I can hear the voices of poor children crying in pain and desperation. Yet here we are debating ideology in the comforts of distance. Events in Angola are saddening. Events in Angola are a challenge to Africa. The civil war in Angola must be brought to an immediate end. We in this organisation cannot on any grounds whatsoever let or encourage Angolans to kill one another or be killed. If the OAU has an obligation to an independent Angola, it is to stop the war. It is war, no matter how much we try to interpret it. It is being fought with tanks, armoured cars and even from the air. Worse still, it is already internationalised. We must reject the erroneous and dangerous assumption that a truly independent Angola will only be achieved through intensification of the civil war.

Therefore, this summit must, very carefully and coolly, examine every aspect of the Angolan tragedy. We must look at the fundamental causes and not merely at the effects of the civil war. We should not indulge in endless recriminations. We must not sink so low as to trade insults amongst ourselves. I am saddened and very deeply hurt that even young comrades in this hall, whose heads of state could not even leave their countries, who could not even send their foreign ministers, could hurl insults at us, young comrades who know nothing about the real struggle in southern Africa, from the safe distance of their countries. Zambians have died for the cause of liberation. We take the problem of southern

This speech was delivered at the First Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments of the OAU.

Africa very seriously and cannot accept insults.

Fundamental Aims

This summit should clearly address itself to the basic problem in Angola and then suggest ways and means which will achieve two fundamental aims, namely: first the ending of conflict in Angola in the interests of Angolans as a whole; and, second, the strengthening of unity in the OAU which the Angolan tragedy so clearly threatens. In our view this meeting should start by examining the objective reality of the situation, by looking at the whole issue from at least three angles:

- the history of the Angolan struggle and the OAU attitude to it;
- what the current situation is in Angola and what Angolans and we Africans gathered here want; and
- what Africa's collective position should be in order to resolve the problem within the OAU context.

The OAU recognised the three nationalist movements in Angola. Until early 1975, this organisation recognised the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA). Subsequently, this recognition was extended to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). No one can dispute that the OAU regarded each movement as a legitimate and authentic representative of the Angolan people and expression of their aspirations. The OAU did not meet before the independence of Angola to withdraw recognition from any of the movements. Until 11th November, 1975, all our actions clearly show that the OAU was working toward achieving unity among the three groups. Zambia was among the countries charged by this organisation to unify the Angolan liberation movements. The others were Congo, Tanzania and Zaire. In accordance with our mandate we kept the OAU informed.

We as an organisation have done nothing to indicate that we have changed our collective attitude and actions in this regard. In June last year, the summit in Kampala called for reconciliation and unity amongst the three movements. MPLA, FNLA and UNITA were together and on the basis of equality in Mombasa, Alvor, and Nakuru. Pictorial history will show them embracing and smiling in acknowledgment of their common brotherhood and basic aims. No one claimed exclusive right to represent the people of Angola. Africa prayed for their unity. We in Zambia worked and continue to work for their unity.

Zambia's Position Regarding MPLA

There should be no misunderstanding about Zambia's position regarding our relations with the MPLA. Our relations date back to

the time shortly after our independence when they opened their eastern zone in their fight for the liberation of Angola. The MPLA established its base in Zambia. That base is still there today. It is from this base that the MPLA intensified its heroic war of liberation against the fascist Portuguese forces.

Zambia has always been, as the MPLA themselves referred to us, a logistical bridgehead for their armed struggle against the Portuguese fascists. The MPLA asked for material assistance and we gave it to them generously. Considering our obligations to the liberation movements of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Mozambique then, this is a great sacrifice for the five million people of Zambia. Few countries have made similar sacrifices. It is a fact that MPLA fought heroically and made great sacrifices. We had experience of their heroism because Zambia, as is well known, acted as their rearguard. Without that rearguard support from Zambia, the struggle could have been more difficult. We made these sacrifices for the cause of MPLA — namely, the independence of the Angolan people.

In referring to our fraternal assistance to the MPLA, I want to stress the fact that preference for one movement does not and should not necessarily preclude other movements from the gigantic task of national reconstruction.

This cardinal principle is even more relevant to the current situation in Angola. As I have stated above, the OAU has not withdrawn recognition from any of the three political parties in Angola, formally or otherwise. MPLA, FNLA and UNITA remain in the territory of Angola as political and military facts. As of now the following is the situation in Angola:

- Angola is a multi-party state with three political parties struggling for power. None has an exclusive right to represent the people of Angola as a whole;
- the two super-powers and other countries have intervened on the side of one or the other of the claimant governments;
- South Africa, that racist and major problem for Africa, has taken sides and is fighting against one of the parties; and
- two contending governments have been declared by the three movements and some African governments have recognised the Luanda-based government while others are calling for the formation of a government of national unity.

We cannot pretend that the three political parties do not exist in Angola. This would be a futile exercise in self-deception. The fact that each one is ideologically unacceptable to one or the other of member states of the OAU does not render its existence null and void. The fact that all of them are being supported by countries or forces against which some member states object, does not erase the fact of a party.

Foreign Intervention

Another factor is one of foreign intervention. Here I would like to state, first and foremost, that everyone in this hall condemns South African intervention in Angola. We have repeatedly condemned South Africa and do condemn them now. We call for the withdrawal of all South African troops from Angola. We in Zambia need no lecturing from anyone about apartheid and colonialism. We have fought South African apartheid for many years. Our people have been killed or maimed and property destroyed in support of the liberation struggle. We know that pious speeches do not bring liberation. Only action does. I know some of us will forget about the struggle soon after take-off from Addis Ababa, while, for Zambia, this is only part of the daily programme.

There is an equally dangerous dimension contributing to the Angolan tragedy. This is the intervention of super-powers and their allies. In the history of independent Africa, this is the first time that thousands of non-African regular troops and heavy sophisticated military equipment have been brought in to instal one political party into power and in service of their hegemonic interests. This is a most dangerous phenomenon which constitutes a grave threat to the entire continent and the unity of Africa.

The involvement and rivalry of super-powers in Angola must not be condoned by the OAU. Whilst these super-powers are trumpeting the end of the cold war era, in their bilateral relations, they are at the same time sowing seeds of discord in Africa. Angola is now a theatre for their hegemonic rivalry.

Basic principles of Pan-Africanism

It is dangerous for Africa to side with one super-power, for that is an automatic invitation to the other to get involved. The world is cruel. Time has come for us to reaffirm the basic principles of Pan-Africanism:

- no intervention by foreign powers in African affairs.
- no interference in the internal affairs of other independent states.

All foreign intervention must cease and all foreign troops and equipment must be withdrawn from Angola. Africa must never be the instrument for furthering the objectives of any super-powers.

Africa must understand that imperialism is imperialism. It knows neither race nor colour nor ideology. All nations which seek to impose their will on others are imperialists. Africa must not permit these Trojan imperialist horses which can come under the guise of furthering the cause of liberation, to divide us. But the truth is that in 1965, shortly after UDI in rebel Rhodesia, I sent a mission to Moscow and Washington, to explain the grave consequences of UDI and to ask for material assistance. Moscow's

reply was that they could not give us assistance because our economy was still organised on a capitalist basis. This was shocking to us. We were only a year old and yet Moscow expected us to overhaul the capitalist system and organise our economy on socialist lines without manpower and the capacity to build a socialist economy.

This is why it pains us to hear the insults when people talk about fighting South Africa. We have been fighting South African apartheid since Independence. We have fought the Portuguese and the rebels in Rhodesia. Fighting is not a new thing to us. We have fought capitalism as well. If anyone wants to see our revolution I say come and see. We do not talk about revolution, we believe in revolutionary action. There can, therefore, be no doubt about our programme.

In dealing with this grave issue, Zambia is in no way questioning the sovereign right of each member state to make its own independent decisions. However, if we as member states fail to harmonise our views on such issues as Angola, our organisation will no longer be credible. We run the risk of playing into the hands of the enemies of Africa. We believe that the existence of two rival governments, or the recognition of one of them, does not necessarily preclude reconciliation between the two claimant governments. In the final analysis peace in Angola will only be achieved through an agreed solution.

Assistance to liberation movements must not be an excuse for establishing hegemony in Africa. In this respect, we should learn from the People's Republic of China. Among the socialist countries, China is easily the leading source of material assistance in the liberation struggle. Her contribution is immense. The OAU asked the People's Republic of China for assistance, she gave it willingly, but China has not sought to impose her will on the people of Africa. She has not sought to twist the arm of Africa by any means. In this context we in Zambia deeply regret the untimely death of Premier Chou en Lai. We pay tribute to him for leaving behind a clean record. China helped the struggle in Angola, but she has no imperialist ambitions.

China helped us in Zambia by building a railway line from Kapiri Mposhi to Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania. She gave us massive assistance which strengthened our resolve to fight colonialism, racism and fascism in southern Africa. Let there be no misunderstanding. We are not against the Soviet Union. Our relations with the Soviet Union are very good. We have bought many things from them. Even now at the Addis Ababa Airport, we have a plane, a YAK 40, which we bought from the Soviet Union and Soviet personnel are helping to train our officers. So there can be no doubt about our bilateral relations.

We are also certain that if the fundamental issue of unity is achieved among the contending parties it will be infinitely easy for Angolans and the OAU to remove all external factors contributing to the intensification of the conflict. The OAU should not play a divisive role in Angola. If we are not careful, we shall create a very dangerous precedent for Africa. We could very easily erode the very principles which have sustained our unity in the past. We could sow seeds of Angola's dismemberment. Zambia does not want any of these possibilities to occur. Zambia is committed, as always, to the unity of both the OAU and Angola. Zambia's objectives in this regard are as follows:

- peace in Angola. We want peace which means more than the absence of a fruitless war. We seek the establishment of understanding, harmony, and co-operation among all the people of Angola who have struggled for centuries for freedom and peace against foreign domination and exploitation. Today in Angola, as I have stated on previous occasions, there is independence which we happily recognise but which does not carry with it the attributes of freedom.
- Zambia would like to see the establishment of a united and prosperous Angola. In Zambia's view, if the war continues it will result in the balkanisation of Angola. The OAU does not want to see this happen. The OAU and the Angolan people did not fight for such an outcome. Zambia did not make sacrifices in support of the Angolan people in order to achieve that negative outcome. We have repeatedly stated that Africa must not build conditions for the partition of Angola but for her unity.
- Zambia wants a progressive and non-aligned Angola, completely free from external pressures.

In the light of the foregoing, Zambia stands by the call for the establishment of a government of national unity in Angola that will bring peace and unity and reconciliation in Angola.

We thus recommend to this Extraordinary Session of our Assembly:

- that the OAU should condemn South Africa's aggression in Angola and call upon her to withdraw from Angola forthwith;
- that the OAU should condemn and call for an immediate end to all other forms of intervention;
- that the OAU should call for an immediate ceasefire;
- that the OAU calls upon the three Angolan movements to find a political solution which should guarantee peace, unity and the territorial integrity of their bleeding fatherland;
- that the three movements must form a government of national unity.

The Challenge of the OAU

We came here not to save face but to save the lives of millions of innocent Angolans.

We are here not to usurp the sovereign right of the Angolan people to determine their own destiny. We are here to help end the senseless killing of brother by brother in the current civil war.

We are not an electoral college. We did not come here to confirm any one political party as the government of Angola. We are here to build bridges of love and understanding across the chasm of fear, hatred and destruction.

We are here not to confirm the right of any foreign power to intervene in Angola. We are here to ensure that the people of Angola are left alone to determine their own destiny without foreign interference in any shape or guise.

Our inescapable duty is to ensure that Angola achieves peace, unity and economic and social progress. We remain committed to finding a solution that will help Angola achieve these objectives.

This is the challenge of the OAU. We must face the crisis without emotion. Time is against the OAU and the true interests of the people of Angola. Africa's honour is at stake. Zambia is, however, confident that our collective wisdom will prevail so that Africa can emerge as a continent capable of making its own decisions which are primarily in the interest of the African people. To this end, Zambia reaffirms its commitment to the principles and ideals of the OAU Charter and to the legitimate aspirations of the Angolan people.

Africa, where is your power? Is it in insults we have heard? No. Is it in division which we witness? No. The power of Africa lies in unity; in constructive action. Without these elements we simply have no power.

Finally, Africa must not deceive itself. Decisions on Angola, effective decisions I mean, are being made in Moscow and Washington. Our failure to find a solution here confirms that the OAU has no power to shape the destiny of Africa. The power is in the hands of super-powers to whom we are handing over Africa by our failure. We must not fail, we must not be divided. We must be united.

SOUTH AFRICA AND ANGOLA:

A. Statement in Parliament on 25 March 1976 by the South African Minister of Defence, the Hon. P.W. Botha, concerning refugees in Angola and the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola.

The House will remember that on 27 January of this year, the Minister of the Interior, during the non-confidence debate, explained at length South Africa's handling of refugees from Angola. Besides the mammoth task which different departments performed to house and care for these persons before their eventual repatriation to Portugal, there was also the matter of thousands of displaced persons whom the South African Defence Force had to care for in South Angola. It is known to all that South Africa has performed an enormous task in regard to those persons. South Africa did not shrink from this humanitarian task which made great demands upon it. On the contrary, South Africa went out of its way to help these people.

As far as the outside world is concerned, South Africa has attempted throughout to bring the international community to the realization that it, and in particular the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross, has a responsibility towards these unfortunate persons. South Africa addressed three direct requests, on 27 January, 6 February and 13 February, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to do something about the fate and the problems of these refugees. Except for the Red Cross, the international community did nothing. All that South Africa received for this humanitarian task was blame and abuse.

In order to prevent suffering when South Africa completely withdraws all its troops from these camps, an appeal was again made yesterday to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to do everything possible to ensure a smooth and orderly take-over of the task which South Africa has had to perform alone for so long. It was very clearly put to him that the alternative would be chaos and suffering and that South Africa wished to state unambiguously in advance that it accepted no responsibility for this. He was accordingly requested to consider sending representatives to assist in this task. We also requested the International Red Cross to help where possible.

We have done all and more than could be expected of us in carrying out this humanitarian task. Others must now assume this responsibility.

Furthermore, the South African Defence Force gave protection to the workers at Calueque in order to ensure the vital water supply to Owambo. In this connection it will be recalled that the

Hon. the Prime Minister, in a statement released on 21 March, referred to assurances which we had received through a third party — incidentally, the British Government — and which, broadly speaking, appeared to be acceptable to us. Before taking any final action on our side, however, we wanted clarity on our interpretation of these assurances.

Since then we have obtained the necessary clarification through the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Seen as a whole, the assurances by the Government of the People's Republic of Angola amount to this — that it will not damage the hydro-electric project concerned or endanger the workers and that it will respect the international boundary. That Government has already indicated that it does not wish to harm the people of South West Africa by depriving them of the electricity supply.

In these circumstances, the Government has decided that all our troops will be out of Angola by Saturday, 27 March 1976.

South Africa's only interest is that the Calueque and Ruacana schemes, in both Angola and Owambo, should be secured. It is expected that after our withdrawal and when conditions in the area are again normal, it will be feasible to arrange practical matters concerning the scheme with those concerned.

From: South Africa (Republic) House of Assembly Debates No. 9, 1976.

B. Letter dated 28 March 1976 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

With reference to my telephone conversation with you today, I have the honour to confirm that the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola was completed by 27 March 1976.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council in the usual way.

S/12026

C. Letter dated 31 March 1976 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations, addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the statement by the Permanent Representative of Portugal in the Security Council this morning (1905th meeting) in connexion with the protection of the Calueque Dam in southern Angola.

That statement did not disclose any substantial divergence in the viewpoints of South Africa and Portugal on the principal issues relating to this aspect of the debate currently in progress in the Security Council, although there was a clear difference in

emphasis, some differences of interpretation and several omissions in the statement. I wish to focus the attention of the Council on the elements about which there would appear to be no dispute:

Firstly, the Portuguese authorities were requested as early as April, 1975, to provide protection for Calueque Dam in terms of the international agreement on the development of the Cunene River, between Portugal and South Africa and they were unable to comply;

Secondly, the note delivered by the South African Ambassador in Lisbon to the Portuguese Government at the beginning of September, 1975, and copied to the Secretary-General on 5 September is, as far as we are aware, not disputed. In it South Africa welcomed the Portuguese decision that Portuguese troops were at that time in a position to protect workers in the area concerned; undertook to withdraw the South African personnel concerned in co-operation with the Portuguese commander, and commented on the practical question of provisioning the Portuguese force from South West Africa. An important fact to be noted in this letter is that South Africa expressed readiness to withdraw from Angola on 5 September 1975, long before Angola became an independent State;

Thirdly, the Portuguese in fact never came to Calueque in a protective capacity.

Because the Portuguese Government found themselves unable to assume this role, South Africa had no choice but to protect the workers and the construction work at the dam. After the Portuguese departure from Angola, the works and workers at Calueque still required protection. Immediately assurances on this, and related matters, were received, South African troops were withdrawn.

The Permanent Representative of Portugal apparently implies that because contacts between his and my Government concerning Calueque had been 'at the highest level, through the diplomatic representatives accredited to the two capitals', South Africa could not rely on 'imaginary statements of an unknown emissary of the High Commissioner in Luanda'. I find it difficult to reconcile this attitude with paragraph 4 of the note of 2 September 1975, handed by the Portuguese Government to the South African Ambassador in Lisbon, and referred to both by the Portuguese Permanent Representative today and by me at yesterday afternoon's meeting. The extract I quoted then (S/PV.1904 at p.53) reads as follows:

"If at the start it was not immediately possible for the Portuguese authorities to transfer military units to the

above-mentioned area, they meanwhile had direct contacts in Windhoek between representatives of the High Commissioner in Luanda and the Pretoria Government. At present the Portuguese are at Calueque."

In other words the Portuguese authorities themselves admit that contacts took place between representatives of the High Commissioner in Luanda and the South African authorities.

I wish to reiterate that arrangements were made with the Portuguese authorities for them to assume protection of the Calueque Dam, and for South Africa to carry out the task until they arrived.

I should be glad if this letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

S/12033

D. Resolution 387 (1976) Adopted by the Security Council on 31 March 1976

The Security Council,

Having considered the letter of the Permanent Representative of Kenya on behalf of the African Group of States at the United Nations (S/12007),

Having heard the statement of the representative of the People's Republic of Angola,

Recalling the principle that no State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State,

Recalling also the inherent and lawful right of every state, in the exercise of its sovereignty, to request assistance from any other State or group of States,

Bearing in mind that all States Members of the United Nations must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

Gravely concerned at the acts of aggression committed by South Africa against the People's Republic of Angola and the violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity,

Condemning the utilization by South Africa of the international Territory of Namibia to mount that aggression,

Gravely concerned also at the damage and destruction done by the South African invading forces in Angola and by their seizure of Angolan equipment and materials,

Noting the letter of the Permanent Representative of South Africa regarding the withdrawal of South African troops (S/12026),

1. *Condemns* South Africa's aggression against the People's Republic of Angola;
2. *Demands* that South Africa scrupulously respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Angola;
3. *Demands also* that South Africa desist from the utilization of the international Territory of Namibia to mount provocative or aggressive acts against the People's Republic of Angola or any other neighbouring African State;
4. *Calls upon* the Government of South Africa to meet the just claims of the People's Republic of Angola for a full compensation for the damage and destruction inflicted on its State and for the restoration of the equipment and materials which its invading forces seized;
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of this resolution.

**PRESS STATEMENT CONCERNING THE BREAKDOWN OF
THE SMITH-NKOMO CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS, BY THE
PRESIDENT OF ZAMBIA, H.E. DR K.D. KAUNDA, ON 22
MARCH 1976**

In April 1969, Heads of States of the East and Central African countries gathered in Lusaka and worked out a document that is now known as the Manifesto on Southern Africa.¹ That important document was later adopted by the OAU and was acclaimed by the United Nations as a landmark approach to the questions of war or peace in Southern Africa. The message was clear. Africa declared her preparedness to resolve problems of unliberated areas by peaceful means if possible but reserved her right to intensify the armed struggle if this was the only option left for achieving majority rule in minority-held territories.

This message remained unreciprocated by minority regimes in Southern Africa until armed struggle in the then Portuguese territories in Africa brought about the collapse of the Portuguese fascists and imperialists in Mozambique and Angola.

Even at this late stage we allowed peaceful change to have an opportunity in Zimbabwe. The total breakdown of constitutional negotiations in Rhodesia has now demonstrated to all and sundry that nothing can be gained by a peace strategy as an approach to ending racism and colonialism which have led to conflict in Southern Africa. We have left no stone unturned in our determination to achieve majority rule by peaceful means. We invested a lot in the peace programme as an instrument for beneficial change; this has failed. But we place this failure squarely on the shoulders of rebel leader Mr Ian Smith and his henchmen. We wish to pay timely tribute to Zimbabwe nationalists for persisting to the end and for unmasking Mr Smith and his diehard supporters and exposing them for what they are to the entire world, that is, racists and fascists who would like to continue feasting on the blood of the exploited and down-trodden black masses of Zimbabwe. Mr Smith has closed all the avenues to peaceful change, leaving violence for which the six million people are fully prepared.

In these circumstances Africa has no option left but to help intensify the armed struggle which is now in full swing. This is the gravest hour in the history of our subcontinent. This period will go down as the time when minority regimes gave a formal "no" to peaceful change. But this refusal is also salutary because it marks the watershed between peaceful change and intensified armed struggle in this area. An entirely new chapter has been opened; it

1. See: *Southern Africa Record* no. 2, June 1975, p. 1

is a new and formidable one in which majority rule must be irrevocable and must be decided on the battlefield with all the consequences that it entails. The armed struggle is a just war against injustice which must be waged until victory is won.

By its very nature peaceful and constitutional change involves guarantees for property, pensions, right to life, privacy of homes together with a host of fundamental freedoms for the protection of minority groups. Violent change, on the other hand, has no place for any of these. This is in the nature of things. However, the whites in Rhodesia have made their choice, namely that they prefer change to come by violent means. Who are we to deny them this right? It is their choice freely made. But they should not blame anybody except themselves for opting for a course that is clearly not in their interests and has the gravest consequences for non-racialism in Southern Africa.

We call upon the international community, we call upon all those nations and peoples who genuinely believe in freedom and human rights to support the just struggle of freedom fighters. We call upon all friendly and peace-loving countries of the world to stand up and be counted on our side in this hour of crisis. The states are clear: victory is on the side of the oppressed people. We will not lack will, we have not lacked will in the past, we will strive until victory is achieved.

EXTRACTS CONCERNING RHODESIA, SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN, FROM A MOZAMBIQUE/ZAMBIA JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED IN MAPUTO ON 25 APRIL 1976

The two Presidents discussed in detail the struggle in Southern Africa. On Zimbabwe they reaffirmed their belief that the first option, namely peaceful change under the Manifesto on Southern Africa and the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration¹ had been exhausted: since Smith obstinately refused the transfer of power from the racist minority to a majority government. In this connection the two Presidents reaffirmed their intensified militant support for the Zimbabwe nationalists in their armed struggle; they called for unity in the ANC in order to pursue the war of liberation efficiently and effectively against the minority regime and further, appealed for the political, moral and material support from all progressive, peace and justice loving forces, to the people of Zimbabwe.

President Kaunda hailed the border closure by Mozambique against the racist minority regime of Ian Smith and upheld it as a great act of gallantry that could only be achieved by a committed people. He noted that Zambia herself had closed the border in 1973 and Zambia knew what it meant to make this kind of sacrifice. He thus saluted President Machel and FRELIMO for this courageous act on behalf of the suffering masses of Zimbabwe. This was also a significant landmark in the implementation of United Nations sanctions against the Smith regime and a measure that will accelerate the downfall of this inhuman minority regime. The President pledged Zambia's continued support for FRELIMO's significant performance.

President Samora Machel reaffirmed that the closure of the Rhodesian border by the People's Republic of Mozambique was an expression of international obligation of the people of Mozambique to assist the oppressed people of Zimbabwe. He emphasised that in accomplishing their duty Mozambique was contributing to enlarge the borders of liberty in the African continent and at the same time, consolidating the achievement of the Mozambique revolution.

In this context both Presidents saluted the recent Resolution of the United Nations Security Council as added victory to the people of Mozambique.

On Namibia, President Samora Machel and President Kenneth Kaunda recalled the numerous resolutions of the United Nations on the illegal occupation of this country by South Africa, which

The communique was issued on the occasion of the State Visit of the President of Zambia, H.E. Dr K.D. Kaunda.

1. See: *Southern Africa Record* no. 2, June 1975, p.37

constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security.

In particular the Presidents referred to the recent United Nations Security Council Resolution 385² on Namibia, passed in January this year, which called upon South Africa to respect the will of the international community and leave the people of Namibia to freely determine their own destiny. The Presidents reaffirmed their support for SWAPO as the sole legitimate and authentic representative of the people of Namibia, which, alone can bring a genuine peace to that territory. They condemned the establishment of bantustans, which have the sole objective of dividing the Namibian people and continuing their exploitation and demanded the immediate withdrawal of South Africa from the territory. The two Presidents appealed also to all the peace and freedom loving countries to intensify their support to SWAPO.

With regard to the situation in South Africa itself, both Presidents strongly declared their continued opposition to apartheid as a racist and fascist system which has been violently condemned by the entire world community. They reaffirmed their unconditional support to the freedom fighters in South Africa who struggle for the birth of a society free from racial discrimination and based on human equality and dignity. They condemned the Pretoria - Tel Aviv racist-fascist alliance which is directed at continued domination and oppression of the peoples of South Africa and Palestine and further appealed to the international community to support the South African majority people in their just struggle.

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With regard to the Indian Ocean question, the two Presidents stressed their desire that this Ocean become a peace zone and expressed their conviction that the forthcoming Non-Aligned Summit Conference, scheduled to be held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, shall devise the means to bring to reality this just aspiration of the peoples of the Indian Ocean.

President Samora Machel thanking President Kaunda for the visit to Mozambique stressed its high historical significance for it gives a great encouragement to the people of Mozambique in this difficult phase of national reconstruction and of consolidation of the People's Power in Mozambique. President Kaunda also shared these sentiments and said that the visit was also an encouragement and a great inspiration to the people of Zambia.

2. See: *Southern Africa Record* no. 4, February 1976, p.40

BRITISH PROPOSALS FOR A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT IN RHODESIA (JANUARY 1977)

The following is the text of the British proposals put to the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Mr Ian Smith, by the Chairman of the Geneva Conference, Mr Ivor Richard, in Salisbury, in January 1977:

This note is being given to delegations in confidence as a suggested basis for further discussion and negotiation.

The British Government believe that the ideas contained in it will help the conference participants to reach agreement on the form of a transitional government for Rhodesia. In formulating these ideas the British Government have attempted to meet the general concern that the process of transition to independence should be rapid, guaranteed and orderly. It is the particular concern of the nationalists that the minority should not be able to exercise such a control over the transitional government as to allow it either to delay independence or so to influence the drawing-up of the independence constitution as to prevent it from giving full effect to genuine majority rule. It is the particular concern of the minority that there will be a genuine transitional period, during which the security situation will be properly controlled, and that there will be a place for them in an independent Zimbabwe.

In pursuance of these interests, the two sides in the negotiations have hitherto adopted incompatible positions concerning the power-structure during the transitional period: the nationalists have pressed for an immediate transfer of full power to themselves; the minority have insisted on a structure for the transitional government which would have the effect of leaving control over vital areas in their own hands. In the view of the British Government both of these positions are unrealistic. A negotiated settlement is possible only if both sides agree to a structure for the transitional government which strikes a reasonable balance between them and which gives adequate protection to the legitimate interests of both. This would have to provide for a visible and effective African majority in the government but also for a participation by representatives of the European minority sufficient to ensure that their interests were taken into account. While power in sensitive areas, such as internal security and the drawing-up of the independence constitution, could not be left in minority hands, it should not pass, during the transitional period, wholly into the hands of the nationalists.

The suggestions in this paper are designed to provide such a

structure. They proceed on the basis that where solutions can be found using purely Rhodesian elements, that should be done. But where that is not possible, it is suggested that a British presence could usefully be introduced to assure each side that neither can prevent the achievement of the legitimate aims of the other.

There would have to be a number of pre-conditions for the introduction of any British presence into the constitutional arrangements for Rhodesia during the transitional period. Among the most important of these would be that—

- A. It was clearly accepted by all parties concerned that guerrilla activity would cease as soon as agreement had been reached on the setting up of the transitional government; and
- B. British readiness to continue to play a part in the agreed transitional arrangements would be conditional upon all other parties abiding by that agreement.

In the light of the above considerations, the British Government suggest that the parties should now discuss a structure for the transitional government of Rhodesia on the following lines:

- (i) The transitional government would be headed by an interim commissioner who would be appointed by the British Government, after due consultations. There would also be a deputy interim commissioner, appointed in the same way, who would act as interim commissioner, whenever the latter was unable to do so.
- (ii) In addition to the interim commissioner, the transitional government would have three principal organs —
 - (a) a Council of Ministers;
 - (b) an Advisory Council of Senior Ministers;
 - (c) a National Security Council.
- (iii) The Council of Ministers would contain equal numbers of members from each of the political groups represented by the delegations to the Geneva conference and a further similar number of members appointed by the interim commissioner from among members of the European minority. It would thus have a substantial African majority.
- (iv) The leaders of the delegations to the Geneva conference would be members of the Council of Ministers and would together form an inner cabinet (perhaps called the Advisory Council) which would act in a general advisory capacity to the interim commissioner and would also have other specified functions.

- (v) The Council of Ministers would have full executive and legislative competence for the government of Rhodesia, subject only to the interim commissioner's reserve powers.
- (vi) Except where his reserve powers were involved, the interim commissioner would be required to act in accordance with the advice of his ministers in exercising all his executive functions and in assenting to legislation.
- (vii) If there were agreement on the choice of one of the African members of the Council of Ministers as a first minister, the meetings of the Council of Ministers would be presided over by the first minister who would, as such, also have other specified functions. If not, other arrangements would have to be made: e.g. the chairmanship of the meetings of the Council of Ministers might rotate among the members of the Advisory Council. In any event, the person presiding over the Council of Ministers would not have a casting vote.
- (viii) The interim commissioner would not be a member of the Council of Ministers and would ordinarily not attend its meetings. However, he would be empowered to do so when he considered that matters might be discussed which could affect his residual responsibilities (see paragraph (ix) below).
- (ix) The interim commissioner would have residual responsibility for certain subjects (primarily external affairs, defence, internal security and the implementation of the programme for independence). His powers in the Council of Ministers in relation to these subjects would enable him to ensure, on the one hand, that the minority in the Council of Ministers could not impede the transition to majority rule and independence and, on the other hand, that the transitional government did not act in a way which would imperil the orderly nature of that transition or which was incompatible with the exercise of the United Kingdom's constitutional responsibilities.
- (x) The question of voting procedures in the Council of Ministers could be regulated in a number of different ways. In choosing the appropriate voting system, the aim should be to ensure that the will of the substantial majority of the members of the Council of Ministers prevailed in matters of day-to-day government and in maintaining the momentum of the transition to majority rule and independence: but also to ensure that the representatives of the minority community, whilst not being able to impede that transition, were given an

effective voice in all decisions of special concern to their community. Where the interim commissioner's residual responsibilities were involved, a special majority would be required and the interim commissioner would himself be given a vote which, in certain situations, could operate as a casting vote.

- (xi) Apart perhaps from defence and internal security (see paragraph (xii) below) and possibly also external affairs, all departments of government would be in the charge of a minister. The Council of Ministers would have collective responsibility for governing Rhodesia.
- (xii) Defence and internal security would be the responsibility of the National Security Council, though this would not necessarily preclude the allocation of these portfolios to individual ministers if agreement on that matter could be reached. The Council would consist of the interim commissioner (and perhaps also the deputy interim commissioner), the leading members of the Council of Ministers and the two chiefs of staff of the armed forces and the commissioner of police. These three officers would themselves be appointed and removable by the interim commissioner. The interim commissioner would preside over meetings of the National Security Council and would be in a position to exercise a casting vote.
- (xiii) The day-to-day organization and operational control of the armed forces and the police would be the responsibility of the respective chiefs of staff and the commissioner of police, but these would be responsible (either directly or, if there were ministers for defence and internal security, through those ministers) to the National Security Council which would give them general directives of policy with regard to the maintenance of public security and generally with regard to the organization and employment of the forces under their command. The National Security Council, with the concurrence of the interim commissioner, would have the power to appoint and remove the holders of certain senior offices in the armed forces and the police. The National Security Council would also be responsible for supervising the re-organization of the defence and internal security forces.
- (xiv) The Council of Ministers would be responsible for the implementation of the programme for independence and in particular for the working out of the independence constitution.

For this purpose it would appoint a constitutional committee which would include representatives of the various political parties and also constitutional and other experts (perhaps from outside Rhodesia). The constitutional committee would formulate recommendations to the Council of Ministers. The interim commissioner would himself preside over the constitutional committee (as well, of course, as taking part in the consideration of its recommendations in the Council of Ministers).

EXTRACTS CONCERNING RHODESIA AND SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA, FROM AN ADDRESS BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER, THE HON. R.F. BOTHA, TO A SEMINAR IN NEW YORK ON 20 JUNE 1977

South Africa has from the outset recognised the important role which the situation in Rhodesia plays in stabilising the situation in Southern Africa. South Africa has therefore sought to facilitate the creation of an atmosphere conducive to black and white Rhodesians agreeing amongst themselves about their own future.

South Africa has not recognised the present Rhodesian government *de jure*, but has consistently preserved its longstanding trading and other ties on the basis of the *de facto* position in the interest of both black and white Rhodesians. South Africa has consistently declined to participate in economic boycotts and sanctions against Rhodesia or against other countries in the region. We believe neither in the practical efficacy of economic sanctions nor in the political motivation underlying their application. South Africa has sought to encourage Rhodesian leaders both white and black to get together to work out their own solutions, but we do not believe that threats of any kind have a salutary effect; indeed the reverse. And we do not prescribe to them the constitutional solutions they should adopt.

Regarding the present initiative, the South African Government has agreed to support the British/American efforts to get the directly interested parties to agree to an independence constitution and the necessary transitional arrangements, including the holding of elections in which all can take part equally so that Rhodesia can achieve independence during 1978, and peace. It is also agreed that the negotiating process offers the best hope of a reduction of violence and that efforts should be made to this end.

But the question remains: can the Rhodesian question ever be settled peacefully and reasonably? I believe so, provided the British and American Governments are prepared to hold fast to the principles they themselves have enunciated. I assume that they will, but they must do so not only with the weight of their moral authority but also with a *physical commitment*. Broadly speaking these principles are:

- A government elected by the majority of the people;
- Security and integrity of the electoral process;
- Freedom of speech;
- Freedom of assembly;
- Freedom of religion;
- Full protection of property by due process of law;
- Equal protection before the law;

Seminar, *Why Invest in South Africa?* organised by SAFTO and SENBANK.

- Independence of the judiciary;
- Safeguards for the maintenance of minority rights;
- Implementation of economic, financial and technological assistance.

The British/American initiative on Rhodesia may, however, be faced with a dilemma whether or not to proceed with a constitution, and with subsequent elections based thereon, which has enjoyed the endorsement of the supporters of the major black and white parties who support a peaceful negotiating process towards independence, as against the implacable opposition of the Patriotic Front which believes that power stems from the barrel of a gun.

The decisions to be made in this context will prove as good a test case as any of the genuineness of the commitments of the United States and British Governments to the list of principles — which particularly the United States Government — has propounded with such forthrightness, indeed with such dogmatism, in the last few weeks. It is said all too often that Mr Ian Smith is the obstacle to a solution. I do not wish to plead Mr Smith's case, but I want to stress that in the opinion of the South African Government Mr Smith is not the problem. Mr Smith accepts majority rule, he accepts that the transfer of power to majority rule is irrevocable and that majority rule means that black Rhodesians would have a predominant voice in the election of future governments. The question of instituting black majority rule is therefore not an issue. Objectively all the prerequisites for a peaceful solution are there, if only the necessary resolution can be applied to move forward on the basis of the principles which Britain and the United States themselves insisted upon.

South West Africa/Namibia

The question of South West Africa has been on the agenda of various United Nations bodies since the inception of the United Nations in 1946. For more than three decades South West Africa has been the subject of a number of World Court decisions and many acrimonious debates inside and outside the United Nations. Canvassing the right and wrongs in the history of this long dispute will require a lengthy exposition for which there is no time this evening.

While the debate concerning South West Africa was continuing unabatedly in the United Nations during the past two years, the representatives of the various population groups inside the territory — blacks, whites and coloureds — were meeting in an open and honest attempt to work out their constitutional future in a peaceful way. They assembled in a building in Windhoek known

as the Turnhalle. Recently they agreed on a constitution for the territory, to which the United Nations took exception. The South African Government was committed to instituting an interim authority based on the Turnhalle constitution. However, as a result of views expressed by the five Western countries represented in the Security Council of the United Nations, the Turnhalle delegates decided on 10 June, 1977, to request the South African Government not to proceed with its undertaking to institute such an authority, but instead to appoint an Administrator-General to carry on the administration of the territory until elections were held and a government constituted in terms of a constitution decided upon by a constituent assembly to be elected as the first step in the process towards independence.

A bill was passed by the South African parliament last week which will empower the State President to appoint an Administrator-General for the territory who will be responsible *inter alia* for the drawing up of election regulations.

The inhabitants of South West Africa are now exercising their right to self-determination and they have moved to a position where they are substantially in accord with most, if not all, of the requirements which, in the view of reasonable minds in the outside world, are necessary to a settlement of the question of the political and constitutional future of the territory.

These requirements are:

- Every person to have the right to the free development of his personality, in so far as this does not violate the rights of others or offend against the public order and moral code.
- The life, the freedom and the inviolability of the person of everyone to be unassailable and only to be encroached upon pursuant to a law.
- All persons to be equal before the law. No person to be favoured or prejudiced by reason of his origin, sex, language, race, colour, creed or political convictions.
- Freedom of faith to be guaranteed.
- Freedom of movement to be guaranteed.
- Every person to have the right to express his opinion in speech, writing or pictures, in so far as it does not infringe the rights of others or is not harmful to the state.
- Freedom of the press to be guaranteed; this right to be limited by the general laws, the protection of the constitutional order of youth and of personal honour and dignity.
- The right to ownership, whether individually or collectively, of

movable or immovable property to be guaranteed.

- South West Africa to be an independent country before 31 December, 1978.
- A special representative of the Secretary-General to be involved in the elections to ensure that elections are held on a free and fair basis.
- A panel of jurists to settle disputes which might arise in the electoral process.
- Persons in exile to be free to return to participate peacefully in the political process. (Indeed a number have already returned.)
- Persons detained on political grounds inside and outside South West Africa to be released. (In other words, South West Africans presently being detained in certain African countries must be released, together with those detained by the South African authorities.)
- The panel of jurists to decide on whether persons who claim to be "political prisoners" have in fact been imprisoned because of their political beliefs or actions, or whether they were sentenced after having been found guilty of common-law crimes.

The South African Government accepts these principles, because they are acceptable to the inhabitants of South West Africa. It is for the peoples of South West Africa to decide their own internal arrangements and external relations. They will elect a Constitutional Assembly and that Assembly will decide upon a constitution which in turn will form the basis for elections to constitute a government for the territory. It will be the responsibility of this government, in advance of independence, to conduct negotiations with the South African Government on a large number of complicated issues, such as the South African Railways, use of the port of Walvis Bay, debts incurred in respect of developmental plans and projects, communications, trade and finance, as well as administrative, health, social, technical and security services.

All the basic ingredients necessary to bring this long dispute to an end, are now in existence. The basis for an internationally acceptable solution has been established.

SPEECH ON RELATIONS WITH AFRICA BY THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE, MR CYRUS VANCE, TO THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLOURED PEOPLE, IN ST LOUIS, MISSOURI, ON 1 JULY 1977

This is a special occasion for me to meet with you and to discuss with you such an important subject: American relations with Africa.

Africa matters very much to the United States. This is a fact more and more Americans are coming to understand. You in the NAACP have recognized this fact since the first days of your organization, almost seventy years ago: in sponsoring the first Pan American Congress in 1919 . . . in your calls, during the days of the Marshall Plan, for effective assistance as well to Africa, the Caribbean and other developing areas.

We, in a new Administration, hope that we can show similar vision as we build our policies toward Africa. We proceed from a basic proposition: that our policies must recognize the unique identity of Africa. We can be neither right nor effective if we treat Africa simply as one part of the third world, or as a testing ground of east-west competition.

African reality is incredibly diverse, but out of this diversity comes a general fact of great importance, Africa has an enormous potential — in human talent, in resources to be developed, in energy to be harnessed. Let us consider how this is true in terms of our own national interests. For Africa's potential is tied to our own.

- The success or failure of the search for racial justice and peace in Southern Africa will have profound effects among the American people, and our participation in that search is based on the values of our own society.
- The role of the African nations at the United Nations, and in other multilateral bodies, is pivotal. *One-third of the UN member states are African.*
- Africa's mineral and agricultural wealth already provides a substantial portion of our imports of such commodities as copper, cobalt, and manganese for our industries, and cocoa and coffee for our homes, and Africa supplies 38 percent of our crude petroleum imports.
- Our direct investment in sub-Saharan Africa has increased nearly six fold over the past 15 years, our trade now is almost 12 times what it was then, and the pattern of our trade with Africa includes an even larger share for black Africa. Trade with South Africa in 1960 was 39 percent of our commerce with Africa; now, our trade with Nigeria alone is double the value of

that with South Africa.

- Beyond these political and economic ties that bind our futures, there are the social and cultural links from which we have benefited greatly. Our society and culture are enriched by the heritage so many Americans find in Africa. We experience this enrichment every day — in our literature, our art, our music, and our social values.

During the past few months, as we have considered the specific policies I will discuss today, a number of broad points emerged. They define the general nature of our approach.

First, the most effective policies towards Africa are affirmative policies. They should not be reactive to what other powers do, nor to crises as they arise. Daily headlines should not set our agenda for progress. A negative, reactive American policy that seeks only to oppose Soviet or Cuban involvement in Africa would be both dangerous and futile. Our best course is to help resolve the problems which create opportunities for external intervention.

Second, our objective must be to foster a prosperous and strong Africa that is at peace with itself and at peace with the world. The long-term success of our African policy will depend more on our actual assistance to African development and our ability to help Africans resolve their disputes than on maneuvers for short-term diplomatic advantage.

Third, our policies should recognize and encourage African nationalism. Having won independence, African nations will defend it against challenges from any source. If we try to impose American solutions for African problems, we may sow division among the Africans and undermine their ability to oppose efforts at domination by others. We will not do so.

Fourth, our policies must reflect our national values. Our deep belief in human rights — political, economic, and social — leads us to policies that support their promotion throughout Africa. This means concern for individuals whose rights are threatened, anywhere on the continent, and it means making our best effort peacefully to promote racial justice in Southern Africa. In this we join the many African nations who, having won their freedom, are determined that all of Africa shall be free.

Fifth, our ties with Africa are not only political, but cultural and economic as well. It is the latter two that are most enduring.

And finally, we will seek openness in our dealing with African states. We are willing to discuss any issue, African or global; to broaden our dialogue with African nations and to try to work with them, even when we may not agree.

Only thus can we promote our views without rancor. Our renewed relations with the People's Republic of the Congo, our experience at the recent conference on Southern Africa in

Maputo, and our work with African delegations at the United Nations all demonstrate the value of this approach. In the end, of course, our Africa policy will be judged by results, not intentions.

One of Africa's principal concerns is that its basic human needs be met. Despite its vast resources, it is still one of the least-developed areas of the world. Eighteen of the 28 least-developed countries in the world are African. We are prepared to help.

In addition to our growing trade and investment relationships with African nations, we are committed to providing economic assistance that will directly improve the lives of those most in need. Turning this principle into practice cannot be accomplished overnight but it must be done.

Our economic assistance to Africa is being increased — from 271 million dollars in fiscal year 1976, to a projected 450 million dollars in fiscal year 1978. We hope that assistance from our European friends will also increase and expect to consult with them on how we can all make the most effective contributions.

To help our aid reach rural villages, we will emphasize support for development and sharing of appropriate technology and technique. I have in mind such devices as small farm machinery now being manufactured in Senegal, Upper Volta, Mali and elsewhere; hand-hydraulic palm oil presses in Nigeria, and basic agricultural research in Africa; and try to assure that our own technical assistance is appropriate to African requirements.

We also acknowledge the needs of African states for advanced techniques that will enable them to develop and process more of their own natural resources. Our Agency for International Development, headed by Governor Gilligan, is determined to cut down on red tape in approving assistance projects, so it can respond quickly and effectively. Greater attention will be given to projects which can be started quickly and require minimal outside technical assistance or expensive equipment.

Men and women are more important than machines, Africa's natural resources will be developed by Africa's people. Human development is thus the key to Africa's future. While we will provide additional opportunities for Africans to study here, emphasis will be on programs of training and education in Africa.

We must also remember the importance of Africa's infrastructure. It is a vast continent, and improved transport and communications are essential to its welfare.

I am aware, as I indicate these directions for our program, how tempting, but mistaken, it would be to design blueprints for another continent's development. We can only work effectively if we work co-operatively with African governments on behalf of their development priorities. Accordingly, we will seek to increase our contribution to the African Development fund and we are

requesting from Congress 200 million dollars for the Sahel, to be managed in co-ordination with the Club du Sahel.

The long drought in the Sahel devastated the economies of some of the poorest countries in the world. Now these countries are working together to become self-sufficient in food production and to develop the ability to withstand future droughts. In the Club du Sahel, the African states plan together for the region. The donor nations participate in the planning and determine how each can assist most effectively. They then commit the resources necessary to meet their goals. In this process, we are discovering the great value of encouraging co-ordination among African states, of planning with them and with other donors and on concentrating on regional problems rather than isolated projects. For it will be essential that sensible and effective programs be planned and implemented.

America can fully support African development only if we meet the kind of commitments I have outlined. I hope that every citizen with an interest in Africa will make it clear, to the Congress and to us in the executive branch, that he or she wants those commitments met.

While we address the reality of human needs in Africa, we must also do what we can on behalf of human justice there. We will be firm in our support of individual human rights. Our concern is not limited to any one region of the continent.

We must understand the diversity of African social and value systems. Gross violations of individual human dignity are no more acceptable in African terms than in ours. One of the most significant events in modern African history, and in the international effort to promote human rights, was the recent decision by commonwealth countries to condemn the "massive violation of human rights" in Uganda. Many African nations took part in this decision. Their action should be applauded. Abuse of human rights is wrong on any grounds. It is particularly offensive when it is on the basis of race.

In Southern Africa, issues of race, of justice, and of self-determination have built to a crisis.

- The conflict in Rhodesia is growing. Rhodesian incursions into neighboring countries exacerbate an already dangerous situation and deserve the condemnation they have received. The choice between negotiated settlement and violent solution must be made now. The same is true for Namibia. Many lives—black and white—hang in the balance.
- The risk of increased foreign involvement is real.
- Violence within South Africa grows. There may be more time there than in Rhodesia and Namibia for people of goodwill to achieve a solution, but progress must soon be made, or good-

will be lost.

Crisis within the region has brought pressure for stronger action at the United Nations and appeals to our responsibilities under its charter.

This is the reality we face. The dangers, our interest, and our values, as well as the desires of the Africans themselves, require our involvement — and our most dedicated and practical efforts.

We cannot impose solutions in Southern Africa. We cannot dictate terms to any of the parties; our leverage is limited, but we are among the few governments in the world that can talk to both white and black Africans frankly and yet with a measure of trust. We would lose our ability to be helpful if we lost that trust. It is, therefore, essential that our policies of encouraging justice for people of all races in Southern Africa be clear to all.

After careful consideration, this Administration has decided to pursue actively solutions to all three Southern African problems — Rhodesia, Namibia, and the situation within South Africa itself. These problems must be addressed together, for they are intertwined.

Some have argued that apartheid in South Africa should be ignored for the time being, in order to concentrate on achieving progress on Rhodesia and Namibia. Such a policy would be wrong and would not work. It would be blind to the reality that the beginning of progress must be made soon within South Africa, if there is to be a possibility of peaceful solutions in the longer run. It could mislead the South Africans about our real concerns. It would prejudice our relations with our African friends, it would do a disservice to our own beliefs, and it would discourage those of all races who are working for peaceful progress within South Africa.

We believe that we can effectively influence South Africa on Rhodesia and Namibia while expressing our concerns about apartheid. Implicit in that belief is the judgment that progress in all three areas is strongly in the interest of the South African Government.

We believe that whites as well as blacks must have a future in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. We also believe that their security lies in progress. Intransigence will only lead to greater insecurity. We will welcome and recognize positive action by South Africa on each of these three issues, but the need is real for progress on all of them. Let me review briefly our approach to each.

We are actively supporting a British initiative to achieve a negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian crisis. In coming weeks, we will be seeking agreement on a constitution that would allow free elections, open to all parties and in which all of voting age

could participate equally. These elections would establish the government of an independent Zimbabwe. Our goal is that this be accomplished during 1978. This constitution should include a justifiable bill of rights and an independent judiciary, so that the rights of all citizens, of all races, are protected.

We also hope to lend greater assistance to the peoples of neighboring nations whose lives have been disrupted by the crisis in Southern Africa.

In Namibia, a solution leading to independence is being sought through the efforts of the five Western members of the Security Council with South Africa; the United Nations, and other interested parties, including the South West Africa People's Organization. That solution would include free elections in which the United Nations is involved; freedom for political prisoners; repeal of discriminatory laws and regulations; and the withdrawal of instruments of South African authority as the elections are held and independence achieved.

On the basis of our discussions thus far, we are encouraged by the prospects for an independent Namibia — one which will take its rightful place in African and world community. We welcome the indications of flexibility on the part of South Africa. We are gratified by the confidence shown by many African governments in the efforts of the US and Western associates on the Security Council. Differences remain, however, and progress will require a willingness on all sides to be open-minded and forthcoming, but we will persevere.

While pursuing these efforts for peace and justice in Namibia and Rhodesia, we will have also expressed to the South African Government our firm belief in the benefits of a progressive transformation of South African society. This would mean an end to racial discrimination and the establishment of a new course toward full political participation by all South Africans.

The specific form of government through which this participation could be expressed is a matter for the people of South Africa to decide; there are many ways in which the individual rights of all citizens within South Africa could be protected. The key to the future is that South African citizens of all races now begin a dialogue on how to achieve this better future.

The South African Government's policy of establishing separate homelands for black Africans was devised without reference to the wishes of the blacks themselves. For this reason, and because we do not believe it constitutes a fair and viable solution to South Africa's problems, we oppose this policy. We did not recognize the Transkei, and we will not recognize Bophuthatswana if its independence is proclaimed in December, as scheduled.

We deeply hope that the South African Government will play a progressive role on the three issues I have discussed; we will applaud such efforts. If there is no progress, our relations will inevitably suffer. We cannot defend a government that is based on a system of racial domination and remain true to ourselves.

The activities of the NAACP are a testament to the inseparability of our foreign and domestic goals. It is also entirely fitting that Andy Young, who has done so much in the struggle against our divisions at home, should now be contributing so well to the design and effectiveness of our policies abroad.

I have heard some suggest that we must support the white governments in Southern Africa — come what may — since they are anti-communist. In fact, the continued denial of racial justice in Southern Africa encourages the possibilities for outside intervention.

Similarly, when such crises as the recent invasion of Zaire arise, we see no advantage in unilateral responses and emphasizing their east-west implications. We prefer to work with African nations and with our European allies in positive efforts to resolve such disputes. As President Carter recently said, it is best to fight fire with water. The history of the past 15 years suggests that efforts by outside powers to dominate African nations will fail.

Our challenge is to find ways of being supportive without becoming interventionist or intrusive. We see no benefit if we interject ourselves into regional disputes. We hope that they can be resolved through the diplomatic efforts of the parties themselves in an African setting.

We are aware of the African concern that we have sometimes seemed more interested in the activities of other outside powers in Africa than in Africa itself. They know that some argue we should almost automatically respond in kind to the increase in Soviet arms and Cuban personnel in Africa. We cannot ignore this increase, and we oppose it, all sides should be aware that when outside powers pour substantial quantities of arms and military personnel into Africa, it greatly enhances the danger that disputes will be resolved militarily rather than through mediation by African states or by the OAU.

This danger is particularly great in the Horn, where there has been an escalation of arms transfer from the outside. The current difficulties in Ethiopia and the tensions among nations in the area, present complex diplomatic challenges. We seek friendship with all the governments of that region, and we have established an embassy in the new nation of Djibouti. Its peaceful accession to independence marks a step toward stability in what remains a troubled area.

We will consider sympathetically appeals for assistance from

states which are threatened by a build-up of foreign military equipment and advisers on their borders, in the Horn and elsewhere in Africa, but we hope such local arms races and the consequent dangers of deepening outside involvement can be limited. In accordance with the policy recently announced by the President, arms transfer to Africa will be an exceptional tool of our policy and will be used only after the most careful consideration.

We hope that all the major powers will join us in supporting African nationalism rather than fragmenting it, and in concentrating on economic assistance rather than arms. Our approach is to build positive relations with the Africans primarily through support for their political independence and economic development and through the strengthening of our economic, cultural, and social ties. Our new and positive relationships with nations like Nigeria encourage us in this course. Our efforts to build such relations may not seize the headlines, but this quiet strategy will produce long-term benefits.

Our relations will be closest with those nations whose views and actions are most congruent with ours. We will never forget or take old friends for granted. Their continuing friendship is a fundamental concern; they can rely on our support. When the territorial integrity of a friendly state is threatened, we will continue to respond to requests for appropriate assistance.

We do not insist that there is only one road to economic progress or one way of expressing the political will of a people. In so diverse a continent, we must be prepared to work with peoples and governments of distinctive and differing beliefs.

American representatives in Africa met last May to compare notes and discuss new policy ideas. They agreed that almost everywhere in the continent there is a new feeling about America, a sense of hope, a sense that we have returned to our ideals.

The future of Africa will be built with African hands. Our interests and our ideals will be served as we offer our own support. It will require the understanding and approval of this audience and of Americans everywhere.

ADDRESS TO THE NATION BY THE RHODESIAN PRIME MINISTER, THE HON. IAN D. SMITH, ON 18 JULY 1977

The recent visit to Salisbury of the British and American representatives indicated a dramatic change for the worse in the current settlement initiative. Regrettably, the British are no longer prepared to abide by those understandings which were made with Dr Owen at the meetings held in Cape Town and Salisbury when we commenced this exercise. I made it clear that without these, it would be dishonest to embark on the operation, and it was agreed by both parties that we should be absolutely straight-forward and honest in our dealings.

In order to explain the position clearly, I will have to give you specific examples. Apart from undertakings given to me and my colleagues, Dr Owen reiterated to the Rhodesian public that any settlement which did not retain the confidence of white Rhodesians would be unacceptable; anything which prejudiced the maintenance of law and order could not be countenanced; all voices had a right to be heard, and no party would be given a right of veto.

Let me give you the facts: from the outset we made it clear that if confidence was to be retained, it would be necessary to provide certain safeguards in the constitution, such as: franchise qualifications, special representation in Parliament and an adequate blocking mechanism to protect entrenched clauses, protection for the impartiality of the judiciary and the forces of law and order, the maintenance of the Civil Service and the Security Forces. Without these, not only would the confidence of the white man be lost, but it would lead to tragedy for the mass of our decent law-abiding black Rhodesians, and the development of a situation of chaos comparable to post-independent Angola.

The British Government did say at an earlier meeting that they believed there were alternative safeguards to high franchise qualifications and special parliamentary representation, which their constitutional experts could provide. We were prepared to examine these. However, last week we were informed that there was no hope of anything other than: one man one vote, no special representation for whites and no adequate protection in the constitution of entrenched clauses; any suggestion of underwriting pension funds could not be considered. In Cape Town we discussed the question of rehabilitating the terrorists. Dr Owen saw no problem — the majority would be re-absorbed into their civilian occupations, and those who were not interested could be accommodated in certain other countries. We were impressed with the facility with which he handled this problem. However, last week we were informed that there was a new

solution — they would be given preferential treatment for inclusion in our Security Forces.

Throughout all of the discussions last week, it was absolutely clear to us that the Patriotic Front were calling the tune. This is tantamount to giving them a veto.

I reminded the British and United States representatives that this new offer was completely outside what had previously been agreed. I said that it was not only unacceptable, to me and my Government, but that no white Rhodesian of any consequence would go along with it. To my surprise, Mr Graham informed me that he had to disagree with me and that a large number of Rhodesians had assured him that they would be happy to support such a plan. I doubt whether those Rhodesians have been made aware of the full implications of the plan.

I asked Mr Graham to convey to Dr Owen that these new proposals were a breach of the understanding which we had made, that they were completely unacceptable, and that I believed it was imperative that Dr Owen and I should have an early meeting to determine the position. This was confirmed with a formal message and a reply has now been received to the effect that Dr Owen was considering Mr Graham's report, he would be travelling to America this coming weekend for consultations, and after that he would give consideration to my request. I have no doubt in my mind that he would also feel obliged to consult the Patriotic Front.

It was clear to me, and to our other representatives who participated in the discussions, that the British believe they are dealing with a divided and weak Rhodesia, and that they have us on the run. Certainly, on the surface one can understand people coming to such a conclusion, and therefore I believe it is imperative that we should take positive and decisive action in order to remove any such illusion. I have no wish to sail under any false colours — if it is the wish of the majority of Rhodesians to surrender and betray those principles for which so many sacrifices have been made, they will have to find someone else to lead them. On the other hand, if the majority believe there is any hope of continuing with those ideals and policies which we believed in ten years ago then, regrettably, they are completely out of touch with the world they live in, and such a course can only mean disaster. I could not be party to leading Rhodesians on such a suicide course. I believe there is a road between these two extremes, one along which the majority of Rhodesians, black and white, are prepared to travel, and I have decided to seek a mandate for such a course. Apart from the need for this in order to strengthen our hand in the negotiations with the British, during these exacting and changing times that we are living in, it can only be appropriate to

give the Rhodesian electorate an opportunity to indicate their choice of political direction.

When Dr Owen departed from Salisbury in April, he indicated that he hoped to return in June. I doubt whether he now sees this taking place before August. Moreover, as you may have noticed in recent news reports, he has run into problems in gaining the support of his own Government for his plans on Rhodesia. In addition, the House of Commons is about to go into its summer recess, which lasts until October. Therefore I believe we can go through with our election without holding up the settlement initiative. In fact, it is my assessment that the British Government will still be the guilty party when it comes to delaying progress. I must go further, and say that after last week's setback, I do not believe that there is much hope of a successful outcome to these negotiations. In which case, as I have indicated on a number of occasions, we have alternative plans, namely for an internal settlement between internal Rhodesians — the only ones who really count. I do not accept that Rhodesians should be expected to go on indefinitely in this state of uncertainty, awaiting a settlement with a vacillating British Government.

Accordingly, let us set as our objective a new constitution, if not agreed with the British Government, then agreed internally, before the end of this year. As part of this plan I envisage the creation of a broad-based Government, incorporating those black Rhodesians who are prepared to work peacefully and constitutionally with Government, in order to establish a base from which we will be able to draw up our future constitution.

There is one other point on which I must touch — my concern over cases which are drawn to my attention of continuing racial discrimination which are unnecessary and which infringe against the dignity of man. Clearly, these must be removed. However, let us not oversimplify the problem — much of our discrimination today is in favour of black Rhodesians, and if this was removed it would be to their serious disadvantage.

Let me sum up by placing before you our immediate objectives:

1. A fair and just settlement constitution, which will entrench the necessary safeguards, by the end of this year. Any such constitution would be put to the Electorate through a Referendum.
2. A continuing determination to strengthen the war effort against terrorism. It must be made absolutely clear, that we are quite determined to eradicate the scourge of terrorism from our land, and to this end we are prepared to adopt stronger and if need be ruthless measures.
3. The maintenance of a viable economy, without which the two above objectives cannot be achieved. The manner in which

Rhodesia has overcome the economic war waged against us by the rest of the world, will be recorded in history as one of the greatest economic achievements of this century.

4. The establishment of a broad-based government, including black Rhodesians in order to promote a climate of trust and confidence in which all Rhodesians can work together for a settlement.
5. The removal of any remaining discrimination which is considered unnecessary and undesirable.

It is my belief that if we show our characteristic courage and determination, we will win through to our objective.

My appeal to you is for a clear and positive mandate to proceed with this plan. Over the past ten years we have shown great unity, with resulting strength, from white Rhodesians. This, above all, has been the cause of our incredible success. Regrettably, division and strife between our black Rhodesians has dissipated their effort. While today there are welcome signs of a move towards concerted black opinion within Rhodesia, we are witnessing the tragic spectacle of a new white disunity, which is inviting our enemies to exploit the tactic of divide and rule.

There is today a greater need than ever before in our history, for Rhodesians to unite in order to give us the necessary strength and dedication to go into what I predict will be the final lap of our settlement marathon. Even under normal conditions, a divided nation is a weak nation. But when at war, fighting for its very survival, a divided nation courts defeat, and invites disaster.

Accordingly, in terms of the Constitution, I have advised the President to dissolve Parliament. This Proclamation giving effect to this will be published tomorrow morning and will provide for the General Election to be held on Wednesday, 31st August.

I hope all Rhodesians will join with me in praying that God will help us and guide us in the difficult days which lie ahead.

UITTREKSELS UIT TOESPRAKE DEUR DIE SUID- AFRIKAANSE EERSTE MINISTER, SY EDELE B.J. VORSTER

A. Tydens die Nasionale Party-Kongres van Kaapland, op 24 Augustus, 1977

U sal vir u herinner dat toe ek dit 'n paar jaar gelede namens die Regering wêreldkundig gemaak het dat ons wetenskaplikes uraan kan verryk en dat hulle op die mees denkbare vernuftige wyse 'n eie proses ontwikkel het om dit te doen, toe het die wêreld ons uitgelag en toe ons aangebied het om vreedsaam en vir vreedsame doeleindes saam te werk met alle nasies is ons eenvoudig geïgnoreer en in Junie van hierdie jaar, ten spyte van die feit dat ons 'n stigterslid was, is ons uitgeskop uit die komitee wat met hierdie aangeleenthede handel en Egipte is in ons plek geplaas en as verskoning is aangevoer dat ons te agterlik is op die kerngebied. Nou moet hierdie agterlike nasie op hierdie gebied voor die vier-skaar gebring word omdat hy dan nou skielik 'n kernbom sal wil laat ontplof . . .

South Africa and Nuclear energy

Now, it is well known when I speak about this subject that I as Prime Minister, and other Ministers as well as the President of the South African Atomic Energy Board, have on frequent occasions stated and reaffirmed the South African Government's support for the ideal that nuclear energy be used solely for peaceful purposes. As a practical manifestation of our policy in support of non-proliferation, South Africa has participated actively in setting up the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Furthermore, South Africa has voluntarily undertaken to supply its uranium to non-nuclear weapon states only under Agency or equivalent safeguards. Indeed, South Africa has, throughout, scrupulously honoured all its obligations under the Statute of the Agency. There is ample evidence of the constructive role South Africa has played in this field in the Agency from its very founding days. Therefore, although South Africa has not acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (N.P.T.), that does not mean that we have not co-operated in achieving the object of preventing proliferation. Indeed all the evidence shows that we have in fact co-operated to prevent proliferation.

South Africa's offer to place its large-scale commercial enrichment plant which is to be erected in South Africa, unilaterally, under Agency safeguards, was taken a step further in August 1976 when the President of the South African Atomic Energy Board asked the Director-General of the Agency to provide a proposed draft for such an agreement. A design information

questionnaire was received in October 1976, followed by a draft safeguards agreement at the end of February 1977. Since then the President of the South African Atomic Energy Board has had discussions on this matter with the Inspector-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and during these discussions in Salzburg the President pointed out that the Uranium Enrichment Corporation of South Africa had in fact completed the questionnaire assuming a hypothetical capacity for the commercial enrichment plant. He indicated, however, that as announced before, the South African Government would only decide on the size of the plant in 1978 and pointed out that if the size differed substantially from the one that had been assumed in filling in the questionnaire, the answers would not be applicable at all. In these circumstances it was agreed that it would be better to wait until the South African Government had taken a firm decision on the size of the commercial plant before completion of the questionnaire and its submission to the Agency. These facts are well known.

Furthermore, South Africa has on various occasions in the past given consideration to accession to the *Non-Proliferation Treaty*. In this process South Africa must naturally bear in mind the obligations undertaken by the other parties, on a bilateral as well as a multilateral basis in this field. For instance, in terms of Article IV(2) of the *Non-Proliferation Treaty*, all parties undertake to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Arising from bilateral agreements there have been *specific commitments* in regard to the supply of materials and equipment subject to Agency safeguards, but it has been South Africa's experience in the recent past that these commitments have been totally ignored. Inevitably South Africa must, in considering accession to the *Non-Proliferation Treaty*, be influenced by the way in which the powers concerned live up to their commitments under bilateral agreement with South Africa as well as under Article IV(2) of the *Non-Proliferation Treaty* in general.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, which has a responsibility of ensuring that the obligations of the *Non-Proliferation Treaty* are carried out by the signatories, must inspire confidence with all the parties to the Treaty and only then can it fulfil its functions satisfactorily. Far from inspiring confidence, however, and contrary to its own Statute — it decided last June to oust South Africa from the Board of Governors and to replace it by Egypt "as the most advanced country in Africa in the field of nuclear energy, including the production of nuclear raw material". So it was motivated. This, in spite of the fact that since

the inception of the Agency, South Africa has been a member of the Board of Governors and in spite of its recognised position as a major producer of uranium, as well as its achievements in the field of nuclear research, including the development of a new enrichment process.

Furthermore, countries like the USA have not honoured the commitments they have entered into bilaterally. So, for example, the USA has not honoured the undertaking to supply fuel for the research reactor Safari I, which is under full International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, in spite of the undertaking South Africa has given and honoured, that the burnt fuel elements will be returned to the USA for re-processing. No delivery has yet been made of fuel elements ordered from the USA two years ago, although the enriched uranium was paid for at the time that the order was placed. Up to now South Africa has not even received an indication whether an export permit for the elements will be issued.

As you know, South Africa has decided to build a nuclear power station at Koeberg. South Africa has entered into a contract with the United States Energy Research and Development Agency for the supply of the necessary fuel for the initial period. What guarantee do we have that this contract will be honoured and that the fuel will be delivered in time? — is the question I am entitled to put tonight.

We are still seriously considering accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and we would be prepared to discuss the matter with the United States, who last week urged us to do so, but naturally the discriminatory actions, including those to which I have referred, will be raised and will have to be sorted out at the same time. In the envisaged discussions we would of course also ask for information on what steps the United States Government has taken to induce other countries to adhere to the N.P.T. According to the latest information at my disposal it is interesting to note that apart from other countries which have not done so, no less than thirteen of the thirty-four members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency have either not ratified or acceded to the N.P.T. These thirteen countries are:

Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, France (may I pause here for a moment and say "et tu Brute"), India, Indonesia, Niger, Pakistan, Panama and Portugal.

I ask you in all seriousness, I ask the world by what rights are they pressurising South Africa - why this blatant discrimination against South Africa when there are so many other countries and even thirteen who are sitting on the Board itself, why must South

Africa again be singled out?

The USA, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom are parties to the Treaty but they have fully protected their positions as nuclear weapon states with large nuclear arsenals. Indeed at this time when the Soviet Union is accusing South Africa of preparing a nuclear explosion, reports indicate that the Soviet Union herself has set off a further explosion in its current series. Such are the double standards to which South Africa is subjected to in this world. And I say so in all seriousness, as a matter of fact I say so in all humility; if these things continue the time will arrive when South Africa will have no option, small as it is, to say to the world; so far and no further, do your damndest if you so wish.

B. Tydens 'n Openbare Vergadering te Durban, op 31 Augustus 1977

Rhodesië

Ek het my standpunt andermaal baie duidelik gestel sonder om doekies om te draai en ek wil dit vanaand weer hier herhaal. Die Rhodesiese aangeleentheid is in die eerste plek 'n saak vir die witmense en die swartmense van Rhodesië om op te los. Ek glo dat dit moontlik is, selfs op hierdie late uur, vir die swartmense en die witmense van Rhodesië om tot die besef te kom dat dit in hulle eie belang is om 'n oplossing vir hulle probleem te vind. Maar as daar uitgegaan word van die standpunt dat dit state buite om Rhodesië se eerste reg is om te sê hoe die oplossing moet wees, dan kan ek baie moeilik voorsien dat daar ooit 'n oplossing sal kom. Suid-Afrika het hom nog nooit die reg aangematig nie en Suid-Afrika sal hom nooit die reg aanmatig om te sê wat daardie oplossing moet wees nie. Suid-Afrika was behulpsaam oor baie jare, behulpsaam om die partye bymekaar te bring, behulpsaam om 'n atmosfeer te skep waarin dit moontlik is om 'n oplossing te vind, maar Suid-Afrika het tot vanaand nog nooit 'n oplossing op Rhodesië probeer afdwing nie. Suid-Afrika het nog nooit enige iemand probeer forseer om 'n sekere oplossing te aanvaar of om dit nie te aanvaar nie. Volgens die nuus van vanaand sal die plan van dr Owen môre bekend gemaak word, dan sal die wêreld in spanning wag om te sien of daardie plan tot 'n oplossing kan lei. Ek wil hoop en vertrou dat daardie plan sodanig sal wees dat dit wel moontlik is vir Rhodesië se blankes en vir die swartmense om tot 'n vergelyk te kom. Ek herhaal: Suid-Afrika was vir sy mening gevra, Suid-Afrika het sy mening onomwonde gegee. Suid-Afrika was in die verlede en sal in die toekoms bereid wees om behulpsaam te wees om 'n oplossing te vind, maar Suid-Afrika kan nie gedruk word en sal nie gedruk word om 'n oplossing op iemand af te forseer nie.

Suidwes-Afrika/Namibia

Daar is ook die kwessie van Suidwes-Afrika. Die Administrateur-Generaal wat Suid-Afrika in die toekoms en tot en met onafhanklikheidwording in Suidwes sal verteenwoordig, sal môre sy plicte in Suidwes-Afrika aanvaar. Ek is bewus daarvan dat daar mense is wat eksepsie daarteen neem dat Suidwes-Afrika se Administrateur-Generaal reeds sy plek môre sal inneem. Mense wat so argumenteer is buitestaanders wat nie belang het in die wel en weë en in die lotgevalle van Suidwes-Afrika nie, en as hulle nie daarvan hou nie dan is daar niks wat ek daaraan kan doen nie. Ek het vanaand ook oor die radio gehoor dat die President van Mosambiek aanspraak daarop maak dat Suidwes-Afrika, ingeslote Walvisbaai, aan Swapo moet oorhandig word. Hy het nog nie ons staatskoerant gelees nie. As hy dit wel gelees het, dan sou hy weet dat daar vandag in die staatskoerant gepubliseer is dat Walvisbaai vanaf môre uitgesny is uit Suidwes-Afrika, omdat daardie gebied aan die Republiek van Suid-Afrika behoort en nie aan Suidwes-Afrika nie. Maar ook in die geval van Suidwes-Afrika laat Suid-Afrika hom lei deur net een oorweging. Daardie oorweging is: wat is die wens en die begeertes van die volkere van Suidwes-Afrika? Dit is hulle land, dit is hulle toekoms wat op die spel is. Ons standpunt was deurgaans en dit sal enduit ons standpunt bly dat dit vir die mense van Suidwes-Afrika is om self oor hulle lotgevalle en hulle toekoms te besluit. Ek is bewus daarvan dat daar ook in die komende tye eise aan Suid-Afrika in daardie verband gestel sal word. Ek wil nou met groot verantwoordelikheid sê: Suid-Afrika het getoon dat hy bereid is om met die vyf Westerse lande, wat lid is van die Veiligheidsraad, saam te werk in 'n eerlike poging om 'n internasionaal aanvaarde oplossing vir Suidwes-Afrika te vind. Ons is nog besig met samesprekings en Suid-Afrika het ten alle tye met groot verantwoordelikheid en redelikheid aan daardie samesprekings deelgeneem. Suid-Afrika sal ver uit sy pad uit gaan, ter wille van die mense van Suidwes-Afrika, om 'n internasionaal aanvaarde skikking te probeer verkry. Maar altyd en so het ek dit ook aan hulle gestel met die een uitdruklike voorwaarde dat al daardie ander oorwegings ondergeskik is en ondergeskik moet wees aan die wense en die begeertes van die mense van Suidwes-Afrika self. En wat die Suid-Afrikaanse regering betref, ons geen party sal wees om daardie wense en begeertes te minag of te onderdruk nie.

C. During the National Party Congress of the Orange Free State, on 8 September 1977

South West Africa: Walvis Bay

I want to refer to a report in this afternoon's newspapers, emanating from New York, in connection with South West Africa. The report reads as follows - I quote:

The United Nations Council for Namibia is to call for a meeting of the Security Council to debate South Africa's annexation of Walvis Bay. Egypt's United Nations Ambassador, Mr. Abdel Meguid, took the initiative in pressing for a Security Council meeting and he is believed to have done so with the knowledge and approval of the five Western powers on the Security Council. The Western powers are not represented on the Council for Namibia. African sources say the debate could start before the new session of the General Assembly which begins on September 21 and that the whole independence plan for South West Africa could rest on the outcome.

Now I want to say categorically tonight, ladies and gentlemen, Walvis Bay is South African territory. It has been South African territory for close to two hundred years. It became part of the Cape Province in 1884, it became part of the Union of South Africa in 1910 and part of the Republic of South Africa in 1961. What is more, it was always recognised by all countries as belonging to South Africa. The ownership of Walvis Bay was never disputed even in the hottest debates that we had in the United Nations. Everybody knows and even Dr Waldheim should know that in 1922 a law was passed by the South African Parliament which made it possible, only for practical reasons and it was stated explicitly as such in the Bill, made it possible to administer it as if, for that purpose and that purpose alone, it was part of South West Africa. And I said, on behalf of the Government, in Parliament last year and I said it again this year, and what is more I told the representatives of the five Western countries, namely, United States, Britain, France, Germany and Canada, when I met them in May of this year; I told them that it was the intention of the South African Government to bring back Walvis Bay for administrative purposes to the Cape Province, to the Republic of South Africa. And in terms of my announcement a notice was published on the 1st of September which did just that. Immediately after this proclamation appeared on 1st of September a spokesman of the Secretary-General of United Nations saw fit to criticise us and he had the temerity to call our action unfortunate and unilateral. I might add that we immediately protested to the Secretary-General in the strongest terms. Now comes this announcement of the intentions of the

so-called Namibia Council. Therefore I want to say on behalf of the South African Government that if this report is correct, I repeat, if this report is correct and should the Security Council decide to condemn South Africa for claiming jurisdiction over its own territory or if it should in anyway dispute South Africa's ownership of the territory, then I see no merit at all in any further discussions with the five countries concerned, then, you will agree with me, that it will be a futile time wasting exercise.

INTERVIEW WITH MR PETER KATJAVIVI, INFORMATION SECRETARY OF SWAPO, IN LONDON (SEPTEMBER 1977)

Q. A joint statement was issued in New York on August 12 by Swapo and the Big Five Western nations. Does this indicate that Swapo's status is now recognised by the West?

A. There is no doubt that Swapo leads the liberation struggle in Namibia. It has assumed the total responsibility of acting as the instrument for the change desired by the Namibian people in the existing order.

Recognition of this is acknowledged by the fact that Swapo is recognised by the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity as the authentic spokesman of the Namibian people. It is only natural that the five Western members of the Security Council should act accordingly.

How does Swapo view the Western initiative on Namibia?

We welcome any attempts aimed at achieving a genuine independence for the Namibian people. We remain open to any constructive discussions, provided that they are conducted within the framework of the UN Security Council Resolution 385. We will, however, not allow these discussions to delay, or be used to postpone other actions.

How hopeful are you about a peaceful resolution of the Namibian initiative?

The South African Government of Mr Vorster does have the choice between a negotiated settlement of the Namibia question, or an escalation of the armed struggle.

As we stated in a joint communique issued by the five-nation contact group and Swapo: "The two sides agreed that there exist possibilities for a negotiated settlement of the issue consistent with Security Council Resolution 385." It remains for South Africa to demonstrate its sincerity.

What is the gap that still exists between what Swapo wants and what the South African Government is willing to do?

The gap is there in reality in the form of South African troops, and the daily increase in victimisation and harassment of the Namibian people. This prevents any climate conducive to free national elections, through which the Namibian people can determine their own future.

It is often said that Swapo demands that Namibia simply be handed over to it, without elections being held? Is that fact Swapo's view?

Swapo stands by its repeated call for UN supervised and controlled national elections. We are only too happy to challenge the South African Government through the democratic process of such elections.

Is Swapo willing to have free elections in Namibia? And will it abide by the decision of the electorate, whatever it might be?

We are of course quite prepared to accept the democratic choice of the Namibian people.

While Swapo demands the release of political prisoners in South Africa, Mr Vorster in return has demanded the release of Swapo dissidents being held in Zambian jails. Is Swapo willing to agree to this and if not, why not?

Swapo demands the unconditional release of all Namibian political prisoners held in detention by the South African Government, whether in Namibia or in South Africa. We do not accept the parallel being drawn between the Namibian political prisoners and the Swapo dissidents, detained under party disciplinary measures.

The Namibian political prisoners are in detention for actively participating in the struggle for the liberation of Namibia. The Swapo dissidents are guilty of having betrayed their compatriots in the struggle. Eleven of them are being detained.

How does Swapo see the future for whites in Namibia? Is it willing to give them any special guarantees as a minority group?

There can be no special guarantee for any group in an independent Namibia. The issue to be faced is that of equal rights for all, irrespective of race, creed or colour.

We are especially determined about this because the Namibian people, more perhaps than any other people who have suffered under colonialism, have been persecuted, exterminated and completely denied the most basic human rights. We have no intention of replacing this system by another system which perpetuates the same crimes.

Has Swapo been involved in the forcible abduction of school-children in Owambo for military training? What about the episode earlier this year when a large number of children seemed to have been kidnap victims?

Swapo does not need to pursue such tactics in order to recruit people to the military wing. The reality of the situation regarding these school children is that their school is located within the war zone. Most of the children at this school have suffered directly. It is therefore quite obvious that they should choose to leave. They are not the first group to leave the country in this way.

If a negotiated settlement in Namibia does not come about what are Swapo's plans?

Swapo is ready for a protracted liberation struggle. We will continue the struggle until Namibia is totally free. That means armed struggle.

Swapo is known of course, to have a military programme. How is the Angolan situation, with Savimbi and Unita fighting against the MPLA in the south, affecting this?

It is true that the Angolan renegades are operating from Namibia. They have declared war on Swapo. For this reason Unita is our declared enemy.

Is Swapo willing to recognise South Africa's stake to Walvis Bay as South African territory?

South Africa's claim to Walvis Bay is based on a legally invalid document drawn up between the British Government and its Cape Colony. Walvis Bay is an integral part of Namibia and as our only port it will be of crucial importance to an independent Namibia. South Africa wants to hold on to it in order to sabotage our future. We will never accept this.

Would Swapo allow the use of Walvis Bay as a naval base for the Soviet Union?

Walvis Bay belongs to Namibia and it is to be used for our own imports and exports. There is no question of allowing the Soviet Union or any other country to use it as a naval base.

Namibia will have its own navy and there is no reason why we must give our major port to be utilised by other nations. As a free and independent country we will be an outward-looking nation having ties with the nations of the world, whoever they may be.

What form of economic future does Swapo contemplate for Namibia? Is there an ideological commitment to a capitalist, or socialist, or Marxist type of economic order?

Swapo stands for an economic reconstruction of Namibia which will have as its motive force the establishment of a classless society. The cornerstone of a classless society is the equal distribution of wealth, which means the control of the means of production by the people. We want a socialist society.

What about foreign companies which exist there now.

We take serious exception to those companies which continue to operate illegally in Namibia, and pay taxes to the South African Government. The UN demands that these companies should be registered with the UN Council for Namibia, the only legal authority. We warn those companies which continue to operate in this manner that they will be harshly judged in an independent Namibia. The choice remains with them.

To the South African Government, Turnhalle is the representative voice of all SWA's peoples. What is your view of this?

The relationship which exists between the South African Government and the Turnhalle crowd is that of master and servant.

These people are hand-picked, funded and directed by the South African Government to maintain Pretoria's control over Namibia, albeit in a disguised form. Evidence of the close links between Turnhalle and the South African Government continue to be seen in the current events in Namibia.

Despite Proclamation R17 the Turnhalle is freely able to hold public meetings in the north while Swapo is denied any equivalent rights. It is quite obvious that the Turnhalle owe their existence to the South African army and police.

What sort of future relationship does Swapo envisage between Namibia and South Africa?

We will continue to regard the present South African Government as a racist minority regime imposed upon the majority of the people of that great country. We shall not consider ourselves to be totally free until our brothers and sisters in South Africa and Zimbabwe are also free.

But surely you cannot dismiss the close economic links which exist — and which will continue to exist — between the two countries?

We are aware of the fact that Namibia has had a long history of close association with South Africa whereby everything is tied to

South Africa, economically, politically and culturally. We would therefore have to have a general review of the situation and take steps which are in the interests of the people of Namibia in line with our basic attitude towards South Africa as outlined in my previous answer.

It is often said that Swapo is an Ovambo-only organisation. Is that correct?

Recent events have exploded this myth. Swapo enjoys support on a nationwide basis. Our membership, our central committee and our executive committee reflect this.

It is said that Swapo was started by South African white communists. Is this correct?

The notion of Swapo having been formed by white South African communists is a deliberate misrepresentation of facts. The fact is that Swapo's forerunner, the Ovambo People's congress, later changed to Ovamboland People's Organisation, was formed by Namibian contract workers in Namibia as well as South Africa, who were inspired by all democratic South African patriots. It was started in Cape Town, enjoying support from the Liberal Party and the African National Congress.