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STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF MOZAMBIQUE, H.E. SAMORA MACHEL, AT THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLES OF NAMIBIA AND ZIMBABWE, MAPUTO 16 MAY 1977

After the defeat of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique, humanity was able to extend her liberated zone to the doors of South Africa, a colonial and oppressive stronghold. This is a victory of our people's just liberation war, this is a victory of the cause of the United Nations, a victory of the action of the Committee of 24, a victory of your political and diplomatic battle for the implementation of the historical resolution 1514 (XV).

Freedom and peace are indivisible; the security of nations and human rights are inseparable, they are in the same compartment. The existence of an atmosphere of war in Southern Africa, the growing tension in this region which threatens to involve the whole of humanity, is the direct result of colonialism and racism which still exist here. No country or man can remain indifferent to the Soweto massacres, to the death camps, to the beheadings and hangings in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Confronted by the continuous revolt of the masses, the colonialists and racists are striving to extend their internal conflicts to all neighbouring countries in order to deflect attention from the essence of the conflict. We, therefore, witness a multiplication of subversive acts, border violations, provocations and aggression. The colonialists and racists intensify the arms race and recently have been trying to enter into the atomic arms race. Wishing to maintain the broad masses in a sub-human condition, so that a handful can live in a situation of incomparable privilege, the colonialists and racists are trying to provoke a generalised conflict, to transform their internal conflicts into clashes between the great powers.

Your presence here and the holding of this meeting is a concrete affirmation that we are all determined not to allow the extension of the conflict; that we wish to define it with precision. The situation in Zimbabwe; the situation in Namibia; are colonial situations and colonialism is condemned by the whole of humanity, by all member countries of the United Nations Organisation. It constitutes the most serious form of violation of the people's right to choose their destiny, it represents the most violent form of aggression against the rights of man.

We are meeting so that together we may find the fastest and most efficient means of eliminating colonialism in Zimbabwe and Namibia. We are meeting in order to find the fastest and most efficient way of totally transferring all powers of sovereignty and their exercise to the only legitimate wielders of those powers: the

people of Zimbabwe and Namibia. The United Nations Charter and the Resolutions which guide us are clear. Our mission is to liquidate colonialism and racism and in order to find the just solutions we must clarify some fundamental points.

Over and above specific historical aspects, in Zimbabwe and Namibia we are faced with typical colonial situations. In Zimbabwe and Namibia colonial domination and oppression caused the people to take up arms for their liberation, this was the only alternative left to them. The people had to choose between dying as a consequence of colonial oppression and taking up arms in order to live in freedom and dignity. We feel it is wrong to talk of peaceful solutions when there is already war. We must seek realistically the means to put an end to the war, and this necessitates eliminating the causes of the war. Practical experience has demonstrated that a colonial war can only end in one of two ways, either the military defeat of the colonial forces or the colonial forces' acceptance of the people's right to their complete independence.

The successes of the armed struggle in Zimbabwe and Namibia, combined with the political and diplomatic action of the international community, and particularly the United Nations Organisation and the Organisation of African Unity, have made the colonialists aware of the inevitability of their defeat in Zimbabwe and Namibia. This has created favourable conditions for a negotiated settlement of the existing wars. To be successful a negotiated settlement demands that the colonial forces fully accept the right to total independence and the full territorial integrity of Zimbabwe and Namibia. Some positive steps have been taken in this direction, but important obstacles still exist.

Of late, we see with apprehension, that certain forces, although declaring their acceptance of the principle of independence, are trying to annul it through guarantees to be conceded to minorities. In trying to understand the nature of these minorities, we find that we are not dealing with any national minorities; in fact this is a subtle manoeuvre to define minorities exclusively on the basis of skin colour, these minorities being white.

In almost all United Nations member states there are citizens of the most varied ethnic origins. We find millions of citizens who belong to ethnic and racial groups different from the majority of the population, nevertheless they are citizens like everyone else and they are not treated as minorities. Their presence results from the historical evolution and the economic and social development of those countries. In all African, Asian, Latin American countries, in all countries which have been subjected to colonial domination, settlers were present as the direct result of colonial domination. They were foreigners, who for different reasons related to the colonial phenomenon, came to inhabit the dominat-

ed territory. They were settlers and not a national minority, they were foreigners living in the territory. With the accession to independence of the dominated territory, some of these settlers, wishing to be integrated in the new country, became national citizens. Now they are not a minority, they are citizens like any others, without any privileges or discrimination. This is the historical experience of all colonised countries.

We see no reason why the settlers of Rhodesia or Namibia should be treated otherwise, to do so is an attempt to preserve colonialism. To do so is to maintain in the country a category of citizens, very small in number but with sufficient power to block decisions of the vast majority of the population. To propose such a solution to a country which has just lived through the horrors and hatreds of a colonial war is to sow the seeds of a serious conflict in the first hours of independence. Our preoccupation is that all, regardless of race or colour, be citizens equal in rights and duties, citizens capable of being integrated in the community and of strengthening national unity.

The experience of negotiations in all previously colonial countries is that negotiations take place between the representatives of the patriotic forces and the colonial power. The colonial power represents the interests of the settlers and the patriotic forces represent the interests of the masses. We see in the negotiations which have been taking place both on Zimbabwe and on Namibia, a violation of this principle, which has led the negotiations to failure.

In Zimbabwe the settlers refuse to be represented by the colonial power and wish to present themselves as a third force, since they cannot claim to represent the interests of the masses, which they massacre, and the patriotic forces which they fight. Their numbers decrease daily, according to statistics. The vast majority of them have a second nationality. They effectively behave as foreigners and, as in the experience of all colonial countries, tend to leave the country after independence. These are the settlers who have repeatedly been responsible for the failure of all negotiations. The mistake is to regard them as the fundamental and decisive interlocutor, the mistake is to allow a tiny group of privileged foreigners the power to create obstacles to the implementation of the interests of the majority.

In Namibia we are surprised to see talks of settlers' parties and their puppets. Everybody knows who is fighting for Namibia's independence. Everybody knows who is imprisoned, deported, murdered in Namibia for demanding independence. Because the sacrifice of the black people of Namibia, the struggle of the oppressed and humiliated of Namibia, forced South African colonialists to accept the principle of independence, today the

privileged whites of Namibia use their parties, which maintain colonial domination, for retaining representation as an interested party in the liberation of the country, when in fact they represent the force which hinders the liberation of the country. This state of affairs prevents a fruitful discussion between the patriotic forces, represented by SWAPO, and the forces of colonialism.

We are told that in Namibia the main stumbling block to a negotiated solution is the existence of only one nationalist movement — SWAPO — and we are told that one movement alone cannot claim to represent the interests of all the people. Simultaneously we are told that in Zimbabwe the lack of unity creates an obstacle to the discussions, the difficulty is the existence of too many nationalist movements. It would be convenient to use some logic to determine the real obstacle to national independence. The only obstacle to national independence is colonialism. The manoeuvres preventing the success of negotiated solutions to the colonial wars in Rhodesia and Namibia have been given decisive support by some Western powers.

The United Nations have repeatedly condemned foreign investments in colonial territories. At Great Britain's request, the United Nations' Security Council decreed sanctions against the British colony of Southern Rhodesia. These sanctions have been fully implemented by the People's Republic of Mozambique, by the Republic of Zambia and by many other countries, entailing heavy sacrifices to their economies. We nevertheless see that they are openly and systematically broken by other United Nations member states, including Western members of the Security Council and many arguments are presented in defence of these violations. We are told that the immobilization of economic activities would be detrimental mainly to the black population. We are told that the pursuance of these economic activities in no way contributes towards the pursuance of the colonial wars. These same countries which violate sanctions, during the Second World War took drastic measures to isolate completely the fascist powers; they inflicted heavy reprisals against companies which dared to trade with the fascist powers, they confiscated those companies' assets, arrested, tried and condemned those who were responsible. In the defence of freedom those countries rightly built up a legal arsenal of repression against those who dared collaborate with the fascist oppressors. If today those same countries refuse to undertake severe measures against those who collaborate to strengthen the potential of the fascists, colonialists and racists of Southern Africa, it is surely because sordid interests have made them join sides with the inhuman camp against which they formerly fought.

It surprises us equally that citizens of Western countries,

members of the United Nations and of the Security Council, are freely recruited as mercenaries for the rebel forces of Rhodesia. Once again the argument is in defence of liberty and the right to travel. However, we believe that in no country is the right to treason, the right to crime, taken to be part of the democratic rights of citizens. The countries which allow the recruitment of mercenaries for Rhodesia, even today contain in their legislation extremely severe dispositions against citizens who commit crimes of treason and who collaborate with forces hostile to the country. The non-implementation of those principles can only mean that the fascist, racist and colonialist system has become an ally.

A special responsibility for prolonging the conflict falls upon those who supply the military means which enable the colonialists to continue with the policy of internal repression and colonial war, and the extension of armed aggression against other countries. Although the United Nations clearly forbids the sale of weapons to Southern Africa's colonialists and racists, we see a continuous reinforcement of Pretoria's and Salisbury's arsenals. We are sure that any responsible state has ample means at its disposal to prevent transactions of weapons sales which are contrary to its interests. Therefore the supply of weapons, the supply of patents for manufacture, the establishment of arms industries, the establishment of industries which can lead to the nuclear armament of colonial and racist regimes, can only be interpreted as active support for the systems condemned by the United Nations.

The evolution of the Zimbabwe situation is favourable. The armed struggle for national liberation has inflicted serious drawbacks upon the rebel, minority regime, and the patriots' victories galvanise the enthusiasm of the masses and bring about increasing organisation and mobilisation to eliminate the rebels. The sanctions decreed by the United Nations and applied by many countries, including the People's Republic of Mozambique, have seriously affected the already shaken economy of the British colony of Southern Rhodesia. The entire international community unanimously condemns Salisbury's cruel regime, condemns its criminal policies, condemns its massacres. The creation of the Patriotic Front constitutes a decisive step in the unity of the people, in the efficiency of their struggle. The Patriotic Front provides the broad masses of Zimbabwe with the instrument to deal increasingly heavy blows against an odious and isolated regime.

Britain's initiatives can constitute a positive factor in the liquidation of the colonial, racist system in Rhodesia, so long as these initiatives have as a sincere objective the complete independence of Zimbabwe. They will fail if they aim to legalise colonialism; they will fail if they aim only at allowing some black puppets to have a

share of colonial, racist power rather than transferring total power to the people. They will fail if their aim is to institutionalise privileges based on skin colour and if their objective is to preserve the interests of the so-called minorities and not of the overwhelming majority.

On Namibia, the United Nations have often held debates and proposed the just way for the solution of the conflict. Resolution 385 of the Security Council taken in its whole constitutes such a platform. The recent initiatives by the five Western members of the Security Council, if seen in this context, will contribute to the acceleration of the resolution of the conflict. If, however, once again they are aimed at safeguarding interests which are alien to the people, and privileges for the settlers; if they contribute to the divisions of the territory and the appearance of puppets as pre-emptive valid interlocutors, then the initiatives will only serve needlessly to lengthen the conflict.

The question of Walvis Bay is an artificial one, an inheritance from Anglo-German rivalries during the Berlin Conference of 1885. In Africa we respect inherited borders even if they are not just, but an attempt to include the enclave of Walvis Bay in this context is only an attempt to sabotage the independence of Namibia in its territorial whole. There are no citizens of Walvis Bay as separate from citizens of Namibia. It is the men of Namibia, it is the sweat of Namibian workers which accounts for the existence of Walvis Bay. When we talk of the territorial integrity of Namibia, we logically talk of the integration of Walvis Bay.

It is with SWAPO, recognised by the United Nations and by the Organisation of African Unity that the South African government must discuss the process of the transfer of its powers in Namibia.

As in the past, the People's Republic of Mozambique carries out her internationalist duty in relation to the liberation struggle of all peoples, and in particular the peoples of Southern Africa. She supports the armed liberation struggle of the people of Zimbabwe and Namibia. She will continue to apply full sanctions as decreed by the United Nations.

Like all peace-loving countries, like all countries which have lived through the devastating experience of war, we are ardent defenders of peace, we support peaceful solutions in all regions in which the conflict has not yet reached the armed stage, we try to find negotiated solutions to the existing wars. This was our experience. When the Portuguese government recognised our right to independence, accepted a date for our independence and agreed with us on the mechanism of transferring power, it was logical and easy to establish a cease-fire and to re-establish peace.

We believe peace can be re-established in Zimbabwe once there has been agreement on the mechanism leading to independence,

since the colonial power has recognised the right to independence and has agreed with the patriotic forces on the ceiling date for the independence of the territory. We believe that the people of Zimbabwe, the people in the concentration camps, the men killed in the street for not carrying a pass, the men arrested arbitrarily, the men massacred in their peaceful villages, the men who, underground and in the guerrilla war, build the independence of their country, have the right to demand immediate and complete independence. All the other territories of the former Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland are independent, they have all celebrated more than 10 years of independence. To demand immediate independence is not an act of extremism when independence should have taken place already more than 10 years ago, when a tiny handful of foreign rebels supported by imperialism has for almost 12 years kept the country under the most fierce, cruel and barbarous form of oppression.

Our Conference in support of the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe and Namibia must decide on measures which politically, diplomatically and materially strengthen the liberation struggle. It must adopt measures to isolate the colonial and racist regimes because by isolating them we force them to negotiate. Our Conference must aim for measures to be taken against any economic and commercial investment or collaboration with the colonial and racist regimes. It must equally propose that the international community reinforce the economic capacity of the frontline countries to enable them better to support the Southern African people's liberation struggle .

**EXTRACT CONCERNING SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA
AND RHODESIA, FROM A STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT BY
THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER, THE HON. R.F.
BOTHA, ON 14 JUNE 1977**

The hon. member for Etosha asked me yesterday whether I could say something in this debate about the talks on South West Africa with the five Western countries.

.....

South West Africa/Namibia

When one mentions the words "South West Africa" one's thoughts involuntary go back over a period of many years. They go back to our military conquest of that territory in 1915. They go back to that contentious situation which prevailed in this country during those years. The bitter irony of it all is that our predecessors in the party which is today governing South Africa rebelled as it were at what they regarded at that time as being a false move, *viz.* the military occupation of the territory of other people. It is of no avail now to try to avoid the history of this matter. These are the facts. The occupation of South West Africa was, as it were, an operation carried out to assist the Allied Forces of the West. The Government of this country — whether it was UP or Nationalist is not internationally relevant now — stood by a section of the Western forces through two wars. The bitter irony of it all is that this Government is today being taken to task, pressurized and abused in respect of what happened in South West Africa. That is the bitter irony. But we shall leave it at that. I just wanted to make it very clear here that this was as I saw the matter in its historical perspective.

Reflecting further on South West Africa, one recalls the years of supervision over the area in terms of the mandate and how South African representatives went to Geneva and there reported, with favourable consequences, on the administration of South West Africa. There were occasions when the Permanent Mandate Commission of the old League of Nations praised our administration. Those were interesting and historical years. They were followed by the Second World War. The League of Nations was no more. A new organization, the United Nations Organization, was established. New issues developed. Shortly after the establishment of this world organization, which was supposed to preserve world peace for all time, the power-bloc struggle, which we know only too well, began. In this way many issues, which should never have done so, became international issues or disputes. In the cut and thrust of the great powers in their struggle for the soul of the people, South West Africa also became a point

in dispute, something which it should never have become compared to the real problems of the world. But here, too, we shall leave it at that.

The World Court at The Hague gave various verdicts and opinions on South West Africa. These concerned the status of the territory, the supervision of the UN and the right of petitionaries to submit petitions to the UN. When Ethiopia and Liberia instituted the contentious legal proceedings against us in the early sixties, legal proceedings which lasted until a verdict was given on 18 July 1966, it concerned the policy which was being applied in the territory. The essence of the charge was the alleged brutal and deliberate suppression of the non-Whites, the Black people, which the South African authorities practiced or allowed in the territory. The records in this regard ran into hundreds, in fact into thousands of pages. There was a record of every law, every measure and every practice which, according to the records of the UN and the allegations of petitionaries, were allegedly of a suppressive nature. We replied to these. A fierce struggle followed. Eventually we did not lose the case, if I may put it that way. Eventually Ethiopia and Liberia lost the case, and this again gave rise to an emotional outburst at the UN in the debate in the General Assembly in 1966.

Eighty Foreign Ministers participated in that debate. Brutal demands were made, *inter alia* that South Africa should immediately withdraw from South West Africa, should get out. Our administration of the Territory was allegedly terminated and a Council for South West Africa, which subsequently became the Council for Namibia, was established to govern the Territory. Hon. members will recall that, before we reached that point, South Africa had over the years launched several initiatives in this regard. We never used article 2, paragraph 7 of the UN Charter to block discussions of South West Africa in the General Assembly of the UN itself because South West Africa was never part of the sovereign territory of the then Union, subsequently the Republic of South Africa. That was not the case.

No South African Government, and no Prime Minister from General Smuts right down to the present Prime Minister, ever resorted to article 2, paragraph 7 when it came to South West Africa. South West Africa was never part of the territory of South Africa. Unfortunately misunderstanding frequently prevailed on this point, although I think that at present this is no longer the case to such an extent. But these are facts which I am stating here, even though they may make painful hearing. One need only look at the Constitution Act of the Republic to see that the territory of South West Africa is not included in it.

South Africa has therefore recognized the international

character or nature — or whatever we wish to call it — of the Territory in this sense that the Territory never formed part of the territory of South Africa. One can say that from the earliest times it was already the policy of the South African Government that the people of the territory of South West Africa themselves should decide their future. This was implied and stated in World Court proceedings in which I myself had the honour of participating. This was made abundantly clear in a report on South West Africa which was published in 1967 and which I helped to draft, and which fell directly under the jurisdiction of the present Prime Minister, namely that it was up to the people of South West Africa to decide their own destinies and future. In other words, one can say that this sound policy, this far-sighted policy of the South African Government, *viz.* that it is a matter for the people of South West Africa themselves to decide their destinies and future, ultimately formed the corner-stone of the relative success which in my opinion has eventually been achieved now on the way to an internationally acceptable solution to South West Africa.

We have never recognized direct UN supervision over our administration of South West Africa, and to this day there is still no binding judgment of the World Court stating that the UN has such supervision. There is no such thing. There is, it is true, an advisory opinion, the one which eventually followed in 1971¹, which does state this, but it is not binding and according to the Charter and the statutes of the court, it is not binding on any State or party. Nor is it enforceable. Besides, we know under what circumstances the World Court was constituted in 1971 and on what it based its decisions. We know that they rejected a plebescite which South Africa proposed.

There is another aspect concerning South West Africa to which I should like to refer, namely the candidness of South Africa and the South African Government concerning the Territory, its willingness at the UN over many years, at the World Court in thousands of pages, to inform the world of what was happening in South West Africa. Hon. members will all recall our willingness during the 'fifties to discuss matters with various committees of the UN and to negotiate in order to try to find a political solution or to try to find a basis of negotiation for a solution.

There was the Arden-Clarke Committee and subsequently the Carpio/De Alva Committee which instituted investigations. Hon. members will recall that South Africa always came out of these investigations favourably in this sense that in the reports and communiques that were subsequently issued, the South African Government's attitude and sincerity in finding a solution was spoken well of and referred to in friendly terms. But this was followed by evermore radical demands on the part of certain

1. See: International Court of Justice. *Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971*. The Hague, The Court, 1971.

groups at the UN, and in this way the progress we had made was overtaken and outstripped by the more radical demands.

This is briefly the history of the Territory. It is therefore not a history of a stubborn, recalcitrant South African Government. It is a history of a Government that was willing to settle an international problem amicably, but which always held firmly to one standpoint, whatever such a settlement may comprise, the people of South West Africa themselves should approve of it, the people of South West Africa themselves should be consulted about it, and the people of South West Africa themselves should ultimately take the decisions.

Since the court finding, or Opinion, of 1971, a whole series of actions followed from the UN and these gradually spilled over into the Security Council. The Security Council of the UN is not like the General Assembly of the UN. The Security Council of the UN consists of 15 members, of whom five are the so-called permanent members. Those five are a remnant of the Second World War. They were regarded as the five major powers that would have the potency, the great deterrents and that would therefore be capable of preserving world peace, and therefore it was the idea that unanimity among them was essential to preserve world peace, and for that reason each power was given the right of veto. If any action were proposed with which all five could not agree, it was regarded as something not conducive to world peace, and for that reason one of them, or all together, or two, could veto any action. The Security Council today, by virtue of the five member countries that have permanent representation on the council — these are Russia, Britain, France, the USA and China — probably has 99% of all nuclear weapons at its disposal. They are the countries that send rockets to the moon and to Mars. They are the countries with power, brute power. For a small country it is therefore important not to get in the way of that power. We must have no illusions about that. There is potency in that council which can inflict severe damage.

We have always participated in the debates in that council. My predecessor and I, as well as Mr Brand Fourie, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, have participated in debates there. We have repeatedly gone out of our way, in the face of all the unsavoury things which were said against us there, to make our position in regard to South West Africa as clear as possible. We have been doing this all these years. We have made repeated appeals to the Council to understand that we do not claim the territory for ourselves. All we have done is to try to get the UN to accept that we want the people of South West Africa to decide their own affairs. That was all we were really advocating. In aggregate that was what all our pleas amounted to.

Our problem, however, was that there were powers that did not want peaceful solutions. Peaceful solutions could possibly mean that the power of the gun, with which they want to take over regimes, would be eliminated, and that their selfish political and national objectives would in that way be defeated. That is briefly the position, if only people would recognize it as such.

When it seemed as though we were heading for a confrontation with the Security Council, Dr Waldheim paid us a visit. This was five years ago. Nothing came of that visit either, in spite of the fact that important progress was in fact made in the negotiations with Dr Waldheim and with his personal representative, Dr Escher. Eventually we reached the position in which the people of South West Africa themselves met around a conference table. Blacks, Whites, Basters, Coloureds sat down together around that conference table. There warring parties of the past buried the hatchet.

After all, we all know that the history of South West Africa during the previous century was one of bloodshed, warfare, strife and rebellion. At that conference table the most divergent groups of people came together: People from Kavango, from Caprivi, Owambo, the Hereros including those of Kaokoland, the Namas, the Damaras, the Coloureds, the Basters of Rehoboth and the Tswanas — a Coloured group from the border of Botswana — the Whites and the Bushmen. All these groups eventually came together. In spite of their earlier history, they met around a conference table for more than two years. There were differences. Hon. members read about these in the newspapers. These were severely exaggerated in that part of the world where I represented South Africa.

Those differences were resolved, however. Initially these were considerable disputes in the ranks of the individual delegations. Those disputes were resolved, however. What happened then? When the delegates, after much hard work, reached a consensus in regard to a constitution, that was no longer good enough either. Then it was "too good to be true". Here, too, we shall leave it at that.

What eventually happened this year was that the European countries — and subsequently, too, representatives of the five Western countries on the Security Council — apart from the three major countries, Germany and Canada as well — came to discuss the issue with us. They came to discuss the issue with us in order, as they put it, to see whether the gap between the position of the South African Government in respect of the cardinal issues between us and the UN could not be narrowed. The hon. the Prime Minister made a speech in Windhoek two years ago in which he indicated himself that that gap has been narrowed to a

considerable extent.

Be that as it may, in the circumstances in which we now find ourselves, there is no time to mete out blame. There is no time for animosity. What we are aiming at now is to see to what extent to the five Western countries can accept the standpoints advocated by the people of South West Africa, can sell these to their Governments and to what extent those Governments will then stand firm and will try to persuade the members of the Security Council of the UN to accept them. If this can be done, the ball can, it is hoped, be set rolling, in order to start the final process by means of which South West Africa can become independent in a peaceful way, based on the declared will of the majority of the people of South West Africa in a way on which the inhabitants of the territory itself have decided and in a way which will bring open recognition of that territory by at least the moderate, responsible countries of the world. That, in brief is the story.

For the first time in South West Africa's history Blacks, Coloureds and Whites are meeting in an open and honest attempt to find a constitutional *modus vivendi* for their country. Since September 1975 representatives of all the population groups in the territory have been assembled in conference, freely and of their own accord, in order to co-operate in eliminating their differences and advancing social and economic conditions, thus creating an atmosphere of mutual confidence for their main task, *viz.* the adoption of a constitution for their country. Past adversaries have extended a hand of friendship to each other, as I have said, in a true spirit of goodwill to search for a durable and peaceful solution. The leaders of the Territory have been discussing their differences around a conference table. They did not try to shoot it out.

When the record is scrutinized and studied objectively, it will be seen that in substance the leaders of South West Africa were in agreement with the most important aspects of the points which were put in the United Nations even before the recent discussions with the five Western countries commenced. I think it is important to remember this. The leaders of South West Africa were in agreement before the five Western countries actually came to South Africa.

Let me mention some of those basic points, points which for 31 years formed the basis of the dispute and acrimony between South Africa and the United Nations: the separate international status of South West Africa — which is now, after consensus, accepted South West Africa's independence as a whole; South Africa's withdrawal from South West Africa and arrangements for that withdrawal and transfer of power according to the wishes of the inhabitants; the opportunity for the inhabitants of the territory to

express their views freely on the constitutional future of their country; the allowance of all political groups to propagate their points of view and to participate without intimidation in peaceful political activities in the process leading to self-determination, and the question of exiles returning to South West Africa to participate in peaceful political activities.

The following points are extremely important: Every person to have the right to the free development of his personality in so far as this does not violate the rights of others or offend against the public order and moral code; the life, freedom and inviolability of the person of everyone to be unassailable and only to be encroached upon pursuant to a law; all persons to be equal before the law; no person to be favoured or prejudiced by reason of his origin, sex, language, race, colour, creed or political convictions; freedom of faith to be guaranteed; freedom of movement to be guaranteed; every person to have the right to express his opinion by speech, writing or pictures in so far as it does not infringe on the rights of others or is not harmful to the State; freedom of the press to be guaranteed, this right to be limited by the general laws for the protection of the constitutional order, the youth and personal honour and dignity; and the right to ownership, whether individual or collective, of movable or immovable property is to be guaranteed.

South Africa, for its part, accepts these points because they have been accepted by the representatives of the Territory. It is our policy that we accept what the people of South West Africa freely, openly and sincerely decide and want. There must be no misconception about that.

There were other matters, too, which were discussed, for example the question of the release of prisoners. All the Western countries call them political prisoners, but we draw a distinction between political detainees and people lawfully sentenced by the courts for common law offences. Be that as it may, I can assure hon. members that the standpoint of the South African Government in respect of this matter is not only reasonable, but the only one which can possibly be adopted, the standpoint that we are prepared to submit this dispute over who are political prisoners and who not, to a panel of jurists on which we will have representation.

In addition, of course, we ask that Swapo release the hundreds of detainees in Tanzania and Zambia. I think hon. members, as well as any reasonable person, will agree that if one's point of departure is one of morality, it is only equitable that everyone who is ostensibly detaining people should release them.

There is the question of UN involvement in the Territory with a view to satisfying the world and ourselves that the elections will be

held openly and fairly and that there will be no intimidation. In my opinion these matters have been satisfactorily discussed. Good progress has been made with them.

There is also the question of the withdrawal of South Africa from the Territory. Good progress has been made in this regard. It is of course a matter which cannot now be discussed or worked out. It is something which will have to be discussed with the future Government of the Territory, which is still to be elected. There are many facets to South Africa's presence in the Territory. There is the Railways, in which an investment of more than R200 million has been made, road carrier transportation services, the use of the harbour at Walvis Bay and many other undertakings and institutions of the Republic which are rendering assistance to South West Africa and its people. I am thinking here of the CSIR and other technological institutes in our country. In addition there are various government departments, of a technical and of administrative nature, health services and social welfare service and so on. Hon. members will understand that the question of safety and security is one of the most important aspects.

If it is said that there should not be any intimidation, it follows that there should not be intimidation from any quarters. Therefore it is important that those matters be discussed and thrashed out by the government which will be elected. It is foreseen that an assembly of constituents will be convened which will decide on a constitution for the territory of South West Africa. That constitution will then form the basis of further elections which will constitute a government for the Territory and which will function until the date of independence.

During that period, and not before the time, this matter will be negotiated and agreed on. That must be clearly understood. This is the case with all countries that become independent. That is more or less the pattern which has been followed in the case of other countries which became independent.

Rhodesia

I wish to stress a few facts about Rhodesia, facts which are sometimes not taken account of. The question of majority rule is not an issue in Rhodesia. This has been said by its own leader to be the policy of the Rhodesian Government, i.e. majority rule. Therefore nobody must come and tell us that that is an issue any longer. Whether there exists suspicion against Mr Smith or whether suspicion against him does not exist, this is not the issue at the moment. If that is the premise from which hon. members want to proceed, they can test Mr Smith. For our part, we believe and accept the statement of the Rhodesian Government that the transfer of power to the majority in the country is irrevocable and

also that majority rule means the Black Rhodesians would have a predominant voice in the election of future governments.

The Rhodesian Government stated this itself, and we have no reason to doubt their sincerity; we accept this. The real problem in this regard is the creation of suitable machinery for an effective negotiation process. The onus to set that machinery in motion, does not lie with South Africa, but with the Black factions, the Frontline Presidents and Britain.

In the past South Africa has done what it could to bring about an atmosphere amenable to peaceful discussions and in trying to bring the parties together. South Africa has played a constructive role throughout. It does not prescribe to the Rhodesians as to what kind of constitution they should draw up; we only say that it will be in the interest of all of us in the whole region of Southern Africa if a peaceful solution could be obtained. We have played a constructive role in this respect. That is as far as we went in the past and that is as far as we can go in the future.

EXTRACT FROM AN ADDRESS BY THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA, THE HON. M.T. STEYN, IN WINDHOEK ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1977

The future destiny of the population of South West Africa/Namibia should be determined by themselves, and it should be left to them alone to work out their own salvation. They alone can decide about the form of their future state, and only they should determine the way in which that goal could be achieved.

Because of the attitude of a section of the international community, particularly the United Nations on the one hand, and the Government of the Republic of South Africa on the other, there is some difference of opinion on certain issues. However, all parties agree that the first actual direct step towards independence should be a general election, by which a constitutional conference would be elected, to decide on a constitution for a new, independent state, comprising the whole Territory; and secondly, that an interim authority should be established to organize and supervise such an election.

As a result of the consultations with the five Western powers, and as specially requested by the Turnhalle, the Government of the Republic of South Africa decided to appoint an impartial Administrator-General to take charge of the interim government of the Territory, as well as to supervise the election.

The Secretary General of the United Nations is also at liberty to appoint a special representative, together with the necessary personnel, in order to satisfy himself about the fairness of the election and the election campaign.

The main task of the Administrator-General is to act as an impartial arbitrator, who should create the circumstances for the unimpeded expression of the real will of the inhabitants of South West Africa/Namibia by means of the country-wide election of a constitutional conference.*

For that purpose electoral legislation will have to be prepared and promulgated and certain existing measures inconsistent with, or in any material way hampering free electioneering and canvassing or the conduct of the elections themselves, will have to be done away with either by way of amendment or repeal.

- All political parties, including SWAPO and its associates, will be allowed to participate in the whole political process and are in fact invited to do so.
- No violence, intimidation or undue influencing of whatever nature or from whatever source will, however, be tolerated. The elections and the preceding electioneering campaign will have to be conducted lawfully, peacefully and openly otherwise the whole purpose thereof will be defeated. For there can be no

* Above paragraphs translated from Afrikaans

effective exercise of political choice or true expression of the will of the people in an atmosphere of threats, intimidation, victimisation or other form of political duress or blackmail.

- There can be no rights without corresponding duties nor true liberty without reciprocal restraints and responsibilities.
- Reasonable opportunity for organising and electioneering will be afforded to all contestants, but the preparation for, and conduct of, the elections will be initiated and carried through with deliberate speed and unperturbed pace. And it will avail no party or group to attempt retarding the process or postponing the elections by threats of non-participation, by actual withdrawal or by the invocation of outside aid and interference. The road to independence may not be an easy one and ambushes may already have been set along the way. The movement towards that goal, already started, must therefore not be allowed to lose momentum as it could then bog down for an indefinite period, and the dangers inherent in such a state of affairs are so fraught with disaster as not to be countenanced.
- In addition to what has already been said thereon, certain of the existing laws of the Territory, both locally enacted and emanating from the South African Parliament, will have to be altered during my term of office so as not *only to conform to the new political and social dispensation*, but also to assist in the creation and development thereof.

In my office I am endowed with a very great measure of independent discretion in the exercise of my powers and performance of my duties, but I am basically responsible to the peoples of this land and cannot discharge my functions properly without knowing them and appreciating their needs, fears and aspirations.

I therefore intend meeting, conversing with, and listening to, the leaders of all population groups, political parties, religious denominations, agricultural, industrial and business interests, cultural and educational organisations and the like, but will compel nobody to have audience with me; our contacts will have to be voluntary, peaceable and hopefully cordial. Such contacts should be made as soon as possible but will perforce be subject to the exigencies of my office.

The Supreme and other Courts of the Territory will still perform their high, honourable and vital functions, but most, if not all, South African Departments of State functioning in the Territory will in due course be brought under my authority.

Walvis Bay, which is South African territory, does not, however, fall within my jurisdiction since it is once again to be administered directly by the South African Government as part of the Republic.

*It is not my fate to occupy or to use the official government

* Following two paragraphs translated from Afrikaans

premises in the Territory, and therefore, for the proper execution of my task, my staff and I are now situated on neutral ground in central Windhoek.

Finally, I would like to emphasize that the future destiny of this Territory and all its people depends upon the manner in which the various factions and groups can relate to one another, and the way in which the various viewpoints and political streams can be reconciled and can learn to work and live together for the sake of the general welfare. In my opinion, however, personal relationships on all levels are the real key to the future of this country.

**STATEMENT BY THE RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT,
ANNOUNCING PLANS FOR INTERNAL TALKS, AND
REPLIES BY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE HON. IAN D. SMITH,
TO QUESTIONS AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN BULAWAYO
ON 23 NOVEMBER 1977**

In view of the failure of the latest Anglo-American initiative, the Prime Minister invited the leaders of the black political parties to enter into constitutional negotiations with the Government, with a view to reaching a constitutional settlement in Rhodesia, and thus to bring peace to the country. The black leaders, without exception, impressed upon the Prime Minister that the only way of successfully launching the negotiations would be for the Government to make a firm commitment to the principle of majority rule based on adult suffrage.

The Prime Minister pointed out that his Government's interest in a qualified franchise was as a means of ensuring the maintenance not only of standards, but also of the confidence of white Rhodesians. Constitutional and other evidence now available indicated that there were other and possibly better ways of maintaining standards and retaining this confidence, than by means of a qualified franchise. Accordingly, Government would reserve the right to pursue these aspects in any constitutional negotiations.

The black political leaders fully endorsed the desirability of retaining white confidence, and accepted Government's right to follow this course at the conference table. In view of this undertaking, Government is prepared to enter the negotiations on the understanding that if their requirements in this regard are met, they will accept the principle of majority rule, based on adult suffrage.

Q. Mr Prime Minister, can you name the black leaders with whom you propose these negotiations?

A. I have been in touch with the leaders of the internally based political parties continually. I am on record on previous occasions as saying there are, in the main, three locally based political parties and that they represent the lion's share of the thinking of black Rhodesians. Assessments have been made that this amounts to 85 per cent or 86 per cent of black Rhodesians. The three concerned are, as I think you are well aware, the Muzorewa faction of the ANC, the Sithole faction of the ANC and then there is ZUPO.

Sir, how soon will talks begin?

I hope, and have asked for, preparations to be made for a

meeting next week, although I want to make it clear this does not necessarily mean that the constitutional conference as such will commence next week. I believe the first meeting will be to make the plans and the preparation before we actually hold the first meeting of the conference. But it is my intention to get on with this as quickly as possible and once again I am happy to inform you that I believe I am representing the views of the black political parties which I have referred to when I say that they are also of the opinion that it is time we got on in Rhodesia and came to some finality so that we can bring to an end the kind of madness which exists today, where Rhodesians are killing Rhodesians — and at a pretty fair pace I would remind you. Some weeks the numbers have reached nearer 200 than 100. I am happy to say I have found their attitude most responsible in this regard and they join me in wishing to bring this state of affairs to a conclusion at the earliest moment.

Prime Minister, can you specify the kinds of safeguards which you now hope to turn to in the maintenance of standards in Rhodesia?

I don't think it is necessary for me to go into details as far as these are concerned. I have mentioned them on a number of occasions in connection with previous discussions. They were part of what we were trying to achieve in the settlement talks with the British and the Americans — such things as the impartiality of the judiciary and the courts, and the forces of law and order, special representation for minority groups, but there is a long list and in keeping with my constant stance I would rather not get myself into a position where I am negotiating in public.

Prime Minister, does your statement mean that Rhodesia has rejected the Anglo-American plan and will no longer co-operate with the Anglo-American initiative?

No. I believe my statement indicates that this recent initiative has failed and I would refer you to remarks that have been made by the leaders of black political parties, not only those within Rhodesia, which have stated the same fact in much harsher terms than I have ever stated them. In fact many of these people have condemned them completely. All I am saying is they have failed and there will have to be some serious re-thinking on the part of the British and American Governments and readjusting of their plans if there is any chance of them making a meaningful contribution. But again my stance is constant. I believe we should never close the door to anybody, and this includes the British and American Governments, if they believe they have a contribution

to make.

Prime Minister, you may now be seeing both initiatives — yours and the Anglo-American initiative — proceed simultaneously?

Well if you know what is going on in the minds of the Anglo-American people I won't get into an argument with you as far as that is concerned. I am quite clear what my stance is. It has yet to be seen what the British and Americans are going to do in the new circumstances.

There seems to be a likelihood that you will be blamed for the failure of the Anglo-American plan. Can you tell us how you feel about this personally?

Well in view of the fact that my conscience is clear I don't think I will lose any sleep on that one. I think the record makes it abundantly clear that at no time have I rejected these proposals. I have criticized them, yes, but we from the outset adopted a constructive attitude and kept in touch with the British. In fact we are still right up to this moment in touch with the British and messages are passing, but it does seem to me that the gap is so wide that we are, I believe, wasting time today and we have been for the last few weeks. Because of the problems in Rhodesia and the suffering that is taking place among Rhodesians, I am reluctant to continue this game of passing messages when it is clear to me that we are not making progress, so I have come to the conclusion that our best way forward is to get Rhodesians together among themselves. That in no way shuts the door to anyone else.

Mr Prime Minister, can you at this stage put any sort of time period on the negotiations that you will be having with the Nationalists? You have mentioned the urgency of the problem, can you see whether you view the negotiations going on over weeks or months or perhaps longer?

It is very difficult to estimate this kind of question. However, I repeat what I said to you earlier. I am impressed by the sense of urgency among the leaders of the black parties in Rhodesia and I would therefore say to you that while certainly it is not the kind of problem that can be solved in weeks — it is a big and involved problem — I would hope that in a matter of months we should be able to see some real results.

Mr Prime Minister, where does the referendum for the black people fit into this over-all pattern and when is it likely to come about?

As far as the referendum for the black people is concerned I

think this seems to have fallen into the background. There was a time when some of the black political leaders were very interested in this. I don't see any great urgency in their approach to me at the moment. However, the question of a referendum among the electorate, and mainly white Rhodesians, is a different matter. I have given an undertaking that this is something which we must go through and I abide by that undertaking. Whatever I might do beforehand in no way interferes with that commitment which Government has, and of course in no way can interfere with the constitutional realities of life which means that a constitutional Bill will have to be passed through the Rhodesian Parliament before any constitutional changes can take place.

Mr Prime Minister, do you foresee yourself participating in these talks or do you think it will be committees and then with your involvement later?

I think it is possible at the outset I will participate — I hope with the leaders of the black parties — so that we can make decisions at top level in order to chart the course. Thereafter I anticipate it is possible that meetings will be held at committee level. I want to make it clear and I, and my Cabinet colleagues who will be participating, will be available constantly and I hope this applies to the other teams, so that there can be no delay because of people being unavailable for meetings. I once again stress to you the need for urgency, and as far as I and my Government are concerned we will not be found wanting in this regard.

Prime Minister, do you anticipate that should this internal initiative move towards what appears to be a successful conclusion there will be a reduction in the terrorist war?

This is our assessment — and it isn't only our assessment. It is the assessment of the black political leaders as well. In view of that I think that there is a very real chance, in fact more than a chance, that this will happen.

Mr Prime Minister, to carry on from that, if this initiative is successful do you foresee that governments overseas will accept it and end the terrorist war and possibly lift sanctions as well?

Well this is a little more involved and complicated, but I would say to you that we have over quite a considerable space of time now had evidence that points in this direction — that the whole world is sick and tired of this Rhodesian issue, that even certain of the black countries bordering us are not only sick and tired of it but they

themselves are suffering, and some of them suffering to a greater extent than are Rhodesians, because of the Rhodesian impasse and for that reason, while I cannot give any guarantee, there is strong evidence which we have had for some time now indicating that we will gain acceptance from the rest of the world providing this settlement is genuine and providing it has the backing of the majority of people. That means the majority of black Rhodesians as well as the majority of white Rhodesians. I believe that we will achieve that objective.

Do you foresee that once negotiations are completed there will be a fairly short transitional period before the election . . . ?

This sort of thing will be determined at the conference and I don't believe anybody can anticipate that kind of question at this stage.

You have mentioned previous contacts with Nationalists. At what level were these contacts and discussions?

With the leaders of the internally based black Nationalist parties.

If the elections and the referendum rejects this internal settlement what do you do, what is the next step?

It is so unlikely, improbable, that I am a little doubtful as to whether one should waste much time considering that kind of eventuality. I am satisfied that if we come to agreement at the level of discussions which I believe will now take place that this will have massive acceptance from both black and white Rhodesians. The kind of situation which you envisage in your question, I believe, is almost impossible.

You mentioned a moment ago that you had been in contact with the British and American Governments. Can you say in your last messages whether you have told them about your new initiative and whether they have responded in any way to it?

No.

Is there any chance that any of the externally based organizations such as Mr. Nkomo's and Mr Mugabe's organizations will be invited or do you think . . . ?

Once again I think my stance in regard to this question is consis-

tent. I have said that if any of the externally based organizations are interested in turning over a new leaf, so to speak, and coming back to Rhodesia on the basis that they forsake terrorism and accept that the best thing to do is to work constitutionally for a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia, then their case will be given very serious and, I should imagine, favourable, consideration. Clearly we will have to be satisfied that any such offers and undertakings given are given in all honesty and with complete sincerity.

In the past it has always seemed that once the main stumbling blocks to an internal settlement, or any settlement, were divisions among the Nationalists themselves. Have you had any indication that the three Nationalist parties you are about to embark on talks with might be more amenable now, perhaps forming a united front or getting together for an internal settlement?

I suggest you ask them that question tomorrow.

Will these talks involve a policy of safe return for those terrorists who want to lay down arms?

This is not part of this immediate plan but I believe it is possible that it will be incorporated as the negotiations continue. I would think that that was a fairly intelligent kind of guess to make.

I apologise for going over something that has been covered but I just want to make sure of the position in my mind. Have the leaders of the three parties that you mentioned given a firm indication that they will take part in those talks?

As you know, in the past we have had a number of false starts on the kind of proposition I am now putting forward so I have gone out of my way to try to ensure that we do not have a repetition. So much time has been given to contacts with the political parties which I have mentioned and although it is now over to them to make a final decision now that I have publicly made this offer, I think I can safely say that I have been led to believe that we are going to get this one off the ground.

You briefly covered the topic of war earlier and how it pertains to a settlement. Can you tell us how you see an internal settlement bringing peace to this country — how you see an internal settlement could bring about an end to war?

I think you are going a little bit beyond the sort of question I should be dealing with here. I'm trying to confine myself specifically to this statement otherwise as you know this could go on for

hours but I will go further and say to you that I think I have answered that specific question previously so if you don't mind we will leave that until next time.

Can you say where the talks will be held and who will be the Government negotiating team?

The first meeting will take place in Salisbury. At that meeting we will then, with the other parties concerned, go into the plans of how we proceed thereafter so I am not going to make this decision myself, or attempt to dictate to the others. I hope we are going to work together in this regard. I would have thought it was a pretty good guess that the talks would be held in Salisbury, because the headquarters of all the people concerned are in Salisbury.

At your office, Prime Minister?

Not necessarily.

Mr Sithole has said that he will not be party to any internal settlement if it doesn't follow the Anglo-American proposals . . .

I would ask you to do what I do: I don't believe everything that I read in the newspapers.

DISCLOSURE OF 1968 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER, THE HON B.J. VORSTER, AND THE ZAMBIAN PRESIDENT, H.E. DR K.D. KAUNDA

A. Statement in Parliament by Prime Minister Vorster on 21 April 1971

Hon. members will recall that previously in Parliament, I stated, referring to Zambia, that when my Vote comes up for discussion, I would take this opportunity to expose President Kaunda of Zambia as a double-talker, and that is in fact what I want to do tonight. I think it must be done, not only in the interests of South Africa, but also in the interests of Zambia, and I think it must be done also in the interests of Southern Africa and of Africa as a whole.

Ever since 1965 it was felt by the South African Government, by my late predecessor, that it was of the utmost importance for the peace and stability and the progress of Southern Africa that there should be a good understanding and co-operation between the states of Southern Africa. Because my predecessor felt that way, he sent out feelers, as far as Zambia was concerned, in an effort to create a better understanding as between Zambia and South Africa. When I took over I was of the same opinion and I want to say tonight — and I think here I speak on behalf of my friends on the opposite side as well as on behalf of my friends on this side — that it is in fact very important that an understanding with Zambia should be arrived at if it is humanly possible to do so. We are all of Southern Africa; we are all of Africa; and as far as Zambia is concerned, it holds a key position in Southern Africa.

I say I continued along that course, and to the best of my ability tried to induce Zambia to change its attitude and to make contact with this African state on a proper level. Eventually our attempts met with success, and in April, 1968, an envoy of the President of Zambia came to South Africa. He came here for two purposes: in the first instance, to ask for information and, in the second instance, to put to me Zambia's charge, if I may put it that way, against South Africa. That was done by letter by President Kaunda. Consequently I am going to read out to the House certain quotations taken from that letter. It is a lengthy letter which deals with human rights and human dignity, etc., a general philosophy, but this is not relevant for the purposes of the debate this evening. What is in fact relevant for the purposes of this debate, is the charge which Zambia formulated against South Africa at that stage and the reasons why the relations between us were the way they were. In fact, he said to me:

You will therefore excuse me if I am too frank in this letter, if

only to put my views as clearly as possible.

Well, as far as I am concerned, I am a frank man myself and I do not mind anybody being frank with me. President Kaunda was in fact very frank in his letter and I was equally frank in my reply to him. This is the gravamen of his charge against South Africa:

However, I cannot pretend that relations between South Africa and Zambia today are easy to harmonize, since they are at about their lowest ebb. The South African Government has threatened to "hit Zambia so hard that they will not forget it". Economic and military assistance has openly been given by the South African Government to the rebel régime in Rhodesia to sustain the latter in their bid to create conditions under which the minority will exercise unbridled control over the rights and well-being of the majority of human beings. It is clear that the objectives of the rebel régime in Rhodesia are a complete violation of all that is human in man. These factors, apart from the general attitude of the South African Government towards the African people, have been the root causes of the growing distance between the people of South Africa and of Zambia. Recent statements from South Africa have only confirmed the impressions about the offensive nature of the prejudices of the South African authorities against Africans, including African independent states.

After moralizing further, he said:

The present policy of the South African Government is certainly inconsistent with the Christian concept of brotherly understanding and co-operation.

As I have said, it is a long letter, but that is the gravamen of the charge levelled against South Africa by President Kaunda in very frank terms. In the letter he uses some harsh words.

I then replied to him and in my letter I was as frank as he had been. I want to quote relevant portions from my letter. I wrote back to him and said:

In the third paragraph of your letter under reply you state: "The South African Government has threatened to hit Zambia so hard that they will not forget it." First of all, it was not a threat, but a plain statement of fact. In the second place, it is a half-truth, in that I stated very clearly . . .

If I may interrupt the quotation here, hon. members will recall that I made this speech at Rustenburg in 1967 after a threat by President Kaunda that he and his associates will do this, that and the other to South Africa. Hon. members and the Leader of the Opposition will remember that warlike speech he made against South Africa. In my letter I said:

In the second place, it is a half-truth, in that I stated very clearly that, if at any time Zambia were to attack South Africa, either

alone or in collaboration with other African states, then we will hit Zambia so hard that she will never forget it.

Hon. members will appreciate that there is a vast difference between the accusations levelled at me and the actual words I used as a result of the threats that Zambia levelled against South Africa. I then went on to say:

You conveniently chose to omit the first part of my statement. I went further and said to him:

It was of course necessary for me to issue this timely warning in view of the repeated statements by the representatives of Zambia in the UN and at the OAU conferences and elsewhere about the use of force against South Africa and the putting of Zambian territory at the disposal of terrorists who were trained by communists and others to murder South African citizens and to subvert the state of the Republic of South Africa. That, to say the least of it, is to play a very dangerous game, and you will do well to think it over very carefully. Your further assertion that recent statements from South Africa have only confirmed the impressions about the offensive nature of the prejudices of the South African authorities against Africans, including African independent states, is of course just not true. We are progressively leading our various Black nations to self-determination and independence and we have stated over and over again that we are and have always been prepared to co-operate with all countries, Black and White, on a basis of equality and that the differences in domestic policy are no bar to friendly cooperation.

Firstly, it is pointed out that our policy of separate development is not a denial of human rights or values but, in fact, it means that we Whites wish — and that is our right — to maintain our identity as Whites, just as all decent Black people I know wish to maintain their identity as Blacks, with their language, culture and traditions. Secondly, the policy makes it possible to create, as we have created, opportunities for the various Black nations which never existed before and which were not possible under any other policy. Thirdly, our domestic policy is our concern and I do not expect you or any other leader to subscribe to it. In fact, to name only two, President Banda and Prime Minister Jonathan have both stated in public that they disagree with the policy and it certainly did not jeopardize the very friendly relations that exist between my country and theirs.

Whilst on the subject I might add that I have often stated in public that the basic philosophy underlying the policy of separate development is not that we think we are better, richer or more developed than Black or any other people but that we are different and that we, like all other nations, want to maintain

that difference.

Coming back to your country, we have never tried to tell you how to run your country except to express the wish that it should be well run in the interests of your people and in the interests of the stability of Southern Africa, in which we all have an acute interest. Like the people of Zambia, we are also of Africa, and being of Africa, we feel it our duty to put our technical skill, experience and knowledge at the disposal of African states who wish to make use of it. We do not believe in handouts, but rather in offering help in such a way that developing countries can with self-respect help themselves on the path of development.

That also applies to Zambia, but let there be no misunderstanding. We are not prepared to buy friendship or co-operation. Although we would naturally rather have it than do without it, we are not prepared to sacrifice our principles. We seek co-operation with due recognition of each other's sovereignty and without interference in each other's affairs. The ball is therefore entirely in your court and I am prepared to play it the way you serve it. The fact that the relations between our respective countries are what they are, cannot be laid at our door, since it is none of our making, as you are well aware.

You have also seen fit to criticize our Rhodesian policy. Here again you failed to appreciate that with us it is a stand on principle that we will not be forced by anyone to take part in sanctions or boycotts against any country, be it Zambia or Rhodesia. Boycotts are wrong in principle and serve no purpose whatever. Nations, especially small nations, cannot ever concede the principle that big or other nations have the right to prescribe to them with whom they might or might not trade or have friendly relations. I am not aware that Rhodesia seeks to harm or to destroy Zambia, nor has Rhodesia, like South Africa, to my knowledge refused to co-operate with Zambia as an independent state on an equal footing. It might just therefore be worth your while to reconsider your attitude. As far as we are concerned, that is what South Africa is offering its neighbours and other states without any strings attached and without any desire or wish to meddle in their internal affairs or to prescribe their policy. On that basis all countries, including Zambia, will find South Africa willing to co-operate and to work for the common good of mankind.

We believe, however, that in the interest of all our peoples in our part of Africa the circle should be widened to include the whole sub-continent. You, Mr President, heading the Government of Zambia, with its economic potential and political importance, hold the key to the extension of this co-operation to all

countries in Southern Africa.

Hon. members will see that from his side it was a frank statement and that it was an equally frank statement from my side.

Now, hon. members must remember what threats were levelled against South Africa. I have here with me a whole file filled with such threats, but I do not think it necessary for me to read them out here. There is not one single hon. member on that side of the House who does not know what threats were levelled against South Africa, who does not know that we in South Africa were called colonialists, that South Africa had to be boycotted, that South Africa had to be blockaded, in fact, that South Africa had to be squashed here on the southernmost tip of Africa. These threats were regularly levelled by Zambia. Then I received this astonishing letter from him in August, 1968, in reply to that very frank letter of mine:

It is not my intention to dwell on the points of difference clearly indicated in your letter, for I consider this would be futile. However, I would like to correct two impressions which I consider important. The first one relates to the first paragraph on page 2 of your letter in which you stated that "it was necessary for me to issue this timely warning in view of the repeated statements by representatives of Zambia in the UN and OAU conferences and elsewhere about the use of force against South Africa".

Then he made this surprising statement:

With respect, it is just not true that Zambia has advocated the use of force against South Africa. We have always and ever since UDI made a clear distinction between the problem in Rhodesia and the problem in your country. I want to reaffirm the fact that at no time has my Government or its representatives advocated the use of force against South Africa. What is true, is that we have called for the use of force by Britain in Rhodesia to bring down the rebellious régime.

Hon. members should now listen to the following:

In actual fact, nobody, at least in this part of the world, had considered the question of lumping together South Africa with the rest of the minority régimes.

Then he goes on to say:

It is important to understand therefore that at no time have we considered that force is the answer in South Africa.

Then I shall omit other matters which are not of importance in this debate. He went on to say:

The discussions which we had with your Government officials and the subsequent information which I have been able to

receive, have together confirmed our view, held for a long time, namely that the problem of South Africa is very different from that which obtains in Rhodesia or, indeed, in Angola or Mozambique.

I think I have now quoted sufficiently from that correspondence. Along with this letter, the courier who conveyed this letter, also conveyed a message to the effect that instead of continuing to write to each other, we should proceed to making further arrangements for a meeting between envoys. I was pleased at this being the case. I arranged for an envoy of mine to go to Zambia. That was after the first letter had been disposed of. An appointment was in fact arranged for 25th May, 1968, but just before that meeting was to take place, President Kaunda made a speech in Botswana in which he — and I am sure hon. members will remember that speech — publicly made very vicious remarks against South Africa. I then sent him word that I was astonished at the fact that he had requested me to send an envoy, that he had said he would not use force against South Africa and did not lump South Africa together with the “minority régimes”, but had done everything but that in the speech he had made in Botswana. I then told him that to my mind it was a waste of time to hold discussions under those circumstances. He subsequently informed me that I was not to take that speech too seriously, that it was intended for the consumption of other people and that we should proceed with the discussions in spite of that speech. I replied to him that under those circumstances I was prepared to proceed with the discussions, and, as he had requested, I sent a delegate of high standing to discuss matters with him. That appointment was honoured on 22nd June, 1968, and it followed on the correspondence that had taken place.

I now personally, not as a quotation from a letter, want to furnish hon. members with the charges levelled against South Africa. He said that his problem with South Africa was the following:

- (a) The South African Government's policy of apartheid in general
- (b) the fact that the South African Government supports the rebel Government in Rhodesia
- (c) the fact that the South African Government refuses to respond to the United Nations' resolution and appeals in regard to South-West Africa
- (d) South Africa's defence agreement with the two Portuguese territories and Rhodesia, and the fact that White Southern Africa is hostile to the Black African States, and
- (e) the South African Government's policy in respect of its own

Black people locally.

My delegate discussed each of these objections with him, and reported back to me that he was able to satisfy the President of Zambia on every charge. He also told me that the President of Zambia had in fact told him that he understood very well the position prevailing in Southern Africa at present. In particular my delegate pointed out to him very clearly that we had no defence agreement whatsoever with Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories and that he was aware that this was in fact the case. Nevertheless, be that as it may, on that occasion he stated that he was satisfied with the replies he had received.

On that occasion it was agreed that envoys would no longer be used, but that a personal meeting between President Kaunda and myself would take place. I had informed him that I was agreeable to such a meeting, that, for the sake of the interests of Southern Africa and for the sake of the interests of both his country and mine, I should like to see him personally in order that we might come to an agreement and settle matters. Subsequently it was agreed on that date that such a meeting would in fact take place. He said that it would be difficult for him to get away, as at that stage he was not keen to broadcast the fact of having had talks with me, but that he would like to do so in secret. I then sent him word that I appreciated his circumstances and that I was waiting for the opportunity to hold talks with him. I made inquiries from time to time, but there was always some excuse for its not being possible for the talks to take place. Eventually, because nothing materialized from these enquiries, I once again sent the same highranking envoy to Lusaka, on 21st January, 1969, to find out what the position was. I informed the President of Zambia that this story about meeting in secret would not work out. He had been battling for so long to bring it about, but it would not work. He was to arrange a public meeting with me somewhere, and I would be prepared to hold talks with him at an agreed venue. I invited him to come to Pretoria, if it would suit him, or to any other place on which we could agree. It was then agreed that such a dialogue would be a public one.

Attempts were then made to arrange for this dialogue to take place. Once again I waited, and in March, 1969, his envoy came to South Africa and contacted mine. Now, hon. members must keep this well in mind: The accusation was now being levelled against us that we, according to him and many people in the world outside, wanted to attack Zambia, that we wanted to destroy Zambia. In March, 1969, his envoy, in hot haste, came to South Africa with a major problem. His problem at that stage was that the President of Zambia had received information that Rhodesia and Portugal

were on the point of invading Zambia and going to war against them. As I had influence with them, would I not be so kind as to use my influence in order to call off that war against him? I told his envoy — and I am repeating this word for word — “Go back to your country, tell your President he and your people must go on with your work. There is no such thing as anybody wanting to attack you from any side. If there were such a thing, surely I would at least have been aware of it, because I know what is going on in Southern Africa. I am not even prepared to speak to those two countries about it, for it is absolute nonsense and the source from which you obtained it, is a mendacious one, to put it very mildly”. Then he left, and hon. members know, of course, that no war ever took place, for no war against anybody was being envisaged at all.

On that occasion the question of a meeting was again discussed. In spite of the fact that it had again been discussed, there was always some excuse for its being impossible for the meeting to take place.

This went on, and I was still waiting all the time, until in May, 1970, my envoy again had personal talks with the President of Zambia and again raised this question. And on that occasion it was definitely agreed, without any doubt, that he would keep a public appointment with me in November, 1970, so that we might discuss the problems of Southern Africa as well as those of our own two countries.

At that stage there was no longer any doubt about the matter. There was a definite appointment for November, 1970. During all that time all the problems were discussed openly and full reports were drawn up on them. What is very important, is that notwithstanding the fact that the President of Zambia was duly aware that South Africa did not bear him any malice, that South Africa had no intention of attacking him, that South Africa stood to gain nothing from any attack on him, and notwithstanding the fact that he had asked South Africa to prevent the war which he thought other people wanted to make against him, the President of Zambia made, in December, 1970 — having failed to keep his appointment in November — a very strong attack on South Africa. I shall now quote from the *Times of Zambia*, which is more or less the official mouthpiece of the President of Zambia. He said at the time:

There is no question of a dialogue between Zambia and South Africa as long as John Vorster remains the spokesman of a minority group.

He said this in spite of the fact that in his own letter he had written to me that he did not regard me in that light. Furthermore, he said this in spite of the fact that when he himself had had to confront me, he had said that he did not lump me together with Rhodesia

and the Portuguese territories. The report went on to say:

And President Kaunda told journalists at the State House that Zambia must boycott the forthcoming Commonwealth Leaders' Conference if Britain sells arms to South Africa. He said South Africa had drawn up secret plans to invade Zambia and form a puppet government. This was a way of creating a buffer belt of Mozambique, Zambia and Angola. Helping the liberation of South Africa was now a question of survival. South Africa had put a cross on Zambia on their secret maps, meaning they want to destroy it. How can we have a dialogue with such people, the President asked.

This happened after everything I told you had taken place. Can hon. members understand now why, on a certain occasion, I called him a double-talker?

But then I said during the no-confidence debate that I would on a subsequent occasion expose the President of Zambia to the world as a double-talker. Immediately after that the President of Zambia contacted me and said that I had to send an envoy to him again.

I then sent my envoy to him. My envoy met him personally on 27th March, 1971, and said to him, "Now we are completely baffled. Why do you adopt one kind of attitude in public and another in private? Surely this is an untenable position. The Prime Minister of South Africa now has no alternative other than exposing the whole matter to the world." His reply to that was that he would decide on this matter in June or July, for at that stage he was not only President of Zambia; he was also chairman of the Organization for African Unity.

I have now dealt fully with this matter because tonight I want to repeat this with all the power and emphasis at my command: It is absolutely essential for we states in Southern Africa, in view of the threat facing us and the fact that many of these states are underdeveloped, that we should understand one another, in spite of our differences in domestic policy. It is essential for proper cooperation to exist between us as states. In respect of his double-talking it is important for me to say this not only to South Africa, but also to all states in Africa: Here one has the President of a country who, on the one hand, tells the African states — and there are many witnesses to this — "Under no circumstances must you have a dialogue with South Africa. They are not people with whom one should have a dialogue." But ever since 1968 he himself has been having a dialogue with us. Here one has the President of a country saying, "It is pernicious to trade with South Africa, and you may not do so." But he himself trades with South Africa. Here one has a man who, on the one hand, presents us to the outside world in a suspicious light, and there are people who believe him. He says

that we want to attack him and that we want to destroy him. But in the same breath he tells us that others want to destroy him and that we must please help him. Here one has a man who, on the one hand, tells the world outside that we are colonialists and, on the other hand, tells me that he has never said this about us. Here one has a man who, on the one hand, advocates the use of force against us morning, noon and night, and then tells me, "Nobody, at least in this part of the world, has ever said such a thing." I believe that it is and has become in the interests of Southern Africa for this exposure of the President of Zambia to take place for the good of Southern Africa. It must take place for the sake of a better understanding in Africa.

Having said all these things, I want to make it very clear that I am making many allowances for the President of Zambia. I know his circumstances and his problems. That he has been acting against South Africa in the way I have described to the House, does not matter now. It is still in the interests of Southern Africa and all of us that we should reach an understanding. In spite of all these considerations, President Kaunda is the ruler and the leader of Zambia. I now want to state openly that I am still prepared to hold talks with him, and I think I am doing so not only on behalf of my side of the House, but also on behalf of hon. members on the opposite side of the House. I am still prepared to meet him at any venue on which we may agree. I am prepared to receive him in Pretoria, as I would receive any head of state of any country, in spite of everything that has happened, because I set more value on the interests of Southern Africa, of the states in this part of the world, than I do on the interests of the person of President Kaunda and the interests of my own person, because even the interests of our two countries are, as far as the leaders are concerned, secondary to the interests and the good of Southern Africa as a whole. I am, as I have said, quite prepared to hold those talks, and whereas we have now done everything in our power in the way I have described to the House, I now extend this open invitation to the President of Zambia to honour that promise of talks and to discuss with me the venue and the date, because I believe that it is in the highest interests of Southern Africa that such talks will in fact take place.

There is, of course — and I must say this just in passing — the so-called Lusaka Manifesto.¹ That so-called Lusaka Manifesto, on which many people in the world take their stand and on which President Kaunda takes his stand, was never sent to us by them. There has never been any attempt on their part to negotiate with us on the basis of that so-called manifesto. Of course, I totally reject the allegations in that manifesto as being devoid of any

1. See: *Southern Africa Record* no. 2, June 1975, p.1

truth. But, be that as it may, for the sake of Southern Africa I am prepared to hold those talks, and I hope and trust that this double standard, this double-talking, will now stop once and for all.

South Africa (Republic) *House of Assembly Debates*, no. 11, 1971. Cols. 4928-4940

B. Zambian Statements

(i) STATEMENT BY THE ZAMBIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON 22 APRIL 1971

The cause of the internal problems that face the South African Government and her failure to win blanket support from African countries for a dialogue should not be laid at the door of President Kaunda or Zambia . . .

The tone of the South African Prime Minister's attack on the Zambian Head of State, and its timing are sufficient evidence of the depth of the strains and stresses that South Africa must be currently undergoing.

On several occasions since 1968 the South African Government has been making overtures to the Zambian Head of State through secret envoys for a meeting with the South African Prime Minister. These attempts, as correspondence is available to prove it, failed due to irreconcilable political philosophies of President Kaunda and Mr Vorster on the central question of the dignity and equality of man.

Since then there has never been any question of a meeting between President Kaunda and Mr Vorster and accusations, therefore, that President Kaunda has been dealing in double-talk are an utter fabrication at a very high level.

Zambia's stand on the question of the moral right of a people irrespective of race, colour or religion, to self-determination is an article of faith which we have stated time and again on all occasions. It is this same stand that President Kaunda made clear to the South African Prime Minister as correspondence shows.

(ii) STATEMENT BY THE ZAMBIAN MINISTER OF INFORMATION ON 23 APRIL 1971

Yesterday, the Government of the Republic of Zambia issued a statement through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the attack by the Prime Minister of South Africa on the President of the Republic of Zambia, Dr Kenneth Kaunda, in his speech in the South African Parliament.

The purpose of holding this Press Conference is to give to the people of Zambia, and indeed to the world, the true facts

of the events on which the Prime Minister of South Africa based his attack. I will provide detailed documents of the exchanges which took place between His Excellency the President and Mr John Vorster. These documents which I am giving to the press will be published shortly by Government as a White Paper, which should be available to all as a record.

It should be clear from these detailed documents that the only basis for the outburst by the Prime Minister of South Africa and other allegations made by him could be an intense feeling of frustration on his part for failing to drag Zambia into a dialogue with him. As explained in yesterday's statement, the philosophies of Zambia and South Africa on the question of the dignity of man are so divergent that it would be impossible on Zambia's part to imagine any possibility of a dialogue with South Africa. I will now briefly outline what in fact took place:

In the early part of 1964, after Zambia became a self-governing territory, Dr Kaunda, as Prime Minister, made a public statement in Kabwe on a civic occasion expressing his preparedness to establish diplomatic relations with South Africa on condition that Zambia's envoys enjoyed exactly the same rights, were allowed complete freedom of movement in South Africa as any other foreign diplomat in that country. The South African Government at that time treated this gesture of goodwill by Dr Kaunda with scorn. They did not even reply. No formal messages were exchanged.

In 1965, it appeared that the South African Government, led by Dr Verwoerd as Prime Minister then, realised they had missed a chance. They started to send out feelers to Zambia with a view to establishing some kind of contact with the Zambian Government. These were continued after Mr Vorster took over the premiership on the death of Dr Verwoerd. All these feelers were ignored by the Zambian Government, as it was quite clear that the South African authorities had spurned Dr Kaunda's efforts before.

In 1967 and early 1968, these feelers were intensified with constant requests for co-operation. A list of subjects in which co-operation was possible was transmitted through a source. Among the main subjects proposed for consideration were:

- a possible meeting between Mr Vorster and President Kaunda;
- Rhodesia: the question was asked, what compromise Zambia would prefer on the Rhodesian issue. It was suggested that the talks on the subject should include South Africa, Rhodesia and Zambia.

It was revealed that the South African authorities deplored what they called terrorism. This was the period when freedom fighters' operation in Rhodesia was at its highest intensity. Co-operation in many fields, including transport, airways, communications, commerce, industry and labour were among the subjects which would form a fruitful basis for the improvement of relations between Zambia and South Africa.

In view of the efforts in Rhodesia, it appeared quite clear that the South Africans were beginning to recognise the need to discuss Rhodesia, in which of course they already had their security forces fighting with the Rhodesian rebels. President Kaunda, therefore, decided that it would be fruitful to pursue a line of investigation into the intentions of the South African leaders. He decided to send to Mr Vorster a lengthy and frank letter laying down the Zambian principles and the obstacles towards any improvement in relations between South Africa and Zambia.

C. Correspondence

(i) LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KAUNDA, DATED 1 APRIL 1968

I have recently received intimations through a source about your Government's concern over the state of relations between Zambia and South Africa. In dealing with matters regarding relations with neighbours whose problems are bound to have an influence on us I have always found it imperative to adopt an attitude of frankness and sincerity in the search for solutions to such problems. Frankness and honesty, in my opinion, are the foundation of a true, lasting and just solution to problems facing Southern Africa and man as a whole. You will therefore excuse me if I am too frank in this letter if only to put my views as clearly as possible.

I have studied with interest a number of proposals aimed at promoting understanding and opening a wide field of co-operation in the economic, technical, educational and other fields. There is no doubt that the inalterable facts of geography and history create a vast potential for such co-operation between the peoples of South Africa and Zambia and I certainly look forward to the day when such co-operation will be a part of life and not merely a policy.

However, I cannot pretend that the relations between South Africa and Zambia today are easy to harmonise since they are at about their lowest ebb. The South African Govern-

ment has threatened to hit Zambia "so hard that they will not forget it". Economic and military assistance has openly been given by the South African Government to the rebel regime in Rhodesia to sustain the latter in their bid to create conditions under which the minority will exercise unbridled control over the rights and well-being of the majority of human beings. It is clear that the objectives of the rebel régime in Rhodesia are a complete violation of all that is human in man. These factors, apart from the general attitude of the South African Government towards the African people, have been the root causes of the growing distance between the people of South Africa and Zambia. Recent statements from South Africa have only confirmed the impressions about the offensive nature of the prejudices of the South African authorities against Africans including African independent States.

In saying all this I must underline the fact that my Government's policy is firmly one of securing peace, freedom and prosperity through justice at home whilst at the same time maximising our contribution to the peace, security and the welfare of mankind as a whole. Good neighbourliness and non-interference in the internal affairs of other independent states, non-alignment and co-operation with all members of the international community, without discrimination based on ideology or some other concept which does not satisfy present-day conditions and our objectives, are cardinal principles of my Government's foreign policy. Our adherence to the Charter of the United Nations and the OAU and to the principles laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is based on our own conviction regarding the importance of man as the highest symbol of God's creation. The equality of man and the dignity of person indeed form the cornerstone upon which our own society is built. Obligated by the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we are compelled to deplore the coercive instruments and the inhuman laws which prevail in territories which are still under minority rule and in which the majority of the people have no voice in the shaping of the destiny of their own country.

We have never declared ourselves against *all* the people of South Africa whether white or black, nor have we condemned *all* the people of Rhodesia. We have criticised and indeed condemned the policies of the governing authorities in Rhodesia and indeed in South Africa because, in our opinion, such policies are not in the interests of the majority of the people whom those authorities are under an obligation to serve in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United

Nations. In our view international understanding and co-operation is based on mutual respect among human beings regardless of race, colour or creed. Without mutual understanding, mutual respect, co-operation which could only work in the service of a few would be based on dishonesty if not hypocrisy. In this connection I might emphasize that I welcome the intimations about the South African Government's readiness to co-operate. But in all honesty, it would be difficult for me to believe that while the South African Government's policy does not agree with the principles of equality of races, it would be possible for my Government and the people of Zambia to co-operate with the Government of South Africa in the spirit of friendship and equality and mutual respect. This contradiction would have to be resolved in the first instance and is definitely the root cause of the large gap which exists between us. The present policy of the South African Government is certainly inconsistent with the Christian concept of brotherly understanding and co-operation. This is very briefly how I look at the situation:

In order to implement the various proposals in the field of co-operation in which, as I have indicated earlier, there is a very great potential, certain basic issues must be tackled and genuine conditions for co-operation established. It is clear that the burning issue at the present moment which has brought South Africa's name into disrepute remains one of the South African Government's attitude to racial discrimination and all other related policies regarding the manner in which human beings in South Africa will live and share the fruits of nature and their labour. The international community, including Zambia, have found the policies in this field unjust and certainly inconsistent with Western civilization — particularly so when South Africa is associated with 'the free world'. *In my view, the manner in which the South African Government has responded to various suggestions for racial accommodation and more freedom to share the economic wealth of that country among the 18 million people has been the cause of so many difficulties which have involved us in trying to find a lasting solution which would be a guarantee for genuine peace.*

I must emphasize that we in Zambia have nothing against the white people in South Africa as such. We have never adopted a policy of 'driving the white people into the sea' — this would in fact be unimaginable, unrealistic and un-Christian. We have already demonstrated this in Zambia by adopting non-racialism as a way of life. We are prepared to

share the wealth which nature has provided this country without discrimination based on any concept including race and colour. I think we are much happier than we were when racial discrimination was the basis of the political and administrative machinery. The economy is more dynamic than when a handful were involved in the effective participation in the process of development. This would be exactly the same in South Africa. As soon as the majority of Africans know the perimeters of their responsibility a new field of co-operation among whites and blacks would open and the present fears which are a source of instability, and all the laws which have been condemned by the international community, will give way to greater confidence, happiness and prosperity in peace and justice.

The cry for greater freedom among human beings is not unique to territories south of the Zambezi. You will only have to look at what is happening in the Communist world; Czechoslovakia in which recently a new spirit of democratic revolution has brought about changes in the policies of government. Czechoslovakia is not the only one. There are a number of movements in Eastern Europe which are an outward expression of the people's desire to have not only more freedom but a greater say in the shaping of the future of their respective countries. This is in the nature of things for man's desire to be free to pursue life's happiness in his own way without undue restriction will remain unquenchable no matter what force is brought to bear upon him.

In my opinion this is exactly what is likely to happen in South Africa. The millions of Africans and other non-white races will continue to grow in number and in their political awareness and they will not stop their struggle, in various forms, for their rights. While the present administration may be able to withstand the forces of change the future generation will probably not. In which case those in the administration now are only creating greater problems for their children who will be finding it difficult to re-adjust to new changes. The present South African Government has a great potential for making changes consistent with the total objectives of promoting understanding and co-operation among nations and races not only in Africa but in the world as a whole. Eastern Europe is in the process of change. Western Europe and America are also in the process of change to accommodate the new socio-economic and political conditions which are, in a number of cases, intended to make the world a much better place. South Africa has a contribution to make. This is why it is necessary to prepare

the way now to ensure that justice takes the place of racial discrimination. When once this is achieved the way is open for unlimited co-operation between the people of South Africa and those of Zambia and the rest of Africa. The way indeed is open for lasting peace and undisturbed prosperity.

From the above it will be readily noted that while it is admitted that the relations between Zambia and South Africa have deteriorated, improvement can be made through the removal of the root causes of such a state of relations. Only by removing these causes and narrowing the distance in the misunderstanding that exists now can genuine co-operation based on an honest approach to life be promoted on the basis of mutual respect and in the interest of peace and development. I repeat what I have said earlier that the potential for co-operation exists particularly in view of the fact that we in Zambia have nothing against the *people* of South Africa as such, but rather against the policy which does not serve the interests of everybody and in fact only creates potential threats to peace and security.

I have every hope that just as people in Czechoslovakia and other European countries have found it necessary to relax a number of restrictions on freedom of the individual and restoring the dignity of the human being, it will be possible for the South African Government to initiate measures to bring about a change in the current policies in order to harmonise the relations between human beings of different faces and colour. This definitely is the only obstacle to a much happier relationship between South Africa and Zambia. I want to emphasize, Mr Prime Minister, that nothing else stands in the way for the achievement of this objective.

With regard to Rhodesia I have to make it clear that we are completely against the rebel government's policies and the objectives behind UDI. The rebel authorities have in fact created an additional problem on the road to better understanding between South Africa and Zambia. Short of majority rule in that country there will be no peace and we are going to be saddled with a very unstable situation which will work against the interests of both South Africa and Zambia. The solution lies in ending the rebellion. We have never advocated in Zambia that majority rule and independence will come tomorrow, but rather we had thought that there would be a transitional government which would immediately make a thorough preparation for majority rule and independence. The present conditions in Rhodesia are most unsatisfactory and are a source of insecurity for

Zambia.

In my opinion it is not in the interests of South Africa to support the Smith regime. The odds against the Smith regime are so overwhelming that it will serve no purpose at all to give them the assistance which they naturally desire. I do hope, therefore, that the assistance which is being rendered by your Government to the Smith regime will be withdrawn in order to create conditions under which a lasting and just solution can be found.

I would like to end by pointing out that I am convinced beyond doubt that you personally, Mr Prime Minister, hold the key to the future insofar as finding peaceful solutions to problems confronting the whole of Southern Africa are concerned. I believe you hold a very strong position in the ruling Party and you have the necessary courage and foresight to enable you to do within South Africa what you are doing in co-operation with certain independent African States.

(ii) LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER VORSTER, DATED
2 MAY 1968

Dear Mr President,

I have received your letter dated the 1st April, 1968, and have read it with interest and considerable surprise.

Like yourself I also believe in plain speaking at all times and especially under existing circumstances and I believe, taking into account the present relations between our countries, I must be equally frank with you.

Let me, therefore, begin by saying that your letter under reply strikes me as being as presumptuous as it is uninformed. Presumptuous in that you take it upon yourself to criticise the domestic policy, as well as certain aspects of my Government's foreign policy, in terms like 'offensive' and insinuating that our policy is un-Christian. Furthermore your letter bristles with statements proving how uninformed you are about our real policy and objectives.

In the third paragraph of your letter under reply, you state that 'the South African Government has threatened to hit Zambia so hard that they will not forget it'. First of all it was not a threat but a plain statement of fact. In the second place it is a half truth in that I stated very clearly that *if at any time Zambia were to attack South Africa either alone or in collaboration with other African states, then we will hit Zambia so hard that she will never forget it.* You conveniently chose to

omit the first part of my statement.

It was, of course, necessary for me to issue this timely warning in view of repeated statements by representatives of Zambia in the UN and at OAU conferences and elsewhere, about the use of force against South Africa and the putting of Zambian territory at the disposal of terrorists who were trained by Communists and others to murder South African citizens and to subvert the state of the Republic of South Africa. That, to say the least of it, is to play a very dangerous game and you will do well to think it over very carefully.

Your further assertion that 'recent statements from South Africa have only confirmed the impressions about the offensive nature of the prejudices of the South African authorities against Africans including African independent States' is of course just not true. We are progressively leading our various black nations to self determination and independence and we have stated over and over again that we are and have always been prepared to co-operate with all countries, black and white, on a basis of equality and that a difference in domestic policy is no bar to friendly co-operation.

Firstly, it is pointed out that our policy of 'separate development' is not, I repeat not, a denial of human rights or values but in fact it means that we whites wish, and that is our right, to maintain our identity as whites just as all decent black people I know wish to maintain their identity as blacks with their language, culture and traditions. Secondly, the policy makes it possible to create as we have created, opportunities for the various black nations which never existed before and which were not possible under any other policy. Thirdly, our domestic policy is our concern and I do not expect you or any other leader to subscribe to it. In fact, to name only two, President Banda and Prime Minister Jonathan, have both stated in public that they disagree with the policy and it certainly did not jeopardise the very friendly relations that exist between my country and theirs.

While on the subject I might add that I have often stated in public that the basic philosophy underlying the policy of 'separate development' is not that we think that we are better, richer or more developed than black or any other people, but that we are different and that we, like all other nations, want to maintain that difference.

The calm, peace, order, prosperity and stability of South Africa prove that this policy, because it eradicates friction, serves the interests of all the population groups and is, in fact, accepted as such by the leaders and masses of the

various coloured groups in South Africa.

Coming back to your country, we have never tried to tell you how to run your country, except to express the wish that it should be well run in the interest of your people and in the interest of stability of Southern Africa in which we all have an acute interest.

Like the people of Zambia we are also of Africa, and being of Africa, we feel it our duty to put our technical skill, experience and knowledge at the disposal of African states who wish to make use of it. We don't believe in 'handouts' but rather in offering help in such a way that developing countries can, with self respect, help themselves on the path of development.

That also applies to Zambia. But let there be no misunderstanding. We are not prepared to buy friendship or co-operation and although we would naturally rather have it than do without it, we are not prepared to sacrifice our principles. We seek co-operation with due recognition of each other's sovereignty and without interference in each other's affairs. The ball is therefore entirely in your court and I am prepared to play it the way you serve it. The fact that relations between our respective countries are what they are, cannot be laid at our door since it is none of our making, as you are well aware.

You have also seen fit to criticise our Rhodesian policy. Here again you fail to appreciate that with us it is a stand on principle that we will not be forced by anyone to take part in sanctions or boycotts against any country, be it Zambia or Rhodesia. Boycotts are wrong in principle and serve no purpose whatsoever. Nations, especially small nations, cannot ever concede the principle that big or other nations have the right to prescribe to them with whom they might or might not trade or have friendly relations.

I am not aware that Rhodesia seeks to harm or to destroy Zambia. Nor has Rhodesia, like South Africa, to my knowledge, refused to co-operate with Zambia as an independent State on an equal footing. It might just, therefore, be worth your while to reconsider your own attitude.

I have taken the trouble to write to you at length as I did because I believe that we both have an important part to play in the development of a stable and prosperous Southern Africa and that plain speaking at this stage might perhaps bring about the desired result to the benefit of us all and the peoples under our care.

Refusal to accept that South Africa, like every other inde-

pendent state, has the right to adopt its own domestic policy must inevitably lead to unnecessary friction and must obviously only retard progress and prosperity and hamper good relations which both Africa and the world very badly need.

Your own experience, I am sure, has taught you that the greatest ill in the world today is the fact that leaders of nations seem to have solutions for all the problems in the world, except their own.

What the world, and Africa in particular, today need, are leaders who mind their own business and govern their countries in the best interests of their subjects, in co-operation with their neighbours in a spirit of friendship and helpfulness.

That is what South Africa is offering its neighbours and other states without any strings attached and without any desire or wish to meddle in their internal affairs or to prescribe their policy. On that basis all countries, including Zambia, will find South Africa willing to co-operate and to work for the common good of mankind.

The problems of any country, including your own, Mr President, will not be solved by the OAU or any other organisation. Like ourselves, you and your people will have to solve yours, and the choice how you are going to do it, is entirely your own.

In the concluding paragraph of your letter you refer, *inter alia*, to our co-operation with certain independent African States. Our growing co-operation with, for example, Malawi, Lesotho and Botswana is holding increasing benefits for us all. Furthermore, I am confident that the already existing co-operation with Swaziland will not only be maintained but will be intensified when that country shortly achieves its independence.

We believe, however, that in the interests of all peoples in our part of Africa the circle should be widened to include the whole subcontinent and *you*, Mr President, heading the Government of Zambia, with its economic potential and political importance, hold the key to the extension of this co-operation to all countries in Southern Africa.

(iii) LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KAUNDA, DATED 15 AUGUST 1968

I thank you for your letter reference C.3/7 dated the 2nd May, 1968. I greatly appreciate your frankness as this can be

the only genuine basis of true co-operation.

It is not my intention to dwell on the points of difference clearly indicated in your letter, for I consider that this would be futile. However, I would like to correct two impressions which I consider important. The first one relates to the first paragraph on page 2 of your letter in which you stated that it was 'necessary for me to issue this timely warning in view of the repeated statements by representatives of Zambia in the UN and OAU Conferences and elsewhere about the use of force against South Africa . . .' With respect, it is not just true that Zambia has advocated the use of force against South Africa. We have always, and ever since UDI, made a clear distinction between the problem in Rhodesia and the problem in your country. I want to reaffirm the fact that at no time has my Government or its representatives advocated the use of force against South Africa. What is true is that we have called for the use of force by Britain in Rhodesia to bring down the rebellious regime.

In actual fact, nobody, at least in this part of the world, had considered the question of lumping together South Africa with the rest of minority regimes. It is only South Africa's apparent decision to throw her lot in with the rebel regime in Rhodesia which has brought her into the full focus of criticism by the rest of the international community. We are perfectly aware in Zambia that the solutions which are being proposed for Rhodesia are not applicable to the situation in South Africa. It is important to understand, therefore, that at no time have we considered that force is the answer in South Africa.

The second point relates to Rhodesia itself. I think it is important for me to reaffirm the fact that we have fully considered the whole question of Rhodesia and still believe that the rebellion in Rhodesia is not the choice of the majority and is neither in Zambia's interests nor in those of South Africa. For a long time we shall be saddled with a very unstable situation. I would not like, therefore, to delude myself into thinking that the rebellion in Rhodesia will harm nobody, for the inevitable consequences of failure by the rebel regime to hold on to the reins of power against the overwhelming majority will have far-reaching consequences in which our own security and that of South Africa will be put in jeopardy. I believe, as you yourself said, that South Africa desires to have a stable neighbour. The present regime just does not offer stability except by a continued utilisation of arms to maintain a semblance of peace. This is why it is not possible for me to genuinely consider that a change of policy towards

Rhodesia would pay because it just does not offer any such prospects.

Since receiving your letter I have had opportunity to see some of your officials. I had an interesting meeting with them in June. I do hope that they derived a lot of experience from their visit to Zambia just as much as I had a lot to learn from the exchange of views which the meeting afforded. Such contacts are useful, for ignorance is always the source of suspicion and fear and both in turn breed conflict and all the attendant consequences. I know that we have been very misunderstood but all I can say is that we mean well and sincerely believe that politics of expediency do not provide a good foundation for lasting friendship. We believe that principles are for ages and expediencies only for the day.

It is in this spirit that, first, I accepted the visit of your officials to Lusaka and, secondly, I engaged in a frank exchange of views with them. This meeting should be regarded as opening a possible channel of communication to ensure that our positions are clarified.

The discussions which we had with your Government officials and the subsequent information which I have been able to receive have together confirmed our view held for a long time; viz, that the problem of South Africa is very different from that which obtains in Rhodesia or indeed in Angola or Mozambique. We are, therefore, interested to learn more of the evolutionary process of change which obviously is one of the most important phenomena in South Africa's future development. You have spoken in your letter, for example, of the fact that you are progressively leading 'the various Black Nations to self-determination and independence'. The final objectives of the South African Government in relation to these 'nations' and their relationship to the Government, for example, in Pretoria would be of interest to the critics of South African policy. This I certainly would be interested to know, although part of the story was explained by your officials. It would help provide a basis for future considerations.

Understanding the present policies of your Government is a problem although, of course, I perfectly understand your contention that it is not my business nor that of anybody else; but I know that international obligations alone make it imperative for all of us to consider what builds peace on just and lasting foundations. The problem would probably have been easier if it was not unfortunately accentuated by the involvement of your country in the current problems facing the rebels in Rhodesia. It is accepted that your Government

has every right to trade with anybody but I consider it also the duty of friends to advise where dangers exist. We, for our part, have often been warned about Communism and we have not ignored this advice. Similarly, it is imperative for us to point out that the Smith regime is not really helping South Africa nor is it helping the white people in Rhodesia. They will stand to lose unless they accept a complete take-over by South Africa which will in turn only increase her own problems.

I submit that the best test of the true reaction of people in Rhodesia is that of a full and free referendum. This will reveal exactly what the people of Rhodesia want. Otherwise, instability will continue to reign for as long as the *status quo* remains the feature of Rhodesia's political life.

Mr Prime Minister, I have fully considered all that you said in your letter and I have taken into account the fruitful conversation which we had with your officials which shed more light on the path for the future. In conclusion, I feel bound once again to say that the rebel regime in Rhodesia may well be the key or the obstacle in the path towards better understanding. It is my hope and trust that you will consider your country's interests in this matter and, indeed, your whole position vis-a-vis the rebel regime.

Once again, thank you for your letter and thank you for sending your officials to Lusaka.

(iv) LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KAUNDA, DATED 29 AUGUST 1968

I have received your message which has been communicated to me through your emissary. I have examined very carefully the problems of organising such a meeting as proposed and the implications which could follow if the whole project misfired at the present moment. It is therefore my strong feeling that such a meeting is most inopportune at this time. With regard to the subject of discussion I want to say that I am pleased to know that you have a real concern over Rhodesia. I cannot emphasize more how much this is a disturbing factor in the stability and future welfare in Southern Africa.

As I understand, you are particularly interested in the idea of a full and free referendum as a test of the reaction of the people in Rhodesia to not only the rebellion but also as to the form of Government which serves their interests best. It would be difficult for me to explain fully at such short notice all the details about this proposal in this submission. However, my ideas are as follows:

- Such a referendum should be full: It must be based on testing the opinion of each and every man and woman of adult age, that is, twenty-one and above.
- It must be a free and straight referendum with no strings attached. This means that the question of the Royal Commission or utilising the traditional machinery in the village for testing the opinion of the majority of the people through Indabas, where only Headmen and the like will be represented, will be inappropriate if the result is to be satisfactory.
- The referendum must be directed towards ensuring that all communities in Rhodesia have opportunity to indicate the manner in which the future of the country should be run. The two points above will ensure that this is effectively achieved.
- In these circumstances it would be absolutely necessary to release the political detainees with a promise by those in power to allow them free participation in the organisation of the referendum. The Nationalist Parties would for their part ensure that the referendum is conducted without violence provided their own personal freedom and safety are assured.
- I am aware that for an understandable reason your Government would not accept the supervision of the United Nations. For this reason a number of countries, in and outside the Commonwealth, could be asked to participate in the supervision of the referendum. I would suggest the following: United Kingdom, Canada, Kenya, India, Sweden, South Africa, and Zambia. In selecting the participating countries the aim must be to achieve maximum effectiveness and the best possible result which would assist in bringing about stability and lasting settlement of the current unsatisfactory situation in Rhodesia.

The results of the referendum must be accepted in full and be the basis of the decision for an acceptable constitution for Rhodesia. It is necessary here for me to re-state what I have said before, namely, that we envisage a period of direct rule by Britain in order to repair the damage which has been done so far between different racial communities and to create an atmosphere which could best suit the new government based on majority decision. The precept of such government therefore must remain, 'What touches all must be approved by all'.

The British Government in the circumstances would have to be responsible for Rhodesia directly through an effective Governor. I do not expect that the period of direct rule

would be long as it would have the specific object of, first, normalising the situation in Rhodesia; and, second, embarking on a programme of training all those who will be responsible for the administration of Rhodesia, apart from re-conditioning the minds of those who are currently operating the administrative machinery; and, finally, making thorough preparations for independence.

It is only in this atmosphere that preparations for independence could be made in the spirit of true co-operation among all people in Rhodesia who, in any case, have to live in harmony if peace and progress are to be maintained and if we are to enjoy stability and security on our borders.

Briefly, these are the points which I can put very hurriedly since your emissary must return, and in view of the urgency attached to my response.

Once again, let me say that it is regrettable that it has not been possible for the meeting to take place but I greatly appreciate the opportunity given to clarify my views on the proposal for a full and free referendum.

EXTRACT CONCERNING ANGOLA FROM A STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT ON 9 FEBRUARY 1976, BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINISTER OF DEFENCE, THE HON. P.W. BOTHA (During debate on the Third Reading of the Defence Amendment Bill)

I asked the hon. member where in the Bill he gets this impression from, namely that South Africa will now have the right to practise intervention anywhere in the world.

.....
The hon. member referred to Angola, and I therefore want to define it with reference to Angola. Surely we did not practise intervention in Angola. After all, South Africa would not have intervened in Angola if there had been an authority with whom it could have negotiated on its interests. After all, South Africa had obligations in regard to the lives of people who asked for its protection. Is the hon. member not aware of that? How many times more must I spell it out for him? There are people who will suffer hunger and thirst if we do not protect those interests.

Because there was no authority there, South Africa intervened. What did it do then, immediately? It notified the former authority of what it had done. We did not act self-righteously. We told them that if they would maintain order, we would withdraw immediately. Did they come? No, and then we had to discharge our obligations. What happened then? We then found that a threat was building up against us as a result of the intervention of another country.

I now want to ask the hon. member why I have never heard him saying in these debates, or outside in the front lines, that Russia is committing a crime in Southern Africa. Why is he attacking me because I am resisting a crime which is being committed? He conveniently forgets about the person who is committing the crime, and then says that we are insulting him. The hon. member must not do what the parrot did that joined the crows and, when they began to peck at him, said that he was in bad company. The fact of the matter is that the hon. member could not prove to me where we would be able to practise intervention.

The areas in which we may take action in time of war, in a state of emergency, in the combating of terrorism and in the combating of an armed conflict, are all defined in this Bill. The Republic has to be threatened.

I am now asking him where the intervention is. Why is he creating that wrong impression outside? What does the hon. member wish to achieve by creating the impression in Africa that South Africa now has a law which entitles it to practise intervention any-

For other statements concerning South Africa and Angola see: *Southern Africa Record* no. 10, October 1977 p.8

where? What impression does he wish to create in this way? What purpose does he have in trying to give African states the impression, African States that are threatened by Communism just as we are, that they are now being threatened from another quarter as well? He must not cry when we mete out punishment to him, or say that we are insulting him.