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# SOUTHERN AFRICA RECORD

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## CONTENTS/INHOUD

### Negotiations on South West Africa/Namibia:

- A. Resolution 431 (1978), adopted by the UN Security Council on 27 July 1978 1
- B. Resolution 432 (1978), adopted by the UN Security Council on 27 July 1978 1
- C. Statement by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon. R.F. Botha, before the UN Security Council, on 27 July 1978 2
- D. Statement on South West Africa/Namibia by the United States Secretary of State, Mr Cyrus Vance, in the UN Security Council, on 27 July 1978 10
- E. Text of letter dated 31 July 1978, to the UN Secretary-General from the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, concerning Security Council resolutions 431 (1978) and 432 (1978) 13

### Statements by Mr Sam Nujoma, President of Swapo, at the United Nations Conference on Southern Africa, at Maputo, Mozambique, May 1977:

- A. Extracts from a statement to the Conference on 16 May 1977 17
- B. Press statement on 17 May 1977 24

### Statement by the Executive Council of the Transitional Government in Rhodesia, on 2 May 1978 26

### Statements on Southern Africa by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, the Rt Hon. Dr David Owen:

- A. Extract from a speech at the Mansion House Banquet in London, on 5 April 1978 28
- B. Extracts from a speech in the House of Commons, on 7 June 1978 29

### Brief extracts concerning Africa from a speech by the President of the United States, Mr Jimmy Carter, at the Naval Academy, Annapolis, on 7 June 1978 36

### Extracts from a special message concerning foreign intervention in Africa, by the President of Tanzania, H.E. Dr Julius Nyerere, to foreign envoys accredited to Tanzania, on 8 June 1978 38

### Extracts from a statement on Africa by the Soviet Union, on 23 June 1978 43

### Uittreksels uit 'n toespraak deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Eerste Minister, Sy Edele B.J. Vorster, te Graaff-Reinet op 27 Mei 1978 47



## **NEGOTIATIONS ON SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA**

### **A. Resolution 431 (1978), adopted by the UN Security Council on 27 July 1978**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolution 385 (1976) of January 30, 1976,

*Taking Note* of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation contained in Document S/12636 of April 10, 1978;

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for Namibia in order to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations;
2. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to submit at the earliest date a report containing his recommendations for the implementation of the proposal in accordance with Security Council resolution 385 (1976);
3. *Urges* all concerned to exert their best efforts towards the achievement of independence by Namibia at the earliest possible date.

### **B. Resolution 432 (1978), adopted by the UN Security Council on 27 July 1978**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 385 (1976) and 431 (1978);

*Reaffirming* in particular the Provisions of Security Council resolution 385 (1976) relating to the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia;

*Taking note* of paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 32/9D which declared that Walvis Bay is an integral part of Namibia;

1. *Declares* that the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia must be assured through the reintegration of Walvis Bay within its territory;
2. *Decides* to lend its full support to the initiation of steps necessary to ensure early reintegration of Walvis Bay into Namibia;
3. *Declares* that, pending the attainment of this objective, South Africa must not use Walvis Bay in any manner prejudicial to the independence of Namibia or the viability of its economy;
4. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter until Walvis Bay is fully reintegrated into Namibia.

**C. Statement by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon. R.F. Botha, before the UN Security Council on 27 July 1978**

Mr President,

I hope that this will be the last time that I speak in this forum on the principles underlying the attainment by South West Africa of its independence. Very soon South West Africa will be independent. The people of the Territory demand it, it is their will and their inalienable right.

For over 30 years South West Africa has been the subject of lengthy and acrimonious debate in the United Nations; all efforts to resolve the issue failed in spite of the fact that South Africa went out of its way to find an internationally acceptable solution. As far as the questions of principle are concerned, we are hopefully closer than we have ever been to a peaceful settlement. We sincerely trust that the present initiative will not be frustrated by those like the Nujoma-faction of Swapo who in the name of liberation, attempt to gain by violence that which they fear they cannot gain by peaceful means. To them I say: "If, as you claim, you have the support of the majority in South West Africa, then prove your claim by participating in elections; abandon the bullet and accept the verdict of the ballot."

All along, Mr President, South Africa has administered South West Africa in the interests of the inhabitants and in the spirit of the mandate entrusted to it by the League of Nations. We have repeatedly stated that we recognize the separate international status of the Territory and that it is our goal to bring it to full independence. To this end we have systematically developed it politically and economically; I have on previous occasions outlined to the Council our positive contributions in this connection; they are a matter of record; the results are there for all to see. But it has always been and still remains our declared policy that it is for the people of the Territory themselves to decide their own political and constitutional future. Their wishes in this regard are the paramount consideration, as we stated as far back as 1967:

"However, at this stage it is impossible to foresee with any degree of accuracy the ultimate interactions of the various population groups. Circumstances will alter radically. What is considered anathema today may well become sound practical politics tomorrow, and vice versa. Nor is it necessary to embark on speculation as to what the ultimate future political pattern will be. The peoples themselves will ultimately decide."

Mr President, pursuant to the South African Government's farsighted vision and sound approach, the process of political

development can now come to fruition. The leaders in the Territory told us nearly two years ago that they were ready for independence and they wanted it by the end of 1978.

It is something we cannot deny them, it is something which cannot be delayed any longer — we have no right to thwart the will of the people. We therefore welcomed and co-operated in the initiative set in motion by the five Western members of the Security Council in April last year.

Throughout the months of negotiations which followed, South Africa played a positive and constructive role. With the knowledge of the five powers, it last year appointed an Administrator-General whose task it is to create conditions for the free expression of the will of the people and to govern the Territory in the interim period leading to independence. In the execution of his task, the Administrator-General has, *inter alia*:

- Assumed authority over 27 Government departments;
- Abolished restrictions on freedom of movement;
- Gone a long way towards abolishing discriminatory measures based on race or colour. He has, for example, instituted equal work in the public sector;
- Taken the necessary steps to ensure that during this interim period law and order is maintained and to prevent any disruption or obstruction of peaceful and orderly political and constitutional development;
- Accelerated socio-economic projects in education, housing, agriculture, trade and water supplies.

The negotiations on the Western proposal have stretched over fifteen months and South Africa lent its full co-operation to these efforts. The same cannot be said of Swapo who, backed by their neo-imperialist allies from other continents, have done all they can to obstruct the attainment of a peaceful solution. Their intransigence was intended to delay the date of independence for the Territory and these delaying tactics and statements raise strong doubts that they are really willing to participate in genuine elections. Indeed, if reports are correct, it is even at this late stage not yet clear whether Swapo has in fact accepted the proposal adopted by the Council. Nowhere in his statement today did Mr Nujoma express acceptance. In his statement Mr Nujoma creates the impression that he has either accepted or is considering accepting a proposal different from the one submitted by the five Western powers and today approved by the Security Council. I shall refer to a few examples to illustrate the point:

There is no provision in the proposal indicating that a residual South African force should be confined to one base. Paragraph 8(B) of the proposal explicitly provides that the residual South

African force would be based at Grootfontein or Oshivello, or both — leaving the option to South Africa itself.

Similarly, it is not for Mr Nujoma to give a new directive to the Special Representative of the Secretary General. Furthermore, some parts of his statement cast doubt on his willingness to abandon violence; acceptance demands cessation of violence. This is crucial to the implementation of the proposal. His assertions in regard to Walvis Bay are entirely devoid of any legal or factual basis, his demands in this respect are arrogant. We do not intend to withdraw our troops from Walvis Bay; indeed, the proposal does not contain such a provision and he knows it. I shall deal later in more detail with the issue of Walvis Bay.

South Africa, for its part, accepted the proposal in its final and definitive form as far back as 25 April 1978<sup>1</sup> — within two weeks of its circulation as a Security Council document. The proposal does not fully satisfy all the leaders in the Territory or the South African Government, nevertheless, after consultation with all groups seeking a peaceful settlement, my Prime Minister, in announcing the South African Government's decision, informed the South African House of Assembly of the South African Government's reply to the Five. Because of the importance of this decision, I quote it in full:

“You will recall that our main preoccupation with your proposals for a settlement of the South West African situation centres on paragraph 8(B) of your proposals, in particular the provision that the remaining South African forces would be withdrawn one week after the certification of the election of the constituent assembly. In the light of your clarification, conveyed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on Monday, 24 April 1978, we are now giving the people of South West Africa the assurance that we will be guided by the wishes of the Constituent Assembly in regard to this very important matter. Bearing in mind also our discussions last week in Pretoria, we are now satisfied that the role of the Administrator-General, as all along envisaged, remains unimpaired, for example that he will head the administrative structure of the Territory, furthermore, that the Special Representative of the Secretary General, in carrying out his responsibilities, will work together with the Administrator-General to ensure the orderly transition to independence. My Government, in coming to its decision, has also been influenced decisively by the provision that there should be a complete cessation of hostilities, including, *inter alia*, mine-laying, killings, abductions, etc., before any reduction in the South African forces takes place, that primary responsibility for maintaining

1. See: *Southern Africa Record*, no. 12, May 1978, p. 32-33.



law and order during the transitional period shall rest with the existing police forces and that the issue of Walvis Bay is not included in the proposals. Having now been advised by the Administrator-General that he has consulted the various political parties and Church organizations in the Territory and that he is satisfied that the proposals are acceptable to the majority, he has recommended acceptance by the South African Government. Bearing this in mind, and also the assurance by the five Western powers on the Security Council that their proposals are now in a final and definitive form and that the Five are giving them their unreserved backing, the South African Government accepts these proposals. In accepting them we are not placing the maintenance of law and order and the security of the people of South West Africa in jeopardy. You, yourselves, emphasized that the transitional period should be stable and peaceful. The people of South West Africa are anxiously and impatiently awaiting their independence which has been promised them not later than the end of this year. We assume we can rely on the co-operation of the five Western Powers, as well as others concerned, to move rapidly in order to realize this goal."

Our acceptance on 25 April 1978 was based on the assumption that the proposal would be implemented in good faith by 31 December 1978 — not "at the earliest possible date" — if this phrase were to signify a later date. We must emphasize that the clarifications given during the negotiations and the spirit in which they were conducted will be vital to the successful implementation of the proposal. There are several aspects of the proposal to which special attention will have to be paid:

1. As the legislative and administrative authority in the Territory, the Administrator-General will continue to govern during the transition period.
2. Primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in South West Africa during the transition period shall rest with the existing police forces.
3. The Administrator-General and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General are required to work together and to consult each other with a view to full co-operation between them, to ensure an orderly and peaceful transition to independence. The proposal has deliberately been left somewhat vague in this regard but it will be appreciated that unless the relationship between them is characterised by a spirit of mutual trust and co-operation it will be difficult, if not impossible, for them to implement their respective tasks successfully; it is in this light that my Government views this relationship. The size, composition, functions and deployment of UNTAG are precisely the sort of matter

on which close consultation is required.

4. The reduction of South African troops in South West Africa will commence only after the comprehensive cessation of all hostile acts and the establishment of a visible peace. The South African Government regards its responsibility for the security of the Territory in a very serious light.

5. The functions of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in respect of the electoral process are spelt out in the proposal in that, as a condition to the conduct of the electoral process, the elections themselves, and the certification of their results, the United Nations Special Representative will have to satisfy himself at each stage as to the fairness and appropriateness of all such measures. In the course of the negotiations we were repeatedly assured that the Special Representative will be guided by the procedures and precedents established by the United Nations in other appropriate cases where the United Nations had played a role in the determination of the wishes of the people.

6. South Africa accepted the proposal in its final and definitive form.

7. Walvis Bay, over which South Africa has undisputed sovereignty, is not included in the proposal accepted by my Government.

Mr President, I come to the resolution dealing with the question of Walvis Bay. The settlement is now threatened by the introduction of this new element despite the fact that the proposal was submitted in March 1978, in a final and definitive form. I want to make it absolutely clear that Walvis Bay is South African territory. It is *not* part of South West Africa. Its position legally and historically is indisputable; it has been part of the Cape of Good Hope for almost 100 years. As such it became part of the Union of South Africa and consequently of the Republic of South Africa. It never formed part of the German Protectorate or of the former mandated Territory of South West Africa. This position was recognized by the League of Nations, the International Court of Justice and the United Nations.

Throughout the negotiations leading to my Government's acceptance of the Western proposal, the Five acknowledged that Walvis Bay was not part and parcel of South West Africa, alluding merely to the possibility that a controversy might arise about the issue at some future stage. They acknowledged that they were not arguing at all about the political and legal situation in respect of Walvis Bay. They were not addressing the merits of the case. On various occasions my Prime Minister also informed the representatives of the Five that the introduction of the Walvis Bay issue into

the proposal would lead to the immediate termination of the negotiations. The Five more than once gave assurances that this was not their intention. This was reaffirmed by their abstention on General Assembly Resolution 32/9D of 4 November 1977, declaring that Walvis Bay is an integral part of South West Africa.

During the talks in New York in February this year, it was proposed to dispose of the question of Walvis Bay in a paragraph which stated that acceptance of the proposal would in no way prejudice the territorial claim of any party. At my insistence it was agreed to delete even this implied reference to the question of Walvis Bay. The Five again stated their position, both in the General Assembly — on 25 April 1978 — and to us, as follows:

“All aspects of the question of Walvis Bay must be subject to discussion between the South African Government and the elected government of Namibia.”

There is no room for any doubt. In the event, the final proposal contained no reference at all to Walvis Bay. Nor, I may add, did Security Council resolution 385 which has throughout formed the basis of our negotiations and the final proposals.

The boundaries of South West Africa and of the Republic have been fixed since colonial times. No country and no organization can arrogate to itself the right to alter them unilaterally. In this connection I may also quote shortly from a letter I addressed to the Secretary-General on 2 May 1978, as contained in document S/12678. I stated:

“Based on treaties which also define the borders of other countries in the region, the Territory’s boundaries have been internationally recognized for almost 100 years. Furthermore, most Afro-Asian and Latin American countries have accepted that colonial boundaries must, under international law, continue to be the boundaries after independence. Moreover, paragraph 11 of the Manifesto on Southern Africa<sup>2</sup> approved by the conference of East and Central African States at Lusaka, on 16 April 1969, and adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its sixth ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 6 to 9 September 1969, states in part:

“As far as we are concerned the present boundaries of the states of Southern Africa are the boundaries of what will be free and independent African states.”

This Manifesto was welcomed by the General Assembly itself in resolution 2505 (XXIV) of 20 November 1969.

It is thus clear beyond any shadow of doubt that Walvis Bay is as much part of the Republic of South Africa as Alaska is of the

2. See: *Southern Africa Record*, no. 2, June 1975, pp. 1-7.

United States of America. I wish to repeat that at no time did it feature in the proposal accepted by South Africa.

We fully agree that the territorial integrity of South West Africa must be assured. In exactly the same way must that of the Republic of South Africa. Perhaps there is a desire to modify the situations which today exist throughout the world in regard to enclaves or islands in the immediate vicinity of the mainland in such a way as to require them to form part of the contiguous or mainland territory concerned. If any attempt is made to modify such cases then all such cases must be reviewed simultaneously on a global basis; if that is the intention and if the responsible powers are willing to submit to a new international arrangement — such examples as Gibraltar, Cabinda, Hong Kong, Northern Ireland, Berlin, Belize the Panama Canal, Guantanamo Bay and Macao; to mention only some — then, and then only, would South Africa, for its part, be prepared to have the case of Walvis Bay examined on the same basis.

In conclusion, while South Africa accepted on 25 April 1978, the proposal on South West Africa in its final and definitive form, we categorically reject the resolution on Walvis Bay. This resolution, in draft form, came to our attention for the first time a few days ago — months after our acceptance of the proposal. It clearly seeks to prejudge the whole issue. It never formed part of the negotiations leading to South Africa's acceptance of the proposal. We reject it. We object to it. We will not be prepared to negotiate with anybody, not even with the duly elected government of South West Africa, on the basis of this resolution. As indicated in the course of the negotiations with the Five, any discussion of the matter will be on the basis of a voluntary act on our part, a decision taken by us in the exercise of our sovereign right to do so. That we remain willing to do.

I want to be very frank with the Council. We were shocked by reports that the Five were going to support a resolution of the nature now before the Council. My Government concluded that support for such a resolution would raise grave doubts as to the spirit and manner in which the Five would stand behind their own proposal. We feared that it would so destroy confidence as to make it impossible to co-operate in the implementation of the proposal. The South African Government had, at the time, come to the conclusion that, were the Five to vote unreservedly for such a resolution, South Africa could no longer co-operate in the implementation of the proposal.

Since my arrival in New York, I have had discussions with representatives of the Five regarding the purport and the implications of the resolution. I have taken note of the explanation of vote

made on behalf of the Five today and I will convey the statement to my Government. We will have to study the full import of this statement. I will also furnish my Government with the additional elucidation provided by the five Foreign Ministers, it will then be for the South African Government to make its final decision.

I cannot conclude without referring briefly to the invective directed against my Government in this debate today by some representatives. I do feel that the time has come to point out that there is apparently no limit to the duplicity practiced within this Organization. We all know what is going on in the world today. We all know about the struggle for the balance of power and we know that the Soviet Union lusts after world domination. The Soviet Union's concern for Africa and the welfare of the African people is hypocritical and contrived. I want to ask the representative of the Soviet Union: "What has your country done to improve the quality of life on the African continent?" The Soviet Union is undermining the Governments of Africa; it is disturbing the peace, and without peace Africa cannot develop. It is subverting the Governments of Africa. It is introducing into Africa bullets and guns to kill people. It is not assisting the people with their agriculture, their road construction, their dams. It is not helping them in any meaningful sense to live a better life. I want to give the following advice to the Soviet Union: "Withdraw from Africa, take out your surrogates, return to the USSR and attend to the upliftment of your own people. You will have decades to keep yourself busy with this task. Uplift your people, give them freedom, give them freedom of expression. Give them freedom of religion, of movement. Give them freedom of the press and allow them to elect their own Government according to majority vote, which the Soviet Union tells us it supports and respects in all other countries of the world."

Instead of using every inappropriate opportunity to engage in unsubstantiated attacks on my Government, I urge the United Nations and, in particular, the Security Council, to devote attention to the plight of the millions of human beings who must live a life without any hope of receiving proper training and education, of enjoying a balanced diet, of living under conditions of personal security and safety — in short, of exercising in any meaningful sense a choice between alternatives for the improvement of their lives. Using South Africa as a scapegoat will simply not alleviate the plight of the suffering millions and of their desire to enjoy a better life. We stand ready to co-operate with all our fellow-Africans in all spheres of life. However, the deadly struggle between the super-powers tends to overwhelm the many efforts of the African nations towards development and stability.

This struggle will bring about the disintegration of Africa economically and politically. The African nations have so much to offer the world, but it seems as if this continent is doomed to be the hunting ground of the big powers in search of their own selfish interests.

I appeal to my fellow-Africans to rid themselves of the temptation of requesting outside assistance, which results in increased tension on our continent. Let us make an earnest attempt to remove the clouds of misunderstanding separating us and move closer towards one another in the bright glare of our African sun. Let us work together. Let us not allow others to drive a wedge between us. All of us in Africa will have to pay the price of outside interference in the affairs of our continent; allowing subversion from outside will make the intruders the victors and we, the peoples of Africa, the vanquished.

The first part of the statement made as US representative and second part on Walvis Bay on behalf of the five Western Governments involved.

**D. Statement on South West Africa/Namibia by the United States Secretary of State, Mr Cyrus Vance, in the UN Security Council, on 27 July 1978**

This is an auspicious occasion in the history of the United Nations and in the work of this Council. After months of painstaking diplomatic efforts by the representatives of many countries and organizations, including the UN itself, we are on the threshold of a peaceful settlement to a problem nearly as old as the United Nations itself. The issue of Namibia was first raised in the United Nations in 1946, and the inability of the world community to come to an internationally acceptable solution to this problem has, over the years, posed an increasingly serious threat to the peace and stability of Southern Africa.

Today, by dint of hard work and good will, we have finally set in motion the process by which Namibia will achieve independence peacefully and in accordance with Security Council Resolution 385. In terms of the purposes of the United Nations and the history of this problem, it is of paramount importance that this process take place peacefully and through direct participation of the United Nations.

I am pleased that the United States and other Western members of the Security Council have been able to play a role in what has been achieved. It would be incorrect to single out any one country or group of countries. Many countries have made a contribution, and it is fair to say that each contribution was in its own way vital and essential to the success which has been achieved. In the final analysis, this diplomatic achievement belongs to the United Nations itself. It has provided the impetus for a Namibian settle-

ment, served as the focal point for the negotiations leading to the settlement agreement, and is now providing the mechanism for its implementation. Secretary-General Waldheim, whose support and advice has been invaluable throughout these negotiations and who will have to see the process through to its conclusion, merits our particular gratitude.

To the Government of South Africa and the South West Africa People's Organization, we must express our sense of appreciation for their pursuit of a peaceful solution to Namibian independence and their willingness to join with members of this Council in working diligently toward that goal. To the front line African states, without whose assistance this conclusion to our efforts would have been impossible, we must express our gratitude and our belief that in facilitating a peaceful settlement in Namibia, they have made a major contribution to the peace and stability of Africa as a whole. We also wish to call attention to the positive role other parties in Namibia have played in this endeavour.

In my Government's view, the importance of what has been achieved has implications which go far beyond the Namibian problem itself. The successful resolution of this international issue can encourage solutions for other pressing problems of Africa, particularly in the case of Rhodesia. There, the same spirit of goodwill and compromise exhibited by the parties in Namibia, could create a basis for peaceful settlement.

By opening a new chapter in the history of Namibia, we also open a new chapter in the history of the United Nations. The world body will now provide the impetus for the emergence of a newly-independent nation. By approving this proposal for Namibian independence, at one and the same time we vote for an independent Namibia and we take a step to strengthen the prestige of the United Nations and its ability to respond effectively to critical problems wherever they arise. Let us hope this success will serve as an example to encourage all of us to join in seeking equally positive solutions to other critical problems that confront the world community.

That concludes my remarks on behalf of the United States. I would now like to make an additional statement on behalf of the Governments of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States about the resolution on Walvis Bay which has been adopted unanimously by the Security Council.

From the beginning of our efforts to assist in the achievement of independence by Namibia in accordance with Security Council resolution 385, our Governments have been conscious of the strongly-held views by the parties concerned on the status of

Walvis Bay. Since these opposing views appeared to be irreconcilable, the five Governments decided to take the position that they would not include any provisions on this question in their proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation. Consequently, the terms of the proposal which we submitted to the Security Council on 10 April contain no mention of Walvis Bay. This does not mean that we have no views concerning this question. We adopted our position in recognition of the fact that no proposal on Walvis Bay appeared to be capable of acceptance by the parties. Indeed, we were acutely aware that an effort to resolve the question in the context of our proposal would make agreement on the proposal impossible.

Thus, in our discussion with the parties we did not seek to initiate a substantive discussion of this issue. We emphasized to all concerned our belief that a discussion of the legal status of Walvis Bay would not be useful and could only continue to hamper a resolution of the thirty-year controversy over Namibia. Instead, we stated on a number of occasions that the question of Walvis Bay would have to be the subject of negotiations between the parties concerned because we recognize, and we believe all parties recognize, that Walvis Bay is critical to the future of Namibia. In this connection, I would like to reiterate what the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada said when he spoke in the General Assembly during the ninth Special Session on 25 April:

“The General Assembly will have noted that we have omitted from our proposal the difficult question of Walvis Bay for the reason that we see no way of settling the question in the context of the present negotiations. We feel strongly, however, that the issue should not delay the long sought-after independence of Namibia. We consider that all aspects of the question of Walvis Bay must be subject to discussion between the South African Government and the elected government of Namibia. We have, furthermore, obtained assurances that the strength of the South African force in Walvis Bay will not be increased during the transitional period and that Namibians in Walvis Bay will be able to participate in the political life of the Territory during the transitional period, including by voting in the elections.”

Since that time our Governments have given further consideration to this difficult question. We have confirmed our position that we do not wish to enter into disputes of a legal character concerning the various claims as to the status of Walvis Bay. Nevertheless, we recognize that there are arguments of a geographic, political, social cultural, and administrative nature which support the union of Walvis Bay with Namibia. Our Governments have also taken due note of the fact that political parties in Namibia



hold the view that Walvis Bay must be part of an independent Namibia.

All these considerations lead to the conclusion that it is appropriate that the Security Council should adopt a resolution which calls for "the initiation of steps necessary to ensure the early re-integration of Walvis Bay into Namibia." This resolution does not prejudice the legal position of any party, it does not seek to coerce any party. For our part we would like to state our understanding of our role with respect to the future of Walvis Bay. The commitment our five Governments are undertaking by voting in favour of this resolution is to stand ready to offer the diplomatic support of our Governments to achieve the objective of a successful negotiation. We view our undertaking as consistent with the fundamental principle of the Charter of the United Nations that disputed questions are to be settled peacefully.

We consider that the "steps necessary" referred to in operative paragraph 2 of the resolution are negotiations between the two parties directly concerned. Accordingly, we will encourage negotiations on this subject between the Government of South Africa and the Government of Namibia that will be elected in accordance with our proposal for a settlement of the situation, and we are pleased to note that the Government of South Africa has publicly indicated its readiness to enter into such discussions. We hope that the adoption of this resolution will make a positive contribution. In our view, the support of the Security Council in resolving this question is entirely appropriate in view of the responsibilities which the United Nations Charter bestows upon this body. Our Governments pledge to exert our best efforts in order to promote the achievement of an early, peaceful, and successful result to the negotiations on Walvis Bay for the mutual benefit of the people of the region.

**E. Text of letter dated 31 July 1978, to the UN Secretary-General from the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, concerning Security Council resolutions 431 (1978) and 432 (1978)**

Your Excellency

I have the honour to refer to my statement in the Security Council on 27 July 1978 in which I set out my Government's point of view in respect of Security Council resolutions 431 and 432 dated 27 July 1978.

I wish to reiterate that the South African Government completely rejects resolution 432 and considers it to be devoid of any legal or factual basis. I also wish to reaffirm, on behalf of my

Government, that we will not be prepared to negotiate with anybody on the basis of Security Council resolution 432.

I also wish to bring to your attention the text of a statement made by the South African Prime Minister on 28 July 1978:

“Walvis Bay is South African territory and no decision by the United Nations or any other body can deprive South Africa of it. In fact, only a decision by the South African Parliament can bring about change to the status and position of the territory of Walvis Bay.

The decision by the Security Council thus has no force of law and the Government cannot allow that it be dictated to as to what it should do with its property or how it should be controlled or administered.

To have negotiations with a friendly government in South West Africa about the harbour and its use is one matter which speaks for itself, but to make demands and to link these demands to a settlement in South West Africa is another matter which the Government rejects unconditionally.”

The action of the five Western Powers in the Security Council in supporting the resolution in question has shocked my Government. In this regard I wish to draw your attention once more to that part of my statement setting out the understanding reached between my Government and the five Western Powers, on Walvis Bay. Throughout the negotiations leading to my Government's acceptance of the Western proposal, the Five acknowledged that Walvis Bay was not part of South West Africa. They alluded merely to the possibility that a controversy might arise about the issue at some future stage. They acknowledged that they were not at all arguing about the political and legal situation in respect of Walvis Bay; they were not addressing the merits of the case. On various occasions my Prime Minister also informed the representatives of the Five that the introduction of the Walvis Bay issue into the proposal would lead to the immediate termination of the negotiations. The Five more than once gave assurances that it was not their intention to address themselves to the political or legal aspects of the matter.

That was reaffirmed by their abstention on General Assembly resolution 32/9D of 4 November 1977, declaring that Walvis Bay is an integral part of South West Africa.

During the talks in New York in February of this year it was proposed to dispose of the question of Walvis Bay in a paragraph stating that acceptance of the proposal would in no way prejudice the territorial claim of any party. At my insistence it was agreed to delete even this implied reference to the question of Walvis Bay.

The five Western Governments again stated their position, both

in the General Assembly on 25 April and to us, as follows: "All aspects of the question of Walvis Bay must be subject to discussion between the South African Government and the elected government of Namibia". There is no room for any doubt; the language is clear.

In the event, the final proposal contained no reference at all to Walvis Bay. Nor, I may add, did Security Council resolution 385 (1976), which has throughout formed the basis of our negotiations and the final proposal.

My Government has carefully studied and considered the explanation of vote in the Security Council on 27 July 1978 by the United States Secretary of State, Mr Vance, on behalf of the five Western Powers as well as communication received from them on the issue of Walvis Bay.

While we cannot agree with their justification for introducing the Walvis Bay issue at all, my Government has taken note of certain clarifications *inter alia* that they do not regard this subject as part of their settlement proposal and they emphasize that the resolution does not address itself to the legal status of Walvis Bay, nor does it, in any way, prejudice South Africa's legal position.

According to the Five the "steps necessary" referred to in operative paragraph 2 of resolution 432, mean negotiation and do not seek to coerce any party. Furthermore, it is stressed, the treatment of Walvis Bay is in a future context and there is no timetable — the future of Walvis Bay can *only* be determined in discussion between the South African Government and the future government of South West Africa.

In the light of what has happened, two aspects have taken on special significance in the deliberations of the South African Government, namely:

- (a) the issue of Walvis Bay; and
- (b) the implementation of the proposal.

I have already set out the South African Government's position on Walvis Bay. Bearing in mind the manner in which this issue has been dragged into the ambit of the proposal, the South African Government is deeply concerned that the letter and spirit of the proposal would not be observed and implemented by some of the parties. Accordingly the South African Government would wish to satisfy itself that the letter and spirit of the proposal will indeed be honoured, such as those provisions concerning the maintenance of law and order, the presence of South African forces and the functions, deployment, size and composition of United Nations military personnel and observers, as well as the commitment that the elections would be held before the end of 1978.

In spite of our misgivings flowing from the circumstances set out above, the South African Government as well as the Administrator-General of South West Africa, would be willing to receive your Special Representative and to await his subsequent report on the manner in which he, in his capacity as your Special Representative, envisages the implementation of the proposal, which we on our part accepted in good faith on 25 April last. On receipt of his report the South African Government will decide whether his recommendations are indeed in accordance with the proposal.

Please accept, your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

R.F. Botha  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

**STATEMENTS BY MR SAM NUJOMA, PRESIDENT OF SWAPO, AT THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA AT MAPUTO, MOZAMBIQUE, MAY 1977**

**A. Extracts from a Statement to the Conference on 16 May 1977**

To us in Swapo who, for more than a decade, have shared with Frelimo the daily agonies of the arduous and bitter struggle for national liberation, it is, indeed, a profound source of inspiration and encouragement to have this important meeting taking place in Maputo. The fact that it is now possible for us to meet in Maputo is a concrete and cheering demonstration of the irreversible advance of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa.

Swapo has always considered the struggle to liberate all of Southern Africa as indivisible. Accordingly, we regard the victories scored by the peoples of Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Principe and Sao Tome as important battles won in a single, on-going and united struggle. Moreover, these victories of the peoples of Mozambique and other former Portuguese colonies, have reaffirmed Swapo's conviction that no matter how difficult the struggle may be, we will certainly win against the forces of imperialism, colonialism and racism.

It is now seventeen years since the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted its historic resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. This resolution placed a special responsibility upon the United Nations to support the struggle of all the oppressed and colonized peoples so as to enable them to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence. This special responsibility is enshrined in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Since the adoption of that historic resolution, the United Nations has taken a number of commendable steps towards the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Over the last seventeen years, many countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Pacific Islands have achieved their independence with the expressed support, and in some cases assistance, of the United Nations. Special tribute in this respect must be paid to the 24-nation Decolonization Committee whose members have kept both the spirit and the letter of the 1960 Declaration very much alive since 1961. It is through this important Committee of the World Body that representatives of the oppressed and colonized peoples have been accorded the opportunity to expose the inhuman policies of imperialism, colonialism and racism. It was also through this

Committee that spokesmen of the liberation movements have been afforded a platform to popularize the just struggle of their peoples against colonial domination, racist reaction and imperialist exploitation . . .

*The World Body's Special Responsibility*

With particular reference to our country, I wish to express my movement's appreciation of the positive role which the United Nations has played towards the liberation of the oppressed people of Namibia. Through both the Committee of 24 and the Council for Namibia, and on the initiative of the OAU and the non-aligned countries, the United Nations has correctly recognized Swapo as the legitimate and authentic representative of the Namibian people. It must be pointed out, however, that the United Nations has not bestowed this recognition on Swapo as a matter of political favour. Rather, its heroic political and military activities against the occupation regime in our country. It is also for this reason that the World Body has granted observer status to Swapo in the General Assembly.

The establishment of the United Nations Institute for Namibia in Lusaka is another concrete demonstration that the United Nations is aware of its special responsibility to assist the people of Namibia in their struggle for liberation. The United Nations has also taken an unambiguous stand on the illegality of South Africa's oppressive and exploitative rule over Namibia, despite the fact that some United Nations member states have refused to accept the economic and legal implications of the 1971 World Court ruling that South Africa's occupation of Namibia has been totally unlawful since 27 October 1966, and that any dealing with the occupying regime in Namibia, whether it be in terms of trade or investment, is a violation of the United Nations correct position.

Notwithstanding all this United Nations generous assistance and its commendable acts of solidarity with the struggling people of Namibia, our people are still suffering under continued oppression and domination by the illegal racist minority regime of South Africa. In defiance of the many decisions by the Security Council and the General Assembly that South Africa must end its repressive occupation of Namibia, Pretoria is now more busy than ever before hatching out new colonial schemes with a view to entrenching its economic and military control over Namibia. Against this background, the United Nations must do more to help the Namibian people to put an immediate end to South Africa's illegal and brutal administration in the Territory . . .

What is of special importance regarding this Conference is the fact that it is being held under the enemy's very nose. This fact should bring home to the fanatic and racist oppressors of our

people in Pretoria and Salisbury, that representatives of an overwhelming majority of mankind are assembled here today to pass serious negative judgement against their repressive and fascist régimes. More importantly, I am certain that the toiling masses of workers and peasants in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa are following the proceedings of this meeting with great interest and deep sense of hope. They will draw appropriate conclusions regarding this historic gathering. That is to say, if the Conference can come up with correct decisions, they will be inspired and encouraged to know that an extremely large portion of humanity is on the side of their just and noble struggle for national and social liberation. While the oppressed people of Southern Africa are hopeful of the new Maputo initiative in support of their liberation struggle, they are also mindful that in the past many progressive initiatives regarding United Nations support for the liberation struggle in Southern Africa have been frustrated by the forces of imperialism within the United Nations system. Things like triple vetos in support of the South African racists, sanction-bustings, military collaboration, exploitation of our people's labour and resources through investments in the racist-run economies of Southern Africa, are but constant and ugly reminders to the oppressed peoples of Southern Africa that the world organization is not totally behind their struggle for liberation.

Against this background, I can assure you that no amount of pious declarations from this Conference, which do not contain convincing measures towards the total liquidation of imperialism, colonialism and racism in Southern Africa, will impress these oppressed peoples. The World Body must, therefore, do more to actually inspire and assist the peoples of Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa in their bitter fight for genuine independence and social liberation.

*The Situation in Namibia Today*

The most prominent feature of the political situation in Namibia today is the sharpening confrontation between the forces of national liberation, on one hand, and those of illegal occupation and Bantustanized new colonialism, on the other. Despite all the new manoeuvres designed to create a false impression that South Africa wants to give up its illegal and repressive occupation over Namibia, the objective fact remains that Pretoria has not abandoned its basic imperialist aim to keep Namibia under its political, economic and military domination. A close examination of the evolution of the South African imperialist policy in respect to

Namibia shows that while there have been a number of strategic moves and tactical shifts over the last five years or so, there has been no clearly identifiable fundamental change in the essence of South Africa's policy objective to retain control and domination over Namibia.

Confronted, during the 1972-1974 period, with Swapo's internal mobilization of workers, youths, churches; and having a large part of its armed forces tied down in Namibia by our liberation fighters, and also faced with intensified international pressure, the South African racist regime was forced to modify its strategy of overt Bantustan-building. This strategy came to be seen as inadequate to ensure South Africa's continued domination over Namibia. Against this background, we heard, by 1975, Vorster talking of the special international status of "South West Africa" and the idea of a confederation of eleven Bantustans. The political essence of such a confederation would be a built-in protection for inequality on the basis of race, a dominant settler group with entrenched power to defend their own and South Africa's exploitative interests, and a facade of puppet black "leaders" who have been brought together into the Turnhalle tribal talks.

As these tactical shifts were going on, many more South African troops and so-called security forces were being brought into Namibia to suppress the people. Moreover, harassments and intimidations remained the order of the day against all those who dared to oppose the illegal presence of South Africa in our country.

Over the last seventeen months, a more elaborate vision of a Bantustanized and puppet confederation began to emerge. By February this year Vorster had called upon the Turnhalle puppets to release to the world their so-called draft constitution for the establishment of an interim government in Windhoek. However, this draft constitution came as a shocking embarrassment to those it was intended to satisfy, the major Western powers. The proposals contained in the so-called draft constitution have revealed clearly that what Pretoria is trying to impose on the Namibians is nothing more than a Transkei type of independence. In line with the true motives of the real sponsors of Turnhalle tribal talks, this laughable draft constitution has, as the foundation of its ideological and economic policy, "the principle of free economic structure and inviolability of the possession of land and property". This pre-occupation with the protection of the existing structure of private property can, of course, never be confused with the genuine interest and aspirations of the Namibian people to assert their sovereign right over their land and all its resources. On the contrary, this constitutional provision about the "inviolability" of private possession of land and property



is obviously intended to protect white property-owning classes and their privileged position, which is the cause of the liberation struggle the Namibian people are waging.

With this built-in protection for inequality on the basis of race, with the socio-economic power of the local settler group, and with the broader exploitative interest of the multi-national corporations firmly entrenched in the Turnhalle draft constitution, it has now been thought possible to call upon the white settlers in Namibia to approve the establishment of a puppet interim government in Namibia.

Under the terms of the Turnhalle constitution, the South African Government has arrogated to itself all the most essential aspects of government power, such as, in those crucial areas of security, public media and finance. It is impossible to imagine how free conditions for independence can be created by the interim government if the following executive and legislative powers are retained by the South African Government as proposed in the Turnhalle document:- Defence, external affairs, transport, finance and foreign exchange, internal security, including the operation of the South African defence force and police, telecommunications, including broadcasting, posts, customs and excise and sales policy.

Thus, the proposed constitutional basis for the interim government exposes the determination of the South African Government to continue its illegal control and occupation of Namibia, under the pretext that this has been agreed to by the Namibian people themselves through the Turnhalle stooges. Through the Turnhalle circus, South Africa is trying to cheat the whole world into believing that she is ready to grant independence to Namibia whereas in actual fact she is working hard to formalize the existing, imposed *de facto* Bantustan status of Namibia.

The Namibian people, led by Swapo, will continue with the struggle until such a time when the South African Government can understand that it cannot succeed in forcing our people to accept its scheme of a Bantustanized neo-colonialism controlled from Pretoria. To this end, I would like to renew our call to all members of the United Nations to reject and denounce the South African Government attempt to set up the so-called interim puppet government in Namibia. Visits to Namibia by representatives of the five Western countries are illegal.

As we have said time and again, Swapo is ready to talk to the representatives of the South African Government about the modalities of transferring power to the Namibian people whenever Pretoria decides to face up to the objective reality that it cannot force the Namibian people to accept a puppet regime

imposed on them through the Turnhalle stooges. It also remains our firm position that the United Nations is the legal custodian of Namibia, and that, as the only just conditions for talks, the occupying regime must accept the following:

- South Africa must publicly accept the right of the Namibian people to independence and national sovereignty.
- South Africa must publicly announce that Namibian territorial integrity is absolute and not negotiable in any quarter.
- All political prisoners must be released.
- All political exiles, of whatever political organization, must be allowed freely to return to their country without fear of arrest or victimization.
- South Africa must commit herself to the removal of her police and army.
- Any constitutional talks on Namibia must take place under United Nations supervision, and should aim at the holding of free elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision and control.

Moreover, Swapo supports Security Council resolution 385 of 30 January 1976, which, among other things, calls on South Africa to take immediate steps to withdraw its occupying forces from Namibia and allow for free national elections under United Nations supervision and control.

Swapo cannot, however, conceive of free elections in Namibia which do not involve prior withdrawal of South African forces of repression and intimidation. For those who do not know Namibia well, it is necessary to point out that South Africa has ruled Namibia over the last sixty-two years by fear and force, trickery and treachery. As such, no election held with her army or police still present would be free from fear and intimidation. Without a clear international administrative presence and a free campaign, many potential voters would feel that the whole exercise is a trap set to identify supporters of the liberation movement. Therefore, a selected international administration for the purpose of conducting free elections, would be necessary. Many Namibians will not believe that they have been given a fair chance to express their true political position if the South African troops and police are not withdrawn.

Allow me to make one thing absolutely clear here. As a true liberation movement which has been fighting South African colonialism over the last sixteen years, a movement whose many cadres have sacrificed their lives or are imprisoned because of their effort to liberate Namibia, Swapo cannot and will never accept any attempt, from any quarter, to bring it on the same level with the Turnhalle puppets.

We know that when Vorster organized the Turnhalle circus in September 1975, some of the Western Powers welcomed, if perhaps mutedly, the exercise. Some felt that the Turnhalle tribal talks held forth some prospects for a "moderate" and "anti-communist" black government in Namibia. Against this background, some kinds of paternalist attempts were made to persuade Swapo to accept the Turnhalle as "one of the interested major parties" regarding the question of finding a genuine solution to the problem of Namibia's independence. This is, in our view, an attempt to undermine the correct position of the United Nations, OAU and the non-alignment movement, a position which says there are only three interested major parties to the problem — namely Swapo, the United Nations and South Africa.

The Turnhalle people are puppets of South Africa, plain and simple. They have no serious independent views which are different from those of their sponsor — the South African Government. It is against this background that we are opposed to the current United States, British, West German, French and Canadian attempts to want to place our glorious movement on a par with those traitors to the Namibian people. Puppets are puppets. They cannot serve both the interests of their masters and of the Namibian people at the same time. Swapo will never accept any kind of compromise with, or accommodation of, the Turnhalle puppets, except if they renounce quite categorically their present reactionary position.

As I have pointed out earlier, the Namibian people will continue the political and armed struggle until genuine national independence is achieved. South Africa must be obliged to give up her imperialistic designs in respect of Namibia.

Until South Africa complies with the Security Council resolution 385, the United Nations must now intensify its opposition to continued South African occupation of Namibia on the following levels:

- Isolate any puppet regime which South Africa may impose on the Namibian people.
- The Security Council should impose a complete embargo on the sale of arms and military telecommunications equipment to the South African regime in Namibia.
- No trade alliances with South Africa in respect of Namibia should be undertaken by the United Nations member states, or non-member states.
- United Nations member states should take steps to enforce the United Nations Decree for the protection of Namibian natural resources by prohibiting the importation of Namibian goods without the permission of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia.

- The United Nations should re-affirm its correct position concerning Swapo's role as the only authentic representative of the people of Namibia.
- Maximum political and material support must be given to Swapo to enable it to speed up the struggle for liberation.
- Grant full membership to Namibia, through the United Nations Council for Namibia, in the Specialized Agencies and other United Nations bodies.
- Member states should provide more financial contribution to the Institute for Namibia to enable the Institute to expand both its training and research programmes in preparation for Namibian nationhood.
- This Conference should examine ways whereby a special session of the General Assembly can be convened to review the critical situation in Namibia and take appropriate measures to end the illegal occupation by South Africa.

#### **B. Press Statement on 17 May 1977**

During my address to the plenary session of the Interational Conference in Support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, I indicated that we would hold a press conference in order to clarify certain points of cardinal importance to Swapo. These points concern the current diplomatic contacts by the five Western Governments, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Canada, regarding Namibia.

It is a well-known fact that these Western Powers have diplomatic, economic, military and strategic relations with South Africa. It is also a well-known fact that these Powers are among the ones which do everything in their power to frustrate all constructive efforts by the United Nations to compel South Africa to withdraw its illegal colonial occupation of Namibia. Clear examples in this regard are their repeated vetoes in the Security Council to protect South Africa.

Because of their special links with that regime, these Powers are in a position to compel South Africa to comply with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations on Namibia.

If these Powers have now abandoned their previous obstructionist role at the United Nations with regard to Namibia, then their efforts would be welcome. However, in our judgement, the present diplomatic moves by the five Western Powers are aimed at bailing South Africa out of her political predicament in Namibia.

In the context of the United Nations resolutions and decisions, as well as the advisory opinion of the International Court of

Justice, of 1971, the recent visit to Namibia by representatives of the five countries mentioned earlier is a naked violation of the correct legal position of the United Nations on Namibia. The legal position of the United Nations states clearly and categorically that no member state should have any direct or indirect dealings with South Africa in respect of Namibia, which dealings will accord a semblance of legality to South Africa's occupation of Namibia. Particularly the talks held by the five Powers and South Africa's Turnhalle puppets are an unfriendly act and have exposed the fact that the "Five" are actually at their old obstructionist game. They are helping South Africa to consolidate her control of Namibia under a new cloak — Turnhalle. We strongly condemn these treacherous manoeuvres which are contrary to the United Nations position *vis-a-vis* Namibia.

## **STATEMENT BY THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT IN RHODESIA, ON 2 MAY 1978**

The Salisbury Agreement was signed on 3 March by us, the four leaders, namely Chief Chirau, Bishop Muzorewa, Rev. Sithole and Mr Ian Smith. The settlement provides for majority rule by 31 December, 1978, on the basis of universal adult suffrage. Preparations are under way to register all citizens aged eighteen and over — a potential electorate of about three million — and to produce voters' rolls for the first election. Majority rule — one man one vote — is what the people have been pressing for for many years. It was the objective of the fighting which has cost so many lives. This objective has now been achieved and the time has therefore come to call a halt in the fighting and to restore peace to our land.

In furtherance of the Agreement we, the Members of the Executive Council have ordered the release of people held in detention. Already over seven hundred have been freed and the cases of the remainder — a little over two hundred — are being examined. The only proviso we make is that after their release they should live peacefully and not engage in unlawful activities. The overwhelming majority of those released have indicated their support for the Agreement through one or other of the parties which we head.

As an indication of our intention that there should be free political activity in the period leading up to the first election we have decided that the ban on all proscribed political organizations should be lifted forthwith. This includes ZANU and ZAPU. Freedom of political activity places a heavy responsibility on the various parties to ensure that political activity is peaceful.

We therefore urge all of our followers to show restraint in their contacts with members of other parties. Our enemies are predicting that our internal agreement will fail because of interparty rivalries within the Transitional Government. We must all ensure that they are proved wrong. Our first priority is to gain international acceptance of our Agreement. Electioneering can come later.

We know from our contacts with them that most of those who have been fighting for the principle of majority rule are aware that the battle has been won. We say to them that the time has now come to bring an end to the fighting. It is time for them to join us in the peaceful transition to majority rule which is the basis of our Agreement of 3 March. We guarantee their safety if they come in peace. Through our contacts with them, detailed arrangements

Articles by the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole and Bishop Muzorewa, based on talks given to the South African Institute of International Affairs, Jan Smuts House, in June/July 1978, appear in the Institute's publication, *International Affairs Bulletin*, V.2 No. 2, 1978.

are being made for their reception and to enable them to return to their homes and rejoin their families if they wish to do so.

Because the case of the fighting has fallen away it follows that those who reject our statement and continue fighting have some other reason such as the desire for personal power on the part of some individual.

We are very conscious that the main sufferers in the fighting are innocent civilians on both sides and of all races. We urge most earnestly that those on both sides who are doing the fighting should now make certain that civilian targets are avoided.

If civilian casualties can be significantly reduced this will have an immediate and marked effect on the whole political climate in our country. It will also assist materially in convincing our friends outside of our determination and our ability to take our country peacefully to majority rule by 31 December, 1978.

We are giving our close attention to the question of protected villages. The purpose of these was to enable the security forces to provide better protection against attack for the people in the rural areas.

We realize that these protected villages are unpopular and that the people prefer to live freely and without restrictions in their own areas. As the fighting dies down and peace is restored the protected villages will be dismantled. However, we have already given instructions that wherever possible the restrictions on the movements of the occupants should be eased.

Finally, we call upon all of our people of all races to rally behind the Transitional Government and to support our determined efforts to achieve a peaceful transfer of power to the majority by 31 December, 1978.

We stress once again that nobody is barred or excluded from the process. Those outside the country are free to return and play their part under the amnesty, provided only that they come in peace.

We, your leaders, declare jointly that it shall be the will of the people, expressed through the ballot box and not by force of arms, which will determine who shall lead the country after independence.

## **STATEMENTS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA BY THE UNITED KINGDOM FOREIGN SECRETARY, THE RT HON. DR DAVID OWEN**

### **A. Extract from a speech at the Mansion House Banquet in London, on 5 April 1978**

Serious complications for Africa and for East-West relations would flow if there were any attempt to use Cuban forces to undermine current talks to bring peace and democracy to Rhodesia and Namibia through negotiated and internationally acceptable settlement.

But I hold the view, which I believe would be generally shared by African governments, that disputes within Africa are best dealt with by the states of Africa themselves. Peaceful solutions should ideally be sought in an African context. The OAU possesses the mechanism for dealing with such issues and we have given it our full support. It is moreover an accepted principle within the OAU that outside states should refrain from interference in African affairs. We respect this.

Any serious analysis of what is going on in Africa today must therefore take fully into account the African dimension and balance it against wider concerns affecting international peace and stability. For African states, many of whom were bequeathed ethnically illogical frontiers by the colonial powers, the principles of territorial integrity and the inviolability of existing frontiers are sacrosanct: they are enshrined in the OAU Charter. Any forcible attempt to realign frontiers in Africa would, if successful, be a recipe for future chaos and disorder.

#### *US and Soviet aid*

It is legitimate for us to ask what is the purpose of Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa. As I have frequently pointed out, while the Russians give a great deal of military aid, there is very little real transfer of the resources which the African states so desperately need. While the United State's budget for military aid is equivalent to about twenty four per cent of their total aid budget, Soviet military assistance is between sixty and seventy per cent of theirs, and the remainder — including aid to communist developing countries — represents less than zero point one per cent of Soviet GNP. Indeed the value of Soviet aid to developing countries has declined since 1973/4, and debt service payments to the Soviet Union now exceed new disbursements to the least developed countries.

During the first part of this speech Dr Owen spoke about the difficulties in East-West relations outside of Europe, particularly in Africa. He dealt with the Russian and Cuban intervention in the Horn of Africa, and Western intervention in Zaire, as also the right of governments to request aid. He deplored the emphasis on the violent settlement of disputes.



The over-riding requirement is for sovereign African states to be able and be willing to solve their own problems, preferably through the Organisation of African Unity. This is the only means of avoiding East-West rivalry and confrontation in the area. If detente is to survive, and it must do if we are to survive, it is essential that East and West should not be drawn into local conflicts on opposing sides. The main contribution that we in the West can make is to help create conditions in which there can be no call for massive infusions of foreign troops.

This applies with particular force to Namibia and Rhodesia. The easiest way to lose the battle of ideology which continues, despite detente, would be for us in the West to espouse the lost cause of white minority rule and so assume the role of 'racist reactionaries' in which others propaganda would wish to cast us. The West in general and this country in particular cannot lay any future claim to a moral or political role in Africa which is not based on a rejection of white supremacy and an acceptance of majority rule. The surest guarantee against the appearance of Cuban troops and Soviet military advisers in Namibia and Rhodesia is for the West to engage its ideals and values in realising — and realising successfully — the justifiable aspirations of black Africans. This is why what will happen this month in the negotiations over Rhodesia and Namibia is of such vital importance to us all.

#### **B. Extracts from a speech in the House of Commons, on 7 June 1978**

I turn to the subject of Africa. Here again there has been a tendency, particularly in the last few months, for people to feel that detente is threatened. I do not think that any of us has denied that if detente is to gather momentum — and I have never believed that it is a passive process: there is a passive policy of detente, but there is also a dynamic policy — it must go into new areas and must take a managed relationship and greater harmony out into areas such as Africa.

There is little doubt that in the past year or more there has been growing evidence that some of the ideological disputes and East-West tensions have been taken away from Europe to other areas, particularly Africa. However, it would be a gross travesty and a corruption of the evidence and the facts to say that Africa is solely an East-West issue. It is not. In going through each of the different issues that we face, I wish to say to the House why I believe that it is not the case. I believe that it would be gravely damaging for our policy and standing in Africa if we were to allow this to be portrayed as a purely East-West struggle, although there are ele-

ments of East-West tension within it.

There are elements of East-West competition within most of the trouble spots. But the Government stands absolutely firm on their belief that African problems are by far best dealt with by African nations. We stand firmly behind our support for the Organisation of African Unity, which faces some extremely difficult problems.

#### *Western response in Zaire*

I turn to Zaire, which is the most immediate issue facing us. What should the response of the West be in Zaire? Let us go back in history to the spring of 1977, when there was a similar incident on the borders between Angola and Zaire. At that time the French Government responded to a request from a Sovereign Government to fly troops from Morocco down into Zaire. The troops were requested of Morocco by Zaire, and Morocco asked whether France would fly troops down there. At that time we had a political co-operation meeting in London and I was in the Chair. The entire European Community supported the decision that was taken on that occasion. In retrospect, I think that we ought to have done more to try to stabilise the economic and political factors in Zaire. We were given a warning sign then, although I may say that a great deal of effort was made, particularly by the Belgian Government.

This is an example of how deep-seated is the problem and how very difficult it will be to establish economic and political stability in Zaire, because so little progress was made during that time . . .

I have (also) no doubt that the Belgians and the French when asked to keep their forces in the area for a short period of time, to try to ensure the establishment of law and order, were right to keep their forces there. They have had our support.

The next question is much the hardest one. What should be done once the emergency is over? I believe that, through a combination of press stories and statements, the West has been in danger of getting its priorities somewhat wrong. I believe that the first priority now for Zaire is political and economic stability. In this connection a most important event has taken place over the last three days. The decision of President Kaunda to meet President Neto was extremely important, as was the decision of President Kaunda to meet President Mobutu. There is no doubt whatsoever that the three countries concerned — Zambia, Angola and Zaire — will have to come together in a political agreement to settle this long-standing problem.

This is a problem that the world has known about for some time. The Congo is still with us and its legacy still lives on in Shaba Province. This is shown by the number of refugees. I was talking this afternoon to the High Commissioner who is dealing with the refugee problem, and he told me that there are over two hundred thousand Angolans in Zaire and Zaireans in Angola. There is a

lesser number of refugees in Zambia. Those three countries have a deep-seated political problem which has its roots in the Lunda tribe . . .

These political problems cannot be resolved against a background of military and economic instability. Unfortunately, we allowed the military aspects to dominate the headlines. We allowed the military issue to come first, important though it is. It is immensely important to try to get the key technicians for the copper and cobalt mines in Shaba to stay. This is the key to the economy of Zaire. They will not stay if they think that their security is threatened. In that respect the security position has to be addressed.

If the West's support for Zaire — and I stress that it is for Zaire — was not to be contingent on certain conditions, we would be making a great mistake. I believe that our economic support and all other forms of support now must be clearly and deeply contingent on a monitorable plan for economic assistance, economic reform and restructuring in that country, to ensure that the money goes for the purpose for which it is allocated and for which it is given, and also that it is accompanied by a readiness to look at political solutions to problems and, if possible, a widening of the decision-making structure and political involvement in that country.

I want to stress that I believe that we have an opportunity to create a strong Zaire. But if we do it in a way which says "this is carte blanche to do what you like" we shall make a grave mistake. I am not in favour of too much paternalism, but in this case I believe that it will be necessary to ensure that there is an agreed economic plan which is kept to and a degree of political commitment and widening out.

This is one reason why I am particularly against seeing these issues as an East-West struggle. If we see it as an East-West struggle, we shall be dragged in day by day to supporting purely a particular regime or a particular group of individuals, and we shall lose sight of our central objective, which is to support Zaire and the stability of Africa in that region.

As for the question of military intervention, — and I deal with it because it is a serious problem — would that it were so easy and would that it were possible for security to come purely and simply from the indigenous forces of that country. That would be by far the easiest solution. But I believe that it is reasonable for troops from other African countries to be called in by other governments if they wish to do so.

*Pan-African force*

Here I come to this suggestion of a Pan-African Force, and I

must say that I still have great difficulty with what this concept is. I see a European Community which in 1954 failed to agree on a defence community.

I do not know what people think of or mean by a Pan-African Force. Are we asking the OAU to have a structure, and a command structure, or are we asking for a collective response? Certainly I think that we should involve the OAU as much as we can in any military questions which are being asked. I think that any questions which are being asked about military support there are more likely to come not from Africa collectively but from the region, and that it would be helpful if the type of military response was always seen as a response by a government asking for support from other governments. For instance, in 1964 in East Africa when this arose, it was an emergency action initially and then one other African Government came in and put their troops at the disposal of the Government. That was a decision taken at an OAU meeting.

If we are to have that sort of response, I think that it should be geared to Zaire and Zaire's problems. There is no African country which will put troops at the disposal of any country. They will judge each one on its merits. They will ask themselves "if we put in our troops, which country, under what circumstances, and what are the arrangements?"

If some permanent military defence structure for Africa comes, it will come from the OAU. The belief that such a structure can be built up by us in the West, with a lot too much talk of NATO involvement, has made some of the sensible security arrangements which ought to have been made over the last few weeks much harder to achieve. Now, by standing back a little, let us hope that we can provide a sensible security structure which will be seen to be supporting the Zaire Government and not polarising the issue into East-West relations and which will allow for a political framework.

We ought not to forget that the OAU has attempted before — recently not always with a great deal of success, but in the past with considerable success — mediation and conciliation, and I believe that we should encourage that process now. In the last Shaba incident in 1977, Nigeria worked very hard to try to achieve conciliation.

Concerned involvement from the West is helpful to Africa. Many African countries want it, and we should not be ashamed to demonstrate it. But it is the way that we do it and the manner in which we do it which is important. If we keep it as being to help Africans solve African problems, I believe that it will meet with a response. But if it is seen as the West intervening in Africa, I believe that we shall not get the sort of response that is wanted.

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### *West's policies in Africa*

At this stage I would like to suggest what the West can do, and why I believe that the last few weeks have shown a lack of confidence in the West's policies in Africa. Over the last few years, I believe the West has improved its standing, its position and its ability to influence in Africa. I do not take the defeatist view of our lack of influence in Africa. We shall carry influence in Africa by sticking to principle.

It will be achieved by pursuing, even through long-drawn-out negotiations, the negotiated path to independence in Namibia and by doing the same thing in Rhodesia and bringing Zimbabwe to independence. It will not be achieved by having a foreign policy that flutters around on the wind of editorial policies that often change three times in ten days. It will be achieved by having principles and sticking to them, by refusing to simplify extremely complex issues and by being prepared to take one's stand on principles. Because it has been prepared to condemn abuses of human rights in Africa — not just South Africa and apartheid, but in Uganda, and action over the Central African Empire — the West will have some influence long term on that pattern of government.

I believe that if we hold steady, even on Rhodesia, in dealing with the problem that has bedevilled us for more than twelve years, there is a prospect of a negotiated settlement. I believe that the atmosphere in that country and around it is coming close to a recognition that there must be negotiations between all the parties and that the round-table talks must take place. Given persistence, given that we stick to our principles and are not back-tracked into other parts of Africa, and given that we do not damage our standing in other parts of Africa, we can achieve the settlement that we all want to see in Rhodesia.

That settlement will not be achieved by going down one side or another or by embracing the internal settlement, which has many features that are inadequate and will have to be negotiated. It will not be achieved by attending meetings of the internal settlement. It will be achieved by holding our position on principle and by being prepared to bring together all the parties, those outside and those inside. I believe that it could happen.

The settlement will be achieved not by being thought to be, or being seen to be, supporting any one group of nationalist leaders, but by letting that decision be taken by the electors.

In Namibia and in Rhodesia we have the chance of an internationally acceptable solution as a result of fair and free elections, with United Nations peace-keeping and involvement if necessary. This is a great prize. It is a prize which the Soviet Union has never been able to contribute to Africa. We want to achieve that type of high-level commitment to a negotiated settlement, to peaceful objectives and to the principle of an African solution. We ought to

help with aid . . . It is wise for us to put economic aid into these countries. I am not at all apologetic over the fact that we have an aid budget for Mozambique. I believe that it is a great mistake to believe that one influences countries by cutting oneself off from them. It is very rare that one can totally cut oneself off from countries which have governments which are recognised in the United Nations and free and sovereign governments recognised by the OAU. The fact that we have relations with Angola and Mozambique helps us to influence their policies, and all the money is contingent, qualified and carefully selected so that it cannot be given for such purposes — (to murder blacks and whites etc.). If some of it slips in the wrong direction, I would be very grateful to have information about it and I will do my utmost to stop it. But given the choice, it is wise to keep relations with those countries, to keep our influence with them and to try to ensure that they remain non-aligned so that they are not driven ever-increasingly into a marxist ideology and total alignment with the Soviet Union.

*Marxist ideology in Africa.*  
I have tried to relate in a whole variety of different parts of Africa these complex issues of East-West relations. They are very difficult. There is no doubt that it is not in our interests to see a marxist ideology spread across Africa. I do not believe that it is in Africa's interests either. Many people in Africa know this. We should be more confident about the whole of our aid budget. The Soviet Union spends less than zero point one per cent of Soviet GNP on foreign aid. In fact the value of Soviet aid to developing countries has declined since 1973-74. The Soviet Union makes no contribution whatever to the North-South dialogue. The Soviet Union is not making friends in many of these countries.

Where the Cubans have involved themselves they have often found themselves very soon in dispute with the country into which they have gone. In the Horn of Africa the Russians supplied arms to Somalia and to Ethiopia. Both those countries were under Soviet influence but now, hopefully, one of those countries will come increasingly into a friendly relationship with us now that it has withdrawn to its own boundaries. In acting as we have in this matter we have retained the friendship of Kenya which, at one stage, could have been gravely damaged had we followed some of the advice urged upon us in the House. There is no simple easy 'one-paper' policy for dealing with Africa. But I believe that if we apply principle, if we have courage and steady nerves, we will have a policy for Africa which will

enrich Africa, contribute to that continent and its future and in the process increase the standing of Britain, increase our export effort and our industrial involvement in that continent, and bring greater peace to the world.

**BRIEF EXTRACTS CONCERNING AFRICA FROM A SPEECH  
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, MR JIMMY  
CARTER, AT THE NAVAL ACADEMY, ANNAPOLIS, ON 7  
JUNE 1978**

To the Soviet Union, detente seems to mean a continuing aggressive struggle for political advantage and increased influence in a variety of ways. The Soviet Union apparently sees military power and military assistance as the best means of expanding their influence abroad. Obviously areas of instability in the world provide a tempting target for this effort and all too often they seem ready to exploit any such opportunities.

As became apparent in Korea, in Angola and also, as you know, in Ethiopia more recently, the Soviets prefer to use proxy forces to achieve their purposes.

To other nations throughout the world, the Soviet military build-up appears to be excessive, far beyond any legitimate requirement to defend themselves or to defend their allies. For more than fifteen years they have maintained this programme of military growth, investing almost fifteen percent of their total Gross National Product in armaments and this sustained growth continues.

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Many countries are becoming very concerned that the non-aligned movement is being subverted by Cuba, which is obviously closely aligned with the Soviet Union and dependent upon the Soviets for economic sustenance and for military and political guidance and direction.

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Looking beyond our alliances, we will support world-wide and regional organizations which are dedicated to enhancing international peace, like the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the Organization of African Unity. In Africa, we and our African friends want to see a continent that is free of the dominance of outside powers, free of the bitterness of racial injustice, free of conflict and free of the burdens of poverty and hunger and disease. We are convinced that the best way to work towards these objectives is through affirmative policies that recognize African aspirations. The persistent and increasing military involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa could deny this hopeful vision. We are deeply concerned about the threat to regional peace and to the autonomy of countries within which these foreign troops seem permanently to be stationed. That is why I have spoken up on this subject today. And this is why I and the American people will support African efforts to contain



such intrusion, as we have done recently in Zaire.

I urge again that all other powers join us in emphasizing works of peace rather than the weapons of war. In their assistance to Africa, let the Soviet Union now join us in seeking peaceful and speedy transition to majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia. Let us see efforts to resolve peacefully the disputes in Eritrea and in Angola.

Let us all work, not to divide and to seek domination in Africa, but to help those nations to fulfill their great potential.

**EXTRACTS FROM A SPECIAL MESSAGE CONCERNING  
FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN AFRICA, BY THE PRESIDENT  
OF TANZANIA, H.E. DR JULIUS NYERERE, TO FOREIGN  
ENVOYS ACCREDITED TO TANZANIA, ON 8 JUNE 1978**

I have been very concerned indeed about world reactions to recent events in Africa, and it seems to me to be necessary that I should make Tanzania's position clear. For the events of the past few weeks have once again demonstrated that although our legal independence is officially recognised, our need and our right to develop our countries and our continent in our own interests has not yet been conceded in practice. The habit of regarding Africa as an appendage of Western Europe has not yet been broken.

*Soviet forces in Africa*

In Angola the MPLA did almost all the fighting against the Portuguese colonialists. As independence approached after the revolution in Portugal, various Western countries, led by the United States of America, decided to try to prevent the establishment of an MPLA Government in that country. They conspired with South Africa and gave under-cover finance and arms to rival nationalist movements which had previously been almost inactive. Faced with this conspiracy and the consequent attacks on Angola from South Africa and across the Zaire border, the MPLA Government sought help from those who had given support to the Movement during the Independence struggle.

Cuba and the Soviet Union responded to those requests. With their help, the Angolan Government overcame the immediate military threat to its existence, pushed South African troops back across the border into Namibia and pushed the FNLA troops back to where they had come from — Zaire.

Cuban troops are still in Angola and the Soviet Union continues to give military assistance to Angola. The Angolan Government is forced to ask for this assistance to be continued because the threat to the integrity of Angola still exists. Only last month South African troops entered Southern Angola again and inflicted heavy casualties upon Namibian refugees. Unita continues to get outside support. There have been continual attacks made across the Angolan/Zaire border by FNLA troops, who are financed and supplied with weapons by external forces and who operate with the active or tacit support of the Zaire Government.

That all this is happening, and how it is happening, is known to the secret services of South Africa, and of the USA, France and some other Western Countries. It would not be happening without their connivance and their involvement. It would be incredible if the Governments of those countries did not know what their

Agencies were doing.

The history of the ex-Katangese Gendarmes pre-dates the independence of Angola. It was not actions of the MPLA which took them to Angola, nor were they trained by MPLA. They are a living reminder to Africa of the determined and shameless attempt by the West to dismember the former Congo (Leopoldville) in their own economic interests.

When that attempt was defeated, some of these Gendarmes moved into Angola and remained there as refugees. Now things have changed, the West has a different view of Zaire and is using it to destabilise Angola. It would therefore not be surprising if Angola, on its part, felt forced to withdraw the restraints it had been imposing on those Zairean refugees in Northern Angola. Whether such a policy of retaliation is correct or wise is a matter of judgment, it is nevertheless understandable. But one thing is clear; there is no evidence of Cuban or Soviet involvement in this retaliation. The US State Department was at one time reported to have said as much and the Cubans have persistently and convincingly repudiated such allegations.

So Cuba and the Soviet Union went into Angola and are still in Angola for understandable reasons at the request of the Angolan Government. There is no evidence at all that they have been involved, directly or indirectly, in any fighting within Zaire.

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Apart from those two countries, where else in Africa are there Soviet or Cuban Forces? There are a few Cuban and Soviet nationals, and a few Chinese nationals, helping to train the freedom fighters of Southern Africa in the use of weapons which Africa gets from communist countries for the liberation struggle in Rhodesia and Namibia. Apart from vague generalities and rumours based on the jackets people wear, there is no serious suggestion that these forces are operating or stationed anywhere else in Africa.

It is, then, on the basis of Soviet and Cuban forces in the African countries that there is a great furore in the West about a so-called Soviet penetration of Africa. And those forces are in those two countries at the request of the legitimate and recognised Governments of the countries concerned, and for reasons which are well known and completely understandable to all reasonable people. Yet Western countries are objecting, and are holding meetings ostensibly about how to defend the freedom of Africa against what they call Soviet penetration.

Let me make it quite clear: Tanzania does not want anyone from outside Africa to govern Africa. We regret, even while we recognise, the occasional necessity for an African Government to ask for

military assistance from a non-African country when it is faced with an external threat to its national integrity. We know that a response to such a request by any of the big powers is determined by what that big power sees as its own interests. We have been forced to recognise that most of the countries acknowledged as world powers do not find it beneath their dignity to exacerbate existing and genuine African problems and conflicts when they believe they can benefit by doing so. We in Tanzania believe that African countries, separately and through the Organization of African Unity, need to guard against such actions. But we need to guard Africa against being used by any other nation or group of nations. *The danger to Africa does not come just from nations in the Eastern bloc.* The West still considers Africa to be within its sphere of influence and acts accordingly. Current developments show that greater immediate danger to Africa's freedom comes from nations in that Western bloc.

*A Pan-African security force*

It might be a good thing if the Organization of African Unity was sufficiently united to establish an African High Command and a Pan-African security force. If having done so, the Organization of African Unity then decided to ask for external support for this force, no-one could legitimately object. But the Organization of African Unity has made no such decision. It is highly unlikely that the Organization of African Unity meeting at Khartoum will be able to agree unanimously on the creation of such a military force, or — if it did — that it would be able to agree unanimously on which countries to ask for support if that was needed.

Yet, until Africa, at the OAU, has made such a decision, there can be no Pan-African security force which will uphold the freedom of Africa. It is the height of arrogance for anyone else to talk of establishing a Pan-African force to defend Africa. It is quite obvious, moreover, that those who have put forward this idea, and those who seek to initiate such a force, are not interested in the freedom of Africa. They are interested in the domination of Africa.

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The French have troops in many countries of Africa. In Chad, in Western Sahara, in Mauritania, and now also in Zaire French forces are engaged in combat against Africans. France continues to occupy Mayotte. But there are no meetings in Washington, or even in Moscow, to discuss the threat to Africa's freedom by the French penetration of Africa. Nor should there be. But not even Africa, in Africa, discusses the question. The reason is very simple. It is the continued assumption that it is natural for French troops, or Belgian troops, or British troops, to be in Africa, but it is a

threat for troops from any non-member of the Western bloc to be in Africa. A threat to whom? To African freedom or to the domination of Africa by ex-colonial powers and their allies operated now through more subtle means and with the help of an Africa fifth column? The answers to those questions are very obvious. There have been continued incursions by South Africans and Rhodesia into Angola, Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique. The West has not shown much concern about these, nor have their new-found surrogates in Africa.

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There should be no mistake. Whatever the official agenda, the Paris or Brussels meetings are not discussing the freedom of Africa. They are discussing the continued domination of Africa, and the continued use of Africa, by Western powers. They are intended to be, taken together, a second Berlin Conference.

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But the costs may also be higher than the participants anticipate. Tanzania is not the only nationalist country in Africa. There are nationalists everywhere. Sooner or later, and for as long as necessary, Africa will fight against neo-colonialism as it has fought against colonialism, and eventually it will win. Western bloc countries which try to resist the struggle against neo-colonialism need to recognise that it will not be African countries only which will suffer in the process. Nor will the whole of Africa acquiesce in being used in the East-West confrontation. We are weak, but weak countries have before now caused a great deal of embarrassment and some difficulty for big powers. If the West wants to prove, either to the Russians or to their own people that they are not soft on communism, they should direct their attention to where the Soviet tanks are and the Soviet front lines. They should not invent an excuse to bring the East-West conflict into Africa. For if they succeed in doing that, Africa will suffer and African freedom will suffer. But it may also turn out to be very expensive for those who chose Africa as another site for East-West confrontation.

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We do not deny the principle that any African state has the right to ask for assistance, either military or economic, from the country of its choice. On the contrary, we assert that right. Angola, Ethiopia, Chad, Zaire and all of us have that right. It is not for the West to object when Angola asks assistance from the USSR. It is not for the East to object when Djibouti asks for assistance from France. And the requested country always has the right to decide whether to give that assistance.

We do not deny either that all African Governments can be

threatened by a few malcontents, possibly financed by external elements, even while they are fully supported by the mass of their people. In such circumstances a Government is surely justified in seeking assistance to overcome a temporary crisis, and the donor country should not be accused of neo-colonialism for responding. Other Governments in Africa have inherited chaotic situations and need somewhat longer-term support while they genuinely try to bring peace to their people and to develop their country in the interests of those people.

But we must reject the principle that external powers have the right to maintain in power African Governments which are universally recognised to be corrupt or incompetent or a bunch of murderers, when their peoples try to make a change. Africa cannot have its present Governments frozen into position for all time by neo-colonialism or because there are cold wars or ideological conflicts between big powers. The peoples of an individual African country have as much right to change their corrupt Government in the last half of the twentieth century as in the past, the British, French and Russian peoples had to overthrow their own rotten regimes. The peoples of China waged a long, historic and exemplary struggle against the lackeys and running dogs of imperialism in so-called independent China. Are African peoples to be denied that same right?

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Western Europe and the United States of America are interested in having continued access to the minerals of Africa to sustain their own economies, but that access is not ensured by corruption or support for corruption; it is endangered by such support. That access is not dependent, either, upon the ideology espoused by particular African Governments. The present realities of African politics and economics force all African countries to sell their minerals where they can get the best price for them, and where they can get in exchange the goods they themselves need; there is much evidence for both those propositions.

**EXTRACTS FROM A STATEMENT ON AFRICA BY THE  
SOVIET UNION, ON 23 JUNE 1978**

The growth of tension on the African continent, resulting from the aggressive actions of a group of leading NATO countries headed by the USA, arouses the legitimate anxiety of all peaceable states. The armed conflict on the Horn of Africa, the unceasing military provocations against Angola, the intervention in Zaire, the formation of so-called 'pan-African' and in fact anti-African armed forces under the command of NATO officers, the coup staged by mercenaries on the Comoro Islands — this is a far from complete list of only the most recent imperialist actions. It is evidence showing that an offensive is being conducted against the national liberation forces in Africa. The colonialists would like once again to impose their diktat upon the African peoples, though this is obviously hopeless.

In the present situation, the Soviet Government deems it necessary to express its viewpoint on the topical problems of the situation in Africa and around it.

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The Soviet Union entertains profound sympathy for these changes. Both the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community have vigorously supported and continue to support the just struggle of the African peoples. It was precisely on the initiative of the socialist countries that the UN General Assembly in 1960 adopted the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. The development of the relations between our state and the African countries is determined by our objective community of interests on the fundamental problems of our time. In its relations with the states of Africa, the Soviet Union invariably adheres to the principles of solidarity with the peoples' struggle for independence and freedom, for national and social progress, genuine equality, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs and mutually advantageous co-operation. This principled foundation of our relations is of lasting significance.

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The imperialists and their accomplices have more than once undertaken military ventures in Africa, provoked inter-state conflicts, encouraged actions by separatists with the aim of weakening the corresponding African countries. On their conscience are many state coups and anti-government plots, notorious "secret operations", and the extermination of such glorious sons of free Africa as Patrice Lumumba, Marien Ngouabi, Eduardo Mondlane, Amilcar Cabral, and others.

At present imperialist interference in the affairs of Africa has acquired a particularly cynical and dangerous nature. Such, in particular, is the operation in Shaba (Zaire) carried out for the sake of preserving the control of Western monopolies over Zairean copper, cobalt, uranium, diamonds and other natural resources, for the sake of ensuring the West's military-strategic and selfish interests. The example of Zaire demonstrates that the imperialist powers are resorting to direct military actions against Africans with the use of their own armed forces, reviving thus the worst times of colonial plunder. They obviously want to assume again the functions of the gendarme of Africa, the ruler of the destinies of its peoples, although nobody has ever elected them into this office.

The transition of the leading Western powers to collective and aggressive military-political activity is a new dangerous moment in Africa. The guiding role in its implementation belongs to the United States of America, which is making extensive use of the NATO mechanism for its aims. There is a striving to spread the sphere of activity of this aggressive bloc to Africa. Precisely this was discussed at the latest session of the NATO Council in Washington and the conference of the five leading NATO states in Paris. For the West the internal events in Zaire were only a pretext for switching to the formalisation of long-drafted plans in NATO for creating a "mechanism for a rapid response" to changes in the African continent that are not to the taste of the Western imperialist powers.

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Another aim of the intervention in Zaire is to exert direct pressure on the patriotic forces of Zimbabwe and Namibia, on the so-called "frontline" states of Africa and to impose a neo-colonialist solution of the Rhodesian and Namibian questions. Very indicative in this respect is the recent discussion in Britain about the possibility of holding similar operations to protect the West's interests in Rhodesia.

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As part of the attempt to justify the NATO intervention in Zaire, which the Soviet Union resolutely condemns, a persistent effort is being made to spread the myth about the involvement of the USSR, Cuba and a number of African countries in the events in Zaire, although the obvious mendacity of this version has already been repeatedly exposed both in Soviet official statements and in statements made by Governments of other countries.

Just as groundless are the contentions that the aid given by the USSR and Cuba to some African countries, above all to Angola and Ethiopia, to the national-liberation movements in the south of



Africa, creates a threat to peace and stability in the continent, undermines the process of relaxation of international tension. The legitimacy of our aid is based firmly on the Charter of the United Nations Organisation, on the decisions of this organisation and other authoritative international forums. One cannot fail to see the difference in principle between the assistance given by socialist countries to the states and peoples of Africa, and the armed interference in the internal affairs of Africa practiced in reality by Western countries in their narrow, selfish interests. The assistance given by socialist countries serves the just cause of the liberation of the peoples from racist-colonialist slavery and the cause of protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states from outside encroachments. The Soviet people are rightly proud of their assistance in these lofty aims.

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If the remaining seats of racism and colonialism in the world were quickly liquidated, detente would only gain . . .

The racist regime in Pretoria, which by its very existence presents a threat to international peace, is an accomplice of the Western powers. It is actively building up its military might with the assistance of NATO and strives to get access to nuclear weapons.

The changes in Africa are just as little to the taste of the Peking leaders who, for their chauvinistic, hegemonistic and selfish reasons, would like to see the continent as an arena of serious international complications and conflicts. The Peking leadership, along with NATO and the Republic of South Africa, is an active co-participant in the fanning of tension in Africa. It has merged forces with imperialism, with the forces of aggression and reaction, neo-colonialism and racism and thereby placed itself in the ranks of the opponents not only of the socialist countries, but also of the entire national-liberation movement, the unity of African peoples, the struggle of African countries for their independence and freedom against imperialist domination. Such was the case during the events in Angola and in the Horn of Africa. Peking's perfidious role has also manifested itself fully in connection with the NATO intervention in Zaire.

The eagerness of the former colonialists to return to Africa with arms in hand, under the false cover of protecting it from the Soviet and Cuban "threat", is a cause for concern the world over, and especially to the peoples of Africa. They rightly see in this a real danger of the restoration of the colonial order, of the creation of imperialism's punitive forces against the forces of social progress, of the implanting in the continent of neo-colonialist relations based on exploitation and plunder, and attempts to under-

mine progressive regimes. And all this is directed against the political and economic independence of African states, at undermining this independence . . .

Under threat is the very existence of the Organisation of African Unity, that body which is such an important instrument in the struggle for the common interests of the African states. It is no coincidence that many African leaders strongly condemn the military imperialist intervention in Zaire, the attempts to create in the continent groupings directly or indirectly associated with NATO. Attempts to solve African affairs behind the backs of Africans are rightly being taken as an insult to Africa, as a refusal to take heed of its increased role in the international arena.

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The Soviet Union's policy in respect of Africa is clear and consistent. In the developing countries, as everywhere, it is on the side of the forces upholding the cause of national independence, social progress and democracy. It treats them as its friends in struggle. In this the Soviet Union does not seek any advantages for itself, does not hunt for concessions, does not press for political domination, does not solicit military bases. The USSR is entirely on the side of the African peoples struggling against the further preservation in any form of the remnants of colonialism and racism in Africa, against neo-colonialism.

It is natural, therefore, that the Soviet Union consistently has called and continues to call for the liquidation of the racist regime in Rhodesia, and the handing over of full power to the people of Zimbabwe in the person of the Patriotic Front, for the immediate and full withdrawal of the Republic of South Africa from Namibia and the handing over of power to Swapo, the genuine representative of the people of its country; for the liquidation of the system of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa.

## UITTREKSELS UIT 'N TOESPRAAK DEUR DIE SUID- AFRIKAANSE EERSTE MINISTER, SY EDELE B.J. VORSTER, TE GRAAFF-REINET OP 27 MEI 1978

Daar is mense wat bang is vir 'n kommunistiese oorname van Suid-Afrika. Ek is baie meer bang dat Europa oorgeneem sal word deur die kommuniste; ek is baie meer bang dat die res van die Vrye Wêreld deur die kommunisme ingeneem sal word, want weet u die verskil tussen ons en hulle is dat ons weet wie ons vyand is en dat ons ons voorberei daarvoor.

Nou, na dertigjaar, het ek vir u gesê daardie druk was altyd daar. Ek sal u mislei as ek vanaand vir u sê dat daardie druk nie sal toeneem nie. Hy sal wel toeneem en namate die druk van buite toeneem — na daardie mate sal die ondermyning van binne toeneem. Ons sal, soos in die verlede, verplig wees om daarteen op te tree. Dit is nie 'n maklike taak nie, omdat 'n mens altyd hier met twee sake te maak het.

Dit is 'n dwaas wat 'n leier is van 'n volk, gesitueerd soos Suid-Afrika, wat nie agslaan op die buitelandse mening nie. Jy moet uit die aard van die saak daarop agslaan en wanneer jy 'n optrede neem dan moet jy altyd twee dinge teen mekaar opweeg. Die een is die buitelandse reaksie en die ander is die binnelandse veiligheid. Jy moet dit teen mekaar opweeg en hoe bitter graag jy ook al nie aanstoot wil gee aan die sogenaamde buitelandse mening nie, wanneer die keuse kom tussen daardie mening en Suid-Afrika se veiligheid, dan spreek dit vanself dat jy geen keuse hoegenaamd het nie. Jy regeer mos nie hierdie land om die buiteland te plesier nie. Jy regeer mos nou nie hierdie land sodat hulle gelukkig kan bly nie. Het die wyse Langenhoven nie gesê: „'n Mens steek jou neus in 'n ander man se sake in omdat jou eie nie te lekker ruik nie?”

Ek het darem bitter baie soorte mense gesien wat hulle neuse in ons sake steek en hulle het rede om dit te doen. 'n Mens tree nie onverantwoordelik op nie, jy tart nie die sogenaamde “international community” onnodiglik uit nie. Ek sê dit is 'n dwaas wat nie vir hom steur aan billike kritiek, aan gegronde kritiek nie, maar my vriende, dit is 'n pappbroek wat vir hom laat voorskrywe deur oningelighes van buite hoe hy sy eie land moet regeer. En kan u nou vir my in my posisie kwalik neem dat ek al meer en meer allergies word vir die sogenaamde buitelandse mening, as ek weet waarop dit gegrond is?

Laat ek vir u een voorbeeld noem. Lesotho kla ons aan by die VVO dat ons drie grensposte tussen Lesotho en Suid-Afrika gesluit het en dat hulle R70 miljoen se skade gely het as gevolg daarvan. Ons het geen grensposte met hulle gesluit nie, die drie

As is customary this speech was delivered in both English and Afrikaans.

grensposte waarna hulle verwys het is in Transkei geleë en hulle was nie vir 'n enkele sekond gesluit nie. Maar al was hulle gesluit, het Lesotho nie sewe en 'n sikspens se skade gelei as gevolg daarvan nie . . . Ek praat nie agter die mense se rug nie, ek het dit voor hulle gesê; die Britte, die Amerikaners, die Duitsers, die Franse het geweet dat daardie grensposte nooit gesluit was nie en ten spyte daarvan stem hulle teen ons by die VVO, toe hulle ons veroordeel omdat ons Lesotho hierdie groot skade berokken het om hierdie grensposte te sluit. Dit is een van talle voorbeelde wat ek vir u kan noem.

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*South Africa and the question of black majority rule*

We know that the militants and the liberals want to move us in the direction of one man one vote, black majority rule, in South Africa. We know that they are prepared, or that they are considering, selective sanctions and ultimately even full sanctions against South Africa if we are not prepared to move in that direction. We are aware that Mr Mondale and Mr Young have spelt it out that we must move in that direction or else face the wrath of the United States of America . . .

I want to say, on behalf of the National Party, that after thirty years this Government gave the vote to each and every individual, be they white, be they coloured, be they Indian or be they black. We did not withhold the vote from peoples of colour in South Africa. To speak, as they do, of voteless masses, is unadulterated nonsense. We have given the vote which they never had before, to all blacks, male and female, in South Africa, but they vote for their own members of Parliament, they vote for their own Cabinets, they vote for their own Prime Ministers and they vote for their own Presidents ultimately, if they want to become independent. But they don't vote with us in our Parliament.

It is well-known that it is the policy of this Government to make black states independent, we have made two of them independent and the third is on the point of becoming independent, and even if they turn hostile to us later, as has happened, that proves nothing else but the sincerity of our policy. They are not our stooges, we don't make them independent to be our stooges, they have got the right to be hostile to us if they so wish and if they are so foolish.

We gave the vote, for their own Parliament, to all coloureds in South Africa not only to the handful who had the vote originally in the Cape. We gave the vote to all Indians; it is true not for the same Parliament because we don't believe in it and I can readily understand that leaders of other countries can argue with me and say; "The vote doesn't go far enough." Then I can state my case and then I can argue the point. But to accuse me and to accuse South

Africa that there are voteless masses in South Africa is a violation of the truth when two-thirds of the world's population live under dictatorships where there are no freedoms whatsoever, where there are no votes whatsoever, one way or the other.

Then, to my astonishment, the President of the United States comes to Africa for the first time and he goes to Lagos and predictably attacks South Africa, from Nigeria, because we are not observing human rights. He did so in Nigeria, a military dictatorship where there is no free press, where there is no free bench and where people are still executed in public every Saturday. If that is the morality of the world then we have naught for our comfort as far as the Western World is concerned. Then *The Washington Post*, an influential newspaper, when it wrote about this, reported that I spoke about the "so-called dictatorship" of Nigeria.

### *Rhodesië*

Daar is Rhodesië wat van meet af aan 'n ander beleid as ons daarop nagehou het, trouens u het mnr Smith verskeie kere hoor sê dat dit altyd inherent was van die Rhodesiese beleid, sedert 1923 toe hy sy eerste konstitusie verkry het, dat daar meerderheidsregering uiteindelik in Rhodesië sal kom. Ek het nooit, in al die jare wat ek met Rhodesië en mnr Smith onderhandel het, vir hom voorgeskrywe wat hy moes doen nie. Hy was mans genoeg om sy eie besluite te neem en hy het dit gedoen. Ek het hom raad gegee wanneer hy om raad gevra het, ek het alternatiewe aan hom uitgewys maar verder as dit het ek mooi gegaan nie.

Toe dr Kissinger hier was, toe was daar een versoek wat hy aan my gerig het en dit is dat ek dit vir hom moontlik moes maak om self met dr Kissinger te praat. Kissinger wou dit aanvanklik nie doen nie maar ek het hom uiteindelik sover gekry om mnr Smith te sien en hulle het 'n dag lank alleen gepraat sonder dat ek daarby was. Hy het sekere voorstelle aan mnr Smith gemaak en hy het daardie voorstelle nie alleen aanvaar nie, maar hy het dit letterlik nagekom, sy onderneming teenoor dr Kissinger tot stand gebring. Dit was die anderkant wat nie hulle onderneming nagekom het nie, en ek bedoel nie dr Kissinger en sy mense nie, maar die sogenaamde Frontlinie Presidente.

Hulle het daardie skikking afgeskiet en nou het mnr Smith 'n interne skikking aangegaan en na lang raadspreking het hy tot 'n ooreenkoms geraak met die swartleiers Muzorewa, Sithole en Chirau, en het hulle vier 'n voorlopige regering gevorm. Ek het in die tussentyd die geleentheid gehad om nie alleen met mnr Smith te gesels nie, maar ook om met die Adjunk Eerste Minister, mnr David Smith en sy mede-Minister van Finansies, mnr Ernest Bulle, die swartman, te praat. Ek het geleentheid gehad om met mnr P.K. van der Bijl, die Minister van Buitelandse Sake en sy

mede-Minister, dr Elliot Gabellah, te praat. Ek het nie alleen die indruk nie, maar ek het ook die rapporte dat dit goed gaan met daardie regering.

Maar ongelukkig het jy hier 'n situasie dat Rhodesië, swart en wit, ooreengekom het om hulle probleme op te los — hulle verteenwoordig op 'n minimum tagtig-persent van die bevolking van Rhodesië — maar dit wat hulle bereik het word nie aanvaar deur óf die Britte óf deur die Amerikaners nie. As ek sê die Britte dan bedoel ek die Britse Regering. Ek is baie dankbaar dat die Opposisie in Brittanje 'n ander siening oor die saak het. Al hierdie Ministers, swart en wit, het dit baie duidelik aan my gestel dat hulle heeltemaal bereid is, en hulle het dit ook so in die openbaar gestel, dat as Nkomo wil inkom en op vreedsame wyse wil meewerk aan die toekoms van Rhodesië, en sy gewelddadigheid wil laat staan, dan is hulle bereid om vir hom plek te maak op dieselfde platform waarop hulle staan en vir hom verteenwoordiging te gee in die Tussentydse Regering sowel as in die Ministeriële Raad.

En as dit so is, wil ek nou vanaand namens Suidelike Afrika 'n beroep doen op die Amerikaners en die Britse Regering:

„Waarom werk julle nie saam met die Rhodesiërs wat vrede wil hê nie? Waarom los julle nie jul eie skemas wat nie lewensvatbaarheid het, soos wat hierdie mense vir my sê nie? Waarom bou julle nie voort op die fondament wat deur hierdie mense gelê is nie? Waarom, as julle enige invloed by Nkomo het, gebruik julle dit nie om hom binne daardie geledere te bring wat vrede wil soek in Rhodesië nie? Waarom legaliseer julle nie die posisie in Rhodesië so gou as moontlik nie? Waarom hef julle nie sanksies op tot voordeel van swart en wit van Rhodesië en tot voordeel van die sub-kontinent van Afrika nie? Waarom, met inagneming van die marxistiese dreigement, nie alleen in die Indiese Oseaan nie, maar in die hele Afrika, waarom kom werk julle nie liever saam vir vrede in Suidelike Afrika nie?“

Ek glo na alles wat gebeur het in die jare wat verby is dat met inagneming van die bydrae wat Suid-Afrika se regering, en ek as persoon, geneem het om vrede in Afrika te bestendig, het ek die reg om daardie beroep op daardie twee regerings te doen. Afrika

#### *Die Weste se verantwoordelikheid teenoor Afrika*

Afrika is ons kontinent, die sub-kontinent van Afrika behoort deels aan ons. Afrika het nie meer politiekery nodig nie. Afrika is in die posisie waarin hy hom vandag bevind as gevolg van te veel politiek maak. Afrika is besig om te verarm. Die gaping wat tussen Afrika en die ontwikkelde wêreld was, het nie vernou soos wat gehoop was in die jare wat verby is nie, daardie gaping word groter en groter. Afrika het nie politieke spel nodig in hierdie

stadium nie. Afrika het hulp nodig, hulp om homself te help.

Die Sjinese het dit eeue gelede al gesê: „Gee 'n man 'n vis en hy eet eenmaal, leer hom om vis te vang en hy eet vir die res van sy lewe”. Dis wat Afrika vra van die ontwikkelde wêreld. Moenie geld in bodemlose putte gooi nie, moenie politiek inmeng in die saak van Afrika nie. Leer vir ons sodat ons onself kan help, met ander woorde, dieselfde beginsel wat ons sendingwerkers gevolg het van die begin af toe hulle sendingwerk in Midde Afrika gaan doen het. Daardie beginsel moet vandag weer in Afrika toegepas word. Afrika is ons kontinent, ons is net so van hom as enige ander staat, dis hier waar ons wieg gestaan het, dis hier waar ons graf sal wees en as die leier van die ontwikkeldste volk in Afrika, het ek die reg om te pleit vir die reg van Afrika se voortbestaan.

Ek sê ons is die ontwikkeldste volk, maar ons is ook die volk wat die moed het en die moed gehad het om teen die marxiste vierkantig op te staan, so klein as wat ons is, en wanneer ek pleit vir Afrika, dan vra ek ook aan die Westerse Wêreld: „Julle, dié uit julle geledere wat van tyd tot tyd dreigemente teenoor ons maak, as julle ons sou vernietig wat dink julle sal van die res van Suidelike Afrika word? Watter chaos en ellende sal daar kom?” Maar dan, sonder om groot te praat — want ons is klein, in die wêreldkonteks geneem, baie klein — maar weet u, klein volkere het ook selfrespek en klein volkere veg ook vir hulle voortbestaan, en klein volkere verloor nie altyd nie. Die geskiedenis is vol voorbeelde daarvan. En so klein as wat hierdie volk is, so seker sal hy vir sy voortbestaan veg. Wanneer daar van druk en vernietiging gepraat word, dan word ons nie sommer so vernietig nie, dan sal ons eers moet sien wat verder gebeur.

#### *SWA/Namibia*

Daar is die kwessie van Suidwes-Afrika wat by u lê. Ons standpunt van meet af aan was dat die volkere van daardie gebied self moet besluit oor hul toekoms. U het my hoor sê dat al sou hulle besluite neem waarvan ons nie hou nie, sal ons dit nogtans aanvaar. Hulle het besluite geneem wat nie strook met ons standpunte en beleid nie, ons het dit aanvaar vir hulle. Hulle het om 'n tafel gaan sit, hulle het mekaar gevind, hulle het 'n modus vivendi uitgewerk vir die toekoms, en op grond daarvan het hulle vir ons onafhanklikheid gevra en ons het gesê ons sal daardie onafhanklikheid vir hulle gee soos hulle gevra het, die end van hierdie jaar. En toe verlede jaar, April-maand, het die Westerse Wêreld met ons kom praat, Brittanje, die VSA, Frankryk, Wes-Duitsland en Kanada — almal lede van die Veiligheidsraad. Hulle het as lede van die Veiligheidsraad met ons samesprekings gevra om te kyk of hulle 'n oplossing kon vind, saam met ons, wat aanvaarbaar vir die res van die wêreld sou wees en wat erkenning sou geniet van die

sogenaamde wêreldgemeenskap.

Daar was natuurlik heelwat struikelblokke in die pad, onder andere 'n besluit waarvoor hulle deels verantwoordelik was omdat hulle nie genoeg daarteen gewaarsku het nie, en wat deur die Algemene Vergadering geneem is *nl.* dat Suidwes-Afrika behoort aan Swapo en dat Sam Nujoma die enigste erfgenaam van Suidwes is. Terwyl ons standpunt was, en ek dit vir hulle baie duidelik gestel het, dat Nujoma 'n kommunistiese avonturier is, hy is nie 'n natuurlike of gekose leier van enige van die volkere van Suidwes nie, derhalwe is ek nie bereid om met hom te praat of te onderhandel nie. Dit bly steeds my standpunt.

Verbeel jou, hier kom die Algemene Vergadering van die VVO en by meerderheidsbesluit — hierdie Algemene Vergadering wat vir ons beskuldig dat ons nie demokraties genoeg is nie, intendeel, dat ons so min demokraties is dat ons gedissiplineer moet word — kom neem hy 'n besluit ten opsigte van 'n gebied dat een sekere organisasie die enigste erkende liggaam in daardie gebied is, en dat 'n skobbejak die enigste leier in daardie gebied is.

As dit dan jou opvatting van demokrasie is, dan mag ons bewaar bly daarvan. Maar ek sê sedert April 1977 het ons ons bereidwilligheid betoon om met die vyf Westerse lande te onderhandel, net soos wat my voorgangers bereid was om oor die jare heen te onderhandel met die Arden Clarke-komitee in die vyftigerjare, met Carpio en de Alva — in die sestigerjare, en ek onderhandel het met Waldheim en Escher in die sewentigerjare. Ons het niks verder gekom nie.

Nou het ons lang samesprekings gehad, ek wil nie daarby stilstaan nie behalwe om te sê dat ons uiteindelik sekere voorstelle van die vyf Westerse lande ontvang het en binne drie weke nadat ons die voorstelle ontvang het en nadat ons dit voorgelê het aan die mense van Suidwes-Afrika, en ons by monde van die Administrateur-generaal, regter Steyn, verneem het dat die meerderheid van die volkere, mense van Suidwes-Afrika, ten gunste daarvan was, het ons die voorstelle aanvaar op 25 April, en het ons daardie medeling gemaak aan die Westerse lande. Dieselfde tyd wat hulle met ons onderhandel het, het hulle met hierdie een organisasie, Swapo, onderhandel.

Wil u nou vir my sê dat as ons vir hulle 'n antwoord kon gee op 25 April, terwyl ons baie mense moes raadpleeg, dat Swapo nie vir hulle 'n antwoord kon gee op 25 April nie? Maar wat was Swapo se reaksie? Sy antwoord was om in die openbaar aan te kondig dat hy sy terroriste-bedrywighede gaan verskerp, dat hy sterker gaan toeslaan in Suidwes as wat hy vantevore gedoen het, en daar kom geen woord van die Weste nie, geen woord van die mense wat wêreldvrede soek in die VVO, om vir hom te sê: „Ons is op die



punt om hierdie saak te besleg, die Suid-Afrikaanse regering het reeds die voorwaardes aanvaar, hoekom aanvaar jy dit ook nie en maak die saak uit die weg uit?" Uitdagend kom hierdie avonturiër en hy sê sy antwoord op ons aanname van die voorstelle is, hy gaan sy terrorisme verskerp. Toe slaan ons hom op 4 Mei en toe is dit interessant wat daarna gebeur het.

Toe kom die wêreldpers eers en hulle sê: „Ja maar dit is nie Swapo wat julle geslaan het nie, dit is 'n vlugtelingkamp.” Toe vind hulle uit die fout wat hulle gemaak het en hulle sê vir ons: „Nujoma is kwaad, hy wil nie nou praat nie, hy moet eers afkoel.” Hy is kwaad omdat ons hom geslaan het op 4 Mei; dis die feite. Ons aanvaar op 25 April en in stede van om saam met ons te aanvaar, kom die dreigement hulle gaan hul terroriste-bedrywighede verskerp en toe kom 4 Mei en nou is dit vir my duidelik dat die grondslag gelê word vir 'n verwyd teen Suid-Afrika dat dit ons skuld is dat Swapo nog nie aanvaar het nie, want as ons hulle nou nie reg gesien het op 4 Mei nie, dan sou hulle nou al aangeneem het.

Ek moet nou sê dat as mnr McHenry van die VSA reg gerapporteer is, dat hy vyf daë van 'n ooreenkoms af weg was toe ons die sogenaamde onbesonne daad aangevang het, dan wil ek vanaand vir u sê dit is my oortuiging dat Swapo nooit wou nie, en hy wil ook nie, 'n vreedsame einde in Suidwes-Afrika sien nie. Maar dit is vir my baie duidelik dat hierdie skikking kan misluk as gevolg van twee gebeure. Hy kan misluk omdat Swapo dit nie wil aanvaar nie en hy kan misluk omdat die Weste nie die nodige steun in die Veiligheidsraad daarvoor kan kry nie. Dit is die twee moontlikhede.

En as enige van daardie moontlikhede gaan gebeur dan is dit vir my baie duidelik dan gaan hulle die skuld op Suid-Afrika se skouers pak en ek sê nou by voorbaat: „Ek is nie bereid om namens Suid-Afrika daardie skuld te aanvaar nie”. Ek wil dit ook baie duidelik sê dat dit vir my begin deurskemer dat mnr McHenry se besoek hier en sy praatjies die afgelope tyd, 'n baie deursigtige poging is om die skuld van mislukking op die skouers van Suid-Afrika te lê.

Ek wil vir u die versekering gee dat ons daardie voorwaardes aanvaar het, dat die mense van Suidwes dit aanvaar het omdat ons waaragtig vrede in Suidelike Afrika wil soek, omdat dit in belang is van almal van ons dat daar vrede in Suidelike Afrika moet kom.

*Suid-Afrika se strewe vir vrede in Suidelike Afrika*

Ek het myself in daardie proses nie gespaar nie. Ek het my toegewy aan die soek van vrede in Suidelike Afrika. Ek het onder moeilike omstandighede in Afrika ingegaan om dit te bevorder na die beste van my vermoë. Ek staan hier as 'n mens met skoon

hande in daardie verband. Ons het vrede gesoek en ons sal altyd vrede soek maar as die militantes en die marxiste, as die liberaliste en die onverstandiges, dan nie vir ons daardie vrede gun nie, dan weet ons wat om te doen.

Hulle weet ook dat Suid-Afrika nie maar net 'n muur is wat jy kan omstoot nie. Dit is die groot strategie van die marxiste om die wêreld te domineer. Dit val binne die raamwerk van die groot strategie om Afrika te domineer. Dis 'n groot element van die strategie om die mineraalrykdomme van Suid-Afrika en die Kaapse seeroete in marxistiese hande te laat val. Ons op ons beurt, so klein as wat ons is, glo dat dit ons roeping is, nie net om te woon en te werk in hierdie deel van die wêreld wat God in Sy genade aan ons gegee het nie, maar ons glo dat dit ons roeping is om wal te gooi teen die marxistiese aanslae, letterlik met alles wat ons het.

En ek, wat my betref, omdat ek die verantwoordelikheid ken, omdat ek dit elke dag aan my lyf ervaar, moet ek teenoor die jongmense van Suid-Afrika verantwoording doen. Ek kan nie vir u sê wat môre, oormôre gaan gebeur nie behalwe dat ek glo en dat ek weet dat dit goed sal gaan met Suid-Afrika omdat ons 'n roeping het om te vervul, en omdat ons 'n pad het wat ons moet loop en ons nog nie aan die einde van daardie pad gekom het nie, en Hy wat ons geroep het om te loop op daardie pad, Hy gaan nie vir ons kruppel maak voordat ons by die end van die pad gekom het nie. Ek glo dat ons 'n roeping het om te volvoer. En ek kan my verantwoord teenoor elke vader en moeder, teenoor elke jongmens in Suid-Afrika, dat ek my bes gedoen het om vrede te bestendig in Suider Afrika en as dit ons nie gegun word nie dan moet ons dit langs ander weë bestendig, en Goddank, die jeug van Suid-Afrika is nie net bereid om dit te doen nie, maar is opgewasse om dit inderdaad te doen.