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SOUTHERN AFRICA RECORD contains the original texts of, or extracts from, important statements by political leaders, government representatives and international organisations, concerning international relations in the southern region of Africa. In addition to statements on issues of current concern, some significant statements made in the past are included in the RECORD from time to time. The reproduction of these policy statements of the past and present is intended for information and reference purposes, not only for students, but also for all those who are concerned with the relations between the countries of Southern Africa.

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*Compiler:* Alan Begg

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# Southern Africa Record

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# South Africa and Swaziland

- A. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland, relating to security matters.
- (i) Proposal for an agreement on security between their two Governments, by the South African Prime Minister, the Hon P.W. Botha, to H.M. King Sobhuza II of Swaziland, on 12 February 1982.

## Your Majesty

I have the honour to refer to various discussions and correspondence between the Foreign Ministers of the Kingdom of Swaziland and the Republic of South Africa which resulted in mutual agreement between our respective Governments to the effect that both Governments are aware of the fact that international terrorism, in all its manifestations, poses a real threat to international peace and security and that our respective Governments should take steps to protect our respective states and nationals against this threat.

Therefore, I now have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Republic of South Africa proposes the following Agreement between our respective Governments:

### ARTICLE 1

*The Contracting Parties undertake to combat terrorism, insurgency and subversion individually and collectively and shall call upon each other wherever possible for such assistance and steps as may be deemed necessary or expedient to eliminate this evil.*

### ARTICLE 2

*In the conduct of their mutual relations the Contracting Parties shall furthermore respect each other's independence, sovereignty and territo-*

rial integrity and shall refrain from the unlawful threat or use of force and from any other act which is inconsistent with the purposes and principles of good neighbourliness.

### ARTICLE 3

The Contracting Parties shall live in peace and further develop and maintain friendly relations with each other and shall therefore not allow any activities within their respective territories directed towards the commission of any act which involves a threat or use of force against each other's territorial integrity.

### ARTICLE 4

The Contracting Parties shall not allow within their respective territories the installation or maintenance of foreign military bases or the presence of foreign military units except in accordance with their right of self-defence in the event of armed attacks as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and only after due notification to the other.

Should the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland agree with the abovementioned provisions, this letter and your affirmative reply thereto shall constitute an Agreement between our two Governments.

- (ii) Acceptance by the Government of Swaziland of the South African proposal for a Security Agreement, 17 February 1982.

#### **Honourable Prime Minister**

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 12 February 1982 which reads as follows:

.....  
Duly authorised by His Majesty King Sobhuza II, I have the honour to inform you, Mr Prime Minister, that the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland agrees to the abovementioned provisions and regards your letter and this reply as constituting an agreement between our two Governments.

- (iii) Joint statement by the South-African Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon R.F. Botha, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Swaziland, the Hon R.V. Dlamini, in Pretoria on 31 March 1984.

During discussions between the Honourable R.F. Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, and the Honourable R.V. Dlamini,

mini, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Swaziland, in Pretoria today, it was decided to make public, on behalf of their respective Governments, the existence and contents of an Agreement relating to Security Matters.

After having been granted full powers by the South African State President in Council and His Majesty, the late King Sobhuza II of Swaziland, respectively, the Honourable P.W. Botha, Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, and the Honourable M.F. Dlamini, former Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Swaziland, concluded the Agreement, which came into force on 17 February 1982, on behalf of the two Governments.

The introductory paragraph of the Agreement expresses the awareness of the two States that international terrorism, in all its manifestations, poses a real threat to international peace and security as well as their agreement that they should take steps to protect their respective States and nationals against this threat. The Agreement accordingly records the undertaking of the Parties to combat terrorism, insurgency and subversion individually and collectively as well as their right to call upon each other for such assistance and steps as may be deemed necessary or expedient to eliminate this evil.

The Parties are required to respect each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity in the conduct of their mutual relations and to refrain from the threat or use of force as well as any other act which would be inconsistent with the purposes and principles of good neighbourliness.

In order to facilitate the maintenance and development of peace and friendly relations between the two States, they are required not to allow any activities within their respective territories which are directed towards the commission of any act which involves a threat or use of force against each other's territorial integrity.

The Parties are also required not to allow the installation or maintenance of foreign military bases or the presence of foreign military units within their respective territories except in accordance with their right of self-defence in the event of armed attacks and only after due notification to the other.

Texts for items (A)(i)-(iii) issued by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs

- B.** Joint statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Swaziland, the Hon R.V. Dlamini, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, the Hon R.F. Botha, concerning the exchange of Trade Representatives between their two Governments, Pretoria, 31 March 1984.

During a meeting between the Honourable R.V. Dlamini, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Swaziland, and the Honourable R.F. Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, in Pretoria today, it was decided that the interests of both States would be well

served by the exchange of permanent representatives entrusted with the task of promoting such interests in the economic, labour, trade, tourism and related fields.

It was accordingly agreed that the two Governments would exchange, as soon as practicable, Trade Representatives to establish Trade Missions in their respective countries.

It is the belief of both Governments that such a step would further promote the spirit of good neighbourliness and constructive co-operation which characterises the relationship between them.

Text issued by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information

**C.** Address by the South African Prime Minister, the Hon P.W. Botha, on the occasion of the visit to South Africa of members of the Supreme Council of State, the Prime Minister and members of the Swaziland Cabinet, on 11 May 1984.

Honourable Members of the Supreme Council of State, Honourable Prime Minister, Members of the Swaziland Cabinet, Colleagues.

It is a pleasure to welcome you, Mr Prime Minister, on this, your first official visit to South Africa. I trust that you and your colleagues enjoy your stay in my country. I look forward to our discussions and am confident that they will produce positive results.

The Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of Swaziland, historically, have had a close and cordial relationship which I and my Cabinet colleagues wish to see *continued and expanded*. Africa has experienced, in the past two and a half decades, a great measure of instability, caused by a number of factors resulting in serious doubts being expressed about the viability of many of the nations of this continent. Swaziland, in contrast, has been an example of moderation, stability and progress. For this we must give credit to the late King Sobhuza II.

Throughout his long reign, His Majesty King Sobhuza II, a wise man whose reputation and presence were respected and felt far beyond the borders of his own country, sought peace and progress rather than confrontation in Southern Africa. He believed in solving problems through patient dialogue and in bringing together opponents at the conference table. It was His Majesty, for example, who took the initiative to arrange an important meeting of Heads of State of countries in Southern Africa in April 1981 to discuss the situation in the region. His wisdom, consistency and integrity will long be remembered and will serve as an example to those of us who wish to see the nations of our continent living together in peace and harmony.



It is clear to me that the present Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland has every intention of following the ideals of this African Statesman. It was your Government, Sir, that made its facilities available for the talks between South Africa and Mozambique in December 1983, which laid the foundation for further fruitful meetings which culminated in the signing of the Nkomati Accord<sup>1</sup> in March of this year. We are grateful to you for the role that Swaziland played. The signing of the Accord was an event of significance which has demonstrated to the international community that there is a serious drive for co-operation among the peoples of Southern Africa. It shows that African countries have the capacity to solve their problems among themselves without outside interference.

An important development in the relations between our two countries was the conclusion of the Agreement to jointly combat terrorism and subversion. It was, in my opinion, necessary and inevitable that the world should be informed of the existence of this Agreement. We in South Africa have noted with appreciation the actions taken by the Government of Swaziland against forces involved in terrorism.

Mr Prime Minister, there are many spheres in which South Africa and Swaziland work closely together. The decision to exchange Trade Representatives will undoubtedly contribute towards a widening of this co-operation and place it on a more co-ordinated basis. I can envisage that this co-operation could cover such areas as transport, health, agriculture, forestry, the rational utilisation of common water resources, the exploitation of minerals and the establishment of industries. In the course of our discussions today these matters can receive further attention. The vast damage caused by natural phenomena such as hurricanes and droughts underlines the need to develop strong and resilient economies.

It should be evident from the recent developments in our region that South Africa seeks a positive and realistic relationship with our neighbours and it is my earnest wish to see the progress that has been made in this regard expanded throughout the sub-continent. Swaziland which has already played such an important role in the initial stages of this process, can render further valuable assistance in this regard. Then we can successfully counter the evils of disease, ignorance, poverty and hunger that shackle so many of our peoples. Unstable economies lead to unstable governments. Instability is contagious and a weak and confused region attracts the unwelcome attention of outsiders like the carrion of the veld attracts vultures. This we are all determined to avoid.

The South African Government appreciates the friendly and positive spirit displayed by the Government and the people of the Kingdom of Swaziland, for it is precisely in this spirit that the nations of Southern Africa can face and

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 35, April 1984, pp. 6-10.

overcome the awesome challenges facing them in the latter half of the twentieth century, and can look forward to a new era of well-being for all their children. You are welcome here today.

Text issued by the Liaison and Information Section of the Office of the South African Prime Minister, Cape Town

# South Africa and Angola and Namibia

- A. UN Security Council Resolution 539 (1983), adopted at its 2 492nd meeting on 28 October 1983.

## **The Security Council,**

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General (S/15943) of 29 August 1983<sup>1</sup>,

*Recalling* General Assembly Resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966,

*Recalling and reaffirming* its Resolution 301 (1971), 385 (1976)<sup>2</sup> 431 (1978)<sup>3</sup>, 432 (1978)<sup>4</sup>, 435 (1978)<sup>5</sup> and 532 (1983)<sup>6</sup>,

*Gravely concerned* at South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia,

*Gravely concerned also* at the tension and instability prevailing in southern Africa and the mounting threat to the security of the region and its wider implications for international peace and security resulting from continued utilization of Namibia as a springboard for attacks against and destabilization of African States in the region,

*Reaffirming* the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for ensuring the implementation of its resolutions, in particular Resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), which call for the holding of free and fair elections in the territory under the supervision and control of the United Nations,

*Indignant* that South Africa's insistence on an irrelevant and extraneous issue of "linkage" has obstructed the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978).

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 33, October 1983, pp. 53-60

2. *Op. cit.* no. 4, February 1976, pp. 40-42

3. *Op. cit.* no. 13, September 1978, p. 1

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Op. cit.* no. 14, December 1978, p. 43

6. *Op. cit.* no. 33, October 1983, pp. 52-53

1. *Condemns* South Africa for its continued illegal occupation of Namibia in flagrant defiance of resolutions of the General Assembly and decisions of the Security Council of the United Nations:
2. *Further condemns* South Africa for its obstruction of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) by insisting on conditions contrary to the provisions of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia:
3. *Rejects* South Africa's insistence on linking the independence of Namibia to irrelevant and extraneous issues as incompatible with Resolution 435 (1978), other decisions of the Security Council and the resolutions of the General Assembly on Namibia, including General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960:
4. *Declares* that the independence of Namibia cannot be held hostage to the resolution of issues that are alien to Security Council Resolution 435 (1978):
5. *Reiterates* that Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) embodying the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia is the only basis for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian problems:
6. *Takes note* that the consultations undertaken by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 5 of Resolution 532 (1983) have confirmed that all the outstanding issues relevant to Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) have been resolved:
7. *Affirms* that the electoral system to be used for the elections of the Constituent Assembly should be determined prior to the adoption by the Security Council of the enabling resolution for the implementation of the United Nations plan:
8. *Calls upon* South Africa to co-operate with the Secretary-General forthwith and to communicate to him its choice of the electoral system in order to facilitate the immediate and unconditional implementation of the United Nations plan embodied in Security Council Resolution 435 (1978):
9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution as soon as possible and not later than 31 December 1983:
10. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter and to meet as soon as possible following the Secretary-General's report for the purpose of reviewing progress on the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978) and, in the event of continued obstruction by South Africa, to consider the adoption of appropriate measures under the United Nations Charter.

- B. Letter, dated 21 November 1983, from the South African Foreign Minister, the Hon. R.F. Botha, to the UN Secretary-General

### **Your Excellency**

Note has been taken of Your Excellency's report to the Security Council of 29 August 1983 (S/15943)<sup>1</sup> and of your view that substantial progress had been made on the South West African question since the Security Council meeting in May 1983.

It, therefore, came as a surprize to me to learn that some elements wish to resurrect one of the issues the substance of which has been settled i.e. the issue of the electoral system.

Your Excellency will recall that the settlement plan stipulated that the electoral system should be decided upon promptly

"so as to give all political parties and interested persons, without regard to their political views, a full and fair opportunity to organize and participate in the political process."

In South Africa's view this requirement would have been more than adequately met by the proposal made to Your Excellency during your visit to Cape Town on 23 August 1983, namely, that

"this choice will be made by the Administrator-General and communicated to the Special Representative as soon as a date for implementation has been set, i.e. earlier than originally envisaged."

South Africa had received the impression from Your Excellency's report that this position was acceptable to the other parties involved who had apparently expressed the view that

"agreement should be secured on the electoral system prior to the implementation of Security Resolution 435 (1978)."<sup>2</sup>

South Africa trusts that these parties are not once again attempting to avoid the single remaining obstacle to the settlement of the South West Africa question by making an issue of this relatively inconsequential question. Your Excellency will recall that these parties caused a delay last year of nearly six months over petty objections which they raised to various proposals of the Western Contact Group concerning the electoral system. The problems which were thereby created were subsequently resolved by the cooperative attitude adopted by South Africa.

During his meeting with your Special Representative on 30 June 1982, the former Administrator-General made it clear that the decision relating to the electoral system is a complex one, involving as it does the determination of which system will be the most equitable for a Territory with a sparse and unevenly distributed population. This decision will involve consultations

1. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 33, October 1983, pp. 53-60.

2. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

with the leaders of the Territory and a proper assessment of the relative advantages of each system. It might also be useful to have a further exchange of views on this question between the Administrator-General and the Special Representative preferably in Pretoria. The South African Government's views on this matter accord with an understanding reached with the Five Western Contact Group countries.

- C. Letter, dated 16 December 1983, from South Africa's Permanent Representative to the UN, Mr Kurt van Schirnding, to the President of the Security Council; and containing a message, dated 15 December, to the UN Secretary-General, on the question of the disengagement of South African forces from Angola.

Mr President

Once again the Security Council has been called together to consider the situation in Southern Angola. However, the factors which have brought about this situation have not changed since the Council last considered this question in August 1981.

Firstly, South Africa's security operations in Southern Angola have one objective and one objective only—the protection of South West Africa/Namibia against SWAPO terrorist attacks.

SWAPO has murdered almost one thousand SWA/Namibians since it began its terrorist campaign against the people of the Territory. It has conducted a systematic campaign of intimidation against its political opponents and has been responsible for the assassination of political leaders including Chief Clemens Kapuuo, Toivo Shyagaya, Filemon Nika, Chief Elifas, Paulus Hamalua Heita, Thomas Shikongo and Oswald Andawa.

In addition more than one thousand SWA/Namibians have been maimed or seriously injured as a result of SWAPO's violent activities. Eleven hundred people, mostly school children, have been abducted from SWA/Namibia. SWAPO now relies on such abductions and the recruitment of Angolan citizens to replenish terrorist bands.

These actions, and not its UN rhetoric, are SWAPO's response to the prospect of free and fair elections in South West Africa/Namibia. Since all the parties to this dispute have agreed that South West Africa/Namibia should become independent on the basis of free and fair elections SWAPO ought to account why it continues with this senseless campaign of violence.

South Africa will not allow SWAPO bands to establish sanctuaries north of the border in Angola from where they can carry out their raids against the inhabitants of the Territory.

In keeping with the Charter, South Africa would have preferred to resolve

this problem by peaceful means. Indeed, South Africa has explored all the possibilities for a negotiated solution. In 54 letters to the former Secretary-General, South Africa brought to the attention of the United Nations details of the hundreds of murders which had been perpetrated by SWAPO. South Africa repeatedly urged the former Secretary-General to use his good offices to bring about a cessation of armed attacks against SWA/Namibia from Angola. However, its letters were ignored. On several occasions South Africa sought to put its case to the General Assembly but its right to do so was simply brushed aside, obviously because the majority in the United Nations find the truth unpalatable. And when the representatives of the Territory who were suffering from SWAPO attacks sought to express their grievances, this Council was not even prepared to give them a hearing. Far from playing the role envisaged in the Charter for the peaceful resolution of disputes, the United Nations has been one of the main instigators and supporters of SWAPO's terrorist violence against the people of the Territory.

Having exhausted the possibilities of preventing SWAPO aggression through the United Nations, South Africa attempted to resolve the problem directly with the MPLA régime. On 7 and 8 December 1982 a South African delegation, led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, held promising talks with an MPLA delegation in the Cape Verde Islands. A formula was proposed which would have led to the cessation of armed activities in the border area and the withdrawal of SWAPO and Cuban forces above certain latitudes in Angola. It was hoped that this process would lead to the establishment or visible peace in the border-area and that it would make an important contribution to the settlement of the broader problems of the region. A second meeting between Ministerial delegations from South Africa and the MPLA régime was accordingly arranged to take place in the Cape Verde Islands on 23 February 1983, to make further progress toward what was believed to be a common objective — the establishment of peace in the border area.

However, SWAPO, actively supported by the MPLA régime, chose the eve of the second round of talks to launch its largest ever offensive against the people of SWA/Namibia. Although South Africa would have been entitled to do so, it did not cancel the talks but sent a senior delegation to the Cape Verde Islands to make it clear that the talks could not continue unless FAPLA and SWAPO manifested the same military restraint that South Africa had for a number of months maintained. South Africa also made it clear that an overall solution to the problems of the region would require the withdrawal of the Cubans from the whole of Angola. South Africa informed the MPLA régime on a number of occasions that it would be prepared to continue its bilateral discussions on this basis. However, the MPLA régime had clearly decided to abandon the process of peaceful negotiation and to seek to achieve its objectives by other means. Despite this attitude, South Africa's offer still stands. It has no desire to control a single centimetre of Angolan territory. Although it

differs radically with the policies and approach of the MPLA régime, it is prepared to examine the possibility of peaceful co-existence with all the states of the region, South Africa has repeatedly stated that the moment SWAPO undertakes to cease its campaign of violence, and in fact carries out such a commitment, action against SWAPO by the South African forces would cease. Under such circumstances, there would, of course be no necessity for South African military action across the border against SWAPO elements in Angola.

The solution to the present problem is indeed very simple. The MPLA régime should, in accordance with international law, ensure that its territory is not used for the launching of terrorist attacks against its neighbours. The MPLA régime is aware of this and yet it persists in supporting SWAPO's policy of aggression. It has called this meeting of the Security Council to hide its own aggressive designs against the people of SWA/Namibia and to distract attention from its own serious internal problems. These problems have arisen from the imposition on Angola of an ideology which is utterly alien to the people of Africa. The fact of the matter is that the authority of the MPLA régime does not derive from the freely-expressed wishes of the Angolan people but from the military violence of alien surrogates. The MPLA will not solve its problems by pretending that they derive from South Africa. If there are any members of this Council who believe the MPLA's propaganda that South Africa is responsible for the present situation in Angola then we challenge the MPLA to invite members of the Council to go to Angola to assess the situation freely for themselves.

By calling this meeting, the MPLA also hopes to justify the presence in Angola of the Cuban and other surrogates which it has invited to suppress the people of Angola. They are not there to fight South Africa. They are there to fight the Angolan people. They are not there to defend the independence of a sovereign government. They are there to prop up an unrepresentative, unelected and unpopular clique. They are not the allies of Africa in the struggle for liberation. They are the vanguard of the new imperialists and colonialists and their eyes are as much on Lusaka, Kinshasa, Gaborone, Brazzaville and Libreville as they are on Windhoek and Pretoria.

One day Africa will understand that the South African forces in the Angolan/SWA border area, which it now so vehemently condemns, are in fact fighting in the defence of the whole of Africa against a powerful and sinister threat to all the African States.

Nothing that the Security Council decides now or in the future on this particular matter can change this basic fact. Indeed many African leaders fear this same threat by the same superpower and its surrogates. And the majority of the members of this Council know what the truth is but would not admit it for reasons of their own.

Yesterday I conveyed the following message to the Secretary General:



### **Your Excellency,**

Further to my letter of 22 November 1983, and with a view to facilitating the process of achieving a peaceful settlement of the South West Africa/Namibia issue, the Government of South Africa is prepared to begin a disengagement of forces which from time to time conduct military operations against SWAPO in Angola, on 31 January 1984, on the understanding that this gesture would be reciprocated by the Angolan Government which would assure that its own forces, SWAPO and the Cubans would not exploit the resulting situation, in particular with regard to actions which might threaten the security of the inhabitants of South West Africa/Namibia.

The proposed action by South Africa would last initially for 30 days, and could be extended on condition that the provisions of this proposal are adhered to.

The South African Government remains prepared to begin the process of implementing Security Council resolution 435 upon resolution of the problem of Cuban forces in Angola, as reflected in paragraph 12 of Your Excellency's report of 29 August 1983 (S/15943)<sup>1</sup> to the Security Council.

I should be grateful if this letter and my letter of 22 November 1983, referred to above, could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

It will be realized that the South African Government's attitude toward further efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution of the South West Africa/Namibia issue will be influenced by the response to this latest initiative for peace.

Texts for items B and C supplied by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information.

### **D. Letter and annex, dated 31 December 1983, from the President of Angola, the Hon José Eduardo dos Santos, to the UN Secretary-General.**

The People's Republic of Angola, in its capacity as State Member of the United Nations, has always scrupulously respected the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and has abided by the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. In this spirit, the Government of Angola has played an active role in the search for peace and stability in southern Africa and considers itself an interested party in the application of resolution 435 (1978) and other resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly which refer to the safeguarding of the rights of self-determination and independence of the Namibian people, whose territory is illegally occu-

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 33, October 1983, pp. 53-60.

pied and used by South Africa to commit acts of armed aggression against the Angolan people.

The South African Government and yourself are aware that the Namibian people, under the leadership of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), are engaged in a struggle of national liberation within the territory of Namibia against the colonialism installed in their land, a struggle which is being supported by the entire international community — a struggle where there is no involvement on Namibian territory by the Angolan armed forces.

The Government of the People's Republic of Angola regrets that its often reiterated policy of peace finds itself confronted by the systematic acts of military aggression by the Government of South Africa, whose armed forces illegally occupy parts of southern Angola and commit atrocities against the civilian population.

Annexed to this communication is a partial chronological list of acts of aggression perpetrated against the sovereignty of the People's Republic of Angola by the South African armed forces, and which demonstrates the military escalation which has taken place since the communication of 15 December 1983, addressed to you by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa, with the offer of a "disengagement".

In order to contribute to an early, peaceful and durable solution to the problem of Namibia, the Angolan Government would not oppose the establishment of a truce of 30 days after 31 January 1984, if Your Excellency obtains the agreement of SWAPO, if the South African Government withdraws its military units from Angolan territory and solemnly promises to initiate the implementation, within 15 days after that period, of resolution 435 (1978) on Namibia, without extraneous considerations in that context.

For the setting of the exact date for the proclamation of a cease-fire in Namibia between SWAPO and the Government of South Africa, a matter that involves only these two parties, Your Excellency has the mandate from the Security Council to proceed with the necessary consultations.

I request Your Excellency to circulate this letter and the annex as a document of the Security Council.

#### Annex

Partial list of acts of military aggression by the armed forces of South Africa against the People's Republic of Angola

16-28 December 1983

16/12/1983      The racist South African armed forces fortify their positions in Mupa

- 17/12/1983 Seventeen South African Mirage fighters undertake massive bombing raids against FAPLA units in Mulondo; heavy South African artillery against FAPLA units in Cahama
- 18/12/1983 Two South African aircraft carry out a reconnaissance flight over Caiundo, 190 kilometres from the Namibian border; 2 Mirage fighters bomb Caiundo; helicopter-borne South African troops disembark 20 kilometres south of Caiundo; special South African battalion with 3 AML-90 and 15 hunting vehicles attack a FAPLA unit; heavy artillery fire by South African troops against FAPLA positions in Mulondo and in the direction of Calovanga; concentration of South African armoured vehicles in Manobras and Chicuse; South African troops ambush FAPLA vehicles in various localities
- 19/12/1983 Numerous overflights deep inside Angolan territory; four South African fighter aircraft bomb Caiundo
- 20/12/1983 South African aircraft bomb Bimbe; four South African aircraft fire rockets at and bomb Mulondo; ambush Angolan units
- 21/12/1983 South African artillery attacks against a number of Angolans
- 22/12/1983 South African aircraft bomb Kassinga and occupy the town; helicopter-borne South African troops disembark 9 kilometres east of Kassinga and in Indungo and Tchamutete; South African artillery attack against Cuvelai and Cahama; six South African aircraft fire rockets at Cahama and Mulonde and artillery attacks are carried out against the latter town; Cuvelai is blockaded by South African troops from the north, south-east and east
- 23/12/1983 South African reconnaissance flights deep inside Angolan territory; South African infantry attack against a FAPLA unit near Tchibemba
- 24/12/1983 South African artillery attacks against Cahama, Cuvelai, Monobras; 12 South African fighter aircraft bomb and fire rockets against Cahama
- 25/12/1983 South African artillery attacks against Cahama, Manobras and Chicuse; one South African battalion attempts to penetrate Angolan positions near Cahama; a 6-6 (155 mm) battery attack by South Africa in Caluandeja

- 26/12/1983 South African artillery and air attacks against FAPLA units in Indungo; 12 South African fighter aircraft bomb the Kassinga area and other localities; South African troops disembark and advance on Manobras and Cuvelai; South African rocket attacks on and bombing of FAPLA positions.
- 27/12/1983 Fifteen South African fighter aircraft bomb Caiundo and South African troops continue to occupy Kassinga; South African artillery attacks against Inamucua and Mulondo and Caracanga
- 28/12/1983 South African artillery attacks and bombs Cuvelai and other localities
- |   |    |
|---|----|
| Total FAPLA dead . . . . .              | 78 |
| Total FAPLA wounded . . . . .           | 64 |
| Total FAPLA missing in action . . . . . | 38 |
- Many civilians dead, wounded and disappeared.

S/16245 and annex

- E.** Letter, dated 1 January 1984, from Angola's Permanent Representative to the UN, the Hon Elísio de Figueiredo, to the President of the Security Council.

I have the honour to transmit to you the following urgent message from H.E. José Eduardo dos Santos, President of the People's Republic of Angola:

"In the face of the worsening military situation in southern Angola created by the progressive moves by the South African military units further north into Angolan territory and the violent combat that is at the present occurring between these South African military units and Angolan units in the localities of Cuvelai, Mulondo, Cahama, Kassinga and Caiundo, more than 200 kilometres distant from the Namibian border, and wishing to avoid a situation that would lead to disastrous consequences, which would in turn threaten peace and security in the region, I request Your Excellency to convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council to take necessary action.

José Eduardo dos Santos  
President of the People's Republic of Angola"

S/16244

- F.** Speech in the UN Security Council on 4 January 1984, by South Africa's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Mr Kurt von Schirnding

In requesting this meeting of the Security Council the Permanent Representative of Angola in his letter dated 1 January 1984 and circulated as docu-

ment S/16244 transmitted a message from the President of Angola to the Secretary-General in which reference is made to, and I quote; "the worsening military situation in Southern Angola created by the progressive moves by the South African military units further north into Angolan territory"; and expressed a wish to avoid and I quote again; "a situation that would lead to disastrous consequences, which would in turn threaten peace and security in the region".

Mr President, when I last addressed the Security Council, as recently as 16 December 1983, I made it clear that South Africa has no desire to control a single centimetre of Angolan territory and that South African security operations in southern Angola have a single objective and that is the protection of the inhabitants of SWA/Namibia from SWAPO terrorist attacks which are launched from Angolan territory.

The so-called "progressive moves" by South African military units which the President of Angola has referred to, are being conducted with precisely that objective in mind.

It is hypocrisy for Angola to come to this Council and to state that it wishes to avoid a situation that would lead to "disastrous consequences". It is the actions of the Angolan régime in aiding and abetting SWAPO's terrorist aims and by supporting SWAPO to launch attacks from and maintain bases on Angolan territory which will lead to "disastrous consequences", unless the Luanda regime comes to its senses.

South Africa has stated on innumerable occasions that it will not sit idly by while SWAPO operates with impunity from the safety of Angolan territory from where they plan and execute their acts of murder and pillage against the civilians of the territory of SWA/Namibia.

It is hypocrisy for Angola to have the effrontery to complain to this Council about the security operations of the South African military forces in the execution of their task to seek out and to destroy SWAPO bases in southern Angola in pre-emptive actions such as the one presently under way. South Africa has declared its intentions openly. I have personally said it in this Council and I repeat it here today.

The Luanda régime makes no secret of its support for SWAPO's aims and objectives and it is also no secret that the forces of the Angolan régime are becoming increasingly integrated with the SWAPO murder gangs for whom they have provided facilities, arms and equipment.

South Africa has made it clear that it has no quarrel with the military units of the Luanda régime and that its cross-border activities are aimed at eradicating SWAPO nests in Angola. However, we have made it equally clear that if

the armed forces of the Angolan régime are bent on giving active military support to SWAPO or interfere with South Africa's operations against SWAPO, then they must bear full responsibility for the consequences. South Africa furthermore denies that its forces commit atrocities against the civilian population of Angola.

If the Luanda régime is so concerned with the threat to "peace and security in the region", it should take the necessary steps to ensure that its territory is not used for the launching of aggression against its neighbours.

If they are so concerned with the threat to "peace and security in the region" why do they attempt to justify the presence in Angola of the Cuban and other surrogates, representing ideologies completely foreign to Africa? This presence is indeed a threat to peace and security in the region, and is leading Angola to disastrous consequences because the people of Angola refuse to succumb to the tyranny which has been imposed on them with the direct assistance of the Cuban forces.

South Africa, and I trust the members of this Council, will not be taken in by this transparent attempt of the Luanda régime at deception. As long as the Angolan régime tolerates, encourages and nourishes SWAPO's gangs of terrorists on its soil, for so long will the South African Defence Force seek out their bases and destroy them.

Let me turn now to the letter dated 31 December 1983 which the President of Angola addressed to the Secretary-General and which has been circulated as document No. S/16245. It will be recalled that when I addressed the Council on 16 December 1983 I read to the Council the text of the South African Foreign Minister's message to the Secretary-General in which the Government of South Africa indicated that it was prepared to begin a disengagement on 31 January 1984 of forces which from time to time conduct military operations against SWAPO in Angola, on the understanding that this gesture would be reciprocated by the Angolan Government, which would assure that its own forces, SWAPO and the Cubans would not exploit the resulting situation, in particular with regard to actions which might threaten the security of the inhabitants of South West Africa/Namibia.

It will be recalled that Angola's immediate response to this positive gesture on the part of South Africa was one of contemptuous rejection. Apparently that régime has now had second thoughts and must have been advised that its outright rejection of South Africa's initiative did it more harm than good. Hence this attempt by Angola to appear to be reasonable. The Angolan Government is, however, the one which will have to comply with the conditions for peace, not the South African Government. The South African Government's offer still stands. Its language is clear: if Angola desires peace it can have peace by not allowing SWAPO to operate from its territory and by not

exploiting any arrangement for the cessation of hostilities. As regards the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978)<sup>1</sup>, South Africa has stated that it remains prepared to begin the process of implementation, upon resolution of the problem of Cuban forces in Angola as reflected in paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council of 28 August 1983 (S/15943)<sup>2</sup>. That remains South Africa's position.

Text issued by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information.

**G.** Suid-Afrikaanse Regering se reaksie op persnavrae rakende skakeling tussen die Suid-Afrikaanse en Russiese Regerings ten opsigte van die situasie in SWA/Namibië en Suidelike Angola, op 4 Januarie 1984.

Verteenwoordigers van die Sowjet-Unie het 'n Suid-Afrikaanse verteenwoordiger in November 1983 in verband met die SWA-kwessie en die konfliktsituasie in Angola genader om 'n boodskap van die Regering van die Sowjet-Unie aan die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering oor te dra. Die Suid-Afrikaanse Ambassade in Washington was nie hierby betrokke nie. Die Sowjetboodskap het breedweg op die volgende neergekom:

- Besorgdheid is uitgespreek oor die feit dat die situasie in SWA tans "meer akuut" is as ooit vantevore;
- Die voortgesette besetting van Angolese grondgebied deur Suid-Afrikaanse magte is onaanvaarbaar;
- So-ook Suid-Afrika se steun vir die "anti-regeringsbendes" van Unita;
- Suid-Afrika sou onredelik wees om nie voordeel te trek uit die steeds bestaande geleentheid vir 'n spoedige oplossing van die SWA-probleem en die onttrekking van Suid-Afrikaanse magte uit Angola nie;
- Kubaanse onttrekking sal, as 'n voorvereiste vir 'n SWA-skikking, onder geen omstandighede deur die Amerikaners bewerkstellig kan word nie — die "Chester Crocker Cycle" is nou beëindig en dit sou in Suid-Afrika se belang wees om hierdie werklikheid onder oë te sien;
- Die USSR is aan Angola gebonde deur 'n verdrag van vriendskap en samewerking en sal aan daardie land alle steun verleen wat nodig is om sy soewereiniteit en territoriale integriteit te verdedig;

1. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

2. *Op. cit.* no. 33, October 1983, pp. 53-60.

- Hierdie boodskap moet nie as 'n dreigement beskou word nie maar is bedoel om Suid-Afrika bewus te maak van die "logiese en redelike gevolge" van sy optrede en te verseker dat Suid-Afrika die "regte afleidings" daaruit maak.

In sy reaksie op die Sowjetboodskap het die betrokke Suid-Afrikaanse verteenwoordiger ondermeer die volgende onder die aandag van die Sowjet-verteenwoordiger gebring:

Dit sou vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering moeilik wees om enigiets minder as 'n dreigement in die boodskap te sien. Indien dit wel die geval is sou die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering hierdie boodskap in 'n uiters negatiewe lig sien. Suid-Afrika sal hom nie deur sulke dreigemente laat intimideer nie. Hoewel 'n toename in die konfliktsituasie nòg in Suid-Afrika nòg in die Sowjet-Unie se belang is, sal Suid-Afrika sy eie sekerheidsbelange verdedig teen wie ookal dit bedreig. Suid-Afrika sien die verslegtende toestand in Suider-Afrika as die regstreekse gevolg van Sowjet-geïnspireerde optrede en die teenwoordigheid in die streek van Russiese surrogaatmagte. Suid-Afrika is wel deeglik bewus van die samewerking tussen Kubane, FAPLA en SWAPO in Angola en vind dit noodsaaklik om enige bedreiging van die Gebied teen te werk en te bestraf, ongeag die oorsprong daarvan.

Die Minister van Buitelandse Sake wou nie verder kommentaar lewer oor die gesprek nie en ook nie oor die vraag of daar opvolggesprekke met Sowjet-verteenwoordigers plaasgevind het nie.

Teks uitgereik deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Departement van Buitelandse Sake en Inligting.

## H. UN Security Council Resolution 546 (1984) adopted at its 2511th meeting on 6 January 1984.

*The Security Council,*  
*Having considered* the statement of the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations,

*Recalling* its resolutions 387 (1976), 418 (1977), 428 (1978), 447 (1979), 454 (1979), 475 (1980) and 545 (1983),

*Gravely concerned* at the renewed escalation of unprovoked bombing and persistent acts of aggression, including the continued military occupation, committed by the racist régime of South Africa in violation of the sovereignty, airspace and territorial integrity of Angola,

*Grieved* at the tragic and mounting loss of human life and concerned about the damage and destruction of property resulting from those escalated bomb-



ing and other military attacks against and occupation of the territory of Angola by South Africa,

*Indignant* at the continued military occupation of parts of the territory of Angola by South Africa in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations and relevant Security Council resolutions,

*Conscious* of the need to take effective steps for the prevention and removal of all threats to international peace and security posed by South Africa's military attacks,

1. *Strongly condemns* South Africa for its renewed, intensified, premeditated and unprovoked bombing, as well as the continuing occupation of parts of the territory of Angola, which constitute a flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country and endanger seriously international peace and security;

2. *Further strongly condemns* South Africa for its utilization of the international territory of Namibia as a springboard for perpetrating the armed attacks as well as sustaining its occupation of parts of the territory of Angola;

3. *Demands* that South Africa cease immediately all bombing and other acts of aggression and unconditionally withdraw forthwith all its military forces occupying Angolan territory as well as undertake to scrupulously respect the sovereignty, airspace, territorial integrity and independence of Angola;

4. *Calls upon* all States to implement fully the arms embargo imposed against South Africa in Security Council resolution 418 (1977);

5. *Reaffirms* the right of Angola, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and, in particular, Article 51, to take all the measures necessary to defend and safeguard its sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence;

6. *Renews* its request to Member States to extend all necessary assistance to the People's Republic of Angola in order to defend itself against South Africa's escalating military attacks as well as its continuing occupation of parts of Angola;

7. *Reaffirms further* that Angola is entitled to prompt and adequate compensation for the damage to life and property consequent upon these acts of aggression and the continuing occupation of parts of its territory by the South African military forces;

8. *Decides* to meet again in the event of non-compliance by South Africa with the present resolution in order to consider the adoption of more effective measures in accordance with appropriate provisions of the Charter of the United Nations;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow up and report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution not later than 10 January 1984;

10. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

1. Verklaring op 7 Januarie 1984, deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Minister van Buitelandse Sake, Sy Edele R.F. Botha, rakende die Veiligheidsraad Besluit van 6 Januarie 1984.

Die Suid-Afrikaanse regering het agteroor geleun in 'n poging om vrede in die SWA/Angola-gebied te probeer bewerkstellig. Ons het hier te doen met 'n elementêre situasie. Die Angolese regering wat nie deur die meerderheid mense van Angola gekies is om hul te regeer nie, volg doelbewus 'n beleid van aggressie teenoor alle regerings van Suidelike Afrika wat nie hul Marxistiese ideologie aanhang nie. Hulle laat 'n organisasie soos SWAPO wat openlik en direk deur Moskou ondersteun en befonds word toe om van hul grondgebied Suidwes-Afrika aan te val.

Dit is nou duideliker as ooit vantevore dat nie slegs Suidwes-Afrika die skyf is van Moskou nie, maar Suid-Afrika self. Suid-Afrika is 'n staat in Suider-Afrika met sekere belange en regte. Ons het nog nooit in die interne sake van ons buurstate ingemeng nie en ons handhaaf die beginsel dat die staat geregtig is om sy eie konstitusionele teokoms te bepaal, insluitende Suidwes-Afrika.

Daarom kan die Suid-Afrikaanse regering nie toelaat dat politieke oplossings deur buitelandse magte afgedwing word by wyse van geweld nie. Die Veiligheidsraad se besluit grens aan 'n geweldsbesluit. Die Suid-Afrikaanse regering verwerp daardie besluit. Die Suid-Afrikaanse regering herbevestig sy standpunt dat hy sal voortgaan om op te tree teen enige terroriste-organisasie wat die teokoms van Suidwes-Afrika by wyse van geweld wil bepaal.

Die Suid-Afrikaanse regering aanvaar dat hierdie standpunt kan meebring dat hy in botsing met die hele wêreld mag kom. Nogtans moet die Veiligheidsraad en wêreld nou kennis neem dat die Suid-Afrikaanse regering bereid is om die botsings en Konflik wat direk mag voortspruit te aanvaar mer al die gevolge wat dit mag voortbring.

Die tyd het gekom dat die wêreld moet weet dat Suid-Afrika hom nie sal laat intimideer nie. Wat die Veiligheidsraad aanbetref gee die Suid-Afrikaanse regering kennis aan daardie Raad dat hy kan maak net wat hy wil en enige besluit kan neem wat hy goeddink. Die Suid-Afrikaanse regering is siek en sat vir die geveinsdheid van die Raad en sy lede. Die Sekretaris-generaal van die VVO hoef nie tot Dinsdag te wag om te rapporteer oor die implementering van die Veiligheidsraad se besluit nie. Hy kan dit sommer oor die naweek doen.

Ek vertrou dat die Veiligheidsraad en wêreld nou duidelik verstaan wat die Suid-Afrikaanse regering se standpunt is: ons sal ons nie laat voorskryf nie en ons sal ons nie laat intimideer nie.

Teks uitgereik deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Departement van Buitelandse Sake

J. Statement by SWAPO, issued in Luanda on 10 January 1984\*

Various propaganda statements have come out of Pretoria over the past weekend. In these statements, the apartheid regime has continued to repeat the lie that it has been fighting the combined forces of the Angolan Army, Swapo and Cubans. The statements have also asserted that the racist army has killed over 400 Swapo, Cuban and Angolan soldiers at the loss of only 27 of their own soldiers.

Swapo would like to re-state the fact, which it has already made public, that there were definitely no Swapo fighters involved in the one-month fight which the South African Army unleashed against the Angolan military position in the areas of Mulondo, Cuvelai, Kahama and Caiundo in southern Angola.

Furthermore, Swapo would like to categorically deny that members of its armed forces were among the 400 or so people the racist army reported to have killed in the above mentioned areas, during the recent massive South African military aggression against Angola.

The claim by Pretoria that Swapo, Cubans and Angolan forces are fighting together against the South African invasion force is calculated to give credence to the widely rejected linkage position of South Africa and US. In other words, if the racist regime could succeed to convince the world that Swapo, Cubans and the Angolan Army are integrated, then the world should accept the linkage thesis of Pretoria and Washington.

It is against this background that Swapo would like to re-emphasise the objective fact that Swapo armed cadres were most certainly not in any way involved in the recent fighting in southern Angola.

The fight was strictly between the defending Angolan army and the invading South African forces.

The South African propaganda machinery has also been telling the world, beginning the past weekend, that the regime is ready to have direct talks with Swapo, something which Pretoria has consistently refused to do hitherto. Swapo hopes that Pretoria is now serious and that its announcement that the so-called administrator-general, the colonial governor in Namibia, will meet Swapo for direct talks is genuine.

We hope that the direct talks will not be a replay of the January 1981 Geneva talks, when South Africa turned the conference into a public relations charade by instigating its Namibian puppets to herald insults and abuses at Swapo, the UN and independent Africa.

While Swapo has no intention of interfering with how the the South African delegations will be composed, our standpoint is that the proposed talks

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are welcome and must strictly and solely deal with the issue of ceasefire.

The identity and responsibility of political organisations are provided for in the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 435, to whose implementation the ceasefire agreement must lead. The arena of exchange of views among Namibian political parties and organisations will be the election campaign period.

Therefore, Swapo hopes that no issues unrelated to the proposed ceasefire should be injected into the proposed talks to which Swapo has agreed to participate.

Ever conscious of its responsibility to the Namibian people and aware of the untold agony afflicting the Namibian nation under the yoke of apartheid oppression, Swapo calls upon South Africa, through the UN secretary-general, to immediately set a definite date for the ceasefire talks.

**K.** Extract, concerning SWA/Namibia, from the address by the South African Prime Minister, The Hon P.W. Botha, during the no-confidence debate in the House of Assembly, on 31 January 1984

Throughout the protracted dispute with the international community on South West Africa, the Republic of South Africa has been guided by four basic principles:

- (i) That the Territory is not and never has been part of South Africa.
- (ii) That the people of the Territory should themselves decide on their Constitutional dispensation.
- (iii) That the people of the Territory should have the opportunity of developing towards self-determination in circumstances of peace and security.
- (iv) And that our differences with the international community over South West Africa should be resolved wherever possible by negotiation.

The Republic of South Africa has never regarded South West Africa as an integral part of its territory. This position has been adhered to by all South Africa's Prime Ministers. During the thirties Gen J.B.M. Hertzog as Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, acknowledged in a letter to the League of Nations that the Union did not possess sovereignty over the Territory. For this reason, in its dispute with the United Nations over the Territory, the Republic of South Africa has never had recourse to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which specifically prohibits interference in the domestic affairs of States.

The Republic of South Africa has done everything in its power to develop South West Africa and to assure that its people will be able to go about their daily lives in circumstances of peace and security. During the current financial year, for example, the Republic of South Africa has made direct and indirect assistance available to the Territory amounting to about R560 million. This does not include the R400 to R500 million which South Africa has spent during the current financial year on the security and protection of the people of South West Africa. Moreover South African guarantees for South West African loans, both internally and abroad up to 31 March 1984, will be of the order of R690 million which, in the event of a South West Africa default, carries the possible implication of paying interest, equal to double the capital owing, should investors insist upon the Republic of South Africa honouring the full investment terms.

The Republic of South Africa's total assistance to South West Africa, with a total population of just over one million, must surely be one of the most generous foreign aid programmes anywhere in the world today. It has as its prime objective the establishment of a situation where the people of South West Africa will be able to decide their own future. However, they will not be able to realize this objective while they continue to be attacked by terrorists who cross international borders to murder, to maim, to intimidate, to abduct school children and to destroy the economic infrastructure. The Republic of South Africa has accordingly done whatever has been necessary to protect South West Africans against such attacks and to act against the perpetrators wherever they may be found. Our determination to do so has exacted a heavy price—in material, in international condemnation and in the lives of our young men. Nevertheless, we have felt that heavy as this price has been, the sacrifice will not have been in vain if it has served to demonstrate to our enemies that we shall not bow before terrorism as a means of achieving political power. Nor shall we bow before Soviet threats. However, it goes without saying that the Republic of South Africa will not continue to bear this heavy burden if it seems that the continued presence of our forces does not enjoy the whole-hearted support of the people of South West Africa. It must be clearly understood that we will not impose ourselves on others. We will not protect others who do not desire our protection.

Can it be expected from the Republic of South Africa to continue to bear this burden under circumstances where we do not claim sovereignty over the territory, where we are exposed to criticism from the internal Parties of South West Africa, where we are severely condemned by the West and where the United Nations is threatening us with enforcement measures?

Although the Republic of South Africa has never shied away from the use of arms when such action has been unavoidable, it has never believed that there can be any long-term military solutions to the problems of Southern Africa. It is for this reason that the Republic of South Africa has patiently

argued its case at the United Nations and in the International Court of Justice. It has consistently co-operated with the various initiatives which were launched by the international community to resolve this matter, including the proposal of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in 1951, the Arden/Clarke initiative of 1958, the visits of Carpio and De Alva in 1962, and of Dr Waldheim and Dr Alfred Esscher in 1972. The fact that these efforts were not successful cannot be laid at the Republic of South Africa's door but may be ascribed to the persistent refusal of the international community to acknowledge the realities of the South West Africa situation.

Similarly, the Republic of South Africa has co-operated with the initiative of the five Western Contact Group countries. Despite repeated disappointments and set-backs during the past seven years, the Republic of South Africa was able to announce during the Secretary-General's visit to Cape Town last year that all the outstanding obstacles to the implementation of a settlement based on Resolution 435 had been resolved, with the exception of the continuing presence of the Cubans in Angola. The introduction and consolidation of Soviet influence in Angola clearly poses a threat not only to the future independence of South West Africa but to the stability of all the countries of our region. The fact that this last remaining obstacle has not yet been removed can also not be laid at the Republic of South Africa's door.

The Republic of South Africa has done everything in its power to bring about a peaceful settlement in the border area between South West Africa and Angola. It repeatedly urged the former Secretary-General to use his good offices to bring about a cessation of armed attacks against South West Africa/Namibia from Angola. However, its requests were ignored. On several occasions the Republic of South Africa sought to put its case to the General Assembly but its right to do so was simply brushed aside, obviously because the majority of the United Nations find the truth too painful to accept. And when the representatives of the people of South West Africa, who were suffering from Swapo attacks sought to express their grievances to the UN, the Security Council was not even prepared to give them a hearing.

Having exhausted the possibilities of preventing Swapo aggression through the United Nations, the Republic of South Africa attempted to resolve the problem directly with the MPLA Government. It was hoped that the Cape Verde talks in December 1982 and February 1983 would lead to the establishment of visible peace in the border area and would make an important contribution to the settlement of the broader problems of the region. These hopes were, however, dashed when it became evident that the MPLA Government was not prepared to stop Swapo's terrorist activities. Nevertheless, the Republic of South Africa continued its efforts for peace and on 15 December 1983 informed the Secretary-General that it would be prepared to begin a disengagement of forces on 31 January 1984 on the understanding that this gesture would be reciprocated by the Angolan Government, which

would assure that its own forces, Swapo and the Cubans would not exploit the resulting situation in particular in regard to actions which might threaten the security of the inhabitants of South West Africa/Namibia.

On the basis of assurances received from the United States Government, during the latest round of discussions in Cape Town on 27 and 28 January, I wish now to confirm the Republic of South Africa's decision to begin disengaging its forces in Angola with effect from today. The success of a disengagement of forces and ultimately a ceasefire depends not on one party alone but on the behaviour of all the parties. Necessary steps must and indeed will be taken to ensure that our decision is not exploited at the expense of the security of the inhabitants of South West Africa. We believe there is a possibility for achieving a climate of increased security in that area and are prepared to negotiate practical arrangements to ensure that this possibility is given every chance of success. To achieve this objective tri-lateral discussions between the Republic of South Africa, the United States of America and Angola are not excluded.

However, the problems of South West Africa will not be resolved simply by stopping the war. The people of South West Africa must now demonstrate their willingness to produce a viable political solution.

Towards the middle of 1983 various leaders in South West Africa came together to see to what extent they could agree on the most important problems facing the Territory.

At the time, the South African Government did not wish to comment on this development because it was in line with our basic approach that the people of the Territory should themselves decide their future.

This initiative, which originated amongst the leaders of several of the parties of South West Africa, created a forum for discussion, the Multi-Party Conference. As Honourable Members are aware, they issued a statement on 24 January 1984 in which they set out their objectives and mutually agreed points of view, including the desirability of peace and an internationally acceptable solution for the South West African issue. I quote from the concluding paragraphs of the statement:

"The Multi-Party Conference is a spontaneous effort which has committed itself to the urgency of effecting peace, national reconciliation, independence and economic welfare.

"It is our conviction that these objectives cannot be attained under conditions of continued political subjugation or a belief in the total effectiveness of the military struggle. National reconciliation and significant negotiations can also accelerate the process of independence.

"The Multi-Party Conference is of the opinion that the present political and constitutional order is unsatisfactory and contrary to the national interest of our people as a whole.

"We shall therefore strive to find ways and means to work out a political

and constitutional system which is acceptable to the people as a whole and which will fit into the framework which the Republic of South Africa and the Western Contact Group have worked out. We shall contribute to the removal of the stumbling blocks in the path of an acceptable settlement and independence with international recognition."

It should be emphasized that I have quoted from their own statement and that the South African Government therefore is entitled to accept that this is what they intend to do. They have, moreover, also personally conveyed these sentiments to Dr Chester Crocker during his visit to the Republic of South Africa at the end of last week. I also met with them in Cape Town on Thursday, 26 January 1984, and follow-up meetings were held with my Colleague, the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 27 and 28 January 1984.

During the meeting on 26 January 1984 I conveyed to them the South African Government's views on a number of important issues. Amongst others I informed them — and I wish to repeat it in the House today — that the interests of the Republic of South Africa are of paramount importance to me and if there is to be a choice between the interests of the Republic of South Africa and the interests of South West Africa, I will give priority to the interests of the Republic of South Africa.

I also said that the Republic of South Africa is no longer prepared to shoulder the tremendous financial burden of South West Africa alone.

I believe that the leaders of South West Africa who came to see me are now under no illusion about my Government's determination to resolve this matter one way or another and as soon as possible.

I therefore trust that South Africa's position is perfectly clear. It is up to the political leaders of South West Africa to decide what they are going to do and to do so urgently.

I have this morning received the following message from the representatives of the six parties which are at present participating in the Multi-Party Conference of South West Africa:

"The Multi-Party Conference expresses its appreciation for the direct manner in which you conveyed the position of the South African Government on the SWA/Namibia question to the MPC-Delegation on 28 January 1984. The MPC also expresses its understanding for the points of view which you conveyed to us during that interview.

"The Multi-Party Conference accepts the opportunity which you have granted us, as a challenge to work with the South African Government and other members of the international community in urgently identifying ways and means of working out a political and constitutional dispensation which will be acceptable to the people as a whole and which will be within the framework established by South Africa and the Western Contact Group.

"The Multi-Party Conference is already committed to strive for peace,



national reconciliation, independence and economic progress, and to contribute to the removal of the obstacles which stand in the way of a nationally acceptable solution and independence with international recognition. After the discussions which the MPC-Delegation conducted with you last week, with Ministers of your Government, and the American delegation led by Dr Chester Crocker, the MPC reaffirms its commitment to these objectives in a renewed spirit of urgency and determination.”

This is an encouraging message and I wish to express my appreciation to the leaders who subscribed to it namely:

The Damara Council  
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance  
National Party of South West Africa  
Rehoboth Freedom Front  
South West Africa National Union and  
South West Africa Peoples' Organisation (Democrats)

L. Press Conference with the South African Prime Minister, the Hon P.W. Botha, in Cape Town on 31 January 1984

**Prime Minister:**

Ladies and gentlemen I have agreed to this short press conference. I've made a statement to the House of Assembly and at this stage I don't feel that I have anything to add to it. If there are any questions you wish to ask I will try to reply to them.

*Mnr F. Swart: Mr Prime Minister in your speech in Parliament the disengagement of South African forces in Angola seems to have been the operative sentence, could you elaborate on what that exactly means?*

In the first instance, after the action we took, a few weeks ago, the Minister of Defence announced that we will withdraw our main forces who took part in the operational area in Angola and since then, after certain assurances given to us by the United States Government we have decided that it would be necessary under the circumstances to take the necessary steps in preparation for a ceasefire and that is what it means.

*Mr O. Pollok: Mr Prime Minister we are not still quite sure whether the disengagement actually means a troop withdrawal or whether it just means a cease of action?*

It might include that, but it is more than that, it is preparatory steps to have an eventual ceasefire if the other parties co-operate.

*Mr P. Sullivan: Prime Minister could you give us some sort of time span when the ceasefire could be expected to come into operation?*

It all depends on the co-operation we receive from the other parties concerned.

*Mr André le Roux: Mr Prime Minister according to reports monitored from Radio Tanzania, Swapo has already rejected your offer this afternoon?*

Who made the statement on behalf of Swapo?

*Mr le Roux: Apparently it is Sam Nujoma.*

I am not aware that he was operating from there or that Mr Nyerere had something to do with the discussions.

*Mr le Roux: Will this offer be a unilateral move?*

I am not sure whether he made that statement, and until I am sure of that I will not react to it.

*Mr Dries van Heerden: Mr Prime Minister could you elaborate on the assurances that you received because in your speech you referred just previously to this that up to now there had been difficulties because the MPLA Government could not succeed in curbing the activities of Swapo?*

I think that in my statement I said enough to explain what we envisage and this pertains to assurances obtained from amongst others the American Government.

*Mr Alf Ries: Mr Prime Minister, with reference to the presence of Cubans in Angola and in view of your statement this afternoon, is this still the standpoint of both the South African and American Governments?*

The American Government has stated very clearly in public through the President of the United States and other responsible leaders of the government that Cuban withdrawal is a prerequisite for the implementation of Resolution 435 and we agree with the American Government on this issue.

*Andrew Torchia: I noticed that you did not mention contact with Swapo in your address today and I wondered what role you see them in.*

I have made it plain and clear on many occasions that the discussions on the future of South West Africa/Namibia can take place between all the parties concerned provided that they do it in a constitutional way.

*Mr André le Roux: Mr Prime Minister you spoke about certain assurances the American Government gave you before making this statement. Could you elaborate on those?*

No, I have gone very far this afternoon to explain what our aims are and we are satisfied that with the assurances we received we can achieve our goals.

*Mr Sullivan: Mr Prime Minister will the electricity scheme at Ruacana remain protected by South Africa's forces?*

Of course we are not withdrawing our presence from those areas.

*Mr Freek Robinson: Mr Prime Minister you have mentioned the possibilities of further talks with Angola and you've said already now in this press conference that South Africa's withdrawal from Angola is dependent on the co-operation that you get from Angola?*

I said from other parties concerned.

*I have to rephrase it to other parties concerned but there were preparatory talks with Angola some time ago?*

I have referred to that in my statement this afternoon.

*Are you satisfied that the conditions are so that the talks with Angola can resume soon?*

I would not exclude them. I said that talks between the United States, Angola and South Africa are not excluded, and that is as far as I want to go.

*Mr Prime Minister you said that your ceasefire depends on the other side on the other parties not exploiting the situation, not taking military advantage. What would you regard as military advantage, taking advantage of?*

By bringing in new forces and arming themselves for a new attack and activities which would lead to crossing the border and proceeding with their attacks on the civilian population of South West Africa.

*Mr Prime Minister in the light of what you said, is there going to be some monitoring system so that you can make sure?*

Naturally certain steps will have to be taken to see that all the parties adhere to the agreement.

*Who would do this?*

Those are matters that will have to be discussed in the near future.

*Mr T. Wentzel: Mr Prime Minister, Is South Africa prepared to talk to Swapo?*

On many occasions I said that the South African Government is not prepared, as far as I am concerned and the Minister of Foreign Affairs is concerned, to take part in talks only with Swapo. However, I have said that I thought it fit and in the interest of South West Africa/Namibia for all Parties concerned to take part in constitutional talks on the future of that territory.

*Mr Prime Minister just to clarify the phrase "disengagement" does this mean that South African troops will be travelling southwards across the border shortly?*

South African troops have been withdrawn from Angola after the Minister of Defence announced that it would happen, but of course with this step we are now undertaking to prepare for a ceasefire; there might be certain elements of South African troops still present in the most southern parts of Angola.

*Mr Peter Sullivan: Mr Prime Minister to what extent will this affect UNITA's fight against the MPLA in Angola?*

I'm not now taking part in the civil war between UNITA and Luanda. That's a matter for them to iron out.

*Mr André le Roux: Mr Prime Minister do you have any reason after this offer to expect a positive result?*

I'm an optimist and as an optimist I believe that you should build and not destroy. I made it plain and very clear in my statement this afternoon that we are working for peace, stability and co-operation, but I said that we are doing it not from a position of weakness but from strength.

*Are there any diplomatic pointers that you may be achieving this in the near future?*

I dealt with that in my statement this afternoon. I've said there are signs that other governments are gradually coming to realise the necessity for these goals.

*Neal Lewis: Mr Prime Minister for those of us who were watching this complicated and confusing process, could you give us any guidance as to what you might see happening?*

If these first steps are successful, I would say a ceasefire, and from a ceasefire, we then take the next step. It is no use trying to prophesy until you are convinced that the other parties are acting in the same spirit that you are acting.

*Mr Prime Minister would there be a South African retaliation if there are incursions across the border?*

South Africa is bound to defend the people of South West Africa as long as they request us to do so.

*Does your statement imply that there will be any change in your concern for linkage?*

No, I've replied to that question already. I said that there is one stumbling block in the way of the application of Resolution 435 and that is the presence of the Cubans in Angola but we are dealing with quite a different matter now.

*Mr Prime Minister you've said in your statement that South Africa can no longer go on bearing the cost of administering Namibia alone and you told the Multi Party Conference delegates of your determination to resolve the situation one way or the other. Could you say what you meant by that?*

I did not only tell the Multi-Party Conference delegates what my point of view is. On quite a few occasions I told representatives of the West that while the United Nations are taking steps to apply boycotts against us, and the West is not satisfied with us, and Angola and Russia try to organise animosity against us, they can't expect us to carry the burden of keeping that territory financially intact on our own. I think there is a commitment that should be accepted by other forces in the West to at least help lighten our burden.

*Mr Prime Minister do you envisage a process whereby a ceasefire can lead to a Cuban withdrawal?*

That is a bit far in the future. I think we must only cross the bridge when we come to it.

*Mr Prime Minister is there a prospect in the reasonably short term of a meeting between Swapo and a delegation lead by the Administrator-General?*

I won't stand in the way if they so wish but Swapo is not the sole representative of the people of South West Africa. It is a party.

*Could you give us an indication of how long this offer will stand and what circumstances will force you to withdraw the offer?*

No, I'm not here to issue ultimatums now. I'm not going to issue ultimatums at this stage. I've made an offer and I am awaiting reaction.

**M.** Tripartite statement following the meeting between representatives of the Governments of Angola, South Africa and the United States, in Lusaka on 16 February 1984

The Angolan delegation was headed by Minister of Interior, Alexandre Rodriques, the South African delegation was headed by Minister of Foreign Affairs R.F. Botha, and the American delegation was led by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester A. Crocker.

Responding to President Kaunda's assessment that an historic opportunity now exists to make progress, the Conference achieved the following results:

- Creation of a joint South African/Angolan commission to monitor the disengagement process in southern Angola and to detect, investigate and report any alleged violations of the commitments of the parties.
- The first meeting of the Joint Commission took place in Lusaka on 16 February 1984. Further meetings will be held in other mutually agreed locations at the convenience of the parties.
- It was agreed that a small number of American representatives could participate in the activities of the Joint Commission at the request of the parties.

The delegation agreed that the task of the Joint Commission in the weeks ahead is to facilitate the successful completion of the disengagement process and to establish an effective cessation of hostilities. The delegations are aware of the many complex and unresolved issues which must still be addressed in the search for solutions to the problems of the region. They agree, however, that the Lusaka meeting constitutes an important and constructive step towards the peaceful resolution of the problems of the region, including the question of the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 435.<sup>1</sup>

1. See *Southern African Record*, No. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

The participants express their deep appreciation to President Kaunda and the Government and people of Zambia and for the generous hospitality and excellent arrangements provided in connection with the Conference.

The American and Angolan delegations were as follows:

### **US Delegation**

Assistant Secretary of State Chester A. Crocker  
Nicholas Platt, US Ambassador to Zambia  
Herman W. Nickel, US Ambassador to the Republic of South Africa  
Robert Frasure, Department of State  
Robert Cabelly, Department of State  
Miss Nancy Ely, Department of State  
Michael Rannenberger, Department of State  
James Wood, Department of Defence  
Col. David Parker, Department of Defence  
Col. Wentz, Department of Defence  
Roger A. Mcguire, US Embassy Lusaka  
Miss Sophia Povson, Interpreter, Department of State

### **Angolan Delegation**

Alexandre Rodrigues 'Kito', Minister of Interior  
Pedro Maria Thona 'Pedale', Minister of Defence  
Venancio Demoura, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Elesio de Figueiredo, Angolan Ambassador to the UN  
Andre Miranda, Angolan Ambassador to Zambia  
Lt Col. Roberto Leal Ribeiro Monteiro, Deputy Chief of Staff  
Lt Col. Salviano Sequeira, Commander: Fifth Military Region  
Maj. Jose Maria, Secretary to the President for Defence  
Louisa Filipe, Interpreter

The above statement was delivered by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon R.F. Botha, on arrival at Jan Smuts Airport from Lusaka, 16 February 1984.

- N.** Verklaring deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Minister van Buitelandse Sake, Sy Edele R.F. Botha, op 23 Februarie 1984.

In die gesamentlike verklaring wat deur die Suid-Afrikaanse en die Angolese Regerings op 16 Februarie 1984 in Lusaka uitgereik is, het die twee Regerings uitdruklik gemeld dat albei Regerings daarvan bewus was dat daar 'n groot aantal ingewikkelde en onopgeloste vraagstukke was wat die nodige aandag sou moes kry in die soeke na oplossings vir die probleme van die

Suid-Afrika subkontinent. Een van die ernstigste probleme wat gedurende die Lusaka ontmoeting bespreek was, was die gevaar dat sekere elemente in die geleedere van SWAPO die verstandhouding wat tussen die Regerings van Angola en Suid-Afrika tot stand gebring is, sou verongeluk.

Ek het in my gesprek met die Angolese afvaardiging besonderhede beskikbaar gestel van ongeveer 400 SWAPO terroriste wat in verskillende groepe besig was om vanuit Angola suidwaarts te beweeg na die Suidwes-Afrika grens. Op daardie stadium het 20 SWAPO terroriste reeds die grens oorgestreek. Ek het ook gemeld dat ons getuicnis het dat hierdie groepe bevele ontvang het van hulle bevelvoerders om Suidwes-Afrika binne te dring om geweld te pleeg. Ek het dit aan die Angolese afvaardiging gestel dat hierdie optrede aan die kant van SWAPO die verstandhouding wat daar tussen Suid-Afrika en Angola bereik is, in die wiele kan ry omdat die Suid-Afrikaanse veiligheidsmagte sal voortgaan om teen die indringers op te tree en indien nodig, hakkejagoperasies teen hulle sal uitvoer. Die Angolese afvaardiging het my verseker dat die Angolese Regering die verstandhouding wat daar tussen ons bereik was, sou nakom en dat SWAPO-leiers 'n dag of twee voor ons Lusaka ontmoeting op 16 Februarie 1984 op die hoogste vlak in Luanda ingeroep was en meegedeel was dat SWAPO enige ooreenkoms wat daar tussen Suid-Afrika en Angola bereik sou word, sou moes gehoorsaam. Die Angolese Regering sou dit nie duld dat SWAPO teenstrydig met Angolese ondernemings optree nie. Verder het die Angolese afvaardiging gesê dat die betrokke SWAPO groepe waarskynlik voor 31 Januarie 1984, die datum waarop Suid-Afrika vyandelikhede sou weerhou, suidwaarts begin beweeg het vanaf punte wat op daardie tydstip nie onder Angolese beheer was nie.

My reaksie was dat ek begrip gehad het vir die probleem waarvoor die Angolese Regering te staan gekom het maar dat die Angolese Regering moes besef dat die Suid-Afrikaanse veiligheidsmagte eenvoudig nie hierdie beplande SWAPO indringing sou duld nie en dat Suid-Afrika hom die reg voorbehou om doeltreffend teen hulle op te tree. Juis daarom het ek gesê moes die Gesamentlike Monitorkommissie ten spoedigste met sy werksaamhede begin. Dit was na my mening noodsaaklik dat die wantroue wat daar ten opsigte van mekaar se motiewe bestaan het, verminder moes word en dat die twee Regerings oor 'n gesamentlike meganisme moes beskik om oor-en weer aantygings van verbreking van die verstandhouding vinnig en doeltreffend te ondersoek ten einde te verhoed dat vyandelikhede weer opvlam met onberekenbare gevolge vir altwee Regerings. Die Angolese Regering het met hierdie standpunt saamgestem.

Die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering het nou inligting ontvang dat die aantal SWAPO terroriste wat suidwaarts beweeg, aangegroei het tot 800 waarvan 200 die Suidwes-Afrika grens oorgesteek het. 'n Totaal van 41 terroriste is reeds hierdie maand in Owambo en Wes-Kavango deur die veiligheidsmagte doodgeskiet. Verskeie dade van sabotasie is deur groepe terroriste in

Owambo gepleeg. Ek het vandag boodskappe aan die Amerikaanse en die Angolese Regerings gestuur waarin ek die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering se diepe besorgdheid uitspreek oor SWAPO se weiering om hom neer te lê by die verstandhouding wat daar tussen Suid-Afrika en Angola tot stand gekom het en dit weer eens benadruk dat SWAPO se optrede die twee Regerings se vrede-sogings in die wiele mag ry. Ek het gemeld dat die Suid-Afrikaanse veiligheidsmagte sal voortgaan om teen die terroriste op te tree. Ook het ek aan die hand gedoen dat die Gesamentlike Monitorkommissie dringend moet vergader om aandag aan hierdie toenemende gevaar te gee.

Teks uitgereik deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Minister van Buitelandse Sake

**O.** Statement concerning reports of a ceasefire agreement between South Africa and SWAPO, by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Hon R.F. Botha, on 11 March 1984

In the light of press reports that Swapo has offered to enter into a ceasefire agreement with the Republic of South Africa, the South African Government would like to point out that all the parties of South West Africa, including Swapo, are free to participate peacefully in the constitutional process. It is not necessary for the South African Government to enter into a ceasefire agreement with any of the parties of South West Africa since the South African Government has not declared war against any party in the Territory but acts in a protective capacity to maintain peace in the Territory so that a political solution may be found and implemented.

The search for a peaceful solution of the problems of the region is clearly apparent from the agreement which was recently reached with Angola. Although tension in the region has been reduced the South African Government is convinced that real peace in the region will only be achieved if all those involved show the will to have peace.

The time has come for the leaders of Southern Africa to resolve their differences themselves. In this spirit the South African Government is willing to participate without any conditions, except the realisation of peace, in a conference of all those involved in the current conflict in SWA/Angola, i.e. the South African Government, MPLA-government, Unita, the Multi Party Conference of South West Africa and Swapo. Should this offer be accepted those involved can agree on a chairman, date and venue for such a conference but the South African Government would prefer that such a conference be held in an African country.

Text issued by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town



P. Statement concerning the Joint Monitoring Commission, by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Hon R.F. Botha, on 20 March 1984

The Minister of Foreign Affairs stated in Cape Town today that the Joint Monitoring Commission decided at a meeting at Cuvelai on 19 March 1984 that, in the light of the progress which has been made in the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement, the JMC Headquarters will move to Mupa as soon as practical arrangements have been finalised.

The problems which caused the delay in the Commission's scheduled departure from Cuvelai included the continuing presence of SWAPO elements in the area monitored by the JMC, as well as other violations in terms of the Lusaka Agreement. A number of incidents resulting from SWAPO activities were brought to the Commission's attention and practical action is being taken to counteract SWAPO infiltration. There were, *inter alia* clashes between mixed JMC patrols and SWAPO elements on 8, 11 and 12 March 1984, in the course of which eight members of SWAPO and two members of the JMC were killed and five members of the JMC were injured.

The South African component on the JMC is satisfied that, at this stage, adequate steps are being taken to resolve violations in terms of the Agreement, including the removal of SWAPO from the area monitored by the Commission.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed South Africa's satisfaction with the co-operative relationship which has thus far been developed between the Angolan and South African components of the JMC.

The statement issued by President dos Santos and President Castro on 19 March 1984, starkly contradicts the spirit and letter of the Lusaka Agreement and the constructive relationship which has developed within the Joint Monitoring Commission. In that statement the Angolan and Cuban Governments expressed

"their admiration and solidarity with the heroic struggle being waged by the peoples of Namibia and South Africa under the direction of their sole and legal representatives, SWAPO and the ANC, against the disgraceful apartheid regime, and reaffirm their conviction that such a repugnant regime is historically condemned to disappear."

This language is unacceptable to the South African Government. If this is an accurate reflection of the Angolan Government's views it would be more consistent for it to negotiate the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola with the ANC. If it wishes to promote a solution to the South West Africa question it would also be more consistent for the Luanda regime to do so with SWAPO. If the Angolan Government is so strongly committed to solidarity with SWAPO's "heroic" struggle, then its current role in the Joint Monitoring Commission makes no sense.

It should be borne in mind that the sole reason for the presence of South

African forces in Angola has been to counteract SWAPO's aggression against the people of South West Africa/Namibia. It is also evident from the statement that the Angolan Government identifies itself with SWAPO's aggression against South West Africa and the ANC's violent activities against South Africa.

The Angolan/Cuban statement is largely a reiteration of the positions adopted by the two countries on 4 February 1982 and of the Angolan statement of 26 August 1983.

South Africa's position remains that it is prepared to seek a peaceful settlement to the South West Africa/Namibia question on the basis of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978)<sup>1</sup> within the framework of the understanding reached with the United States and the Western Contact Group. The one remaining issue still to be resolved is the withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola, on the understanding that they will not be replaced by any other hostile forces. Firm agreement will have to be reached on the fundamental requirements of Cuban withdrawal, and a commitment will have to be obtained from the Angolan Government regarding the implementation of such an agreement.

South Africa believes that the proposal which it made on 11 March 1984 for a conference of all the parties involved in the South West African/Angolan conflict would help to create the atmosphere for the resolution of the problems of the region, including the withdrawal of Cuban forces.

However, before there can be any progress on these questions, the South African Government will have to obtain an urgent clarification of the Angolan Government's position, in the light of the critical situation which has been brought about by the Angolan/Cuban statement of 19 March 1984. In particular, it will have to establish whether this joint statement constitutes a repudiation of the Lusaka Agreement and whether it indicates a call for the end to the activities of the Joint Monitoring Commission by the Luanda regime.

Text issued by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs

**Q.** Extracts from Mr Herman Toivo ja Toivo's speech from the dock, in 1968\*  
Mr Ja Toivo was convicted in 1968 in the Pretoria Supreme Court on charges under the Terrorism Act which, with retrospective provisions, was made applicable to the 33 Namibians charged with supporting SWAPO's guerrilla campaign, launched in 1966. Mr Ja Toivo was released from Robben Island in March, this year, and returned to Namibia.

1. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

\*These extracts were published in the *Cape Times*, 12.3.1984, and are reprinted here with the kind permission of the editor

In the address Mr Ja Toivo said: "My lord, we find ourselves here in a foreign country, convicted under laws made by people whom we have always considered as foreigners. We find ourselves tried by a judge who is not our countryman and who has not shared our background . . .

"We are Namibians and not South Africans. We do not now, and will not in the future, recognize your right to govern us; to make laws for us in which we had no say; to treat our country as if it were your property and as if you were our masters.

"We have always regarded South Africa as an intruder in our country . . .

"Our organization, Swapo, is the largest political organization in South West Africa.

"We know that many whites do not think of blacks as politicians — only as agitators. Many of our people, through no fault of their own, have had no education at all.

"This does not mean that they do not know what they want. A man does not have to be formally educated to know that he wants to live with his family where he wants to live, and not where an official chooses to tell him to live; to move about freely and not require a pass; to earn a decent wage; to be free to work for the person of his choice for as long as he wants; and finally to be ruled by the people that he wants to be ruled by, and not by those who rule him because they have more guns than he has.

"Our grievances are called 'so-called' grievances. We do not believe South Africa is in South West Africa in order to provide facilities and work for non-whites. It is there for its own selfish reasons. For the first 40 years it did practically nothing to fulfill its 'sacred trust'. It only concerned itself with the welfare of the whites.

"Since 1962 because of the pressure from inside by the non-whites and especially my organization, and because of the limelight placed on our country by the world, South Africa has been trying to do a bit more . . .

"I do not claim that it is easy for men of different races to live at peace with one another. I myself had no experience of this in my youth, and at first it surprised me that men of different races could live together in peace.

"But now I know it to be true and to be something for which we must strive.

"The South African government creates hostility by separating people and emphasizing their differences. We believe that by living together, people will learn to lose their fear of each other.

"We also believe that this fear which some of the whites have of Africans is based on their desire to be superior and privileged and that when whites see themselves as part of South West Africa, sharing with us all its hopes and troubles, then that fear will disappear.

"Your lordship emphasized in your judgement the fact that our arms come from communist countries, and also that words commonly used by

communists were to be found in our documents.

"But my lord, in the documents of the state there appears another type of language. It appears even more often than the former.

"It is the wish of the South African government that we should be discredited in the Western world. That is why it calls our struggle a communist plot; but this will not be believed by the world. The world knows we are not interested in ideologies.

"We feel that the world as a whole has a special responsibility towards us. This is because the land of our fathers was handed over to South Africa by a world body. It is a divided world, but it is a matter of hope for us that it at least agrees about one thing — that we are entitled to freedom and justice.

"We do not expect that independence will end our troubles, but we do believe that our people are entitled — to rule themselves. It is not really a question of whether South Africa treats us well or badly, but that South West Africa is our country . . .

"There are some who will say that they are sympathetic with our aims, but that they condemn violence. I would answer that I am not by nature a man of violence and I believe that violence is a sin against God and my fellow men.

"Swapo itself was a non-violent organization, but the South African government is not truly interested in whether opposition is violent or non-violent. It does not wish to hear any opposition to apartheid.

"Since 1963, Swapo meetings have been banned. It is true that it is the tribal authorities who have done so, but they work with the South African government, which has never lifted a finger in favour of political freedom. We have found ourselves voteless in our own country and deprived of the right to meet and state our own political opinions.

"Is it surprising that in such times my countrymen have taken up arms? Violence is truly fearsome, but who would not defend his property and himself against a robber? And we believe that South Africa has robbed us of our country.

"I have spent my life working in Swapo, which is an ordinary political party like any other. Suddenly we in Swapo found that a war situation has arisen and that our colleagues and South Africa were facing each other on the field of battle.

"Although I had not been responsible for organizing my people militarily and although I believe we were unwise to fight the might of South Africa while we were so weak, I could not refuse to help them when the time came.

"My lord, you found it necessary to brand me as a coward. During World War II, when it became evident that both my country and your country were threatened by the dark clouds of nazism, I risked my life to defend both of them, wearing a uniform with orange bands on it.

"But some of your countrymen when called to battle to defend civilization resorted to sabotage against their own fatherland. I volunteered to face

German bullets, and as a guard of military installations, both in South West Africa and the Republic, was prepared to be the victim of their sabotage. Today they are called our masters and are considered heroes, and I am called a coward."

Mr Ja Toivo concluded: "Only when we are granted our independence will the struggle stop. Only when our human dignity is restored to us, as the equals of the whites, will there be peace between us."

**R.** Communiqué by Front Line States following summit meeting in Arusha, Tanzania, on 29 April 1984.

The Front Line States Summit Meeting was held in Arusha, Tanzania, on Sunday 29 April 1984 to consider the recent developments in southern Africa. The Heads of State and Government present were: President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola; President Quett Masire of Botswana; President Samora Machel of Mozambique; President Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania; President Kaunda of Zambia and Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. Also in attendance were: Comrade Oliver Tambo, President of ANC of South Africa; comrade Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO of Namibia.

The leaders stood for one minute of silence in tribute to the late Edward Moringe Sokoine, whose very valuable and practical contributions to the liberation struggles of southern Africa will be greatly missed by the Front Line States and the Liberation Movements.

The Heads of State and Government and the Leaders of the Liberation Movements reaffirmed their total and unqualified commitment to the liberation struggles of the people of Namibia against colonialism and of the people of South Africa against apartheid. They reasserted their conviction, and that of the Organisation of African Unity, that the total liberation of Africa from colonialism and apartheid is essential for the security of all the independent states of the continent in particular the Front Line States.

Further they reiterated that the root cause of the problems in southern Africa is apartheid itself. Apartheid is the cause of Africa's hostility to the South African racist regime and of the existence of South African and Namibian refugees. None of these things is caused by the Frontline or other states neighbouring South Africa. Apartheid has been condemned in categorical terms by the leaders of Europe, America, Australia and Asia as well as by Africa. It cannot be made acceptable by the use of South Africa's military power and economic strength, nor by the use of mercenaries and traitors. The Heads of State and Government and the Leaders of the Liberation Movements exchanged views on the understanding reached by the People's Republic of Angola and the Pretoria Regime and welcomed South Africa's

commitment to withdraw its troops from Angola and hoped that it will honour its commitment to withdraw from Angola. This withdrawal will constitute an opportunity for the immediate and unconditional implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978. They welcomed Angola's reaffirmation of its continued commitment to the struggle of the Namibia people under the leadership of SWAPO. The Heads of State and Government expressed their support for the Angolan actions against the externally supported armed bandits who are causing death and misery to the Angolan people and destruction to the economic infrastructure of the State.

The Heads of State and Government and the Leaders of the Liberation Movements exchanged views on the Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and the South African Government. They expressed the hope that the South African Government will live up to the commitment to cease its acts aimed at the destabilisation of Mozambique through the use of armed bandits and give their support to the Mozambican actions aimed at the total elimination of these vicious bandits. They expressed appreciation of Mozambique's commitment to continued moral, political, and diplomatic support for the ANC in the struggle against apartheid and for majority rule in South Africa.

The Heads of State and Government and the Leaders of the Liberation Movements declared that the immediate objective for Namibia is and must be rapid implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, in order that Namibia may attain full and internationally recognised independence on the basis of self-determination by all the people of that country. They reiterated the continuing role of the UN Security Council and of the Secretary-General in the implementation of Resolution 435. The leaders of the Front Line States reaffirmed their support for SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people.

For South Africa, the objective of the Front Line States and Liberation Movements is the abolition of apartheid by whatever means are necessary. The Leaders present again reiterated their strong preference for apartheid to be brought to an end by peaceful means. This can be achieved only through a process agreed upon in free discussions between the present South African regime and genuine representatives of the people of South Africa who are unrepresented in the present government structure of that country.

A prerequisite for any such discussions would be the unconditional release from prison, detention, house arrest or 'banning', of Nelson Mandela and all other political leaders. Difficult as this step may be in the eyes of the present South African Government, there is no way to peace in southern Africa except through discussions between the South African Government and the African people of South Africa. To avoid any misunderstanding, they stressed that the phrase "African people" includes all those who have been classified as being citizens of the so-called independent homelands in South Africa, the denial of their South African citizenship is not recognised in inter-

national law, nor by any independent state apart from South Africa.

The alternative to free negotiations within South Africa aimed at the ending of apartheid will inevitably be continued struggle against that system by other means, including armed struggle. This struggle is being and will be conducted and led by the people of South Africa themselves on their own initiative and within their own country. However, their struggle is, and is seen by Africa to be, a struggle for the freedom and security of all the peoples of this continent, and for the human dignity of all men and women regardless of colour. It therefore receives, and will continue to receive, the full support of the peoples and nations represented by the Heads of Government of the Front Line States.

Involved in this struggle for the total liberation of Africa from colonialism and racism is the consolidation of the freedom and the security of the states which have already achieved independence. To that end, and in the light of the difficult circumstances which do from time to time confront such states, the leaders of the Front Line States and the Liberation Movements reaffirmed their understanding of steps which are taken for this purpose by states which are fully committed to the liberation struggles. They also reaffirmed their commitment to the internationally recognised boundaries in South Africa as these were defined when the free states achieved their political independence.

The Heads of State and Governments of the Front Line States and the Leaders of the Liberation Movements condemned without reservation the open and the covert aggressive actions of South Africa directed at the destabilisation of African states, and those aimed against refugees from Namibia and apartheid South Africa.

There is no excuse in international law or civilised practice for these actions. The Heads of State and Government and the Leaders of the Liberation Movements also repeated their rejection of the attempt to link the freedom of Namibia with any Angolan Government decisions relating to its internal political structure.

The political and the armed struggles being waged by the peoples of Namibia and South Africa led by SWAPO and ANC respectively are taking place inside those two countries. The struggle is between the people of Namibia and the occupying power, and between the people of South Africa and the apartheid regime. Therefore, the strategy of the Liberation Movements is that of internal struggle, firmly based on the people's will and determination.

As the denial of human rights, and the ruthlessness of the oppressor, has made it impossible for many active leaders of the Liberation Movements to live and work inside their own countries, it has been necessary for both SWAPO and ANC to have an external wing. The international implications of the problems with which the Liberation Movements are contending also require international diplomatic and political activity, together with offices and representatives in other countries.

The Front Line States reaffirm their recognition of the external operation of the Movements, and reassert their intention to give shelter to them. The Front Line States also reaffirm their right and duty under international Conventions to accord hospitality to refugees from Namibia and apartheid South Africa. They appeal to the international community for diplomatic and economic support and protection as they carry out these international responsibilities.

The Heads of State and Governments of the Front Line States and the Leaders of the Liberation Movements represented at the Arusha Meeting, in reasserting their commitment to the struggle for freedom in Namibia and South Africa, also draw attention to the burden they are carrying on behalf of the world conscience and the international condemnation of colonialism and apartheid. They therefore appeal for active participation in the struggle by all other nations, other organisations and institutions, and all people who accept the principles of human dignity and equality.

In particular the Heads of State and Government of the Front Line States and the Leaders of the Liberation Movements appeal for political, moral, material and diplomatic support to be given to the Liberation Movements. They appeal also for concrete support to be given to the efforts of the Front Line States aimed at the consolidation of their independence and their fragile economies, as these are of direct relevance to their ability to play a constructive role in the search for peace and freedom in southern Africa.

The leaders of the Front Line States and the Liberation Movements repeat a truism. Peace is incompatible with racism and with colonialism. Man is so constituted that men and women will die for freedom and human dignity if they are prevented from the peaceful pursuit of these basic human rights. Neither military might nor devious political machinations, whether directed against the peoples inside Namibia and South Africa or against the free states of Africa, can defeat the idea of freedom and racial equality.

The struggle will be long and hard. It will be carried on until final victory.  
A luta continua!

Text from *Botswana Daily News* 2 May 1984



## United States and Southern Africa

- A. Address, entitled "America's role in peaceful settlements in Southern Africa", by the United States Ambassador to South Africa, Mr Herman W. Nickel, to the Pretoria Press Club on 14 March 1984.

Thank you very much for your welcome. I am sorry that it has taken so long for us to get together here, but I am all the more pleased to be with you today. Your chairman was obviously clairvoyant in asking me many weeks ago to speak today about America's role in peaceful settlements in Southern Africa. Your timing has turned out to be excellent, for I have come to speak to you amidst a great deal of diplomatic activity. It is a time of great opportunity and promise.

The pace of movement in relations between South Africa and her neighbours over the last few weeks has been dizzying. South African and Angolan military men who only a short time ago faced each other on the field of battle are now working together in the very same area of Southern Angola to monitor the disengagement process which we hope will then lead to further steps, culminating in the parallel movement of South African and Cuban forces out of Namibia and Angola and the long-awaited implementation of Security Council Resolution 435. Looking east, your government and the government of Mozambique, which used to refer to each other in such terms of endearment as "Marxist" and "Racist", have agreed on the terms of a formal security agreement which Prime Minister P. W. Botha and President Samora Machel are just about to sign at what promises to be a memorable and unique ceremony on the border. I very much look forward to being there on Friday.

There is no question but that the positive developments in the relations between South African and Mozambique have had a favorable impact on relations between South Africa and Angola — and vice versa. Already there are indications that the events of the past weeks also have had a positive effect on the relations between South Africa and her other neighbours, notably Zimbabwe. I'd like to think that peace is habit-forming. As your Prime Minister has put it, we seem to be entering a new era of realism.

These are exciting trends, and they have raised the hopes and expectations of people here, throughout Africa, and indeed everywhere. Once again, we have had proof how keen people are for a taste of peace, no matter where they may live.

It is all the more incumbent on those who have been involved in this process to warn against becoming intoxicated with overexpectations and euphoria. Let us not forget that we have only just taken the first steps on a road. First steps usually are the most difficult to take, and much credit goes to those leaders in this region who have mustered the courage to depart from well-trodden paths and strike out into a new and unfamiliar territory. With each additional step, confidence is built. But we must learn to walk before we can run, and not try to take on more than the traffic will bear. We must not overload the circuits.

Almost inevitably there will be efforts to divert us from the new path. I refer to those who see *their own influence in Southern Africa* linked to the scenario of escalating strife, rather than in peaceful settlements, to those who see *their interests served* by confrontation rather than conciliation, by revolution rather than evolution. I do not believe that these forces and their sponsors in Moscow express the aspirations of the people of Africa, whether they be black or white. But let us not underestimate their ability to rekindle deep-seated suspicions and to create incidents designed to distract us from our agenda for peace. They must not succeed.

The structure of peace which we have begun to build in southern Africa is still fragile, and it will take restraint and forbearance on the part of all participants to give it the strength to withstand such wrecking manoeuvres.

I have talked in terms of "we" and "us," because the United States, I am proud to say, has played an important catalyst role in launching this new departure in Southern African regional relations. As you know, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker and other members of his team have travelled tens of thousands of miles to speak with the key figures throughout this region. They have worked tirelessly, almost literally around the clock, in an effort to seize what we believe to be a truly historic opportunity. I regard myself as lucky to have left my long-accustomed place in the press box and to have joined the players on the field at such an exciting juncture.

Inevitably, there are some cynics who have suggested that all this stepped up activity relates to the fact that this is 1984 — not in the Orwellian but in the American political sense of a Presidential year. With all due respect to those who have imputed such unchaste motives to us, they seem to have a rather naive view of how diplomacy actually works. Wouldn't it be nice if one could go to foreign governments and ask them to take actions that directly impinge on their interests, just to do your own government a political favour? Alas, or, rather, fortunately, most governments take a more hard-headed view and

are prepared to move only when they think this serves their national interests.

What really determines the successful timing of a diplomatic initiative is the convergence of interests among the key players. The time to press for a settlement has arrived when the disincentives of pursuing open-ended and ever more costly conflicts (costly in human, economic and political terms) have come to outweigh whatever incentives there might be for letting the conflict continue. It is the coming about of such a constellation that determined the timing of our initiative. We are such a juncture today.

The forces and events which have led up to this occasion are known to us all. But just as those who explain what's been happening in terms of election year politics are wrong, so are those who now suggest that what we have been witnessing is merely the inevitable result of "objective conditions". But the "objective conditions" merely contribute opportunities that have to be seized. History, alas, is full of missed opportunities. Recognizing the opportunity and persuading governments to seize them is the great challenge of diplomacy. We have tried to play that role. But no amount of US diplomacy could substitute for clear-eyed calculation and tough-minded decision-making by the leaders of this region themselves.

In order to play an effective role as an honest broker, we have had to rely on constructive working relationships with all the concerned governments, based on a recognition of the legitimate security concerns of each of the parties. In particular, it would have been impossible to play this role without the restoration of a working relationship with the South African government. In the past, some of our critics suggested that we accomplished this at the expense of American credibility with other African governments, in particular those of the Front Line States. The events of the past few weeks have totally debunked this criticism. Had we not had a working relationship with the South African government, the governments of Angola and Mozambique would hardly have found us a very useful go-between. To be sure, constructive engagement had to be seen by them as a balanced policy, relevant to the needs and interests of all the countries in this region, and cognizant of regional diversity and divisions.

The other day one of your foreign colleagues asked me with some puzzlement why it was that the United States Government had chosen to become so prominently involved in as difficult and thorny a business as peacemaking in southern Africa. What if we failed? Weren't we placing our prestige at grave risk? The question is fair enough.

The short answer is that our policy is dictated by our perception of our national interests here. Because of this region's strategic, political and economic importance, we are vitally concerned about stability in southern Africa. As we have said time and again, stability in southern Africa is not linked to the perpetuation of the status quo, either in the relations between South Africa and its neighbours, or within South Africa itself. On the contrary, that

stability can only be guaranteed by peaceful evolutionary change on both fronts. In South Africa itself, a lasting basis for stability requires evolutionary change toward government by the consent of the governed. By the same token, we cannot see internal change proceeding at an adequate pace and by democratic means if escalating violence on and across frontiers polarizes the politics of this country and deepens domestic divisions within South Africa itself.

The questions of regional and internal accommodation are in a dynamic relationship with each other. Both must be addressed at the same time. We know that our global adversary, the USSR, can best advance its interests in a climate of conflict and confrontation fuelled by mistrust, suspicion and political and social injustice. The Soviet Union has been able to manipulate the genuine grievances resulting from the status quo. When you add to our strategic consideration the fact that eleven percent of Americans have their origins on the African Continent, the breadth and depth of our interest in resolving conflict in southern Africa becomes clear, and the grounds for our involvement evident. No American policy towards southern Africa can be sustained politically unless it reflects our values as a multiracial society.

With all due modesty, I would maintain that no other power is better placed to play the necessary role in assisting peaceful evolutionary change here in southern Africa. For one thing, the United States has the weight. Moreover, we can talk to all of the players. Of course, we recognize that in the final analysis, the people who live in this region must resolve their own problems. But we can be a catalyst, and we play this part knowing that the people of southern Africa want settlements, not a continuation of destructive and seemingly open-ended conflict.

Again, our concept of settlements is dynamic, not static. Let no one delude himself that our interest is in the restoration of a cordon sanitaire that will make it possible to proceed with internal reform at a more complacent pace. Over the long run regional cooperation in South Africa must be based on more than the superior muscle of one of the players. That is why internal reform is an indispensable aspect of regional cooperation. An encouraging sign of the willingness of South Africa's neighbours to embark on this promising path of regionalism is stated recognition from a major black leader that all South Africans are, indeed, viewed as Africans. At the same time, no leader has modified his call for social justice in South Africa. Let me repeat: Regional and internal accommodation must go hand in hand. Over the long run, you can't have one without the other.

The United States takes an increasingly hopeful view on this issue. Dialogue has been proven possible between heretofore implacable opponents across frontiers. Does this not raise hopes for greater dialogue among South Africans themselves? This would be in line with our consistent view that the complex problems of South African society cannot be resolved either by

revolution or by the violence of repression.

There is no prescription from the United States Government as to what a developing dialogue among South Africans should produce. It is up to you, for example, to determine, given the unique circumstances of South African society, how to resolve the difficult issue of the relationship between individual rights and those of different groups. What we would argue is that schemes based on ethnicity should not be imposed by one group on another and be forced on groups or individuals against their will. That is why reports of such measures as "black spot removals" and other forced relocations will continue to spark criticism among the American people and from their government as well. Events of this kind surely tend to mar the favourable image conveyed by strides taken both in regional relations and in South Africa internally, and make it harder to convince sceptics and critics of our policy that a process of change is indeed underway.

I have made it clear that we regard our policy towards problem-solving in southern Africa to be dictated by our national interest. This is stating the obvious. But I am convinced that there is a growing compatibility between our national interest and the interest of people throughout southern Africa, including all the people of this country. Let me repeat our conviction that moves towards regional peace will also ease the path to peaceful evolution and the elimination of force and violence within South Africa.

I admit to being an optimist. But I reject the label of being pollyanna. We know as well as anyone that the process has a long way to go. The issues are complex, the number of interested parties is large, and the suspicions run deep. But we must not and will not be distracted from our vision. It is a vision which is truly compatible with the true interests of all the people of this region. And that is why we feel so strongly that we will succeed.

**B. Extracts from a satellite interview with United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr Chester Crocker, on 16 May 1984.**

*Moderator: I'd like to start our conversation by citing this constructive engagement. Certainly one of our most dramatic evidences of it is the non-aggression treaty between South Africa and Mozambique. My question to you is what elements have been falling into place that allowed this step to be taken and that perhaps presage other steps.*

*Crocker: Well, it's a very important set of issues involved and that led up to that agreement between Mozambique and South Africa. I think it would be a mistake for us to state that we in the United States take responsibility for that accomplishment. We have, however, played a role. And it's an important role. We have sought to be a catalyst. And I think what we've been doing for the past three years or so is to seek to acquire a pattern of credibility with*

all the key parties at stake in that set of relationships, and at the same time, to make clear that there is an alternative to simply open-ended escalation of cross-border violence, conflicts, and polarization. We can play a role both in the economic side and the diplomatic side to the extent that the parties are seriously interested in working out agreements that are in their mutual interest, on the basis of self-respect and sovereignty of everybody.

And, of course, the Mozambique-South Africa agreement is perhaps the most dramatic, as you said, example of this process. We view it as a regional approach with region-wide implications.

*Moderator: Dr Crocker, thank you. We'll go directly overseas now, with our first question coming from Lagos.*

*Question: My question is related to the first one you just answered, with regard to the non-aggression treaty between Mozambique and South Africa, which you have recently referred to as a growth of realism. To what extent, in practical terms, do you think this growth of realism will contribute to, for instance, a non-racial society in South Africa, and independence for Namibia?*

Answer: Well, on the Namibia aspect, as you know, there was — shortly before the Nkomati Pact, there was an agreement reached between South Africa and Angola. We were involved in those talks, as were the Zambians, at Lusaka, in February. We believe, in other words, that there is a region-wide dynamic in which the parties that were previously very much at each other's throats, were talking to each other and trying to work out practical arrangements.

The disengagement that was set up in Lusaka concerning South African forces in southern Angola, is well advanced, and is nearly completed at this point. It is our view that that can lead, and we hope it will lead, to further steps. It is not an end in itself, but it should be seen as a step toward the implementation of (United Nations Security Council) Resolution 435<sup>1</sup> and Namibia's independence.

On the broader question that you're asking about: what this means for the future of change inside South Africa, I would make two points. First of all, the Nkomati Agreement and others like it are a two-way street. They not only have implications for cross-border violence in one direction but also for cross-border violence in the other direction. They are, in a sense, the Southern Africa reflection of the OAU (Organization of African Unity) charter, if you wish to look at it that way, and that can only be to the good in terms of breeding a climate in the region in which people can take tough decisions inside South Africa.

By the same token, it doesn't make much sense to look to the future when you have South African leaders doing business, making compromises with

1. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 14, December 1978, p. 43.

neighbouring countries' leaders, and yet still not being willing to talk and open dialogue with the black leaders inside South Africa. So we see positive elements here for a change in South Africa, too.

*I would like to refer to the fact that in spite of this treaty, there have been recent escalations in the internal guerrilla tactics inside South Africa.*

Well, it wouldn't be surprizing, I think, at a time when certain movements, several different kinds of movements, feel that they have been perhaps given fewer opportunities to engage in cross-border activity, that they might seek to assert themselves, and to remind the world that they are still there.

We never predicted, I don't think anyone predicted, that this would lead to an overnight cessation of violent incidents. But over time it might lead to people more systematically exploring alternatives and that includes the ANC (African National Congress).

*My question is a little unrelated, and it's got to do with the Olympic Games. The 23rd Olympiad will be opening in July in Los Angeles. Now, with the Eastern Bloc countries pulling out, now with the rugby tour of South Africa going on, some African nations may be tempted to bring up what they were planning for 1986 for this year. Now, what will the State Department be able to do to make sure that we do not have a collapse of the Olympic Games for this year?*

Well, I'm not sure I see any relationship between the recent announcements and claims and decisions coming from the Soviets, and their friends, and decisions being taken or not being taken in Africa. Those decisions, of course, are for Africans to take. But we don't see any particular relationship.

Perhaps you want to make more precise your question concerning that 1986 question. I wasn't sure I understood that.

*Okay, I will make it more explicit. The rugby tour of South Africa going on now is one of the subjects that makes African States boycott international games. And it looks like every time there are going to be some games, internationally, some identifiable people instigate some groups to organize this sporting tour with South Africa, with a view to, "let's see what the African nations will do."*

*Now, the African nations have already said they will boycott the Commonwealth Games in '86, but with the Eastern Bloc boycott of the Olympics now they may just be tempted to boycott the Olympics as well. What is the State Department trying to do . . . to see that this does not happen?*

Yes, I understand your question now. I guess the first point would be that, of course, we are not involved in rugby tours. The one that you're referring to, I believe the British Government has made clear its position, both publicly and diplomatically.

I would point out that Britain and many other countries involved in sport are countries which have pluralistic societies, and it's not always possible for a government to simply turn on and turn off these kinds of events, unlike Eastern countries.

But, nonetheless, we don't see this as a problem for the State Department to solve. We have enough problems on our plate, and we look forward to an Olympics that will take place with or without the Soviets and their friends. We, of course, hope that everyone else will come.

*There is no doubt in the fact that the linkage issue is one, single, contribution factor to the failure of the Namibia talks in Lusaka last weekend. What is the most logical explanation to the attitude of the US and South Africa on linkage? Because, as you know, the Cuban troops have been in Angola for three years before Resolution 435 was worked out.*

If I understood the question correctly, it was; what is the basis for the US position on linkage, and I think you also said that this was the factor which led to the results in Lusaka last week.

In the first place, let me point out that the meetings in Lusaka last week were essentially meetings between political parties. That is to say, SWAPO (The South-West Africa People's Organization) on the one hand and a number of the internal parties inside Namibia on the other hand.

One of the objectives, clearly, of that conference, was to bring people together, to open channels, to hopefully build a climate in which people have a little bit less distrust of each other and can communicate better. From that standpoint, I think President Kaunda of Zambia and his South African counterpart, the Administrator-General, as well as the parties there, must have felt that this was worthwhile. We would not rule out there being further sessions of that kind.

But it is not political parties that are going to negotiate the independence of Namibia. It is sovereign states within the UN context. I think that's an important distinction that should be borne in mind.

Secondly, what we're seeking to do on Namibia is to solve the problem, not feel good about the problem, pass glorious resolutions about the problem, or have mass demonstrations about the problem. That is a distinction that we attach a lot of importance to. We hope to be judged by results.

Now, the Cuban issue, obviously, is one that has region-wide implications. But, in our view, if we can get a commitment on that question, we will get Namibia's independence.

*Yes, but if you don't mind my following up, you have not answered the question. Let's get an explanation of the US position. Why link it? Because that never existed. It's not even a part of Resolution 435. It's not even included in any way in the document.*

We consider Resolution 435 to be the fundamental basis for a Namibia settlement and we have, in fact, strengthened it since this Administration came into office.

But as I tried to indicate, having a resolution and a package, a plan, without having any political basis for implementing it, leaves us with a half a loaf. So, what we have sought to do is to define that basis on which it was our view



that the South African Government would go forward and implement that package. There's got to be something in the overall package for everyone. That is the approach that we have taken. And we are not seeking, I might say, to do this in a way that is a humiliation to anyone.

If we get this overall agreement, it will be through the sovereign decisions of sovereign states and it will be done in a broadly parallel manner which has something in it for everyone.

*Dr Crocker, your government has been quite adamant on the linkage issue and, to some extent, the linkage issue has to some extent, affected the implementation of Resolution 435. Does your government have any intention of finding the different formula from the United Nations Security Council Resolution 435, on finding a solution to the Namibian problem?*

Well, I think we should be very clear on this. It was the Western Five, including the US which were there at the creation, which sponsored, which drafted, and which negotiated Resolution 435, with the active partnership of the Front-Line states, South Africa, and of course, the UN itself.

We were the ones who, in a sense, gave birth to this whole plan. I think it's safe to say that we will be the last ones to abandon it. We are not suggesting any changes in it. And it would only be if everybody else in the world were to agree or to have consensus for some other approach that you would see any shift in our position.

Well, we don't view the talks that took place in Lusaka as talks that were going to lead to decisions either to make or to break this negotiation. As I tried to indicate a moment ago, these were essentially what you might call "all-party talks" among political parties. But the decisions that must be taken must be taken by governments that were not formally participants even at Lusaka. That is the point, I think, that should be stressed.

It is South Africa. It is Angola. It is other Front-Line states. It is ourselves and other members of the Western Contact Group. And then, again, in the UN context, which will sign and seal and deliver a package, when and if we get one.

So, we don't view those talks as having failed. The channels remain open with everybody. There may be further sessions. We keep pushing the ball down the field. That's our approach.

*After three years of your policy of constructive engagement, which in effect means accommodation with South Africa, the Namibian independence remains elusive. The five-nation Contact Group has broken up, and internal oppression continues in South Africa.*

*Now, isn't it time for a more aggressive policy toward South Africa?*

I would reject totally the basis of your question. Our policy of constructive engagement is not a policy that can be described as cozying up to South Africa, or whatever the word was that you used. Rather, it is a policy of seeking to be what we, indeed, are uniquely placed to be, in touch with all parties

in the region, committed to working for peaceful solutions, to reducing violence, to opening channels and building bridges, at the same time, to being relevant to the region's economic prospects, as, indeed, we are.

We believe this approach will have, as well, implications over the longer term for changes inside South Africa. And we have no doubt that a process of change is already underway in that country — not one, however, which has led, yet, to results satisfactory to any of us, you or me.

But our approach is not, as you have described it, one of simply taking one side in a very, very complex and polarized region. If that were the case, why would it be that the Front-Line states recently meeting at Arusha, in effect have given a solid endorsement to the regional diplomacy that we have just seen take place in that region?

We consider ourselves to be, in effect, in tune with, aligned with, and helping to energize and catalyze a process which is in Africa's interest, which is consistent with the OAU Charter, and which is consistent with the UN Charter.

.....  
*You said earlier that Namibian independence can only be resolved through negotiations by sovereign states. Do you in this view, justify South Africa's distrust for Resolution 435?*

Well, I think I'd better let South Africans speak for themselves, and I'll speak for the US on this one. It is our understanding and our position that South Africa has accepted Resolution 435 and has made it about as unambiguously clear as it can be made, that it will proceed to implement 435, provided there is a commitment on the Cuban question.

There remains, as your question implies, no doubt in many South African minds, a question mark concerning the partiality or impartiality of the UN in its role in the transition process for Namibia, just as there remains in many people's eyes and minds further north, among the Front-Line states and SWAPO, some question marks about South Africa's impartiality or partiality, during that transition. This is politics.

*I want to take you back to South Africa again. You have said that the United States has set out to encourage positive and peaceful change within South Africa, by which we understand that you also wish to end the policy and the practice of apartheid in that country.*

*Now, apart from the peace treaties between South Africa and Angola, and Mozambique, what specific proposals are you making to South Africa to help them formulate a consistent programme of action for change within that country?*

That's a very important question. There are already several kinds of things that we are doing on that front. In the first place, we have developed, over the past three or four years, on the basis of bi-partisan support in my country, a series of programmes aimed at channelling funds and support directly to

black South Africans, and to promote black advancement, particularly in the field of education, and we believe that those are important programmes. They are modest but they are a beginning, and they make abundantly clear what we stand for.

Secondly, we have encouraged, and will continue to do so, the constructive involvement of our firms and other firms in the process of removing racism from the economy and the job market. That also is an important set of trends and developments. And I would note that that pressure, if you will, from us and others, coincides with the opening up of the labour market in South Africa. For the first time, there is much greater equality of opportunity to organize trade unions, and there is a very, very active and lively trade union scene in South Africa today.

Thirdly, what we are seeking to do is to make clear that while it is not up to us to write constitutions for South Africa, that there should be and there's got to be, sooner rather than later, a process of change that includes negotiation, and is not simply unilaterally imposed.

So, what we seek to do is to encourage the notion that there's got to be movement, to make clear that we will recognize and give credit where there is movement, but that there are limits to our relationship in the absence of significant movement away from a system that is based fundamentally on legally entrenched racism.

*Clearly the focus of the questions so far has been on South Africa, Namibia, and linkage. Let me approach it in a slightly different way. Have the diplomatic achievements to date, and again I go back to the Mozambique-South Africa treaty, have they put the liberation movements on the defensive?*

*Second, what do you foresee as the future for movements such as SWAPO, ANC and others?*

Well, I think one should distinguish between SWAPO and the ANC, and other exile movements such as the PAC (Pan-African Congress). In SWAPO's case, SWAPO is, clearly, a party, an important party, in the Namibia negotiations, as are the internal parties, and SWAPO has solid support from the Front-Line states and others as well, internationally.

We believe, in fact, that if we are successful in consolidating this disengagement in Southern Angola, that what it can lead to is the very best opportunity that SWAPO will have to compete for office, under free and fair elections, and to do as well as it can do. While there have been military setbacks for SWAPO, no doubt, SWAPO still does exist in the field. But I think, more importantly, the presence of military setbacks has not changed what is seen to be SWAPO's very significant support inside the territory of Namibia.

Obviously, how much support that is you only know when you have an election, so it's kind of hard to predict that. But we don't see SWAPO having been eliminated or destroyed by this process in any way.

*But you draw the distinction between SWAPO and these others?*

Yes. In the case of the movements, the guerrilla movements, nationalist movements aimed at change from across borders, change in South Africa, we think there is, obviously, some changing of the ground rules that is taking place on a region-wide basis. In our view, it was always a bit of an illusion to suppose that change would be brought to South Africa through armed struggle, through the doctrine of armed struggle across borders. That's a doctrine which is more likely to create a whole series of Lebanons around South Africa's borders than it is to bring about change in South Africa.

At the same time, we view it as an illusion that South Africa faces a total onslaught, and if we can get both those illusions put behind us, there will be avenues, there will be openings, for the ANC, for others, to be involved in a process of dialogue and negotiations. We can't predict when, but that, we hope, is the future.

*Let me ask whether there is any possibility of an agreement short of Cuban withdrawal from Angola? In other words, is the linkage so tight that there can be no agreement short of that?*

Well, in fact, the linkage has gotten defined in many different ways, and we're not in the business of trying to sell or promote doctrines, in the abstract sense. You may have noted the way we voted last fall in a series of UN resolutions, which in effect permitted the UN Security Council to slay the evil doctrine of linkage. It didn't change the reality.

The reality is that there are going to have to be some form of parallel commitments on the two sides, in our view, to get a settlement.

Now, that is our assessment. That doesn't mean that — we can't speak for every foreign ministry involved — were the parties themselves to have a different view on that, we'd have to look at it from our standpoint and see if there is some other basis to get a settlement.

But we have been told by the key party in this case, the South Africans, that their position remains as it was reported in that report of the UN Secretary-General last August. So, we don't see any change at this point.

.....

*US aid to Zimbabwe was cut from in excess of — (inaudible) — (inaudible) — that obviously was — (inaudible) — reductions. Two questions — (inaudible) — from this situation. One, what has been the most single achievement of the US government by that action? And secondly, why would a — (inaudible) — superpower like the United States use that food aid as a weapon to take advantage of a small country like Zimbabwe?*

Well, these dialogues are very useful because there are obviously a good many things that need to be talked through and points to be exchanged so that we do communicate better. The United States is the largest single donor to Zimbabwe's development since Zimbabwe's independence. We have a

record of economic assistance to that country based on our commitments, which are second to none.

Our aid programme to Zimbabwe is seen by the Zimbabwe Government itself as the most successful, and is, indeed, a model to many other donors in the way aid has been used and rapidly disbursed.

There has been, in the context of the '84 programme, some reduction in the levels. This is a function of several things, including the fact that we are very different societies, we are getting to know each other — there's a learning process in our bilateral relationship. There have been some rough spots bilaterally which we are aware of, which the Zimbabweans are aware of.

We believe that past can be put behind us and the level of assistance we now have to Zimbabwe is, in fact, one which continues to have Zimbabwe receiving more in terms of aid from us bilaterally than the overwhelming majority of countries in the region.

So, we have nothing to be ashamed of in our assistance for Zimbabwe. We feel it has sent a very positive signal politically, strategically, and economically.

.....

*I'd like to take you back, perhaps for the final time today, to the non-aggression pact. Let us say that it is a major step in your policy of constructive engagement, but we are left with the other issue of apartheid, which a senior US Congressman recently described as "the core of instability" on the continent. So, I am somewhat interested in knowing, how do we then constructively engage apartheid as the next step after we have secured a non-aggression pact?*

Well, that's a key question, and it certainly isn't for Americans alone to answer, as your question implies. We believe that what is going on diplomatically in the region has been to break down a bunch of stereotypes and sterile illusions that have kept people from communicating and talking problems through. But it's just the very beginning and your question rightly implies that one should be looking further down the road.

When those kinds of channels and bridges are open, there are many messages and signals that can be sent in both directions, by both governments and by parties and movements, by journalists, by whoever. And we would hope that in the process the factors of fear, which play such an important role in the situation in South Africa — fear, uncertainty, insecurity — would, in fact, be reduced.

At the same time, we believe that there are many openings, many opportunities in terms of the peaceful organization by black South Africans for acquiring a greater stake, for acquiring a greater position and a greater bargaining stance in the future, whether it's in the field of labour, whether it's in many other fields, the private business sector, professional associations, self-help groups, community action groups, and so forth.

The field, in effect, is wide open. What it's not wide open to is competition between AK-47's and their counterparts. That's not on. It's going to be just destructive for all concerned, in our view.

*Beyond the region of southern Africa, your government was quite instrumental in bringing South Africa to signing the non-aggression pact with its neighbours. At the same time, your Government is well known for having very close ties with Dr Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement. Does it now mean that after the signing of the non-aggression pact between South Africa and its neighbours, that you are withdrawing this association with UNITA, which is a destabilizing force against the Angolan government?*

I think we would look at it this way: The questions of conflict inside Angola are enormously complex and delicate and sensitive. Our position is very clear. We would encourage a process of reconciliation. We hope there will be sooner, rather than later, some process of reconciliation inside Angola. But it's an internal question. It is not something to be negotiated internationally.

We have not been asked to get involved in it and we would not get involved in it unless we were asked to get involved in it. I would imagine that there's a similar position by a number of other countries in the region. If asked, one might play a role in trying to open dialogue inside Angola.

Now, you mentioned that we have a relationship, quote-unquote, with UNITA. We consider UNITA to be a longstanding and, obviously, important nationalist movement in Angola. There can be no debate about that. I think that point has been proven many times.

We are not seeking, in our policies, to destroy anybody. That would not accomplish anything, either as concerns UNITA or as concerns the MPLA Government of Angola. We are not providing, as your question seems to imply, any physical support to UNITA, but we do recognize UNITA's importance in the Angolan equation.

I hope those points have clarified, somewhat, our stance on that issue.

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