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# South Africa, Namibia and Angola

Interview: Major-General G.L. Meiring, General Officer Commanding SWA Territory Force by Dr Simon Baynham, Dept of Political Studies, University of Cape Town at SWATF HQ Windhoek on 14 May 1985

- SJB: Are the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the South West Africa Territory Force (SWATF) in good shape at the moment, General?
- GLM: Starting off with the SWATF, I think it is in pretty good shape at the moment, as good as can be. As regards the SADF, I'm not au fait with them as far as their capabilities outside South West Africa are concerned, but inside South West Africa they are in pretty good shape.
- SJB: In what ways, if any, have the activities of extra-parliamentary opposition groups such as the UDF and the End Conscription Campaign had an impact on the morale of the military, both on conscript soldiers and on the Permanent Force?
- GLM: None you could notice in this area, I am sure. I didn't find any real direct influence arising from such activities in this area.
- SJB: What about the violence and unrest in the black townships?
- GLM: Obviously, we are worried about that, looking back on the South African situation, but we have no such happenings occurring here and consequently we are not involved.
- SJB: Should the SADF be deployed in support of the police in the maintenance of law and order?
- GLM: Well, that is a very theoretical question. In certain instances I would say yes and in certain instances no — it depends on the nature of the unrest. I would say that in general, inside an established society such as South Africa it is not usual for the SADF or similar defence force to be called in but if they are only required in a supporting role, I think it is acceptable. And if at one stage or other the local authorities can't cope, it is also difficult but they can be called in.
- SJB: While some commentators agree that the military should be brought in to help the police in the final resort, perhaps the SADF has been

brought in too early on occasion and this might politicize conscript soldiers. Would you like to comment?

GLM: It is a possibility, but I don't know what the situation was when they were called in, so I have not enough information to comment on that statement, I am afraid.

SJB: How does the Security Establishment read the current situation in both the RSA and SWA/Namibia?

GLM: Well, as far as we are concerned from a security point of view, in SWA/Namibia I would say we have high hopes. We see a forward movement—progress both on the military side as well as on the political side, which makes us really happy. In fact, because we are there to establish peace and tranquillity so that the political questions can be addressed, as they are now being addressed in this instance, I am quite happy with the progress made.

SJB: How do you define the present military and security situation in the territory (SWA/Namibia)? I ask this because I believe your Chief of Staff Operations, Brigadier Johan Louw, made a statement recently claiming that the security forces in SWA/Namibia were achieving “a remarkable feat” in modern revolutionary warfare, because they were winning the bush war in the territory.

GLM: I will comment on that briefly and I would also very much like to enlarge on what Brigadier Louw said. I am quite au fait with his statement and I support it, but we must know that any counter-insurgency war is a protracted war. It's a long term affair and it is true that we are definitely seeing light at the end of the tunnel—the results of years of hard struggle and hard work—and we can see a change in the attitude of the people towards us, which indicates more than anything else that we are winning not only the “military” war but also the “hearts and minds” war. Therefore, I am very optimistic that we are finally on the right track towards winning this war.

SJB: As General Officer commanding the SWATF, what is your biggest headache at present?

GLM: I think the lack of money, which is basically the factor that worries everybody in South Africa too. You can't do exactly what you'd like to do because there are not enough funds available—if there were enough, I would have fewer headaches.

SJB: If more financial resources were available, in what direction would you like to see them utilized?

GLM: There are a number of directions. First of all, I would like to see the personnel side being sorted out. We could have a wider national service commitment in SWA/Namibia, not necessarily only to be used as soldiers but to get all the people, all the school-leavers, doing a stint of training. Secondly, I would very much like to get better

equipment, military-wise. We have very good equipment but we would like even better and that's always something one can't get in unlimited quantities.

SJB: Such as jet-interception systems, battle tanks and so on?

GLM: Yes.

SJB: And your major sources of optimism?

GLM: Well, my major source of optimism is that, as I have already said, we are changing the attitude of the population in SWA/Namibia and I feel we have played a major part in that change of attitudes/ideas, which makes me very happy.

SJB: In your role as GOC SWATF, you are obviously involved in wider policy decisions affecting the war. In this regard, what is the relationship between senior military personnel like yourself and the politicians who ultimately take decisions?

GLM: That is a very difficult question to answer because there were no politicians responsible for administration in SWA. Up to now there was only an Administrator-General, who in fact ruled the country and as far as that was concerned there was a very good understanding between us. I don't think there would be any major difference or any major change in this regard. As far as security is concerned, we work on a combined operation plan and combined strategy that's been built up and made available in cooperation with all sections of the community, and I think we will continue to work along those lines. I don't foresee any trouble at this stage of the game.

SJB: Philip Frankel, in his recently published book, *Pretoria's Praetorians: civil-military relations in South Africa* (Cambridge: CUP, 1984), p. 42, has written that the extent of military influence in the public policy-making process has become "so great that some commentators have been led to conclude that in the policy-making realm Namibia is, to all intents and purposes, a military fiefdom". Is this an exaggeration?

GLM: I would think so. In fact, I would definitely say so because in no way is the military in supreme control. The only area where we have a major influence here is that of the final decision making in the actual security area and even then only insofar as the security angle of that area is concerned. We support the local authorities and we do not take any action whatsoever that is not cleared with these people, except, as I say, in the area where it is our responsibility —safeguarding the lives of the people.

SJB: But in conventional wars and counter-insurgency operations elsewhere the military invariably have a greater input in the political decision-making process. Surely, that applies to the situation here as well?

GLM: I think it acts both ways. Take our latest operation in Angola at the

beginning of last year. That was a major political decision to stop at the time, so I think the input works both ways. You make a suggestion in the policy-making area and from there it depends on what type of input you deliver and also on what decisions have to be taken over what area. If of course you are in a major war, the opinions of the military will obviously have more weight. If on the other hand you are in a political situation, surely the military input would not carry as much weight as it would in other cases? But I think you cannot completely put the two political and diplomatic areas in one corner and the military in another corner. There is a good deal of interaction all along the line.

SJB: Moving away from SWA/Namibia for a moment, how do you react to Kenneth Grundy's conclusion that the SADF "is no longer simply an instrument for policy implementation [but] an active participant in policy-making . . . in military matters, in wider security issues, both domestic and external, and even in matters concerning the homelands and economic and foreign policy". *The Rise of the South African Security Establishment: An Essay on the Changing Locus of State Power* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, Bradlow Series No. 1, 1983), p. 1.

GLM: One has in the decision-making mechanism the Minister of Law and Order and the Minister of Defence, who is also head of a department. He must obviously get information from his department to enable him to offer significant input; it would be irresponsible to take a decision without a military input because it influences the safety of the state. In that direction I would say that the military has an input but I would not be able to make any further comment because I just don't have that information.

SJB: How have André Beaufré's writings on counter-insurgency influenced the ideas and actions of your staff in the war against SWAPO?

GLM: We are not using directly André Beaufré's writing alone. We based our actions and our ideas on a wide number of writers as well as on certain practical considerations that we found along the way. There are certain actions, I think, that you could say are taken more from practical experience than from any author up to now. We found that one of the best books in this line is by John J. McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War* (Faber and Faber, London 1968), which we felt has a distillation of many other sources and his own findings as well. This we use more than anything else, directly. And we also evolved our strategy from other aspects.

SJB: Beaufré emphasises terms like "total strategy in the indirect mode" where "grey matter takes over from brute force"?

GLM: I quite agree with him, but I don't like the way he puts his statements. They are very vague at times. You could turn a wagon and a team of oxen around him. That is why I say we merely take note of what he says. I do agree that you need not to work harder but to work more cleverly and more with the mind than you would with the body; in that I would agree with him. But we found that philosophy alone, and logically speaking, strategy alone, does not quite work out; you must have also a specific framework against which you can measure your plans. I think the writings of John J. McCuen are more practically inclined; they give you better ideas, but let you make your own decision within practical limits based both on theory and on a good philosophical view of things. So I think I do agree, and I do agree that we would work along these lines.

SJB: Given a good deal of talk to the effect that this war is eighty per cent a political war and twenty per cent a military operation, to what extent does the military establishment get involved in the wider decisions affecting the war?

GLM: It depends, if again I can quote McCuen. He sees revolutionary war being fought in four stages: the organisational phase, the terrorism phase, a guerrilla phase and a mobile warfare phase. If you agree that his strategy says: to fight a revolutionary war you have to determine which phase you are in — then use the direction of that phase and turn it back on itself. In other words, a counter-organisational phase, a counter-terrorism phase, a counter-revolutionary stage and a counter-mobile phase. And depending on what phase you are in determines the degree of military involvement. In the organisational phase, I think the influence of the military is not so big. If you continue to the terrorism phase, I think it becomes much more. I am not talking only about the twenty per cent that you mentioned, I'm talking about the entire counter-revolutionary struggle. In guerrilla warfare the military almost carries the entire can and if it is mobile warfare it does carry the whole can. So one should first determine the phase of the counter-revolutionary war, then determine how far to carry this thing. If we take the operational area, for instance, we may agree that in a certain part of Ovamboland we are in the terrorist phase, so one of the things to do is to guarantee the safety of the human being; to let him decide and then to counter the propaganda, to counter the mobilization of the masses, etc., etc., in that you are helped by a police force which does all the policing activities. You are helped by the local authorities, they must pay out pensions, and see that proper services are run, etc. You are helped by the politicians because they must carry on normal political activity, so that you have a direct involvement. In certain cases where the local authorities



can't cope, where pensions can't be paid out for instance, we will provide a convoy to carry the people across to pay out pensions, or a specific guard for the headman, to safeguard him against attacks at night. And in other cases where the local authorities can't cope, where you don't have enough teachers or enough people looking after agriculture, and things like that you will, in fact, help out the local authority to tide them over that period. It is a difficult question to answer but we are quite involved in the entire spectrum of this war.

SJB: What lessons were learned from the Rhodesian Army's Civic Action Programme?

GLM: How not to do things.

SJB: And what sort of things have you learned not to do?

GLM: Well, they acted too late — too little, too late. They acted with things like a *cordon sanitaire*, with guarded villages. I think it backfired on them. I don't think we would use that sort of action. But the main thing I think is that they didn't understand the nature of the war before it became too late, and it showed us that you must bring in a civic action programme far, far earlier than they started out. That's why I said we learnt what not to do, because it was no use at the time they tried to do it. They were clutching at straws. They thought they could solve this thing with the police and the military. They eventually found out that it's a war of hearts and minds of the people but they started too late in life, to help them out of this thing.

SJB: And the experiences of other armies — such as the British in Malaya, and the Israelis?

GLM: We learnt a lot from Malaya and a very large number of basic actions that the Brits employed and that they learned through experience in Malaya, we also employ. Large parts of the McCuen treatise on these things are also taken from lessons learned in Malaya, lessons learned by the French in Algeria and in Indo-China. We learnt a lot from the faults of Chiang Kai-shek fighting Mao Tse Tung. We learnt from the war fought in Greece; contrary to normal belief, Greece really fought a war through all the phases from mobile warfare back to complete peace and freedom, while the Brits only fought from a guerrilla and in certain cases only the terrorism phases back to the organizational phase in Malaya. We learnt a lot from the French in Algeria. The French had this thing almost taped before the territory was actually given away underneath their hands so to speak. We didn't learn a lot from the Israelis in this sort of warfare because they don't fight it in the same way as we do. They fight with brute force and ignorance I think — yet in a civic action way, fighting the war in

a way that it should be fought. I think we learnt a lot from other armies, yes.

SJB: In an article on the Civic Action Programme in *Paratus* a few years back it was argued that "supportive services evolve around the principle of building and maintaining a contented, if not prosperous, community which otherwise would have fallen prey to subversive SWAPO activities, which is an imminent threat to all of SWA/Namibia's eleven population groups. The discontented community lacking an operational and effective socio-economic structure is the ideal target for SWAPO activities . . .". How successful has the Civic Action Programme been in winning the support of the local peoples?

GLM: I think very much so. In Kakaoland, that is the western part, there is no way that SWAPO can survive. There is no way whatsoever. The western part of Ovambo was usually teeming with SWAPO activity and we now have a great deal of information coming from the local population, telling us where SWAPO is, where caches are and so forth. The central part of Ovamboland is a unique part of the world because there live fifty per cent of the Ovambos, which accounts for twenty-five per cent of the entire population of SWA/Namibia. That part of the world was at the beginning of 1983 what we would call the worm in the apple. It was to all intents and purposes in the guerrilla phase of revolutionary war. Major bands of SWAPO, thirty-forty and sometimes up to one hundred were roaming around the area, moving freely across the border. The people either wouldn't or couldn't give any aid to the security forces. They backed SWAPO completely. Then we mounted Operation Askari, where we pushed SWAPO back out of contact with the population and then decided we would put a high density team into operation in the area. We divided the area into twelve parts and we assigned a major platoon to each part. The platoon would consist of intelligence personnel, doctors, veterinary surgeons, agriculture people, people that could mend pumps, tractors, fix wheelbarrows and bicycles and bakkies; a dominee to go along and talk to the local padres and so on. We played soccer with the kids; we gave them chocolates or biscuits or whatever. We patrolled the area intensively. We saw that every kraal in that area was visited once a week, and slowly but surely the infiltration zone was moved back so far so that the terrorists themselves say that they can't survive in central Ovamboland. With everything they could give throughout the present insurgency period they had never had more than seventy terrorists in that area, where there were normally bands of more than one hundred walking around and these were in twos and threes walking in civilian clothes.

And we managed, in fact, to catch a lot of these people, to get them out from among the local population basically because they (the local population) came forth with the information. It is also our major recruiting area for 101 Battalion. We established another company in that area and we start recruiting these people. We let them know that we have vacancies for about 200 people and almost 3 000 people lined up to come for these vacancies. So they are also identifying themselves with the security forces which they haven't done so much in the past. I can go on like this over the entire area. I feel very confident in the fact that we are really winning the hearts and minds of the population.

SJB: Have your forces ever encountered local suspicion/cynicism with regard to this battle for hearts and minds? If so, has this sometimes resulted in major set-backs to this dimension of the total strategy?

GLM: Oh yes. You do get that from time to time I am sure—but you know, they must be convinced of your sincerity and once they are convinced of your sincerity this goes by the board, of course. You will always find the hard case who thinks this is nonsense, but the people themselves are proving to us that the majority of them like our approach.

SJB: Have such suspicions actually led to any major setback in a particular area?

GLM: The setback we do get is that of SWAPO coming in the night to cut their throats, which creates a major problem, because SWAPO will say that this man was an informer and that is why his throat was cut. In fact, this tactic is now increasing because SWAPO in no other way can get its influence back, so they're reverting to very hard intimidation, but if you can give the local people a guarantee of safety you recover the ground. I hope this answers your query?

SJB: Is there ever a contradiction between the Civic Action Programme and other, more orthodox, military activities?

GLM: I don't think so. I think it is a very well combined operation. You use exactly the same techniques of war in another way. You work from a solid base, a strategic base, you do planning, you do strategy and you have goals. The goals are a little bit different. You don't fire live rounds of ammunition at people to enable you to reach a goal or an objective. Looking back perhaps ten years ago it would seem strange to imagine doing things like this.

SJB: The Civic Action Programme appears to have been particularly successful in western Caprivi. Why is this?

GLM: It is strange that you should ask this question in this way because there is no real Civic Action Programme in this sense there. In the

western Caprivi there is only a number of Bushmen. The Civic Action Programme I believe is much more successful in Kavango or in central Ovambo than anywhere else, because there it worked against an established SWAPO presence, whereas in the western Caprivi there never was a SWAPO presence, the programme there really is not so much civic action, as winning back the hearts and minds of the people. In that sense it works well, because we have Bushmen there who fled Angola in 1975 and established a base at Omega. We are now uplifting the bushmen out of a primitive age into the twentieth century.

SJB: I asked the question because the western Caprivi tends to have a high profile perhaps due to the original "backwardness" of the people.

GLM: Yes, I think there lies the real interest. It is more in the upliftment side of it. You are uplifting a tribe, a people, from a stone age to a modern society: so much so that some of them even have electric lights in their houses which they bought themselves. So it is a hell of a wide gap that we've bridged for these people, without any ill effects.

SJB: Clearly in this case this is one of the lessons you've learned from Rhodesia. Getting into the area early—long before a SWAPO incursion.

GLM: Yes. Long before. Quite.

SJB: How good is your intelligence system—particularly in terms of feedback from the local population?

GLM: Very good. I could show you pictures, illustrated in little diagrams and graphs and histograms. For argument's sake, say in 1983, I think we had, 65 cases which resulted directly in either a SWAPO cache being found or a SWAPO kill, flowing from information obtained from the local population. In 1984, we had almost 300 such cases, so it has increased four-fold over one year. This year it is much higher still. The number of mines lifted is more in the first four months of this year than it was in three years put together and this also is the result of people coming forth and saying "there are mines being placed" or "there is a cache of mines" and so on. I think the intelligence is good as a whole. I think the intelligence resulting from the information flowing from the local population has increased tremendously, dramatically so.

SJB: Is this the result of the Civic Action Programme? Is it also the result of disillusionment with SWAPO? Is it a two-sided thing?

GLM: I think it is something of both, yes. The security forces also give a more secure environment in which to come forth and tell. It is a continuous snowballing effect.

SJB: SWAPO has orchestrated a major propaganda campaign against the South African role in SWA/Namibia. How are you able to counteract these activities?

GLM: This is a very difficult thing to do because as you know SWAPO has been named by the UN as the sole authentic representative of the peoples of Namibia. The SWAPO propaganda is very good, in fact, if I am not mistaken, the UN spent R750 000 a year solely and directly on SWAPO propaganda. Quite apart from indirect aid, SWAPO gets a lot of money from the UN, from worldwide sources. They use the propaganda machine of Russia very well and also those of Angola, China, Algeria, Zambia. There is a lot of propaganda going on. I think at the moment, facts speak for themselves more than anything else can. There is, in fact, as far as I am concerned, a disillusionment amongst certain black leaders in Africa with SWAPO because SWAPO said to them that they were going to gain control in this country by a certain date. This date has never come. They also said, as they say every year, this year will be the time when they will throw SA troops out of this country. They haven't done so yet and to all intents and purposes SWAPO's actual strength has dwindled from potential manpower of over 16 000 in 1978 to not more than 8 500 at best now. Despite all the recruitment over the years, just in terms of numbers, SWAPO has been declining a lot, so I think in matters of fact we can counteract their propaganda here. Whether one is able to counteract propaganda overseas in the written press I am not very sure because nothing one says in SWA/Namibia is believed so much as SWAPO counter-propaganda. It is a very difficult question to answer.

SJB: What contribution do black soldiers make to your forces' overall results?

GLM: I can put it to you in this way: I don't think we would be able to cope without black soldiers. Black soldiers do a lot. At the moment of the fighting soldiers in the operational area, 61 % of them are South West African and of that 61 % I would say almost 70 % are black. We have a number of very good battalions there: 101 Battalion is in Ovamboland with a strength of more than 2 000. We have 102 Battalion in Kakaoland. We have 202 Battalion in Kavango and 203 and 201 — two Bushmen battalions. We have 701 Battalion in Caprivi and we have 911 Battalion in Windhoek which normally supplies a company for a continuous period in the operational area and they are very good troops. They are in fact very seasoned troops at this stage. Some of the major successes in operations come from these black troops. I am very happy with them.

SJB: You mention experience and you've hinted at motivation — that

they are motivated and believe what they are fighting for.

GLM: They are very well motivated. Many of them come from families that have actually suffered at the hands of SWAPO. Many of them have had a brother or sister or a father or mother or many families who have died because of SWAPO atrocities and this is also a driving force behind them, to get even with SWAPO. But they are very loyal—very loyal to their unit or to the territory force and they are very loyal to their officers. I think this is also a major contributory factor.

SJB: There have been several reports that the majority of officers in SWA/Namibia have been impressed by the ability of black, white and coloured soldiers to interact on a non-racial basis. How has this helped to contribute to the prosecution of your campaign in the operational area?

GLM: I think a lot. Soldiers are soldiers. It doesn't matter what colour or creed you are: when you fight you are as one, and this I think contributes largely to the successes, to the interaction of the forces among one another. We find that we have—I'm not even talking White and Black—I'm pointing to Herero and Ovambo who were harsh enemies from way back yonder and we did find that we have competition between the two. If they do get drunk now and then you find that there can be a bit of a clash between them but in the actual working of the unit in day-to-day organization, out on patrol and on operations, these people work together tremendously well.

SJB: Who do the indigenous population fear most—your units or those of SWAPO?

GLM: I think SWAPO, because we do not use violent intimidation and SWAPO does. They know we protect, they know SWAPO kill, and there is a major difference between the two.

SJB: In a letter to the *Cape Times* on 9 May 1985, Mrs Helen Suzman wrote (in a reply to a piece by Willem Steenkamp on 1 May) that "the citizens of South West Africa/Namibia [would] be immeasurably better off without Koevoet". Would you care to comment on her assessment?

GLM: I do not think she is very well informed. I would contradict that completely. Koevoet is a very good fighting unit. They are very good, very capable. They are very good as far as tracking is concerned, very good soldiers. They are effective fighters. We had in the early stages atrocities ascribed to Koevoet—every one of these was investigated and quite a number of these originated from some of the white population, from the white part of Koevoet. This was ironed out. We went into this matter with a fine toothcomb and we found that many of the atrocities ascribed to Koevoet were actually com-

mitted by the special constables, the guards of the local headmen who are not under our control but they also wear camouflage uniforms and they want to be big men; they call themselves Koevoet and do something bad, then Koevoet gets the blame for this. Koevoet is not entirely scot free, of course. I mean, if you do a follow-up, some of your men have just been killed by stepping on a Pom-Z mine which SWAPO has put on the track for you, you come into a local kraal and you ask them where they are — you see the tracks and you ask them where are these people. They say they don't know. At that stage tempers run high, it is only natural that a few hard hits would be handed out around the corner. But on the whole I would say Koevoet, as far as killing SWAPO is concerned, is a very good machine. And Koevoet gets information by asking the people. Most of the time they work in their home areas. I don't think her statement is true at all. Basically the propaganda against Koevoet was started by SWAPO. We have definite indications of this. SWAPO really fears Koevoet. They couldn't break them any other way but by using propaganda. They haven't succeeded in that either. So I think people accepting this sort of statement are very ill-informed, actually.

SJB: Is it good PR for members of this unit to be seen wearing T-shirts bearing the message: "Our business is killing and business is good"?

GLM: It is not, it has been changed. They don't wear these at all now.

SJB: What about allegations concerning SWAPO atrocities?

GLM: We have a little paper we put together some time ago indicating the atrocities of SWAPO. It gives a very good comparison between the two sides.

SJB: How would you describe your attitude to the military tactics and strategy employed by SWAPO operatives?

GLM: They have successes now and then but they are very stereotyped in their actions, very predictable. This year we thought that they might change tactics, but they didn't. They did exactly the same. They followed all the same routes coming down. They had the same tactics as they used before. What saves them is that the area is so large and the bush is so thick that you cannot find them as easily as you would like to *but apart from that, I don't have a very high opinion of their fighting ability. I would like to qualify that by saying I met some of the Rhodesian fighters — "the boys in the bush" — and I think SWAPO are better than those. They are also better than the Angolans (Fapla). A large number of them fight UNITA. More than 2 400 of them are used to pay their keep in Angola by fighting next to Fapla against UNITA. From reports received UNITA find them a harder soldier than the Fapla forces. We find that once they are cornered they fight*

very well, because they can't flee. But we don't regard them as really good fighters.

SJB: The independence of Angola in 1975 gave SWAPO insurgents the external bases it needed to escalate their armed struggle in SWA/Namibia. This situation has now changed. It is now being argued that SWAPO's faltering guerrilla campaign has suffered a serious blow from the terms of the Lusaka Agreement between the RSA and Angola. What does the agreement mean to your overall strategy?

GLM: It didn't help us much, not in the military sense. It helped in the diplomatic sphere, in the political sphere, but military-wise, no way. At the time of the Lusaka Agreement we were sitting at a place called Tchemukele in the southern part of Angola. It was a very strategic position about 250 km from the border. There was at that stage an estimated 90 SWAPO left over in the entire SWA/Namibia. Following the Lusaka Agreement, to show its good faith, South Africa withdrew all its forces from Angola a week before the Lusaka conference started. From then until the time the JMC had been established, back at Cuvelai when we could go back up to the JMC lines so to speak, about 800 terrorists came through the area in question. They filled the vacuum. And we had our work cut out — the better part of last year — to weed them out. In fact, I think we weeded out about 600 of them last year of the 800 who came through. In the area in question they moved through at will. Their bases are still established in Angola; they are just further away from the border than they used to be just after 1975. They are still there and they still use the same logistic routes. They are not openly supported by Fapla but if Fapla really wanted them out they could have done so; they could have put Sam Nujoma in jail or cut off their logistic support or something drastic like that. They never did. They tried to prevent them by talking to them but not very hard at that. If you have been fighting alongside a man for 15 odd years you just don't turn against him in a matter of minutes or months. This is exactly what happened. They still have a sanctuary in Angola. So from a military point of view, the Lusaka Agreement didn't help us one little bit.

SJB: In fact, you are almost suggesting it's done the opposite?

GLM: Not quite, not quite. We were able to do certain things with this but we would have been better off without it.

SJB: The Joint Monitoring Commission. Is it working and could its brief be improved upon?

GLM: It's stopping at the moment because the Lusaka Agreement terminates on 16 May and from all that I could gather up to now it will not be continued. I don't think that the MPLA would in fact want it to continue because they have achieved their end in getting South



Africa out of their country. As far as I could glean from the talks that were held on the 9th, it's going to terminate on the 16th.

SJB: Is there any possibility of a further reduction in military activity in the operational zone?

GLM: It is like pushing a lorry up a very high dune. You can see the top but the top is angled and coming from the bottom you can't even see the top, then all at once you can see the top. If you leave it alone now it will run all the way back, slowly at first and then faster and faster. So, you cannot really reduce your effort until such time as you are completely on top. I would think a reduction in the near future of force levels would be disastrous. I don't think it should be done. That is what you read in the books: you shouldn't stop too quickly — you should go the whole hog until you have got the position completely under control. I think that is all I'd like to say on this one.

SJB: Are cross-border hot pursuit operations still the order of the day?

GLM: No.

SJB: But earlier this month General Magnus Malan, the Minister of Defence, warned Angola that operations over the border would be resumed if they didn't act against SWAPO themselves.

GLM: At the moment there are no over the border operations whatsoever. There is not a single South African soldier left in Angola except the two platoons that were at Calueqhe on a combined operation guarding the dam with two platoons of Fapla. It depends on the outcome of the talks at ministerial level, whether they will be withdrawn or not. Apart from them, there are no troops in Angola, and no over the border pursuit operations whatsoever. But we have said to the MPLA and Fapla: "we do not promise to cut out hot pursuit operations. You had better take SWAPO out of the area because we will not be responsible for our actions if we follow SWAPO". This is stated loud and clear and I believe that if the occasion does arise, we will go ahead on that basis.

SJB: One factor that tends to dominate talks on the SWA/Namibia question is the presence of the United States. How is this influence felt in military circles?

GLM: I think first of all it was the involvement of the United States as a so-called honest-broker that led to the Lusaka Agreement, so that did have an influence on the military side. There was always an influence felt indirectly via Foreign Affairs from the US on the actions at the JMC, for instance whenever it was time for a possible move of the JMC headquarters further south, there would be a high level conference held between people of the military and Foreign Affairs, discussing conditions and the actual situation, to decide whether we

should propose a further move or not. Then we would go into a combined session with the MPLA and Fapla people on the other side. In that sense there was a slight influence felt as to how the Americans would react if we did this or that, but no direct influence whatsoever on the military side.

SJB: Since the failure of the US to come to South Africa's aid in Angola in 1975, can the Americans still be trusted by South Africa?

GLM: It depends on whether this is in the interests of America. I think South Africa would be naive to do so at this stage. In 1975, things were not going the Americans' way at that stage either and yet they made a promise that they couldn't keep . . . I think one should be very careful in analysing in what terms the Americans put forward a proposal because, as was said so many times, the Americans will do anything if it is in their own interest and if it is not they will not do it. I think therefore one should just be careful in working with all nations of the world to see whether the interest of a specific nation coincided with one's own. If it does, fine, if it does not, one should be able to barter or negotiate to find a happy medium. The word of a nation means nothing if it is not in its own favour. It would be stupid of America not to act in its own interests.

SJB: Would the South African military and political authorities ever overcome their long-standing opposition to a SWAPO-dominated Namibia?

GLM: We are working not to have a SWAPO-dominated Namibia. If one looks at SWAPO's terms of reference, its basic document, it says categorically that it stands for a one-party state, that it stands for a Marxist dominated state, that it is against South Africa, that it will give the ANC a springboard into South Africa. Just looking at it strategically, if one has a country the size of SWA/Namibia unfriendly towards South Africa, it is strategically wrong and so you work to create a country that is favourably inclined. Therefore, I think this question answers itself. There is no reason to have a SWAPO-dominated government in this country, no reason whatsoever; the only status SWAPO really has at the moment is PLAN (People's Liberation Army of Namibia) and that is a crumbling power base; when that is gone, SWAPO will be but another political party in SWA — which is what we are working for: to take the subversion away from the politics. That is all I am interested in.

SJB: And, finally, a question put to Dr Chester Crocker by Professor Hermann Giliomee (Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town) in the United States on 1 May 1985: Does the new arrangement for self-rule in Namibia make any sense to you?

GLM: I wouldn't like to stand next to Dr Crocker in answering this ques-

tion. We look at it from two completely different points of view. It certainly makes sense to me. Up till now, the people of this country were ruled by a single man and they are getting now no other powers beyond those stated so far, but which give them as people of this country, a separate say in their own matters and which is quite natural as far as I am concerned. It is a matter of evolution. It doesn't negate the use of any UN resolution to take this country into internationally recognized independence. It is just an interim step. It gives the people a feeling that they are responsible for their own future, which I think is a very good thing — on the grounds that the people have more interest now in their own future than they have had before, when they were ruled by one man from South Africa, as they saw it. And now they are becoming responsible for their own well-being, with the aid of course of South Africa and this I feel is a major improvement.

SJB: Well, thank you very much, General Meiring.

GLM: You're welcome.

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## Zimbabwe and Namibia

Text of a message sent by the Acting Prime Minister and ZANU (PF) Secretary for External Affairs, Cde Simon Muzenda to the President of Swapo, Cde Sam Nujoma, on the occasion of Namibia Day 26 August 1985.

On behalf of the Central Committee of ZANU (PF), the Government and people of the Republic of Zimbabwe, I wish to convey revolutionary greetings and warm congratulations to you, your party, and the people of Namibia on the occasion of Namibia Day.

Namibia Day to us is a constant reminder of the supreme sacrifices and noble goals of the heroic people of Namibia in their struggle for liberation. We in Zimbabwe are consciously aware of the continued suffering of our brothers and sisters in Namibia under the oppressive yoke of the colonial occupation of their country by apartheid South Africa. Indeed we share your anger and indignation at the loss of innocent blood being shed by the Pretoria regime's racist troops.

On this occasion we salute you and reaffirm our unequivocal support for, and solidarity with, SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, in its just struggle for national independence and self-determination. We remain unflinchingly committed to the demand for the immediate implementation of the UN Security Council resolution 435 as the only peaceful way to bring about the independence of Namibia. In the light of that, we totally reject the insistence by the Pretoria regime and its western allies on linking Namibian independence to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.

Today marks the 14th anniversary of the launching of the armed struggle by SWAPO. In the face of the apartheid regime and its puppets' intransigence, the armed struggle must be intensified until total victory. Therefore, as SWAPO rededicates itself to that struggle, I avail myself of this opportunity to wish you success in the year ahead.

Accept, Comrade President, my best wishes for your personal good health and the assurances of my highest consideration.

Footnote: Text supplied by the Department of Information, P.O. Box 8150, Causeway, Harare.

## Zimbabwe and SADCC

Speech by Prime Minister, Cde Robert Mugabe, at the summit meeting of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in Arusha, Tanzania 9 August 1985.

As we come to the conclusion of this historic summit, it is a great pleasure and honour for me to make a few remarks by way of seconding the sentiments which have already been eloquently expressed by the Chairman and President of the Republic of Botswana, Dr Quett Masire.

Indeed, this is a momentous occasion in the short but rich history of SADCC. Since the SADCC was founded, six years ago, we have become very accustomed to the very valuable contributions to the success of our regional organization by the United Republic of Tanzania under the wise leadership of Mwalimu Julius Nyerere. Today, we have heard him bid us farewell, and I feel greatly honoured to have been granted this opportunity to pay tribute to this tremendous colleague and friend; to this great man, leader and son of Africa.

I am sure, Mr Chairman, I am expressing the sentiments of all of us here when I say that it is very difficult to envisage how we will fare without the wise counsel, the experience and unfaltering helmsmanship of President Nyerere. It is the feeling perhaps of a ship that has or is about to lose its captain.

Mr Chairman, there is really no need to recount here the well-known story of our dear colleague's singular and equally wealthy career. In fact, even if I had wished to do so, I could probably have never had the ability or enough time to do justice to such an immense responsibility. For, indeed, when the complete and correct history of our continent's decolonization and the post-colonial era is written and analysed, President Nyerere's will be a chapter full of brilliance and fascination. This challenge we must leave to our own scholars to take up.

Under his imaginative and creative leadership and guidance, since independence, the people of Tanzania have successfully fought and overcome the colonial legacy of the balkanization of their country and society. Today, perhaps more than any people in Africa, they can boast the existence and flourishing of a new order characterised by stability, peace and unity.

Mr Chairman, as we all know, this meeting was supposed to have been hosted by our Angolan brothers. There is no doubt, the usual warmth and hospitality of the government and people of Angola would have guaranteed us success in our deliberations. However, the decision to change the venue of the meeting to Arusha was not only correct in the circumstances, but also highly commendable. For, what greater honour could our young regional organisation do this remarkable colleague and friend, who has devoted the past six years to the building of this viable organisation, than to give him the joy of hosting for the last time one of its summits. Our sincere gratitude goes to you, Mr Chairman, for conducting successful consultations leading to this decision, and also to the government and people of Angola for their understanding and co-operation.

Mr Chairman and distinguished colleagues, SADCC was conceived six years ago out of a keen awareness among us of the fact that for any of our countries, a transition from colonialism to national statehood, important as that was, was only a first step towards achieving real independence: that is economic as well as political independence. We formed the SADCC group, not out of fear, but because we were convinced, and continue to be convinced, that only by economic co-operation, not by competition and conflict, by co-ordination and dialogue between and amongst our governments and peoples, as independent, sovereign and equal nations, could we realise and secure our common interests, goals and destiny. It was clear to us that, as together our countries and peoples had suffered the devastation and neglect during colonial rule for long generations, now as free and independent nations we must together face and tackle our daunting and challenging tasks of mobilizing and organizing our resources for the benefit of all our peoples, now and for generations to come. Both in the conceiving and the realization of the SADCC idea, the intellectual and practical contributions of Mwalimu Julius Nyerere were as immense as they were invaluable.

It must be a cause for profound satisfaction, joy and even pride to him, therefore, that at the time of his richly deserved retirement SADCC is a very much flourishing success story. I am sure, we all agree, that the greatest challenge before us at this stage is to ensure the continued success of this great experiment. We are of course pleased to know that our colleague's retirement later this year will not in any way mean the end of his interest in the welfare of the peoples of our region.

Mr Chairman, this summit has been presented with an informative review of the progress so far achieved. We are all greatly encouraged by the detailed and instructive reports presented by the various sectors. There is indeed justifiable optimism in the future of the great human endeavour and joint venture that is SADCC. Every worthwhile effort must be made during the next five years to implement the Plan of Action, along the lines that will also simultaneously contribute towards continent-wide efforts to implement the Lagos

Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos as reaffirmed by the OAU three weeks ago.

Mr Chairman and distinguished colleagues, this summit and our efforts both nationally and collectively within SADCC, are taking place against the background of economic destabilization, naked military aggression and insecurity caused by the criminal activities of the apartheid regime of South Africa. Indeed, even now as we are gathered here, the people of Angola and Botswana are still preoccupied with the processes of assessing the casualties, in terms of both human life and property, of recent unprovoked invasions against their countries by the racist regime's forces.

The regime, as we all know, has also arrogated to itself the role of training, equipping and directing bandits and dissidents for the purpose of brutalizing and murdering innocent civilians engaged in productive endeavours in neighbouring states. Within South Africa itself and in occupied Namibia, the regime has unleashed a reign of terror, under which it cold-bloodedly murders hundreds of those resisting it and imprisons even thousands more.

Yet, dear colleagues, for our people there is no alternative but to forge ahead with determination against all these odds. We must continue our support for and solidarity with the struggling oppressed masses in Namibia and South Africa. SADCC has greater stakes and vital interest in the struggles in the two countries. For one reason, the defeat of racist colonialism and colonial occupation ensures the elimination of destabilization in our region, so that all our material, financial and manpower resources may be channelled towards improving the quality of life for all our peoples. And, for another, both Namibia and South Africa will take up their rightful places, not only within SADCC, but also in the international community.

Mr Chairman, if we are going to succeed in our SADCC efforts, and succeed we must, two factors are equally crucial: the intensification of efforts in the mobilization of our own resources, and the continued flow of external goodwill and material and practical support. As we know, excellent feasibility studies of project proposals have been carried out in the various sectors. Practical proposals and suggestions have been made for their implementation. For example, in the Food Security Sector, for which my country is responsible, while high priority has been given to short and medium-term measures necessitated by the need to deal with the effects of the three-year drought, work has also continued on long-term measures designed to improve productivity, irrigation development, food storage and distribution.

We believe, Mr Chairman, that as far as the regional food plan is concerned, some progress has been achieved in the implementation of an inter-related set of agreed projects which are aimed at the establishment of a comprehensive network of institutions to strengthen SADCC's capacity to respond, at regional level, to some of the problems which have for a long time undermined the ability of member states to achieve food security. Progress has involved the establishment of:

- (a) an early warning system for food security;
- (b) regional resources information system;
- (c) inventory of agricultural resource base;
- (d) food processing technologies; and
- (e) the post-harvest loss reduction system.

In addition to the establishment of these institutional arrangements, bold steps and plans are in hand to deal with the development of:

- (i) food reserves in the region;
- (ii) food marketing infrastructure; and
- (iii) regional seed production and supply.

Mr Chairman, we can be assured that with the increased efforts, goodwill and direction, in food and agricultural development programmes, our region should have the capacity to respond to the problems of food security in a few years.

With our Programme of Action thus shifting from project identification to project implementation, I note with satisfaction that the Council of Ministers, assisted by the Secretariat, has deemed it necessary to assess problems and difficulties which our organization experienced during the past five years in its relationship with the international co-operating partners. Arising from this exercise, a full-scale review of the existing organizational and legal arrangements has proved to be necessary in an effort to decide whether these modalities are in all respects best suited for their expected purposes and objectives.

Mr Chairman, I also note with satisfaction that alongside the foregoing review, we have so successfully deliberated on a programme of work aimed at producing a five-year strategy in each sector.

It is equally pleasing to note that the Secretariat will proceed with the preparation of a regional macro-economic survey which should ensure that sectoral strategies, so worked out, are realistically related to the region's economic and other relevant conditions.

The macro-economic survey, upon which new strategies currently being worked out will be anchored, is of vital importance in that objective facts about the economic reality in our region will be laid before us to determine matters of policy. It has been argued for example that, whilst the drought has had a severe and tragic impact on our region, the declining trend in food production which we have witnessed in the last three years cannot be blamed entirely on short-run cyclical factors, natural calamities or external aggression. This only underscores the importance of the various exercises which I have referred to already. Development must also mean our ability to adapt to natural calamities through the establishment of a firm base in agricultural productivity.

Mr Chairman, Your Excellencies, I do not wish to review everything which we have deliberated on at this historic summit. My main point is to



express on behalf of us here, our tribute and sense of appreciation for Mwalimu's dedicated service to the people of Tanzania, of the Southern-Africa region and the entire continent of Africa, and to wish him a happy retirement from government service.

We also wish to pledge to those who shall succeed him that we shall continue to work with Tanzania to widen and consolidate the close solidarity that was forged between our countries under Mwalimu's leadership. Together we shall continue the struggle for our own further development and for the total liberation of our continent.

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# United Kingdom and Southern Africa

Extracts from a speech given by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe, QC, MP, to the Royal Commonwealth Society, on 23 July 1985.

It is tragic that recent years should have brought such serious economic difficulties to Africa. As I have said, many governments are tackling them with resolve, especially where there is a firm basis of internal stability. But some serious political problems remain. Most of these are for Africans to solve with the support and encouragement of their friends. But the problems of Southern Africa stand apart. The raids by South African forces, including that into Botswana in June, and the mounting violence in South Africa itself, underline the urgent need for progress on these problems.

It is easy to forget in the face of such outrages that Southern Africa as a whole has seen major changes in the last ten years: the independence of Mozambique and Angola in 1975; the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980; and the Nkomati Accord in 1984. Britain has played a part and we do not intend to opt out. We have watched with great sympathy Mozambique's struggle to overcome threats to stability. We have increased our aid and recently we have agreed, in conjunction with the Government of Zimbabwe, to give military training to selected members of the Mozambican Army within Zimbabwe.

## South Africa

Within South Africa there is much of real value which South Africa inherited from its links with Western Europe — a body of law, a legal system, a constitutionally based administration, and a significant role for the press. It is this which needs to be strengthened for the future. South Africa's developed economy could contribute much to the health of the region. Yet so much of what could be intrinsically good is shared on a basis of grotesque inequality.

Let there be no doubt about our abhorrence of apartheid and all the repressive measures used to enforce it. Apartheid is unacceptable, unworkable and indefensible. It is contrary to all British and Commonwealth values. It is given added repugnance by the existence side by side of two communities — a ruling minority and a majority deprived of power — between whom the inequalities, in terms of material possessions, education and expectations are vast. Most repugnant of all is the fact that these inequalities are built upon foundations of racial discrimination.

It is just because we condemn apartheid so strongly that our efforts to promote change in South Africa through continuing involvement in that country are not always understood.

I hope it will be clear from what I have said that our differences are about means rather than ends. We have been following closely the debate on selective economic sanctions in the United States and in other Western countries. Every new outrage in South Africa gives those who press for such measures further ammunition. Western governments certainly ask themselves seriously whether such measures offer the right approach, whether their existing policies have failed so badly that they should abandon them and, in effect, disengage in any constructive sense from the problems. Frankly I do not believe this would be right. We remain firmly opposed to economic sanctions of any kind.

- Sanctions against Rhodesia served to strengthen parts of the white business sector at the expense of blacks. The South African economy is much stronger and more diversified than was Rhodesia's. It would undoubtedly adapt to sanctions.
- The effects of economic measures would of course be felt most keenly by black South Africans. They would also affect the economies of South Africa's neighbours even if the latter did not formally participate in the sanctions policy.
- We oppose sanctions because we believe that economic growth in South Africa offers the most likely route for peaceful political change. We should be looking for ways of strengthening these internal economic forces, especially the growing economic power of the black community; the black trade union movement, and the facilities for training and education of blacks. The application of sanctions would mean an end to all these activities.

As Mrs Helen Suzman remarked recently in Luxembourg, sanctions would in fact "Blunt the only weapon that blacks have . . . the economic muscle that accompanies upward mobility on the ladder by virtue of greater skills and increased consumer power". Alan Paton, too, has argued very recently that his conscience would not allow him to support disinvestment, since in his view those who would pay most grievously for it would be the black workers of South Africa.

I believe that we have been right to draw attention to those reforms that were until recently beginning to emerge. We have emphasised that they were only a small beginning. The lot of some black South Africans had in some respects begun to improve. But the fundamental reforms which we all seek have still not been taken in hand. And tragically such changes as have taken place have been accompanied by repression in its ugliest form. The South African Government's call earlier this year for a dialogue with black South Africans has been flatly contradicted — and indeed frustrated — by the arrest

of many of those whom black South Africans regard as leaders. And the state of emergency declared over the weekend will add to the growing numbers who languish in detention without any legal recourse.

What must be done? The state of emergency sharply underlines the urgent need to redress fundamental grievances. The South African Government should be in no doubt of our strong conviction that their society must evolve in a way which will provide a system of Government which commands the support of the people of South Africa as a whole. It is not for us to prescribe cut-and-dried solutions. The most urgent priority is action, and action of a convincing and effective kind, to create a climate of confidence which will permit a real dialogue with the genuine leaders of the black community, whom blacks must be permitted to choose. The dialogue cannot avoid the fundamental question of the political aspiration of blacks. And the dialogue must be seriously meant and tenaciously pursued. This requires bold steps by the South African Government.

- The unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and other acknowledged political leaders;
- an end to forced removals;
- an end to detention without trial;
- an early end to the state of emergency;
- the progressive abolition of discriminatory legislation such as the pass laws and the Group Areas Act;
- a commitment to some form of common citizenship for all South Africans.

I am sure that all those who are working for peaceful evolutionary change in South Africa know that an outcome must be found whereby white South Africans are guaranteed their rightful place, but not more than their rightful place, in any future South African political system.

British and other foreign companies in South Africa cannot expect to continue their activities there as though they were in a political vacuum. Many, indeed most, accept their responsibilities willingly. They play constructive and positive roles.

Apartheid is abhorrent in moral and social terms. Beyond that, the practical effects of apartheid hold back South Africa's economic growth potential, based on her vast natural resources, which could contribute much more to the welfare of all her peoples.

The private sector must continue challenging these conditions, which impede its own success as much as they are socially unjust. The EC Code of Conduct can play a very important part in that respect. For it is clear that the further economic development of South Africa will hasten the collapse of apartheid. The commitment to the ending of job reservation, and the acceptance of blacks as permanent residents in the urban areas are evidence of this. There is considerable scope for further initiative by British companies: com-

munity works, social welfare of their employees, equal opportunities. And the private sector must play a full part in the broader political life of South Africa, condemning repression and working for peaceful change.

### **Namibia**

I turn now to another issue which is of great concern to the British Government. The settlement of the Namibia problem is long overdue. Namibia needs a truly independent and representative government. This is not only in the best interests of Namibians themselves. Greater stability and an end to cross-border violence is clearly in Western interests too. The world cannot wait for ever while South Africa delays. The South African Government should be in no doubt of the responsibility it bears for its unlawful occupation of Namibia. Nor should it believe that the world will accept the unilateral establishment of an interim administration. Such measures have no status whatsoever under the UN settlement plan.

### **Cross-Border Violence**

There must be an end, once and for all, to the sort of violence we saw recently in Gaborone. The UK is no stranger to terrorism and condemns without qualification violence by the ANC or anybody else who employs it in the course of seeking political change, inside or outside South Africa. But nothing can justify the actions which this regional superpower has been prepared to mount against its weaker neighbours. If there is to be any prospect of stability and economic recovery in the region, actions of this kind must cease.

I have explained what I consider needs to be done to solve these complex and deeply worrying problems:

- To secure the independence of Namibia in accordance with SCR 435;
- to press ahead with the changes that are needed to bring apartheid to an end;
- and to prevent a recurrence of the recent attack on Gaborone and the shootings at Uitenhage.

Our approach is shared by our partners in the European Community. Foreign Ministers of the Ten yesterday issued an important statement about the situation in Southern Africa which reflects very closely the policies which I have just described.

The only course of action consistent with our values and our record is to do what we have done elsewhere—over the major problems of debt, drought and famine: to remain closely and continuously involved and to work for positive, peaceful change. I can assure you—and this is my main message to you today—that the British Government will remain energetically and actively involved in pressing for solutions to all these problems, and in particular in pressing for the establishment of genuine, non-racial democracy in South Africa.

Text supplied by British Information Services, Johannesburg.

## Canada and South Africa

Text of the statement issued on 6 July 1985 by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark.

Canadian policy on human rights in South Africa follows a tradition of special involvement and concern which dates back to the early sixties. When John Diefenbaker returned from the meeting in London which resulted in South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth, in 1961, he told the House: 'I took the position that if we were to accept South Africa's request unconditionally our action would be taken as approval, or at least condonation, of racial policies which are repugnant to and unequivocally abhorred and condemned by Canadians as a whole'.

Canadians are aware that no country's record is without blemish on questions of race and colour. Our own approach cannot be a vindictive or self-righteous one: we must lament all instances of prejudice.

There are flagrant violations of human rights in countries other than South Africa — and Canada has protested against them in clear and forceful terms. But we surely cannot ignore a situation, in a country once close to us, where the principles of equality and justice are so grossly denied. South Africa stands alone in continuing to pursue an official and avowed policy of separation and discrimination based on race and colour.

The fundamental changes in South Africa we had hoped for — during the past quarter century — have not come about. One tragic incident follows another — almost 400 South Africans have lost their lives in the past year, reflecting growing frustration at exclusion and rejection. In these circumstances the persistence — the enormity — of institutionalized racism can only cause a widening gulf between our two countries.

We regret that. But the time has come for basic change for the repudiation of apartheid as a concept and a policy.

Let me address a brief word, in this context, to the Government of South Africa and its supporters. We believe a change of direction is possible within South Africa and in South Africa's relations with other countries. Though it may seem frightening to some, it is surely better to abandon conflict and to

enter into partnership with all South Africans than to persist in the present course. If the Government of South Africa continues to proceed timidly and grudgingly at each step, and continues to put down non-violent opposition, even the most moderate may reach the end of their patience, and be driven to violence. Far better to admit all South Africans to full participation in the affairs of their country now. Far better to rebuild your ties with other countries. That is the future we hope to see.

In view of the continuing violence imposed by apartheid within South Africa and the repeated attacks on neighbouring states, we must, however, make our position clear. Canada cannot tolerate a course which means continued repression within South Africa, and lawless raids outside — on countries which are our friends and our partners in the Commonwealth. There is a rising tide of revulsion in Canada — and elsewhere — at the injustices of apartheid. We cannot accept that the majority of South Africans should remain on the outside, deprived of dignity and basic human rights, harassed by police, arbitrarily held in detention, denied citizenship, some separated from their families, all deprived of a true voice in their own country's affairs.

It has been too long, much too long when apartheid needs to be defended outside the country's border by gross violations of other countries' sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the suffering too great. It must not continue.

That is the view that has been forcefully conveyed to me by many Canadians. That is the sense drawn from many Canadians who have written to express their views and from the consultations we have held with interested Canadians from all walks of life. There is a widespread desire for Canada to take a strong stand and to play a constructive part, even if it involves some costs for us.

I am announcing today some further measures as an immediate response to the situation which confronts us. They are, however, only part of a larger process. I hope that Canadians will participate in a broader review of Canada's relations with South Africa through the hearings of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations. They can thus participate in making the choices, including what burdens we should bear.

The additional measures we are introducing, like those which preceded them, do entail some costs for all Canadians, whether as taxpayers, exporters, investors or sports people. In the circumstances, the burden is not heavy and it is widely distributed.

The new measures are as follows:

1. The Government has decided to strengthen the voluntary "code of conduct concerning the employment practices of Canadian companies operating in South Africa" in three ways.

—I shall shortly appoint an independent and impartial administrator for the code, and companies will be expected to submit to him copies of their

annual public reports. He will work with the companies and other interested parties, monitor compliance with the code, and submit an annual report to me which I will table in Parliament.

—A standard reporting format has been devised for the preparation of reports and will be made available to companies operating in South Africa.

—Because some uncertainty has arisen, I also want to make it clear that all Canadian companies operating in South Africa, including those with minority holdings are asked to issue annual reports pertaining to their involvement there.

2. The Government will tighten its application of the United Nations arms embargo by restricting exports of sensitive equipment such as computers to the police, the Armed Forces, and other South African departments and agencies involved in the enforcement of apartheid.

3. The Government has accepted the voluntary United Nations embargo on the importation of arms manufactured in South Africa. This measure was recommended by the UN Security Council last year. It will now be enforced in Canada.

We are, by several steps, terminating a number of official measures which lend support to trade with and investment in South Africa.

4. The Canada-South Africa Double Taxation Agreements will be abrogated. That is the fourth measure.

5. The Programme for Export Market Developments (PEMD) will no longer be available to Canadian exporters for market development in South Africa.

6. We are also terminating the applicability to South Africa of global insurance policies issued by the Export Development Corporation under section 24 of its Act.

7. Canada has been a faithful adherent of the sports boycott first agreed at the Commonwealth meeting in 1977. We are now reaffirming our backing of the boycott on sporting contacts between nationally-representative Canadian and South African athletes. For greater clarity and certainty in its application, the Minister of State for Fitness and Amateur Sports and I have agreed to specific guidelines. They are being issued today in the form of a press release and will be made widely available to sporting organizations. They cover contacts in Canada, South Africa and third countries.

8. The next measure relates specifically to Namibia. As a further voluntary measure, under Security Council Resolution 283, which recommended that countries end commercial activities related to Namibia by agencies under Government control, the Government has decided to terminate all toll-processing of Namibian uranium imported from South Africa. Such processing, has been carried out under contracts between Eldorado Nuclear, a Crown Corporation, and parties in third countries.

Existing contracts will be honoured, but no new contracts for processing



of Namibian uranium imported from South Africa will be entered into. Should South Africa set a date for the implementation of the UN plan for Namibian independence, we shall consider rescinding this measure.

9. The Security Council recently recommended that governments prohibit the sale of Kruggerands in their jurisdiction. Because that may involve problems with GATT, we have decided to discourage their sale by drawing that resolution to the attention of all Canadians and by conveying it to the financial institutions which deal in gold coins. I would emphasize that the Security Council's resolution is not binding. There is therefore no coercion in this matter but our consultations make us confident that the recommendation will be respected.

10. Because co-operation between government departments and agencies may directly or indirectly lend support to the enforcement of apartheid, the Government has decided to monitor more closely contacts between federal departments and agencies and departments and agencies of the South African Government, particularly in sensitive areas. The measures I have cited reinforce Canada's opposition to apartheid. We are also introducing several measures specifically designed to help facilitate peaceful change.

11. We intend to appoint an officer to our Embassy in South Africa charged with responsibility for labour affairs. The mandate of the officer will be to follow the rapidly evolving labour scene in South Africa, the development of non-racial trade unions, and to facilitate co-operation in the labour area. We shall, of course, be consulting with the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) on this matter.

12. Finally, we plan to increase very substantially the funding available to support the education and training of blacks in South Africa and Canada. Some \$5 million has been set aside to support an expanded programme. The World University Service of Canada and the South African Institute for Race Relations have played a key role in our current project and I wish to pay tribute to them. We shall be examining how best to proceed with an expanded programme.

Those are the measures I am announcing today. As I mentioned earlier, they are part of an on-going process.

First we shall continue our review of policy toward South Africa in consultation with the Parliamentary Committee and interested Canadians who come forward to address it. We invite them to do so.

Second, we are going to discuss these questions and the choices open to us with our close friends and allies. That will not be done on one occasion, but through continuing talks and exchanges. The meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government in October will, however, be a particularly important occasion for examining how our goal of peaceful progress towards a free and equal society in South Africa, living at peace with its neighbours, can best be

realized. Some conclusions may be drawn at that time.

Third, the recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee, after its hearings are concluded, will provide a further basis for determining the course to pursue and the progress being made in dismantling apartheid. That is the process we are pursuing.

Let us look to a brighter and better day — when such measures may be abandoned. When tolerance and understanding may grow out of the sad ashes of conquest, colonialism and racial separation; when the people of South Africa may join in a common effort and build a common society.

Mr Diefenbaker said there would always be a light in the window for South Africa. That remains true today. We look to the resumption of old ties and the creation of new ones — when all South Africans are treated on the same basis under their law and constitution — the steps I have announced are signs of Canada's commitment to that goal.

Footnote: Text supplied by the Canadian Embassy, Pretoria.

## United States and South Africa

The following Section contains statements on the relationship between South Africa and the United States made by President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz on 9 September 1985. The original statement by President Reagan has been omitted as the text has already appeared in full in the daily press.

### Text of Executive Order on Relations with South Africa 9 September 1985

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), the United Nations Participation Act (22 U.S.C. 287), the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.), the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), the Foreign Service Act (22 U.S.C. 3901 et seq.), the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App. I), Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, and considering the measures which the United Nations Security Council has decided on or recommended on Security Council Resolutions No. 418 of 4 November 1977, No. 558 of 13 December 1984, and No. 569 of 26 July 1985, and considering that the policy and practice of apartheid are repugnant to the moral and political values of democratic and free societies and run counter to United States policies to promote democratic governments throughout the world and respect for human rights, and the policy of the United States to influence peaceful change in South Africa, as well as the threat posed to United States interests by recent events in that country,

I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, find that the policies and actions of the government of South Africa constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy and economy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.

Sec. 1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following transactions are prohibited effective 11 October 1985:

(a) The making or approval of any loans by financial institutions in the United States to the government of South Africa or to entities owned or controlled by that government. This prohibition shall enter into force on 11 November 1985. It shall not apply to (i) any loan or extension of credit for any educational, housing, or health facility which is available to all persons on a nondiscriminatory basis and which is located in a geographic area accessible

to all population groups without any legal or administrative restriction; or (ii) any loan or extension of credit for which an agreement is entered into before the date of this Order.

The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out this subsection. The initial rules and regulations shall be issued within 60 days. The Secretary of the Treasury may, in consultation with the Secretary of State, permit exceptions to this prohibition only if the Secretary of the Treasury determines that the loan or extension of credit will improve the welfare or expand the economic opportunities of persons in South Africa disadvantaged by the apartheid system, provided that no exception may be made for any apartheid enforcing entity.

(b) All exports of computers, computer software, or goods or technology intended to service computers to or for use by any of the following entities of the government of South Africa:

- (1) The military;
- (2) The police;
- (3) The prison system;
- (4) The national security agencies;
- (5) ARMSCOR and its subsidiaries or the weapons research activities of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research;
- (6) The administering authorities for the black passbook and similar controls;
- (7) Any apartheid enforcing agency;
- (8) Any local or regional government or "homeland" entity which performs any function of any entity described in paragraphs (1) through (7).

The Secretary of Commerce is hereby authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out this subsection and to implement a system of end use verification to ensure that any computers exported directly or indirectly to South Africa will not be used by any entity set forth in this subsection.

(c) (1) Issuance of any licence for the export to South Africa of goods or technology which are to be used in a nuclear production or utilization facility, or which, in the judgment of the Secretary of State, are likely to be diverted for use in such a facility; any authorization to engage, directly or indirectly, in the production of any special nuclear material in South Africa; any license for the export to South Africa of component parts or other items or substances especially relevant from the standpoint of export control because of their significance for nuclear explosive purposes; and any approval of retransfers to South Africa of any goods, technology, special nuclear material, components, items, or substances described in this section. The Secretaries of State, Energy, Commerce and Treasury are hereby authorized to take such actions as may be necessary to carry out this subsection.

(2) Nothing in this section shall preclude assistance for International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or IAEA programs generally available to its member states, or for technical programs for the purpose of reducing proliferation risks, such as for reducing the use of highly enriched uranium and activities envisaged by section 223 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 10203) or for exports which the Secretary of State determines are necessary for humanitarian reasons to protect the public health and safety.

(d) The import into the United States of any arms, ammunition, or military vehicles produced in South Africa or of any manufacturing data for such articles. The Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense are hereby authorized to take such actions as may be necessary to carry out this subsection.

Sec. 2. (a) The majority of United States firms in South Africa have voluntarily adhered to fair labor principles which have benefitted those in South Africa who have been disadvantaged by the apartheid system. It is the policy of the United States to encourage strongly all United States firms in South Africa to follow this commendable example.

(b) Accordingly, no department or agency of the United States may intercede after 31 December 1985, with any foreign government regarding the export marketing activity in any country of any national of the United States employing more than 25 individuals in South Africa who does not adhere to the principles stated in subsection (c) with respect to that national's operations in South Africa. The Secretary of State shall promulgate regulations to further define the requirements of this subsection and procedures to ensure that such nationals may register that they have adhered to the principles.

(c) The principles referred to in subsection (b) are as follows:

(1) Desegregating the races in each employment facility;

(2) Providing equal employment opportunity for all employees without regard to race or ethnic origin;

(3) Assuring that the pay system is applied to all employees without regard to race or ethnic origin;

(4) Establishing a minimum wage and salary structure based on the appropriate local minimum economic level which takes into account the needs of employees and their families;

(5) Increasing by appropriate means the number of persons in managerial, supervisory, administrative, clerical, and technical jobs who are disadvantaged by the apartheid system for the purpose of significantly increasing their representation in such jobs;

(6) Taking reasonable steps to improve the quality of employees' lives outside the work environment with respect to housing, transportation, schooling, recreation, and health;

(7) Implementing fair labor practices by recognizing the right of all employees, regardless of racial or other distinctions, to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labour organizations, freely and without penalty or reprimand.

sal, and recognizing the right to refrain from any such activity.

(d) United States nationals referred to in subsection (b) are encouraged to take reasonable measures to extend the scope of their influence on activities outside the workplace, by measures such as supporting the right of all businesses, regardless of the racial character of their owners or employees, to locate in urban areas, by influencing other companies in South Africa to follow the standards specified in subsection (c) and by supporting the freedom of mobility of all workers, regardless of race, to seek employment opportunities wherever they exist, and by making provision for adequate housing for families of employees within the proximity of the employee's place of work.

Sec. 3. The Secretary of State and the head of any other department or agency of the United States carrying out activities in South Africa shall promptly take, to the extent permitted by law, the necessary steps to ensure that the labor practices described in section (2) (c) are applied to their South African employees.

Sec. 4. The Secretary of State and the head of any other department or agency of the United States carrying out activities in South Africa shall, to the maximum extent practicable and to the extent permitted by law, in procuring goods or services in South Africa, make affirmative efforts to assist business enterprises having more than 50 per cent beneficial ownership by persons in South Africa disadvantaged by the apartheid system.

Sec. 5. (a) The Secretary of State and the United States Trade Representative are directed to consult with other parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade with a view toward adopting a prohibition on the import of Krugerrands.

(b) The Secretary of Treasury is directed to conduct a study to be completed within 60 days regarding the feasibility of minting and issuing gold coins with a view toward expeditiously seeking legislative authority to accomplish the goal of issuing such coins.

Sec. 6. In carrying out their respective functions and responsibilities under this order, the Secretary of Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce shall consult with the Secretary of State. Each such Secretary shall consult, as appropriate, with other government agencies and private persons.

Sec. 7. The Secretary of State shall establish, pursuant to appropriate legal authority, an Advisory Committee on South Africa to provide recommendations on measures to encourage peaceful change in South Africa. The Advisory Committee shall provide its initial report within 12 months.

Sec. 8. The Secretary of State is directed to take the steps necessary pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act and related legislation to (a) increase the amount of internal scholarships provided to South Africans disadvantaged by the apartheid system up to eight million dollars from funds made available for fiscal year 1986, and (b) increase the amount allocated for South Africa from funds made available for fiscal year 1986 in the Human Rights Funds up to 1,5

million dollars. At least one-third of the latter amount shall be used for legal assistance for South Africans. Appropriate increases in the amounts made available for these purposes will be considered in future fiscal years.

Sec. 9. This order is intended to express and implement the foreign policy of the United States. It is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person.

(signed) Ronald Reagan

#### President Ronald Reagan's Message to Congress on South Africa 9 September 1985

Pursuant to section 204 (b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703 (b), I hereby report to the Congress that I have exercised my statutory authority to declare that the policies and actions of the government of South Africa constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy and economy of the United States and to declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.

Pursuant to this and other legal authorities, I have prohibited certain transactions, including the following: (1) the making or approval of bank loans to the South African government, with certain narrow exceptions; (2) the export of computers and related goods and technology to certain government agencies and any apartheid enforcing entity of the South African government; (3) all nuclear exports to South Africa and related transactions, with certain narrow exceptions; (4) the import into the United States of arms, ammunition, or military vehicles produced in South Africa; and (5) the extension of export marketing support to US firms employing at least 25 persons in South Africa which do not adhere to certain fair labor standards.

In addition, I have directed (6) the Secretary of State and the United States Trade Representative to consult with other parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade with a view toward adopting a prohibition on the import of Krugerrands; (7) the Secretary of the Treasury to complete a study within 60 days regarding the feasibility of minting US gold coins; and (8) the Secretary of State to take the steps necessary to increase the amounts provided for scholarships in South Africa for those disadvantaged by the system of apartheid and to increase the amounts allocated for South Africa in the Human Rights Fund, and (9) the Secretary of State to establish an Advisory Committee to provide recommendations on measures to encourage peaceful change in South Africa.

Finally, this order (10) commends the efforts of US firms in South Africa

that have voluntarily adhered to fair labor, nondiscrimination principles and encourages all US firms to do likewise.

I am enclosing a copy of the Executive Order that I have issued making this declaration and exercising this authority.

1. I have authorized these steps in response to the current situation in South Africa. It is the foreign policy of the United States to seek peaceful change in South Africa, and in particular an end to the repugnant practice and policy of apartheid and the establishment of a government based on the consent of the governed. Recent developments in South Africa have serious implications for the prospects for peaceful change and the stability of the region as a whole, a region of strategic importance to the United States. The recent declaration of a state of emergency in 36 magisterial districts by the government of South Africa, the mass arrests and detentions, and the ensuing financial crisis are of direct concern to the foreign policy and economy of the United States. The pace of reform in South Africa has not fulfilled the expectations of the world community nor the people of South Africa. Recent government actions regarding negotiations on the participation of all South Africans in the government of that country have not sufficiently defused tensions and may have indeed exacerbated the situation.

Under these circumstances, I believe that it is necessary for this nation to recognize that our foreign policy of seeking change through peaceful means is seriously threatened. In order for this nation successfully to influence events in that country, it is necessary for the United States to speak with one voice and to demonstrate our opposition to apartheid by taking certain actions directed specifically at key apartheid policies and agencies.

2. The above-described measures, many of which reflect congressional concerns, will immediately demonstrate to the South African government the seriousness of our concern with the situation in that country. Furthermore, this declaration mobilizes the influence of the private sector to promote an improvement in the economic prosperity, freedom, and political influence of blacks and other nonwhites in South Africa.

(signed) Ronald Reagan

Transcript of President Ronald Reagan's Question and Answer Session with Journalists 9 September 1985

Q: Why did you change your mind on sanctions?

President Reagan: I haven't. I thought here I tried to explain. I am opposed and could not sign the bill if it came to me containing the economic sanctions



which, as we have repeatedly said, would have harmed the very people we are trying to help.

Q: But much that's in that — in your order —

A: But there are — no, there were many things in that bill that we could agree with and many of those are incorporated in this Executive Order.

Q: Those are basic sanctions, aren't they?

A: Not in the sense of the economic kind of sanctions that the bill called for and that, as I say, would have hurt the economy there.

Q: And this won't hurt the economy?

A: No, I don't believe so.

Q: You've basically put the weakest measures in the congressional package. Why should this satisfy those in Congress who want a strong message sent to South Africa?

A: We have consulted with some of them and found that there is a great deal of approval for what we're doing here and they see the intent of this.

Q: South Africa's business leaders have been talking about meeting with its black political leaders, but President Botha has described this as disloyal. What do you think?

A: We happen to believe that negotiation is the thing that must take place, and we hope that maybe we can persuade them that they should, with the responsible black leaders, they should negotiate with regard to the solution of the problems.

Q: Can you still call your policy towards South Africa constructive engagement?

A: Yes, you might add the word "active" to constructive, but yes, I do think it is. It is similar to what we have been doing in the past.

Q: What changes would have to take place in South Africa for you to lift these measures?

A: I think the negotiations that lead toward the steps necessary to bring about political participation by all the citizens of South Africa, and when they start those constructive steps, as I've said, there isn't anything that's going to be achieved overnight. And —

Q: So a dialogue would be enough?

A: No, I think out of that dialogue then would come further steps leading toward, as soon as possible, the end of apartheid.

Q: At what point would you feel free to lift what you've done today?

A: Well, that would be hard for me right now to say. I think you have to see the intent and see whether the steps are being taken in a forthright manner, or whether there is some trying to give in here and there, but still hold off from the ultimate results. So let us wait and see what happens.

Q: What are you saying in your letter to Botha? Basically, is it the same premise?

A: I assured him of our desire to be of help in this and to be of help in the

further progress that we hope they intend to make.

Q: How would you describe the kind of message you think this action is sending to South Africa?

A: I think the same kind that we've been using before. It is persuasion, but also indicating that the American people can get impatient with this, that we all feel very strongly about the changes that are needed in that society.

Q: Since the bill is so similar to what you are proposing, why would you veto it?

A: Because, as I say, there were features in there —

Q: What? Which ones?

A: You see, this wouldn't have been necessary if I had what a president should have, which is line-item veto. I could have signed the bill and line-item vetoed out the —

Q: What don't you like?

A: Well, as I say, basically, let me just sum it up and say the actual economic provisions that we thought would have militated against the chance for prosperity and good living of the people we want to help.

Q: Would you tell us, however, if you have discussed this matter with Congress, and what kind of response you are going to get? Aren't you, in effect, stealing their thunder a bit here with what you're doing?

A: No, we have discussed this with leaders of the Congress, and have been very pleased with the reaction that we got.

Q: If these sanctions don't bring progress, the kind of progress you're looking for, will you take stiffer sanctions then?

A: That we'll look at when that comes. But remember, we're talking about a sovereign nation, and there are limits to what another country can do. We can't give orders to South Africa. We're trying to be helpful to them, knowing that there is a large element in South Africa which also wants an answer to this problem.

Q: Do you intend to keep the ambassador there? He was recalled several months ago because of displeasure over policy. Will he remain in South Africa?

A: Yes. I said good-bye this morning.

Q: Have you spoken personally to President Botha about this action?

A: No, I have written him.

Transcript of Secretary of State George Shultz's Question and Answer Session with Journalists 9 September 1985

Q: If the policy is no longer constructive engagement, what are you calling it? And how can you say that these are not economic sanctions, thereby a reversal of the policy of the President?

Secretary Shultz: The President, in his comments after his statement, used the word "active" as well as "constructive". And, of course, we remain engaged and involved. And I think that has been our approach all along — the President's approach. And we all feel that it is essential in South Africa, where we have a stake, both a moral stake and a stake in our interests, that we are there and that we exercise our influence; that we are engaged and we do it in a constructive way and an active way.

And I think, beyond that, the more we are there diplomatically, the more our labor people are there, the more our business people are there, the more interplay there is. And that is the way in which we can exercise our influence.

Q: The President said these are not economic sanctions. How can you say these are not economic sanctions and that this is not a policy reversal for him?

A: Well, these are a codification and a setting out, some things that are presently being done, some that are strengthened and made more clear, basically growing on the conference report of the Congress of those things that they had planned to put into effect right away, although with some changes. And these are actions that are designed to register our view against apartheid, as distinct from actions designed to have an effect by depriving people in South Africa of economic livelihood, particularly Blacks, of course.

So, the President has tried consistently to make that distinction and in selecting the things in the conference report that were slated, if the bill would pass, to go into effect immediately and not including the overhang of disinvestment and other types of economic sanctions. The President has been true to this purpose.

Q: Why not simply ban Krugerrands — Krugerrand imports as Congress would have done? Why give it to GATT? GATT doesn't usually —

A: We don't give it to GATT. We are a party to what amounts to a treaty. GATT is a treaty. And when you sign it, you undertake certain obligations. And, so, if we want to do something in the field of trade, such as stopping the import of something, then, our treaty obligations under GATT come to bear.

So, we want the prohibition on the import of Krugerrands to be done in a proper way so that it will be effective, and we won't have a major suit on the subject. And so that is the approach we're taking.

I might say this was debated as the bill was being considered, and I think the point is a recognized point.

Q: Could you discuss the details of the letter to Botha or any of its provisions?

A: No, I can't. I don't think it's appropriate — I know it's not appropriate to discuss or to release the contents of a message from the President to Mr Botha. However, as the President said, it expressed the concern of the United States, it expresses our desire to be constructively engaged, you

might say to coin a phrase, and also the seriousness with which we take this.

Now, I believe that in taking this action, the President has — and this is part of his intent — tried to send a single message to the government of South Africa and the people of South Africa on behalf of all Americans, on behalf of all the government, on behalf of the Congress and the Presidency, that apartheid must come to an end. And we look to the government of South Africa to work with Blacks, black leaders and others in their country to bring it to an end. That's the message.

Q: Are you calling for one man, one vote?

A: We are calling for the parties concerned to engage with each other and discuss the problem and how to resolve it.

My experience on these things is that there is a key break-over point that must be reached, and that is the point at which people conclude that the system, or whatever it is you're seeking to change, but in this case, the system of apartheid, is going to end. And that is not the subject of argument. The question is how. And once that psychology is created, then the problems of how you end it and what you do can be worked with in a more operational way and a more satisfactory way. And that is the point that I hope they are reaching in South Africa.

Q: Yes. You all have constantly said that if you put economic sanctions against, it's going to hurt the Blacks. Less than one percent of the Blacks work in those factories. When Alan Boesak was over here, he said he wanted the privilege to decide what misery he would accept. And my question is, this is not over — the fight is not over economics with the Blacks, this is a side issue. It's over freedom. And aren't you missing the point if you don't attack this from freedom, just as the Americans did during the Revolutionary War? They weren't all economics of freedom. Aren't you missing the point?

A: The statements you made are precisely why the President picked out measures that are aimed at apartheid, like the ban on computer sales to agencies whose activities have a bearing on the administration of apartheid, and not things that would have some major disruptive economic effect.

Now, I think I am fairly stating the point that the economic progress in South Africa and the participation of Blacks in it, and I might say with American firms leading the way, has enabled Blacks to acquire skills, to have access to on-the-job training, to move up in the skill and managerial ladder, and to have a basis for forming labor unions — labor unions now being one potential source of expression of black concerns. All of this is part of the economic base.

And beyond that, of course, is the livelihood of people there, and not only the livelihood in South Africa, but the whole region is interdependent and what happens in South Africa has a great bearing on what happens in Botswana and so on and so on.

Q: Have you received assurances from (Senate Majority Leader) Robert

Dole and other legislative leaders that they will put over a vote until March and would you welcome such a move on their part? Do you think that that would help keep the pressure on South Africa to change?

A: I feel privileged that both (Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman) Richard Lugar and Majority Leader Dole have spent considerable time with me and colleagues in discussing this issue. How they react and what they will decide to do, of course, is for them to say, and no doubt they will give their views.

I believe and the President believes and I feel that they believe, too, that if we can, it is most important that we as a country express our view in a unified way on this subject. And that is why the President has done what he has done. And I might say that if you look at the structure of the Executive Order and much of the content of the bill, you see that there is a great parallelism there.

Q: What are the features of the measures before the Senate today that you find objectionable — specific features that you object to?

A: The most objectionable feature is the overhang of economic sanctions that stand there as things that might be triggered in at some moment of time. So, as I keep saying, the President has wanted to distinguish between measures directed against apartheid and measures that would wind up with substantial loss of jobs. That's the big distinction.

There are a lot of other distinctions between the Executive Order and the bill, some of them technical such as the slight difference on how to approach the banning of Krugerrands, and there are a number of other things of that kind that distinguish the Executive Order and, we think, improve it over the bill. But the item that I mentioned I think is the principal one.

I might just say, as a matter of something that I would personally be involved in very much, on the subject of an advisory committee. In the bill, the advisory committee provided for is essentially to advise on the labor relations and economic matters, basically having to do with the Sullivan Code. In the Executive Order, the advisory committee is to look at the whole range of developments having to do with the end of apartheid and advise on it. So the mandate is broader. And I hope that it will be possible to have an advisory committee that cannot only make a report at some moment of time, but also be useful in counseling on events as they occur. And we all know there'll be a pattern of events. We don't know what they are. But I hope the advisory committee will be useful in that regard.

Q: Why shouldn't we construe this as the administration being stampeded to cut Congress off at the pass? You weren't for these measures before. You are for them today because you knew that legislation would probably pass. And that appears to be the only reason, and not your burning desire to wipe out apartheid.

A: Some of these measures are in effect now and are being codified. For

example, there are prohibitions on sales of computers. There are prohibitions on sales of nuclear materials, since South Africa has not signed the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, and so on. So there are things that are now being dealt with that are brought together. I think they're improved, they're strengthened on things like scholarships. The amount of money is somewhat larger, and so on.

I think the President's purpose here is, of course, in part to avoid a fight over something where there is a large measure of agreement. But more important, to reach out to the Congress and reach out to the American people and say together, let us send a message about apartheid and work together as effectively as we possibly can to do whatever we can to bring it to an end. That's the reason for it.

Q: Can you tell us if this Executive Order would have been issued around now in the absence of the imminent passage of the bill this week?

A: Well, there are a whole set of events, of course, that have taken place. There's a real dynamic here. And no one can say — abstracting something or other if Mr Botha hadn't given a speech in the middle of August that was a great disappointment, if this, if that, if something else. So I think about the right thing to say is that there is a flow of events here and, under all the circumstances, the President felt that the United States would be well served by this action, and he's taken it.

Q: You said that this package is designed, I think you said something to register United States disapproval of apartheid. Doesn't returning our ambassador on the very same day weaken that message?

A: On the contrary. The ambassador will go with a letter from the President, and I've indicated the general content of it. It will supplement and support the ideas that the President expressed in his statement and are expressed, so to speak, in the Executive Order as such.

Furthermore, the object of an ambassador is to represent us, to represent us with the government, to represent us with groups in the population of South Africa. So, we called him back for consultations. We've benefitted a lot from having his first-hand views here. And we felt that at this point it's important for him to be at his post and on his job there doing the representational duty that ambassadors do all around the world.

Q: What are the prospects that the South African government might retaliate for the sanctions by withholding strategic minerals that we are very dependent upon?

A: I don't think there is much prospect of that or a desire to do that.

I might say that they're looking for all of the export — foreign exchange they can get. So I think that's a very unlikely matter. And I hope that the net impact of the President's action will be to focus the attention of South Africa on the importance of really coming to grips with the problem of apartheid

and acting on the basis that it is going to end and the question is how. And, of course, we think the "how" should be answered through a process of discussion and negotiation.

Q: Ambassador intends to leave?

A: Well, I think the President said he said good-bye to him this morning. And I don't know when he actually takes off. But he's on his way.

#### Extract from a Statement on The Rev. Sullivan's Original Principles for South Africa

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6. Improving the quality of employees' lives outside the work environment in such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation, and health facilities.

Footnote: All texts in this section supplied by US Information Services, Johannesburg.

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