

THE S.A. INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS  
**ARCHIVES**  
NOT TO BE REMOVED

---

SAIIA

---

**SOUTH AFRICAN RECORD**



NUMBER 6

DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE  
THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

**SOUTHERN AFRICA RECORD**, which is issued by the Institute on an irregular basis (the first number having appeared in March, 1975) contains the original texts of, or extracts from, important statements by political leaders, government representatives and international organisations, concerning international relations in the southern region of Africa. In addition to statements on issues of current concern, some significant statements made in the past are included in the **RECORD** from time to time. The reproduction of these policy statements of the past and present, is intended for information and reference purposes, not only for students, but for all those who are concerned with the relations between the countries of Southern Africa.

Statements are reproduced if and when texts become available (not in chronological order), and it must be emphasised that the selection of statements included in **SOUTHERN AFRICA RECORD** should not be regarded as exhaustive or even representative. Nor should the selection be regarded in any sense as indicating a viewpoint as to the relative importance of one or other statement over another not reproduced or reproduced in a later number of the **RECORD**. In any case, as the Institute itself cannot, in terms of its Constitution, hold a viewpoint on any aspect of international affairs, no views expressed in any statement reproduced in the **RECORD** should be identified with the Institute.

The price per issue of **SOUTHERN AFRICA RECORD** is R1,50. As the **RECORD** is issued on an irregular basis (about four times a year), there is no annual subscription rate, but subscribers are charged annually for the issues of the **RECORD** received by them during the previous year.

Orders for the **RECORD** should be addressed to the Administrative Secretary, S.A.I.I.A., P.O. Box 31596, Braamfontein, 2017, South Africa.

# SOUTHERN AFRICA RECORD

NUMBER SIX

SEPTEMBER 1976

---

## CONTENTS/INHOUD

Address by U S Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, to the Annual Conference of the National Urban League in Boston, on 2 August, 1976	1
Toespraak deur Dr. Hilgard Muller, Suid-Afrikaanse Minister van Buitelandse Sake, tydens die Natalse Nasionale Party-Kongres, 13 Augustus, 1976	13
Address by U S Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, in Philadelphia, on 31 August, 1976	23
Transcript of the Press Conference of U S Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, in Zurich, Switzerland, on 6 September, 1976	35
Statement on Namibia by the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mr. Nathaniel Davis, delivered before the Sub-Committee on International Resources, Food and Energy, of the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, in Washington D.C., on 10 June, 1975.	42
Constitutional Conference of South West Africa (Turnhalle Conference)	48
A. Declaration of Intent issued on 14 September, 1975.	
B. Statement issued by the Constitution Committee of the Conference on 18 August, 1976.	
C. Statement issued by the Constitution Committee of the Conference on 16 September, 1976.	

**ADDRESS BY U S SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY  
KISSINGER, TO THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE  
NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE IN BOSTON, 2 AUGUST, 1976**

More than a century ago Abraham Lincoln remarked that Americans were the *Almighty's almost chosen people*. Whether he meant that the Almighty had given us careful consideration and decided to pass us by, or whether He was simply being modest on our behalf, I do not know. I prefer to believe, however, that He meant that America had been provided with everything – material and spiritual – needed to lead the world toward a better time, and that the rest was up to us. In the one hundred and eleven years that have passed since an assassin's bullet ended Lincoln's life Americans have done much to make this a better world. More than any other nation, America has stood in opposition to intolerance, poverty, and war. We have offered a haven to the homeless, and food to the hungry; we have striven to bring hope to the downtrodden and freedom to the oppressed. Being human, we have known prejudice, injustice and cruelty; our institutions have sometimes been rigid and unresponsive. But being a nation of principle, our values have goaded our conscience; we have regularly produced sweeping movements for change which have given new impetus to our institutions, and fresh dedication to our people. Americans have never been satisfied with what we were, so long as it was less than what we knew it should be.

The Urban League epitomizes those qualities. This organization has worked tirelessly against prejudice and for equality with wisdom and uncompromising principle. The League has been a part of the conscience of our time. I have known this personally since the 1950's because of my friendship with Lester Granger, one of the founders of the Urban League. He was a fine man and a distinguished American who felt deeply that genuine progress for Black and White alike could only come through co-operation. Because of that friendship and because of the distinguished work of this organization it is a special honor for me to be here today.

My purpose is to speak to you about the foreign policy of the United States, and in particular about Africa. No part of the world more challenges American purposes and values than that vast and vital continent.

There is, first, a profound human and moral dimension to America's ties with Africa. Three months ago I stood in the dank cells of a slave prison on the Isle of Goree in Senegal, from which hundreds of thousands of Africans were forcibly transported to the new world. I was deeply moved by that grim and awesome scene. The institution of slavery still remains and always shall remain the worst blot on the

history of our nation. It has affected the lives of every American who has ever lived. Its bitter residue continues to this day. Our challenge now is to show the world that the two races who began their association so tragically can surmount the legacy of the past and learn to live together in freedom and harmony, based on a recognition of their common humanity.

History has linked America to Africa in a special bond. The heritage and the struggle of twenty three million Black Americans has inspired throughout this country a profound awareness of – and support for – the aspirations of the African peoples who seek their freedom and their future against great odds. In this generation the assertion of Black nationhood in Africa has co-incided with the new affirmation of equality, dignity, and justice in the United States. Americans know that the values their country stands for – peace, equality, economic opportunity, and national independence – are today being tested in Africa as nowhere else in the world.

The moral imperative behind our African policy is reinforced by practical considerations. With the sweep of political independence and economic inter-dependence, Africa, in less than a decade, has assumed great importance in world affairs. It is a continent of immense size, strategically located, with nearly 50 nations of increasing weight in the world scene. Its vast natural resources are essential elements of the global economy. In the last twenty years direct American investment in Black Africa has tripled. Trade has grown at an even faster rate. Africa's importance to us as a producer of energy and commodities and as a market for our own products is substantial and bound to grow in the future. It is also important for the other industrialized democracies; Western Europe's and Japan's combined trade with Africa now exceeds thirty billion dollars a year. An independent and thriving Africa is essential not only to America's national interest and moral purpose but to global stability and progress as well.

#### **AMERICA'S GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY AND AFRICA**

I do not want to pretend that the realization of the significance of Africa has come easily to American policy. It grew out of painful experience. But whatever past omissions, the lesson has been learned. And we will now pursue our new African policy with conviction and dedication.

To be effective our foreign policy must be global; to be realistic, it must be complex; to be lasting it must be rooted in the hearts as well as the minds of the peoples it is designed to serve. That global policy is the product of necessity, and of the American people's moral and practical interest in the peace of the world and the progress of our

fellow man. Africa has an important place in that design. The fundamental principles of our policy and the basic issues of our time are being tested there. We cannot achieve our worldwide foreign policy goals if we do not strive mightily for them in Africa.

The United States is the world's strongest nation – militarily, economically, and in our commitment to democracy. When we fail – for whatever reason – to use our strength for peace and progress, there is a gap that no one else can fill. Without our vigilance there can be no global security; without our support for friends, there can be no regional balances. Without our co-operation, there is no realistic hope for advancement of the new nations. Without our espousal of freedom, justice and human dignity, their cause will fade.

And the reverse is equally true: never before has our wellbeing been so affected by events abroad. America's peace and safety rest crucially on a global balance of power; our prosperity depends on a flourishing international economy; our future is bound up with the fate of freedom around the world.

But the world of the 1970's is more diverse, fluid, and complex than was the quarter century following the Second World War. Our strength has become less predominant, our margin for error has narrowed, our choices are more difficult and ambiguous. New centers of power have emerged – including stronger allies, and more assertive energy and raw material-producing nations. There is now a substantial nuclear balance between the nuclear super powers. The once-monolithic communist bloc has been fractured by bitter rivalries. The economic system links all nations fortunes, but the developing nations rightly claim a greater role in it. The colonial and Cold War structures of international relations have come to an end, but a new accepted international system has yet to take their place. To shape a new pattern of global relations assuring peace, freedom and progress, is the foremost task of our time. In pursuit of this objective we have consolidated our partnerships with our principal allies, the great industrial democracies of Western Europe, North America and Japan. We have resisted attempts to tip the global balance or to threaten the independence of smaller nations. We have sought to reach beyond security to a relationship more hopeful than a balance of terror constantly contested. And we have striven to engage the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America in full and constructive participation in the international order.

Today, all these global challenges have a crucial African dimension. The nations of Africa face a uniquely difficult task. A continent of vast wealth and potential is fragmented by the arbitrary boundaries of the colonial era. Tribal differences divert energies and resources; racial hatred smothers the spirit and the talents of both its victims and its advocates. National identity – a concept often taken for granted in other parts of the world – must, in many African

countries, be consciously created in an almost impossibly short span of years. An enterprise of nation-building is being pursued at a rate and in ways which have no parallel in human experience. And in the last two years, the pace of change in Africa has accelerated in every dimension:

- The sudden collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire created fundamental changes in Southern Africa. Efforts to negotiate the racial conflict in Rhodesia and Namibia stalled. The forces for moderation in Black Africa risked being discredited. Radical movements and guerrilla violence were on the rise.
- Worldwide recession and the sharp rise in oil prices had a drastic impact on the world's poor nations, many of them African. Developing countries began to form blocs to challenge the industrial countries, threatening new cartels and economic warfare.
- Factional divisions within liberation movements drew outside powers into confrontation in Angola. After Angola, there was a general fear that foreign intervention would spread to other conflicts in Southern Africa. Responsible Africans feared that the peace, integrity, unity and independence of the continent were gravely threatened.

The United States could not remain indifferent to these trends. We decided to exert our influence in the search for negotiated solutions in Southern Africa before time ran out; to seek new ways to foster Africa's economic development and progress; and to buttress the principle of African solutions for African problems in the face of the growing danger of foreign intervention.

President Ford made the courageous decision, for these reasons, to send me on a mission to Africa. It was essential to provide responsible African leaders with a moderate alternative to the grim prospects of violence so rapidly taking shape before them; it was time to strengthen US-African relations in ways with which Africans could identify and co-operate. The new impetus we gave to our policy in Africa was designed to demonstrate that there is a positive and peaceful road open to fulfill African aspirations and that America can be counted on for understanding, advice and assistance.

Against this background, let me discuss in greater detail our response to the three principal challenges:

- Africa's quest for self-determination and human dignity in Southern Africa and throughout the continent.
- Africa's striving for economic progress; and
- Africa's determination to preserve its unity and freedom from outside interference and great-power rivalry.

## SOUTHERN AFRICA

Late last year the situation in Southern Africa took on a new and more critical dimension with implications not only for the peace, independence and unity of Africa, but for global peace and stability. For the first time since the end of the colonial era in the early 1960's, external interventions had begun to overwhelm an essentially African problem. The political evolution of Angola was slipping out of control toward determination by outsiders. The United States was prevented by Congressional action from assisting its friends in their efforts to counter foreign intervention and negotiate a compromise African solution.

After Angola, there was concern that the precedent of external intervention would spread to Rhodesia where a guerrilla war was already taking place. The White minority regime there – representing only four percent of the population – is not recognized by a single government in the world. The negotiations which it had conducted with Black leaders had broken down and guerrilla actions had intensified. Even moderate African leaders began to urge a military solution.

To reverse these trends, the United States set forth a comprehensive program in Lusaka, Zambia, in April.<sup>1</sup> We put our weight behind a British proposal for majority rule in Rhodesia within two years. We stated our readiness to help a new majority-ruled Rhodesia in its peaceful transition to an independent Zimbabwe and after. We stressed the importance of racial peace and equality, including minority rights. The United States is working hard to carry forward this program. We are consulting closely with the leaders of Black Africa, Western Europe and South Africa to promote equitable solutions. We are not seeking to impose an American blueprint; instead we are doing our best to encourage the African parties involved to negotiate a settlement in which Black and White can co-exist and co-operate for Africa's future on the basis of equality, dignity and peace. The United States, together with others, stands ready to help the parties overcome the economic dislocations which inevitably will accompany the process of change in Southern Africa.

In recent weeks we have heard charges that through its policy toward Rhodesia the United States is raising the likelihood of violence and of civil war. The truth is just the opposite. There is bloodshed and civil war now and has been for years. The violence is certain to increase. The Rhodesian authorities – recognized by no one – face an impossible task. The issue is not whether change will take place – but how; whether by violence or by peaceful means; whether the future of Southern Africa will be determined by guns or through accommodation. The answer will determine what legacy will be left to the peoples of Southern Africa. What we seek is the

1. See: *Southern Africa Record* no. 5.



only alternative to intensified conflict; a negotiated settlement that assures the rights of all Rhodesians, Black and White, preserves the economic strength of the country, and removes the opportunity for foreign intervention.

We are moving energetically to take advantage of the momentum thus far achieved. A process is in train. We are engaged in frequent consultations with the African states most directly concerned. We have been in close touch with Great Britain, which has an historic and legal responsibility for Rhodesia. Following my trip to Africa I had useful talks with South African Prime Minister Vorster after which the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs returned to Africa for further consultations. Obviously I cannot go into details about delicate and complicated negotiations which are still in a formative stage. I can say that while the task is formidable, it is by no means impossible. If it is to succeed, however, all interested parties will have to do their share.

The White population of Rhodesia must recognize the inevitable and negotiate for a solution which respects its basic interests while there is yet time. South Africa must demonstrate its commitment to Africa by assisting a negotiated outcome. The Black African states – especially those most directly concerned – must provide guidance, encourage unity among Black leaders and help ease the transition to a government based on majority rule and minority rights. The Black leaders of Rhodesia must submerge their differences and outline a future of co-operation and racial co-existence in an independent Zimbabwe.

Failure would be serious, but it will not occur because of lack of effort by the United States. We have made progress. We will continue on our course with hope and dedication.

While Rhodesia is the most immediately dangerous of the problems of Southern Africa, the future of Namibia is also of deep concern.

The former German colony of South West Africa was a mandated territory of South Africa from 1920 until the United Nations terminated the mandate in 1966. Five years ago the International Court of Justice held that South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia was illegal. The United States supported both of those decisions, and voted for a UN resolution calling for South Africa to take specific steps toward Namibia's self-determination and independence by August 1976. That deadline is now upon us. Progress in solving the Namibian problem has become imperative. A source of international discord for many years, Namibia, like Rhodesia, contains the seeds of greater conflict. With thousands of foreign troops north of the Namibian border and with intensifying warfare in Rhodesia, a far more volatile climate for violence exists in Southern Africa. The risks of confrontation mount. Time is running out.

The United States strongly supports self-determination and independence for Namibia. We urge South Africa to permit the people and all the political groups of Namibia to express themselves freely, under UN supervision, and to participate in determining the future of their country. We support also a firm date for self-determination for Namibia. At the same time we urge the African groups concerned to approach negotiations in a spirit of conciliation. We are working actively in this direction. We are convinced that a solution can be found protecting the interests of all who live and work in Namibia. Once concrete steps are underway, the U S will ease its restrictions on trade and investment in Namibia and provide economic and technical assistance to help that nation consolidate its independence.

The problem of South Africa itself is more complex. No one – including the responsible leaders of Black Africa – challenges the right of White South Africans to live in their country. They are not colonialists; historically, they are an African people; they have lived on African soil for three hundred years. But South Africa's internal structure is explosive and incompatible with any concept of human dignity. Racial discrimination is a blight which afflicts many nations of the world. But South Africa is unique in institutionalizing discrimination in an all-pervasive enforced separation of the races which mocks any definition of human equality. The recent clashes in Black urban townships and Black universities in South Africa are a vivid expression of the frustration of Black South Africans toward a system that denies them status, dignity, or political rights. The United States appeals to South Africa to heed these warning signals. The United States, true to its own beliefs, will use all its influence to encourage peaceful change, an end to institutionalized inequality, and equality of opportunity and basic human rights in South Africa.

The new momentum of our policy in Southern Africa has been welcomed by African leaders of all political persuasions. It has found widespread support around the world. It has given heart to moderate leaders and friends of America. It is the best chance for peaceful solutions and for a secure and just future for Africa free of outside intervention. There are grounds for hope. What is needed now is vision and courage among the groups and governments involved – and in America public support and understanding for the course which we are pursuing. In this spirit, the United States appeals to all nations and parties involved to take rapid, responsible and co-operative steps and thereby spare countless thousands the agony and sacrifices that violence brings:

- We appeal to the current Rhodesian authorities to begin urgent talks for an independent Zimbabwe while the future of the White population can still be negotiated peacefully and guarantees are yet attainable. On this basis, let all Rhodesians, Black and White,

end the bloodshed and work together to create a new nation in which all races co-exist and co-operate in peace.

- We appeal to the Republic of South Africa to recognize that the wind of change is again blowing through Africa. Let it end its increasing isolation and demonstrate its commitment to Africa by making a positive contribution to the humane evolution of the continent.
- We appeal to the Black African nations of Southern Africa to continue the statesmanlike effort which they have already begun. They have declared that peace and stability can only be built upon a settlement that takes account of the legitimate interests of all the groups and races involved. Let them help make these pronouncements a reality.
- And we appeal to the former colonial powers to use their valued, continuing ties to Africa to promote justice, peace, and economic progress for Africa, turning the legacy of the past into a proud and positive future.

Let all the nations and groups make a conscious and dedicated effort to overcome the hatred and distrust of generations. This cannot be easy, but to repeat the past is to perpetuate its anguish. Old injustices cannot be removed by accumulating new ones. At some point, the cycle of violence must be broken and the suffering ended. There will not soon come again an opportunity such as we now have.

## **ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

The nations of Africa do not want to expend all their energies on the problems of Southern Africa. No peoples have more earned the right to economic progress. None have a better prospect to realize their aspiration to economic development. America stands ready to co-operate with Africa on the long-term positive tasks of economic development. The obstacles are vast – but so are the opportunities. Africa is blessed with immense natural wealth. The ratio of population to resources is more favorable than in almost any other region of the developing world, and there is great potential for increasing agricultural productivity. But development in Africa must also surmount great handicaps, some faced by developing nations everywhere, others unique to Africa.

- First, Africa is encumbered by a cruel legacy of history. The continent is fragmented by frontiers drawn in the colonial period into political units that do not always produce a viable national economy. Tribal divisions often thwart the national cohesion and

social organization needed for development. Spanning these states are regions of enormous extremes, from fertile and rich lands to poor and barren deserts.

- Second, Africa bears a crushing burden of poverty. Eighteen of the world's twenty eight least-developed countries are located in Africa. Only seventeen percent of the people are literate. Out of every hundred infants born, fifteen die before their first birthday; life expectancy is ten years less than the average in the developing world and almost thirty years less than in the US.
- Third, Africa is the chronic victim of natural disaster. Few regions are so subject to natural catastrophe. For example, drought in the Sahel on the southern edge of the Sahara Desert, has become chronic; it is altering the ecology of Western Africa and has expanded the desert, which now encroaches steadily into once-fertile lands producing famine and suffering.
- Fourth, Africa is dependent on the world economy to an extraordinary degree. Many African countries rely almost exclusively on the export of one or two primary products for critical foreign exchange earnings. The world recession and declining raw material prices, together with rising prices for food and fuel, have hit the African nations harder than any other region of the world.

America has a stake in the economic development of Africa. A world in which half prosper while the other half despair, cannot be tranquil; a world which the majority of nations considers unjust is a world of instability, turmoil, and danger. We have sought to respond to the challenges of African development in four ways:

- First, to surmount the economic fragmentation that is the legacy of the colonial era, the United States has supported efforts for regional co-operation within Africa. For example, we have offered our help to promote a more efficient regional transportation network in Southern Africa. We have stressed the importance of regional co-operation to deal with the pervasive problems of the Sahel. We believe that the African Fund proposed by President Giscard of France can be used to encourage other regional initiatives.
- Second, to help Africa surmount its pervasive poverty, American trade and investment are crucial and they are rapidly expanding. But they are not enough, especially for the poorest countries. Our bilateral assistance programs are increasingly concentrated on the least-developed countries and on such sectors as food, education, and population where the needs of the poor are greatest. Our requests to the Congress for development assistance for Africa are planned to grow substantially over the coming years.
- Third, to reduce Africa's vulnerability to natural disasters, the United States is placing great emphasis on long-term development projects. The time has come for comprehensive interna-

tional programs aimed at eliminating problems rather than engaging in relief efforts to ease their effects. Last May in Dakar we outlined a program for international co-operation to help the nations of the Sahel develop additional water resources, increase crop acreage by modern agricultural methods, and improve food storage facilities, all designed to make the Sahel less vulnerable to crises in the future.

- Fourth, the United States has taken the lead in efforts to reform the global economic system for the benefit of the developing nations. We called for and made recommendations to the World Food Conference of 1974, to expand agricultural production worldwide. In United Nations meetings ever since we have set forth comprehensive proposals to accelerate development. As a result, several new institutions and mechanisms of co-operation have been created. We have proposed just means of improving the earnings potential of key raw materials. We have reduced trade barriers to the exports of many developing countries into the United States. We are paying special attention to problems of developing countries at the multilateral trade negotiations now underway in Geneva. We have made proposals for a system of world food security. We are examining ways to help developing countries hard hit by increasing energy costs to improve their energy programs. All these initiatives have special relevance to Africa and bring particular benefits to it.

Economic development in Africa requires the co-operation of all the industrial democracies. No other group of countries – certainly not the socialist countries – is able to provide similar levels of technology, managerial expertise or resources. But the industrial democracies must co-ordinate their programs if they are not to dissipate resources and see their efforts overlap or conflict. This is why the United States has endorsed the imaginative proposal of President Giscard of France for a fund to organize and co-ordinate Western assistance efforts for Africa. And we are seeking within the Organization for Economic Development a more general co-ordination of development efforts among the industrial democracies.

Economic development is a long-term process. Manifestos, rhetorical assaults or wholesale programs to redistribute wealth are not the answer. Development depends above all on the sustained and substantial effort of the developing countries themselves. And it requires co-operation between industrialized and developing nations. Neither can impose solutions on the other. An atmosphere of rancor, extortion or unworkable resolutions undermines public support in the industrial nations whose effective contribution is crucial to development. Confrontation leads to retrogression for both the industrial and the developing world. Progress will be sustained only if it benefits both sides. The choice we all face is between co-operation

and chaos. America has made its decision. We will work with all nations in a constructive spirit to make our interdependence a period of unparalleled progress for all of mankind.

#### **AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE**

The surest way to thwart all hopes for political and economic progress in Africa will be to permit the continent to become an arena in which outside powers contest for spheres of influence. Africa has only recently freed itself of great power rivalry. The clock must never be turned back. The United States does not seek any pro-American block in Africa. We will accept and support the non-alignment of all nations and groups, but we strongly oppose the efforts of any other nation that seeks to undermine African independence and unity by attempting to establish an exclusive, dominant position. African unity, integrity and independence are, and will remain, fundamental tenets of our policy.

We have heard it said that there is no need to fear foreign intervention in Africa; that, however successful non-African nations may prove to be temporarily, at some indefinite date in the future, African nationalism will reassert itself and expel the intruder. But let us not forget that it took generations to throw off colonial powers. The modern forms of intervention are much more refined and more difficult to remove. Those who are threatened or pressured from outside do not have the luxury of waiting for history; they must decide whether to resist or succumb. Advice which counsels adaptation and confidence in the verdict of the future and which pretends that freedom occurs automatically may sentence African nations to decades of outside interference and the entire continent to increasing great power confrontation. There is no better guarantee against foreign intervention than the determination of African nations to defend their own independence and unity. Let us, therefore, not minimize the importance of the security problems that some African nations face. I cannot accept the proposition that Black African nations do not have the same right as other nations to defend themselves against recognized dangers – especially when their neighbors have been heavily armed by the Soviet Union. We are determined to avoid unnecessary arms races, but when friendly nations like Kenya or Zaire make modest and serious requests for assistance to protect themselves against neighbours possessing substantial Soviet arms, we owe them our serious consideration.

The ultimate solution is for Africa to strengthen the institutions of its unity and thereby its capacity to insulate African problems from outside involvement. We welcome the efforts of those Black African leaders who have specifically warned against great power involvement in the problems of Southern Africa and who have asked the great powers to refrain from supplying individual factions. The Un-

ited States supports this principle and will abide by it. The United States will do its utmost to help prevent a repetition of the factional and regional rivalries that made it possible for outsiders in Angola to replace a Portuguese army of occupation with a Cuban one. We will vigorously support African unity, independence and integrity.

#### **AMERICA'S COMMITMENT**

Distant events touch our lives and our hearts – whether it is a drought in the Sahel, a civil war in Lebanon or an earthquake in China. In the modern age, our consciousness of each other is a moral as well as a practical reality. The future of races, nations, or continents, is shared.

That is why America's acceptance of global responsibilities is not an act of generosity, but a wise pursuit of the national interest. If we do not do our best to maintain the peace, it is not just the rest of the world but we, ourselves, who will suffer. If we fail to help those living in poverty and despair, the torrent of revolution and turmoil that will inevitably follow will affect us all. And if we flag in our effort to support the forces of liberty and human dignity we cannot long preserve our own freedom. For two centuries the oppressed everywhere have known that the Declaration of Independence was addressed not just to Americans, but to all the world. Men and women deprived of freedom in other lands knew that it was an appeal not just to the conscience of this country, but to all mankind.

No group knows better than this one that justice must always be even-handed, that no moral end is served if the contest is defined as which group shall dominate the others. As we defend majority rule we must not neglect minority rights. As we promote economic development, we must never forget that economic progress is empty if it does not extend the area of human freedom.

Today one of history's great human dramas is being played out in Africa. There peoples cry out for liberty and economic advance. They will not be denied. The question is whether mankind has learned from its travail; whether the price of freedom must be paid in treasure and lasting hatred. Let us pray it will not be so. Let us help the voice of reason to prevail in Africa. In so doing, we will have reflected America's own values in the world. And we will have taken a great step toward the goal of a true world community of brotherhood that remains our most noble vision.

**TOESPRAAK DEUR DR HILGARD MULLER,  
SUID-AFRIKAANSE MINISTER VAN BUITELANDSE SAKE,  
TYDENS DIE NATALSE NASIONALE PARTY-KONGRES, 13  
AUGUSTUS, 1976.**

**Suid-Afrika se Verhoudings met die Wêreld, as Bydrae tot In-  
terne Stabiliteit.**

Ons leef in 'n wêreld van spanning en konflik. 'n Mens hoef slegs terug te dink aan die politieke gebeurtenisse oor die afgelope jaar of twee om oortuig te raak van die struikelblokke in die weg van stabiliteit op nasionale sowel as internasionale terrein.

As die een krisis na die ander in oënskou geneem word, ontstaan die vraag onwillekeurig of dit werklik vrede is wat deur almal in die internasionale politiek nagestreef word, en of sommige nie doelbewus op 'n magsbotsing afstuur en besig is om hulle daarvoor voor te berei nie. In die lig hiervan moet die besluit van die Nasionale Party van Natal om so 'n groot deel van die Kongres se tyd aan stabiliteit te bestee, verwelkom word. Die algemene wêreldtoestand en die donker wolke wat oor Suid-Afrika hang, en ongelukkig nie tot die verre horison beperk is nie, maak dit gebiedend noodsaaklik om die bedreiging van Suid-Afrika se stabiliteit deeglik in oënskou te neem.

Dit is glad nie vergesog nie om die stelling te maak dat daar tans pogings in die buiteland aangewend word om doelbewus ons interne stabiliteit te ondermyn!

Daar is 'n aantal brandende vraagstukke en knelpunte, beide wat die binnelandse situasie en ons buitelandse verhoudinge betref, waaroor in die nabye toekoms uitsluitsel verkry sal moet word. Dit is gebiedend noodsaaklik – nie alleen sover ons buitelandse verhoudinge aanbetref nie, maar ook ten opsigte van ons interne stabiliteit.

My taak vandag is om die Kongres in te lig oor hoe Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleid, ons verhoudings met die buitewêreld, bydra tot interne stabiliteit. Voordat ek daartoe oorgaan, hoop ek u sal my vergun om daarop te wys dat net soos buitelandse verhoudinge 'n uitwerking kan hê op binnelandse stabiliteit, kan binnelandse stabiliteit, of die gebrek daaraan, verreikende gevolge op 'n staat se buitelandse verhoudinge hê. Dit geld vir Suid-Afrika miskien in 'n groter mate as vir die meeste ander state omdat Suid-Afrika voortdurend die skyf is vir aanvalle van buite, en die interne situasie in ons land voortdurend deur die wêreld onder die vergrootglas geplaas word. Ons moet realisties wees en eenvoudig aanvaar dat Suid-Afrika se posisie in die wêreld nooit heeltemal normaal sal wees, voordat ons nie *in die oë van die wêreld en volgens die oordeel van die wêreld* daarin geslaag het om ons verhoudingsvraagstuk bevredigend op te los nie.



Suid-Afrika het in die verlede vir baie jare die reputasie gehad van een van die mees stabiele lande in die wêreld, op politieke, ekonomiese en feitlik alle ander terreine en objektiewe waarnemers, het 'n onfeilbare vertrouwe in ons toekoms gehad. Na die ineenstorting van die Portugese koloniale ryk is daar by die VVO geglo dat dit net 'n kwessie van tyd is voordat die Blankes in Suid-Afrika dieselfde lot sou ondergaan as die Blankes in ons twee Portugese buurstate. Dit het ons vyande aangespoor om hulle pogings te verskerp om ons totaal te isoleer en dan tot 'n val te bring. Groot was hulle verbasing en teleurstelling toe dit in die praktyk geblyk het dat die onafhanklikheid van Mosambiek en Angola nie vir ons rampspoedig was soos verwag en selfs gehoop is nie.

Na die ongelukkige gebeure in Soweto en elders, en 'n paar ander terugslac waarvan u bewus is, was die algemene reaksie baie dieselfde as na die val van die Caetano-regering. Hierdie onluste en veral ook die Russies-Kubaanse militêre intervensie in Angola, word weereens deur ons vyande en kritici aangegryp om 'n klimaat te skep van vrees vir rampspoedige konfrontasie tussen wit en swart in Suid-Afrika, en gevolglik van onsekerheid oor die Blanke se toekoms in ons land.

Dit is nie my taak om oor binnelandse aangeleenthede te praat nie. In hierdie verband wil ek dus volstaan met die volgende stelling: voordat dit nie volkome duidelik is dat die Nasionale Party se beleid van afsonderlike ontwikkeling, die oplossing bied vir ons volkereverhoudingsvraagstuk, wat ons Nasionaliste almal glo dat dit wel bied, voordat ons dit so toepas in die praktyk dat ons nie langer Suid-Afrika se vyande voorsien van ammunisie om afsonderlike ontwikkeling mee af te skiet nie, solank sal ons posisie in die wêreld nie makliker word nie.

Daar is elemente in Suid-Afrika en elders wat alles moontlik doen om die aansienlike vordering wat met ons verhoudingspolitiek gemaak is, te ondermyn. Die Regering sal nie aarsel om met hulle af te reken en hulle pogings te verydel nie, onder andere deur toe te sien dat omstandighede sodanig is dat die kans vir 'n herhaling van Soweto en ander onluste tot 'n minimum beperk word. Maar dit daar gelaat.

Afgesien van die nadele en gevare van gebrek aan stabiliteit vir die betrokke land self en die negatiewe uitwerking wat dit op internasionale stabiliteit het, het die onstabiele van 'n besondere staat soms 'n direkte effek op sy bilaterale verhoudings met ander state, soos Suid-Afrika ongelukkig reeds tot ons nadeel ondervind het. In die geval van 'n aantal state in Afrika en Suid-Amerika het politieke onstabiele wat uitgeloop het op staatsgrepe gelei tot die summiere beëindiging van samewerking met Suid-Afrika. Dit was byvoorbeeld die geval met Madagaskar, waar ons besig was om goeie verhoudings te ontwikkel met President Tsirinana se regering, en ook in die

geval van Ghana waar Dr Busia 'n sterk voorstander van dialoog met Suid-Afrika was.

Terugslae soos hierdie het ons egter nie ontmoedig om bestaande betrekkinge in Afrika en elders te verstewig en nuwe kontakte te maak en uit te bou nie. Die gevolg daarvan is dat ons diplomatieke of konsulêre betrekkinge die afgelope tien jaar uitgebrei is tot 'n stuk of twaalf Latyns-Amerikaanse state en ons kontakte opgebou het met 'n verdere dosyn of meer state in Afrika.

U mag vra waarom die regering hom in hierdie rigting beywer. Die antwoord is voor-die-handliggend. In die moderne wêreld is dit eenvoudig buite die kwessie vir enige land, afgesien van sy grootte of stadium van ontwikkeling, om in isolasie te bestaan. Van die klein staatjies tot die magtigste supermoondhede het 'n behoefte aan vriende, bondgenote en handelsvennote. Daar is nie een enkele staat in die wêreld wat so magtig en selfversorgend is dat hy nie in een of ander opsig van ander afhanklik is nie.

Terwyl die Suid-Afrikaanse regering, net soos alle ander regerings, dus moet toesien dat ons nie in internasionale isolasie vervaal nie, is ons taak moeiliker as die van meeste ander regerings omdat daar reeds oor baie jare 'n doelbewuste en wêreldwye veldtog gevoer word met die doel om Suid-Afrika te isoleer en ons Blankes sodoende op ons knieë te dwing. Dit is dus vanselfsprekend dat die uitbou van Suid-Afrika se interstaatlike verhoudings 'n opdraende stryd is. Nogtans was ons nog nooit bereid om vriendskap te koop nie of om die guns van ander te probeer wen deur toe te gee aan druk van buite, of deur toegewings ten opsigte van ons basiese beleid te maak nie.

Die toetssteen van ons benadering, die vraag wat ons gedurig aan onself stel is: *Wat is die beste vir die belange van Suid-Afrika?* Met ander woorde, ons beleid is eenvoudig *Suid-Afrika eerste*.

Net soos daar geen land in die wêreld is wat in isolasie kan voortbestaan nie, is daar ook nie 'n enkele land wat hom kan losmaak van die gebeure in die res van die wêreld nie. Suid-Afrika kan dit ook nie doen nie. Of dit nou die goudprys in Londen of 'n resoluësie in die VVO of die aanwesigheid van Kubaanse troepe in 'n buurstaat is – ons kan ons oë nie daarvoor sluit nie.

Verder is dit ook vir ons van belang dat daar vrede in ons subkontinent is, dat wet en orde gehandhaaf word, dat ons bure nie 'n tekort aan kos en ander lewensbehoefte het nie, maar dat almal 'n goeie bestaan voer en dat daar vir hulle goeie vooruitsigte is vir die toekoms.

Wanneer die regering hom beywer vir samewerking met Afrika-state en probeer om ontwikkeling en vrede in Afrika te bevorder, dan doen ons dit nie net op grond van blote liefdadigheid nie, alhoewel ons erken dat ons as 'n Christenvolk en Afrikastaat verpligtinge het teenoor Afrika, wat ons graag wil nakom en waartoe ons by uitstrek

in staat is. Ons doen dit egter ook op grond van praktiese oorwegings – in belang van Suidelike Afrika, maar bowenal in ons eie nasionale belang.

Dit is nie nodig om weg te skram van die feit dat ons dit doen om ons eie posisie in Afrika en die wêreld te verstewig en te beveilig nie. Die regering hoef vir niemand verskoning te vra dat hy ook hier 'n beleid volg van *Suid-Afrika eerste* nie. Ons hoef ons nie daarvoor te skaam vir ons eie mense of vir die buitewêreld nie. Die regering hoef ook nie 'n skuldgevoel te hê teenoor ons ondersteuners in die Nasionale Party en ander belastingbetalers vir uitgawes wat ons verplig is om in hierdie verband aan te gaan nie; want wat ons doen is noodsaaklik en in landsbelang. Trouens, as die regering dit nie gedoen het nie sou hy skuldig gewees het aan kortsigtigheid en ernstige pligsversuim. Hoewel Suid-Afrika as onafhanklike land nie 'n lang geskiedenis van betrokkenheid op internasionale gebied het nie, is ons prestasies en bereidwilligheid tot samewerking wyd bekend.

As ons die situasie oor die korttermyn beskou, lyk dit asof die winde van teenstand tans so hewig word dat ons pogings miskien nie met die vroeëre verwagte sukses bekroon mag word nie. Ek herhaal: oor die korttermyn, want by die toekoms van 'n land gaan dit nie oor die korttermyn nie. Oor die langtermyn bly ons vol vertroue; daarom gaan ons voort met ons program.

Die Republiek verleen byvoorbeeld aan 'n verskeidenheid ontwikkelende lande, veral in Afrika en Latyns-Amerika, binne die perke van ons vermoë, tegniese en ekonomiese hulp en kredietfasiliteite met die oog op sneller ontwikkeling in daardie lande. Ons geniet wye erkenning vir die veelsydige bydrae wat Suid-Afrika op so te sê elke gebied in staat is om te lewer, en ons ontvang meer versoeke om hulp as wat moontlik is om aan te voldoen. Suid-Afrika het reeds deur sy deelname aan die Berlynse lugbrug en die Koreaanse oorlog onomstootlike bewys gelewer dat hy belangstel in die wel en weë van ander, en dat hy 'n kampvegter is vir die behoud van die bestaansreg van individuele lande en die bekamping van die onheilspellende golf van kommunisme, wat die reg op voortbestaan van die Vrye Wêreld bedreig.

Net so in die geval van Angola was ons strewe om dit vir Afrika moontlik te maak om self 'n oplossing vir 'n suiwer Afrika-vraagstuk te vind. Ongelukkig het die Weste versuim om ook hulle gewig in te gooi en was dit onmoontlik om die Russe te verhoed om met behulp van Kubaanse troepe 'n nuwe imperialistiese bedreiging in Suider-Afrika te bewerkstellig. Ons het die afgelope paar jaar dikwels van détente of ontspanning gehoor, maar dit het geblyk dat 'n ontspanningsbeleid tussen kommunistiese en nie-kommunistiese lande nie die versekering wat gesoek word, bied nie.

Die strategie wat Rusland volg, het gedurende die afgelope paar jaar onomstootlik bewys dat die verkondiging van vreedsame naas-

bestaan deur die Russe nie vertrou kan word nie. Selfs vanuit die Russiese kamp moes ons by verskeie geleenthede verneem dat dé-tente nie beteken dat van die Marxistiese ideologie afgewyk sal word nie. In werklikheid stel die gebrek aan inisiatief, doelgerigtheid en koördinasie by die Weste, die Russe in staat om hulle eie posisie ten koste van die Weste te verstewig.

Aanvaar moet word dat Rusland en sy sattelliete hulle al meer daarop sal toespits om hulle in te grawe in weerlose jong en ekonomies en polities onstabiele state in Afrika en elders, soos met Angola gebeur het. Daarom sal die Suid-Afrikaanse regering alles in sy vermoë doen om te probeer verhoed dat ander probleem-situasies in Suider-Afrika so ontwikkel dat die Russe en Kubane dit kan gebruik as 'n verskoning om hulle nog verder in Suidelike Afrika in te grawe. Ek wil reguit sê ek is baie besorgd oor die eskalاسie van geweld in Rhodesië, want die rigting waarin die terroristestryd besig is om daar te ontwikkel, is presies wat die Russe en Kubane voor sit en wag – 'n verskoning.<sup>1</sup> Dit sou rampspoedig wees vir Afrika en vir die Vrye Wêreld as 'n situasie toegelaat word om te ontstaan wat aan die Russe die regverdiging verleen om ook elders in te gryp onder die voorwendsel dat hulle optree as kampvegters vir Swart Afrika. Daarom hoop ek dat die betrokke partye en alle ander wat die situasie kan beïnvloed alles moontlik sal doen om so 'n tragedie te verhoed.

U mag miskien vra: maar wat van al die aanslae wat die Republiek voortdurend op internasionale gebied ondervind? Selfs al sou u net oordeel volgens die nuus wat deur die media aangebied word, sal dit vir u duidelik wees dat Suid-Afrika nie die enigste land is wat vir aanslae uitgesonder word nie. Die ondermyning van gevestigde gesag en wet en orde is feitlik oral aan die orde van die dag en volg in breë trekke dieselfde patroon dwarsoor die wêreld.

Die vyandiggesinde elemente wat ongunstige propaganda teen Suid-Afrika in die buiteland verkondig en die terroriste wat ons grense bedreig of verantwoordelik is vir binnelandse onluste en onskuldige mense aanval en eiendom vernietig, se doelstellings is om wantroue en verskrikking te saai en sodoende anarchie te bevorder. Dit verskil in wese nie van die ondermynende bedrywighede in baie ander lande in die res van die wêreld nie. Dit moet alles gesien word binne die raamwerk van die Kommuniste se strewe na wêreldrewolusie wat moet lei tot wêreldoorheersing.

## **AFRIKA**

Daar behoort by niemand enige onduidelikheid te wees in verband met die regering se beleid ten opsigte van Afrika nie. Dit kan egter geen kwaad doen nie om dit vir die rekord weer eens duidelik te stel dat die Republiek hom beywer vir vreedsame naasbestaan

1. Vreemde militêre intervensie in Angola is nie deur Afrika verwelkom nie. Dis vanselfsprekend dat die Russe baie graag hulle beeld in Afrika wil herstel en hulle invloed in Afrika wil uitbrei.

met alle lande op die vasteland van Afrika. Ons het geen territoriale ambisies of aggressiewe planne teen enige land in Afrika nie. Suid-Afrika laat die klem val op diplomاسie, in die sin van kontak en kommunikasie, en nie op sy gedugte militêre mag nie. Ons doel is juis om weg te kom van militêre konfrontasie en al die nadele wat daarmee gepaard gaan. Dit is byvoorbeeld reeds meermale beklemtoon dat die Republiek te vinde is vir 'n nie-aanvalsverdrag met enige land in Afrika.

Ons is ook bereid om ons interne beleid te bespreek met Afrika-leiers wat 'n konstruktiewe belangstelling en objektiewe benadering daartoe het, soos reeds oor die jare gedoen is, ook deur mnr Vorster, tydens sy onlangse besoeke aan Liberië en die Ivoorkus en tydens sy ontmoeting met Dr Kaunda. Skakeling met ons buurstate en ander Afrika-state kan slegs geskied op basis van die wedersydse erkenning van en respek vir mekaar se identiteit en gelykwaardigheid, sonder inmenging deur die een in die ander se huishoudelike aangeleenthede. Dit is die hoeksteen van ons benadering en ons verwag van ander om 'n soortgelyke benadering ten opsigte van Suid-Afrika te volg. Sonder wedersydse respek vir die erfenis en identiteit van elke volk kan daar nie normale internasionale verhoudings tussen state en volkere bestaan en ontwikkel nie. Op hierdie fundamente is ons beleid ten opsigte van Afrika en ander state gebaseer.

Die erns waarmee ons hierdie beginsel nastreef, is besig om uit te kristaliseer en bewaarheid te word in die ontwikkeling en formulering van ons verhoudings met die Transkei wat eersdaags algehele onafhanklikheid sal aanvaar. Langs hierdie weg en slegs op hierdie basis kan daar volgens ons siening stabiliteit op internasionale vlak wees en verseker word dat interne stabiliteit nie deur internasionale interaksie benadeel word nie.

Die uitbou van Suid-Afrika se verhoudings met al ons buurstate is van besondere betekenis omdat dit hopelik in die toekoms die grondslag kan vorm vir verhoudings op 'n strekksbasis. Die bestaande Toluние wat ons het met die drie BLS-lande kan moontlik die nukleus word van interstaatlike samewerking op ekonomiese gebied in Suider-Afrika, veral met die uitbreiding van die lidmaatskap om onder andere ook verdere onafhanklike state, met inbegrip van 'n onafhanklike Suidwes-Afrika, in te sluit.

Omdat Suid-Afrika 'n Afrika-staat is, en omdat ons glo dat ons heil in Afrika gesoek moet word, sal ons volhard met ons pogings om Suid-Afrika se verhoudings ook te normaliseer met ander Afrika-state wie se leiers net soos ons, vrede begeer. Ons sal geen steen onaangeroer laat om hierdie ideaal te verwesenlik nie. Hierdie strewende van die regering word deur die meeste Westerse moondhede verwelkom – meesal stilswyend, maar in sommige gevalle verleen hulle ook hulp. Ek is seker dat ons al meer ondersteuning van die kant van die Weste sal geniet in die lig van die openlike erkenning

deur talle Afrika-leiers dat Suid-Afrika die sleutel hou tot die oplossing van baie van die vraagstukke van Suidelike Afrika. Dit sal nog meer so wees indien hierdie sleutelvraagstukke opgelos kan word. Aanvaar moet word dat die logiese konsekwensie van die normalisering van ons verhoudinge met die res van Afrika is, dat Suid-Afrika uiteindelik lidmaatskap sal verkry van die Organisasie vir Eenheid in Afrika. So 'n stap sal baie help om vrede, ontwikkeling en stabiliteit in Afrika te bevorder.

Dit is allerweë bekend dat die meeste van die onderlinge probleme wat van tyd tot tyd ontstaan tussen die Republiek en ons onmiddellike buurstate, (Botswana, Lesotho en Swaziland), op vriendskaplike wyse benader en gewoonlik bevredigend opgelos word. Daar is vrugbare samewerking ook met verskeie ander Afrikastate. Dit staan meesal in verband met die skepping van groeipunte, die bou van spoorlyne, krag- en hidro-elektriese skemas, landbou, mynbou-ontwikkeling, behuising, gesondheidsdienste, vervoer, ens. Ons handel met Afrika is ook besig om uit te brei.

'n Gebeurtenis wat beslis 'n terugslag vir die ontspanningspolitiek in Suider Afrika was, was Dr Kaunda se besluit om Suid-Afrika by die Veiligheidsraad aan te kla op grond van die beweerde skending van Zambië se grondgebied en soewereiniteit. Die gevolg was dat Suid-Afrika deur al die lede van die Veiligheidsraad behalwe die VSA veroordeel is. Dis jammer dat Suid-Afrika se versoek aan Zambië om besonderhede aan ons te verstrek, sowel as ons aanbod aan die Veiligheidsraad om die klag ter plaatse te laat ondersoek, geïgnoreer is; want, ek is seker dat as die saak in 'n gees van welwillendheid deur ons twee regerings benader en ondersoek is, die eindresultaat vir almal meer bevredigend sou wees.

Dr Kaunda en andere het baie sterk taal gebruik in verband met hierdie ongelukkige insident. Ek hoop dat hulle tot besinning sal kom, en voor dit te laat is, sal besef dat die konfrontasie wat hulle nou bepleit, geen blywende oplossing sal bied nie maar rampspoedig sal wees vir die hele subkontinent.

I believe that Dr Kaunda was sincere when not long ago he welcomed Mr Vorster's voice of reason and that he still sincerely desires peace. I simply cannot therefore accept that he no longer shares Mr Vorster's belief that the alternative will be too ghastly to contemplate.

Daar is nie 'n beter bewys van wat bereik kan word deur 'n doelgerigte, gesamentlike poging om 'n vreedsame oplossing vir 'n ingewikkelde politieke probleem te vind nie, as die wyse waarop ons saam met Dr Kaunda en sy presidensiële kollegas gestrewe het na 'n vreedsame oplossing vir die Rhodesiese vraagstuk nie. Dit was seker nie mnr Vorster en die presidente se skuld dat die eerste poging nie geslaag het nie. Daar is ook geen rede hoegenaamd waarom daar tou opgegooi moet word nie, veral in die lig van die jongste ontwikke-

lings. Daar was dwarsdeur die vrye wêreld waardering vir die konstruktiewe optrede deur die betrokke Afrika-leiers, met inbegrip van ons Eerste Minister, en daar rus nog steeds 'n groot verantwoordelikheid op hulle skouers.

While testifying before a sub-committee of the United States Senate, after his recent visit to a number of African countries, Dr Kissinger openly admitted that practically all the African leaders he had met, had expressed their appreciation of the efforts by our Prime Minister to find peaceful solutions for political problems in Southern Africa. Both Dr Kissinger and Senator Percy, who also recently visited Africa, admitted that they had gained the impression that it is believed in Africa that *South Africa holds the key to the future of Rhodesia*.

Speaking in the South African Senate in May of this year, I said that the South African Government would continue to do whatever it could to make a peaceful solution in Rhodesia possible. I appealed to the West to be more enterprising and to make it easier and more attractive for the Rhodesians, white and black, and to go out of their way to encourage them to work for a peaceful solution to their problems. I addressed a strong appeal to the Free World to come forward with a new approach before it was too late, and assured them of South Africa's full support and co-operation.

This appeal did not pass unheeded. There was encouraging reaction on the part of the USA. Discussions took place between Dr Kissinger and our Ambassador, and this led to fruitful discussions between Dr Kissinger and Mr Vorster in Western Germany on the 21st and 22nd of June, in which I had the privilege to participate. This new interest in Africa by the United States and their determination to do whatever possible to ensure a peaceful settlement for the Rhodesian issue, is most encouraging and I am sure that it will be generally welcomed, also in South Africa.

The activities by the United States were not confined to Dr Kissinger's visit to Africa and his discussions with Mr Vorster. Last week the Secretary of State disclosed that the United States were also engaged in frequent consultations with the African States most directly concerned, as well as with the British and Western European Governments.

In an important policy statement made in Boston on the 2nd of August,<sup>2</sup> Dr Kissinger dealt at great length with what might be described as the new American approach to Africa, including the implications of great power military intervention in Southern Africa. With regard to Rhodesia the Secretary of State said that he could obviously not go into details about delicate and complicated negotiations which are still in a formative stage. He admitted that the task was formidable but by no means impossible.

While it is therefore still uncertain what the outcome of Dr Kissinger's deliberations with other interested governments will be, and

2. See page 1 of this issue

although it is not for the South African Government to determine how the problem should be tackled and solved, I want to declare once again that the South African Government welcomes this initiative and that we are prepared to comply with the request to demonstrate our commitment to Africa by giving our full support for a peaceful outcome.

In his speech last week the Secretary of State repeated that the USA supported the British proposal for majority rule in Rhodesia within two years. According to him *the issue is not whether change (to majority rule) will take place, but how: whether by violence or by peaceful means . . . whether by guns or through accommodation.* In addition to this confirmation of America's well-known approach, a new element was introduced in Dr Kissinger's speech, which is both interesting and encouraging. He went out of his way to stress the necessity not to ignore the rights of the minority in Rhodesia. In the course of his statement he dealt with it, in some form or other, no less than seven times and in no uncertain terms, which is indeed significant. Thus he explained that the United States had *stressed the importance of racial peace and equality, including minority rights.* He said they were doing their best to encourage a settlement *in which black and white can co-exist and co-operate for Africa's future on a basis of equality, dignity and peace.* To this he added that they were seeking *a negotiated settlement that assures the rights of all Rhodesians, black and white, preserves the economic strength of the country, and removes the opportunity for foreign intervention.* He appealed to the leaders of Black African States *to help ease the transition to a government based on majority rule and minority rights.* And by the way, he repeated, almost in the same breath, that white South Africans *are not colonialists* and that *no one – including the responsible leaders of Black Africa – challenge their right to live in their country.*

But to come back to Rhodesia: Dr Kissinger appealed to the Rhodesian authorities to begin urgent talks, *while the future of the white population can still be negotiated peacefully and guarantees are yet attainable.* Further on he continued *that peace and stability can only be built upon a settlement that takes into account the legitimate interests of all the groups and races involved,* to which he added: *. . . as we defend majority rule we must not neglect minority rights.* He concluded his speech with a general appeal *to help the voice of reason to prevail in Africa.*

These quotations leave no doubt that the United States is not advocating the complete and unconditional surrender of the white minority in Rhodesia to the black majority.

## RHODESIË

Wat moet ons houding wees teenoor die rigting waarin Dr Kissinger en die VSA hulle skynbaar beywer? Ek glo ons moet dit van harte verwelkom en moet hoop dat hulle pogings met welslae bckroon sal word.



Wat betref die veronderstelling dat 'n meerderheidsregering on-vermydelik is – dit is nie vir ons om daaroor stelling in te neem nie. Wat ons eie beleid in hierdie verband vir Suid-Afrika is, weet u al-mal. Maar Rhodesië het oor die jare 'n ander beleid gehad wat fundamenteel van ons beleid van afsonderlike ontwikkeling, afsonderlike vryhede, verskil. Mnr Smith het byvoorbeeld verlede jaar in die openbaar verklaar *that every constitution we have had in Rhodesia has been based on the principle of majority rule* – met sekere kwalifikasies.

In reply to a question by Richard Kershaw of the BBC whether eventual majority rule is precluded, he replied: *no, certainly we have never ever said that majority rule isn't something which is inherent in the Rhodesian Constitution.*

In the light of all this nobody can expect South Africa to withhold its support from the efforts by Dr Kissinger and others simply because majority rule is the point from which they proceed.

As I have indicated, this principle has after all been inherent in Rhodesian constitutional philosophy. All indications are that Dr Kissinger is aiming to reach a situation where the rights and interests of the white minority would be protected. Mr Smith himself is of course also on record as having said that any constitutional agreement should have built-in guarantees, but one gets the impression that Dr Kissinger has in mind not only constitutional guarantees. However, time will clarify precisely what is involved.

At this stage we would hope that it would be possible to guarantee the safety and economic and political interests and rights of the white minority, constitutionally and otherwise, in such a way that they themselves would feel convinced that a safe and good future exists for them in their country. If such a solution is sought, there is merit in it and it should be generally welcomed, although we are realistically alive to the practical problems which will have to be solved.

Slaag dit, sal dit 'n kragtige bydrae wees tot stabiliteit in die algemeen in die hele Suider-Afrika. Op sy beurt sal dit weer interne stabiliteit in die afsonderlike lande in die hand werk.

#### **SUIDWES-AFRIKA**

Dit geld ook vir Suidwes-Afrika. 'n Aanvaarbare oplossing daar sal noodwendig bevorderlik wees vir stabiliteit, nie net in die gebied self nie maar dit sal ook wyer uitkring.

Wat is die kanse vir sukses? Ek persoonlik dink die kanse is goed. Daar is reeds goeie vordering gemaak. Die grondwetlike komitee van die beraad is nou in sitting en ek is hoopvol dat daar verdere vordering aangekondig sal word voor die end van die maand. In die lig hiervan lyk dit vir my onraadsaam om uitvoerig oor Suidwes-Afrika uit te wei, maar om liewers te wag vir verdere ontwikkelings.

## ADDRESS BY U S SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER IN PHILADELPHIA ON 31 AUGUST, 1976

I am proud to speak before this remarkable group that so well embodies the American tradition of humane concern combined with practical action . . . I have come here today to talk about Africa – one of the compelling concerns of our time.

When we read of young African students killed in riots, of guerilla raids, or refugee camps attacked in reprisal, the reality lies not in the cold statistics that the media report. In Africa, it is the death of men, women and children; it means hopes extinguished and dreams shattered. The grand issues of strategy or the complexity of negotiations are no consolation to innocent, brutalized victims. As long as these conflicts fester, Africans of all races will be caught up in a widening and escalating cycle of violence. Until these wars are ended, Africa faces a future of danger, anguish and growing risks of foreign intervention.

This is why I will leave on Friday to continue discussions on the President's behalf with the Prime Minister of South Africa. This trip will be the next step in an intensive diplomatic effort ushered in by my visit to Africa in April. Undersecretary of State Rogers and Assistant Secretary Schaufele have just returned from a mission to Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique and Zaire where they met with the Presidents of these African nations most affected by events in Southern Africa – the third such mission in three months. In close collaboration with Great Britain, a serious effort by this country is now underway. We shall use our power and influence to help resolve the burning conflicts of Southern Africa which now sunder Africa's peace, unity, and hopes for progress.

Nearly a third of the world's some one hundred and fifty sovereign nations are on the continent of Africa. Africa's independence – now barely twenty years old – has transformed the character and scope of international affairs. African nations play a major role in international institutions: their importance to the world economy is growing; the inter-dependence of Africa and the industrialized world is obvious. Thus conflict in Africa has political, security and economic implications that reach far beyond the continent itself.

The relationship between the United States and Africa is unique. We were never a colonial power, but America's character and destiny have been permanently shaped by our involvement in a tragic aspect of Africa's past. Twenty-three million Black citizens testify to this heritage and all the American people have been profoundly affected by it. In this generation, the affirmation of equality and Black dignity in America has coincided with the assertions of Black nationhood in Africa. Both represent a great human struggle for freedom; both compel our support if America's principles are to

have meaning.

The United States is the only country which can speak to all sides in Southern Africa's current conflicts. We seek no special place for ourselves, and thus have all influence that can be important for a peaceful outcome. That position carries with it a great responsibility to promote fair and lasting solutions. Our values, our own self-interest in an Africa that lives in peace and racial harmony and our abiding commitment to peace and world order permit us no other course. America's contribution to peace and progress in Africa cannot depend on goodwill and good intentions alone. Nor can our policy be confined to one continent. Our ability to act effectively in Africa reflects in large measure our standing in the world – our strength, our vision, and our reputation for reliability and steadfastness.

It is with great satisfaction, therefore, that I can tell you that America's foreign relations are prosperous and dynamic; that the American people are clearly prepared to do their part in helping shape a better and freer world.

- Today we are at peace for the first time in over a decade. No American is in combat anywhere in the world.
- We have the world's strongest and technologically most advanced military establishment.
- Our relations with our allies in North America, Western Europe and Japan have never been better. Our close co-operation on a wide range of political and economic issues now reinforces our traditional concern with collective security.
- We have established durable new relations with China, the world's most populous nation. This relationship will hold great significance for global stability and progress as we continue to broaden it in the years to come.
- We are on the road to bringing peace to the Middle East after unprecedented progress in recent years.
- We have reduced the levels of tension with the Soviet Union, resolved some conflicts, and begun to push back the spectre of nuclear war. We have slowed the strategic arms race, and there is hope that we may soon, for the first time in history, set a firm ceiling on the total number of strategic nuclear weapons of the two major nuclear powers.
- And we have begun a comprehensive and promising dialogue with the nations of Latin America, Asia, and Africa on fundamental questions of economic equity and progress.

In short, America has come through a decade and more of travail with unmatched strength and resilience, and with a reinforced dedication to the cause of freedom. America with its vast strength remains the hope of the world; America with its optimism and energy remains the tide of the future. And we ourselves have much at stake.

Never before has the well-being of Americans been so affected by events abroad. Our own peace and safety depend on global security; our prosperity at home depends on a flourishing global economy.

Nowhere are contemporary events moving more rapidly than in Africa. Within recent months Southern Africa has faced an imminent, seemingly inescapable prospect of widening violence, economic disarray and a virulent new form of colonialism. The Soviet Union and its Cuban surrogate took upon themselves the right to massive military intervention. Time has been running out fast for negotiated solutions – the only alternative to mounting warfare which could embitter and burden the region for generations to come.

Change has come to Africa with astonishing swiftness. Thirty years ago, much of Africa was the dominion of European powers; today we see a continent of forty nine independent new nations struggling against time, against the elements, and against the forces of instability, to consolidate their nationhood. Africa seeks to achieve three fundamental goals; self-determination and racial justice in Southern Africa; economic development and progress for all of Africa; and the preservation of the continent's unity and integrity against outside interference and greatpower rivalry.

The pace of change has accelerated in the last two years in every dimension.

The sudden collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire wrought fundamental changes in Southern Africa. The remaining outposts of colonialism were now in an untenable position. But civil war within the liberation movement in Angola, Soviet-Cuban intervention, and the continuing massive Cuban military presence in Angola, raised the danger that foreign powers acting for their own ends would seek to impose solutions to all the problems of Southern Africa. New efforts to find negotiated solutions for the racial conflicts in Rhodesia and Namibia failed. The forces for moderation in Black Africa risked irrelevance. The peoples of Southern Africa were menaced by a mounting spiral of action and reprisal. A course of violence from which no nation was safe had been set in motion.

Worldwide recession and the sharp rise in oil prices had a drastic impact on the poorest nations, many of them African. Development plans were crippled by the fall of export earnings and by the surge of prices for fuel, fertilizer, and other key imports. New cycles of drought and famine halted economic progress and intensified the suffering of hundreds of thousands of people.

Against this ominous backdrop, President Ford, last April, decided on a new American initiative in support of peace, racial justice, prosperity and independence for Africa. Our offer of help and constructive influence was strongly encouraged by the leaders of Africa.

With wisdom and flexibility by the parties involved, and with the support of the American people we have a chance to contribute to a turning point in the history of Africa. We can, if we will, participate in a new birth of independence and racial peace; we can, if we will, help shape a new international dedication to Africa's economic development; and we can, if we will, contribute to an Africa strong and free of the threat of outside intervention.

There is no guarantee that our current diplomatic effort will succeed. It would be naive to suggest that a peaceful solution to issues surrounded by passions is inevitable. But whatever the immediate outcome, let it never be said that the United States did not exert itself with energy and determination in the cause of peace, freedom and human dignity at a moment of need and opportunity.

Let me discuss with you what has been achieved, and what yet remains to be done.

### **SOUTHERN AFRICA**

Most urgent has been the mounting racial conflict of Southern Africa – in Rhodesia, in Namibia, and in the Republic of South Africa itself.

The White minority regime in Rhodesia, representing only some four percent of the population, is not recognized by a single government – not even by neighboring South Africa. Its unilateral declaration of independence from Britain in November 1965 is regarded as illegal by every member of the world community. Three United States administrations have supported Britain throughout its long effort to restore its constitutional authority; Britain has been – and remains – committed to grant independence only under conditions of majority rule. Early this year, negotiations between the illegal White minority regime and moderate Black nationalist leaders broke down. Guerrilla action intensified; rapidly escalating violence threatened to engulf the region. While Rhodesia is the most immediately dangerous problem, Namibia is also of urgent concern.

From 1920, South Africa administered the former German colony of South West Africa under a League of Nations mandate. In 1966, the United Nations General Assembly concluded that South Africa was violating important obligations. As a result, the United Nations, with United States support, terminated South Africa's mandate. The United Nations assumed direct responsibility for the territory. South Africa, however, stayed on. In 1971 the IOU concluded that South Africa's occupation was illegal, that it must immediately withdraw, and that no country should recognize, support or assist South Africa in Namibia. The United States has consistently supported the conclusions of the Court and the resolutions of the Security Council. The latest resolution, unanimously passed last

January, calls on South Africa to comply with the Court's conclusions; to declare its acceptance of free elections under UN supervision and control; and to respect the rights of Namibians and the responsibility of the United Nations. The Security Council decided to review South Africa's compliance on or before today, August 31, 1976.

Namibia, like Rhodesia, contains the seeds of greater conflict. There, too, time is running out. With thousands of foreign troops north of the Namibian border and with intensifying warfare in Rhodesia, a volatile situation is emerging.

And in South Africa itself, the recent outbreaks of racial violence have underscored the inevitable instability of a system that institutionalizes human inequality in a way repugnant to the world's conscience.

Therefore, in Lusaka, Zambia, in April<sup>1</sup>, on behalf of President Ford, I put forward an American initiative which addressed the full sweep of the crisis in Southern Africa:

- We promised that we would actively support Mr Callaghan's proposal for majority rule in Rhodesia in two years or less. We urged the African parties involved to pursue a negotiated settlement in which Black and White could co-exist and co-operate. We stated our readiness to assist a new Rhodesia - Zimbabwe - to overcome economic dislocations, so that it could effectively take its place in the community of nations.
- We urged South Africa to set a date for Namibian independence, and to broaden the political process. In our view, all the political groups of Namibia should be permitted to express themselves freely, under UN supervision, and to participate in shaping the constitutional and political future of their country.
- And I restated on African soil America's rejection of the principle and practice of apartheid. I called on South Africa to demonstrate its commitment to peace and harmony on the continent by facilitating early solutions in Rhodesia and Namibia.

Unmistakable progress has been made since this American initiative:

- The character of our relationship with Black Africa has been transformed. Our dialogue with the nations of Black Africa has become close and intensive. Mutual confidence and respect between America and Black Africa has grown substantially. We are now seen as active agents in the process toward independence, self-determination, justice and human dignity in Africa, not as passive observers.
- Since my talks with Prime Minister Vorster in June, South Africa has publicly proclaimed its support for majority rule in Rhodesia - an important step forward.

1. See: *Southern Africa Record* No. 5.

- In Namibia, the constitutional conference organized by South Africa has recently proposed a date of December 31, 1978 for Namibia's independence, conceding the vital principles of independence and majority rule. The means and processes by which the country moves to independence must still be worked out between the interested parties, but the fact that Namibia will shortly be independent is in itself, a major breakthrough.

These significant developments show that progress is possible, but the obstacles to a negotiated settlement remain formidable.

In Rhodesia, it is now vital to bring together the leaders of Black Africa, the various liberation movements, South Africa and the Rhodesian regime on a common program. Namibia will not be removed from the world's agenda of crises until a means and a forum are found for working out Namibia's political future on the basis of participation by all authentic groups.

The situation in South Africa continues to be highly volatile; it poses a threat not only of intensified suffering within that country but also to South Africa's ability to assist constructively in solutions for Rhodesia and Namibia.

The task of diplomacy is to find the common ground among the differing objectives of the multitude of nations and groups involved. Our consultations have convinced us that there is common ground. But all parties must overcome the legacy of generations of mistrust; all must keep in mind that desire to achieve everything at once may frustrate the significant progress which may now be attainable.

*We shall be carrying this message:*

The White populations of Rhodesia and Namibia must recognize that majority rule is inevitable. The only issue is what form it will take and how it will come about. Will it be through protracted and bloody conflict that will leave a heritage of bitterness and destruction of generations? Or will it come rapidly through the peaceful means which offer hope for a just and co-operative future in which majority rule is coupled with a guarantee of minority rights?

South Africa has taken positive steps with respect to Rhodesia and Namibia. We hope that it will continue to recognize that now is the time to make a constructive contribution to Africa by committing itself to rapid progress towards independence in Rhodesia and Namibia.

Black African leaders in the states neighboring Rhodesia and Namibia have perhaps the most difficult challenge. They feel in their hearts the suffering of their brothers; they have themselves experienced the oppression of colonial rule; and they have seen past efforts at settlements fade away. All their instincts are for rapid solutions without the tedious give-and-take of negotiations. And yet violence will only escalate bloodshed and lengthen, rather than shorten, the

road to their goal. The wisdom and moderating influence of Black African leaders are essential if progress is to be achieved. Their own suffering must have taught that new injustice does not right old injustice. They now have the opportunity to break the vicious cycle of centuries of suffering by seizing this opportunity not for conflict but for reconciliation of the races.

Black nationalist groups competing for power must bridge their differences if there is to be early progress to majority rule. We will urge them not to jeopardize everything by personal competition for power. Those rivalries are certain to delay – and may even defeat – the realization of what they have fought so long to attain.

A complex process of negotiation is underway on the urgent issues of Rhodesia and Namibia. These issues are related but we recognize that the requirement for solutions in each case are substantially different. If circumstances so indicate, each issue can be dealt with at the pace appropriate to it. Depending on the desires of the many interested parties, we are prepared to deal with each issue on its individual merits.

Most importantly, all parties must keep in mind that lost opportunities can be irretrievable, there are now conditions for settling both issues that did not exist previously and may never do so again. It would be ironic, to say the least, after years of struggle, hope and disappointment, that those who have the most to gain should let the opportunity slip away because of internal disagreements.

Public support for this effort will be a major factor in the success and durability of any settlement that may eventually emerge. Our goals – to end the suffering and violence of Southern Africa, to bring about majority rule and minority rights – reflect what is best in American values. They are a firm foundation for our common commitment; they are not confined to one party or one branch of the government. They represent an American effort.

South Africa's racial problems are more complex. In Lusaka in April, I pointed out that South African assistance in bringing about rapid negotiated solutions in Rhodesia and Namibia would be viewed positively by the community of nations as well as by the rest of Africa. And I must point out here that since then South Africa's role – with respect to these two problems – has been constructive.

As for conditions within South Africa, itself, the world, and most Black African leaders, recognize South Africa as an African country. Its White settlers have lived on African soil for centuries; no one, including the responsible leaders of Black Africa, challenges their right to remain there. Unlike Rhodesia and Namibia, South Africa cannot be regarded as an illegitimate government, as an outside colonial intrusion. But South Africa's internal structure is incompatible with any concept of human dignity. We are deeply saddened by the recent and continuing clashes in Black urban townships, universities



and schools throughout South Africa. They are dramatic evidence of the frustration of Black South Africans toward a system which denies them status, equality, and political rights. No system that leads to periodic upheavals and violence can possibly be just or acceptable – nor can it last.

The United States must be true to its own beliefs. We urge South Africa to take account of the conscience of humanity. We will continue to use all our influence to bring about peaceful change, equality of opportunity, and basic human rights in South Africa. Our policy is based upon the premise that within a reasonable period of time we will see a clear evolution toward just internal arrangements. In our talks with the South African Prime Minister, and in our diplomatic efforts, we will impress upon South Africa the need to make this premise a reality.

### **ECONOMIC PROGRESS**

It is economic progress which ultimately will determine whether Africa can fulfill the aspirations of its peoples. You here at this convention know that the economic dimension is fundamental. You know full well, as a Black Mississippi politician said recently, that *it's no good being able to join the country club if you haven't got the money to buy a drink*. And you are taking action.

Africa's development needs are massive and your OIC programs strike at their heart: vocational training to teach the skills that Africa needs to realize its potential regardless of changing political circumstances. A mechanic's training or a carpenter's trade can be practiced in the most turbulent time. Political upheavals cannot diminish the individual's sense of worth which training instills.

Beyond its need for skilled manpower, Africa's economic aspirations confront a wide range of other challenges. Africa is blessed with immense natural wealth. The ratio of population to resources is as favorable as that of any region of the developing world. Agricultural productivity can be vastly improved.

But no continent suffers so cruelly when crops fail for lack of rain. No continent's natural economic regions are so fragmented by borders drawn up – often arbitrarily – in the colonial era. And no continent bears such a crushing burden of poverty and illiteracy.

Africa is doubly challenged – by recurrent economic catastrophes, and by the need for long-term growth. The United States is dealing with the various dimensions of the task:

- To provide relief from natural disasters, drought and famine, we have, in the past five years, more than quadrupled emergency aid to African nations.
- American trade and investment are crucial for Africa's development. While they are rapidly expanding, they are not enough, especially for the poorest countries. Therefore, we plan to increase

development assistance for Africa substantially over the coming years – especially for the least-developed countries.

- Because Africa's needs frequently transcend the limits of national boundaries, we are now directing much of our assistance to support regional co-operation – in transportation, agricultural development, health programs, and in collecting information by satellite on crops, weather, water resources, land use, and mineral extraction.

What Africa requires above all else is a strategy for development. For example, the Sahel, the chronically drought-ridden region on the southern edge of the Sahara desert, has been a major recipient of international relief assistance. The monumental suffering in that area has prompted the generous contributions of many individual Americans, as well as large-scale government relief efforts.

But the disasters which afflict the Sahel come in recurrent cycles. They are altering the ecology across central and western Africa; the desert is steadily encroaching upon once-fertile lands.

The time has come to go beyond periodic measures of relief and to take comprehensive steps. To this end the United States together with an international group of donor countries is seeking to reverse the economic and ecological decline of the Sahel and lay the foundations for future growth. We have proposed developing major river basins to improve water supply; increasing crop acreage by modern agricultural methods; improving food storage facilities; and enhancing the transportation network of the area.

The long-term effort in the Sahel, and others needed elsewhere in Africa, will require intensified co-operation among the industrial democracies of North America, Western Europe and Japan. This is why the United States has endorsed the imaginative proposal of President Giscard of France for a fund to organize and co-ordinate Western assistance to Africa. And we are seeking within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development a more general co-ordination of development efforts among the industrial democracies.

Africa is heavily dependent upon the world economy. No African nation can plan its future effectively if its income is buffeted by external economic forces over which it has little or no influence. The export earnings of many African economies rely upon global market conditions for a single commodity. Higher energy prices or inflation abroad can – as they have – raise to prohibitive levels the price of imports that Africa desperately needs.

One year ago, at the special session of the United Nations General Assembly, the United States presented a comprehensive series of proposals aimed at responding in a co-operative spirit to the needs of the developing countries. We have followed up these initiatives with major efforts at the Paris Conference on *International Economic*

Co-operation, at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Nairobi, and in many other international institutions. Many of our proposals have been implemented and have had a direct impact on Africa.

Substantial progress has been made in the past year in shaping the long-term economic relationship between the nations of the northern and southern hemispheres. The initiatives which now form the agenda for discussion are, by and large, proposals made by the United States. But much work remains to be done. The United States is prepared to move forward in areas of great importance to the nations of Africa. For example:

- We are prepared to address the crushing balance of payments problems and debt burdens which many poor African nations suffer as a result of high oil prices, global inflation and the recession-related downturn in export earnings.
- We are prepared to join with producers and consumers of key commodities to explore measures to improve and stabilize markets. We are ready to participate in producer-consumer forums in ways that will benefit Africa.

We will seek satisfactory international arrangements to foster the investment necessary for Africa's growth – arrangements which both respect national sovereignty and assure predictability and fair treatment for foreign investors.

- We have proposed in the multilateral trade negotiations to reduce tariffs for tropical products which are of special interest to Africa.
- We are seeking authorization from Congress to make an initial contribution of dollars fifteen million to the African Development Bank's Development Fund in order to foster industrialization.
- And we will make major efforts to stimulate the flow of modern technology to Africa so as to promote growth and diversify economies now excessively dependent on a single commodity.

The United States is committed to work constructively with the nations of Africa and with other developing countries to promote economic progress and fuller participation in the global economic system. But we must be frank to say that rhetorical assaults and one-sided declarations undermine the conditions for such co-operation. They weaken public support for development in the industrial democracies whose effective and sustained role is crucial. No other group of countries – least of all the socialist countries – is able to provide the technology, the managerial expertise, or the resources.

Many of the resolutions of the just concluded non-aligned conference in Colombo were clearly anything but non-aligned in content or phraseology. We reject such one-sided proclamations and warn that to be effective non-alignment must be true to its name. It cannot – indeed it will not – be taken seriously if it becomes nothing

more than a rigid grouping aimed at producing automatic majorities and rhetorical attacks against the industrial democracies.

The choice that all nations face is between co-operation and chaos. America has made its decision for co-operation. We invite others to join us in the same spirit.

#### **AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE: PRECONDITION FOR PROGRESS**

Africa's development will be impossible if the independence and integrity of the continent are not maintained. Africa must not again become an arena in which outside powers contest for spheres of influence.

This is why the United States agreed with the Presidents of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia that non-African nations should not deal directly with the liberation movements of Southern Africa – to avoid the divisions and the competition which led to the tragedies of the Angolan civil war. We oppose those who would subject the African people to outside domination. Western colonialism in Africa is dying, it must not now be replaced by a new form of external intervention more insidious because less familiar, which in the end may take generations to root out.

The United States seeks an African bloc of its own, not paramount influence in Africa. We will oppose all those who do. The United States calls on all nations to affirm the principle that Africa's destiny is for Africa to determine. The United States will not import great power conflict into Africa, and we will expect the same of others.

There is no better guarantee against foreign intervention than the determination of African nations to defend their own independence and unity. Let us, therefore, not minimize the importance of the security problems that some African nations face. Economic development is certainly a crucial priority; but by itself it cannot prevent outside pressure or threats to African sovereignty. So let us not accept the facile preposition that Black African nations do not have the same need as other nations to defend themselves against recognized dangers – especially when they perceive serious and imminent threats from nearby nations which have been heavily armed by the Soviet Union. We are determined to avoid unnecessary arms races. But when friendly and moderate nations like Kenya or Zaire make modest and responsible requests for assistance to protect themselves against belligerent neighbors possessing substantial quantities of modern Soviet weapons, we owe them our serious consideration.

#### **AFRICA AND THE WORLD**

One fact is clear: a time of change has come again to Africa. Let us all take the opportunity before us to avoid a future of bitterness, escalating war, and foreign intervention. Let us all help a peaceful,

prospering, and just Africa take its rightful place in the world.

What Africa needs now is not a return to the exploitive or interventionist practices of decades past. Nor does it need exuberant promises and vapid expressions of goodwill. It requires concrete commitments to progress – political and economic. It requires our readiness to co-operate as sovereign equals on the basis of mutual responsibility and mutual benefit.

In this spirit, the United States will do its part. Let there be no mistake: Africa will take its destiny firmly into its own hands, whether we like it or not. It will make its contribution to the world community in its own way, whether we co-operate or not. But the cause of freedom, not only for ourselves, but for all mankind will be vitally affected by the part America plays. We can turn our backs on one of the most massive awakenings of a people in history, and in the process desert our principles and help doom a continent to a future of despair. Or we can, as every generation of Americans before us, make history ours.

I believe Americans will choose the course of hope and heart. And by so doing we will once again have demonstrated the vitality of our values and given the world a *new birth of freedom*.

**TRANSCRIPT OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE OF U S  
SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER IN ZURICH,  
SWITZERLAND, ON 6 SEPTEMBER, 1976.**

Let me explain firstly what we are trying to do; secondly, the evolution of these negotiations; and, thirdly, the various elements that have to be reconciled in these negotiations. Then I will take your questions.

The United States is making an effort to bring an end to the mounting crisis in Southern Africa. The United States is conscious of the fact that an escalating guerrilla war is already taking place in Rhodesia, that conditions in Namibia will inevitably lead to a similar crisis, and, of course, we are also aware of conditions in South Africa. The United States is making a serious effort in order to see whether we can achieve the following objectives: majority rule and minority rights; a peaceful end to the disagreement; and negotiation that enables all of the communities to live side by side under conditions of dignity and progress. We do so in the interest of world peace, because continuing conflict in Africa will inevitably bring in the interests of outside powers and runs a major risk of turning Africa into an area of contention of non-African countries. We do so in the national interest of the United States; because of our interest. We have a profound interest in a world at peace, in a world that respects human dignity and in conditions of economic advance. And above all, we do it in the interest of the peoples of the area. They will be those who suffer most from a continuation of conflict. They will have to pay the price for any failure of negotiations, and they will have to be considered, as alternatives to peaceful resolution are being considered.

Now to the talks that have been taking place here in the last two days. The purpose of these talks has not been to develop a joint American-South African program. The evolution of these talks and what has brought us to this point is as follows: on my visit to Africa in April, all African leaders urged a solution to the problems of Southern Africa through quiet discussions with the Prime Minister of South Africa; that for many of these problems, the policies of his government held the key if a peaceful solution was to be achieved. Based on these views, we initiated contact with the Government of South Africa. Prior to my meeting with Prime Minister Vorster in Germany in June, we solicited the views of the Black African governments as to the subjects to be discussed, and as to the conditions under which they believe a peaceful solution to the problems of Southern Africa is achievable. We presented their considerations to the South African Prime Minister in June. Those discussions led to a certain amount of progress.

This press conference was held at the conclusion of the discussions (4-6 September) between Prime Minister Vorster and Secretary of State Kissinger. The text was issued by the U.S. Information Service.

After those discussions the United States sent two missions to the Black African states. The United Kingdom, whose role is crucial in all of these actions, which has an historic responsibility for Rhodesia, and to whose co-operation and wisdom in this matter I would like to pay tribute, also sent two missions to Africa. On the basis of these two American and two British missions, a new set of considerations was developed which formed the basis for my discussions with the South African Prime Minister over the last two days. These discussions have been fruitful. I believe that progress towards the objectives, which have been jointly developed by the United States, the United Kingdom and the states of Black Africa, has been made. It is our view that a basis for further negotiation exists, though work still remains to be done.

In assessing the prospects you have to keep in mind that we are dealing with a negotiation of extraordinary complexity in terms of the issues involved and in terms of the parties involved. In attempting mediation there is first of all the United States and the United Kingdom. We have worked together in close harmony and with no significant differences, but we have had to co-ordinate our positions and we have done so successfully. Within Africa we are dealing internationally now with two major problems: The problem of Rhodesia and the problem of Namibia. They both have the same objectives, that is to say, independence, majority rule, minority rights, and assurances for economic progress. The United States and, I think I am safe in saying, the United Kingdom strongly support these objectives. But in achieving these objectives we are dealing with two different sets of parties in each case. The problem of Namibia is between South Africa, the various groups that have formed the constitutional conference within Namibia, and certain outside groups such as SWAPO, which had been excluded from the negotiations up to now – plus, such neighboring states as Angola, with which our communications are not, shall we say, ideal. With respect to Rhodesia, the problem is between four so-called front line states, bordering Rhodesia, three independence movements, Rhodesian White authorities that are not recognized by either the United States or the United Kingdom, and South Africa which does not recognize the Rhodesian authorities as a government, and which has given support to it in one way or another.

In other words, we are dealing with two different problems, five states, four liberation movements in Black Africa and South Africa, plus the authorities of Rhodesia and the authorities within Namibia. Nevertheless, with all of these complexities, and while we must expect ups and downs, I believe that conditions for negotiation exist on both issues. The United States will work for the objectives that I have described. The United States is opposed to violence, and the United States is opposed to outside intervention. The United States

does believe that the objectives of majority rule, minority rights and economic progress for all the peoples of the area are attainable with patience, with good will and with dedication. And the United States is prepared, together with the United Kingdom, to offer its good offices in the attainment of these objectives.

### Questions and Answers

*Mr. Secretary, can you say whether you made any progress here towards setting up a negotiation framework for resolving the Namibia question?*

I would like to say, before I answer any questions, that I hope you will understand that, at a time before we have had the opportunity to inform the leaders of Black Africa of the details of the negotiations, something which we will do in the immediate future, I cannot go into details on many of the questions that you may ask me. I believe that progress has been made towards setting up a negotiating framework, but of course, we will have to await also the reaction . . . in Namibia, the reaction of other leaders.

*Mr. Secretary, did Prime Minister Vorster show any signs of a willingness to recognize SWAPO in Namibia?*

Well, the United States has stated that it favors the participation of all groups in negotiations, and clearly we include SWAPO in this. It is, of course, up to the Prime Minister to speak for his position. But it is our view that a negotiating process will have to include such groups as SWAPO.

*Sir, do you envisage the possibility of your meeting with Mr. Smith?*

I have no present plans to meet with Mr. Smith and this would depend entirely on assurance that a successful outcome of the negotiations will occur. But at this moment there are no plans to meet with Mr. Smith. It would be totally premature to speculate on it.

*Mr. Secretary, could you tell us if you had any communication with the leaders meeting in Dar Es Salaam and what your plans are regarding your trip to Africa?*

There has been a meeting of the leaders in Dar Es Salaam which only began a few hours ago. We have been in touch over the weekend with some of the leaders, but that was prior to their assembling. My own plans are to return to the United States tomorrow. I am ready to continue the negotiations in Africa, if the parties should desire. We will communicate the results of these meeting to the parties, and we believe that conditions exist for the continuation of these negotiations.

*Dr. Kissinger, I have a question in two parts: (a) Have you been in contact*



*with Black African leaders in Rhodesia; and (b) How do you see the prospects of bringing these Black leaders of Rhodesia together?*

On my trip to Africa in April, I agreed with the Presidents of the so-called frontline states, that is Presidents that border Rhodesia, that a repetition of Angola should be avoided. By this we mean that the outside powers, and especially the super powers, should avoid direct contact with the so-called liberation movements; and to let the liberation movements be dealt with by the Black Africa states. We, therefore, have been in only very infrequent contacts with the Black leaders of Rhodesia, and we have always informed the leaders of Black Africa of these contacts. We believe that the unification of this leadership is a task not for the United States, but is a task for Black Africa. We hope very much that other outside powers exercise similar restraint.

*Mr. Secretary, did you get an invitation to visit South Africa? Are you in favor of going there?*

The Prime Minister did extend an invitation to visit South Africa. A visit by me to South Africa would depend on whether negotiations on the solution of problems of Southern Africa are going forward. It would in any event be preceded by a visit to Black Africa, and the program I would take to South Africa would reflect, as did all previous programs, the considerations of the Black African leaders that I have met. In other words, a visit by me to South Africa would be in the interest of peace in Southern Africa, and would not be a protocol visit by a Secretary of State.

*Mr. Secretary, as you well know, many of the Africans have said that the time for talk is passed and the time is now for fighting. Beyond the general expression of views that you have given here as to the United States and British intentions, are you now in a position to propose specific financial, political and other suggestions that you have been able to agree with Prime Minister Vorster to the Black leaders, or were you essentially only holding open the possibility of good offices without any concrete offers?*

We are moving toward a position where we will be able to put to the leaders of Black Africa a concrete program by which the objectives that I have described can be achieved for both Namibia and Rhodesia. We do not yet have all the details but we are moving in that direction, and the leaders of Black Africa at that point will have to decide first whether the program meets those needs, which I would hope it does, and whether they are prepared to go the route of negotiations, or whether they prefer the route of armed struggle.

*Just to follow that up, does that represent a joint US-South African position, or individual views which vary on the two subjects in some respects on Rhodesia and Namibia?*

I have pointed out that there is no joint US-South African position. The proposals we have put to South Africa have emerged from our discussions with the leaders of Black Africa. Of course, those that are then accepted by South Africa would tend to create a consensus, and in any negotiation a point must be reached where all parties agree, if they are to succeed. But the proposals we have put forward had been developed first in consultation with the leaders of Africa, and are now being discussed with leaders of South Africa.

*In case the African summit in Tanzania decides on Black rule in Rhodesia and Namibia, what will be your next step?*

I don't want to speculate on decisions that the summit in Dar Es Salaam may make. If it recommends a majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia, the United States has already indicated its support for it. The issue is not what is the objective, but how it is to be achieved: first, by what negotiating procedure, and second, under what concrete conditions. And there we have attempted to shape the proposals we have received from Africa and the views we have heard from South Africa into the program which we hope will be acceptable to all of the parties. But, of course, the solution can only come by the agreement of the parties concerned, and not by an imposition of the United States.

*Does your program that you are drawing up involve changes in South Africa as well as Namibia?*

The negotiations, the international negotiations at this moment concern Rhodesia and Namibia. The United States has stated its view with respect to South Africa last week and has had a response from South Africa as well.

*Does South Africa... (Inaudible)*

No, it has been publicly stated. And I am certain that the Prime Minister of South Africa will speak for himself when he meets the press.

*Has South Africa agreed to help finance any guarantee program in Rhodesia?*

There has been an extraordinary amount of speculation about this so-called guarantees program. Our concern is not simply to deal with the minority – with the White minority in Rhodesia; our concern is an economic program that brings about the economic advancement of all of Rhodesia, and within that context to provide opportunities for all races and all communities to live side by side with some security and with some assurances against rapid changes in their position. This program is still in a state of evolution and its details will have to await the precise discussions, though progress has been made in these and previous talks.

*Mr. Secretary, it has been reported this morning on the radio that if the Dar Es Salaam people take the results of your talks quite well, it is thought that there may be a Namibia conference in Geneva quite shortly, by the beginning of October, say.*

I don't want to go into specifics over negotiations that are now still going on. But obviously if independence for Namibia is to be achieved, there will have to be a conference. There has to be a location, and there will have to be an agreement as to participants. And you can safely assume that this is one of the subjects we are discussing right now.

*Mr. Secretary, you are to meet tomorrow with President Giscard D'Estaing (of France). Will you discuss with him about the selling to South Africa of its installations for treatment (inaudible)?<sup>1</sup>*

I do not commit suicide twice in a row. (Laughter). It's also physically impossible. (Laughter) And I will attempt to arrive in France for once without outraged statements in the French press. When I meet the President of France my primary objective is to review with him the state of these negotiations and the world situation, as we always do in a spirit of friendship and co-operation. I do not have on my agenda any specific French commercial transactions, but rather the general strategy that the United States and other countries are pursuing with respect to Southern Africa, to get the benefits of the views of a leader whose opinion we value greatly and of whose friendship we are proud.

*Mr. Secretary, you used the term progress here and so did Mr. Vorster. Progress, of course, is a very rubbery term diplomatically. Is there any way under the limitations upon you, with your diplomatic requirements, that you can be in any way any more specific on any one of these spheres rather than telling us that progress has been made. Can you give us any kind of measurement or increment of progress?*

I would say we have made progress both with respect to procedure and with respect to substance. I would want to repeat again that I measure this progress by the opinions we have previously collected from our various missions to Africa, and the objectives which we have stated for the United States and I believe for the United Kingdom. And we believe that progress is being made with respect both to the procedures and to the substance, though, of course, the many parties that I have described previously must make the final judgement on that.

*Mr. Secretary, when will the proposals you have outlined here be presented to the . . . (inaudible).*

Our tentative plan is to send Assistant Secretary Schaufele to Af-

1. Presumably a reference to the sale of a nuclear power plant.

rica but we may modify this. But this is our tentative plan and in any event, you can be sure that by one means or another they will be presented within the next forty eight hours.

*Mr. Secretary, before these negotiations started, before the talks here started, it was generally thought that the Namibian problem might be a little more tractable than the Rhodesian one. Is that still your view now?*

Well . . . anybody who makes estimates of the tractability of African problems is being very rash. I would think that the Namibian problem, having fewer parties, being at an earlier phase in which procedure is as yet more dominant than substance, may lend itself to more rapid progress. I want to make clear that as far as the United States is concerned we are prepared to move at a pace as rapid as it is possible to achieve agreement among the parties on both of these issues.

*Mr. Secretary, how will the United Nations come into the negotiations?*

Well, the United Nations has of course, a role in South West Africa which some of its representatives carry out very vocally. There will be a role for the United Nations, and this is one of the subjects that is now under discussion. But the United States supports a role for the United Nations in these negotiations.

*Mr. Secretary, how much further do you think your negotiations about Rhodesia can go on without contact or reference to what is the de facto government?*

Well, somebody will have to be in contact with the authorities in Salisbury, and I believe that those possibilities of contact exist, but it doesn't necessarily have to be the United States at this stage.

**STATEMENT ON NAMIBIA BY THE US ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, MR. NATHANIEL DAVIS, DELIVERED BEFORE THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES, FOOD AND ENERGY, OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, IN WASHINGTON, D.C., ON 10 JUNE, 1975.**

I am happy to have the opportunity to represent the Department of State before this sub-committee which is examining US policy toward Namibia. The recently concluded UN Security Council meeting on Namibia<sup>1</sup> has focused international attention on the Namibian question and on the policy of a number of countries including the United States toward the territory.

I would begin by stating that the past year has seen no change in basic US policy toward Namibia. We have reiterated publicly our support for UN General Assembly resolution 2145 of October 1966,<sup>2</sup> which terminated South Africa's mandate over Namibia, and for the conclusions of the International Court of Justice advisory opinion of 1971.<sup>3</sup>

We have made clear to the South African Government our deep concern over violations of human rights in the territory and have emphasized our position that although the mandate has been revoked South Africa continues to have obligations to ensure the observance of basic human rights.

One example of our concrete concern in the human rights area was our persistent effort during the first half of 1974 to seek information from the South African Government on the detention of some fifteen SWAPO and SWAPO Youth League members arrested in late January and early February 1974. Efforts by our Embassy in South Africa to obtain particulars on these detentions, such as charges and planned charges, the legal basis of detention, access to counsel, places of detention, etc., began on February 22, 1974. After repeated oral and written inquiries on our part, the South African Department of Foreign Affairs replied on June 25 by supplying us with the answers to some but not all of our questions. Our efforts to obtain further information continued until all of the seventy five detainees were either released without being charged or brought to trial.

Officers from our Embassy in South Africa attended all three trials which were eventually held, involving five detainees. One de-

1. The Security Council considered the Namibian question between 30 May and 6 June, 1975, but failed to adopt a draft resolution which would have determined that the situation constituted "a threat to international peace and security". The US, together with the UK and France, voted against the draft resolution.

2. For text of resolution see *UN General Assembly, Official records 21st Session 1966, Supp. no. 16, p. 2.*

3. See *Questions Affecting South Africa at the United Nations, 1971, p. 1.* South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg.

tainee was found not guilty, two detainees including SWAPO National Chairman David Meroro were found guilty but received light suspended sentences. The remaining two detainees, David Taopopi and Joseph Kashea, were found guilty of attempting to incite people *to commit murder or to cause public violence or malicious damage to property in South West Africa* and sentenced to five years with three years suspended.

Our Embassy in South Africa also made strong representations to the South African Government in November 1973 and again in April 1974 when we became aware of press reports that people in Ovamboland, northern Namibia, were being publicly flogged because of their political opposition to the South African administration of Namibia. On both occasions our Ambassador to South Africa made clear to high South African Department of Foreign Affairs officials our deep concern over these reported floggings and emphasized the ultimate responsibility which the South African Government bore for the actions of tribal authorities in Namibia. Since that time the Appellate Division of the South African Supreme Court on February 24, 1975, has enjoined such political floggings in Ovamboland.

Regarding US investment in and trade with Namibia; we continue to inform prospective US investors in Namibia who come to attention by letter and in some cases orally of our policy of discouraging investment in the territory. They are also informed that the US Government will not undertake to protect investment made on the basis of rights acquired from the South African Government following the 1966 termination of the mandate against the claims of a future lawful government in Namibia. In addition, Export - Import Bank facilities are not made available for trade with Namibia. US firms having investments in Namibia are informed by letter of US support for UN Security Council resolution 370 (1972)<sup>4</sup> and our hope that they will seek to conform their employment practices to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

We have also sent to all US Companies having interests in Namibia a pamphlet prepared by the Department of State in February 1973 entitled *Employment Practices of US Firms in South Africa*. This pamphlet describes the initiative taken by various firms in South Africa to improve the employment conditions of non-White workers and urges other countries to follow suit. In addition these US firms have received a September 1974 statement in which we call upon US firms to persist in their efforts to ensure that their employees and their families have the means available to lead decent and productive lives.

<sup>4</sup> For text of this and other UN resolutions mentioned below see *Questions Affecting South Africa at the United Nations* issued by the South African Institute of International Affairs, annually.

We are encouraged by *Newport Mining Corporation's* public statement in its 1974 annual report of its policy to adhere to fair employment principles and to seek application of these principles by its subsidiaries and affiliates. The annual report also states that the Tsumeb Corporation in Namibia, mostly owned by *Newmont* and another US firm, *American Metal Climax, Inc.*, has received permission from the de facto authorities to build an initial one hundred houses for Black workers and their families.

We believe that our present policy on investment reflects our concern over South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and our desire that the people be permitted to exercise their right of self-determination. We would hope that our investment policy together with our efforts to encourage US firms in Namibia to utilize enlightened employment practices would result in a future lawful Namibian government being favourably disposed toward US investment. However, at this stage, it is difficult to predict what position such a government would take regarding US investment.

At this point I wish to reiterate the Department's position on the granting of tax credits for US firms doing business in Namibia. While the US Government regards South Africa as illegally occupying Namibia and considers the official actions of the South African Government to be invalid, the Treasury Department has determined that these factors are not governing in determining whether payments to the South African Government are creditable under section 901 of the Internal Revenue Code; thus tax credits are granted. In the Treasury's view the current law provides for a credit in the event of any payments of taxes upon income to a governing power without regard to its legality. We do not consider the granting of the tax credit to imply any recognition by the US Government of the legality of the taxing power, in this case the South African Government.

The UN Council for Namibia decree of September 27, 1974, for the protection of the natural resources of Namibia has generated considerable interest. This decree asserts that no person or corporate body may explore, process, or export any Namibian natural resources without the permission of the UN Council for Namibia and declares that concessions granted by the South African Government in Namibia are null and void. Furthermore, under the decree, natural resources taken from Namibia without the consent of the UN Council for Namibia, and the ships carrying them are subject to seizure by or on behalf of the UN Council for Namibia and persons and corporations contravening the decree may be liable for damages by a future independent Namibian government. UN General Assembly resolution 3295 of December 13, 1974, inter alia requested all states to ensure full compliance with the provisions of the decree. The United States abstained on the resolution, essentially because it contained a veiled call for Chapter VII action by the

Security Council. The Department of State takes the position that enforcement jurisdiction regarding this decree rests not with the Executive Branch but rather with the courts and parties involved.

UN General Assembly resolution 2248 of 1967, which established the council for Namibia, directed the Council to proceed immediately to Namibia and granted it broad administrative powers, all of which were *to be discharged in the territory*. We have interpreted this provision to mean that the Council can exercise its administrative powers only after it gains admission to the territory. However, we cannot judge what position the courts would take should the Council seek legal recourse to enforce the decree.

The Department of State periodically reviews the question of US membership on the UN Council for Namibia. The United States abstained in UN General Assembly resolution 2248 which established the Council because we believed the stated functions of the Council, such as travelling to Namibia to take over the administration of the territory from the South African Government, were beyond the United Nations' available means to achieve. We therefore declined to serve on the Council and have maintained this position ever since.

You have also requested the US position on support for the UN Fund for Namibia and the Institute for Namibia. In 1974 the United States made a voluntary contribution of fifty thousand dollars to the UN Fund for Namibia. In making this contribution we stated that further US contributions to the fund would be conditional upon the cessation of allocations from the regular UN budget to the Fund. The 29th UN General Assembly in December 1974 authorised the appropriation of two hundred thousand dollars from the UN's General budget for the Fund for Namibia. Therefore, we have not proposed to make a voluntary contribution to the Fund in 1975. However, on March 21, 1975, the United States pledged, subject to Congressional approval, fifty thousand dollars to the UN Education and Training Program for Southern Africa to be earmarked for the training of Namibians.

With regard to the Institute for Namibia to be established in Lusaka, we agree in principle with the purpose for its creation. We are awaiting further details, particularly budgetary, regarding its establishment and functions. We will then be in a position to decide what concrete assistance, if any, we are prepared to offer.

Regarding the future of Namibia, we hold the following views: (a) all Namibians should, within a short time, be given the opportunity to express their views freely and under UN supervision on the political future and constitutional structure of the territory; (b) all Namibian political groups should be allowed to campaign for their views and to participate without hindrance in peaceful political activities in the course of the process of self-determination; (c) the territory



should not be split up in accordance with apartheid policy; and (d) the future of Namibia should be determined by the freely expressed choice of its inhabitants.

Over the past year the US Government has made known its views on the future of Namibia both directly and indirectly to the South African Government. In late November and early December 1974 we conveyed to the South African Government our belief that South Africa should make plans in consultation with the UN Secretary General for speedy self-determination within the whole territory, and issue a specific statement of its intentions toward the territory. On December 17 1974, we joined in the unanimous adoption of UN Security Council resolution 366 which demanded that South Africa take a number of actions including the necessary steps to transfer power to the people of Namibia with UN Assistance. On April 22, we joined with the British and French in a tripartite approach to the South African Government to express our views on the future of Namibia.

The South African Government issued virtually identical responses to the April 22 tripartite approach and to Security Council resolution 366, on May 27 1975.<sup>5</sup> In these responses the South African Government emphasized its standing policies on Namibia. It did state that unitary independence was one of the options open to the inhabitants of the territory, who would determine freely their own political and constitutional future and that it would administer the territory *only as long as the inhabitants so wish*. The South African Government asserted that while it ruled out UN supervision of Namibia, it expressed Prime Minister Vorster's willingness to discuss the Namibian situation with a mutually acceptable representative of the UN Secretary General, African leaders, the President of the UN Council for Namibia and the OAU Special Committee on Namibia (composed of the seven African members of the UN Council for Namibia). These responses did not indicate that South Africa was willing to withdraw from Namibia in accordance with UN resolutions, nor did they give significant details for proceeding to self-determination along lines stipulated by these UN resolutions.

The US Government approached last week's Security Council debate on Namibia believing that there had been some forward movement in the Namibian situation over the preceding six months, but clearly not enough. We were disappointed at the pace of movement toward genuine self-determination. However, in order to deal realistically with the present situation we believe that South Africa's offer to resume a dialogue with a representative of the UN Secretary General and to hold discussions with various African leaders, the President of the UN Council for Namibia and the OAU Special Committee on Namibia should be explored, and South Africa

<sup>5</sup> See *Southern Africa Record* no. 2, June 1975, p44ff.

should be induced to move from general statements of purpose to specific implementing action. We reiterate our belief that UN supervision of the self-determination process is necessary to assure the international community that Namibians will be able to choose freely their political future.

Efforts to negotiate an acceptable resolution in the Security Council debate were unsuccessful. As I have said, we condemn South Africa's continued and illegal occupation of Namibia and we made this clear during our participation in the Council's debates. However, we believe that the most effective way to bring about the genuine exercise of the right of self-determination for all Namibians is through continued efforts to induce South Africa to move more quickly to implement its agreement to such a right. There were serious and good faith efforts to work out a meaningful compromise text during the negotiations at the United Nations last week, but in the end the African group decided to press for a vote on its text. We shall continue to work through the UN and with interested parties for the implementation of UN resolutions regarding Namibia.

## **CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA (TURNHALLE CONFERENCE)**

### **A. DECLARATION OF INTENT ISSUED ON 14 SEPTEMBER 1975**

*We*, the true and authentic Representatives of the inhabitants of South West Africa hereby solemnly declare:

- *That* in the exercise of our right to self-determination and independence we are voluntarily gathered in this Conference in order to discuss the Constitutional future of South West Africa;
- *That* we most strongly condemn and reject the use of force or any improper interference in order to overthrow the existing order or to enforce a new dispensation;
- *That* we are firmly resolved to determine our future ourselves by peaceful negotiations and co-operation;
- *That* mindful of the particular circumstances of each of the population groups it is our firm resolve, in the execution of our task, to serve and respect their wishes and interests;
- *That* mindful of the interdependence of the various population groups and the interests of South West Africa in its entirety to create a form of government which will guarantee to every population group the greatest possible say in its own and national affairs which will fully protect the rights of minorities and which will do right and justice to all.

#### ***AND FURTHER WE DECLARE:***

- *That* we are resolved to devote continuous attention to social and economic conditions which will best promote the welfare, interests and peaceful co-existence of all the inhabitants of South West Africa and their posterity;
- *That* we are resolved to exert ourselves towards the promotion of and deference towards human rights and fundamental freedoms of all without discrimination merely on the basis of race, colour or creed.

#### ***WE THEREFORE RESOLVE:***

- to draft a Constitution for South West Africa as soon as appropriate and if possible within a period of three years.
- to devote continuous attention to measures implementing all the aims specified in this declaration.

### **B. STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE CONSTITUTION COMMITTEE OF THE CONFERENCE ON 18 AUGUST 1976**

During the first session of the Constitutional Conference in Sep-

tember 1975 a Declaration of Intent, containing certain principles and intents, was issued.

We hereby confirm the said Declaration of Intent and also confirm our conviction that it presents the way to a true and lasting solution for our country's problems. A thorough reconnaissance was made of the various aspects of the situation in its entirety and we are grateful to announce that we are in principle in agreement on the most important aspects. In particular we would like to refer to the following:

#### *SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE*

The Committee is in agreement that the date for independence for South West Africa can, with a reasonable measure of safety, be stated as 31 December 1978. Meanwhile negotiations will have to be entered into with South Africa regarding a variety of matters, e.g. Walvis Bay, the South African Railways, water and electricity supply, monetary and financial matters, security, etc.

As soon as a constitutional basis has been agreed upon and the negotiations mentioned above completed, we intend to establish an interim government, in terms of such constitutional basis, to attend to the transfer of functions and the establishment of a permanent government based on a constitution to be finalised in the interim period.

#### *TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY*

The Committee reaffirms the interdependence of the different population groups and its firm desire to retain South West Africa as a unit.

#### *FORM OF GOVERNMENT*

Because we do not want to anticipate a final dispensation at this stage it would be premature to furnish details regarding a form of government. However, the Committee can already announce that it envisages a government system in which, especially in the central body, sufficient provision will be made for the protection of minority groups.

#### *PEACEFUL SOLUTION*

We again reject any efforts to solve our country's problems by violence and urgently appeal to all civilised nations to combat any attempt to a violent solution of our problems with all the powers at their disposal.

#### *SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC MATTERS*

We herewith again appeal to the South African Government and all other bodies concerned (private or public) to expedite the implementation of the resolutions of the conference in this regard.

**C. STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE CONSTITUTION COMMITTEE OF THE CONFERENCE ON 16 SEPTEMBER 1976**

Subject to certain reservations the Constitution Committee accepted in principle a three-level government which will be constituted as follows:

- a first level in which all the population groups in South West Africa will be represented and will be responsible for matters of national and state concern;
- a second level government elected by members of the various population groups and which will be responsible for matters which are regarded as own affairs;
- a third level or local authorities for the different towns elected by the inhabitants of the respective towns.

Further the Committee accepted in principle ownership for all residents in the urban areas where they are resident and urgent representations will be made in this respect to the authorities concerned.

Furthermore the Committee decided to instruct the Secretariat to draft a complete progress report in respect of all resolutions which have already been adopted by the Conference and that urgent representations be made to the authorities concerned in respect of resolutions which have not yet been executed.