


# SOUTHERN AFRICA

## RECORD

Number Four

**The South African Institute of International Affairs**



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R E C O R D

Number Four

Die Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut van Internasionale Aangelæenthedes  
The South African Institute of International Affairs

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*STATEMENT BY THE RHODESIAN PRIME MINISTER,  
THE HON. IAN. D. SMITH,  
ON 7 DECEMBER, 1974.*

*Issued after the Lusaka Discussions.*

Consistent with détente which has developed recently in Southern Africa, discussions on the Rhodesia issue have taken place in Pretoria, Lusaka and Salisbury. Resulting from these discussions the Rhodesian Government agreed to mount a constitutional conference on certain conditions.

Firstly, that there should be a cessation of terrorism in accordance with the Prime Minister's frequently stated principle that he would only be prepared to discuss constitutional issues with those who undertook to work constitutionally and within the law.

Secondly, that any constitutional conference would have to accept that there would be no lowering of standards.

Accordingly, and with the concurrence of the Rhodesian Government, discussions were held in Lusaka this week between 18 Rhodesian Africans - six from each of the banned African organizations, and six from the ANC - and the Presidents of Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana. Following on these discussions a meeting was held yesterday (Friday) between the three Presidents and representatives of the Rhodesian Government.

At this meeting our representatives were informed that there would be no cessation of terrorism unless it was agreed that a pre-condition of the constitutional conference was that it would be on the basis of immediate majority rule.

These proposals are not acceptable to the Rhodesian Government. However, the Rhodesian Government repeat their oft-stated policy of promoting cooperation and peaceful co-existence in Southern Africa and will continue to pursue this objective.

STATEMENT BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER,  
THE HON. B.J. VORSTER,  
ON 8 DECEMBER, 1974

*Issued after the Rhodesian Prime Minister's Statement  
of 7 December, 1974.*

However one may look at the matter, it is a great pity that the attempt made on Friday in Lusaka to reach an agreement between Rhodesia, Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana was unsuccessful.

If this were to signify the end of all future negotiations it would be a tragedy.

While one cannot at this stage make a final assessment, nor would one wish to do so, it is necessary briefly to draw attention to the following:

1. The negotiations in Cape Town, Pretoria, Salisbury and Lusaka made very good progress until Friday and were conducted throughout in a relaxed and friendly atmosphere.
2. Promising new points of principle were reached which held out the prospect of a complete and speedy solution.
3. Rhodesia adopted a very realistic and reasonable attitude and throughout fulfilled its obligations in terms of its commitments. I have no doubt in this respect that Rhodesia would have honoured any future commitments.
4. Zambia as well as the other parties also made an honest attempt to find a solution and made a full contribution to this end.
5. As we see it, the discussions foundered as the result of the new demand at the end of the proceedings. This demand was in total conflict with the spirit, intent and result of the agreement up to this point.
6. Rhodesia cannot, therefore, be blamed for the failure of the negotiations.

7. Unless the other parties return to the basis and method of approach which was agreed upon before the deadlock on Friday, it must be assumed that agreement cannot be reached.
8. Without interfering in anyone's domestic affairs, South Africa did everything to bring the parties together and to promote understanding for each other's problems. In this connection, time and expense were not spared and South Africa meticulously carried out its commitments.
9. It is clear that influences exerted by certain circles in the world, African States, Rhodesia and in South Africa militated against the attempts to reach a settlement. But on the credit side it should be noted that useful contacts were established to form the basis for future understanding. A favourable climate was also created, making it possible, other than in the past, to reach sound understanding.
10. South Africa will continue its efforts, if at all possible, to bring the parties together again around the conference table.  
*The alternative is too ghastly to contemplate.*



EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH OPENING "TRADE FAIR RHODESIA"  
BY THE HON. IAN D. SMITH,  
PRIME MINISTER OF RHODESIA.

*Bulawayo, 28 April, 1975.*

Now let me say a few words on the political scene. I will not detain you for long. As my Rhodesian audiences know - basically I am a man of few words, especially for a politician. Is it not preferable that people should wonder why you do not talk, rather than why you do talk? Moreover, at the present time as part of the détente exercise, those participating gave an undertaking that they would do their utmost to play their part in a low key, to avoid provocation.

You may well ask, why the others do not honour this agreement. I am unable to answer that question. It is said that tolerance and humility are amongst the most important qualities to be found in civilised man. There can be no argument with that contention, but let me repeat my warning that it would be stupid to misinterpret our reasonableness as indicating any weakness, any intention of giving way on our principles, or lowering our standards of civilisation.

We are looking for a solution which will be fair and just for all Rhodesians, one which takes into account the realities of the situation. We have shown our sincerity and determination to make very real contributions towards the achievement of peace in Southern Africa. However, this is a two-way trade, demanding reciprocity and co-operation from the others who are participating in this exercise. There are some Rhodesians who believe that a détente exercise is simple, straight-forward, plain sailing, and that once you start you simply roll on to a successful conclusion. I am sure I don't have to tell thinking Rhodesians that people who fall for this are as naive as a newborn babe. Look what détente has meant for the people in South Vietnam. Where did that exercise go wrong - they were gullible enough to put their trust in the promises of those with whom they were negotiating. And what is their redress now? What can the greatest military power on this earth do to recover the situation which has developed because they dropped their guard, without covering themselves against the possibility - indeed, probability in this world of double standards - that the other side would not honour their part of the agreement. What use is it, in this present world, of complaining that the other party did not abide by the rules of the game. You will be told that if you were gullible enough to let the other party take you for a

ride, that's your hard luck. Let us be honest with ourselves - in this world we live in today, there are no rules to the game. As we know from recent history in other parts of the world, sometimes even your own best friends walk out on you.

In this part of the world the Communists are doing their utmost not only so to bewilder Rhodesians that they will turn against one another, but also to drive a wedge between Rhodesia and South Africa. In this campaign they are aided and abetted by the Press - day after day I am completely amazed at the distortion and slanting which is printed in so many newspapers, speculation which has no bearing on the truth and which is deliberately exaggerated to create alarm in people's minds. Recently they have led people to believe that Rhodesia is the major obstacle to détente, and that as a result of this the South African public have become disenchanted with Rhodesia, and the South African Government is about to ditch us. They go so far as to claim that they know what is going on in the mind of the South African Prime Minister, that he and his government are pressurising us, and that as a result an about-face in our policy is imminent. However, when one reads the speeches which have been made by the South African Prime Minister in Parliament during recent months, these completely debunk the stories published in the news media. When the Press accuses Rhodesia of being the main obstacle to détente, you will note that they deal in vague generalities because it is impossible for them to pinpoint any area in the détente exercise where the interests of our two countries do not coincide. However, there is always the danger that with time they may succeed in brainwashing the public into accepting their line of thinking.

I believe South Africans should be warned of the grave dangers inherent in a policy of appeasement. The attraction is that you will buy a little respite, a little time. You buy some short-term benefit at the expense of your long-term future. It is inconceivable to me that South Africans are unaware of the Communist strategy (the domino strategy as it is often called), of eliminating countries one by one. Surely they must know that the elimination of the white man in Southern Africa is one of the immediate, important, objectives of the Communists who are using black Southern Africans to spearhead their attack. It must also be clear that they are aided and abetted by the Left-Wing media and by liberal whites who, in some ways, are our greatest danger, for the Communists use them as a stalking-horse in order to gain entry within our camp, within our walls, and then to attack and undermine our system from this position of advantage. I cannot believe that the South African public have not been made aware of, and continually reminded of, the Lusaka Manifesto, which was drawn up in 1969, as the master plan for "liberating" Southern Africa. I say "liberating" in inverted commas: those of us who live in this part of the world do not have to be re-

minded of the injustices, indeed the horrors, which are associated with this type of liberation. The principles of the manifesto are constantly reiterated and were once more underlined at the Dar-es-Salaam conference held earlier this month. Indeed, the whole strategy received maximum publicity. It was stressed that now that Mozambique and Angola have been conquered, the next objective is Rhodesia, followed by South West Africa, and then the road will be clear to enable their undivided effort to be concentrated on the ultimate objective and target, the Republic of South Africa. The whole scheme is as clear as a pikestaff and is something of which Rhodesians are conscious and concerned. If the mass communication media are not feeding this crucial information to the South African public, in order to alert them to the dangers inherent in an attitude of complacency and a policy of appeasement, then they are guilty of neglecting, worse than that, of betraying the trust which is inherent in their profession. I say to all of the free world, and to our South African friends in particular, that the Communists know only too well that unless they succeed in breaking us here in Rhodesia, they will lose their fight for the conquest of Southern Africa.

Let me once again reiterate how we have gone out of our way to assist in the détente exercise, and of how inadequate has been the response from the ANC: how we have abided by every part of the agreement, and how they have not: how we have been provoked, and in turn resisted counter provocation. I made it clear that I was ready to hold the conference even before the end of last year. On every occasion when we met I urged that we should get down to the business of preparing for and holding the conference. At every stage I have been met by obstruction. When the ANC delegation returned from the recent conference in Dar-es-Salaam, all of the messages which we received were to the effect that the stage was now clear for Rhodesians to hold their conference. Accordingly I approached the ANC and in reply received a message which can only be described as a delaying tactic. They duly received from me the only answer possible and I am satisfied that all along they were aware of what my answer would be. Moreover, I have issued yet another invitation to the ANC to meet me on a specific date later this week, and I expressed the hope that the ANC would, in the national interest, adopt a responsible attitude towards this important subject concerning the future well-being of Rhodesia and all its people. My message was delivered on Tuesday of last week and up to this moment I have not received a reply. And yet some people are making the point, and getting away with it, aided by our daily press, that I and my Government are standing in the way of progress towards a settlement.

I appeal to the press, and here my remarks are directed at Rhodesia and South Africa, to put the facts before their readers: to give them the truth as to what the South African Prime Minister and his colleagues say about Rhodesia; as to what the record is concerning the Rhodesian

Government's attempts to make progress with the détente exercise, and how others are failing on their part; to give them the true story about the Communist strategy to eliminate the white man from Southern Africa.

Could there be a more simple, a more reasonable request to the press media: give the public the plain, simple, factual truth! In all honesty, they are not receiving it now.

I regret to say that I find some Rhodesians losing their heads, their sense of judgment, because of the continual propaganda with which they are bombarded day after day. There has been so much talk of a hand-over, and the time which should be associated with this exercise, that certain people have taken it for granted that this is something which inevitably we must face up to. Precisely to whom we are supposed to hand over, I do not know. Let me make it absolutely clear, as firmly and positively as I can, that as far as I and my Government are concerned, there is never going to be any hand-over in Rhodesia. We will continue in the future as we have done in the past, with a Rhodesia governed by Rhodesians. Any agreement which we reach must ensure and guarantee a place for all Rhodesians - black and white - for all time. If there are people participating in this détente exercise who think that they are going to push around white Rhodesians, then they are wasting their time talking to me. Likewise, anyone who believes that he is going to push around black Rhodesians is equally wasting his time talking to me. Let me make an appeal to my fellow Rhodesians to be on their guard against allowing themselves to be bluffed out of their legitimate position in Rhodesia, a position to which we have a moral right, a legal right, a right by usage and possession, and if we lose this, it will be because we have allowed ourselves to be defeated on paper, to be talked out of our rightful position in our own country. Anyone who allows himself to fall into this communist trap, in spite of the machinations of the press media, has only himself to blame.

An excellent example of what I am referring to was seen in the headline of this morning's local paper. This is an excellent example, how the true position can be misrepresented - by giving such prominence to the utterances of people who were not even present at the meeting, when the terms of the détente exercise were agreed. The position was put clearly and concisely in my broadcast of December 11 last year, where I said - and I quote - 'in particular, firstly I have received assurances to the effect that terrorist activities in Rhodesia will cease immediately; and secondly that the proposed constitutional conference would take place without any preconceived conditions'. Accordingly I had agreed to release the African leaders from detention, and their followers as well. They have never questioned this statement,

ladies and gentlemen. The record of the meeting where these points were confirmed can be found in my office.

There was one subsequent development to which I shall refer to. I received an approach, which asked me to be flexible, over the question of an immediate cessation of terrorist activity, because I was told it would take a couple of weeks for the message to get through to the terrorists who were operating. I accepted that, but it was also on the understanding that I was also given some flexibility on the release of the detainees. I had already released the leaders and a number of others. So I made it clear that we would hold our hand on the release of further detainees, until the ceasefire had been effected. This was accepted, and again the notes of the meeting concerned are available.

However, in order to clear-up the confusion which exists on this point, there is a simple procedure which I will now attempt to implement. The holding of a meeting with representatives with the three original parties of the détente exercise, plus a representative from the ANC. If that ends by producing more obstruction and delays, then I believe the time will have arrived for us to consider whether we have not been led into a bogus exercise, by people who have no intention of bringing it to a successful conclusion.

One other point on the political scene - I would like to urge that great caution be exercised by those enthusiastic political amateurs who are dabbling in the détente exercise. Nowadays, even local politics are more complicated than the average man-in-the-street appreciates. I doubt whether anything in this world is more involved, intricate, devious, than international politics. This is indeed a field where it is so easy, so tempting, for fools to rush in where angels fear to tread. In fact, recently we have witnessed just this, where good people with good intentions, are regrettably guilty of committing acts which will be counter-productive to the objective of détente and will provoke a reaction from some of those who are sincerely attempting to make a constructive contribution.

*STATEMENT TO PARLIAMENT ON 26 AUGUST, 1975 BY THE  
RHODESIAN PRIME MINISTER, THE HON. IAN D. SMITH,  
CONCERNING THE VICTORIA FALLS CONFERENCE  
OF 25 AUGUST, 1975.*

I think it only proper that I should take the earliest opportunity of informing this House and the public of Rhodesia, of the events which led up to the Victoria Falls Conference and clearly outline the Government's intention following the results of this meeting.

The Prime Minister of South Africa, Mr. Vorster, and the President of Zambia, Dr. Kaunda, have, during the last year, played a leading role in seeking a solution to the Rhodesian constitutional problem. Despite earlier setbacks, the South African Prime Minister left no stone unturned to take new initiatives. In these, he received the support and encouragement of the Zambian President. Recently this led to the Pretoria Agreement. For the record, and for a clearer understanding of recent events, I wish to repeat the Pretoria Agreement which was signed by the South African Prime Minister, Dr. Kaunda's personal representative, and myself. In addition, the Pretoria Agreement received the full support of the Presidents of Botswana, Tanzania and Mozambique. This Agreement (August 9, 1975) reads as follows:

- (a) The Rhodesian Government, through its ministerial representatives, and the ANC, through their appointed representatives, will meet not later than August 25 on the Victoria Falls Bridge in coaches to be supplied by the South African Government, for a formal conference without any pre-conditions.
- (b) The object of the formal meeting is to give the parties the opportunity to publicly express their genuine desire to negotiate an acceptable settlement.
- (c) After this, the conference will adjourn to enable the parties to discuss proposals for a settlement in Committee or Committees within Rhodesia.
- (d) Thereafter, the parties will meet again in formal conference anywhere decided upon to ratify the Committee proposals which have been agreed upon.

Subsequent to the Pretoria Agreement, and as a result of contacts between Salisbury and Lusaka, on August 13, 1975, my Government sent a telex to the Zambian Government which read as follows:

"With reference yesterday's telephone calls, the Rhodesian Prime Minister has confirmed that it was agreed in Pretoria on August 9, 1975, that while negotiations are in progress the ANC leaders in Rhodesia will be completely free to consult with their colleagues outside Rhodesia. The Prime Minister is prepared to give this assurance in writing to the ANC".

That evening (Wednesday, August 13), Bishop Muzorewa accepted the Pretoria Agreement and also made mention of this telex message to Zambia.

I quote from the Rhodesia Herald of Thursday, August 14, 1975, which reports Bishop Muzorewa and the ANC's acceptance of the Pretoria Agreement and my Government's solemn undertaking.

"The Prime Minister made a solemn undertaking that while negotiations are in progress the ANC leaders in Rhodesia will be completely free to consult with their colleagues outside Rhodesia", the statement said.

Therefore, before the start of the Victoria Falls Conference, Bishop Muzorewa and the ANC had not only accepted the Pretoria Agreement but had requested an additional assurance which was confirmed by telex and, it will be noted, publicly accepted by Bishop Muzorewa, using the text of Government's telex message.

Let me move on to the Falls Conference.

When the two delegations first assembled in the railway coach we had not only the South African Secretary of Foreign Affairs and President Kaunda's personal representative who were both to remain as observers throughout all the proceedings, but also both the Prime Minister of South Africa and President Kaunda and the South African Foreign Minister.

I opened the proceedings by welcoming and expressing my appreciation to the two national leaders for the trouble they had taken to be present personally. As Hon. Members are aware, they are the two principal architects of the exercise.

I then proceeded to welcome Bishop Muzorewa and the ANC delegates and to assure them of our honest and constructive frame of mind and of our dedication to bring the conference to a successful conclusion.

I went on to point out that we were there to create better understanding, justice and fairness for all who live in this part of the

world, and to bridge racial barriers, and that it should be a major intention of all of us to secure this goal.

On behalf of myself and my Government I undertook to forget the past, and not look over our shoulders. I appealed to them also not to indulge in recrimination. I told them that we had come there with the positive aim of ensuring the success implied in the Pretoria Agreement.

My opening address was followed by a lengthy prepared speech by Bishop Muzorewa which unhappily was not in keeping with the spirit of the conference nor of the subsequent remarks by the two National leaders. Regrettably, his speech contained little that was constructive, and much that was recriminatory. I do not propose to enlarge on it.

The South African Prime Minister then addressed the conference.

He expressed his pleasure at being able to be present on this historic occasion and gave an assurance that he had no wish to meddle in our internal affairs nor to prescribe how a solution to Rhodesia's problems should be found. He spoke of the necessity of avoiding violence and bloodshed and informed the conference that, in his opinion, it was absolutely necessary to adhere to the Pretoria Agreement of August 9. This agreement had called for the conference to demonstrate the willingness of both sides to avail themselves of the opportunity of publicly expressing their desire for a peaceful and acceptable settlement.

He was emphatic that there should be no pre-conditions and that should either side insist on any pre-conditions then it would be contrary to the Pretoria Agreement and its spirit and that under those circumstances success would not be obtained.

He further supported my remarks that if either side were to indulge in recriminations then it would be very difficult to come to an agreement and therefore appealed to both sides to rise above any such temptation.

He believed that for all practical purposes it would be impossible to find a solution in one or two days, or even in a week, sitting on the bridge and this was one reason why the Pretoria Agreement provided for the formal conference to go into committee in Rhodesia to enable both parties to discuss informally their proposals for a solution. If there was goodwill on both sides, then he was sure an acceptable and honourable settlement could be found in the interests of all Rhodesians.



As our neighbour he brought all good wishes for the success of the conference.

President Kaunda then addressed the conference and said that he had originally had doubts as to whether he and the South African Prime Minister should be present in case they were accused of interfering in the internal affairs of Rhodesia. But, had they not been there it might have been considered that they were boycotting the conference and were not interested and this would have been unfortunate.

He stressed that it was necessary to seek answers to our problems and urged the delegates to find a solution to end the fighting, because other countries were involved.

He also referred to what I had said about forgetting the past and avoiding recrimination and agreed that we should try to live in the present and prepare for the future meaningfully. Finally he wished the conference success.

It was evident that Bishop Muzorewa was out of step with the spirit which prevailed amongst the three Southern African leaders present on the Victoria Falls Bridge. After Mr. Vorster and Dr. Kaunda left the conference room Bishop Muzorewa dropped a bombshell. He totally disregarded the advice given by the two leaders and proposed an amendment to the Pretoria Agreement which reads as follows -

"We publicly state that the only genuine settlement to the majority of the people of our country is the one that shall be based on the transfer of power from the minority to the majority people of the country - that is to say majority rule now. Therefore our genuine desire to negotiate should produce a settlement of this nature."

My delegation and I were at pains over a protracted period during the morning to point out that not only was this completely and utterly unacceptable to us, but it was a flagrant violation of the Pretoria Agreement, in that it attempted to introduce a pre-condition which would clearly have prevented any further progress.

The ANC delegation persisted and the only solution was to adjourn the conference well before lunch to give them the opportunity not only to re-think their position but also to consider the advice given to us by the South African Prime Minister and Zambian President. The conference was adjourned until 3.30 p.m. When the conference re-convened the ANC restated their position. Our position remained unchanged in that we were willing to put into practice the Pretoria Agreement by adopting a draft proposal which would give effect to and not deviate from

this Agreement. The conference bogged down once again and was adjourned for an indeterminate period in order to give the ANC the opportunity to once again reconsider their position.

The next bombshell was dropped when we received a document headed "Immunities" from the ANC in which they intimated that they would accept the draft based on the Pretoria proposals on condition that we agreed to grant immunities to externally and internally based ANC members and I quote -

1. Immunity from enforcement in any way or degree in whole or in part of an existing sentence, order or direction.
2. Immunity from arrest, prosecution, detention or restriction or any other process whatsoever for any act or omission in or outside Rhodesia before commencement of the next meeting or conference.
3. Any persons nominated by the ANC to attend in any capacity whatever any meetings in Rhodesia in connection with the conference or any committee or sub-committee thereof shall have full diplomatic immunity as though they were a diplomatic agent including, without prejudice, to the generality of such immunity full right of entry to and exit from Rhodesia without travel documents and full freedom of movement in Rhodesia, but so that the Government of Rhodesia shall not declare such person to be a non persona grata except after consultation with the Governments of the Republic of South Africa and Zambia.
4. Subject to the confidentiality of the discussions as agreed below every such person referred to in clause 3 above shall have freedom of expression at all meetings, formal and informal concerning the business of the conference and any committees or sub-committees including freedom from observation, harrassment or recording.

I am sure I don't have to tell Hon. Members that this was rejected. This was late on Monday night.

The next step came this morning when we received a message that the ANC was prepared to accept the Pretoria Agreement on condition that all ANC delegates living outside Rhodesia would be allowed to come back to Rhodesia for the duration of the negotiations and move about freely. This, was also quite unacceptable. It would involve

people who are well-known terrorist leaders who bear the responsibility for the murders and other atrocities which have been perpetrated in our country. These men can only be compared with the leaders of Baden-Meinhof and the Black September terrorist groups amongst others.

Let me repeat as far as we were concerned, we went to the Victoria Falls Conference to sign a document which would give effect to the letter and the spirit of the Pretoria Agreement. In addition, as I have pointed out, we had already given an undertaking that the ANC representatives within Rhodesia would be completely free to consult with their colleagues outside the country. The very reason for holding the conference on the Victoria Falls Bridge was to accommodate the ANC and make it possible for them to have their externally based representatives present at this formal opening conference. This was a major point of consideration during the Pretoria talks. It is obvious from what I have told Hon. Members that the ANC were determined to make the conference fail.

Because of the fact that the ANC reneged on the Pretoria Agreement, it is now incumbent on the Government to take the positive and constructive move of bringing in other Rhodesians to go forward with us in our quest for a fair and just settlement.

This will involve the holding of a conference to which the representatives of the Chiefs' Council will be invited and representatives of other African organizations who have indicated a desire to participate. I wish to stress here, particularly in view of the part played by the Governments of the Republic of South Africa, Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana in bringing the ANC to the conference table, that the door will be left open to the ANC to participate providing they are prepared to abide by the Pretoria Agreement.

In spite of the fact that the ANC frustrated the principal objective for which the conference was mounted, nevertheless from other points of view the Pretoria Agreement which culminated in the Victoria Falls Conference was a great success. From it has come new contacts, new friendships and a deeper understanding and sympathy between the Governments of the Republic of South Africa, Zambia and indeed, ourselves. I believe it will herald a new era of mutual understanding and co-operation. For this, much praise is due to those who originated this plan. As far as I am concerned I will do my utmost to ensure that the initiative which was taken by the South African Prime Minister and the Zambian President will not be in vain.

If we succeed in our new initiative, great benefits will flow, not only to the people of Rhodesia, but also to our neighbours in Southern Africa.

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER  
OF LESOTHO, DR. LEABUA JONATHAN.

*Quthing, Lesotho, 17 May, 1975.*

In this crucial decade of the seventies, when nations of the world with differing political ideologies are engaged in détente, Lesotho cannot remain static; it has to keep abreast of the changing climate of international relations and to be increasingly involved in international affairs by embarking on a dynamic foreign policy.

We have to follow an outward-looking policy geared towards making friends for Lesotho and seeking aid from all our friends regardless of their beliefs, ideologies and different forms of government, as long as such friendships and aid do not interfere with our own beliefs and integrity, and our form of government. It is within this policy that the Lesotho Minister of Foreign Affairs and his delegation have undertaken the visit to Peking.

Our obligation to seek friends and aid for Lesotho is particularly essential because we are on the verge of pushing our Second Five Year Development Plan. In this ambitious scheme, the Lesotho Government is determined to revolutionise the entire system of farming so that Lesotho becomes self-sufficient in a variety of foodstuffs and agricultural products required by the country. To this end, it gives me great pleasure to inform you that the Government of Canada has donated six million Canadian dollars for an integrated rural development project at Thaba-Tseka. The Government of Denmark is financing the establishment of an abattoir in Maseru this year.

Our top priority is to bring about meaningful economic development in the rural areas of Lesotho. We are pledged to revolutionise education in all its various sectors so that Basotho children should acquire the skills required by the country. We are fully committed to the project of improving our infrastructure. We will improve and expand all our communication systems within Lesotho and extend them to link us with the rest of Africa and other parts of the world.

We shall also embark on intensive and extensive exploration of the mineral resources of our country. It is our aim to conserve and utilise our vast water resources - our white gold - by constructing dams on many of our rivers. Permit me to hazard a guess that soon, with the increase of the human population and increasing industrialisation, water from Lesotho will have a significant and crucial role in the development of Lesotho and for those who may require our surplus water. Our motto is that "the impossible we shall do right away; only miracles will take us a little longer".

In regard to our form of government, let me say that many thousands of Basotho - at the National Pitsos at Leribe, Mohale's Hoek, Mafeteng and here in Quthing today - have been unanimous in their resolution that they will state the form of government they want. In fact, the Basotho have said that the form of government they want should be tailor-made to fit their way of life, customs and traditions: A philosophy which I choose to call "Moshoeshoe".

When I was at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Jamaica, I was able to meet Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, both of whom briefed me on the developments in Zimbabwe and the difficulties they are experiencing; in addition, we also discussed the problems of Southern Africa in general. I don't think it is necessary for me to narrate the decisions made by the OAU Member States at their recent meeting in Dar-Es-Salaam on the problems of Southern Africa, as I have no doubt you are informed of these decisions, inasmuch as you are all aware of the stand taken by the Commonwealth Heads of Government on the same issue.

The responsibility now remains with the white world in this region to soften their hearts and make room for a peaceful rather than a revolutionary change. As members of the Organisation of African Unity, we in Lesotho shall work for the solution of these problems on the basis of the OAU decisions. Despite all these, it is a well-known fact that I personally - and before all other black leaders - was the first to hold talks with the late Dr. Verwoerd in 1967 and subsequently I had talks with Mr. Vorster - though unfortunately without success. It is my firm conviction that all the problems which affect our part of the world should be handled by ourselves supported by you the people we lead, because unless dialogue manifests itself at the grass roots of society in the villages, and between us and our neighbours - black and white - the leaders will certainly not succeed because harmonious relations cannot be expected to come from above. Harmonious relations should begin at grass roots level and be allowed to grow and reach those in the positions of leadership.

In conclusion, I wish to express satisfaction at the recent steps taken by the South African Government in its endeavour to eliminate the discriminatory service at her border posts to Lesotho. This augurs well for the improvement of relations. It is to be hoped that this attitude will be extended into all other spheres in which our geographic proximity dictates mutual relations.

EXTRACT FROM A STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF LESOTHO  
DR. LEABUA JONATHAN.

*On the occasion of the visit to Lesotho  
of the O.A.U. Secretary-General.*

*Maseru, 27 June, 1975.*

Mr. Secretary-General, we are a nation of proud Africans and I should like to assure you today of Lesotho's pledge of solidarity with the Organisation of African Unity and of our determination to remain faithful to its resolutions. We are, as you can see, in the forefront of what is often called the Southern African problem. We live with it in its many manifestations. And we believe we can claim some understanding of its nature as we seek to contribute as best as we can to a positive solution.

You have come from the celebrations of the independence of the valiant peoples of Mozambique. We believe that the total liberation of the whole of Southern Africa is inevitable. No force can stop the changes which must come. Many people did not believe that Mozambique would be free and independent today. But the experience of the great peoples of Mozambique, as well as of other peoples in Africa, is evidence enough that positive change will come as long as men and women remain clear-minded and loyal to their objectives, and resist any efforts to divide them or to confuse the issues.

The tough lessons of this part of the world are that we should be realistic and pragmatic in seeking solutions to our problems. The days of slogans are over; these are days that require clearly thought-out action. And these are days that require unity among all African peoples.

Please be assured, Mr. Secretary-General, that we in Lesotho will do nothing that will confuse or divide Africa. We note with anxiety the many determined efforts which nowadays threaten African Unity by sowing unnecessary discord and confusion. We believe that these efforts should be resisted with all of Africa's might. We are dedicated to African Unity because it is in unity and cooperation that the salvation of our continent will lie.

DECLARATION OF DAKAR ON NAMIBIA AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

*Declaration adopted at the  
International Conference on  
"Namibia and Human Rights",  
Dakar, 5-8 January 1976.*

- *Considering* that the right of the peoples to self-determination is an inalienable and imprescriptible right,

- *Considering* that the implementation of the right of peoples to self-determination is the *sine qua non* of enjoyment of the fundamental rights and freedoms deriving in particular from the provisions of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenants on Human Rights,

- *Considering*, in particular, the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,

- *Considering* resolution 2145, of 27 October 1966, revoking the Mandate of South Africa over South West Africa,

- *Considering* that the International Court of Justice has affirmed that the presence of South Africa in Namibia is illegal,

- *Considering* that the Security Council has declared that such presence is detrimental to the maintenance of peace and security in the region,

- *Convinced* that the armed struggle of the people of Namibia, supported by progressive and democratic forces will inevitably triumph,

- *Noting* that SWAPO has been recognized by the United Nations as the only authentic representative of the people of Namibia,

- *Noting* with satisfaction the creation by the United Nations General Assembly of the United Nations Council for Namibia,

- *Hoping* that the implementation of action by the United Nations Council for Namibia, in particular its Decree No.1, will accelerate the process of the decolonisation of Namibia,

- *Firmly resolved* to support by their words, deeds and studies the struggle for the liberation of Namibia,

- *Adopted the following Declaration and Programme of Action annexed thereto:*

I

1. Like all peoples, the people of Namibia have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right it must be able to determine freely its political status and ensure its economic, social and cultural development.

2. The exercise of that right by the people of Namibia is a prerequisite for their enjoyment of human rights. It involves the liberation of the people of Namibia from the yoke of South Africa's colonialism and the restoration of its fundamental national rights, which are independence, sovereignty, the right to dispose of its natural resources and the unity and integrity of its territory.

3. Any attempt to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia is inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. The policy of "Bantustanization" is contrary to those purposes and principles. It aims at denying to the people of Namibia the exercise of its right to self-determination.

4. It is necessary to denounce and condemn the so-called constitutional conference convened by South Africa, the composition and purpose of which have been illegally determined by the South African Government.

II

5. South Africa has deliberately violated the obligations deriving from its Mandate over South West Africa. Its refusal to place South West Africa under the Trusteeship System, in spite of a number of resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly requesting it to do so, reveals its annexation intent. The termination of its Mandate by the United Nations General Assembly on 27 October 1966 makes its presence in Namibia illegal.

6. The presence of South Africa in Namibia is all the more intolerable in that it is subjecting the people of Namibia to the detestable system of *apartheid*, a deliberate negation of the most elementary human rights which has been universally condemned.



7. Namibia has been split into an arid and economically useless zone of "reserve" (homelands) where the great majority of the Black population is being parked on a third of the Territory, and a "police" zone exclusively reserved for Whites and comprising the major part of the plateau, suitable for agriculture and rich in mineral resources, including uranium. The Blacks are excluded from the "Territorial Government", which itself has very limited authority. They are deprived of freedom of movement and cannot leave their reservation without a pass. They do not have the right to choose either their employment or their employer. When forced to work in the "police" zone, they have to leave their wives and children and live separated from their families. They do not have either the right to organize or the right to strike.

8. Such a system, which reduces a whole people to slavery, constitutes a crime against humanity.

### III

9. Maintenance of the occupation of Namibia by South Africa and of the system of *apartheid* is a continuing threat to peace and security in southern Africa, the whole of Africa and the world. Consequently, South Africa and its colonialist, racist and aggressive policies must be strongly denounced and vigorously combatted by the international community as a whole.

10. The recent reinforcement of the military presence of South Africa in Namibia must be condemned as a means of consolidating the illegal occupation of that country and of repressing the legitimate resistance of the people of Namibia. What is more, the use of the territory of Namibia as a base for intervention in the internal affairs of African countries, as is at present the case in Angola, aggravates the threat to international peace and security and must cease immediately.

11. It is regrettable that the triple veto of the United States, the United Kingdom and France paralyzed the Security Council by preventing it from taking effective action and, more precisely, from applying the sanctions provided for by Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The attitude of these three States has rightly caused and is still causing indignation among the people of Africa and the other peoples of the world.

12. The military and economic assistance furnished to South Africa by certain States must also be openly denounced and manifestly combatted by all the forces of progress. Arms sales, nuclear co-operation agreements and economic activities by multinational companies in South Africa or Namibia constitute acts of sheer complicity with the policies of *apartheid*.

13. It is high time for the States of Africa to make it clear to the countries which are supporting South Africa in this way that they cannot continue to do so while claiming the friendship of the peoples of Africa.

#### IV

14. Unquestionably, substantial efforts have been exerted by the United Nations, the specialized agencies and governmental and non-governmental organizations to bring South Africa to its senses and to obtain improvements in the life of the people of Namibia and its gradual accession to independence. Among the many varied measures taken towards those ends, the termination of the Mandate of South Africa over South West Africa and the creation of the United Nations Council for Namibia undoubtedly mark important stages towards the independence of Namibia.

15. Decree No. 1 of the United Nations Council for Namibia was lawfully issued by that body under its powers as laid down in resolution 2248 (S-V) of the United Nations General Assembly, and it should be possible to use it judiciously to "protect the natural resources of the people of Namibia and to ensure that these natural resources are not exploited to the detriment of Namibia, its people or environmental assets".

16. Also to be welcomed is the firm attitude of the Organization of African Unity towards the problem of Namibia and that attitude, together with the efforts of the United Nations and the struggle of the people of Namibia, will not fail to have its effects.

#### V

17. The facts are inescapable, however, and it must be acknowledged that all these efforts have been incapable of fundamentally modifying the policies of South Africa on Namibia or of bringing about a qualitative change in the situation of the people of Namibia.

18. There is no doubt that a large-scale diplomatic offensive has lately been launched by South Africa in the form of an alleged policy of "overture" and "dialogue" towards the African States, an offensive which has been strongly supported by the mass media, mostly under imperialist control, which is attempting to give it great play by the worldwide dissemination of cleverly controlled "news".

19. However, this policy of South Africa is a snare because it is alien to the true interests of the people of Namibia and is part of a global imperialist military and politico-economic strategy. What is more, the facts show that South Africa has neither in principle nor in practice abandoned its policies of annexation and domination of Namibia.

20. Under these circumstances, as was recommended by the special meeting of the Foreign Ministers of OAU Member States, held at Dar-es-Salaam in April 1975, the policy of concertation and the so-called *détente* as regards the African States, advocated by South Africa and aimed at causing confusion in international public opinion as well as at undermining African unity and the struggle for the elimination of *apartheid* in South Africa must be categorically rejected.

## VI

21. It must be realised that South Africa will never willingly end its illegal occupation of Namibia and will never of its own accord abandon its policies of oppression and enslavement of the peoples of southern Africa.

22. That is why it must be compelled to do so by all means available to the international community, in which the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, governmental and non-governmental organizations, and the States of Africa -each according to its means- have their special role to play.

23. Economic or other measures of compulsion should be taken to oblige South Africa to comply with the decisions of the international community. In that connection, the activities of trade unions and of social and information bodies should reinforce and stimulate the action of international governmental and non-governmental organizations.

24. Obviously, however, so long as the international community does not use the means with which it has endowed itself, or can endow itself, to put an end to the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa, all means, including armed struggle, are justified to liberate the country. Consequently, to that end it is necessary to enlist the efforts of the international community and more particularly that of the countries of Africa, by giving SWAPO all the political, moral and material support it so sorely needs.

25. Accordingly, those Governments which have not yet done so should recognize SWAPO as the only authentic representative of the people of Namibia.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON  
"NAMIBIA AND HUMAN RIGHTS":  
PROGRAMME OF ACTION.

*Adopted by the Dakar Conference on Namibia and Human Rights and Proposed to International Organizations, States, Non-Governmental Organizations and Social, Professional, Trade-Union and Information Organizations as a Set of Measures to be taken to secure for the People of Namibia the exercise of their right to self-determination.*

1. The Security Council could follow up its resolution 366 (1974) by adopting the following measures:
  - (a) Determining, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, that the continued occupation of Namibia by South Africa and, in particular, the use of that Territory as a military base, constitute a threat to international peace and security.
  - (b) Deciding on a complete embargo on the sale, gift or transfer of arms and of all other forms of military equipment to South Africa, such embargo to include existing and future agreements for the provision of radar and telecommunication systems for strategic or military purposes between South Africa and any other country of military alliance.
  - (c) Considering steps to be taken to prevent the training or equipment by the South African authorities of Portuguese or other mercenaries to be used against liberation movements in Namibia or elsewhere in Africa.
  - (d) Restraining any attempts by South Africa to alter the borders of Namibia or to fragment or partition any portion of the Territory.
  - (e) Requesting the European Economic Community and the European Free-Trade Association and all States having financial relations with South Africa to suspend them so long as South Africa continues illegally to occupy Namibia or to practise the system of *apartheid*.

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<sup>+</sup>Adopted by the International Conference on Namibia and Human Rights, Dakar, 5-8 January, 1976.

- (f) Requesting the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to close its consulate in Windhoek and to undertake an education campaign for the re-orientation of the German population in Namibia so as to enable them to live in a free Namibia.
  - (g) Requiring all States to refrain from extending facilities directly or indirectly to enable South Africa to undertake the production of uranium, plutonium and other nuclear materials or reactors.
2. The Security Council could, in addition, take the following measures:
- (a) Declare that in order that the people of Namibia be enabled to freely determine their own future, it is imperative that free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity; the date, timetable and modalities for such elections to be decided upon by the United Nations as soon as possible, providing always that a period of not less than eighteen months should elapse between the time at which the date of the elections is determined and the actual date for the holding of such elections in order to enable the people of Namibia to organize politically for the elections and in order that the United Nations may have adequate time to establish the necessary machinery within Namibia to enable it to supervise and control such elections.
  - (b) Demand that South Africa now make a solemn declaration accepting the foregoing provisions for the holding of free elections in Namibia under the United Nations' supervision and control and undertaking to comply with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 in regard to Namibia and that it recognized the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia as a nation; such declaration to be addressed to the Security Council of the United Nations.
  - (c) Demand that South Africa take the necessary steps to effect the withdrawal, in accordance with resolutions 264 (1969), 269 (1969) and 366 (1974), of its illegal administration maintained in Namibia and to transfer power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations.

- (d) Demand again that South Africa, pending the transfer of powers provided for in the preceding paragraphs:
  - (i) Comply fully in spirit and in practice with the provisions of the Declaration of Human Rights;
  - (ii) Release all Namibian political prisoners, including all those imprisoned or detained in connection with offences under so-called internal security laws, whether such Namibians have been charged or tried or are held without charge and whether held in Namibia or South Africa;
  - (iii) Abolish the application in Namibia of all racially discriminatory and politically repressive laws and practices, particularly bantustans and homelands;
  - (iv) Accord unconditionally to all Namibians currently in exile for political reasons full facilities for return to their country without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment.
- 3. Should the Security Council fail to take effective action to put an end to the illegal occupation of Namibia, the General Assembly should exercise its legal authority, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to implement the previous decisions it adopted in its resolution 2145 (XXI) (1966) terminating South Africa's mandate over Namibia.
- 4. Beginning in 1976, an international week of solidarity with the people of Namibia will be organized in the week following 27 October, the anniversary of the ending of South Africa's mandate in Namibia.
- 5. In order to organize the international week of solidarity with the people of Namibia, there will be set up National Aid to Namibia Committees in all countries where they do not already exist.
- 6. Each year, parliaments and inter-parliamentary organizations should include in their agenda, as an item for discussion, the question of the liberation of Namibia.
- 7. The State Members of the United Nations must fully enforce Decree No. 1 of the United Nations Council for Namibia concerning protection of the natural resources of Namibia, and in particular:

- (a) where necessary, take the measures required for application of the Decree by their domestic authorities and prohibit, under pain of punishment as a criminal offence, the import, without the authorization of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, of goods emanating from that country;
  - (b) provide the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia with all facilities for exercising the judicial activities vested in him by Decree No. 1;
  - (c) disseminate information concerning the unlawfulness of importing goods emanating from Namibia in violation of the provisions of Decree No. 1, and give full publicity to violations committed by enterprises operating under their jurisdiction.
8. The United Nations Council for Namibia must do its utmost to ensure respect for human rights in Namibia and, in particular, consider the possibility of adhering to the United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
  9. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights should make an investigative body responsible for looking into violations of human rights in Namibia and preparing cases for future legal prosecution.
  10. Governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations as well as public opinion must give maximum political and material support to SWAPO, the authentic representative of the people of Namibia in its liberation struggle.
  11. Trade unions should organize themselves to oppose by every means available to them the continuation and expansion of economic dealings between South Africa and other States.
  12. United Nations bodies and international organizations must ensure that political prisoners are provided with effective defence and their families are given financial support.
  13. Organizations and public bodies must extend their support to the churches in Namibia in their opposition to the racist colonial administration and assist the victims of South African oppression in Namibia, including prisoners and dependents.

14. In the project it has undertaken, the International Institute of Human Rights should prepare and publish a compendium of all basic documents relating to Namibia.
15. A United Nations radio transmitter will be established in a free country of Africa to transmit, in all languages spoken in Namibia, United Nations broadcasts on racism, decolonization and Namibia.
16. All nations should contribute to the United Nations Fund for Namibia to promote the training and education of Namibians so as to fit them for assuming the administration of their country.
17. The United Nations Commissioner for Namibia should ensure the preparation and publication of special studies on the following questions:
  - (a) The production and exploitation of uranium in Namibia;
  - (b) The production and export of diamonds from Namibia;
  - (c) The export of Swakara fur;
  - (d) The Cunene Dam scheme (designed to provide power for mines and water works).
18. Each year, at the end of the international week of solidarity with the people of Namibia, the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia should review the efforts made and results obtained in connection with this Programme of Action and report thereon to the United Nations Council for Namibia.



*STATEMENT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SOUTH AFRICA  
IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 27 JANUARY, 1976, ON THE SUBJECT  
OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA; WITH REFERENCE ALSO TO ANGOLA.*

In a communication addressed to the Secretary-General today<sup>+</sup> I dealt at some length with salient aspects of my Government's views on the question of South West Africa, and I respectfully commend that document to the attention of the Council, as it deals with the substantive issues of South West Africa in greater detail than I shall have time to do today. While it should serve to remind the Council of the incontrovertible realities of the Territory, it also outlines the most recent developments there, summarises my Government's position, especially as expounded in recent pronouncements, and refutes many of the allegations brought against South Africa, principally at the United Nations and in this debate. It shows clearly why we believe that Security Council and other United Nations action on South West Africa has been and remains one-sided, unrealistic and contrary to the interests of the peoples of the Territory.

The first irrefutable fact about the Territory, which it is essential to grasp if its problems are to be approached with a minimum of realism, is that my Government did not in some magical way create the peoples of South West Africa, their languages, or their cultures; nor was it responsible for their history. For example, the Owambo, Kavongo and East Caprivi peoples who comprise 60% of the total population, migrated from other parts of Africa in previous centuries and settled, long before the Mandate or the United Nations came into being, in the northern part of the Territory where they live to this day. This is not surprising, since most of the best grazing and arable land is to be found there. As a result of these historical and physical factors, therefore, different peoples exist in the Territory.

The significance of these and similar basic facts will not be lost on the Council. It is that nothing the United Nations, including, with respect, the members sitting around this table, can propose or do, can alter them. It is beyond the power of man-made institutions to change the heterogeneous complexion of the population, the low rainfall and water scarcity, the vast arid areas, the low population density, and so on. The formidable obstacles to economic development are a reality. I bring these facts to the attention of the Council not to obstruct but to help it, because no discussion of South West Africa, or any other question, can achieve meaningful results, except on the basis of correct basic information about prevailing circumstances and conditions.

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<sup>+</sup> See occasional paper "South West Africa and the United Nations: South African letter addressed to the UN Secretary-General on 27 January, 1976", published by the South African Institute of International Affairs, February 1976.

In this connection I wish to remind the Council of the many efforts made by my Government to ensure that full information on the Territory is available for everyone genuinely interested in acquainting himself with conditions in South West Africa. I need only refer to the following to substantiate this statement: thousands of pages in the record of the International Court of Justice contain fully documented facts on conditions in South West Africa; the invitation extended to the World Court in 1956 to inspect South West Africa and to see whatever it wished; the active participation by the South African delegation in the General Assembly debate on South West Africa during the Twenty-First Session in 1966; the publication and distribution to Governments and International Organizations, including the United Nations, of the "South West Africa Survey 1967"; various communications were addressed by the South African Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In particular his letters of 26 September 1967, 15 February 1968, 27 March 1968, 30 April 1969, 26 September 1969, 30 April 1973 and 27 May 1975 are noteworthy examples.

It is clear that no serious attempt has as yet been made by the United Nations fully to acquaint itself with the facts concerning the peoples of South West Africa and their conditions and standards of living. It is therefore not the South African Government that is defying the United Nations, but the true facts and situation of South West Africa which are defying the United Nations.

One fact has clearly emerged, namely, that any information and findings favourable to South Africa are summarily rejected and ignored by the United Nations, while mere assertions are eagerly accepted, provided that they further the political objectives of the majority within the United Nations. Nevertheless the facts concerning the high standards of development already achieved in South West Africa cannot be assailed. What is of even greater importance is that those facts belie any allegation of a threat to peace. Those facts make it clear that there exists no grounds for Security Council intervention.

Despite a natural environment which is basically inimical to economic development, substantial progress has been achieved in the Territory in all fields of human endeavour. The results of progress are there for everybody to see. I would refer the Council to my letter to the Secretary-General today, to which I have already referred, for statistics. The South African Government asserts that these achievements compare favourably with those of any other country of the world under comparable circumstances.

The South African Government does not recognize and has never recognized any right on the part of the United Nations to supervise the affairs of the Territory. Moreover, the Government cannot be expected to agree to United

Nations supervision of any electoral process as long as the majority of members of the United Nations continue for their own interested purposes to conduct a virulent, malicious and completely biased campaign in regard to the Territory. Despite this hostile attitude, we have nevertheless over the years repeatedly endeavoured to find an acceptable basis for negotiations with the United Nations with a view to solving the problem.

The record of South African efforts to co-operate with the United Nations and the United Nations inflexibility in return, is a long one. The 1951 Principal Allied and Associated Powers proposal, the 1952 report of the United Nations Committee concerned, the 1958 Arden-Clarke Good Offices Committee, the 1962 Carpio/de Alva Mission, the contentious proceedings at the International Court (1960-66) and the consultations with the Secretary-General (1972-73). All these initiatives reflect South Africa's goodwill and willingness to accept challenges and to explore possibilities of reaching a solution. On the part of the United Nations, as the record shows, they reflect absolute unwillingness to consider any positive suggestion: rejection without exploration of recommendations, expungement from the records, denunciation of signed agreements, unwillingness to accept the judgment of the world's highest judicial authority, resort to revengeful actions in an attempt to nullify the Court's Judgment. It is important that the Council should realise that it is South Africa which has every reason to be sceptical of the United Nations good faith and not vice versa. I urge those who have doubts about this to look at the records of the Fourth Committee in particular in relation to the initiatives I have mentioned.

The present course of action in the United Nations commenced in the emotional atmosphere which followed on the 1966 Judgment of the International Court of Justice which generally went in favour of South Africa. However, this Judgment constitutes the only legally binding pronouncement on the subject of South West Africa. I say: the law is not on the part of the United Nations. Neither are the facts. The 1971 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on which many States take their stand is not only entirely untenable but is clearly and demonstrably the result of political manoeuvring instead of objective jurisprudence.

Furthermore, the Opinion was advisory and therefore not binding on any State. Its political acceptance by any number of States cannot make it law, no matter how oft repeated.

States who accept that opinion, should also declare whether they accept the Court's underpinning reasoning and its inescapable implications, inter alia, that the powers of the General Assembly are not limited to discussion and recommendation, but that they include the making of decisions binding even on non-consenting and non-member states. Clearly we are all agreed that the General Assembly does not have such powers.

As no homogenous people exists in South West Africa, progress towards self-determination must necessarily proceed, if it is not to be imposed, along the lines of agreement between the different peoples concerned. The role of South Africa thus becomes obvious: it is to promote agreement between the peoples of the Territory without imposing a solution on them. This is the course that South Africa is pursuing and the peoples fully realise that all options are open to them. I ask the Council: "What is wrong with this approach? What can possibly be wrong with this approach?"

As a result of progress achieved in all walks of life and as a result of improved relations between the different peoples of the Territory, an historic event took place in Windhoek on 1 September 1975 when a Constitutional Conference was convened at which delegates representing all the population groups met for the first time to discuss the constitutional future of the Territory.

The Conference at its first session produced a "Declaration of Intent" which envisages the drafting of a Constitution for the Territory if possible within three years of September 1975, inter alia mindful of the interdependence of the various population groups and the interests of South West Africa in its entirety. The Conference also resolved inter alia "to devote themselves to the promotion of and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without discrimination merely on the basis of race, colour or creed". Four Committees set up at the second session of the Conference in November 1975 are currently considering important aspects of discrimination, economic upliftment, social upliftment and education and will report to the third session when it resumes in March 1976 or as soon as possible thereafter.

Mr. President, the achievements of the Conference in a very brief space of time deserve the commendation of the Security Council - not condemnation. I cannot think of a more constructive way in which South West Africans could decide their future.

Yet there has been little positive response in the United Nations to these events which are in the context of the realities of South West Africa truly of historical significance. The United Nations seems to have painted itself into a corner by clinging uncompromisingly to its earlier decisions based on outdated concepts and superseded situations. The differences between the position of South Africa and the leaders of South West Africa on the one hand, and the United Nations on the other, are not that substantial - provided double standards are not applied and regard is had to the basic realities in the Territory. South Africa respects the separate status of the Territory and stakes no claim to an inch of it; it agrees that the peoples themselves should decide their future - which they are indeed engaged in doing: South Africa remains in the Territory only at the wish of its peoples; all political groups may participate peacefully in the political processes in the Territory. The Conference has

invited such groups to submit proposals. While the U.N. calls for the Territorial integrity of the Territory - although the Charter does not preclude the peoples from deciding otherwise - South Africa has declared all options to be open to the inhabitants. The delegates to the Conference, furthermore, were resolved to devote themselves to the promotion of and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without discrimination merely on the basis of race, colour or creed.

The clear and fundamental issue in South West Africa is self-determination by the inhabitants. This is not only conceded by all of us - South West Africa, South Africa and the United Nations - but is actually in the course of realization now in a national, peaceful and realistic way.

The common border can be a focus of constructive co-operation or a line of division and dissension.

The Calueque Dam on the Kunene River is a concrete example of one of the reciprocal interests of Angola and South West Africa. It is a symbol of the positive results that have been and can be achieved by co-operation. The dam, still under construction by workers who travel from South West Africa, is situated 15km. inside Angola and ensures a water supply to the Owambo people in the north of South West Africa. It was built as a result of an agreement negotiated with the Portuguese Government in January, 1969. The water is currently being used for hospitals, industry and agriculture in Owambo and any interruption of its flow could have serious humanitarian consequences for the local population. The security situation in the vicinity of the dam, however, grew increasingly unsettled, with the launching of periodic terrorist attacks and murder of innocent persons in Owambo and the escalating unrest and chaos in Angola.

In April 1975, South Africa approached the Portuguese High Commissioner in Luanda with a request to help ensure the safety of the workers at Calueque in order that they could continue with their work. Nothing came of this request. In August 1975, the workers were endangered by fighting between contending factions in Angola and did not see their way clear to continue with their work. The Portuguese Authorities were again immediately informed and discussions with Portuguese emissaries took place in South Africa in order to establish which steps could be taken to protect the interests of the workers.

On 9 August 1975, following the flight of the workers from Calueque, a small unit of South African troops, a platoon, arrived there with the intention of holding discussions with a view to re-establishing order, so that the workers could return. However, discussions proved impossible as the platoon was fired upon. In the course of the resulting exchange of fire it occupied Calueque.

South Africa immediately informed the Portuguese Authorities and also informed other Governments of this development. The inability of the Portuguese authorities prior to 11 November 1975 and of anyone thereafter to guarantee the security of the dam was a grave development. In the circumstances South Africa had no alternative but to provide the necessary protection herself and did so, although this was intended as an interim measure. The Secretary-General was informed of this action in a letter dated 5 September 1975 and the Portuguese Authorities were at that time requested and agreed to assume responsibility for protecting the dam. Protection of the dam remained South Africa's principal preoccupation in Angola after Portugal's withdrawal and no one else was in a position to afford that protection.

To avoid any controversy in this respect and to make it easier for any government in Angola to avoid a conflict over this matter, I propose that the Security Council should assume responsibility until such time as a Government in Angola can handle the situation satisfactorily.

The geographical contiguity of South West Africa and Angola necessarily imposes a concern in South West Africa for that which occurs in Angola. It is thus that South West Africa has been forced to take note of the war in Angola because of the thousands of refugees and displaced persons who have crossed the border and are still seeking to do so in ever increasing numbers. South Africa, as you will know from letters dated 12 September 1975 and 22 January 1976, addressed by my Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General, has made a substantial contribution at a cost of 5 million dollars, to relieving their plight. However, the situation remains precarious from a humanitarian point of view and contains an inherent disruptive potential.

The plight of the refugees is of great concern to my Government and we have therefore asked the Secretary-General to request the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to assist in resolving this serious problem. I would request the Security Council also to do all it can to assist in the problem of the refugees until such time as a government in Angola can take responsibility for them.

My country has been attacked today in this Council for having committed aggression against Angola and for using South West Africa as a base for intervention in other African countries. I cannot let these accusations pass unanswered. South West Africans are in fact directly affected by events in Angola. The peoples of South West Africa wish at all costs to avoid a repetition in their own country of the massive, foreign, armed intervention. They have seen refugees, hungry, homeless, maimed and sick, streaming through their country from a war-torn and ravaged Angola and fear that these blatant aggressors will wreck the peace that has been South West Africa's for decades.

We in South Africa are Africans. South Africa and South West Africa are

part of continental Africa, a continent of potential greatness if its disparate elements co-operate but, I say in the same breath, a continent of disaster if it is manipulated into dissension by outsiders. It is essential that this Council should understand that South Africa's actions and reactions are predicted upon this fundamental fact of our being an African people.

What do distinguished delegates around this table think the reaction of the inhabitants of South West Africa is when they observe fellow Africans to the North, recently released from the bondage of colonial oppression, being crushed under the heel of the greatest imperial power of modern times.

Can any member of the Council tell me in all truth that it would regard with equanimity the establishment of an aggressive military presence by force of arms on its borders?

I ask the Council and I ask fellow Africans what possible advantage can be derived by Africa from the establishment of Russian hegemony even in the smallest sector of Africa? The only advantage accrues to the Soviet Union itself. Why is Moscow, situated some 7,000 miles away across oceans and continents, engaged in a war of destruction in Angola? Why have Cuban troops come 7,000 miles to invest that country? The Soviet Union, beginning even before 11 November 1975, has pumped between two hundred million and three hundred million dollars worth of armaments into Angola. The twelve thousand Cubans now in Angola are being transported there by Russian aircraft at the rate of 200 per day, approaching 15% of the whole Cuban army. They are being blatantly used as infantry troops to kill, maim, humiliate and intimidate black Africans, using Russian tanks, artillery, mortar, missiles, machine guns, bombs, landmines and soon too, fighters and bomber aircraft. Massive quantities of lethal Soviet arms are being used to destroy and devastate African villages, towns, roads, bridges, schools, hospitals. The economy of the country has been dealt a severe blow. Large areas are threatened by famine. Thousands of Angolans have been forced from their homes and are in state of deprivation and misery. And this the Soviet Union claims is its way to assist an African people!

There was a time when we in Africa looked forward to the possibility of a peaceful transition of power in Angola. What role has the Soviet Union played to destroy these hopes? The clue is to be found in the shiploads of Soviet armaments and equipment unloaded in Luanda.

Our Continent has many serious problems to overcome and my Government feels that every endeavour should be made to overcome them in a climate of peace and with the mutual co-operation of all concerned. Without peace there can be no meaningful development.

It cannot be too strongly deplored that just at a time when the leaders of

Southern Africa are reaching understanding in their search for peaceful solutions to their problems, the Russian bear has arrived to claw a festering wound in Africa's side - a wound that can infect the whole of Africa.

The leaders of Southern Africa have indicated their desire to work towards a peaceful solution of differences. The South African Prime Minister has made it clear that he stands for the way of peace, of sound understanding and the normalization of relations between ourselves and the other countries of Africa.

The South African Prime Minister commented as follows in this regard on 10 December 1975:

"As a result of the fact that South Africa has made incontrovertible progress recently, it is being much more severely attacked than possibly ever before in its history. These attacks - it appears very clearly in their motivation - have a common purpose. In both cases South Africa is being attacked because it has, particularly recently, received credit for being and wishing to be a peacemaker, and secondly because South Africa has received acknowledgement for its positive and strong anti-communist stance which is no secret.

South Africa wishes to live in peace with all its neighbouring states. It has proved this over and over again in recent years. It is accepted and admitted by all unbiased people, that South Africa's immediate neighbours in this dangerous world in which we live, are amongst the happiest people in the world, because as a result of South Africa's well-known standpoint, which it has proved in practice, it is not necessary for them to spend a single cent of their budget on defence. They do not need a defence budget because they know, in spite of all propaganda to the contrary, that they have nothing to fear from South Africa, that South Africa desires nothing that belongs to them, that South Africa does not want any land which is theirs and that South Africa is at all times willing to meet their wishes.

This is true of all our neighbouring states and is valid also for the state of Angola, a state on which South Africa similarly has no territorial claims and where South Africa desires no sphere of influence whatsoever for itself. Indeed South Africa has recognized Angola as a state."

And in a New Year message on 31 December 1975 the Prime Minister, dealing inter alia with the Angola situation, said:

"Our only involvement is that of the free world and the substantial



interest of Owambo in the Kunene scheme - and the protection of the border, for which we are responsible - will at all times dictate our actions regardless of the attempts to make us the scapegoat in the matter. We have recognized the state of Angola, we have committed no act of aggression or subversion, we are in favour of a political settlement and we have no claims of anything in Angola. ... We have established our bona fides and we have proved beyond all doubt that we are as good as our words. Channels of communication have been opened, bridges of understanding built and a solid foundation laid for the future."

The change in the Rhodesian situation from "violent confrontation and terror to hopeful talks in a much calmer atmosphere" was the result of South Africa's "peace offensive" on the African continent, Mr. Vorster said.

My Prime Minister, in concert with other African Leaders, has undertaken bold initiatives in an endeavour to bring together opposing groups to work out a peaceful solution to the problems of Rhodesia. South African police have been withdrawn from Rhodesia, inter alia to contribute to a more amenable atmosphere in which discussions could take place between the Rhodesian political leaders.

In Mozambique, the South African Government acted responsibly and constructively, avoiding any action which would have made the new Government's task more difficult.

The South African Prime Minister has during the past year personally undertaken several journeys to black African countries in a continuing effort to reach a modus vivendi which can form the basis of permanent co-existence on the African Continent. We have never been a colonial power. On the contrary, one of the longest and most severe struggles against colonialist imperialism was fought by us. We neither present any threat to peace, nor are we a threat to any country.

South Africa has not and will not attempt to prescribe to other countries what kind of Government their peoples should choose. As in the case of Mozambique and neighbouring countries this is no concern of ours. It is the right of those people, if that is their will, to choose, for instance, a Marxist or a Communist Government. It is however a totally different matter when a foreign power intervenes to decide who should govern a country.

South Africa has played a limited role in Angola in the hope that inter alia it would secure for the Angolans the time to achieve a settlement for themselves around a conference table, or failing that an opportunity for the OAU to find a political solution without outside interference.

Mr. President, the situation in Angola must obviously exert a strong influence in South West Africa and other neighbouring countries. There is a real danger that the consequences of Russian and Cuban aggression in Angola could spill over into these countries. Numerous and wild allegations have been levelled at my Government. You have heard these allegations. I have also made allegations concerning Soviet and Cuban aggression, and I submit that it is for this Council to apprise itself forthwith of the facts. I propose that the only effective way to do so is for the Security Council to take the necessary steps in accordance with the Charter to go to Angola and establish for itself who is posing a threat to peace in Angola: South Africa or Soviet Russia and Cuba. My Government would welcome an on-the-spot investigation and will lend the Council its willing co-operation in the matter. I challenge our accusers to do the same.

Mr. President, we are astonished at the lack of appreciation for the real efforts we have made to encourage and assist the constitutional development of South West Africa. The great strides which have been made in this regard, particularly in the last year, must be apparent to any objective observer. I repeat, for the first time in history, representatives of all population groups in the Territory are voluntarily co-operating to draft a constitution for South West Africa. This peaceful evolution towards independence is in glaring contradistinction with the tragic war and bloodshed in other parts of the world.

South Africa believes that the peaceful course of action adopted by the inhabitants of South West Africa reflects the true meaning of the concept of self-determination, a concept which the United Nations seems bent on ignoring as far as South West Africa is concerned. For the reaction of this Organization to the many initiatives taken by South Africa to advance the peoples the Territory socially, economically and politically, as indeed she was entrusted to do by the original Mandate, has been to reject out-of-hand these advances and the United Nations has preferred instead to capitulate to the pressures of the supporters of a small group of militants who espouse an open and avowed policy of intimidation, violence and bloodshed against South West Africa. It is difficult to comprehend how Member States of this world body can be so eager to accept the simplistic and ill-founded arguments advanced by those who advocate violence in South West Africa, and to accept without hesitation and without corroboration, the allegations fabricated against my Government.

Despite this hostile reaction, the South African Government reiterates its offer to negotiate with a mutually acceptable personal representative of the Secretary-General in order that he may acquaint himself with the development of the process of self-determination in the Territory. Moreover, as far as the South African Government is concerned, there would be no objection to such a representative attending the Constitutional Conference as an observer, though

this is ultimately a matter for the Conference itself to decide. This in itself would provide a measure of international observation.

The South African Government also reiterates its offer to discuss progress and development with leaders of Africa, the Chairman of the United Nations Council for South West Africa and the Special Committee of the Organization for African Unity. They would also be welcome to visit South West Africa.

There is no legal or factual justification for the Security Council to endeavour to impose its will on the leaders of South West Africa. If the Security Council genuinely desires to achieve a peaceful solution to the question of South West Africa, it must have regard to the true situation which exists in the Territory and not to the narrow political ends of some of its members.

The South African Government would express the hope that the Security Council would refrain from any action which may jeopardise the chances of success of the Constitutional Conference which offers a way to achieving a peaceful future for the Territory. While serious clashes, involving violent death, starvation and misery for thousands of people occur elsewhere; while stagnation and even retrogression is prevalent in many areas, the Territory of South West Africa has a record of impressive progress despite the formidable problems posed by its geographical and physical conformation. There is peace and progress in South West Africa. Its inhabitants live secure and enjoy a growing standard of living based on modern communications and transport systems, on scientific and technical expertise and planned economic development. Its children go to schools and colleges; its inhabitants receive medical facilities of the highest standing; its workers enjoy increasing wages and facilities to improve their skills. The relations between the various groups have never been better. The leaders of the Territory are discussing their differences around a conference table - they are not fighting it out. Is it too much to expect the Security Council to have regard to these basic facts?

Finally, being an African country, South Africa is deeply aware of the problems of our Continent. We realise that there is hard work ahead for all of us. But we believe that we can overcome our obstacles and differences in a spirit of co-operation based on respect for the self-determination of all our peoples - black and white.

We believe in Africa. We believe in Africa's inherent power and potential to realise the greatness which should be her destiny. We believe that we in Africa can overcome our problems of economic development on condition that the developed nations live up to their responsibilities towards us, particularly by paying a fair and stable real price for imports of raw materials and semi-processed goods - in times of boom as well as recession.

We in South Africa appreciate that the prosperity of our neighbours is also in our interests. Their security is our security. No other country is better equipped to assist actively and directly in the development of our African sub-continent. We have the will and the desire to play our role to the full in this great adventure. South Africa looks forward to the day that the sincerity of her purpose will be accepted by all African States.

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL  
RESOLUTION 385 (1976), ON SOUTH  
WEST AFRICA / NAMIBIA

*Adopted by the Security Council  
at its 1885th meeting, on 30  
January, 1976.*

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement by the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia,

Having considered the statement by Mr. Moses M. Garoeb, Administrative Secretary of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO),

Recalling General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, which terminated South Africa's mandate over the Territory of Namibia, and resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, which established a United Nations Council for Namibia, as well as all other subsequent resolutions on Namibia, in particular, resolution 3295 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974 and resolution 3399 (XXX) of 26 November 1975,

Recalling Security Council resolutions 245 (1968) of 25 January and 246 (1968) of 14 March 1968, 264 (1969) of 20 March and 269 (1969) of 12 August 1969, 276 (1970) of 30 January, 282 (1970) of 23 July, 283 (1970) and 284 (1970) of 29 July 1970, 300 (1971) of 12 October and 301 (1971) of 20 October 1971, 310 (1972) of 4 February 1972 and 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974,

Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 that South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its presence from the Territory,

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia,

Concerned at South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its persistent refusal to comply with resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as with advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971,

Gravely concerned at South Africa's brutal repression of the Namibian people and its persistent violation of their human rights, as well as its efforts to

destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia, and its aggressive military build-up in the area,

Strongly deploring the militarization of Namibia by the illegal occupation régime of South Africa,

1. Condemns the continued illegal occupation of the territory of Namibia by South Africa;
2. Condemns the illegal and arbitrary application by South Africa of racially discriminatory and repressive laws and practices in Namibia;
3. Condemns the South African military build-up in Namibia and any utilization of the Territory as a base for attacks on neighbouring countries;
4. Demands that South Africa put an end forthwith to its policy of bantustans and the so-called homelands aimed at violating the national unity and the territorial integrity of Namibia;
5. Further condemns South Africa's failure to comply with the terms of Security Council resolution 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974;
6. Further condemns all attempts by South Africa calculated to evade the clear demand of the United Nations for the holding of free elections under United Nations supervision and control in Namibia;
7. Declares that in order that the people of Namibia be enabled to freely determine their own future, it is imperative that free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity;
8. Further declares that in determining the date, time-table and modalities for the elections in accordance with paragraph 7 above, there shall be adequate time to be decided upon by the Security Council for the purposes of enabling the United Nations to establish the necessary machinery within Namibia to supervise and control such elections, as well as to enable the people of Namibia to organize politically for the purpose of such elections;
9. Demands that South Africa urgently make a solemn declaration accepting the foregoing provisions for the holding of free elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision and control, undertaking to comply with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations and with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 in regard to Namibia, and recognizing the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia as a nation;

10. Reiterates its demand that South Africa take the necessary steps to effect the withdrawal, in accordance with resolutions 264 (1969), 269 (1969) and 366 (1974), of its illegal administration maintained in Namibia and to transfer power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations;

11. Demands again that South Africa, pending the transfer of powers provided for in the preceding paragraph:

(a) Comply fully in spirit and in practice with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

(b) Release all Namibian political prisoners, including all those imprisoned or detained in connection with offences under so-called internal security laws, whether such Namibians have been charged or tried or are held without charge and whether held in Namibia or South Africa;

(c) Abolish the application in Namibia of all racially discriminatory and politically repressive laws and practices, particularly bantustans and homelands;

(d) Accord unconditionally to all Namibians currently in exile for political reasons full facilities for return to their country without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment;

12. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to meet on or before 31 August 1976 for the purpose of reviewing South Africa's compliance with the terms of this resolution and, in the event of non-compliance by South Africa, for the purpose of considering the appropriate measures to be taken under the Charter.

EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER,  
DR. THE HON. H.F. VERWOERD,  
IN PRETORIA, ON 3 SEPTEMBER, 1963,  
CONCERNING RELATIONS WITH BASUTOLAND, BECHUANALAND AND  
SWAZILAND.

*The first part of this speech dealt with world  
attitudes towards South Africa.*

We do not take the road of oppression, and we also wish to remove discrimination. Our policy provides for a proper and independent existence for the Whites. At the same time it seeks to accord the same privileges - in different ways - to all the non-Whites now living in our country. By separating we aim at the same high objectives that others seek through integration. The objectives are similar; the methods differ fundamentally. For this country we have no doubt that our methods alone can ultimately prove fair to all races, including the Whites. Other countries must choose for themselves.

This leads me to a situation nearer home: the nature of the relationship that should exist between South Africa and the High Commission Territories. In some respects this is an international problem but, in essence, it is a problem between the Republic and the Territories alone.

In passing, I would like to emphasise that South Africa wishes to live in friendship and accord with her neighbours, whoever they may be, whether Black or White. When anything happens within these High Commission Territories which hurts us, or seems undesirable, we try not to lose our patience. We try to take into consideration all the problems that exist, even though we sometimes find that our friends who control the territories do not take such steps as seem both logical and possible to us to avoid these difficulties.

We, for our part, try to observe all the proprieties in our relations with either the Territories themselves or the United Kingdom in its capacity as their protector and guardian. We respect the principle of territorial integrity; we also honour the dictates and demands of international law. Our sincerity has been proved on several occasions. Whenever any doubt has arisen as to whether a mistake has been made, as in the case of Ganyile, or if something has happened where the facts are not clear, as in the Abrahams case just recently, we have always done our utmost to preserve good relations.

In this latter case, there is as yet no clarity concerning exactly what happened. The evidence is most contradictory, but we are prepared



to accept that it is advisable in the interest of the good relations which ought to exist that such incidents - the individuals concerned are of relatively minor significance - should not occur or, if they do, should be settled immediately without one side or the other standing too much on its rights. It is not worthwhile allowing such incidents to give rise to tension or conflict.

I must appeal to people in South Africa, or in the adjacent territories for that matter, to desist from taking personal action in such affairs because they may unwittingly infringe international law or the laws of their respective countries. Individuals who are not aware of all the facts in a given situation may act unwisely and embarrass governments striving to do what is both just and right. The authorities concerned are usually well aware of every aspect of a given situation, and can deal with it more adequately than individuals can.

I must admit that the part played by the High Commission Territories can become very trying at times, for example when our air space is violated by aircraft transporting fugitives and offenders from South Africa between such territories. Agreements with our country to facilitate inter-territorial contact should not have led to the establishment of an air escape route from Swaziland to Bechuanaland. We are going into this matter very carefully. At this juncture, I wish only to remark that while South Africa is prepared to meet all the requirements of good neighbourliness or international law, she naturally expects other countries to do likewise.

Before dealing more specifically with the delicate question of the future relationship between the Republic and the High Commission Territories, I would like to place on record that, until now, I have always refrained from discussing the High Commission Territories in public. However, since we have to suffer abuse on our policies even within the United Kingdom Parliament and elsewhere from its members or representatives of the British Government, I feel free to discuss in public - although dispassionately - what in fact is a United Kingdom responsibility, but of great concern to us.

What is the present position of these Territories? The United Kingdom has full control. As their guardian, Great Britain is aiming at exactly what we are achieving in the Transkei this year, namely the granting of self-government. I wholly approve of the principle of their gradual constitutional development and, I take it, this should also ultimately lead to fully independent states in these Territories.

Britain is however trying to transform these historically Black areas into multiracial territories, although, as I have demonstrated, true multi-racialism has failed throughout Africa. The very small number

of White people in Basutoland, under the constitution now enacted, has what one could call second-class rights. On the other hand it is quite true that there is not yet clarity on what the constitution of Bechuanaland will be. It is also a fact that the constitution that Swaziland has proposed for itself has not been accepted in that form and that it is unknown what changes will finally be made. Nevertheless in principle the United Kingdom still wants to grant them multi-racial constitutions, with the white partners in a minor role.

Great Britain does not, however, allow any representative from those countries to have a seat in her own parliament. In this she departs from the principles accepted by France and Portugal. Great Britain does not integrate politically with her dependencies.

It is common knowledge that these Territories are nevertheless economically linked to, and dependent upon, South Africa. Great Britain might guide them to political freedom, but she is almost powerless to regulate the ultimate economic situation or to achieve the economic viability of these areas for their peoples.

That is the general situation. Consideration may also be given to the advice so freely offered from all sides that Great Britain must retain control of the Territories and not free them, because she must protect these areas from possible South African ambitions. Such advice has been given in spite of the fact that I have most clearly stated on behalf of my government that South Africa has no territorial ambitions with regard to these areas.

*Indeed, were they under her guardianship, South Africa would free them stage by stage, just as she is doing in the Transkei.*

Britain actually retains a more bureaucratic form of control, that is, in so far as it is exercised by a single person - by a High Commissioner. He does, of course, act on behalf of the British Government. The point is that a form of centralised control remains as long as these territories are governed by the United Kingdom. They are not free now; nor are they as yet being made free.

I have asked myself whether the existing situation provides the "best deal" for the inhabitants of the so-called Protectorates. Is this the best way in which they can develop? Will it lead to a situation which will be safe for us too, since we are their neighbours?

We have a very direct interest, because our advantage lies in having good, prosperous and trustworthy neighbours. If they are not happy and contented, if "Freedom" brings little participation in government to

them ultimately and if they live in poverty, then that must make them bad neighbours. So we have a direct interest that prompts us to ask these questions.

If the United Party were in power and wanted to introduce its policy, then I could understand resistance by these Territories against becoming closely linked with the Republic of South Africa. For the United Party policy is quite clear: it wants these Territories incorporated as part of a bigger South Africa which must become one single fatherland, with a multi-racial nation and government but with White leadership retained as long as possible, and with only limited representation for such Black territories in a central parliament. This must certainly seem like absorption of small national groups and their countries into a much larger entity, and prove less attractive to them than separate national existence and independence for each, which is the objective of both Great Britain and the South African Government as well as of these peoples themselves.

Since I can well understand the objections against inclusion of these Territories in a larger area with less autonomy than they are now trying to obtain, I am approaching this matter from the opposite angle of my Government's policy. This is to free its Bantu areas, as the example of the Transkei has already made abundantly clear to everybody, although it has only just reached the second stage of development.

Therefore, I maintain that if South Africa were to be, or to become, the guardian, the protector or the helper of these adjacent Territories, instead of the United Kingdom, we could lead them far better and much more quickly to independence and economic prosperity than Great Britain can do.

That would be our aim in accordance with our policy of separate development (apartheid). We would not wish to keep them from developing constitutionally but would be prepared to receive them even now as nations with a separate freedom, if Britain freed them today.

Suppose these territories were South Africa's responsibility, and not the United Kingdom's, what would the effect of our present policy be?

Firstly, we would aim at making them democratic states in which the masses would not be dominated by small groups of authoritarians. Instead, natural native democracy and its leaders coupled with representative democracy - as in the Transkei - would lead the whole population to democratic rule over its own country.

Secondly, we would steer away from the principle of multi-racialism. Where Whites would be needed and must remain for some time in these areas and occupations, they would become voters in the Republic of South Africa, just as the Bechuanas, the Basutos or the Swazis will - when they work in the Republic - be voters in their respective homelands. In other words, for these Bantu people the ideal would be to really obtain their own black-controlled states.

Thirdly, wherever it might be necessary, we would do what is customary in our country under the 1936 Act, i.e. to repurchase or exchange areas now wrongly occupied - in order either to include them in the White areas or in the Black, according to where they rightly belong. That, too, would be to the advantage of the Bantu people of the High Commission Territories.

Fourthly, we would want to have the territories adjacent to us advance in the economic sphere. To help them we would be prepared to apply our border-industry policy of establishing industries near to our boundaries with the states, so that their people need not go far afield to work. For example, this could easily be implemented close to the Basutoland-Free State border. Border industry employees would be able to spend their income within their own states so that these can be built up, as will be done in the Transkei and in other South African Bantu areas.

Such measures would result in satisfied neighbours in states which would no longer be like overfilled dams continually flooding South Africa.

If we were their guides to independence, South Africa would also be able to include the High Commission Territories in future planning on the basis of a common market for White and Black South Africa in co-operation within a consultative political body of free Black and White states. This happy combination would be quite impossible with control still vested at a great distance in Great Britain, since it must develop stage by stage together with the growth of political independence. Left to their own devices these states would lose this valuable opportunity.

There would be a further advantage of closer association between the Republic and the High Commission Territories. We are often asked when the Transkei plan is going to be applied to other groups in South Africa, such as the Tswana, Sotho and Zulu groups. Close liaison with the Territories would create new opportunities more quickly for those Black areas at present under our control which are their neighbours and for which we are seeking further development and freedom. Were it

possible for them to be joined to those High Commission Territories to which their people are ethnically linked, then the present difficulty of establishing one big Tswana area, or one large Sotho or Swazi area in Southern Africa would fall away.

These are great ideas to place before the people of the three Territories. In stating them we are motivated by a desire, on the one hand, to solve our own problems, and on the other, to ensure that we will have good and friendly neighbours. At present the inhabitants of these territories are, however, being influenced to believe that we are merely acquisitive and want to harm them. They have been told that the policy of apartheid will remove rights from them, whereas their separate existence and self-government is essential to this policy! Although they do not realise this fact, their present objectives for securing self-government indicate that they subscribe to apartheid (separate development) just as we do. I want at this stage merely to prevent possible enmity from growing by being given the opportunity to make all this understood.

For these reasons I am now making an offer to Great Britain - I might almost call it a challenge - to allow us to put the essentials of our policies before the inhabitants of these Territories. Let us demonstrate to them what our policies really are, that our real feelings towards them are friendly, how we would view their future, and how we could co-operate.

We should have the opportunity of presenting our case to them. It means a new and a better deal than that which they are getting or can get - not through ill-will on the part of the United Kingdom, but merely because the United Kingdom is not in a geographical position to do for the High Commission Territories what the Republic of South Africa can do for them.

I am sure that were the people of these territories to have the opportunity to understand this, they would wish us to assist them in moving towards freedom and in developing as they can and as they should.

I am sure, too, that if Great Britain were to assent to these suggestions being fully and widely placed before the people of the High Commission Territories by us - and without the consent of the British Government we can do nothing - the chances are very great that the inhabitants would agree to what I have proposed. If the decision is left to the people of the three Territories, I believe they will decide in favour of what we have to offer.

If the same principle of self-determination which South Africa is asked to apply to its Bantu people, is to be applied to the inhabitants

of the three Protectorates, then surely that must be done only after they have been fully informed about the various alternatives.

The United Kingdom should give South Africa the opportunity to inform these neighbours of her programme as we wish to live in friendship and amity with them and to share - to our common advantage - good economic relations. Let us be given the chance to put to them our plans for a great consultative and co-operative future. If they decide to go their own way, in growing isolation from South Africa, so well and good. Let them decide for themselves whether they wish to follow that course or not. Surely this is little enough to ask?

The people of the High Commission Territories have no real self-determination if this is not allowed. Nor will they then have the chance of knowing what a good friend the Republic of South Africa can be and also wishes to be.

I have explained this matter as clearly as I can in order to remove not only a potential source of future friction, but also to elaborate on a factor which can be most important in solving some of our own problems. It is now up to Great Britain to decide whether she wants to retain control at all costs or whether, proceeding from the point of view of the progress of these people, she will grant them the opportunity to decide for themselves - after having become fully acquainted with the benefits of close association with South Africa - where their greater interests lie.

STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER,  
DR. THE HON. H.F. VERWOERD,  
ON 5 SEPTEMBER, 1963, CONCERNING RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

*This Statement was issued in response to reactions to  
Dr. Verwoerd's speech of 3 September, 1963.*

Distortions of, and wrong deductions from, this well-meant proposal on how to aid the development of the High Commission Territories towards political independence and economic prosperity, have made a further statement desirable.

No offer was made to the United Kingdom to "annex" or "take over" or "incorporate" or "administer" these territories as has been said.

The offer which was in fact made, was based on the assumption that the expressed policy of the United Kingdom government still held good, namely, that no change should take place with regard to these Territories until their inhabitants had been consulted, and on the further assumption that this was in accordance with the principle of self-determination recently stressed by a United Nations Committee.

*My offer was to give full information to the inhabitants of these Territories - if the United Kingdom government should give permission - about the advantages which would accrue to them if they, of their own free will, chose to accept the Republic as their aide or guide or guardian to independence and prosperity. It was solely an offer to give information to peoples who have to make their own decisions on their futures.*

I repeated very definitely that "incorporation" was not sought since this was against my government's policy of separate development which has as its objective the political independence of the Bantu nations.

The reasons for this offer to inform the inhabitants of these Territories ourselves were also clearly stated. It is in their interest and that of the Republic that all misunderstandings concerning the intentions and policies of the Republican government should be eliminated so that friendly relations and good co-operation between such close neighbours can exist. Furthermore it is in the interest of both that these Territories should become happy, well-governed and as economically prosperous as is possible.

In order to indicate specifically the type of information with which the South African Government, in terms of its policy, would wish to provide the inhabitants before they would exercise their right of self-determination, I gave several examples of what South Africa has to offer:

Firstly, these states would become fully Bantu-governed (and not multi-racial) in accordance with the pattern of development elsewhere in Africa. Any White inhabitants still necessary for the development of those Territories could exercise their political rights in the adjacent Republic.

Secondly, a greater Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland could eventuate since consolidation could take place with the adjoining areas of the same ethnic groups from within the Republic.

Thirdly, where desirable, the Republic would be prepared to help the Bantu of these Territories to regain, by purchase or exchange, areas at present occupied by Whites.

Fourthly, the economic development of these Territories could be planned and financed in co-ordination with that of the Republic, whose economy is of fundamental importance to them.

Fifthly, these Territories, as they become politically independent states, would be linked with the Republic, and with the Bantu states it is creating from within its own borders, in a consultative body dealing with mutual political interests, as well as in another co-ordinating body envisaged on the principles of a Common Market.

Should the inhabitants of the Territories, notwithstanding these and other advantages of development under the auspices of the Republic and on the basis of separate freedom, reject this course, that would be an end to the matter, and they could go their own way of ever-increasing isolation from the Republic. Consequently it is most unjust to brand a gesture of goodwill as "annexation".

A refusal to entertain this offer to provide information must mean either the rejection of an opportunity for self-determination by the inhabitants of the Territories, or a refusal to allow all facts of value for making a choice themselves to be placed before those concerned by South Africa, the permanent neighbour and potential source of economic advancement, as well as by the United Kingdom, the departing trustee or guardian. All attempts by individual leaders, party organisations or others to ward off the possibility of South Africa putting its proposal to the Bantu inhabitants themselves for their consideration, as befits a democracy, are evidently based on the fear that the latter will become



aware of what is in their best interests. Such preventive action also exposes the fear that the truth about the policy of separate development and its advantages will become apparent to all, in contrast with the distorted image of present-day propaganda which seeks thereby to antagonise the Bantu peoples and the world against South Africa.

Since this was not primarily a matter for private negotiations but an offer to all concerned, including more particularly the large number of Bantu in the three Territories, who have the right to know of South Africa's readiness to confer and co-operate with them, I felt compelled to make this offer in a public statement.