THE AFRICAN CAPACITY BUILDING FOUNDATION

RWANDA

STUDIES IN RECONSTRUCTION AND CAPACITY BUILDING IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES IN AFRICA

SOME LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE FROM RWANDA

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STUDIES IN RECONSTRUCTION AND CAPACITY BUILDING IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES IN AFRICA

SOME LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE FROM RWANDA

AN ACBF OPERATIONS-BASED STUDY BY

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Acronyms

ACBF	-	African Capacity Building Foundation
AFDL	-	Alliance Des Forces Democratique Pour LA Leberation du Congo-Zaire
CDF	-	Common Development Fund
CPI	-	Consumer Price Index
CRS	-	Catholic Relief Services
DHA	-	Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DRC	-	Democratic Republic of Congo
FAR	-	Forces Armees Rwandese
HIPC	-	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
ICRC	-	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTR	-	International Criminal Tribunal Rwanda
IDPs	-	Internally Displaced Persons
MDR-P	-	Movement for the Emancipation of the Hutu
MRND	-	Mouvement Revolutionnaire National Pour le Developpement
MSCBP	-	Multi-Sectoral Capacity Building Program
NA	-	National Assembly
NRA	-	National Resistance Army
NTB	-	National Tender Board
OAG	-	Office of the Auditor General
OAU	-	Organization of African Unity
PIP	-	Programme d'Investissents Public
RPF	-	Rwanda Patriotic Front
RRA	-	Rwanda Revenue Authority
UN	-	United Nations
UNAR	-	Union Nationale Rwandese
UNDP	-	United Nations Development program
UNHCR	-	United nation High Commissioner For Refugees
UNREO	-	UN Rwanda Emergency Office
URC	-	National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
WFP	-	World Food Program
WTO	-	World Trade Organization

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introductory Background

1.1 The state of capacity-building in Rwanda is an outcome of historical developments during the colonial and post-colonial periods, the genocide of 1994, and developments in the post-1994 period. The German and later Belgian colonial policy of divide-and-rule tended to favor Tutsi hegemony through differential education and employment access. In order to further consolidate their colonial rule over Rwanda, particularly the Belgians, they created and promoted ethnic identities based on socially constituted categories from the pre-colonial past. By the late 1950s, the socio-economic disparities between the Tutsi and Hutu, and the animosity this engendered were so strong that the struggle for independence and power was fought more along the Tutsi-Hutu divide than from an anti-colonial position. The Hutu revolted against their growing social, economic and political marginalization based on artificial ethnic grounds.

1.2.1 Both the first and second Hutu majority governments under Gregiore Kayibanda and later under the military rule of General Juvenal Habyarimana pursued policies championing the interests of an elite while perpetuating widespread human rights abuse and the norm of active discrimination along predominantly ethnic lines. Both regimes vigorously promoted ethnic identity in favor of the Hutu by introducing not only national identity cards, but most importantly, by ensuring that the percentage of Tutsi in schools, universities, the civil service and the private sector did not surpass the proportion that they represented in the entire population. As a result, numerous refugees fled Rwanda, including a heavy flow to Uganda during 1959-63. These Uganda-based refugees formed the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) in 1990. The RPA and its political wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), undertook to challenge the Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR) of the incumbent government through military activities within Rwanda. In response to the hostilities of the early 1990s, there was an attempt at a regional peace process (leading to the Arusha Peace Agreements) involving many of the major parties to the conflict in Rwanda.

1.3 Following the signing of the Regional Peace Agreement in Arusha, on 6 April 1994 the plane carrying the presidents of both Rwanda and Burundi was shot down under mysterious circumstances. This event triggered a carefully orchestrated and premeditated genocide in Rwanda of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu by FAR government forces, irregular militia (known as Interahamwe) and ordinary citizens. First, over a 100-day period close to 1 million Tutsi and moderate Hutus were killed in the worst genocidal atrocity of recent times. Only the advancing of RPA forces stopped the killing. Second, in the face of RPA's advance some 1.5 million Hutus fled in a mass exodus to former Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) and Tanzania. Among the fleeing Hutu refugees were the regular (FAR) and irregular (Interahamwe) armed forces that had perpetrated the genocide. These forces have continued their attacks from their Congo base and constitute a real threat to Rwandan stability. Third, in a massive reversal, the larger part of the 2 million self-exiled Rwandans returned *en mass*

in a matter of less than three weeks in late 1996. This high level of movements, in turn, led Rwanda to move its army beyond the Congolese borders, for security reasons, becoming a *de facto* occupying army.

1.4 The 1994 genocide amply demonstrated two important contradictions. On the one hand, it showed how deeply ethnic hatred had been cultivated by the leaders of the First and Second Republic. On the other hand, it showed the extent to which the mentality of the general population will have to be transformed in order to social engineer a peaceful and democratic society. In the post-conflict Rwandan context, capacity building was and continues to be a formidable long-term challenge. The restoration and nurturing of human capital and institutions of democratic governance in the immediate post-conflict phase, though essential in establishing the requisite base for rebuilding the economy and society, unfortunately was given only fleeting attention by most aid donors.

1.5 The period between 1995-1998, the primary focus of this study, has been variously characterized as the "emergency phase". This characterization is quite apt. More than half of the pre-genocide population of about 8 million was directly affected as a result of death, displacement, injury, rape or other brutalities. Education, hospitals, clinics, and community centers were destroyed, as was the government's capacity to administer and deliver services. Civil war and genocide in Rwanda also created new vulnerable groups, such as the unemployed, ex-combatants, women-headed households, children and the disabled. In fact, as one World Bank study indicates, the war and genocide left 85,000 child-headed households. The genocide had a devastating impact on the country's administrative and managerial capacities in all social and economic sectors. In the public sector, policy formulation and economic management declined, and in most cases collapsed altogether. Into this vacuum stepped in donor agencies and international NGOs, whose presence and role extended to all spheres of public life. International interventions were undertaken against acute poverty and tremendous lack of capacities due to the death or flight of most skilled and educated people, the unprecedented more than 100,000 jailed prisoners waiting to be tried, and by insecurity and land shortage.

1.6 The international community, like a the new government in Kigali, was faced with daunting challenges: to understand and address the root causes and consequences of the genocide, to support the rebuilding of the state while acknowledging the contestable Rwandan presence in the DRC, to address capacity-building and education needs, to accomplish essential land reform, and to support the justice and reconciliation process that was underway within and outside the country.

1.7 The first order of business of the victorious FPF army in Kigali was to put in place some rudiments of state institutions in order to provide collective and individual security of the citizenry, restore a civil service to run the government, jump-start the shattered economy, resettle returning old and new refugees, ensure adequate legal process against the 1300,000 prisoners suspected of genocide crimes, and rehabilitate, reconstruct, or even re-establish social infrastructure particularly the schools and health centers. A clear undertaking these daunting challenges, however, was seriously impeded by Rwanda's inordinate capacity deficits, both in human and institutional terms.

1.8 The RPF leadership sought to resuscitate the public administration by deploying what was left of the post-war civil servants, new returnees, international technical cooperation assistance as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This combination of capacities came from quite diverse political and ideological orientations, socio-economic systems and cultures. In the short-term, this multiple diversity posed challenges of consistency and conflicts in the approaches to post-conflict development management. The resulting political uncertainty that followed, characterized by competition among the many exiles and donors that came to head the new civil service, failed to bring the cohesiveness and political unity urgently required to support the reforms and reconstruction of a terribly shattered economy and society.

1.9 At the same time, the new government faced serious security threats from the soldiers of the defeated regime and the Interahamwe militia, who were mainly hiding in camps along the DRC border. During the period we are considering, regular incursions into northwestern and southeastern Rwanda kept these regions under continuous security threat. Understandably, this necessitated crisis management in almost all spheres of public and social life, a situation that called for enormous resources, both in terms of finance, logistics and committed human resources, and the willingness of Rwandans themselves to create a new society.

1.11 As would be expected, the rebuilding the social and human capital in the Rwandan society that had borne the brunt of the trauma was an arduous and long-term task. We argue that because neighbors, teachers, doctors, and religious leaders took part in the genocide, essential trust in social institutions had been destroyed, and replaced by pervasive fear, hostility and insecurity. This affected interpersonal and community interactions across ethnic, economic, generational and political lines. In fact, these indiscriminate yet intimate killings led to the disintegration of communities and families and destroyed social cohesion. One might have expected a paradigm shift in the way capacity restoration was undertaken in a post-conflict environment in Rwanda. But such was not the case. As we saw in Uganda, capacity-building interventions in Rwanda squandered the opportunity by largely following a traditional model of development, although this was a post-conflict situation.

1.12 Since the end of 1994, the RPF government has restored relative stability in most parts of Rwanda. Gradually, the economic recovery began to pick up and the country embarked on daunting tasks of rehabilitation, reconstruction, reconciliation and development. The international community provided generous support conditional on compliance with the standard package of structural adjustment policies involving changes in macro-economic management. These include the removal of price distortions in foreign exchange, capital, and essential commodities, improved fiscal and financial discipline, the reduction of marketing monopolies and state controls, and civil service reform. The government set up participatory political structures at the national and local levels, restored law and order, and took many unpopular decisions required to enforce the changes demanded by the adjustment policy.

1.13 After the first five years, the task of capacity building sought to broadly cover the human resource and institutional aspects as well as to develop a common framework to guide capacity building initiatives in all sectors. The government of Rwanda was acutely aware of the seriousness of dearth of capacity, especially in the public sector, where only 6.5 percent of the workforce has some university education, and many technical, professional and managerial positions were either vacant, or filled by expatriate or unqualified staff. This implies that the large agenda of reconstruction, capacity-building and reconciliation was to stretch the thin capacity of the civil service and adversely affect the pace of implementation of reforms. The government squandered the initial "international goodwill" by failing to institute, as was the case in Uganda, a comprehensive technical cooperation policy which would have guided the modalities of hiring foreign experts, including a strict proviso for counterpart training; failure to institute an aggressive training policy in critical areas policy management coupled with an imaginative bonding system; failure to deliberately build capacities of national training institutions that provide the required manpower; and, failure to put in place a favorable pay package to promote retention. .

1.14 Since 1998 concerted efforts have been made to increase domestic capacities while decreasing the role of the donor agencies and international NGOs. Capacity-building initiatives to accomplish this goal have taken various forms. However, as recent studies have shown, a lot of policy clarifications and strategy refinements need to be done (Government of Rwanda, 2000). In the following section, a summary of capacity-building experiences from the immediate post-conflict phase (1994-1998) is presented.

Capacity-building lessons and best practices

This section summarizes key study findings and presents them as lessons from experience and best practices from Rwanda.

Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Support Unit

1.15 Events during the past decade challenged the thinking of donors about whether development efforts, which have formed a prominent part of post-Cold War engagement in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, have really left an enduring legacy of inclusion, economic growth, and human well-being. It became evident that the ability to prevent conflict has less to do with any scarcity of donor resources than with a lack of understanding and appropriate tools to address discord. The reconstruction and rehabilitation of war-torn societies has become a sub-specialty within the broader development agenda. The special needs of societies emerging from conflict have hastened the development planning cycle in a way that demands more flexibility of programs and resources, and greater responsiveness to emergencies heretofore handled only through humanitarian assistance. The need to nurture that understanding and develop new tools has led to the emergence of specific units within bilateral and multilateral donor agencies to address the development issues of post-

conflict societies.[1] ACBF might consider establishing such a unit that would backstop its various interventions with well-informed background country and/or regional studies that would provide a background. An adequately equipped and staffed support unit should be one of the preconditions for successful intervention in post-conflict situations in Africa.

Understanding the root causes of conflict

1.16 The Rwandan study amply demonstrates the fact that conflicts are different in different countries at different times, and that they thus require tailor-made approaches. They differ, *inter alia*, in duration, intensity and scope of the destruction, the relative military and political strength and resilience of the opponents and the degree to which the middle and upper classes are affected by the hostilities. Our study has also highlighted the fact that, more often than not, donors have had only a superficial understanding of Rwanda's complexity and needs and that insufficient effort went into learning lessons from past aid engagement in the country. A deep analysis of the conflict should be seen as a prerequisite for addressing politically sensitive interventions such as: demobilization and reinsertion of the armed forces, implementation and support of to the peace accords, and the use of incentives and sanctions to respond to the national and regional challenges of insecurity and instability. In this regard, studies from the ACBF post-conflict support unit would provide informed diagnoses of the conflict and suggest the appropriate intervention actions. The major responsibility of this a unit would be to undertake conflict mapping of war-torn countries by gathering information about histories of the conflict and their physical and organizational setting as well as the goals and interests of the parties to the conflict, in order distinguish causes from consequences. Understanding the distinctive histories and the root causes of the conflict helps to inform, among other things, the nature and character of reconstruction and capacity building interventions that are likely to serve as sustainable conflict mitigation measures, and as societal healing and capacity development programs.

Institutional mechanisms for sharing basic information

1.17 A lack of in-depth knowledge of the historical, political, social and economic context of the crisis in Rwanda undermined, in many important ways, the effectiveness of international intervention in Rwanda. First, ignorant of the extent of involvement of political leaders in the genocide, relief agencies used former leaders to deliver assistance in the refugee camps. This enabled the very people who had commanded the genocide to re-establish their command over the refugees. Second, human rights observers were totally ignorant of the

[1] . The following are some of the most robust post-conflict research units: Peace Building Unit (CIDA); Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands); Division for Humanitarian Assistance (SIDA); Conflict and Human Affairs Department (Department of International Development, UK); Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID); European Community Humanitarian Office (EU); International Committee of Red Cross (Red Cross); Interagency Cooperation Unit (WHO); War-torn societies Project (UNRISD); Emergency Response Division (UNDP); Office of Emergency Program (UNCEF); and Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Fund (World Bank).

political history and the social and ethnic structures of the country. Consequently, they failed to establish any rapport with local leaders or local NGOs, which proved self-defeating. The Rwanda crisis thus underscores the need for information-sharing with indigenous counterparts, and for specialized research networks, which possess invaluable knowledge about contextual variables: historical, social, cultural, political, economic and even linguistic among donor, NGO, technical and managerial staff in the field. In this regard, the post-conflict support unit at the ACBF would also be mandated to assemble such informative briefs.

The folly of some conventional wisdom in post-conflict reconstruction

1.18 The devastation of human, social and physical capital that occurred in Rwanda after the war/genocide, as well as specific particular provisions of the Arusha Accords, required that some conventional wisdom of development practice be set-aside for some time. As pointed out earlier, recovery and capacity building require incremental planning, careful and realistic policy reforms, more critical staff time than in "normal operations" and a deliberate concern for post-conflict constraints. Standard and cumbersome procurement and disbursement procedures leading to the untimely delivery of goods and funds should, at all costs, be avoided at all costs. In this regard, ACBF and other donors might consider focusing not only directly upon the objectives of policy reforms and increased service delivery, but also on relaxing any long-term constraints, which would otherwise delay the attainment of these objectives. In this sense, therefore, the critical path to reform and service delivery is the enhancement of human capital, and organizational efficiency in the public and private sectors. Unlike in norm situations of resource gap-filling, building capacity and retaining human resources capacity in Rwanda had to be built across the board within government, civil society, and the private sector if development activities were to be implemented effectively. This opportunity was squandered by massively recruiting expensive foreign assistance personnel and consultants instead of embarking on sector-wide approach on education and institution development.

A Paradigm shift in post-conflict reconstruction and capacity building policies:

1.19 Capacity building is a means to an end in the development process. In fact, capacity building is part of the development process and should be integrated as fully as possible into the implementing institutions. The development objectives in any post-conflict reconstruction process must be defined, institutional and human resource development needs mapped out, and a capacity building strategy identified. As in the case of post-2000 Rwanda, the key issue here was for donors to support the new government in the design of long-term, multi-sector capacity building programs, which were consistent with its peculiar post-conflict situation. Donors should be expected to ensure swifter disbursements, more flexible procedures, better knowledge of local actors and a grater capacity to undertake *ad hoc* actions. Moreover, as was the case in post-conflict Kosovo, the ACBF may want to consider persuading the Bretton Woods institutions to adopt peace-friendly economic reform programs for Africa, including far-

reaching debt relief measures, enhanced quality investment and foreign aid, and deliberate capacity building initiatives in support of long-term development efforts and post-conflict recovery. In the same vein, the ACBF might consider persuading the World Trade Organization (WTO) to adopt a "special and differential treatment" of post-conflict countries in the world trading system. Above all, the ACBF should consider persuading the OECD countries to provide substantive investment guarantees to any corporations based in their respective home countries that may wish to invest in post-conflict countries in Africa.

Expedite procedures for delivering rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance

1.20 Most of our respondents indicated that the international response to the Rwandan refugee emergency was swift. International agencies delivered the much-needed assistance with remarkable speed. However, assistance for rehabilitation and reconstruction inside Rwanda was seriously constrained by donors' administrative procedures and by political conditionalities that often delayed aid for several months or even years. To be sure, while the immediate post-conflict period can represent a window of opportunity to pursue critical policy reforms, especially those essential to macroeconomic stability, caution should be exercised in pursuing an ambitious reform agenda too soon after a major social collapse. In addition to the negative impact on economic recovery, delays in remitting promised funds for long-term reconstruction programs had a negative impact on political and social stability in Rwanda. It is important that donor agencies suspend their traditional administrative procedures and imposes only limited conditionalities, in order to respond usefully to post-conflict contingencies.

Moral imperative to prevent genocide

1.21 One of the main reasons why world leaders have often been reluctant to take on comprehensive conflict prevention measures in Africa is that they hold to the conventional wisdom that the costs to be borne and the risks to be run are too high, and the interests at too marginal. Most of these countries were of negligible strategic value to the major powers. Predictably, once the civil war broke out in Rwanda in 1990, increasingly there were increasing warnings, from human rights organizations and other sources that large-scale civilian massacres might occur. Nonetheless, preparations were inadequate to deal with the contingency of massive violence that targeted civilians were inadequate. In fact, had the international community responded more effectively in the months prior to, or in the days immediately following, the shooting of Habyarimana's plane, perhaps most of those who died would have survived, and much of the subsequent expenditure on massive humanitarian assistance would have been unnecessary. There is a clear need to create robust early warning institutional capacities at all levels, coordinate regional and international responses to those signals, and translate them into effective conflict management tools for prevention or mitigation.

Moral imperative to help those in dire need

1.22 Following the end of the genocide/ civil war, the traumatized Rwandan society was defined as a complex emergency case – a situation typically defined by a breakdown of limits, institutions, and governance, and by widespread suffering and massive displacement. The country required a range of responses from the international community to facilitate the transition from war to sustainable peace, and to support the resumption of economic and social development. As pointed out earlier, both Rwanda's marginal strategic importance to the major powers and conflicting attitudes toward the RPF government and the ousted government among members of the Security Council may serve to explain the lack of resolve to respond immediately to the crisis. We support Stanley Hoffman's (1994:172) recommendation that great powers should have interests in world order that go beyond strict national security concerns. ACBF, in its regular consultations with major donors, may wish to impress upon them that they should feel, without exception, a moral obligation to intervene expeditiously in complex emergency situations like the one in Rwanda in order to avert the social and economic catastrophes of post-conflict situations.

Donor coordination

1.23 Smooth aid coordination is particularly important in post-conflict situations. Due to the massive and urgent need and the presence of many donors eager to provide support, each with its own agenda, it is imperative to provide effective and efficient coordination. At the same time, the overwhelming mix of emergency needs of post-conflict societies like Rwanda (e.g. for justice, knowledge, and capacity) demands a high degree of collaboration, coordination, coherence and complementarity. Counterproductive individual donor agendas should be neutralized. Unlike the Uganda case, the World Bank, the UNDP and the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda prepared, as separate and uncoordinated initiatives, Emergency Recovery Program for Rwanda, the Rehabilitation and Reintegration Program for Rwanda and Rwanda Emergency Normalization Plan respectively. These initiatives were essentially *ad hoc,* haphazard and donor-driven. They came through as scattered, loosely coordinated and often attached with expensive technical assistant personnel. Differences of opinion among EU member states on the most appropriate development and political engagement in Rwanda severely hampered coherence, complementarity and coordination. This study on Rwanda has demonstrated that building consensus on the prioritization of needs remained problematic. Given the donors' differing mandates, priorities derived from headquarters, and history of assistance coordination, this was often a difficult proposition. It is perhaps not surprising that most donors decided to design and support projects of their choice and then created independent project coordination units. "High profile" special needs such as supporting the judicial process around "Gacaca" were more popular with donors than long-term, "low profile" and less innovative activities like agrarian reform. ACBF might consider joining with other key national and international actors to develop a consensus on the most pressing needs of each partner country, and then sequence priorities, jointly mobilize resources, ensure realistic and common expectations regarding

aid on the part of the stakeholders, and simultaneously strengthen the government's aid coordination capacity rather than by-pass it.

The need for the ACBF to participate in multi-donor trust funds (MDFT) to undertake post- conflict institution development and capacity building

1.24 Unlike the case of Uganda where the World Bank assumed the coordination role, the UNDP's coordination role in Rwanda was weak and disjointed. This weakness resulted into a hodge podgy of rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. ACBF has a critical role to play in the early stages of post-conflict reconstruction. It can perform a variable role in aid coordination in the area of capacity building and institution development. In this vein, ACBF might consider participating in peace negotiations in order to provide capacity building advice, post-conflict capacity building coordination, co-financing of specific operations in its interest, joint undertaking of human resource and institutional capacity auditing in order to identify inadequacies and obstacles to capacity building (training, use, retention and continuous upgrading of capacities).

At the same time it might define the capacity-building needs, priorities and sequencing in concert with respective beneficiaries (government, academia, private sector and civil society). In order to maximize the impact of their interventions on post-conflict societies, donors under the leadership of ACBF also might consider building a consensus on the financing modalities for reconstruction and capacity building. The establishment of a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) would facilitate not only a closer linkage with the recipient's country's budget but also promote a productive dialogue between donors and their partners concerning fiscal and development policy. It would also promote ownership of the development project by its recipients.

Lack of a common capacity building Framework

1.25 Capacity building should always be defined and interpreted in relation to national development goals and objectives. We now know that the immediate post-conflict capacity building projects and programs in Rwanda lacked coordination at several levels: both within ministries and between the government of Rwandan government and the donors. Projects tended to be designed and implemented in isolation without being guided by a common national strategy. The situation was further compounded by weak information flow and management of information on capacity gaps, and by limited horizontal and vertical linkages among institutions, which were supposed to collaborate and coordinate similar tasks. Uncoordinated interventions as well as incompatible systems posed challenge that needed to be urgently addressed. There is need to develop a common capacity building framework that seeks to address the institutional and human capacities both from the supply-side issues (e.g. the training of suitably qualified Rwandans) and demand-side issues including human resource planning, pay, incentives and retention within the public service but also to recognize that critical engagement with the government, civil society and the private sector is crucial to ensuring the political and social development of the partners.

Building and strengthening the capacities of national institutions

1.26 At the beginning of the Rwanda emergency, it was necessary to channel international assistance through NGOs, private contractors and international agencies in the absence of any functional state or societal institutional structures. Strangely enough, even with the transition of the Rwandan Patriotic Front into the government and the consolidation of civil society organizations, donors were frequently reluctant to recognize the legitimacy of the government and to provide it with the resources necessary to rebuild its institutional capacity and to establish modalities of mutual policy dialogue and coordination. Although it acknowledged the resiliency and territorial control of the new regime, the donor community remained reluctant to provide substantive funds to the resource-starved government. In addition to participation in determining the priorities of its own national development, financial controls is also important to ensure the ownership, sustainability and legitimacy of the national development project. Unless the international community provides the government with the necessary resources, the donor community cannot realistically expect to build or strengthen the institutional or organizational capacity of Rwandan society. In order to increase ownership and build capacity, ACBF might consider institutionalizing (i) support for the development of a participatory planning and implementation framework at all levels; (ii) support for the training of Rwandans in participatory training tools; (iii) joint studies on the feasibility of the partial or complete transfer of selected functions currently carried out by the donor agencies and the central government to local authorities, along with the accompanying budget, and (iv) an office of the office of the Auditor General in order to tighten financial controls, prevent financial abuses and ensure community monitoring of development spending.

Political pluralism and space for democratic development

1.27 There is a marked lack of political pluralism and political space in Rwanda for civil society, opposition, independent media and ordinary grassroots political dialogue. Given the recent turbulence, it is not entirely surprising that politics and issues of political power remain contentious. By 1998, there were no functioning opposition party, the media was strictly controlled and social organizations had little room for maneuver in political realm. However, political commentators think Rwanda's longer-term stability would be better served by greater latitude for informal and formal political pluralism, in order to restore trust and ensure reconciliation and reconstruction of its social fabric.

Strengthening social capital

1.28 More often than not, post-conflict reconstruction tends to focus more on rebuilding infrastructure than on reconstructing institutions and strengthening the social fabric. The brutal nature and the extent of the slaughter, and by the ensuing mass migration. Vast segments of the population were uprooted, thousands of families lost at least one adult and tens of thousands of children were separated from their parents. Because neighbors, teachers, doctors and religious leaders took part in the carnage, essential trust in social institutions

were destroyed, replaced by fear, hostility and insecurity. War militarized the society, disrupted existing social organizations and created new ones. Relatively little attention was been paid to strengthening the social capital. ACBF should to consider supporting comprehensive programs to assess the impact of war on children, and train teachers and parents to recognize the symptoms of stress, anxiety, trauma and depression.

Self-regulation and partnerships within the NGO community would improve impact

1.29 During the emergency, NGOs provided invaluable assistance in establishing and maintaining the delivery of essential services, and caring for refugees, and internally displaced persons. They later played a critical role in various rehabilitation and reconstruction initiatives. Nonetheless, the overabundance and inexperience of many NGOs have undermined some of the positive contributions. Some of them lacked the essential experience and expertise to function effectively in a developing society. Others initially failed to coordinate their operations with fellow NGOs or with local relief agencies. Still others lured experienced staff from government by offering higher salaries and fringe benefits, thus undermining the institutional capabilities of ministries. Above all, some NGOs refused or showed reluctance to register their organization officially, thereby creating unnecessary tensions between themselves and the Rwandan government. We recommend that the NGO community to follow a well-formulated code of conduct for their operations. We also recommend that ACBF consider entering into formal partnerships with some NGOs that are in the broad business of promoting capacity-building in Africa.

Deliberate policies to reduce social and economic inequalities

1.30 One of the major challenges to reconciliation and reconstruction is to design and implement policies to reduce serious social inequalities. Some of these inequalities, whether ethnic, regional, religious, or class-based, shared in fuelling the civil conflict in the first place and could do so in future. While the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) clearly sets out the relationships among poverty in Rwanda, long-term structural issues and the effects of the genocide, it would benefit from a better analysis of the effects of the country's conflicts and past policies of exclusion, and the impact of recent government policies regarding poverty and all forms of inequality. Reconciliation and reconstruction interventions in Rwanda have not paid adequate attention to these structural inequalities and those processes therefore run the risk of building a new Rwanda upon historical grievances. ACBF might consider supporting in-depth studies to address these inherent inequalities in post-conflict Rwanda, with a view to mitigating future conflict.

The role of women in rebuilding social capital in post-conflict environments should be re-examined and capitalized on

1.31 Genocide and war in Rwanda altered the country's demographic composition so radically that women and girls now represent between 60-70 percent of the population. By some estimates, between one-third and one-half of all women in the hardest hit areas (e.g. north-east) are widows. Furthermore, several thousand women were brutally raped. Initially, women were taken to be like any other beneficiaries. Under existing Rwandan law, property passes through the male members of the household. As a result, women and orphaned daughters risk losing their property to the male relatives of the deceased husband or father. There is an urgent need, therefore, to change not only the judicial guidelines and legal interpretations of laws pertaining to property, land and women's rights but, most importantly, to undertake short-term initiatives to focus on (i) enabling poor households to increase their agricultural output and market their produce at fair prices; (ii) improving the quality of primary education and lowering the costs for the poor; and, (iii) improving access of poor households to basic medical care. ACBF-supported studies should be able to identify men and women's differing vulnerabilities to conflict as well as their different capacities and coping strategies. Such studies should identify the unequal power relations underlying social organizations to ensure that women are not further marginalized by reconstruction interventions.

Mass education for tolerance and reconstruction

1.32 In an ethnically divided society like Rwanda, education for tolerance and reconstruction is an important aspect of democratization. As of 1998, the Rwandan Ministry of Education had yet to design a curriculum in peace education. Formal peace education in schools, which socialize children, is the most direct means of teaching and acquiring positive social values. Community leaders, parents, school authorities, teachers, educators should direct their attention to the planning and implementation of peace education and tolerance. The school can become one of the primary foci for capacity building at the grassroots level and, ultimately, for peace education for the entire community.

Joint conflict resolution approach was missed

1.33 Given the magnitude of the trauma experienced by its survivors, the Rwandan should be required to undergo comprehensive exercises in collective national dialogue about the past, what went wrong at what point, what could have been collectively done to avert it, and what should be done as therapy for the future. From such a collective exercise, then, citizens would propose what kinds of institutions should be created for political, social and economic governance. And in so doing, human and cultural healings as well as structural healings would have been initiated.

Handling the questions of guilty and innocence

1.34 The most difficult challenge to peace building and reconstruction is how to establish and handle questions of guilt and innocence, impunity and justice, and the notions of forgiveness and reconciliation. These key issues undergird many people's understanding of the basis for lasting peace. In the Rwandan context, the genocide survivors' desire for justice is actually greater that their willingness to work for negative peace. The acknowledgement of war crimes can be sufficiently therapeutic, but this acknowledgement is often not provided at the end of the conflict. There is also need to take a long-term perspective that gives top priority to building an effective judicial system based on the rule of law, ensures the physical security to returning refugees and survivors of genocide, promoting rapid economic growth and to seek a regional approach to conflict resolution. Above all, reconciliation in Rwanda should be addressed with much wider historical lenses. Indeed, in order to break the cycle of violence and abuse, the underlying historical structural abuses that have occurred over the last four decades must be addressed in an equitable manner. A non-existent, limited or partial approach to addressing power abuses has in the past simply deferred the problem for a later date in many post-conflict settings.

Reconciliation and reconstruction success requires strong national ownership of the enterprise

1.35 In an attempt to "do the job, right, fast and professionally", most donors created parallel institutional structures that paralleled those of the Rwandan government and designed policies and programs that they considered critical for the genocide victims. Without anchoring rehabilitation and reconstruction in a solid community base, foreign intervention is not likely to be sustainable. This means that the international community should not prescribe or even promote certain institutional or policy choices. Instead, it should try to identify those relationships, processes, mechanisms and institutions that hold the greatest promise for on-going conflict resolution and reconstruction, while understanding that these may not look exactly the same as those in the West. By fostering such a climate, capacity building, policy dialogue and guidance for good governance may be nurtured and developed right from the start.

Integrated regional strategy

1.36 The vast majority of donors have a country-specific program of intervention as opposed to a regional one. When they do exist, regional plans are either at a very early stage or non-operational. Some issues such as demobilization, refugees, HIV/AIDS, natural resource management and exports can only be tackled seriously at a regional level. Although UNDP, FAO and UNHCR recognize the detrimental effects on the assets, livelihood and environment, the compensation mechanisms put into place were grossly inadequate by regional neighbors. This resulted in widespread resentment toward refugees. There is an ongoing need to create and develop capacities that will undertake rigorous impact assessments of large refugee population on host communities and then propose modalities mitigating solutions. On capacity building issues, ACBF might consider

designating some institutions to serve as regional centers of excellence that would mount tailor-made programs to meet the critical needs of post-conflict societies.

Productive synergy between WFP and UNHCR

1.37 The performance of WFP and UNHCR, the two largest agencies within the UN humanitarian system, was of critical importance to the overall response to the Rwanda crisis. The relationship between them was undermined by unproductive tensions stemming from their peculiar mandates. Despite the existence of a detailed Memorandum of Understanding between them, these tensions persist and are likely to continue, given their different perspectives on the same problems and the inherent difficulty of splitting such a critical function between the two largest agencies. One aspect of this division is that accountability is diluted as each may shift the burden of responsibility for problem encountered onto the other and avoid accountability.

Contents

STUDIES IN RECONSTRUCTION AND CAPACITY BUILDING IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES IN AFRICA

SOME LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE FROM RWANDA

HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL SETTING

Study Scope and Methodology

1.1 Case studies of four diverse country experiences form the core of this assessment. They are Uganda, Rwanda, Mozambique and Sierra Leone. Liberia was dropped because of logistics problems. Since authors did not participate in the selection of the countries to be studied nor in deciding on the periods to be covered for each country, we took the liberty of extending the mandate of the terms of reference by documenting the history of each conflict and by going beyond the indicated time frames in order to draw valuable lessons from experience and best practices over a longer time span.

1.2 The Rwanda country study entailed both desk and field research. The main objective of the study is to draw conclusions and present recommendations that can provide a guide to strategies and instruments for capacity-building initiatives undertaken by the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) in post-conflict settings. Additionally, the study aims to contribute to a dialogue on the Fund's ability to respond more effectively and efficiently to the needs of societies that must re-build following conflict. It also provides recommendations for clarification and refinement of the Fund's policy in this area.

1.3 The first phase of the study used secondary sources, including reviews of books, journal articles, newspapers, official government documents and the reports and publications of major donor agencies. These reviews analyzed and summarized experiences with post- conflict reconstruction. The second phase used primary sources, mainly in the form of structured interviews with senior public service personnel, private sector institutions, representatives of donor community and some selected civil society in Kigali, Rwanda and Washington, DC. A selected list of documents reviewed and a list of the people interviewed are contained in the bibliography and appendices respectively. Due to the limitations imposed by time and resources, we managed to visit Kigali and Washington D.C for only four and five working days respectively.

1.4 The Report is thematically organized. It starts with a theoretical presentation that informs the explanation of the nature of conflicts and their costs in the African settings. A short historical background of the Rwandan political economy follows this discussion. This is followed by a presentation on the root causes of the conflict and their cost in the African settings. A short historical background of Rwandan political economy follows this discussion; we look at the root

causes of the conflict, as well as the impact and limitations of external intervention for conflict mitigation, reconstruction and capacity building. Finally, several lessons from experience and best practices are discussed in lieu of the conclusion.

Conflict and African Politics

1.6 In the realm of peace and security in Africa, the 1990s witnessed dramatic and profound changes throughout the continent. With the conclusion of the Cold War, some of the major tensions between East and West over the African battleground were markedly eased. South Africa and Namibia installed democratically elected governments. Relative peace and stability was established in Mozambique after three decades of confrontation between warring parties. Several dozens of African countries held democratic elections. Unquestionably, all these were positive and significant signs of peace, stability and development. However, while many parts of the world moved toward greater stability and political and economic cooperation, Africa remained one of the cauldrons of instability. Political insecurity and violent conflict became increasingly persistent realities of the development scene in Africa. Internal strife with deep historical roots surfaced in many countries on the continent. Ironically, while the international community paid less and less attention to African security affairs, the continent's institutional and organizational capacity to manage its pervasive conflicts was not developing at the same pace as the escalations of conflict. Against such a backdrop, peace and peacemaking in Africa emerge as critical issues in global politics.

1.7 Widespread societal conflicts in Africa are often played out against the backdrop of deep poverty, illiteracy, and weak systems of governance. Undermined by unfavorable terms of trade, indebtedness and administrative failures, most states in Africa have not responded adequately to the critical social needs of their citizen. In the most extreme cases, Africa's insecurity has been reflected in traumatic episodes of collapse is a product of long-term degenerative politics marked by a loss of control over the economic and political space. As would be expected, collapsed states in Africa have had harmful spillover effects on neighboring countries. The overflow of refugees, heightened ethnic tension in some cases, and the resulting diplomatic conflicts, have engaged substantial resources and efforts from relatively stable countries that share borders with collapsed states (Zartman 1995, 1-5). In the process, what were once thought to be merely domestic conflicts, and thus not within the purview of international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) have now become internationalized. External actors have been drawn into what was technically a civil war in order to restore peace and security. It has become increasingly apparent that Africa should develop the capacity to deal with its own growing domestic security problems.

Essence of Conflict and Conflict Mapping

1.8 From antiquity to the present, competition and conflict are regarded as phenomena inherent in both nature and society. Latent or violent social confrontations have long been considered the primum *mobile* for social change

and transformation. Arguments to support this proposition are that conflict and competition are inevitable and ubiquitous in all societies at all times. Similarly, in the best of circumstances, conflict and competition are bounded and circumscribed. Contending groups of people and rival nations get involved in violent conflicts either because their vital interests or their values are challenged or because their needs are not being met. The deprivation (actual or potential) of any important value induces fear, a sense of treat, and unhappiness. Whether contending groups in a particular society are defined by ethnicity, religion, ideology, gender, or class identities, they have, by definition, different needs and interests, values and access to power and resources. Understandably, such differences necessarily generate social conflict and competition. What is at issue, therefore, is how to represent, manage and resolve inherent social conflicts before they degenerate into violence and massive destruction. The aim of conflict prevention then is not to prevent conflict as such; prevention then, is not to prevent conflict as such, but to reduce the likelihood of specific conflicts becoming violent (Goodhand and Hulme, 1999:14).[2]

1.9 The major positive and negative changes and transformations in world history occurred as a result of resolving old intractable conflicts through violence or war. In fact, the epoch-making social revolutions of the past centuries were the only way to resolve the irreconcilable conflicts of different social formations. On the ashes of the destruction and disintegration caused by the previous system, social revolutions provided societies with unique opportunities to devise more conducive institutional arrangements to meet the challenges of the new times. In this broader sense, therefore, conflict *per se* is not at issue. The existence of conflict does not in itself necessarily lead to the eruption of widespread hostilities. The tolerance and coping capacities of the poor, excluded and marginalized are legend and manifold. Conflict does engender large-scale violence if various structural conditions are present, such as authoritarian rule and a lack of political rights, state weakness and lack of institutional capacity to manage conflict. The risk of an outbreak of violence increases when these conditions exist concurrently or are exacerbated by other problems, such as manipulation of ethnic or other differences (in religion, culture, and language), which further fragment society and intensify conflict (Collier And Hoeffler, 1999; Colletta and Cullen, 2000).

1.10 Even the simplest interpersonal conflict has many elements. Conflicts involving multiple parties, a large number of people, or complex organizations such as

[2] . Either termed "conflict", "war", or, more fashionably, "complex political emergencies" they may be characterized by the following features:

- They occur within and across state boundaries. Although the conflict may originate or take place within a particular state, they also have regional origins, spillover effects and involve numerous external actors
- They are political in nature. The competition for power and scarce resources is the central dynamic in social conflicts:
    - They have multiple and interconnected causes
    - They are prorated in duration. They may subside and escalate over time so that sporadic violence and the threat of violence become the accepted norm
    - They are embedded and are expressions of cleavages within existing social, political, economic and cultural differences
    - They involve predatory social formations. Often ethno-nationalist in nature, conflicts involve groups that can be mobilized and violently manipulated by conflict entrepreneurs and political leaders (Goodhand and Hulme, 1999:16).

nation-states are enormously complicated. Every conflict has certain basic elements that permit researchers to produce a tentative road map. The mapper first gathers information about the history of the conflict and its physical and organizational settings. To be sure, a conflict does not emerge in a vacuum. Sometimes one conflict is nested within another. The second stage is to examine the parties to a conflict. These differ in the directness of their involvement, and the importance of its outcome. Primary parties are those who oppose one another, have a direct stake in the outcome of the conflict and exhibit fighting behavior. Secondary parties have an indirect stake in the outcome. They are often allies or sympathizers with the primary parties are actors such as mediators, peacekeeping and peace enforcing forces that might intervene to facilitate the management of the conflict.

1.11 It is not always possible to distinguish the cause of a conflict from its consequences. In fact, as a conflict emerges, cause and consequences tend to blend. Hostility might be a consequence of one phase of a conflict and a cause of the next. Perceived goal and interest incompatibility is perhaps the most basic cause of social conflict. Identity defense is also common, particularly in the contemporary world where group awareness and rights have assumed high visibility. Cultural differences yet other sources of separation and difference. They create a sense of self and self-defense, which is probably another primary motive for conflict. It is important to clearly distinguish the contending goals and interests of each party.

1.12 A conflict is constantly moving and changing. Even if the parties are at a stalemate, aspects of a conflict's may be changing. Runaway responses of parties to one another are made more visible through conflict mapping. Dynamics such as unrestrained escalation and polarization carry participants away from cooperative resolution toward greater hostility. Changes in perception occur within opposing sides, which reinforce runaway responses: stereotyping opponents, seeing them as a negative mirror image of oneself, or imputing to them increasingly malignant motives. In this way, a conflict map is able to serve as a conceptual guide to clarify the nature and dynamics of a conflict (Wehr, 1995).

1.13 Once conflicts escalate into violence, the major concern of neighboring states, civil society, and the international community is to intervene in the conflict in order to facilitate the mediation process and to help transform structures that produce insecurity and structural violence into ones of positive peace.[3] We should hasten to point out that conflicts in which the state is an effective arbiter do not present particular difficulties since they are manageable within the national framework. The problem arises when the state itself is a party to the conflict, for under those conditions, external involvement becomes necessary. It is argued in this report that a solid foundation for effective organization and

[3]. Joan Galtung makes a clear distinction between "positive" and "negative" peace. Positive peace encompasses an ideal of how society should be. It requires that not only all types of violence be minimal or non-existent, but also that the major potential causes of future conflict be removed. The notion of negative peace is defined as the end of widespread violent conflict associate with war. It may include prevalent social violence and structural violence. For details see Galtung (1995; 1996).

enabling institutions is a necessary precondition for sustainable and enduring peace building as well as conflict mitigation. For the purpose of this report, institutions are understood as sets of rules governing the actions of individuals and organizations, and encompass the interactions of all-relevant parties and negotiations among participants. Specifically, countries as well as societies need institutions that strengthen organizations and promote good governance, whether through laws and regulations, or by coordinating the actions of many players, as in international treaties. Rule-based processes increase the transparency of policies designed to create desired outcomes, and of organizations used to implement them. Institutions that are internally consistent have the lowest risk of a breakdown because such institutions are self-reinforcing. For emerging democracies, this means a wide distribution of power and no permanent exclusion of actors from the political system.

Costs of conflict

1.14 During a civil war, a society diverts some of its resources from productive activities to destruction. This, according to Paul Collier et al. (2003), causes double loss: the loss from what the resources were previously contributing and the loss from the damage that they now inflict. The division of resources to the war effort often causes a decrease in other public expenditures such as those for infrastructure, health and education. During the war, the rebel forces tend to target physical infrastructure as part of their strategy. The main targets are the enemy's communications and support lines, such as telecommunications, airport, ports, roads and bridges. They also loot and destroy housing, schools and health facilities.

1.15 As will be noted in this and in subsequent reports, the costs of civil war are usually prohibitive. For example, about 40 percent of Mozambique's immobile capital in agriculture, communications and administration sectors was destroyed. The pre-war transport system had been one of the largest foreign exchange earners, as goods were transported from and to the neighboring states of Malawi, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. In fact, 208 out of 222 units of rolling stock were lost or damaged between 1982 and 1989 (Bruck, 2001).

1.16 Severe conflict, especially its most virulent ethnic forms, destroys much more than buildings and power plants. It short-circuits the rules that keep human interaction constructive and predictable, targets primarily the organizations and individuals who administer those rules, and wipes out most positive forms of social capital. Civil war can have the effect of switching behavior from an equilibrium in which there is expectation for honesty to one in which there is expectation of corruption. Once the reputation for integrity has been lost, the incentive for honest behavior in the future is greatly weakened. In this sense, therefore, post-conflict reconstruction is first and foremost an institutional challenge. Failure to meet that challenge dooms the effectiveness of any external facilitation and intervention.

1.17 Probably a substantial cost arises from the fear that violence generates in a society. Frightened people tend to flee from their homes. They also tend to lose their valuable assets in the process. Paul Collier et al. (2003:14-16) have noted

that less than a fifth of the 1980 cattle stock in Mozambique remained by 1992. Cattle were lost because of direct rebel activity, that is, rebels stole them to feed their troops and killed many others to spread terror, but livestock also was lost because of indirect effects of warfare, namely, the lack of adequate feed and veterinary attention during the war. Faced with the prospects of such losses, people try to protect their assets by shifting wealth abroad. In July 1994, the fleeing Kigali government was said to have looted 24 billion Rwandan franc and substantial amounts of foreign exchange from the Central Bank of Rwanda.

1.18 The more direct effects of civil war are fatalities and population displacement. Violent conflict can decimate the human resources of a country as people are killed, maimed, or displaced in large numbers. In the modern civil war, the victims differ radically from those in the wars of the early 20th century, as the impact has shifted from military personnel to civilians. At the beginning of the 20th century 90 percent of the victims were soldiers, but by the 1990s, nearly 90 percent of the casualties resulting from armed conflict were civilians, mainly women and children (Carns, 1997). Forced migration broadly consists of two groups: refugees and internationally displaced persons. In the Rwandan genocide of 1994, an estimated 1 million men, women and children were killed over a three-month period. The genocide also produced about 3 million refugees and 4 million internally displaced persons out of a total Rwandan population about 8 million.

1.19 Finally, civil wars are not only costly for the countries in which they are fought, but for the entire region. Neighboring countries must accommodate large numbers of refugees and there are negative consequences for the population of the asylum countries. Moreover, civil wars leads to larger defense budgets in neighboring countries, the spreading of diseases, drug trafficking and terrorism, as well as tarnishing the reputation of the region for investors.

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

A conceptual framework

2.1 Post-conflict reconstruction, like other disciplines, has unique concepts that require explanation. The entry point for this work is the World Bank study, A *framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (1997). The study identifies a "country conflict" as one that has recently experienced widespread violence, or where the preoccupation of the state is armed warfare, where the state has failed, or where a significant part of the population is engaged in armed struggle with the state. In each situation, external agencies need to understand the varying histories and the nature of the "failure" process in order to calibrate informed intervention measures to facilitate the transition from war to sustainable peace, support the resumption of economic and social development, and determine at what point in the post-conflict process is a particular country can be judged to have achieved a relative normalcy.[4] These observations are very important precisely because conflicts are always unique and require tailor-made approaches. They differ, *inter alia*, in duration, intensity and scope of the destruction, the relative military and political strength of the opponents, and the degree to which the middle and upper classes are affected by the hostilities. Whereas the conflicts in Uganda and Sierra Leone were products of state failure due to predatory or ineffectual governance and foreign incursions, the Rwandan state erosion was a product of ethnic-cum-regional conflict and the Mozambican state failure was due to ideological conflict.

2.2 While post-conflict reconstruction, like post-natural disaster reconstruction, typically involves the repair and reconstruction of physical and economic infrastructure, it also entails a number of interventions aimed at rebuilding institutions and society. Such interventions include jump-starting the economy, reconstructing the framework for democratic governance, rebuilding key social infrastructure, and planning for financial normalization. In contrast, unlike post-disaster construction, post-conflict reconstruction assistance often operates amid tensions and suspicions between key actors both nationally and internationally, which can and does influence relations among the engaged international parties as well. Moreover, a civil war alters both the level and the structure of economic activity in ways, which persist beyond the war (World Bank, 1998b; Rugumamu, 2001).

2.3 As other cross-country studies have demonstrated, unlike post-post disaster reconstruction, post-conflict reconstruction interventions are radically different from "normal" operations. The devastation of human, social and physical capital often found at the beginning of the post-conflict period, and the particular provisions of the peace agreement, both require a paradigm shift when diagnosing and prescribing policy interventions, which should be conflict

[4]. The speed of the evolution toward normalcy and the benchmarks for evaluating progress remain contentious. The World Bank has tentatively proposed possible indicators to include: (i) macroeconomic stability and its likely sustainability; (ii) recovery of private sector confidence, as measured by the investment ratio; and (iii) the effectiveness with which institutional arrangements and the political system are coping with the tensions, schisms and behaviors that lay behind the conflict to begin with. For details see World Bank (1998b: 47).

mitigating. The volatile and fast-changing circumstances of post-conflict societies demand a high degree of flexibility and speed in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of projects and programs. In addition, post-conflict interventions tend to have explicit objectives like supporting the transition from war to peace, resumption of economic and social development, reconciliation and reconstruction, human and institutional capacity building, special investment funds to maintain social cohesion during the period of economic adjustment, poverty reduction and decentralization. Moreover, a post-conflict reconstruction process typically requires at least two decades of sustained effort, with recurrent risks of war. (Collier et al., 2001). Arguably, conflicts are often protracted rather than limited in duration and tend to tear the country's social fabric and destroy is physical and human capital. Recovery requires incremental planning and careful and realistic policy reforms as well as consideration of the post-war constraints and peace agreements. Raising taxes in post-conflict situations, for example, may discourage private investment and downsizing the civil service under public sector reform programs may contradict agreements made under the peace accords Standard procurement and disbursement procedures can easily degenerate into serious stumbling blocks to recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation. In short, post-conflict operations require intensive monitoring to ensure their continued relevance, effectiveness and efficiency, and timely preparation of post-conflict completion reports to disseminate the lessons learned (World Bank, 1998).

2.4 It is against this background that most bilateral and multilateral organizations have established post-conflict research support units to consolidate institutional learning on reconstruction issues, to support staff in developing and implementing reconstruction strategies, and act as the focal point for networking and partnership with other members of the international community.

Capacity Building Defined

2.5 In the present research, we define capacity --- including knowledge and technology --- as the ability of organizations, organizational units, individuals and societies to identify constraints and to plan and manage development effectively, efficiently and sustainably. This definition involves both the development of human resources, institutions, society and a supportive policy environment. It encompasses the process by which individuals, groups, organizations and societies develop their abilities individually and collectively, to identify their problems and the constraints on development, set development objectives, formulate policies and programs, perform functions required to solve the identified problems and achieve a set of development objectives. To be sure, each society has a unique capacity that corresponds to its own functions and objectives. Non-industrial societies, for example, have relatively few formal institutions, but they do have highly developed skills and complex webs of social and cultural relationships that are often difficult for outsiders to comprehend. Capacity building needs to be addressed on three levels: individual, institutional and societal. All these layers of capacity are mutually interdependent. If one or the other is pursued on its own, development becomes skewed and inefficient (Browne, 2002:2-4). They are:

- ***Individual**:* This involves enabling individuals to embark on a continuous process of learning – building on existing knowledge and skills, and extending these to new directions as fresh opportunities appear.

- ***Institutional**:* This too involves building on existing capacities. Rather than trying to construct new and alien institutions on the basis of foreign blueprints, governments and donors instead need to seek out existing initiatives, however nascent, and encourage these to grow.

- ***Societal**:* This involves capacities in the society as a whole, or transformation for development. It encompasses the facilitatory process, which lie at the heart of human development: the opening and widening of opportunities that enable people to use and expand their capacities to the fullest. Social capital and cohesion are at the core of societal capacity and apply both nationally and locally. Without such opportunities, soon people will find that they skills rapidly erode or become obsolete. And if the find no opportunities locally, trained and skilled people will join the brain drain and take their skills overseas.

2.6 In this regard, therefore, the broad concept of capacity building consists of various processes of creating new capacities (capacity creation), effectively mobilizing and utilizing existing capacities (capacity utilization) and sustaining the created capacity over time (capacity retention). These dimensions of capacity development are interactive and dynamic. Briefly, let us elaborate on each of these processes.

Capacity Creation

2.7 The creation of effective human and institutional capacity rests on a strong foundation that facilitates the creation of new capacities through learning opportunities as well as putting processes in place, which enhance the adaptability required for dealing with the dynamic environment. Such a foundation is created by training in formal institutions and informally through on-the-job training as well as in the form of institutional norms, routines and processes, which promotes capacity creation on a continuing basis.

Capacity Utilization

2.8 Efficient and effective use of existing capacities is an important aspect of capacity- building. The failure of most African countries to make effective use of their human resources has been identified as one of the major factors retarding their development. The cause of the underutilization and/or mis-utilization of this critical agent of progress can be traced to the extant disenabling environment. Effectiveness and efficiency involve taking stock of existing capacities, mobilizing them to achieve a set of development goals. Making best use of existing capacities and then mobilizing them to achieve a set

of development goals. Making optimal use of existing capacities will involve mobilization of all creative and innovative potential in the existing human and institutional capacities.

Sustaining Capacity

2.9 The capacity that is being created and utilized to realize a set of development goals will need to be retained, developed and sustained over time. Capacity-building programs and projects will need to be designed in such a way that they are sustainable beyond the initial external interventions. Sustaining capacities is more likely to occur in the context of a modicum of political and economic stability that is supportive of conducive working conditions, reduces risk of violent social conflict, and provides an atmosphere of support for the capacity building efforts in society and good governance. Sources of funding are an important element of sustainability and capacity retention. In the long run, the key to sustaining capacity building programs will be the availability of local sources of funding. Sustainable capacity building will need to address the capacity to mobilize domestic resources, both government revenues and savings and investments. Resource mobilization is therefore an important component of capacity-building.

Capacity-Building Environments

2.10 The processes of capacity building are embedded in complex environments that affect their ability to achieve the intended objectives. The broad political/ economic environment is the most general level of analysis. This refers to the economic, social and political milieux (local, national and international) in which individuals, organizations and society attempt to carry out their activities, and the extent to which conditions in the environment facilitate or constrain performance. Within this dimension, a broad set of factors affect the ability of actors to perform effectively, efficiently and sustainably. In terms of economic factors, the level and growth rates of GDP, the conditions in international commodity and capital markets, the labor market, and the level of private sector development, and the nature and extent of development assistance, all impinge on every activity carried out by government. Politically, actors are affected by factors such leadership support, the extent to which civil society is mobilized, the degree of political stability, and the nature and development of political institutions. Social factors are also important, including: the level of human resource development; tolerance or tensions among social groups; social mobilization and needs; the development of non-government organizations (NGOs); and the degree of citizen participation in economic and social life.

2.11 At the international level, it is important to emphasize that donors will have a long-term view of what they want to contribute to (e.g. a better health system, efficient judiciary or more skilled economists at the national treasury) within a capacity-building needs matrix. At the same time, however, they remain accountable to their constituencies at home. They feel more comfortable, therefore, if they can point to visible activities such as courses in their home universities, training manuals or computer systems, and this results in a bias

toward self-contained and pre-ordained packages. Moreover, donors want to retain as much control as possible and avoid accusations that hard-earned taxpayer funds were being squandered through inefficiency, incompetence or corruption. One means of achieving this kind of assurance is often to send expatriates as gatekeepers.

2.12 The second dimension of capacity is the institutional environment of the public sector that facilitates or constrains the actors' activities and affects their performance. This dimension includes the laws and regulations that affect the civil service or private sector and the operation of government, such as hiring, promotion, and remuneration policies, general operating procedures; and standards of performance. It includes the financial and budgetary support that allows organizations to carry out particular tasks, as well as the policies in effect that constrain or hinder performance. The institutional context also includes laws and regulations defining responsibilities and power relationships among actors and the informal power relationships that often mean that some institutions and agencies acquire resources or influence policy more effectively than others. Of course, not every capacity-building initiative takes place through the public sector. All countries are constantly engaged in multiple processes of capacity development, in the public sector, civil society and the private sector.

2.13 The third dimension of capacity-building relates to the coordinated activity of several organizations that are required to accomplish a given task, i.e., the task network. The interactions of organizations within this network can facilitate or constrain performance. Some organizations may be more central to a given task than others; these are called "primary organizations". Secondary organizations have a less central role in accomplishing the task but are nonetheless essential to it. In addition, there are often supporting organizations that provide important services that enable a task to be performed. How these networks function and the nature of formal and informal interactions among them are important aspects of organizational performance. Within any particular task network, there may be organizations from diverse levels of government, and from the private sector and NGO sectors.

2.14 The fourth and fifth dimensions of capacity development are the organizational and human resource bases of the organization. These two levels of analysis are closely intertwined. The fourth dimension of capacity development focuses on those organizational structures, processes, resources, and management styles that affect how individual talents and skills are used to accomplish particular tasks. It should be pointed out that organizations establish goals, structure work, define authority relations and provide incentives and disincentives that shape the behavior of those who work within them. The fifth dimension of capacity development relates to the training and recruitment of managerial, professional, and technical talent that contributes to organizational performance. Among these five sets of factors that affect capacity building initiatives there may be some that facilitate effective performance and others that constrain it (Mukandala, 1994). A case study research, such as this of Rwanda, can illuminate how various factors influence capacity building in post-conflict societies and what interventions can promote better performance.

THE RWANDAN CASE STUDY

Country Context

3.1 With just over 26,000 square kilometers and a population of about 8 million people, Rwanda is one of the smallest and most densely populated countries in Africa. The pressure of people on scarce land poses a constant threat to social harmony and the physical environment. Rwanda's geographical position represents a disadvantage because it is land-locked, located a long distances from the closest ocean port. Situated immediately south of the Equator, it is bordered on the south by Burundi, which shares a similarly troubled and violent history. Its neighbor to the west is the Kivu region of Zaire. The Kivu has a large "ethnic" Rwandan population. To the north is Uganda, which also has a Kinyarwanda-speaking population. On the east is Tanzania, whose northwestern region has traditionally been an area of Rwandan migration. Often called the "The Land of a Thousand Hills", or "the Switzerland of Africa", Rwanda is dominated by mountain ranges and highland plateaus of the great watershed between the Nile and the Zaire River basins. Cool climates and few tropical diseases make much of Rwanda highly habitable. High, well-distributed rainfall and good soils, especially in the volcano regions, have permitted the sustenance of large populations. The largest city, the capital Kigali, has a population of a little more than 300,000 people.

3.2 The country became independent in 1962, after being a German colony from 1899 to 1945 and a UN-trust territory of Belgium from 1945 to 1961. In 1961, its monarchical government was formally abolished by a referendum and the first parliamentary elections were held. The legacy of colonial rule posed challenges of capacity building in post-independence Rwanda. The country inherited a weak human, institutional and societal capacity to cope with the challenges of development management. It faced severe capacity constraints in literally all sectors, characterized by a shortage of skilled staff, under-utilization of the available resources, weak institutional environments, inadequate incentive structures, as well as lack of capacity retention strategies. Despite various efforts to promote the social sector, neither institutional nor human capacity grew fast enough to keep pace with the requirements of rapidly changing social-economic circumstances. The advent of the economic crisis of the mid-1980s, as well as the war and genocide from 1990 on, undermined the limited progress that had been made.

3.3 Rwanda's economy is based on agriculture. This sector occupies 91.1 percent of the active population and is a source of 43.5 percent of the GDP, as well as 80 percent of the exports, specifically of coffee and tea. The economy has historically been faced with a combination of structural problems arising from low incomes, low agricultural productivity, and low human resource development. The map of the soil aptitudes, which is complementary to the soil map, shows that more than half of the Rwandan soils are unfit for crops that demand a high rate of fertilization. The very good soils that are well- adapted to crops tend to occupy a very small surface area, and these are found in densely populated areas. However, rainfall is quite irregular and prolonged droughts have, in recent times, affected rain-dependent agriculture. As a resource, land is

the nation's most important asset both for production and survival, and will remain the foundation of the economy and an enduring source of social conflict.

3.4 Rwanda is a poor country with low socio-economic indictors. The economic structure reflects a chronic failure to achieve productivity increases in the context of a large and growing population. Moreover, the economy suffered massive terms-of-trade shocks when international coffee prices fell dramatically in the late 1980s. By 1994, about 60 percent of the population lived below the poverty line, up from 40 percent in 1985. The spread and depth of poverty in Rwanda was compounded by the civil was and genocide of the 1990s. In the past few years, under a structural adjustment regime supported by major donor agencies, the government of Rwanda has improved social service delivery. This is reflected in the steady increase in the budgetary allocation to the social sectors, particularly to education and health.[5] However, the continued external and internal insecurity, including the insurgencies of 1996-97 and 2001, weak institutional capacity and an unfavorable global economy, all remain serious obstacles to sustainable recovery.

Anatomy of the Rwandan Crisis

3.5 Rwanda and Burundi's human history began with the Twa, who inhabited the country's forests for thousands of years and lived as hunters and gathers. Today, due to land constraints, their major form of livelihood is farming. For historical reasons and because of their small numbers, they do not feature in the power dynamics associated with either Rwanda or Burundi. Between the fourth and seventh centuries AD, a group of Bantu clans settled in the region. They cleared much of the forest, cultivated the land, and bartered skins and meat for salt and iron goods. The region's Tutsis are held by some historians to have developed from this group as a cattle-owning class, while the Hutus were predominantly land tillers. According to the 1991 Census, Tutsis represent 8 percent of the population the Hutus over 90 percent, while less than one percent were Twa. In fact, Hutu and Tutsi lived side by side in a patchwork of numerous micro-monarchies and principalities, shared the same Bantu language and traditions, and frequently intermarried and shared governance responsibilities in the traditional monarchies. Interestingly, the kings and princes of these micro-monarchies and principalities were not uniformly Tutsi nor were the inhabitants exclusively from the other group. Both Hutu and Tutsi micro-monarchies existed with members of both ethnic groups acting in senior administrative capacities in each kingdom. Furthermore, it was actually possible for one or the other group to "change" their classification through a mechanism called "ubuhake" among the Tutsi or "umuheto" by the Hutu (Vansina; 1962; Prunier, 1995; Lemarchand, 1970).

3.6 It is important to note that the terms "hutu" and "tutsi" were largely constructed social categories representing differing socio-economic positions within the

[5] . The budget of education as a percentage of the total government budget increased from 12.1 percent in 1996 to 30.2 percent in 2000. The increase in the share of the budget of health was modest, from 2.5 percent to 3.1 percent during the same period. The presence of many international NGOs in the health sector relieved the pressure on the government to fund the health sector rehabilitation and operations. See ***Rwanda Development Indicators*** 2001.

Rwandan society, rather than objective biological, ethnic or cultural categories. Most experts agree that when speaking about Rwanda, "what we are dealing with are not "tribes" (nor ethnic groups) in the usual and misleading sense of the word, but status groups, whose distinctiveness was reinforced by the occupational differences between the Tutsi pastoralists and the Hutu agriculturalists The process of transforming the society from one of relative harmony to one of entrenched hatred took place over a period of only two generations (Vidal, 1974; Newbury, C.1988; Newbury, D. 1980).

3.7 The concentration of power in the hands of the Tutsi monarchy did not take place until the latter half of the 19th century and was not consolidated until the first third of the 20th century. The build-up of indigenous social and political structures began towards the end of the pre-colonial period, in particular, under the reign of the Tutsi king Rwabugiri during the second half of the 19th century. King Rwabugiri's administration (1860-1895) imposed a harsh regime on the formerly autonomous Tutsi and Hutu lineages, confiscating their lands and breaking their political power. He amplified the feudal labor systems, in particular the "uburetwa" i.e. labor in return for access to land, a system that was restricted to Hutu peasant farmers while exempting Tutsis. By entrenching property inequalities between the two social groups, he succeeded in manipulating social categories by creating distinct "ethnic" differentiations between Tutsi and Hutu based on historical social position. Some scholars have argued that the initial ingredients of polarization and politicization of ethnicity began well before the advent of European colonialism (Duly, 2000; Dorsey, 1994).

3.8 The Germans colonized Rwanda and Burundi in 1899. Having subdued the Tutsi kingdom, they eventually brought the Hutu chieftains under their imperial control. Germany ruled both territories until its defeat in World War I, when Belgium assumed power over the territory, which now became Rwanda-Urundi. The colonial policy of indirect rule that was practiced by both colonial powers favored and strengthened the Tutsi hegemony, resulting in a political and administrative monopoly in the hands of the aristocratic Tutsi. In a divide-and-rule fashion, both Germans and Belgians offered education and job opportunities to the Tutsi group on a priority basis. In order to consolidate social control, a colonial policy of "ethnogenesis" was introduced and actively pursued, i.e. a politically motivated creation of ethnic identities based on socially constituted categories from the pre-colonial past. According to this thesis, "everything of value in Africa had been introduced by Hamites, supposedly a branch of the Caucasian race" (Sanders, 1969). In the Rwandan and Burundi communities, the Tutsi were designed as Hamites and said to be of foreign origin. In this regard, the origin of violence in Rwanda is inextricably connected to how the Hutu and Tutsi were constructed as political identities by the colonial state: the Hutus as indigenous and the Tutsis as alien.[6] During much of the colonial period, the colonial administrators, operating under the created myth of Tutsi superiority, and reinforced Tutsi hegemony by removing Hutu chiefs and concentrating

[6] . Mamood Mamdani (2001) has argued that colonialism created the genocide environment in Rwanda by promoting competing and contradictory political identities between Hutu and Tutsi. The Hutu were made into a native identity and Tutsi a settler one. The former saw themselves as sons and daughters of the soil and their mission as one of clearing the soil of a threatening alien presence. In this sense, it was not an ethnic but a racial cleansing.

administrative positions in the hands of Tutsi. Subsequently, this racist myth was exploited in innumerable ways in order to serve the colonial policy of divide-and-rule. From then on, all Rwandans had to relate to "their" respective ethnic group, which in turn, determined one's fortunes in society. Gradually also, the Tutsi military rule and administration were established over the Hutu and Twa. Slowly but inexorably, the minority Tutsi became the economically "haves" and the combined majority Hutu and Twa became the economically "have-nots" (Lemarchand, 1970; Gahama, 1983; Mamdani, 2001).

3.9 As would be expected, the new racist myth turned into a reality. Gradually, it seeped into the consciousness of all players in the Rwandan and Burundi societies. A census taken in 1926 forced Hutu and Tutsi to choose their "ethnic" identity. What had once been a dynamic system of classes became a static system based on "ethnicity", which later became a tool for manipulation of the masses by an elite ruling group. To the colonial powers who believed it in the first place; to elite Tutsi who had vested interest in believing it; to poor Tutsi, who though just as poverty-stricken as their Hutu peasant counterparts, adopted attitudes of superiority toward their Hutu neighbors; and to the Hutu themselves, who, confronted at every turn by the "reality" of their inferiority, the system became reality. By the late 1950s, the disparity between the two groups, and the animosity it engendered, was so strong that the struggle for independence and power in Rwanda and Burundi was fought more along the Hutu-Tutsi divide than from an anti-colonial position. The Hutu revolted against their increasing marginalization on these artificial "ethnic" grounds (Duly, 2000).

3.10 In response to the democratic fervor sweeping across Africa, the Belgians shifted their support from the Tutsi aristocracy to the Hutu majority. They wanted to be on the "right side" of history by supporting the majority group. By 1957, political parties were allowed to operate freely. Though representing a wide range of political interests, most of these parties formed along "ethnic" affiliations, with their uniqueness stemming from subtle interpretations of ethno-political ideology. The major ones were the monarchist Tutsi party, the Union Nationale Rwandese (UNAR) and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Hutu (MDR-P). This important development eased the way for the so-called "Hutu revolution" of 1959-62, through which Rwanda underwent a profound transition from a Tutsi-dominated monarchy to a Hutu-led independent republic in less than three years. The replacement of one political elite by another introduced a new dimension of political and social instability and a potential for future ethnic violence. The widespread revolts of the Hutu population of the 1959-62 forced Tutsi chiefs, sub-chiefs and tens of thousands of Tutsi into exile in neighboring countries, from which groups of refugees began to carry out armed incursions into Rwanda, thus sowing the seeds of the country's ethnically-defined refugee problem.

3.11 The 1961 legislative elections swept the main Hutu party, the MDR-P, into power. On July 1, 1962, Rwanda attained independence and broke with Burundi, establishing the Republic of Rwanda. President Gregoire Kayibanda headed the first republican government. The new government vigorously and rigorously implemented a policy of ethnic identification by introducing national identity cards and by ensuring that the percentage of Tutsi in schools, universities, the

civil service and the private sector did not surpass their percentage in the entire population (Newbury, 1988).

3.12 As threats of Tutsi invasion receded in the late 1960s, political conflicts emerged among the Hutu and class dissensions arose in the face of centralization of power by new Hutu elites. In addition, regional differences arose between the Hutu ruling elites in the south and central heartland and those to the north, and these differences became the principal axes of conflict in the 1970s and 1980s. President, Gregoire Kayibanda drew his support from the southern Hutu, who came to dominate all facets of both the state and economy, causing resentment among northern elites and indeed the Tutsi, who suffered economic marginalization (Diessenbacher, 1995).

3.13 Widespread massacre of Hutus in Burundi in 1972 re-ignited the ethnic tensions in Rwanda and led to reprisals against the Rwandan Tutsi. These tensions provided the pretext for the military coup staged by the Army Chief-of-Staff, Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, in July 1973. This was followed by more politically planned violence, this time with around 100,000 people massacred. The victims were prominent MDR-P supporters, including Kayibanda, but most were ordinary Tutsis. Tens of thousands more Tutsi fled to Burundi and Uganda. Habyarimana dissolved the parliament, banned the MDR-P, and established the Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement (MRND). A civilian rule under a one-party government was introduced in 1978, and a legislature was established in 1981. Although the new regime softened, to some extent, the avowedly Hutu supremacist ideology of the First Republic, there were few substantive changes in those policies and practices. Until the mid-1980s, the Habyarimana government was widely regarded as relatively incorrupt, serious about development, and a good steward of international assistance. Additionally, his rule marked a dramatic shift in power from southern to northern Hutu elites and from the civilian to the military. But his regime grew more authoritarian, as military recruitment and promotion veered more narrowly toward the president's northern kinsmen (Roosens, 1989).

3.14 Intra-Hutu cleavages were heightened by unequal access to resources between the ruling group and the predominantly peasant majority. With the highest population density in mainland Africa (256 persons per kilometer), Rwanda typifies a dilemma of overpopulation and resource scarcity magnified by over dependence on a monoculture (coffee production) for export. Between 1963 and 1993, the population rose from around 3 million to 7.5 million, at an average growth rate of 3.7 percent per annum. Demographic pressures exacerbated the deforestation and soil erosion gradually decreased the productive land available for cultivation, subjecting the peasants to constant threats of famine. By the second half of the 1980s, with economic growth rates falling behind a burgeoning population, the government admitted that it could only feed 5 million people. The economic situation worsened the class and regional polarization and contributed to the general weakening of the Habyarimana regime (Percival and Homer-Dixon, 1995).

3.15 In 1989, Rwanda faced a harsh famine stemming from prolonged drought. At the same time, worldwide prices for coffee plunged as much as 50 percent, decimating the major source of government revenue. The impact of the price

collapse was demonstrated in the sharp drop of coffee export earnings from $150 million in 1986 to $70 million in 1989. In consultation with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the government agreed on a standard structural adjustment package. Following this agreement, the Government announced a-40 percent budget reduction, resulting in deep cuts in social services. World Bank data indicate that aggregate GDP per capita decreased from an estimated $335 in 1983 to $250 in 1990, and the incidence of poverty increased from 40 percent in 1985 to 53 in 1992 (World Bank, 1994).

3.16 Economic decline exacerbated the class distinctions and ruptured the post-independence myth of a Hutu "social revolution" that the Habyarimana regime had sought cultivate. Adding to these strains was external pressure to democratize, which gathered momentum in early 1990 with the French threat to link development assistance to political liberalization. Growing external pressure also galvanized domestic opposition groups to demand political reforms, leading to strikes and demonstrations by the university students in June 1990. In response, Habyarimana agreed to separate his party from the state in July, 1990. As southern elites appropriated the label of democracy to agitate for genuine power sharing, Habyarimana appointed a commission in September, 1990, to work out a National Political Charter that would allow the establishment of different political parties.

3.17 The widespread perception of state paralysis that occurred amid Habyarimana's internal reforms provided a window of opportunity for the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) to strike from Uganda in October, 1990. In the initial phase of the conflict, the RPF launched a conventional campaign, scoring quick victories by overrunning government defenses in northern Rwanda. It appears to have carried out extensive massacres, and precipitated the flight of nearly 1 million Hutu into government-held territory. As Gerard Prunier (1995:90) notes, "By the early fall of 1990, the Rwandese political scene was one of deep and pervasive crisis…The crisis acted as multidimensional spur on the RPF preparations in Uganda…. the Rwandan political system was on the verge of collapse and any strong push from outside would complete the process". RPF demands coalesced around a program calling for restoration of citizenship rights, national unity, and an end to a dictatorial "system that generates refugees". The desire for return by the Tutsi refugees arose from the fact that while Habyarimana's regime rhetorically advocated their return, it did little to facilitate this process, instead invoking Rwanda's demographic pressure to induce neighboring states to naturalize the refugees (Khadiagala, 2002).

3.18 The Kigali regime depicted the RPF invasion as a bid by forces that sought "to restore a minority and feudal regime which was abolished in 1959 under the guise of liberation and democracy". It therefore invited foreign military support from its traditional allies, Belgium, France and Zaire. Meeting Rwanda's emergency appeal for military help, Belgium sent 535 troops and France sent 300 troops, ostensibly to protect their nationals in Rwanda. Zaire's Mobutu dispatched about 1,000 troops, which were deployed in direct combat against the RPF. External support enabled the Rwandese army to inflict heavy casualties on the RPF later in the year. Many Tutsi businessmen and women, teachers and priests were arrested and accused, on the basis of their ethnicity, of collaboration with the rebels even if they had no connection with them. From 1992 onward,

Habyarimana regime began to train Hutu extremist militia groups known as Interahamwe and the Impuzamugabi, while it paradoxically pursued peace talks with the rebel forces in 1993 and early 1994.

3.19 France's military commitment to the government included the provision of troops and military advisors and a supply of heavy weaponry such as armored personnel carriers, reconnaissance vehicles, communications equipment, and helicopters. More importantly, France provided financial guarantees for purchases of small arms, mortars, and grenade launchers from Egypt and South Africa. Military assistance and training enabled Habyarimana to increase the size of the government army, the Forces Armees Rwandese (FAR), which grew from a modest force of 5,200 in October, 1990 to 15,000 by mid-1991, and to 30,000 by the time the Arusha negotiations began in June 1992 (Khadiagala, 2002:467). In addition, following the RPF invasion, the government distributed assault rifles to municipal authorities, working in collaboration with the ruling party's armed militias, the Interahamwe ("those who fight together") and Impuzamugambi ("those who have the same goal"), creating an armed militia of between 20,000 and 30,000 (Des Forges, 1999).

3.20 While France armed the Habyarimana regime, Uganda did the same for the RPF. Uganda was indispensable to the RPF in geographical, military, and political terms, roles that stemmed from the RPF's long-term alliance with Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA). Throughout the war, the RPF benefited from Uganda's supply of arms, food, and gasoline, as well as from use of Uganda's southern border as a military launching pad and place for refuge. Moreover, in the face of condemnation of Uganda's logistical and material support, Museveni remained a dependable RPF ally in regional and international diplomatic circles. From its northern base of operations, the RPF reorganized its forces, shifting from conventional to guerrilla warfare at the end of 1990, and attempted to broaden its ethnic and political base by recruiting Hutus. In part due to these efforts, the RPF grew from 4,000 in 1990 to about 25,000 by early 1994 (Feil, 1998:38).

3.21 In an effort to resolve the Rwandan crisis, under the broad mandate of the then Organization of African Unity (OAU), Tanzania, mediated the Arusha Agreement[7] from June, 1992, to its conclusion in August 1993 between the government of Rwanda, the opposition parties and the RPF. These peace accords provided the framework for the integration of the armed forces, for power-sharing and for resolution of a number of other issues relevant to the establishment of a broad-based transitional government. Unfortunately, implementation of the Agreement was never undertaken, due largely to the recurrent massive killings of Tutsi civilians by Interahamwe militia and intra-party squabbling over cabinet posts and representation in the national parliament. The shooting down of the Habyarimana's plane on April 16, 1994 proved to be the catalyst that set off a three-month orgy of killing and forced the

[7] . The Arusha Agreement consists of 5 Protocols and a ceasefire agreement, namely:
a) restoration of the rule of law
b) power sharing between different armed and non-armed political forces
c) repatriation of Rwanda refugees and the resettlement of internally displaced persons
d) integration of both armies into one of national unity
e) practical steps to be taken for its implementation (Arusha Peace Accords, 1993).

RPF to resume the war until the Rwandan army was routed out of Kigali on July 19, 1994. This stopped the genocide, but not before up to 1 million people, mainly Tutsis, had been killed, and another 3 million and 4 million as refugees and internally displaced persons respectively.

3.22 Once the civil war broke out in 1990, there were warnings from human rights organizations and other sources that large-scale civilian massacres might occur. Nevertheless, international preparations to deal with the contingency of massive violence that targeted civilians were absolutely inadequate. Squabbles among key members of the Security Council combined with the lack of strategic importance of Rwanda to the major powers have been cited as primary reasons for this paralysis. In fact, had the international community responded more effectively in the months prior to, or in the days immediately following the shooting down of the President's plane, perhaps most of those who died would have survived and much of the massive expenditure on humanitarian assistance would have been unnecessary. The study recommends the need to create a robust response mechanism to such warnings and translate them into effective conflict management tools for prevention or mitigation of future conflict.

3.23 The close relationship between the level of security and the effectiveness of international assistance highlights the need to create capacities and strategies among key members of the international community. However, the Rwandan crisis was characterized by the lack of a well-coordinated political strategy for managing crisis. Conflicting self-interests rather than moral obligations to uphold international norms of justice were largely responsible for this inaction. Conflict attitudes toward the FPF government and the ousted government among members of the UN Security Council plus a lack of resolve to overcome those differences, largely stemming from the unimportance of non-strategic and small African country, were responsible for lack of any coordinated political and military strategy. There is a need for great powers to demonstrate their resolve in the world order that go beyond strict national security concerns. Ideally, they should be driven by the moral imperative of saving human lives.

3.24 As in 1990, the RPF military advance on Kigali resulted in a mass Hutu exodus, orchestrated by the Rwandan army and MRND officials. In all, over 2 million people left Rwanda for the DRC, Tanzania and Burundi during 1994-95. The main killers were the militias and the army, but thousands of civilians also participated after varying degrees of coercion and persuasion. The refugee gathered in camps run by the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and international aid agencies. Tens of thousands died in a matter of weeks, with their plight broadcast live by the international media. Aid agencies slowly and painfully stabilized the situation, while old regime leaders established political control in the refugee camps, partly by supervising the distribution of food and shelter. These leaders were able to prevent most refugees from returning home through the use of intimidation and propaganda; their cause was helped by the massacres, murders or arrests by RPF of many who did return. The militiamen among the refugees began to regroup militarily and repeatedly raided Rwanda from Zaire and Tanzania. The RPF responded with counter-insurgence, alienating many Hutu from the regime by its brutal reprisals for rebel attacks (Amnesty International, 1994).

3.25 In late 1996, the Alliance Des Forces Democratique pour la Leberation du Congo-Zaire (AFDL) led by Laurent Desire Kabila, together with the RPF, broke up Zaire's Rwandan refugee camps on their way to Kinshasa to topple the Mobutu regime. About 1.2 million returned voluntarily or were driven back between November 1996 and January 1997. The Tanzania government also expelled 500,000 Rwandan refugees in January 1997. At the same time, some militias from Zaire entered Rwanda by evading the government's screening process, and have since been active, primarily in Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, targeting Hutu "collaborators" with the Rwandan regime, military installations, genocide survivors and sometimes even humanitarian workers. Above all, Rwanda's security was further compromised when Kagame and his allies started a second war on Zaire against President Kabila in August 1998. The latter responded by employing armed Hutu groups as his infantry to stem the advance of Rwandan troops. Since then, the Zairean government has constantly sought to maintain the security threat to Rwanda by arming the ex-FAR soldiers and the Interahamwe as well as their new recruits, who have been mobilized from the two Kivus, to contain the RPA's military advance and "send the war back to where it came from". In short, Rwanda's national security and its prospects for post-conflict reconstruction are ineluctably embedded in a larger regional security complex.

3.26 How to restore sustainable peace and security in Rwanda has remained contentious. Along with some international observers, the government has contended that the only way to secure genuine peace and stability in Rwanda is to defeat the Interahamwe and ex-FAR forces militarily, both inside and outside its borders. While the removal of the Interahamwe threat would go far toward promoting stability, there are those who are calling for a more encompassing definition and approach to the security problem. The lack of security felt by many Rwandans requires a more nuanced approach than simply the military defeat of ex-FAR and its allies. Equitable security for all segments of society requires simultaneously addressing collectively and simultaneously all the root causes of the conflict.

The Impact of the War and 1994 Genocide

3.27 As Paul Collier at al. (2003:130 have observed, a "civil war is development in reverse". During war, a society diverts some of its scarce resources from productive activities to destruction. Some of these accrue to the combatants, but many such diversions affect people who have no part in the decisions that create and sustain conflict. The genocide of 1994 added further development challenges following protracted insecurity, loss of life, increased the numbers of vulnerable citizens and destruction of infrastructure in structure in the rural as well as urban areas from decapitalization, and also caused large populations movements and reduced social capital. More specifically, the war and genocide left 85,000 child-headed households. In April-June 1994, up to one million people were killed in a series of massacres. In the aftermath, two million people fled to neighboring countries and up to one million people who had been pushed into exile by previous purges returned to their country and caused a systematic destruction of existing wooded and previously protected areas. Some of those who have not returned are still posing a security threat to the state and society. In

short, during and immediately after the genocide, which is the main focus of this study, Rwandan society collapsed completely; business and agricultural activities ceased, skilled people and the intelligentsia were slaughtered or fled, the infrastructure was purposely destroyed, and government operations, including legal, educational, and health activities, were completely dissolved.

3.28 During the genocide, social capital atrophied as the country, communities and families fell prey to hatred and violence. Yet integrative forms of social capital increased within families fighting for survival; among individuals attempting to save or rescue Tutsi, and in the small Muslim community within Rwanda, which never took part in the genocide. Strong, exclusionary social capital also emerged within Hutu extremism, with extremely negative ramifications for those excluded; thus violence can coexist with, or be a result of, strong bonding social capital among its perpetrators. Once the killings began, Hutu killed not only Tutsis unknown to them, but also their neighbors and, in some cases, even family members. These indiscriminate yet intimate killings led to the disintegration of communes and families and fragmented social cohesion in general. High levels of social capital existed both vertically and horizontally among the Hutu ranks, while bridging the social capital that linked Hutu and Tutsi was all but eliminated (Colletta and Cullen, 2000).

3.29 In economic terms, Rwanda saw its GDP fall by 50 percent in 1994, and the rate of inflation rose by 64 percent. Rwanda remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with per capita GDP under US$220 in 1997. Over 60 percent of the households live below the poverty line, compared to about 40 percent in 1985. The government made a commitment to rapid economic recovery, with prudent fiscal and monetary policies, liberalization of the economy, and institutional capacity building. The economy subsequently rebounded, growing by 70 percent between 1994-97, and 8.9 percent in 1998, fueled by large inflows of external resources for relief and reconstruction and supported by the stabilization and liberalization of the economy. However, real GDP in 1996 remained at only 72 percent of the 1990 level. Inflation, as measured by the change of in the consumer Price Index (CPI), was reduced from 17 percent at the end of 1997, to an average of 6.8 percent in 1998 Agriculture and construction have been the main sources of growth since 1998, as manufacturing, and commerce and other service sectors stagnated following reduction in the activities and related employment of international NGOs and relief agencies. The excess capacity that facilitated the rapid rebound was quickly exhausted and new investments in productive capacity will be needed to keep the economy growing (World Bank, 1998a). The following chapter evaluates some of the major post-conflict capacity-building initiatives in Rwanda.

CAPACITY RESTORATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

Government of national unity

4.1 As pointed out earlier, the state of capacity-building, restoration and development in Rwanda is, therefore, an outcome of historical developments in the post-colonial period, the genocide of 1994 and developments in the post-1994 period. It was been observed that because neighbors, teachers, doctors and religious leaders also took part in the carnage, any trust in social institutions was destroyed and replaced by pervasive fear, hostility and insecurity. The indiscriminate yet intimate killings led to the disintegration of communes and families and fragmented social cohesion. These unprecedented social upheavals affected interpersonal and community interactions across ethnic, economic, generational and political lines and have had far reaching implications in creating and nurturing capacity in post-conflict Rwanda.

4.2 The immediate implications of such losses and destruction are that public administration had to be rebuilt employing what was essentially left of the post-war civil servants, new returnees and international technical cooperation interventions. In the Rwandan context, therefore, capacity building was and remains a formidable long-term challenge. It implies the need to address the capacity-building challenge and broadly, to cover not only the human resources and institutional aspects but also to develop a common policy framework to guide capacity building initiatives in all sectors. Essentially, this means helping the public sector to reach a point where it may function on a sustainable basis: sound policy and decision-making processes and mechanisms; coherent and consistent management of human and financial resources, a functioning internal and external control and audit system; competent staff who are both adequately rewarded and held accountable for their performance; clear mandates and work programs for line ministries and local authorities; fiscal decentralization and transfers, and, above all, with appropriate administrative structures.

4.3 To demonstrate its resolve for reconciliation and social healing, the RPF leadership, like its NRM counterpart in Uganda, promoted the formation of a multi-party coalition government of national unity. It took as its inspiration and its claim to legitimacy the Arusha Accords. The new government included Hutu moderates from different political parties who had survived the massacres. The MRND was excluded. Initially, the Hutus Pasteur Bizimungu, (the President) and Faustin Twagiramungu, (the Prime Minister), headed the first post-genocide government. Real power, however, rested in the hands of the Tutsi military commander of the RPF, General Paul Kagame, who became Vice-President and Minister of Defense. The idea of a broad-based government served as a powerful policy strategy for promoting peace, retaining the best and brightest at home and managing the conduct of would-be spoilers. Over time, however, the RPF has come to control a disproportionate share of cabinet posts in the government headed by President Paul Kagame.[8]

[8] . As of 1997/98, RPF had 7 cabinet posts in Kagame's government. Other shared the rest: MDR (3 posts); PSA (4 posts); PL (1 post); RDC (1 post) and Independents (3 posts).

4.4 The new government of national unity continued to face a series of formidable challenges. It faced security threats from the soldiers of the ousted regime (ExFAR) and from militia housed in camps along the border with the then Zaire during 1995 and 1996. It also faced an urgent need to ensure adequate legal process against the 130,000 prisoners suspected of genocide crimes contained in Rwandan jails, the need to accommodate over 800,000 returning Rwandan citizens who had left the country between 1959 and 1964, and the final return and reintegration of 1.3 million people to Rwanda from Tanzania and Zaire in 1996. It was also faced with an economy in shambles, a civil service that had lost three-quarters of its qualified and experienced staff, and widespread destruction of social and economic infrastructure. Broadly speaking, the time period designated for this study, covers the "emergency phase" in the conflict studies nomenclature.

4.5 The first criteria for testing the legitimacy of the newly established institutions was their capacity to provide collective and individual security to the citizenry from immediate and large scale violence, and to restore the capacity of the state to maintain territorial integrity. Arguably, national security is the foundation on which progress in other issues is firmly anchored. In answering basic questions like who and what was to be protected and for whom, the new government was forced to expand the size of the army and police in order to protect the general populace, selected key individuals, infrastructure, institutions, and humanitarian workers and to control internal and external belligerents. Moreover, territorial integrity had to be secured through a combination of border/boundary movement, and point-of-entry controls. Finally, diplomatic efforts were deployed to normalize bilateral security initiatives with neighboring states in order to gain cooperation in information and intelligence sharing as well as to prevent unhelpful interference from regional actors.

4.6 The philosophy of reconciliation and reconstruction enshrined in the Arusha Accords largely informed the analysis of conflict transformation by the leaders of Rwanda. Historically, the Rwandan state rested on an extremely hierarchical administrative model, characterized by centralization of power and concentration of resources in the hands of the central government, local decision-making was concentrated in the person of the bourgmestre, and the prevailing view of the population was that it was the passive recipient of orders from above. Previous regimes were also characterized by "ethnic" hatred and discrimination. Leaders built their power and authority on the ideology that political majority rule equals ethnic majority rule, implying that democracy mandated the empowerment of Hutu leaders and the exclusion of Tutsi from all positions of power. According this diagnosis, the Rwandan population was disempowered and obeyed the state like automatons, blindly accepting the scape-goating of the Tutsi community and the Hutu internal opposition (Goose and Symth, 1994). Arguably, the genocide showed how deeply ethnic hatred had been cultivated by the leaders of the First and Second Republic, and it demonstrated the extent to which the mentality of the general population and the new leaders will have be transformed. A "New Rwanda" has to be reconstituted. The broad vision of a new Rwanda is encapsulated in the Vision 2020, Poverty Reduction Strategy and the National

Investment Strategy.[9] Above all, the countrywide dialogue on national unity in Rwanda, initiated by the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (URC), identified poor justice, governance, and leadership and poverty as the major obstacles to national unity.

4.7 Under those inauspicious circumstances, the government of national unity showed considerable commitment to strengthening national cohesion via a number of strategies:

- Ensuring democratic governance: actions to ensure democratic governance since 1994 have included the passing of the genocide law to challenge the impunity which characterized acts of violence in Rwanda for three decades before 1994; adherence to the Arusha Accords of 1993 to guide the composition of the government of national unity and national assembly.
- Public service reforms to enhance transparency, efficiency and effectiveness in public service delivery.
- Promoting peace, security and unity through reconciliation programs.
- Creation of a community police force to enhance security at the local levels.
- Promoting national dialogue on the country's needs and aspirations through forums.
- Initiation of the decentralized process facilitating the devolution of administrative responsibilities and supportive to local government units, and consolidation of the structure of local governments.
- Provision of social and physical infrastructure in the local administrative units is substantially supported by direct contribution from local communities, a visible evidence of the popularity of representative local government.
- Cooperation with the international agencies in monitoring human rights standards and reconstruction. Above all, in a remarkably short time, Rwanda has succeeded in rebuilding a functioning civil society; in particular, strong women's associations, and a free press, and employers and workers associations.

4.8 In order to demonstrate its resolve for participatory democracy and inclusiveness, the RPF-led government supported the creation of a powerful parliament and a weakened presidency. Moreover, in its efforts to increase the representation of women, for example, the government split in 1999 the Ministry of Gender, Family and Social Affairs into the Ministry of Family and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Gender and the Promotion of Women. The latter Ministry was charged with the responsibility of developing projects to reform all laws discriminating against women, and of promoting women's education and

[9] . The Vision 2020 for Rwanda, for example, envisages a new start for building peace and prosperity, achieving the Millennium Development Goals and moving Rwanda out of underdevelopment and poverty. It envisages that by 2020 a GDP per capita will increase from US$230 in 2000 to US$900; the incidence of poverty will decline from 60 percent in 2000 to 25 percent; life expectancy will increase from 49 years to 65 years; and, that literacy will reach 90 percent.

training, as well as ensuring their effective participation in post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction (Enloe, 1993; UNICEF, 1997). Arguably, this was a laudable policy decision given the fact that the war and genocide altered the country's demographic composition so radically that women now represent between 60-70 percent of the population.[10] Of special significance was the 1999 amendment of the civil code that gave women the right to inherit and own property, seats reserved for women in central and local legislative bodies and an action plan to eliminate gender disparities by 2000.

4.9 Besides the central government, another political institution that has come to wield considerable power is the Rwandan Peoples'Army (RPA). The army and the gendarmerie both have seats in the National Assembly. Although the army is politically powerful and no civilian politician would seriously contemplate taking measures against its fundamental interests, the recent dispersal of power among governance institutions has markedly increased, particularly when Mr. Paul Kagame assumed the presidency. For most of the transitional period, RPA consisted primarily of RPF soldiers. Gradually, some ex-army soldiers and new recruits joined the army. The RPA politics have consistently reflected and openly supported the RPF's political and economic agenda. In the virtual absence of a police force, the RPA controlled internal security and carried out most arrests. It has come to have more impact on people's daily lives than the civilian authorities. Above all, during their absence, most RPA soldiers lost family members in the genocide, which has sharply affected their attitude toward different groups within the population.

4.10 But where did the RPF and its army come from? It was not formed in Rwanda but in Uganda, by a group of Rwandan Tutsi exiles, who were fighting as part of the Ugandan National Resistance Army (NRA). The RPF was founded in 1979 as the Rwandan Alliance for National Unity. It operated clandestinely until 1983, recruiting Rwandans for the Ugandan NRA. The NRA overthrew the regime of Milton Obote in 1986, installing its leader Yoweri Museveni as Uganda's president. These Tutsi exiles, most of whom had settled in Uganda in the wake of the uprising accompanying Rwanda's independence, played a significant role in the NRA's accession to power. Many RPF leaders had occupied senior positions in the Ugandan state apparatus. For example, Paul Kagame was head of military intelligence between November 1989, and June 1990; Fred Rwigyema was a Major General; Dr. Peter Baingana was head of the medical services; and Chris Bunyenyezi was commander of the notorious 306th Brigade. About 3,000 RPF soldiers had belonged to the Ugandan army. The RPF operated openly from 1986 onwards, after the NRA seized power in Uganda. The large presence of the Rwandans in the military became a focus of resentment among Ugandans, who regarded them as unfairly privileged foreigners. In addition, the size of the military was attracting local and Western criticism, particularly after the threat to state security posed by the northern dissident movements had largely been contained. As part of the Western-funded demobilization exercise, distinct RPF battalions were created, and were ready to go!

[10] . It is important to note also that by the same estimates, between two-third and one-half of all women in Rwanda in the hardest hit areas are widows. In may cases, these women were brutally raped, gave birth to unwanted children, take care of unaccompanied children, lost some members of their families, their belongings and homes in the genocide.

4.11 Over the years, the desire of the 600,000 Rwandan refugees in Uganda, Burundi, Zaire and Tanzania to return to their country of origin remained strong. The political change in Uganda after 1986 and the involvement of the Tutsi in the consolidation process provided them with a good framework for the planning of a military invasion of Rwanda. Another major contributing factor was the support that RPF got for their cause at the Refugee Congress in Washington DC, in August 1988. Thereafter, some 2,5000 Rwandans of the NRA defected, taking their uniforms and personal weapons as well as ammunition with them. The defected NRA troops were declared to be in violation of the law in Uganda. No one, however, has been reported arrested, in spite of frequent visits of RPA commanders and soldiers to Uganda. On July 6, 1994, the RPF-dominated army overran Kigali and on July 18, 1994, it declared the war to be over (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1997).

Rwandan Interim Constitution

4.12 Rwanda is a republic. The Interim Constitution was passed into law by the Assemblee Nationale (National Assembly) in May 1995. It draws on the 1991 Constitution, which legalized a multi-party system, on the Arusha Accords of 1993, and on the agreements between political parties excluding the MRND and the CRD made in 1994. Much of the Constitution and the legal system are adapted from Belgian law. The considerable presidential powers allowed for in the 1991 Constitution have been reduced. The National Assembly has the power to force individual ministers, and the government as a whole, to resign.[11] The interim Constitution asserts the independence of the Judiciary, the subordination of the Executive to the Legislative Branch, and the separation of ruling party and state. The whole Constitution was due to be substantially rewritten under the transitional government. No member of the armed forces can head a political party. In the meantime, it was agreed that in the event of a conflict between the Constitution and the Arusha Peace Agreement, the latter was to take precedence. Meanwhile, the Legal and Constitutional Affairs Commission started work in 2000 to draft a new constitution that would pave the way for national elections in 2003 (International Crisis Group, 2002).

Political Parties and Competition

4.13 Just like the NRM government in neighboring Uganda, the RPF has had a strong tendency toward favoring an indefinitely prolonged suspension of party political activity and imposed the boundaries of "political correctness" for reasons of security, reconciliation and national unity after the genocide. As will be argued later, according to the RPF's position, the Rwandan population will only be able to exercise its full democratic rights once it abandons the ethnic distinctions and hatreds that led to the genocide. The ban on political party activities and creation

[11] . However, the President still has more powers than initially appears, which are based on a declaration made by the RPF on July 17, 1994. According to the declaration, the President can dismiss cabinet ministers at will and the prime minister with a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. For new appointments to the government, the parties put forward candidates, which he can reject or accept.

of opposition grassroots networks, have obviously prevented such parties from spreading across the country. With no viable grassroots structures, opposition parties are little more than an elite group of leaders whose political combat is limited to obtaining positions of responsibility.

4.14 Although the political discourse of the Rwandan authorities emphasizes reconciliation, national unity, and the respect for the rights for all, the government has been in the grip of a hazardous authoritarian drift. Since 1994, the RPF has turned its brand of the so-called "consensual politics" of the Ugandan style into a veritable mode of governance. The civil society, the media and politicians, whether they belong to the RPF or have any other political affiliation, are expected to remain in the same political straightjacket. Their activities are tolerated as long as they are compatible with the official line. Fears of being accused by the government of being genocidal media, for example, have silenced even the slightest desire to challenge the establishment. The minute they seek to dissent or offer differences of opinion, their independence is brutally crushed in the name of national security! It is little wonder, therefore, that many respectable journalists and opposition politicians have chosen to flee the country.

4.15 In the short and medium term, the imposition of a consensual politics of governance has marginalized the role of criticism and opposition. Dialectically speaking, excluding part of the politically conscious citizens from legalized political life can only serve to radicalize it. Without public fora, criticism about the political system may initially circulate subterranean and in limited groups as rumors, prophecy or veiled criticism. In the long run, however, and for a growing number of opponents, armed resistance is seen as an option, which, in turn, could fuel a security pressure on the regime in power.

4.16By the same token, the role of the media has been highly circumscribed. Its role in post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction is considered a highly sensitive issue. The media is principally blamed for the rise of the "Hutu Power" and for the organization of the genocide. Given the fact that for most of the so-called "transition years", Rwanda was marked by a situation of almost permanent war, liberalizing either politics or the media was considered politically suicide. Obviously, such sensitivities had a negative impact on the planned processes of political reform, and most of all, on the granting of political liberties. The real fear was not only to avoid the rise of ethnically based political movements inside Rwanda, but also of possible connections between internal opposition and external armed movements (ICG, 2001).

Decentralized of Power

4.17 In order to build trust in state institutions and dismantle the legacy of centralized power, the RPF government sought to create a "New Rwanda" by adopting a decentralized participatory approach to policy-making and development. In such a system, the citizens and the leadership work together to transform the economy and society. It seeks to involve Rwandans closely in the management of their own affairs and to make the local administrative structures responsible for the planning and management of development. Three background activities were

considered necessary before authority devolved: educating the population, making the elite more responsible and creating new institutions. Once these conditions have been put in place and the effects of the bad governance of previous regimes has disappeared, so the argument goes, then the Rwandan people will emancipate themselves from cultural obscurantism and be able to fully excise their civil and political liberties. This emancipation will be based on three principles:

- Educating the population. The decades of authoritarianism and sectarianism from the long monarchical tradition through to the one-party regimes resulted in the concentration of economic and political power and the reinforcement of top-down administrative control over the population. This control was so tight that the government was able to manipulate the population to commit genocide. For the RPF, it is important to help the population resist such political manipulation by tackling key issues such as hunger, illiteracy and obscurantism and gradually instill democratic principles through a deliberately structured political education.

- Giving leaders a sense of responsibility: Because leaders have much responsibility for the people, the transformation of these leaders by political schools must be undertaken. The RPF neither does nor foresee banning political parties, but rather obliging them to subscribe to its overall plan for a new Rwandan society. A strict code of conduct should be designed to govern all political activity. On a local and national level, the people will monitor the behavior of their leaders through the power of their vote.

- Reforming institutions of governance: The first stage in creating a new Rwanda is to introduce the decentralization of power. This is intended to bring the people into decision-making institutions in which they will participate actively by setting up structures in which they give their ideas about how problems should be solved. This will involve setting up local government structures elected by the people and close to them. Moreover, the new Rwandan Constitution should ensure a balance between central and local government. It should also provide an institutional framework to consolidate the RPF's political platform. To be sure, the new Constitution does not envisage the immediate arrival of democracy, but proposes a framework in which this could be achieved. Only at the end of this process of education and re-education, will respect for political liberties be guaranteed. For the time being, a strong "enlightened" leadership is required to maintain the country's unity.

4.18 Besides democratization, the policy of decentralization seeks to break the administrative machinery that facilitated genocide and that still inhibits change in Rwanda's political culture. Under the Habyarimana regime, Rwanda was administratively divided into prefectures, communes, sectors and cells. Each division had a head, appointed by the Office of the President. The commune

became a strong unit of identification for the Rwandan population, and its leaders, the bourgmestre, had unchallenged authority over their fellow commune members, whom they guided and coerced in all aspects of life. The new structures would bury the immense power and prestige of the former commune leaders, the bourgmestres, who bore much of the responsibility for implementing the genocide, and to set up new social structures and a political culture based on participation, collective decision-making and accountability of district executives to the district councils.

4.19 The implementation of this decentralized structure came into force in December, 2000. The 154 communes were transformed into 106 new autonomous units consisting of 91 districts and 15 towns. The sectors and cells remained the same. The decentralization policy identifies three modes of implementation: a shift of central government services and functions toward local government levels; delegation of resources to local government; and devolution of power to local government institutions.

4.20 On March 6, 2001, Rwanda held the first local government elections in the history of the country. The Rwandan population elected 2,765 sector representatives nationally. One week later, district-based Electoral Colleges selected 106 town and district mayors, and an additional 424 new town and district executives. These multiple polls followed the cell and sector polls of March 1999 and were the most visible implementation so far of the official democratic decentralization, which has been promoted since 1998 as one of the building blocks of Rwanda's political restructuring. As a study by the International Crisis Group (ICG, 2001) pointed out, these elections had two further objectives. First, they provided an opportunity for the ruling RPF to identify a new set of leaders, whom it sought to co-opt in order to entrench its power in the rural areas, and thus guarantee a parliamentary and a presidential majority in 2003. Second, the RPF sought to establish a competent and politically reliable local government leadership that would guarantee the flow of aid, effectively pursue the national development strategy, and provide solid support for the national unity and reconstruction project.

Administration of Justice

4.21 Establishing sustainable peace in Rwanda is not simply a matter of re-building governance institutions and the economy, but also of reweaving the social and moral tissue of the nation. The brutal nature and the extent of the slaughter, along with the ensuring mass migration, swiftly and profoundly damaged Rwandan society. Nine years after the genocide, Rwanda remains a deeply divided society. Divisions exist not only between Hutu and Tutsi, but also between different groups within society. For example, old conflicts persist between moderate Hutu and extremist Hutu who still support the genocidal ideology; and new conflicts have arisen between "old refugees" (Tutsi who returned to Rwanda in 1994 after decades of exile) and "new refugees" (Hutu who returned in 1996-97 from camps in Tanzania and Zaire). There are even tensions between some genocide survivors who feel as if they are being asked to forget and forgive too quickly, and those who are demanding serious retribution from the culprits. Given the magnitude of the trauma experienced relatively little

attention has been paid to the problem of psychosocial healing. Donor efforts (e.g. UNICEF and African Humanitarian Action) have concentrated primarily on trauma counseling for children. In addition, some organizations (mostly religious), have attempted to confront the ethnic animosity directly through reconciliation workshops and community healing initiatives and indirectly within the context of their other programs (Hamilton, 2000).

4.22 Of crucial importance to reconciliation and reconstruction in Rwanda, is the two-generations-old issue of impunity for genocidal crimes in Rwanda. The international Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, confirmed by the International Court of Justice in 1951 and ratified by Rwanda in 1975, stipulates that persons committing genocide shall be punished, "whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals". In addition to the crime of genocide as such, punishable acts according to the Convention are conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempting to commit genocide and complicity in genocide. In Rwanda, most of those who have been responsible for ethnic mass killings have not, however, been brought to justice. For the psychological health of the people, and the political health of the country, these crimes must be addressed. Justice relative to the genocide represents a unique attempt to reconcile truth and justice, fight impunity and calls for a general pardon, record history and promote social harmony. Despite the limited human, financial and material resources available to it, the government was committed to idea that there could be no national reconciliation without justice. The crux of the matter was how to do it? How can justice help to console the victims? How is it possible to avoid the suspicion that this is a victor's justice? How can justice act as cement for the future?

4.23 The situation on the ground necessary to administer justice in Rwanda left a lot to be desired. The legal infrastructure and the law enforcement system, which had collapsed in the aftermath of the civil war, remain in shambles. Moreover, the system was manipulated by the former regime, despite constitutional provisions ensuring its independence. Human rights abuses relating to arrests, detentions, trials without counsel, and widespread corruption have been frequent in the past. Law enforcement duties continue to be performed primarily by members and officers of the military, either in their capacity as FPF soldiers, or in their re-deployed status as gendarmes. Prisons continue to be severely overcrowded, the government having squeezed approximately 41,000 prisoners into a central prison system capable of housing only 12,250 individuals. As of December 1995, another 15,000-20,000 prisoners were housed in "communal prisons" throughout the country and arrests and detentions continue. Not surprisingly, hundreds of prisoners have died from asphyxiation and diarrhea, illnesses tied indirectly or directly to the unsanitary conditions created by overcrowding (DANIDA, 1997).

4.24 The quality of the judicial system was seriously impaired by the lack of fully qualified magistrates. Out of some 600 magistrates, only one in fifty held a law degree. In addition, the judicial institution was highly corrupt and dependent on the good will of the government, which used it as a political tool (Amnesty International, 1993). The magistrates and civil servants associated with the

former regime had fled the country. Almost all Tutsi civil servants and magistrates had been killed, along with any of their Hutu colleagues who had shown signs of independence under the former government. Constructing a viable judicial system and ensuring protection of human rights were critical for several reasons. Refugees in neighboring countries were reluctant to return unless they were assured of justice and security at home. Additionally, the conviction and punishment of those who were involved in the massacres by legally constituted courts is likely to alleviate the desire to exact revenge on suspects and begins to address a culture of impunity. A failure to act would reinforce the victims' sense of injustice and spur further acts of violence. Above all, the UN and its member states have an obligation under the Genocide Convention to take action for the "prevention and suppression of acts of genocide". Setting up the judicial machinery became one of the government's priorities. Three separate periods can be distinguished in the reconstruction of the justice system in Rwanda between July 1994 and March 1999:

- The first period (July 1994 to August 1996), saw the start of the emergency reconstruction phase of a judicial system that was barely functioning. This period concluded with the passing of a law on 30 August 1996 relative to the genocide and massacre.[12]
- The second period, August 1996 to December 1997, saw the application of this law and the first genocide trials. It concluded with the completion of the emergency reconstruction phase.
- The third period began in mid-1998 with the opening of the debate on the sensitive issue of the measures to be adopted in order to process 120,000 detainees within a reason period of time. The government solution, to develop a form of citizens' justice is a bold gamble.

4.25 By the end of 1996, the government and the National Assembly had already completed a remarkable amount of legislative work. In addition to the genocide law, all the judicial institutions foreseen by the Arusha Accords had been set up. In the same year, the government created a Ministry of Internal Security to take over the national police service, which oversees the normal police service, the Gendarmerie, prison warders and IPJs. The Security Court has been abolished and the Supreme Court has been established under a law passed in June 1996. This body, which is completely autonomous, comprises the Court of Final Appeal, the Council of State, the Accounting Office, the Constitutional Court and the Department of Courts and Tribunals. Moreover, the legislation of April, 1997, created an independent Bar Association, and addressed the military justice system, labor matters, and commerce.

[12] . On 30 August 1996, a law (une loi organique) was passed in regard to prosecutions for the crime ofgenocide and crimes against humanity. It covers acts committed between January 1, 1990 and December 1994 that constitute a crime both under Rwandan criminal law and under the international criminal (genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes).

4.26 In addition, the UN Security Council created an International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) on 8 November 1994 under resolution 955. Its purpose is to try those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed during 1994 in Rwanda or by Rwandans in neighboring countries. The Security Council decided that this Tribunal would sit in Arusha, Tanzania.

4.27 Large-scale training programs have been underway since January 1995 in an urgent attempt to deal with the lack of judicial personnel. Courses last for one to five months. They are always organized in the same way: a radio appeal for candidates holding secondary school diplomas, an admission test, training culminating in examinations and the allocation of posts to those who pass them. It is a remarkable fact that candidates are coming forward from both communities. As a result, magistrates sitting in special courts dealing with the genocide may be either Tutsi or Hutu. So far, 750 IPJs, 200 OMPs 300 magistrates, 150 court clerks and 150 prosecutor's secretaries have received training. This has cost around $4 million. The principle donors are Belgium, Canada, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the European Union. Apart from the Rwandan Ministry of Justice itself, the main implementing agencies in order of arrival have been the NGO – Reseau de Citoyens – Citizens' Network, and the Belgian and Canadian Development cooperation agencies.

4.28 In parallel with the training courses, a great deal of work has also gone into restoring buildings, and providing vehicles and other essential materials. Around $4.2 has been invested in rehabilitating the judicial infrastructure, mainly coming from the European Union, Switzerland, Belgium, Japan and USAIS. Programs to supply equipment and vehicles to the Ministry of Justice, the courts and prosecutor's offices have cost more than ten million dollars provided principally by the European Union, UNHCR, USAID, UNDP, and Belgian, German, Canadian and Dutch development agencies. The local communal police force and prisons has been given assistance worth about $8 million from UNDP and the USAID. From 995 through 1998 the judicial system had received international support to the tune of about $40 million (Hageruka, 1997).

4.29 In order to ensure national reconstruction and the peaceful cohabitation of the two main ethnic communities, the justice system had to be re-organized throughout the country. This large-scale and exacting task was accomplished within five years, thanks to government efforts, new legislation and considerable international support. The first genocide trials began in Rwanda in early 1997 but proceeded slowly with only about 2,500 cases fully processed by the end of 1999. At the end 2000, the National Assembly adopted the enabling legislation for the use of the traditional method of justice (Gacaca) to accelerate the trials and clear most of the caseload. Elections for the Gacaca jurors took place in October 2001 and the process started in June 2002. Meanwhile, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) based in Arusha, Tanzania, recorded its first verdict on May 1, 1998, finding guilty the former Rwandan Prime Minister Jean Kambanda, one of the theoreticians behind genocide, following his guilty plea. Mr Kambanda is expected to incriminate other suspects held by the ICTR, all of who have pleaded not guilty. On the whole, the quality of the proceedings

has continued to improve and the administration of justice also improved, although there are variations from one place to another.

4.30 The difficulties that remain are far from negligible. Even after a massive training program, there are far too few judicial staff given the number of cases to be adjudicated. From the figures available, it appears that about 20 percent of them have deserted their posts. The low salary levels go a long way toward explaining this. However, on January 1999, the government increased the civil servants' salaries by between 25 percent and 45 percent. This increase will hopefully stem the flow. Moreover, the structural weaknesses of the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court represent a major handicap far outweighing any other problem. Neither the Ministry nor the Court is yet capable of ensuring the logistic and supervisory services that are required to guarantee an effective administration.

4.31 It is important to note that, unlike the post-conflict reconstruction of Mozambique and Uganda, there has never been any real coordination of international support for Rwanda. The UNDP tried to play this role for some time, but without success. However, the technical assistants meet regularly and thus ensure an informal coordination. A round- table meeting was organized in Geneva in June 1996. This should have been followed at the end of 1997 by a consultation process on specific themes that would have again brought the Rwandan government together with the representatives of all the donor countries. This would have been an excellent opportunity to review the international effort and examine it from the perspective of government policy. Our respondents informed us that none of these meetings took place rendering the post-conflict reconstruction in Rwanda chaotic, at best.

Economic Management

4.32 As pointed out earlier, Rwanda is one of the poorest countries in the world with a gross national product (GNP) of US$237 million (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 1999). In its Human Development Index, the UNDP ranked Rwanda 152nd out of 162 countries in 2000 (UNDP, 2001). However, the economy has undoubtedly improved since 1994 when it was devastated by the genocide. Yet, the pre-1994 structural economic problems still persist and will take decades to resolve. Weakness of the Rwandan economy stems from lack of natural resources, poorly developed human resources, high population density, antiquated agricultural practices, environmental degradation and difficulties in economic management. Both the private and public sectors remain small and neither has been developed to meet the population's needs. Although agriculture contributes only 45 percent of the gross national product (GDP), it provides more than 90 percent of employment. Nonetheless, significant progress has been made in rehabilitating and strengthening the economy, with GDP increasing at the rate of 5.2 percent in 2000 and inflation at 2.8 percent (IMF, 2000).

4.33 At their peak in 1986, coffee earnings accounted for 82 percent of Rwanda's total export earnings. However, following the collapse of international coffee prices in 1989 and the war that began in October 1990, coffee's share of export revenue dropped to 51 percent in 1992 because the war left coffee bushes damaged, unattended and diseased all over the country. The manufacturing

sector, small to start with, has grown in importance since independence, rising from virtually nothing to around 16 percent of GDP in 1992. Before the genocide, the most important sub-sectors included the production of beverages and food, detergents, textiles and agricultural tools such as hoes and machetes. According to World Bank figures, Rwanda's GDP grew in real terms by an impressive annual average of 4.7 percent in the period of 1970-79, but slowed down to about 2.2 percent in 1980-88 period. The average inflation rate during the 1980s was not higher than 4 percent per annum, compared to sub-Saharan Africa's average rate of 20 percent. Substantial support from multilateral, bilateral donors (Belgium, France, Germany and United States) and NGOs contributed to this development. Support grew from an annual level of US$35 million in 1971-74 to US$343 million in 1990-93. In 1991, for instance, bilateral and multilateral donor support represented 21.5 percent of Rwanda's GDP and 60 percent of the government's development expenditures. Rwanda drew international attention due to its low rural-urban migration rate, its sound monetary policy and the active involvement of government and civil society in anti-erosion and reforestation activities, education and health services (World Bank, 1998).

4.34 In 1989, GDP fell significantly due to a sharp fall in coffee earnings. The decline continued in 1991, 1992 and 1993, and was, for obvious reasons, particularly devastating in 1994. GDP per capita was estimated at US$200 in 1993, compared with US$330 in 1989. The balance of payments also deteriorated from 1985, and by 1989 the value of imported goods was 3.5 times higher than the value of goods exported. This was largely a consequence of the decline in Rwanda's terms of trade or international purchasing power, which fell by 47 percent between 1980 and 1987. Finally, the ensuing external debt – which in 1980 stood at US$189 million – rose virtually constantly throughout the 1980s and 1990s and had in 2000 had jumped to US$ 1 billion – over five times the value of its exports. Repayments are absorbing almost one-third of foreign exchange earnings and one quarter of government revenues. Using the debt-sustainability criteria adopted under the IMF-World Bank Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, Rwanda's debt is unsustainable. Although bilateral creditors have reduced their claims, the impact has been limited, because multilateral debt accounts for over 80 percent of Rwanda's debt stock (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2000).

4.35 The 1990 and 1992 World Bank/IMF structural adjustment program coincided with the civil war that started with the invasion of the RPF in October, 1990.[13] While the program of structural adjustment was not fully implemented before and during the war, key measures such as two large devaluations and the removal of official prices were enacted. The consequence on salaries was rapid

12. The following is a list of the elements of the program that was approved in June 1991 by the World Bank/IMF in the structural adjustment package:

- macro-economic stabilization and improved international competitiveness through maintaining a competitive exchange rate; reducing the government budget deficits; import liberalization and elimination of controls on domestic prices and improved monetary policy
- Reduction of the role of the state in the economy through: reduction in guaranteed prices for coffee and elimination of subsidy elements, reforming public enterprises for privatization, liquidation or reorganization
- Protection of the vulnerable with a "social safety net" through a Social Action Program.

and dramatic. Purchasing power declined as the cost of imported goods and services increased. This crisis affected the educated elites, most of whom were employed in the civil service or in public enterprises. Against a backdrop of developing rebel insurgency from Uganda, the hiring freezes and other cost - containment measures of structural adjustment contributed to the perception that the future was indeed bleak.

4.36 The four-year civil war had a devastating effect on the economy. First, it displaced peasant farmers particularly in rich northern Rwanda, and this had a dramatic impact on coffee, livestock, and food's main overland route to the outside world. While huge amounts of humanitarian aid helped to dissipate the worst effects, most of the aid was given to those who fled Rwanda. Second, potentially most damaging to the economy in the long-term was not the physical destruction of resources, but the fact that most of the skilled population either were either killed, jailed, or fled the country in 1994 and thereafter. This had a catastrophic effect on productivity and even on the basic functioning of the already limited private and public sectors. Third, it destroyed the country's fledgling tourist industry, which had become the third largest earner of foreign exchange. Finally, it prompted the government to enlarge its armed forces exponentially, thereby the reducing national resources available for other purposes (Vassall-Adams, 1994).[14] All these economic dislocations created a fertile ground for an eventual genocide.

4.37 The war destroyed the macro-economic and institutional infrastructure necessary for successful and balanced growth of a modern, market-based economy. Banks were shut down, a significant amount of the money supply was taken out of circulation to refugee camps, and the administrative capacity of the government was obliterated. In July, 1994, the fleeing government took 24 billion Rwandan franks and allegedly substantial amounts of hard currency that had been in the coffers of the Central Bank. It is important to recall that Rwanda was one of the poorest countries in the world even before the genocide. Rising poverty undoubtedly played some role in exacerbating social tensions leading to the genocide, and reducing poverty is therefore critical in its aftermath not only as a goal in itself but also as a means to improve the prospects for social and political stability. The economy had collapsed, almost all institutions of local and central government had been destroyed and the social fabric was rent. Post-conflict reconstruction in Rwanda is not only a matter of re-building the former society and economy, but also re-launching the development project. If one of the most cited causes of the conflict is Rwanda's endemic structural poverty, then the attainment of a sustainable, long-term peace will require substantial progress toward equitable economic development. Sadly enough also, among the casualties of the genocide, were thousands of educated and skilled men and women. The war-shattered country of Rwanda lacks most of the expertise it badly requires for the running of the government and dreaming big dreams of sustainable economic development.

[14] . From 1989 to 1992, for instance, military spending quadrupled from 1.9 percent to 7.8 percent of the GDP (World Bank, 1995).

4.38 The situation was aggravated by the large number of persons who had fled the country as refugees (some 2 million) or were internally displaced (1 million, of which 500,000 in camps) and by the return of the former (Tutsi) refugees (some 500,000) to Rwanda after spending over a decade outside the country (Pruiner, 1995). Re-establishing conditions favoring growth and development of the Rwandan economy and society will require large investments in education and training, rebuilding the institutions of governance and in repairing infrastructure. Re-creating the public sector, however, provides a unique opportunity for Rwanda's new leaders and development partners seriously to address the inconsistencies and inefficiencies, such as high public wage bills and extensive public investment in the private sector that had begun to hinder Rwanda's development under the previous regime. It is unlikely that Rwanda will be able to achieve the 9 percent GDP growth for the next 15 years targeted in the interim poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) as needed to make an impact on widespread poverty.

4.39 The challenges for social and economic reconstruction in Rwanda are unbelievably huge: to recover from the civil war that preceded the genocide; to heal the wounds caused by genocide's grim aftermath of loss, trauma, and fear; and to accommodate 3.8 million repatriates, whether internally displaced people or refugees returning, either from the vast refugee camps on Rwanda's borders or from decades-long exile. Many refugees and displaced persons who have returned to their homes now compete with others for land they had previously occupied. Thousands of ex-combatants are swelling the ranks of urban unemployed. Over one hundred thousand children are described as "unaccompanied" – orphaned by conflict or by HIV/AIDS, or simply abandoned. The war and massacres have left behind a large number of female-headed households, who are often at a social, legal and economic disadvantage, and who constitute one of the poorest and most vulnerable groups in Rwandan society. The re-integration into society of the vulnerable, traumatized, disenfranchised, and impoverished is critical to long-term stability and development of Rwanda, and across the Great Lakes Region. The destruction and total collapse of so many institutions following the genocide has forced the current government to rebuild the state from the ground up. Good progress has been made in recent years rebuilding these institutions, yet they remain far from optimal.

4.40 While acknowledging the need for Rwanda to have a robust defensive capability, donors have repeatedly called for the government to reduce spending on the military. According to the Ministry of Finance, defense accounted for 31 percent of government expenditures in 1999. While reliable figure are difficult to come by, the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo was undoubtedly impacting the Rwandan economy, particularly available public expenditure. While a few individuals became wealthy through profiteering, predominantly in dealing in diamond and coltan, it is generally acknowledged that war was costing significantly more than was being economically gained for the Rwandan state (Camara, 2001:6).

4.41 The new RPF-led government came to power with a basic set of principles regarding macroeconomic policy and public administration as articulated in its first comprehensive policy document: greater market liberalization, disengagement of the state from commercial and productive activities, greater regional trade, and reduced public expenditure. This economic philosophy was shaped by pragmatic analysis of the economic crisis, the view and priorities of donors, and the failure of highly interventionist approaches to development. The economic reforms central to Ugandan reconstruction, in the wake of a long civil war could serve as an important model. It is against this background that a new Ministry of Rehabilitation was created and given priority over other ministries that had traditionally had the technical expertise necessary to carry out programs of development. Above all, these policies have been reinforced by those international financial institutions most involved in the assistance for the re-establishment of economic and public management capabilities. In January 1995, the IMF outlined its policy recommendations for Rwanda's recovery of macroeconomic and financial management. It proposed extensive short-term reliance on technical assistance in policy formulation and implementation, the preparation of a public budget, adoption of a tax code "to incorporate structural changes" implementation of a new tariff system and increased reliance on direct foreign investments of monetary policy, especially for the management of exchange rates. The IMF, like the World Bank, was particularly interested in keeping public recurrent costs down, and in ensuring that the government maintain an employment policy driven by new realities and new needs rather than one based on past staffing levels or on political convenience (IMF, 1995).

4.42 UNDP, the World Bank and the IMF sent consultative missions to conduct a series of studies, and otherwise supported subsequent processes of identifying priority needs for economic and administrative management. The UNDP, for example, was involved in the preparation of the Rwanda Recovery Program and co-managed the UN Trust Fund with the government. The World Bank Assessment Mission in September 1994 one of the earliest major donor in Rwanda, and it set the tone for donor assistance. The implicit recommendation was that donors should move rapidly and unreservedly to support and strengthen the capacities of the new government, and that aid should rapidly shift away from the refugee camps to Rwanda itself, and confront the question of growing poverty headlong. A number of reforms were implemented, including exchange rate liberalization, autonomy of the Central Bank and approved the legal framework for privatization. The Government's *Programme d'Investissents Public* (PIP) (1996-1998) sought to prioritize Rwandan reconstruction needs (DANIDA, 1997).

4.43 While economic recovery has been rapid, it remains incomplete. Real GDP in 1997 reached only 85 percent of its 1990 levels. Per capita GDP was only US$200 (World Bank, 1998b). The government has been severely revenue-constrained since 1994 in allocating adequate resources to the public sector, principally because of the drop in the GDP, but also because the revenue collection system was badly damaged by the war. This, in itself, is a primary constraint for reconstruction in general and poverty reduction in particular. Undoubtedly, both social services and economic services suffered. In order to achieve pre-war current expenditure targets of US$11.00 per capita on education

and US$4.50 per capita on health by 2003, the total share of health and education in the budget would need to rise to 40 percent (Government of Rwanda, 1996b). At the same time, the 1995-98 budget continued to reflect huge military expenditure together with an increasing debt burden.[15] While recognizing the argument that the government has legitimate security concerns, current military spending levels of about 40 percent of government budget and about 55,000 men and women in uniform remain unacceptably high and must be reversed.

Rwandan External Debt

4.44 Rwanda faces an extremely high debt burden. Debt stock has doubled over the past five years to US$1 billion, over five times the value of its exports, and about 75 percent of its GDP at the end of 1998. Repayments are absorbing almost one-third of foreign exchange earnings and about one quarter of government revenue. Rwanda also built up a large public domestic debt, reaching the equivalent of US$220 million by mid-1997. Using the debt-sustainability criteria adopted under the IMF-World Bank Highly Indebted (HIPC) Initiative, Rwanda's debt is unsustainable. It will remain so until well into the next decade – Rwanda will not qualify for comprehensive debt relief under the HIPC framework until 2003, or later. Although bilateral creditors have reduced their claims, the impact has been limited, because multilateral debt accounts for over 80 percent of Rwanda's debt stock (World Bank, 1998).

Poverty and Poverty Reduction

4.45 The 1998 World Bank study concluded that the events of 1994 and thereafter caused a catastrophic rise in poverty in Rwanda, with approximately 70 percent of all households falling under the poverty line in 1997 compared to 53 percent in 1993. The depth of poverty also increased, meaning that not only had the poor households increased in number, they had also grown poorer. Furthermore, there had not been even incremental recovery in the poverty situation since 1994, after a small improvement in 1995-96, poverty levels rose again in 1997 following the influx of population from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in late 1996. Above all, geographic profile has changed, with the poorest regions before the war remaining poor in income terms but possessing better access to social services than other areas of the country. The characteristics of poor households have also changed dramatically: poor households are now more likely to be female-headed or to lack able-bodied labor. In the social sector, there has been a severe deterioration in health indicators, with infant mortality rising from 8.7 percent to 13.1 percent and maternal mortality almost quadrupling since 1990. Other social indicators such as primary education, access to water and sanitation have not declined as quickly as income poverty has increased, primarily due to

[15] . Both military expenditures and the debt burden constrain allocations to the education and heath sectors. The former should be addressed by the government in keeping to demobilization targets and abiding by the Lusaka Accords regarding its involvement in the DRC. The latter should be approached through rapid negotiations to treat Rwanda as a special case for accelerated debt reduction under the HIPC framework, together with external assistance for debt service in the transitional period. For details see Rugumamu (2001).

strong government and donor support for the social sector. However, while enrolment rates have not greatly decreased, there is a serious problem of the quality of basic education. Only 32 percent of primary school teachers possess the appropriate qualifications to teach, less than 30 of the basic teaching materials are available to teachers, and children posses less than 25 percent of the minimum package of school materials (World Bank, 1998:ii).

CAPACITY BUILDING INITIATIVES (1995-1998)

International Emergence and Relief

5.1 Development assistance to Rwanda can be divided in to two distinct phases in terms of donor implementation: the pre-1994 genocide phase and the post-1994 genocide phase. Before 1994, Belgium, France and to a lesser extent Germany and Switzerland provided significant bilateral ODA to traditional activities. The aftermath of the 1994 genocide brought a number of new donors and significantly more resources to Rwanda. It has been argued that the way in which aid was given in the lead-up to the genocide certainly did nothing to dissipate the likelihood of the violence, and may even have been a contributing factor (Lancaster, 1999). From April 1994 through the end of that year, the international community focused largely on saving lives by providing food, shelter, and medical and sanitary services to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The vast majority of the assistance was expended to maintain refugee populations in Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi. Emergency food aid was and continues to be massive, provided mostly by the United States and European Union through pipelines managed by the World Food Program (WFP), Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This undoubtedly prevented large-scale starvation and malnutrition among the affected population (FAO/EU/WFP/MINAGRI, 1996).

5.2 In addition to the first Secretary-General's Trust Fund for Rwanda, established in July 1994 for emergency aid, a second Trust Fund was established for UNDP at the request of donors in November 1994, to accelerate the disbursement of funds of rehabilitation. It provided a means for adapting aid to the conditions of the country, to lighten the bureaucratic load of donors, and to provide for rapid, flexible disbursement. The Netherlands had promoted the idea and had proven to be its principal backer. Nearly one year after the war ended, The Netherlands and the UK together had provided US$12.9 million to the UNDP Trust Fund (US$10.8 million and US$2.1 million respectively). By November 1995, the contribution of the Netherlands alone amounted to US$16 million. These funds were used largely for providing administrative support to the government, rehabilitating the judicial system, and refurbishing the city of Kigali (DANIDA, 1997; ICG, 2002).

5.3 The UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal of January 1995, while still primarily a program of emergency assistance, had important rehabilitation and reconstruction components. In fact, most rehabilitation work up through May 1995 was funded through the Appeal. As stated in the Appeal document, "The [Appeal] reflects the UN agency and NGO response and the Government's needs with respect to emergency assistance and first-stage recovery requirements…" The agencies most closely associated with rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in the Appeal were WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF and FAO. The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), which coordinated the Appeal process, played a key coordinating role during the emergency and transition period for such activities, through the UN Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO). There were also a number of additional UN and NGO emergency (flash) appeals (Government of Rwanda, 1996).

5.4 Attention began to shift toward rehabilitation and reconstruction in late September 1994, when the international community realized the severity of the devastation brought about by the civil war and genocide. Since then, the UN and donor agencies have extended support to a wide array of projects and programs in different sectors and regions throughout the country. One year into the crisis there were about 130 NGOs represented in Rwanda. Many of them continued into the rehabilitation phase of assistance through their initial participation in emergency humanitarian assistance to Rwandan refugees and internally displaced persons. Relations between these NGOs and the government, however, were characterized by wariness, bordering on suspicion and hostility in some cases. In December 1995, 38 NGOs were expelled and an additional 18 had their activities suspended, pending further negotiations. Most NGOs, some 102 in all, remained operational (DANIDA, 1997).

5.5 Prior to 1998, many donors disbursed their funds through the UN-administered UN Trust Fund for Rwanda. This brought about a degree of coherence and a large amount of flexibility. Yet, the Trust Fund had many critics, and once the bilateral donors established or re-established themselves in Kigali, they were quick to take on the management and direction of their own development assistance. A tentative proposal to adopt a "strategic framework" for coordinating aid in Rwanda, as had developed in Mozambique, Uganda and Afghanistan, was met with limited enthusiasm. The UN's Common Country Assessment (CCA) leading to a UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Rwanda was finalized in late 1999 and launched in 2000. Its goal was to "provide an in-depth analysis and common vision of the key development challenges facing Rwanda".

5.6 While the development needs were huge, there was concern that the capacity to absorb and effectively administer the large amounts of aid being given to Rwanda was very limited. While overseas development assistance (ODA) sums have not reached the massive levels of 1995, they topped US$705 million in the immediate post-genocide humanitarian phase when the world attention was focus on Rwanda. The years 1996-98 marked a significant decline in bilateral ODA as donors spent less on emergency and relief efforts toward achieving sustainable development and transformation in agriculture, education, reconciliation, human rights, health and governance. The Rwandan government often protested that insufficient aid was being targeted at increasing its own capacity. The basic argument was that some key donors lacked confidence in the government coordination mechanism, CEPEX, which they considered to be very weak and lacking in human and physical resource capacity. Yet, the same donors were unwilling to give the government the necessary resources, time or authority to actually take on this role.

5.7.1 The World Bank Emergency Recovery Program, which grew out of two donor meetings held in Paris in September and October 1994, one of the first major initiatives specifically aimed at reconstruction. It was designed to "(a) help the new government begin the restoration of key economic and social services, rebuild the institutional capacity necessary for sustainable economic recovery, and design a coherent economic policy framework; and (b) provide the private sector with the means to resume operations and create jobs." The program

included US$200 million in funding for 1995, of which US$50 million was the World Bank's own Emergency Recovery Credit to finance reconstruction-related import needs and short-term technical assistance, mostly for private sector needs assessment and rehabilitation. By the end of 1995, direct funding to the government under this credit had not yet been disbursed. Assistance to the private sector had been released, and the terms of the credit allowed some reimbursement of expenses incurred back to November 1994. In contrast to the impasse on the Emergency Recovery Credit, the World Bank had expeditiously helped finance early rehabilitation and reintegration programs through a US$20 million grant to UN agencies in August of 1994 (Government of Rwanda, 1996a; DANIDA, 1997). Let us look closely at a few of them.

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Project de Rehabilitation des Capacites de Gestion Economique

5.8 In a separate initiative, UNDP together with the government of Rwanda designed the first major capacity-building initiative: *Project de Rehabilitation des Capacites de Gestion Economique* (CAGE). It started operation in 1995 and closed in 1997. The total CAGE budget was about US$5 million, with the largest contribution coming from the United Kingdom (US$2.8 million). Other major contributors to the scheme included the UNDP (US$1.4 million) and the World Bank (US$600,000).

5.9 In terms of disbursement, the main recipients of CAGE funds were as follows: Ministry of Public Service (US$1.7 Million), Ministry of Finance and the National Bank of Rwanda (US$672,684), Ministry of Planning (US$653,485), Ministry of Interior (US$582,838), and the Office of the Prime Minister (US$404,517).

5.10 The administrative and management structure of CAGE was as follows: The Inter-Ministerial Committee on Capacity Building was a policy setting body for the project. It comprised of the Director Generals from the relevant ministries. The UN's Department for Development Support and Management (DDSMS), was the executing agency, while the UNDP was the funding agency. The day-to-day management of the project was executed by a small administrative unit housed in the Ministry of Planning, reporting to the Director General of that Ministry. Briefly, the following is the summary of the activities undertaken:

- *Ministry of Public Service:* The Ministry of Public Service had the largest share of CAGE's budget. Two international experts were hired to support the Ministry in organizational analysis and human resources training strategy. Surprisingly, only a couple of workshops, one involving the Director Generals and Directors of Cabinet, the other involving the Council of Ministers, were undertaken.[16]

15. Particular reference should be made in this context to the cost of expatriate personnel, which shows persistent tendency to increase over the years. Foreign experts from bilateral aid agencies easily cost between US$100,000 to US$150,000 per year and absorb between 70 to 80 percent of the total technical cooperation resources (Cassen, 1986; Rugumamu, 1997). This, understandably, is a source of irritation for recipient countries, especially when it is abundantly clear that aid resources are fungible, and even more so where international experts are financed by loans rather than grants.

- *Ministry of Interior:* One international consultant was hired. He was deployed to design the decentralization and local governance processes. The consultant teamed up with local experts to undertake these important assignments.
- *Ministry of Planning:* Two international consultants were hired to reconstruct the Department of Statistics. The nationals who were trained under this program have long left the Ministry for "greener pastures".
- *Ministry of Finance:* For the Ministry of Finance, the CAGE project provided short-term consultants on taxation policy, macroeconomic policy, fiscal policy, re-enacting the flash reporting unit, monitoring Rwanda's transnational economic program, and in training the Ministry's employees in basic computer skills.
- *National Bank of Rwanda:* CAGE funds were used to purchase computers and the deployment of short-term and long-term consultants. For long-term consultants, they were used to assist in the formulation of monetary policy, foreign exchange and commercial bank supervision.

Aid Coordination Project

5.11 Following the closure of the CAGE project in 1997, a new capacity-building project, the Aid Coordination Project was established under the auspices of the UNDP. It was worth US$5.4 million. The principal objective of the Aid Coordination Project was to strengthen national capacities in the planning and management. More specifically, it sought to assist the following institutions:

- To establish the Privatization Unit in the Ministry of Finance
- To hire international experts to strengthen capacity in ESAF negotiations with the IMF
- Hire experts to develop a national accounting system, anti-poverty strategy and data collection for poverty profiles
- To hire experts to assist in the preparation of a data management system
- To hire international experts to assist in budget preparations and public investment program.

5.11 As was the case with Uganda and Mozambique, the focus for the CAGE and Aid Coordination projects were on establishing management systems and filling the manpower gaps created by the loss of skilled personnel during the war. To be sure, various training activities created a critical mass of economists and statisticians cadres; the reintroduction of the statistical bulletins, and increased flow and improved quality of policy papers and briefs, and incremental improvements in the planning and budgetary systems. However, the long-term impact on human resource development and institution building was practically negligible. The following explanations are in order:

- There was no national ownership of the capacity-building in both programs. The Inter-Ministerial Committee did not take ownership, nor did it set any specific goals for capacity-building in Rwanda, let alone define, orient and schedule time frame for accomplishments of milestones in the exercise. In fact, it never met to evaluate the progress of CAGE. Even with the reconstitution of a new Committee to oversee

the activities of CAGE, it was unable to guide capacity-building in the country.

- The UN executing agencies, namely the DDSMS for the former and the United Nations Office of the Project Services (UNOPS) for the latter, were never represented in Rwanda. They managed both capacity-building initiatives in Rwanda from their New York offices, with visits to the field as and when events on the ground dictated to do so.
- The administrative unit of CAGE, though located in the Ministry of Planning, reported to the UNDP, the latter becoming the executing and managing agency by default.

5.12 Five lessons can be distilled from the CAGE and Aid Coordination capacity-building initiatives. First, effective and efficient capacity-building initiatives must be firmly anchored in a broader national capacity-building program, with clearly stated long-term goals and objectives. Second, in order to attain those objectives, both projects had to be owned by the beneficiary institutions in order to create the minimum required legitimacy. Third, national ownership presupposes effective participation in the selection, design, implementation and evaluation of the program. Both projects ignored this important proposition. Fourth, as earlier pointed out, the capacity-building exercise in post-conflict environment is a long and cumbersome process. To create, nurture and sustain capacity not only requires a long time, but most importantly, demands flexible and incremental planning, realistic policy reforms and sensitivity to post-conflict constraints. Finally, both programs failed to incorporate a big dose of various training components: in-house training of counterparts, short-term training using local institutions, and long-term post-graduate training using relatively cheaper regional institutions such as the AERC's MA and PhD programs.

Later cases of Capacity building Initiatives

5.13 Other capacity-building programs in Rwanda took place at four specific levels: the central government level (civil service reforms), local government reforms, assistance to autonomous public institutions, and capacity building in the private sector. We briefly look at each in turn.

(i) *Public Service Reform program:* The major capacity-building initiative in the central government has been the civil service reform and later widened into public service reform program. It sought to enhance efficiency and effectiveness of Rwanda's public administration, as well as to improve the quality of services rendered by public institutions through cost effectiveness. It entailed human resource development, putting in place public infrastructure, management systems, legislation, norms, procedures, and professional aptitudes in the public service.

(ii) *Local Government Reform program:* It is widely recognized that to addressing good governance hinges on decentralization and democratization. Surprisingly, the local government reform program has been handled as a separate program from the civil

service reform. This unfortunate separation has tended to inhibit a comprehensive analysis of the capacity building challenge in government. One of the main responsibilities of the newly created Ministry of Local Government and Social Affairs is to oversee the implementation of capacity building programs at the local government level. Its main challenges included institutional, human resources and financial aspects of the councils, community development committees and tender boards.

(iii) *Autonomous Public Institutions:* In order to respond to the specific demands of post-genocide circumstances, the Rwandan government created new institutions. They include: the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) to lead government revenue mobilization; the National Tender Board (NTB) to ensure good tendering practices; and the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) to ensure financial accountability in government.

1. National Tender Board (NTB): It was created by a cabinet decision in November 1997 in response to shortcomings in public procurement. More specifically, NTB was intended to contribute to good governance in public procurement, improve public accountability and maintain a modern register of approved suppliers by categories of goods and services. Capacity-building initiatives at the NTB are supported by the World Bank, primarily to put in place a legal framework, including procedures and regulations on public procurement, training of the NTB officers and procurement of equipment.

2. Rwanda Revenue Authority (NRA): It was established in January 1998. It was intended to maximize revenue collection at minimum cost, while providing high quality services. The ongoing capacity building initiatives are supported by DFID in the form of on the job training supported by KPMG and PWC, technical assistance and the provision of some equipment. Some training programs were also supported by SIDA conducted by the Tanzania Revenue Authority as well as in South Africa. According to our interviews, capacity building initiatives in RRA have been successful.

(iv) Other institutional capacity building efforts were addressed in the following areas:

(i) Capacity Building in Private Sector: The government of Rwanda recognizes the critical importance of the private sector in the reconstruction process. Various capacity building measures have been undertaken to facilitate private sector development. They include hastening the pace of privatization of public enterprises, promoting public-private partnerships, promoting and facilitating

private investments and providing supportive services to private enterprises especially the small and medium size enterprises. These include the facilitation by the Rwanda Investment Promotion Authority, Capacity dialogue between the government, private sector and civil society to promote economic partnership.

(ii) Capacity building for Civil Society: The government of Rwanda has taken various initiatives to enhance the role of civil society. Such initiatives seek to strengthen the organizational, managerial, and technical capacity of community-based organizations, non-governmental organizations and other segments of the civil society. Examples in this area include capacity building initiatives by the Common Development Fund and the by the Care International.

a) Common Development Fund: A Common Development Fund (CDF) was established within the Ministry of Local Government in order to support development activities in the local authorities. The Fund supports community development committees in implementing various development and decentralization initiatives such as infrastructure development, income generating projects, as well as skills development. The resources set aside for CDF activities have fallen far short of its mandate.

b) Care International: It has contributed toward the rehabilitation and development programs in Rwanda since 1994 by focusing on HIV/AIDS, education and policy advocacy programs. Care International has also taken part in building the capacity of the NGO in the development, implementation and monitoring poverty reduction initiatives at district and provincial levels. However, such initiatives are limited only to a few provinces and compounded by aid delivery procedures, conditionalities and red-tape. The following chapter addresses these issues.

PROBLEMS OF DONOR-SUPPORTED INITIATIVES

Assistance pledged during the Round Table Conference

6.1 The most critical post-emergency event in international assistance to Rwanda was the "Round Table Pledging Conference for Rwanda Reconstruction" held at the initiative of the new government of Rwanda, in January 1995. A national policy framework expressing the government's priorities, around which rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance could be mobilized (including programs explained above), was presented by the Prime Minister and the main technical ministers, concerned (reflecting the political components of the government), and discussed. This policy was articulated in a document entitled *Program of National Reconciliation, Rehabilitation and Socio-Economic Recovery*, prepared by the government in collaboration with UNDP and in consultation with the World Bank and other donors. As the year progressed, the level of pledged assistance grew to slightly over US$1 billion. The donor community largely accepted the government's proposed program with the exception of the request for US$273.7 million for reparation and reintegration of refugees. The government based its estimates on the assumption that most old and new caseload refugees would return by the end of 1995. Donors rightly questioned this premise and pledged less than one-fourth of the requested amount. Furthermore, some donors had already pledged assistance to the UN and relief agencies for repatriation, under the aegis of the Appeal (or other flash appeals). Such assistance covered transport facilities for refugees, the provision of food aid at way stations and the distribution of seeds and agricultural implements (DANIDA, 1997).

Delayed disbursement of pledged funds

6.2 Disbursement of emergency assistance to Rwanda through the initial UN agency and NGO appeals was relatively rapid. On the other hand, donors were slow to provide assistance to the government for national recovery. They pledged US$707.3 million during the Round Table Conference, but nearly halfway through the year only US$68.1 million had been disbursed, less than 10 percent of the pledged amount. Of this amount, US$19.4 million was disbursed for programs outside the Rwanda Recovery Program – such as food aid contributions to WFP, UNREO operating expenses, the Bujumbura Conference, and the International Tribunal. Twenty-one percent of the remaining funds disbursed went to pay arrears to the World Bank and the African Development Bank. Of the US$38.3 million that remained for disbursement, US$5 million funded UN and other agency activities, and US$10.5 actually comprised "old money" counterpart funds, little of which remained in bank accounts in the aftermath of the war. Thus, at best, only about a third of the funds disbursed was left for direct assistance to the government for balance of payments support, purchase of vehicles and equipment, technical assistance and so on. This remaining amount, US$22.8 million represented only three percent of the total pledged amount. This situation began to improve substantially towards the end of the year. A UNDP update of the Round Table Conference funding status

shows that nine months after the pledging conference a little over one-third of the pledged assistance had been disbursed, and only one-quarter actually received in Rwanda. By the end of the year, roughly half had been disbursed (Government of Rwanda, 1997).

6.3 The delay in disbursement of pledged funds has been caused by many factors. Many donors, most notably Belgium, the EU and the Netherlands, suspended direct assistance to the government because of their opposition to the excessive force used by the government in closing IDP camps, specifically in Kibeho. Assistance frozen in the aftermath of Kibeho was later reinstated. Additionally, the World Bank and the government continued to disagree over assignment of a procurement agency to help the government manage procurement of commodities and technical assistance under the Emergency Recovery Credit. Another impediment was the lengthy procedures for designing, assessing and approving development projects, which could take from one to two years. Furthermore, some donors placed implicit and explicit conditions on assistance that influenced the pace at which certain types of funds are released. An example of implicit conditions is the priority of the EU that the political base of the new government be enlarged, and the statement in the same document that the EU should "progressively and under certain conditions recommence development assistance to Rwanda." Since the only pre-civil-war political parties not represented in the new government were those largely implicated in the genocide, this requirement amounted to a highly unpalatable condition that the government was very unlikely to accept. The common position of the European Community did not, however, prevent the Commission from implementing a rehabilitation program decided upon in November 1994.

6.4 Finally, the limited absorptive capacity (limited technical and administrative staff), unwillingness to accept foreign technical assistance, and reasonable concerns about the political legitimacy and durability of the new government, made it difficult to rapidly disburse funds directly through it. Overall, however, regardless of the reasons, the delays in disbursement of funds undermined the government's overall capacity to pursue timely initiatives for economic recovery and political stability (DANIDA, 1997).

Disproportionality of assistance

6.5 Of the more than US$2 billion spent on the Rwanda crisis since April 1994, the vastly larger share has gone to the maintenance of refugees in asylum countries. The EU has estimated that as of May 1995, it alone was spending US$400,000 per day to maintain the refugee camps. Furthermore, only about 11 percent of the grants of these same nine donors during the one-year period were provided specifically for rehabilitation and reconstruction. While gross measures such as these cannot give the full picture, the figures do suggest a disproportionate response, especially in the light of the nature of Rwanda's refugee crisis. Such a disproportionate allocation is understandable, though hardly justifiable. In spite of attempts on the part of some major donors to balance their assistance, it appeared to Rwandans who lived through the horror of genocide that the international community was more concerned about the refugees than the surviving victims of the genocide. In addition, the refugee camps, which were

totally dependent on international assistance, posed a serious security threat to Rwanda because they were heavily armed by shipments from abroad.

6.6 Moreover, increased rehabilitation and reconstruction expenditures to promote economic growth and social reconciliation in Rwanda could provide an inducement to some refugees to return home. The above discussion is not intended to convey the impression that international assistance to Rwanda and refugees is a zero-sum game in which assistance to one comes at the expense of the other. For the European Union, for example, different sources of financing exist for different problems and types of beneficiaries, so it is not simply a matter of shifting funds, but rather of increasing amounts of funds allocated to rehabilitation and reconstruction (DANIDA, 1997).

Confusion between the appeals process and the Round Table

6.7 Confusion persists about assistance provided through the UNDP-supported Round Table Conference versus the DHA- sponsored Appeal. Conceptually, their mandates were different: the Appeal provided a mechanism to mobilize resources needed for funding the UN specialized agencies' response to emergencies, while the Round Table Conference mechanism provided a forum in which the government can discuss its national policies with the donors, and to the donors to pledge resources in support of the implementation of national policies. Meanwhile, whether or not the conceptual distinction between the emergency phase and the rehabilitation phase and the reconstruction phase were clear-cut, who had the responsibility to raise funds and the onus of defining the priorities to address in such complex emergencies remained the central issues. There was a considerable overlap that created some friction between the two UN agencies. Understandably, therefore, the government did not always know through which assistance mechanism funds for reconstruction were passing. This complicated the issues of accountability and transparency, and also made simple tracking difficult. Furthermore, it remained unclear whether the funds solicited and pledged during the Round Table Conference represented the rehabilitation and reconstruction needs for one year (1995) or reflected the value of development assistance over a number of years. The Rwanda Recovery Program, as well as the July 1995 mid-term evaluation of the Round Table process, clearly state that the funds solicited were for 1995 recovery programs. There was ample evidence, however, that some donors saw the Round Table pledging process as a multi-year exercise. There were numerous old multi-year projects, interrupted by the war, that were reconfigured and included in pledged assistance.

CAPACITY-BUILDING LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study has examined the root causes of the Rwandan war and genocide as well as as its impact on the economy and society. It has also reviewed various interventions intended for post-conflict reconstruction and capacity building. In this final chapter, the study synthesizes the key study findings and presents them as capacity-building lessons and best practices from Rwanda.

7.1 ***Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Support Unit:*** Events during the past decade challenged the thinking of donors about whether development efforts, which have formed a prominent part of post-Cold War engagement in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, have really achieved an enduring legacy of inclusion, economic growth, or human well-being. It has become evident that the ability to prevent conflict has less to do with a scarcity of donor resources than with the lack of understanding and the appropriate tools to address them. The reconstruction and rehabilitation of war-torn societies has become a sub-specialty within the broader development agenda. The special needs of societies emerging from conflict have hastened the development planning cycle in such a way as to demand more flexibility of programs and resources, and greater responsiveness to emergencies heretofore handled only through humanitarian assistance. The need to nurture that understanding and develop new tools has led to the emergence of specific units within bilateral and multilateral donor agencies to address the development issues of post-conflict societies.[17] ACBF might consider establishing such a unit that would backstop its various interventions with well-informed background country and/or regional studies. An adequately equipped and staffed support unit would be one of the preconditions for successful interventions in post-conflict situations in Africa.

7.2 ***Understanding the root causes of conflict:*** This study amply demonstrates the fact that conflicts are different in different countries at different times and that they require tailor-made approaches. They differ, *inter alia,* in duration, intensity and scope of destruction, the relative military and political strength and resilience of the opponents and the degree to which the middle and upper classes are affected by the hostilities. In this regard, conflict analysis and conflict impact assessment studies from the ACBF post-conflict support unit must be an integral part of the entire planning cycle of every individual program and project that is undertaken. Such studies would ensure that ACBF actions do not unwittingly feed into the conflict. The major responsibility of such a unit would be to undertake conflict mapping of respective conflict countries by gathering information about the history of the conflict including the physical and organizational setting, parties to the conflict, their goals and interests, and the causes and consequences. Understanding various histories and the root causes of the conflicts help to inform, among other things, the nature and character of the

[17] . The following are some of the most robust post-conflict research units: Peace Building Unit (CIDA); Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands); Division for Humanitarian Assistance (SIDA); Conflict and Human Affairs Department (Department of International Development, UK); Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID); European Community Humanitarian Office (EU); International Committee of Red Cross (Red Cross); Interagency Cooperation Unit (WHO); War-torn societies Project (UNRISD); Emergency Response Division (UNDP); Office of Emergency Program (UNCEF); and Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Fund (World Bank).

required reconstruction and capacity building interventions that are likely to serve as sustainable conflict-mitigation, social healing or capacity development measures.

7.3 ***Institutional mechanisms for sharing basic information:*** A lack of in-depth knowledge of the historical, political and social and economic context of the crisis in Rwanda undermined, in many important ways, the effectiveness of international intervention in Rwanda. First, because of their ignorance of the extent of involvement of political leaders in the genocide, relief agencies used former instruments of genocide to deliver assistance in refugee camps. This enabled the very people who commanded the genocide to re-establish their command over the refugees. Secondly, human rights observers were totally ignorant of the political history and the social and ethnic structures of the country. Consequently, they failed to establish any rapport with the local leaders or local NGOs, which proved self-defeating. The Rwanda crisis thus underscores the need for information sharing with indigenous counterparts and for specialized research networks, which possess invaluable knowledge about contextual variables: historical, social, cultural, political, economic and even linguistic among donor, NGO, technical and managerial staff in the field. In this regard, the post-conflict support unit at the ACBF would also be mandated to assemble such informational briefs.

7.4 ***Folly of some conventional wisdom***: While acknowledging that interventions in post-conflict societies are a special case, most donors seemed to be more comfortable with planning and undertaking projects based on "conventional" ways of working rather than undertaking a radical approach and responding to the contingencies of the moment. It is perhaps unsurprising that most donors, particularly the multilateral agencies' organizational cultures and mandates seemed to have far more effect on strategic and operational decisions than on the situation on the ground. Indeed, the devastation of human, social and physical capital that occurred in Rwanda and particular provisions of the Arusha Agreements, required that some conventional wisdom of development practice be set aside. As pointed out earlier, recovery and capacity building require incremental planning, careful and realistic policy reforms, more critical staff time than in "normal operations" and a deliberate concern for the post-conflict constraints. Standard and cumbersome procurement and disbursement procedures leading to the untimely delivery of goods and funds should be avoided at all cost. In this regard, ACBF and other donors might consider focusing not only directly upon objectives of policy reforms and increased service delivery, but on relaxing the long-term constraints which might otherwise delay the attainment of these objectives. The critical path to reform and service delivery is the enhancement of human capital and organizational efficiency in the public and private sectors.

7.5 ***Paradigm shift in post-conflict reconstruction and capacity building policies and strategies:*** Capacity building is a means to an end in the development process. In fact, capacity building is part of the development process and should be integrated as fully as possible with implementing institutions. In this regard, the development objective in the post-conflict reconstruction process must be defined, institutional and human resource development needs mapped out, and a capacity building strategy identified. As in the case of post-2000 Rwanda, the

key issue here is to design a long-term, multi-sector capacity building program, which is consistent with its peculiar post-conflict situation. Moreover, as in the case with Kosovo, the ACBF might consider persuading the Bretton Woods institutions to adopt peace-friendly economic reform programs in Africa, including far-reaching debt relief measures, enhanced quality investment and foreign aid, deliberate capacity building initiatives in support of long-term development efforts and post-conflict recovery. In the same vein, the ACBF might consider persuading the World Trade Organization (WTO) to adopt the "special and differential treatment" of post-conflict countries in the world trading system. Above all, the ACBF might consider persuading the OECD countries to provide substantive investment guarantees to corporations based in their respective countries that might wish to invest in post-conflict countries in Africa.

7.6 ***Expedite procedures for delivering rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance:*** Most of our respondents indicated that the international response to the Rwandan refugee crisis was swift. International agencies delivered the much-needed assistance with remarkable speed. However, assistance to rehabilitation and reconstruction inside Rwanda was seriously constrained by donors' administrative procedures and conditionalities that delayed aid for several months and even years. To be sure, while the immediate post-conflict period can be a window of opportunity to pursue critical policy reforms, especially those essential to macroeconomic stability and democratization, prudence should be exercised in pursuing an ambitious reform agenda too soon after a major social collapse. In addition to the negative impact on economic recovery, delays in remitting promised funds for long-term reconstruction programs had a negative impact on the political and social stability in Rwanda. It is important that donor agencies suspend their traditional administrative procedures for rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance in order to respond usefully to the post-conflict contingencies.

7.7 ***Donor coordination***: While the impetus and mechanisms for coordination were certainly stronger in the humanitarian emergency phase 1994-98, the need to coordinate post-conflict reconstruction ODA in Rwanda remained elusive. Smooth aid coordination is particularly important in post-conflict situations. Due to the massive, urgent needs and the presence of many donors eager to provide support, each with its own agenda demands effective and efficient coordination. In many post-conflict countries like Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Mozambique, governments lacked the capacity to articulate its needs and coordinate donor assistance. Donors, in turn, designed their own projects and created independent project coordination units. Despite a number of high-level multi-donor meetings held with the Rwandan government outside the country, it was noted that lack of strategic partnerships and coordination was a recurrent theme of donor involvement in Rwanda. ACBF might consider joining with a few key actors in accepting the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) as representing the most coherent attempt at generating consensus on Rwanda's development needs for donors to coordinate their activities around.[18]

[18] . A EU monthly meeting on aid in Kigali was said to be a "coffee club", an information sharing session with no fixed agenda. While on one level this was seen as useful, it could not be construed as coordination in strict sense of the meaning. Development coordination by EU member states was acknowledged to be weak.

7.8 ***Moral imperative to prevent genocide:*** One of the main reasons why world leaders have often been reluctant to take on comprehensive conflict prevention measures in Africa is that they hold to the conventional wisdom that the costs to be borne and the risks to be run are too high, while the interests at stake are too low. Most of these poor countries are of negligible strategic value to major powers. Predictably, once the civil war broke out in Rwanda in 1990, increasingly there were warnings, from the UN country office in Kigali, human rights organizations and other sources that large-scale civilian massacres might occur. Nonetheless, preparations to deal with the contingency of massive violence that targeted civilians were inadequate. In fact, had the international community responded more effectively in the months prior to, or in the days immediately following, the shooting of Habyarimana's plane, perhaps most of those who died would have survived and much of the massive expenditure on the provision of humanitarian assistance would have been unnecessary. There is need to create robust early-warning institutional capacities at all levels, including coordination regional and international responses to those signals and some mechanisms to translate warnings into effective conflict management tools for prevention or mitigation.

7.9 ***A Moral imperative to help those in urgent need:*** Following the end of the genocide and civil war, the traumatized Rwandan society was viewed as a complex emergency case – typically defined by a breakdown of limits, institutions, and governance, widespread suffering and massive displacement. The country required a range of responses from the international community to facilitate the transition from war to sustainable peace and to support the resumption of economic and social development. As pointed out earlier, largely because of Rwanda's marginal strategic importance to the major powers, and conflicting attitudes toward the RPF government and the ousted government among members of the Security Council, there may have been a lack of resolve to respond expeditiously to the crisis. Our study supports Stanley Hoffman's (1994:172) recommendation that great powers should have interests in world order that go beyond strict national security concerns. ACBF, in its regular consultations with major donors, might wish to impress upon them that they should feel, without exception, a moral obligation to intervene quickly in complex emergency situations like the one in Rwanda, in order to avert the social and economic catastrophes of post-conflict situations.

7.10 ***Coordinated, holistic and integrated capacity building policies and programs:*** Following the genocide, Rwanda was faced with peculiar human, institutional and logistical requirements, mainly to replace the tragic loss of human resources and economic and social infrastructure, and to re-orient the cultural and social forces toward a modern, progressive and tolerant society. Such circumstances called for close coordination of resources. Unlike the Uganda case, the World Bank, the UNDP and the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda prepared, as separate and uncoordinated initiatives: the Emergency Recovery Program for Rwanda; the Rehabilitation and Reintegration Program for Rwanda; and the Rwanda Emergency Normalization Plan. These initiatives were essentially *ad hoc*, haphazard and donor-driven. They were fragmented, loosely coordinated and often included expensive technical assistance personnel. Moreover, in the absence of an effective government capacity, most donors took responsibility for

the execution of those projects that they funded by establishing separate project coordination units (PCU), which usually bypassed governmental structures. Not surprisingly, the immediate post-conflict capacity-building initiatives in Rwanda were poorly coordinated both within and between ministries, and between the government and the donor community. We recommend coordinated, holistic and integrated reconstruction and capacity-building policies and programs in post-conflict societies.

7.11 ***The need for the ACBF to participate in multi-donor trust fund (MDFT) to undertake post-conflict institution development and capacity building:*** Unlike the case of Uganda in which the World Bank assumed the role of coordinator, the UNDP's coordination role in Rwanda was weak and disjointed. This weakness resulted into a mélange of rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. ACBF has a critical role to play in the early stages of post-conflict reconstruction. It should coordinate aid in the area of capacity-building and institution development. ACBF might consider participating in peace negotiations in order to provide timely capacity-building advice, post-conflict capacity building coordination, co-financing of specific operations in its interest (e.g. utilization of expertise of Diaspora), joint undertaking of human resource and institutional capacity audit in order to identify inadequacies and obstacles to capacity building (training, use, retention and continuous upgrading of capacities), and, together with respective beneficiaries (government, academia, private sector and civil society), define capacity-building needs, priorities and sequencing. In order to maximize the impact of their interventions on post-conflict societies, donors under the leadership of ACBF might consider building a consensus on the financing modalities of reconstruction and capacity-building. The establishment of a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) would facilitate not only a closer linkage with the recipient's country budget, but also it would promote a productive dialogue of fiscal and development policy between donors and the beneficiaries. This would also foster a sense of ownership of the development project by the recipients.

7.12 ***Lack of a Common capacity building Framework:*** Capacity building is supposed to be defined and interpreted in relation to national development goals and objectives. We found that the immediate post-conflict capacity-building projects and programs in Rwanda lacked coordination at multiple levels: within ministries and between the government of Rwandan government and donors. Capacity building initiatives tended to be designed and implemented in isolation without being guided by a neither common national policy nor strategy. The situation was further compounded by a weak information flow and management of information on capacity gaps, limited horizontal and vertical linkages among institutions, which were supposed to collaborate and coordinate similar tasks. Uncoordinated intervention as well as incompatible systems in the country corresponding to the different systems applied by different development partners are daunting challenges that need to be urgently addressed. There is need, therefore, to develop a common capacity building framework with a comprehensive program that seeks to address institutional and human capacities both from the supply-side issues (e.g. the training of suitably qualified Rwandans) and demand-side issues including human resource planning, pay, incentives and retention within the public service.

7.13 ***Building and Strengthening the capacities of national institutions:*** At the beginning of the Rwanda emergency, it was necessary to channel international assistance through NGOs, private contractors and international agencies, in the absence of functioning state and civil society institutional structures. Strangely enough, even with the transition of the Rwandan Patriotic Front into a government and the consolidation of civil society organizations, donors were frequently reluctant to recognize the legitimacy the government and provide it with the resources necessary to rebuild its institutional capacity and to establish modalities of mutual policy dialogue and coordination. Although acknowledging the resiliency and territorial control of the new regime, the donor community remained reluctant to provide substantial funds to the resource-starved government. In addition to participation in priority-setting for national development, the other equally important aspect to ensure the ownership, sustainability and legitimacy of the national development project, is financial control. Unless the international community provides the government with the necessary resources and support, the donor community should not realistically expect to build or strengthen institutional and organizational capacity of Rwandan society. In order to increase ownership and build capacity, ACBF might consider institutionalizing (i) support for the development of a participatory planning and implementation of a training framework at all levels;[19] (ii) support for training of Rwandans in participatory training tools; (iii) studies be jointly conducted on the feasibility of the partial or complete transfer of selected functions currently carried out by the donor agencies and the central government to local authorities, along with the accompanying budget, and (iv) an office of the Auditor General in order to tighten financial controls, pre-empt financial abuses and ensure community monitoring of development spending.

[19] . As pointed out earlier, high levels of illiteracy, high levels of school dropouts and a severe shortage of skilled personnel characterize Rwandan population. The lack of skills affects all sectors of the national political economy. There is, therefore, urgent need to train people at all levels: primary, middle and higher levels. For an elaborate capacity-building strategy see a study by the Government of Rwanda (2000).

7.14 ***Strengthening social capital:*** More often than not, post-conflict reconstruction tends to focus more on rebuilding infrastructure than on reconstructing institutions and strengthen the social fabric of the society. The brutal nature and extent of the slaughter, along with the ensuing mass migration, profoundly affected Rwanda's social foundations. Vast segments of the population were uprooted, thousands of families lost at least one adult, and tens of thousands of children were separated from their parents. Because neighbors, teachers, doctors and religious leaders took part in the carnage, essential trust in social institutions were destroyed, replaced by fear, hostility and insecurity. War militarized society, disrupted existing social organizations and created others. Relatively little attention has been paid to strengthening the social capital. There is need for the ACBF to consider supporting comprehensive programs to assess the impact of war on children, to train teachers and parents to recognize the symptoms of stress, anxiety, trauma and depression in the most vulnerable.

7.15 ***Self-regulation and partnerships within the NGO community would improve impact:*** During the emergency, NGOs provided invaluable assistance in establishing and maintaining the delivery of essential services, and caring for refugees, and internally displaced persons. They subsequently played a critical role in various rehabilitation and reconstruction initiatives. Nonetheless, the overabundance and inexperience of many NGOs have undermined several of these positive contributions. Some lacked the essential experience and expertise to function effectively in developing societies. Others initially failed to coordinate their operations with fellow NGOs or local and relief agencies. Still others lured experienced staff from government by offering higher salaries and fringe benefits, thus undermining institutional capabilities of ministries. Above all, some NGOs refused or showed reluctance to register their organization officially, thereby creating unnecessary tensions between themselves and the Rwandan government. This study makes three recommends. First, it calls on the NGO community to follow a well-formulated code of conduct in their operations. Second, it recommends that ACBF should consider entering into formal partnerships with some NGOs that are in the broad business promoting capacity building in Africa. Third, in Rwanda, the civil society needs more than simply financial resources, but rather political space in which to develop. After well over a decade, a democratization conditionality on the Rwandan government would be in order.

7.16 ***Deliberate policies to reduce social and economic inequalities***: One of the major challenges to reconciliation and reconstruction is to design and implement policies to reduce serious social inequalities. Some of these inequalities, whether ethnic, regional, religious, or class-based contributed to fuelling the conflict in the first place. While the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) clearly sets out the relationship between poverty in Rwanda, long-term structural issues and the effects of the genocide, it could benefit from a better analysis of the effects of the country's conflicts and past policies of exclusion, and of the impact of recent government policies of poverty and all forms of inequalities. The reconciliation and reconstruction interventions in Rwanda have not paid adequate attention to these structural inequalities and the process risks building a new Rwanda upon historical grievances. ACBF might consider supporting in-depth studies to address these inherent inequalities in post-conflict Rwanda with a view to mitigating conflict.

7.17 ***The role of women in rebuilding social capital in post-conflict environments should be re-examined and capitalized on:*** Genocide and war in Rwanda altered the country's demographic composition so radically that women and girls now represent between 60-70 percent of the population. By some estimates, between one-third and one-half of all women in the hardest hit areas (e.g. north-east) are widows. Furthermore, several thousand women were brutally raped. Most post-conflict programs tended to consider women to be like any other beneficiaries. Under the existing Rwandan law, property passes through the male members of the household. As a result, women and orphaned daughters risk losing their property to the male relatives of the deceased husband or father. There is an urgent need, therefore, to change not only the judicial guidelines and legal interpretations of laws pertaining to property, land and women rights but, most importantly, undertake short-term initiatives to focus on (i) enabling poor households to increase their agricultural output and market their produce at fair prices; (ii) improve the quality of primary education and lowering the costs for the poor; and, (iii) improving access of poor households to basic medical care. ACBF-supported studies should be able to identify men and women's differing vulnerabilities and sensibilities to conflict as well as their different capacities and coping strategies. Additionally, such studies should be able to identify unequal power relations underlying social organizations in order to ensure that post-conflict interventions do not instigate, exacerbate or further marginalize women.

7.18 ***Mass Education for tolerance and reconstruction:*** In an "ethnically" divided society such as Rwanda, education for tolerance and reconstruction is an important aspect of democratization and social healing. By 1998, the Rwandan Ministry of Education had yet to design a curriculum in peace education. Formal peace education in the schools, which help socialize children, is the most direct means of teaching and acquiring positive social values. Community leaders, parents, school authorities, teachers, educators should direct their attention to the planning and implementation of peace education and tolerance. The school remains one of the primary *foci* for capacity-building at the grassroots level and, ultimately, for peace education in the entire community.

7.19 ***Joint conflict resolution approach missed:*** Given the magnitude of the trauma experienced by survivors of the genocide, the Rwandan society might be required to undergo comprehensive exercises in collective national dialogue about the past, what went wrong at what point, what could have been collectively done to avert it, and what should be done as a therapy for the future. From such a collective exercise, then citizens would propose what kinds of institutions should be created for political, social and economic governance. And in so doing, human and cultural healings as well as structural healing would have been undertaken.

7.20 ***Handling the questions of guilty and innocence:*** The most difficult challenge to peace -building and reconstruction is how to handle questions of guilt and innocence, impunity and justice, and the notions of forgiveness and reconciliation. These key issues underwrite many people's understanding of the basis for lasting peace. In the Rwandan context, the genocide survivors, the desire for justice is actually greater that their willingness to work for negative

peace. The acknowledgement of crimes committed during the conflict can be sufficient, but this acknowledgement is often not provided satisfactorily at the end of the conflict. There is need, therefore, for the formalization of such acknowledgement is often not satisfactory at the end of the conflict. There is also a need to take a long-term perspective giving top priority to building an effective judicial system based on the rule of law, ensuring physical security to returning refugees and survivors of genocide, promoting rapid economic growth and to seek a regional approach to conflict resolution.

7.21 ***Successful reconciliation and reconstruction success require strong national ownership of the enterprise:*** In an attempt to "do the job, right, fast and professionally" most donors created parallel institutional structures to those of the Rwandan government and designed policies and programs that they considered critical for genocide victims. Without anchoring rehabilitation and reconstruction in a solid community base, foreign intervention is not likely to be sustainable. This means that the international community should not prescribe or certain institutional or policy choices. Instead, it should try to identify those relationships, processes, mechanisms and institutions that hold the greatest promise for on-going conflict resolution and reconstruction, which may not look exactly the same as those in the West. In fostering such a climate, capacity building, policy dialogue and guidance for good governance may be nurtured and developed right from the start.

7.22 ***Mitigating the impact of large refugee populations on host communities:*** There is a notable imbalance between the level of international support designed to meet refugee needs and the level of support designed to meet the needs of the host community, and the delay in actual provision of that support. Although UNDP, FAO and UNHCR recognize the detrimental effects on the assets, livelihood, and environment by a huge influx of refugees, the compensation mechanisms put into place were found grossly inadequate. This was resulted in widespread resentment toward refugees. There is therefore need to create and develop capacities that will undertake rigorous impact assessment of large refugee population on host communities and propose modalities for mitigating that impact.

7.24 ***Productive synergy between WFP and UNHCR***: The performance of WFP and UNHCR, the two largest agencies within the UN humanitarian system, were of critical importance in the overall response to the Rwanda crisis. The relationship between them was subject to unproductive tensions stemming from their peculiar mandates. Despite the existence of a detailed Memorandum of Understanding between them, these tensions persisted and are likely to continue, given their different perspectives on the same problems. One aspect of this conflict is that close cooperation and coordination dilutes accountability as each may shift the burden of responsibility for problems can easily be shifted.

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APPENDIX I

List of Persons interviewed in Kigali, Rwanda (July 27-August 2, 2003).

i. Justin Rusandazangabo, Economist, Ministry of Finance
ii. Silas Lwakabamba, Rector, Kigali Institute of Technology
iii. Stella Mugabo, Human Resource Development Authority
iv. Charles Karake, Human Resource Development Authority
v. Asmalash Bayene, Maastrich School of Management
vi. Sarah Mahandutiye, Ministry of Finance
vii. Soteri Gatara, Fonds D'entretien Routier
viii. Joanna Walgrave ILO
ix Meinhard Gans, Maastricht School of Management
x. Albert Butare Deputy Rector, Kigali Institute of Technology
xi. Peter Mukurasi, Pace International Ltd

APPENDIX 11

List of Interviews in Washington, DC (June 20-25)

i. ongumer, Zhou, Sierra Leone desk
ii. Chukwima Obidegwu, Rwanda desk
iii. Robert Floyd, Capacity Building desk
iv. Henry Garnette, Mozambique desk
v. Dennis Morin, Rwanda desk
vi. Patrick Mamboleo, Uganda desk
vii. Samuel Wangwe, Senior Fellow
viii. John Rutayuga, Private Sector Development
ix. Ian Bannon, Conflict Prevention Unit