

**THE RHODESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTE:
BLACK MAJORITY RULE OR MERITOCRACY?**

Denis Venter

OCCASIONAL PAPER

GELEENTHEIDSPUBLIKASIE



**DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE
THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

Mr Denis Venter is Assistant Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs, as well as Secretary of the Pretoria Branch of the Institute. He was formerly a member of the Department of Political Science and International Politics at the University of Pretoria where he lectured on international politics, *inter alia* in African politics. He is a member of the Africa Institute of South Africa and of the Political Science Association of South Africa.

This paper was specially written for the Africa Institute of South Africa during May 1976, and first published in the *Africa Institute Bulletin*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1976 (English issue), as well as in the *Afrika-Instituut-Bulletin*, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1976 (Afrikaans issue).

It should be noted that, as the Institute is precluded by its Constitution from itself expressing an opinion on any aspect of international affairs, opinions expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the author and not of the Institute.

ISBN : 0 909239 22 3

The South African Institute of International Affairs
Jan Smuts House
P O Box 31596
Braamfontein
2017
South Africa

September 1976

THE RHODESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTE: BLACK MAJORITY RULE
OR MERITOCRACY:

Denis Venter

Black Africa's association of colonial rule with special protection of minorities and with refusal to acknowledge the rightful claims of the majority, has had unfortunate long-term consequences for whites in Africa. Constitutional proposals reserving a preferential position for a communal minority in a new order, will seldom now be judged objectively on their merits. Techniques which are apparently non-communal, but calculated to bring about a similar result by indirect means, will be equally unacceptable. When methods have to be conceived for special institutional guarantees against communal discrimination, the proposition that *politics is the art of the possible* ceases to be merely a platitude.

Constitutional methods like indirect elections, qualitative franchise requirements, separate voters' rolls and communally reserved seats, are based on the assumption that, at least for the immediate future, majority rule on the Westminster model is excluded. When, however, this assumption is relinquished, the preservation of the aforementioned constitutional apparatus will depend on whether the dominant political powers find them tolerable. The political realities of Africa prove that the rejection thereof is the rule rather than the exception. "The pyramidal type of indirect election, heavily weighted in favour of the influence of tribal chiefs and elders, has been an early casualty in Africa.... The fancy franchises and elaborate classifications and allocations of seats ... gave disproportionate legislative representation to the opinions of European settled minorities; they are ... giving place ... to systems that reflect more accurately the new balance of power. They tended, moreover, to be inordinately complicated.... Communal representation through communal electoral rolls has been popular only with the minorities it has been designed to protect...."¹

The Constitutional Framework

The 1961 Constitution provided by implication for eventual black majority rule, although the white electorate could control progress in that direction. The essence of this constitution was retained in the Independence Constitution of 1965. The present (1969) Constitution, whilst allowing for eventual parity in representation between white and black, excludes black majority rule permanently, however. For the first time in Rhodesian history franchise was introduced along racial lines and this was attained through the elimination of the common voters' roll. This constitution also decreased the number of directly elected black members of the House of Assembly and replaced it with representatives nominated by tribal electoral colleges. This stipulation is in accordance with the Rhodesian government's confidence in black tribal leaders for support (see Tables 1 and 2 at the end of this article).

Franchise qualifications therefore ensure that "... government will be retained in responsible hands and will provide Africans with the right to play an increasing part in government as they earn it by increased contributions to the national exchequer".² Greater numbers of blacks who satisfy franchise qualifications therefore imply an increased contribution by blacks to income tax and this, in turn, leads to increased representation in the House of Assembly. Additional black

seats are only added when the income tax paid by blacks exceeds by six percent that paid by whites, but only until parity is reached. Franchise, as a constitutional apparatus, therefore offers to the whites in Rhodesia - in the light of the absolute opposition against black majority rule - a guarantee of existence and is the final rampart against Africanisation. *The crux of the dispute between the black nationalists and the Rhodesian government over a settlement of the constitutional stalemate therefore is, and remains, franchise qualifications and representation in Parliament.*

The Wilson-Smith Talks: HMS Tiger to HMS Fearless

For the first year after the unilateral declaration of independence by Rhodesia, on 11 November 1965, there were frequent feeler contacts between London and Salisbury, which were generally described as "talks about talks" and "negotiations about negotiations".³ This culminated in December 1966 in talks aboard *HMS Tiger*. The British Labour Party's stubborn insistence on the "return to legality" principle; the inhibiting influence of the Commonwealth's NIBMAR requirement (*No Independence before Majority Rule*), as set out in the Lagos and London communiqués; and Premier Smith's refusal, *inter alia*, to abandon independence without the assurance that the proposed constitutional amendments would be implemented, effectively torpedoed an agreement on settlement. The British proposals for an interim government and dissolution of Parliament meant, for Rhodesia, capitulation and transfer of power.⁴ Taking everything into account "... one wonders whether to be more surprised that the *Tiger* terms were offered or that they were refused. For it was not their severity that might properly have raised a questioning eyebrow but their laxity"⁵

The next round of talks took place on board *HMS Fearless* in October 1968. Here the British delegation insisted on a blocking quarter⁶ of directly and popularly elected black members in Parliament. The Rhodesian delegation was of the opinion that some agreement or other could be reached with the British government. The stipulations of the 1961 Constitution would have been applicable to franchise, but the British delegation insisted on an amendment in the qualifications for the "B" Voters' Roll. This had to be extended to include all blacks over the age of 30 years, who satisfied the qualifications for citizenship and residence. The cross-voting formula⁷ between the "A" and "B" Voters' Rolls had to be maintained at 25 percent. The Rhodesian government insisted, however, that the cross-voting formula should be reduced to 10 percent, to compensate for the lowering of qualifications for the "B" Voters' Roll.⁸

The main difference between the *Tiger* and *Fearless* Proposals was not constitutional in nature, but the revocation of the British viewpoint of return to legality. This was the crux of the British position and the reason for Rhodesia's rejection of the *Tiger* document. The British government furthermore insisted that any settlement terms had to be an improvement on the *Tiger* proposals. The *Fearless* proposals were, however, clearly a watered-down version of the 1966 terms. This time agreement was wrecked on the Rhodesian insistence that the blocking quarter should also include chiefs, the rejection of "a broadly based government", as well as the right to appeal to the Privy Council in London. This latter stipulation, it was felt, would detract from Rhodesia's sovereignty and lead to "second-class independence".

"The external safeguard (appeal to the Privy Council) was the principal impediment (to a settlement) and Wilson must have cast his eye longingly beyond it to an agenda at last free of this vexing issue."⁹

During further discussions in Salisbury, which actually were just a continuation of the *Fearless* talks, the Rhodesian government accepted, with certain reservations, the *Fearless* Proposals on franchise qualifications. All blacks over the age of 30 years, who satisfied the qualifications for citizenship and residence, would be allowed on the "B" Voters' Roll. The Rhodesian government, however, continued to insist that parallel with the lowering of qualifications for the "B" Voters' Roll the cross-voting influence should vary according to a sliding scale from 25 percent to 10 percent, in accordance with the specific qualifications. The British government was not prepared to discuss the composition of the legislature any further, in spite of the Rhodesian government's readiness to conform to the stipulation of a blocking quarter of directly and popularly elected black members.¹⁰

After the failure of these discussions, the Rhodesian government again made alternative proposals in March 1969. The "B" Voters' Roll had been extended to include all blacks over the age of 30 years, with no literacy test at all. This voters' roll, however, had to be divided into two sections: a higher section with qualifications on the existing scale (according to the 1961 Constitution); and a lower qualification for the rest. The cross-voting influence for those with higher qualifications could then be retained at 25 percent, while those with lower qualifications would not be able to exercise any cross-voting at all. In respect of representation the Rhodesian government was prepared to strengthen the blocking mechanism in Parliament, by allowing a blocking quarter plus one of elected black members, over and above the six chiefs in the Senate. The British government, however, obstinately refused to negotiate any further on the *Fearless* Proposals and insisted on the Rhodesian government's acceptance thereof *in toto*.¹¹

The Smith-Home Agreement and the Pearce Commission's Test of Acceptability

During the following two years it seemed that the gulf between the Rhodesian and British positions became greater. In November 1969, a Constitution was adopted by the Rhodesian Parliament, which excluded majority rule permanently. This was followed by Rhodesia becoming a Republic in March 1970, and a total victory for the *Rhodesian Front* in the general elections of April 1970. All this pointed to a gradual movement towards the right in the politics of Rhodesia. In spite of the fact, therefore, that a new Conservative Party government came into power in Britain in May 1970, and Premier Heath had more manoeuvrability in settlement negotiations than his predecessor, the same was definitely not true for his Rhodesian colleague. Feeler contacts by Lord Goodman, which had already started under the old Labour regime, continued and eventually culminated in the surprising Smith-Home Agreement of 24 November 1971. If, however, the 1971 Proposals are compared with the Rhodesian Constitutions of 1961 and 1969, as well as the *Tiger* and *Fearless* Proposals, it is clear that it was not the Rhodesian Front which made the concessions, but the British government (see Tables 1 and 2).

Premier Smith warned from the outset that the alternative to acceptance of the 1971 Proposals would mean the preservation of the *status quo*: retention of the 1969 Constitution without amendment. Amendments to the 1969 Constitution and related electoral laws, on which the

Rhodesian and British governments agreed, would include: The method of basing additional black representation in Parliament on the amount of income tax paid by blacks would be abolished. A new Higher Voters' Roll for Blacks would be created with the same qualifications as that for the White Voters' Roll. When the number of voters on this higher voters' roll was equal to six percent of the number of voters on the White Voters' Roll, two additional seats for the Higher Voters' Roll for Blacks would be created. When the ratio reached 12 percent, two further seats would be added and they would be filled by indirect election by tribal electoral colleges. This process of adding seats would continue until the number of additional seats reached 34 (in other words, parity), by which time the number of voters on the Higher Voters' Roll for Blacks would be approximately equal to the number of voters on the White Voters' Roll.¹² "A more appropriate application of *the principle of advancement on merit* would be hard to find - the yardstick being the standard laid down and accepted for Europeans"¹³ When parity was reached, the blacks themselves, by way of a referendum of all black voters, should decide whether they wished to retain the indirectly elected representatives, or whether they wished to replace them with directly elected representatives.

The Rhodesian government believes that the concept of *parity* ensures stability and guarantees the safety of both racial groups. "We should therefore have wished to *retain this concept in perpetuity*",¹⁴ but it became clear in the course of the negotiations that a settlement would not be reached with the British government, unless provision were made for progress beyond parity. For this reason provision was made for the creation, after the attainment of parity, of 10 seats on a common voters' roll which would be filled by direct election; that is, a voters' roll of all voters registered on the White Voters' Roll and on the Higher Voters' Roll for Blacks. For the purpose of the election of these representatives, Rhodesia would form a single constituency.¹⁵ In spite of these stipulations of the 1971 Proposals, Premier Smith was of the opinion that "... this Constitution ... will enable us to comply with our most important principle - *the retention of Government in civilised hands*".¹⁶

In 1965, the British government had laid down six principles which had to be complied with before the independence of Rhodesia could be acknowledged: (1) unhindered progress to majority rule; (2) efficient guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution; (3) immediate improvement in the political status of the black population; (4) a move away from racial discrimination; (5) acceptability of settlement proposals to the Rhodesian population as a whole; and (6) protection of minority groups. The fifth principle, namely the test of acceptability, has always played a cardinal role in British thoughts on settlement.¹⁷

The *African National Council* (ANC) was established in December 1971, under the leadership of Bishop Abel Muzorewa with the sole purpose " ... to explain and to expose the dangers of accepting the settlement proposals and to co-ordinate the campaign for their rejection".¹⁸ *For all practical purposes the political power of the ANC vis-a-vis the Rhodesian government is thus related to the fifth principle: the test of acceptability.* The Pearce Commission which had to conduct the test was reminded by the ANC that no settlement of the Rhodesian question could be brought about without the active participation of the blacks, through leaders of their

own choice, in the actual process of negotiations. The political power of the ANC became clear when Sir Alec Douglas-Home, at that time the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced the findings of the Pearce Commission to the British House of Commons, namely that the proposed settlement was not acceptable to the population of Rhodesia as a whole (meaning the blacks).

The reasons¹⁹ for black opposition to the Proposals were, *inter alia*:

- (i) that the franchise qualifications for the Higher Voters' Roll for Blacks were too high and progress to parity therefore too slow;
- (ii) that the franchise qualifications would divide blacks among themselves on the basis of wealth and the various communities on grounds of race;
- (iii) that equal qualifications for the White Voters' Roll and the Higher Voters' Roll for Blacks were unfair, because blacks did not receive the same remuneration as whites for the same work;
- (iv) that the fixed property qualification was discriminating, because of the restrictions on private and home ownership for blacks;
- (v) that chiefs and tribal authorities should not be used as a method to control political representation;
- (vi) that the Lower Voters' Roll for Blacks was meaningless, because eight seats would have little or no effect in Parliament;
- (vii) that government support for white immigration was in sharp contrast to government statements in favour of family planning for blacks and that increasing white immigration would only be to the disadvantage of blacks, because greater numbers of blacks would then be needed as qualified voters on the Higher Voters' Roll for Blacks in order to obtain additional black seats; and
- (viii) that there was a complete lack of consultation with the blacks during negotiations between the British and Rhodesian governments.

The Proposals were therefore rejected because the blacks doubted the motives of the Rhodesian government, which continually insisted on the exclusion of the blacks from any constitutional talks. Bishop Muzorewa declared that "... Africans are afraid that if ... (they) recognise ... (Mr Smith's) way of independence (which he tries to legalise ... through a settlement) he will find some way of eroding it"²⁰ The Rhodesian government, however, is of the opinion that there was not sufficient understanding of the proposals. Before any settlement could materialise, the Rhodesian government first had to implement the proposals by way of a Constitutional Amendment Act before the British government would honour its part of the agreement: granting of *de jure* independence and the abolition of sanctions. Furthermore, it was declared that built-in guarantees should obviously be part of any constitutional settlement, but "... in the last resort the effectiveness of these will depend on the faith and the goodwill of Rhodesians of all races".²¹ *The necessary position of trust for an acceptable settlement between white and black, therefore, just did not exist.*

The Muzorewa-ANC and Smith: Parity or Meritocracy?

The viewpoint of the British government after the Pearce Commission Report was that Rhodesians of all racial groups should find a way out of the political stalemate themselves and that the 1971 Proposals should serve as a basis for this. The onus was therefore placed on the Rhodesian government to come to a mutually acceptable settlement with the ANC. Such an agreement would then form the basis for the granting of *de jure* independence and international recognition. This British policy gave additional power to the ANC, because no settlement was now possible without the direct participation of blacks in future constitutional talks. The realities of the Rhodesian situation were therefore "... the emergence of the ANC as a political force and an unavoidable part of the settlement equation".²²

The Rhodesian government's viewpoint, on the other hand, was that the 1971 settlement terms were non-negotiable and that there was no question of amendment thereof to accommodate "... any further concessions to the Africans or to anybody else".²³ The Rhodesian Premier gave a preview of the style of future negotiations with the ANC, when he declared in a debate in Parliament on the Pearce Commission Report that "... each time we have negotiated, the British have given a lot more. And this is perhaps yet another lesson for the Africans".²⁴

During 1973 and 1974, the Rhodesian government was in some way or other in continual contact with black public opinion - through the chiefs, both in the Senate and in the Council of Chiefs; through black members in the House of Assembly; through the leaders of various black organisations; and through informal contacts with black businessmen and others. On the specific question of settlement there was direct contact with the two pro-settlement groups, the *African Settlement Convention* and the *African Settlement Forum*, and there were discussions with the ANC as well.²⁵ During initial talks this organisation made it very clear that *majority rule was the ultimate aim* and that the black population would not accept a settlement just because it would result in more work opportunities, better educational facilities and higher wages. *A transitional period during which there would be a sharing of power between white and black was accepted as an interim arrangement*, but this did not mean a change in the attitude of the ANC towards the 1971 proposals.²⁶ An internal settlement which, however, would not allow Rhodesia to return to legality and attain international recognition, was regarded as meaningless. Negotiations between the Rhodesian government and pro-settlement groups were therefore rejected and it was pointed out that the British government "... do not consider the Chiefs and pro-settlement groups as representative of the African people".²⁷

The Rhodesian government in further negotiations with the ANC, insisted on the *fundamental principle of advancement on merit* as contained in the 1971 Proposals: equal qualifications for the White Voters' Roll and the Higher Voters' Roll for Blacks. The ANC, however, wanted to bring about a substantial lowering and broadening of franchise qualifications for the Higher Voters' Roll for Blacks. Furthermore, the 1971 Proposals made provision for a gradual increase in black representation in the House of Assembly, as the number of voters on the Higher Voters' Roll for Blacks increased - a further application of the principle of advancement on merit. The ANC insisted on *immediate parity, with the guarantee of speedy black majority rule* thereafter.²⁸ The Rhodesian Premier found the demands of the ANC, individually and collectively, completely unacceptable

and ascribed them to the complete lack of realism in this organisation.

After this apparent stalemate in negotiations, Premier Smith repeated his offer to implement the 1971 Proposals in letter and spirit, if the British government would do the same. As long, however, as the government in London insisted on regarding the ANC as the most important mouth-piece of black opinion, there would be little hope for a settlement. British participation in settlement negotiations was regarded as the paramount stumbling block in the way of a solution to the Rhodesian problem. The necessity of an internal settlement was acknowledged, but it would not be reached as long as the ANC "... continue to look to Britain instead of coming to terms with reality in Rhodesia".²⁹ An appeal was therefore made on the British government "... (to) get off our backs and let us get on with the job".³⁰ This viewpoint of the Rhodesian government was in sharp contrast to the attitude up to that stage, namely that all negotiations should be between the British and Rhodesian governments.

In further settlement negotiations the ANC once again requested that franchise qualifications for the Higher Voters' Roll for Blacks should be determined at a lower level than that for the White Voters' Roll, in order to entitle more blacks to an immediate vote on the Higher Voters' Roll. This request was rejected on the grounds that the particular franchise qualifications were accepted criteria for determining the enfranchisement of whites. To lower it for blacks would imply that they were second-class citizens. "(Bishop Muzorewa) ... supported the principle of real advancement on merit, but without lowering standards merely to accommodate Africans",³¹ Premier Smith declared in Parliament.

The ANC leader realised, however, that there should be an immediate increase in black representation in Parliament; as a clear and tangible benefit from a settlement agreement. Should the franchise qualifications be left unchanged, the number of blacks that would be considered for the Higher Voters' Roll would initially be too few to justify more than two additional seats. It was therefore insisted that an advance of the first six seats be made, to which others would be added in terms of the formula in the 1971 Proposals. The Rhodesian Premier, however, was only prepared to give an advance of two seats.³² Later an offer would, after all, be made to the ANC of an advance of four additional seats. This would have brought the number of black seats in the House of Assembly to 20 out of a total of 70. This concession was, however, not sufficient for Bishop Muzorewa.³³

After further discussions the question of representation was the only matter on which no finality could be reached. The ANC leader continued to insist that an advance of six seats would be of some significance towards satisfying the aspirations of the black population; a gesture from the government's side that would make an impression.³⁴ On these grounds Premier Smith agreed to add two additional seats to his earlier offer of four seats. This would mean a House of Assembly of 22 black seats plus 50 white seats, and the 22 seats would therefore be less than a blocking third - 24 plus one - which could prevent retrogressive amendment of the Constitution. Two further seats would be obtainable only when the number of registered voters on the Higher Voters' Roll for Blacks reached 24 percent of the number of registered voters on the White Voters' Roll. (In terms of the 1971 Proposals there would have been 16 black seats and 50 white seats, but two additional black seats would have been added every time the number of registered voters on the Higher Voters' Roll for Blacks

reached six percent of the registered voters on the White Voters' Roll.) The aforementioned stipulation, namely the increase to 24 percent of the six percent ratio requirement between the Higher Voters' Roll for Blacks and the White Voters' Roll, actually only preserved the *status quo* on representation; and that in spite of the advance of six seats. Strictly according to the 1971 Proposals, for every addition of two seats an additional six percent was simply added to the eventual requirement of six percent for further additional seats. (Therefore: $2 + 2 + 2 = 6 + 2 = 8$, is proportionate to $6 + 6 + 6 = 18 + 6 = 24$ percent.) *It would therefore have taken the same period to obtain the fourth addition of two seats, as it would have taken if the normal procedure in terms of the 1971 Proposals were followed.*

The Rhodesian Premier voiced his satisfaction with the result of the negotiations and declared: "The ANC leader ... said that it was not often that a negotiator in his position ended up getting exactly what he had asked for."³⁵ The Central Executive Committee of the ANC, however, rejected the 1974 Proposals, because under these proposals it would have taken 40 to 60 years for blacks to reach parity with whites in Parliament. The organisation was prepared to proceed with talks with the emphasis on parliamentary representation and franchise.³⁶ Premier Smith's reaction was that the militants would have rejected any agreement, no matter what the terms may have been - except perhaps immediate parity in Parliament. When shortly afterwards, Bishop Muzorewa was asked in an interview whether blacks still accepted sharing of power (parity) or whether majority rule was their primary goal, he declared that "... majority rule of course has been and is the main objective ... but we are talking about a way of ... transferring (power) smoothly, ... there are a lot of things to be done to get to that."³⁷

As an indication of what would happen in future, Bishop Muzorewa's declaration of October 1974 that the *Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU)*, the *Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)*, the *Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI)* and the *ANC* all fight for the freedom of Rhodesia and that only their methods differed, serves as a pointer. (The *ANC* was attempting to attain its aim through constitutional channels.) During a summit conference of the aforementioned organisations in December 1974 in Lusaka, and which was also attended by the Presidents of Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana, it was agreed that a united front should be formed under the *ANC*, in order to bring about majority rule in Rhodesia. This terminated the longstanding feud between Joshua Nkomo of *ZAPU* and the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole of *ZANU* and placed them under the overall leadership of Bishop Muzorewa. Turbulence, however, was to continue behind the scenes and erupted later.

With the Vorster-Callaghan discussions in December 1974, hope once again mounted that constitutional talks could soon take place which would bring the Rhodesian stalemate to an end. However, unyielding viewpoints on the part of both the Rhodesian government and the *ANC* prolonged the stalemate. This was broken at last on 9 August 1975 with the reaching of the Pretoria Agreement, in terms of which constitutional talks would be started at Victoria Falls. This agreement, which had the full support of the Rhodesian and South African Premiers and the Presidents of Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania and Mozambique, had the following stipulations:³⁸

- (a) The Rhodesian government, through its ministerial representatives, and the *ANC*, through their appointed representatives, will meet not later than August 25 on the Victoria Falls Bridge in coaches to be

supplied by the South African government, for a formal conference without any pre-conditions.

- (b) The object of the formal meeting is to give the parties the opportunity to publicly express their genuine desire to negotiate an acceptable settlement.
- (c) After this, the conference will adjourn to enable the parties to discuss proposals for a settlement in Committee or Committees within Rhodesia.
- (d) Thereafter, the parties will meet again in formal conference anywhere decided upon to ratify the Committee proposals which have been agreed upon.

Even before the Victoria Falls Conference on 25 August 1975, Dr Edson Sithole, publicity secretary of the ANC, declared that his organisation no longer thought in terms of a transitional period of gradual progress to black majority rule. "We are now only considering the establishment of a provisional government in which there would be a majority of Africans".³⁹ Such a government would, according to him, require time to implement the transfer of power, but it could be measured in months, rather than in years. During the Victoria Falls Conference, the ANC proposed an amendment to the Pretoria Agreement to the effect that "... the only genuine settlement ... is the one that shall be based on the transfer of power from the minority to the majority ... - that is to say majority rule now..."⁴⁰ The Rhodesian government found this completely unacceptable and declared that the door would be left open for the ANC to take part in a future conference, on condition that the stipulations of the Pretoria Agreement were adhered to (especially the one relating to no pre-conditions).

After the unsuccessful Bridge Conference, the 16 black members of the Rhodesian House of Assembly declared that they had no desire to take over the role of the ANC in constitutional talks and that they recognised this organisation as the true voice of the black population. Bishop Muzorewa in turn, issued a warning to the tribal chiefs not to come to an agreement with Premier Smith. Senator Chief Chirau, chairman of the Rhodesian Council of Chiefs, declared however that the Victoria Falls talks were proof of the ANC's inability to recognise realities, that the government should now negotiate with the Council of Chiefs and that all true leaders, white and black, should pursue negotiations with Premier Smith. Earlier Chief Chirau alleged that the ANC was not a representative body, that it encouraged terrorism and promoted the aims of communism.⁴¹ With this Premier Smith associated himself when he pointed out that responsible black opinion was ready to provide positive leadership. These leaders were kept in the background, however, because of the British government's continued insistence that the ANC was the most important representative of black opinion.⁴²

The Nkomo-ANC and Smith: Black Majority Rule or Meritocracy?

The smouldering discord in the ANC (mainly between ZAPU and ZANU) had long been a matter of concern for the Rhodesian government. It made negotiations difficult, it affected the credibility of the ANC as a mouthpiece for the black population and certainly did not engender confidence among whites in Rhodesia.⁴³ The final break was to come with the establishment of an external wing of the ANC, the *Zimbabwe Liberation Council*

(ZLC), after the Bridge Conference in August 1975, under the leadership of the Reverend Sithole and with headquarters initially in Zambia. Factionalism now openly came to the fore and subsequently Nkomo was elected President of the ANC at a conference convened by his faction. The dissention in ANC ranks between the *ANC Zimbabwe* (the Nkomo group) and the *United ANC* (the Muzorewa-Sithole group) was immediately widely condemned. The absolute necessity of bringing and keeping the opposing groups in Rhodesia round the conference table was realised by everybody - except the ANC factions. Only by compromise and negotiation could peace be assured and to make this possible there had to be a cohesive organisation which could speak for all blacks. It was felt that the ANC was doing great damage to its cause and the cause of peace in Rhodesia by its aggressive display of disunity.⁴⁴

The short-term consequences of the discord in ANC ranks were a weakening of the bargaining position of moderate blacks *vis-a-vis* negotiations with the Rhodesian government. The long-term consequences would be to divide the armed struggle of the militants should a settlement not be reached. A common strategy therefore no longer existed: the Muzorewa-Sithole faction would now concentrate on guerrilla action, while the Nkomo-ANC continued negotiations with the Rhodesian government.⁴⁵ *Both strategies, seen together, synchronise however with the strategy of parallel alternatives - armed struggle and negotiations - as enunciated in the Lusaka Manifesto and the Dar es Salaam Declaration.* The outcome of the negotiations was therefore of cardinal importance for the future. These were in actual fact the continuation of the Victoria Falls Conference in committee; the only difference in how it was originally visualised, was that the Muzorewa-Sithole faction was not present.⁴⁶

Both Premier Smith and Nkomo found themselves in unenviable positions not only towards each other, but also towards their supporters. The white electorate was in no mood for any agreement which would endanger their position. Pressure groups to withstand any possible capitulation by Smith sprang up throughout Rhodesia. These developments indicated a *hardening in the attitude of the white electorate.* If the Rhodesian Premier could reach an agreement, it was improbable that he would be able to sell it to his own people. And yet, the Rhodesian government admitted that although an agreement was essentially an internal matter, there was no doubt that a settlement would have enormous advantages for the stability of the whole of Southern Africa. For this reason and "... in the light of the aftermath of the Communist intervention in Angola there is an added urgency"⁴⁷ Nkomo, in turn, had to cope with *increasing militancy* in his own ranks and *among the black population* in general. In Black Africa, his task was seen as a final effort to achieve immediate majority rule by peaceful means. Should this fail, however, it would prove that "... Africa's olive branch - the option to negotiate - has been conclusively eschewed by Smith. Africa will then know where to turn, to those who hold the gun."⁴⁸

In his first policy speech as ANC President, Nkomo insisted on *immediate majority rule*, if possible through negotiations; should this fail, however, he foresaw an intensified armed struggle. It was already clear, at that stage, that if any settlement under his leadership were to materialise, it would probably be based on an initial sharing of power, rather than on the immediate establishment of majority rule. Premier Smith had already declared earlier that *eventual sharing of power between white and black is absolutely logical, as well as common sense.* "The ideal is to be governed by the best people who are available

in Rhodesia, irrespective of colour."⁴⁹ The Rhodesian government has repeatedly made it clear that it would find any constitutional solution based on immediate black majority rule completely unacceptable. Once again therefore a clash of principles was unavoidable.

Nkomo's proposals included three interlinked voters' rolls, determined by personal income, job security and educational qualifications, but with provision for universal adult suffrage. The "A" Voters' Roll (36 seats) would be dominated by whites and a small number of blacks; the "B" Voters' Roll (72 seats) would include a majority of black voters; and the "C" Voters' Roll would accommodate the remaining voters not able to qualify for one of the two higher voters' rolls. Such an arrangement would have resulted in an overall black majority in the House of Assembly after the first general elections and would have led to majority government after expiry of the agreed transitional period.⁵⁰

In contrast to this, the Rhodesian government came forward with proposals for an increase of the number of seats in the House of Assembly, which would bring the black seats to a blocking third. The only concession was the abolition of the link between black representation and the income tax payable by blacks, as written into the 1969 Constitution. This would, according to the government's own statisticians, possibly bring about majority rule in two decades.⁵¹ From this it is clear that there was a wide gulf between the Rhodesian government and the Nkomo-ANC, both in terms of objectives and understanding of the issues central to the conflict (see Tables 1 and 2).

It is therefore not surprising that the negotiations sprang off irrevocably on 19 March 1976. In a joint statement by the Rhodesian government and the ANC it was stated that after much deliberation, stretching over a period of months, a stalemate had been reached. The talks were, therefore, discontinued to provide opportunity for consultation and reflection.⁵²

In a document the ANC alleged that the Rhodesian government accepted the principle of majority rule, but "... in some indefinite future too far ahead to be accepted by the ANC". In case an acceptable settlement was reached, the Rhodesian Front proposed immediate parity in the Cabinet, but not in Parliament. The document detailed further government proposals for a three-tier House of Assembly in which a third of the seats would be reserved for whites, a third for blacks and a third would be national seats on a common voters' roll with high franchise qualifications.⁵³ This arrangement would assure a white majority of some sort for an indefinite period. There was difference of opinion on how long it would be, but it surely would have been longer than the ANC was in a position to consider. (The Rhodesian government was of the opinion that it could be from 10 to 15 years.) *The talks therefore stranded on the single and fundamental issue of immediate majority rule.*

According to the Rhodesian government, the negotiations broke down for two reasons. In the first place, the ANC demanded that the Rhodesian government should immediately transfer its powers to an interim Council composed of an equal number of Government and ANC ministers. A chairman would then be appointed by the British government and should have a deciding vote in case of a tie of votes. Parliament should also immediately be disbanded and the interim Council would rule by decree until the first Parliament under the new constitution was elected. In the second place, the ANC insisted on a parliamentary structure and

franchise qualifications which would ensure a substantial black majority in Parliament at the first election.⁵⁴ These demands were totally unacceptable, especially because they were *inter alia*, a return to the British demands during the *Tiger* talks.

March 1976, will probably become known as the great watershed in Rhodesia's political history; the events that took place then were momentous and may have far-reaching implications not only for Southern Africa, but also for the whole continent. It would appear as if the battle lines have been drawn. Nkomo categorically rejected any further negotiations. "We have come to the end of the road. The consequences are not of our choosing and not of our making."⁵⁵ President Kaunda referred to "... a new and formidable era in which majority rule must irrevocably be decided on the battlefield...."⁵⁶ On the other hand, Premier Smith quite frankly declared: "I don't believe in black majority rule ever in Rhodesia, not in a thousand years." In the same breath, however, he also referred to "... responsible majority rule as opposed to irresponsible majority rule."⁵⁷

Attitude of the British Government

The British government, under Labour Party rule, over the last few years increasingly interfered with the Rhodesian constitutional issue in spite of an understanding reached with the previous Conservative Party government after the Pearce debacle. This was that, whereas negotiations up to 1971 had taken place on an inter-governmental level, it should be attempted in future to reach an internal settlement by way of direct negotiations between the Rhodesian government and the black nationalists. The interference by the British government in the dispute, however, made realistic negotiations impossible. For this reason the Rhodesian government was compelled to request the British government to accept its responsibilities and once again participate in settlement talks.⁵⁸

In reaction to this, the British government, through Foreign Secretary Callaghan, made four conditions for British re-entry into formal discussions. All the main parties to the dispute (including the nationalist movements) had first to conform to these conditions before a settlement could be reached which would accommodate black aspirations and also eliminate white fears.⁵⁹ The conditions were: (1) acceptance of the principle of majority rule; (2) agreement that there would be no independence before majority rule; (3) a period of 18 months to two years before elections for majority rule; and (4) no long drawn out settlement negotiations. In *The Times* (London) of 23 March 1976 the opinion was expressed that "... no agreement would be worth anything until the principle of majority rule opens the door to new negotiations."⁶⁰

The Rhodesian government rejected the Callaghan proposals and declared that the British government was as out of touch with the realities of the Rhodesian situation as in the past. These proposals were no less extreme than those of the ANC; especially so the revival of the demand of *No Independence before Majority Rule* (NIBMAR). The Rhodesian white opposition parties, the *Rhodesia Party* and the *Centre Party*, also expressed some hesitation about the proposals and stated that a timetable of five years before majority rule would be more realistic.

The New Initiative

The Rhodesian government has always regarded the tribal chiefs as the

true leaders of the black population. The powers of the chiefs were increased by way of legislative amendments, such as the *Constitutional Amendment Act* of September 1966, according to which the powers of the tribal chiefs were broadened and customary law was made applicable to all blacks in Rhodesia. Similarly, the *African Affairs Amendment Act* of October 1966, increased the powers of the tribal chiefs by awarding them administrative authority in tribal areas.⁶¹ Since 1970, the government has attempted to strengthen the tribal system institutionally by means of the Senate, by assuring the tribal chiefs of greater participation in the political process. In actual fact, both the House of Assembly (through 8 tribally elected members) and the Senate (through 10 tribal chiefs) provide for the handling of tribal interests. The general tendency in Africa - with few exceptions - is, however, to discard traditional leaders, and thus the tribal system is subjected to tremendous strain. Representation in the legislature, which was acquired due to the prominence of the tribal system, offers the blacks (under present conditions) a channel for political representation which should be fully exploited and utilised.

With the appointment of four Senator Chiefs as ministers, and of three tribally elected members of the House of Assembly as deputy ministers, Premier Smith launched a new initiative on 28 April 1976. He believes that it gives expression to the Rhodesian government's *philosophy of responsible majority rule* and *policy of maintenance of standards*. He has also declared that the government has been waiting a long time for the opportunity of launching this new initiative. While he negotiated with Britain and the ANC, it was important that he should retain his bargaining counters.⁶² And yet, it is surprising that the Rhodesian Premier waited almost 10 years to initiate a political reform which was already included in the *Tiger* proposals. This was namely, that two blacks from outside the governing party, be appointed as ministers in an interim government. The same stipulation was included in the *Fearless* proposals, namely the establishment of a *broad-based administration* with two blacks, of unspecified rank, as ministers.⁶³ In his appointment of four Senator Chiefs as ministers, Premier Smith has declared that, in the difficult times now encountered in Rhodesia, it has become necessary to form a *government of national unity*, and that it would not be necessary for the new black ministers to join the Rhodesian Front.

Although this is a movement in the right direction, *it would appear that this new initiative would not be able to accommodate the demands of the here and now - possibly those of six or seven years ago. At that time blocking quarter and blocking third mechanisms, which had to prevent retrogressive amendment of the Constitution and which had to lead to eventual parity in Parliament, were central to the dispute. Today the demand of the black nationalists is: immediate majority rule. Both factions of the ANC have forthwith rejected the new plan as an alliance of the Rhodesian government with conservative and unrepresentative tribal elements.*

The Rhodesian Impasse: Implications for Southern Africa

It is difficult to see how the re-entry of Britain into constitutional talks can convince the Rhodesian government to accept black majority rule, or the Nkomo-ANC to relinquish the demand for it. It is highly improbable that any method remains untried to bridge the gulf between Premier Smith's 10 year transitional period (should it be as short as that!) and the one or two years which are the most which Nkomo can concede. Without a positive commitment to early majority rule, Nkomo - already in the unenviable position of *moderate* in black politics - cannot retain the support of his

faction of the ANC; and, at least as important, the support of Presidents Kaunda, Khama, Nyerere and Machel, who alone are capable of keeping the militants in check. For Premier Smith, his own proposals could have led to black majority rule in two decades, in spite of all the "never ever" talk. If he had been prepared, at an earlier stage, to submit to less extreme demands by the ANC, the situation could have been saved. With every series of negotiations the demands of the blacks became more and more *radical*, with the result that the Rhodesian government's concessions were always that one step behind.

In Black Africa the problem of Rhodesia is now seen as primarily an African responsibility. The role which Britain can play in a settlement is questioned, because the so-called "six principles" have lost their applicability to the crisis situation in Rhodesia. A diplomat of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) states that there remains only one principle: *the transfer of political power to the majority.*⁶⁴ The increasing swing towards militancy in African ranks is further illustrated by a statement by President Kaunda, one of the main architects of the détente efforts in Southern Africa: "We had warned that if there is no natural birth of Zimbabwe, a caesarian operation will have to be performed. Africa has now got sufficient surgeons to bring about an operation."⁶⁵

For South Africa's relations with Black Africa, the Rhodesian question is indeed one of primary importance, because *Rhodesia has always been the main stumbling block in the way of a normalisation of relations; initially with the outward movement and dialogue, and now again with the détente efforts.*⁶⁶ Both the Lusaka Manifesto and the Dar es Salaam Declaration place a high premium on independence for Rhodesia, on the basis of black majority rule.⁶⁷ South Africa's continued support for Rhodesia has made it difficult for the Republic to realise its aims in Africa. *The African states regard Rhodesia, therefore, as a test case for South Africa's credibility in the search for peaceful solutions to the problems of Southern Africa.* "South Africa has a strong leverage upon the Smith government (and) it is therefore expected to ensure that ... constitutional talks produce positive results by making it clear to the Rhodesian Front government that if talks failed the Republic would no longer provide those facilities which have enabled Rhodesia to survive (sanctions)...."⁶⁸ This expectation of Black Africa is, at the same time, also South Africa's dilemma.

The aforementioned viewpoint puts South Africa in an unenviable position. *As the most important power in the Southern African region, the Republic cannot escape involvement, in one way or another, in the political turbulence of this sub-continent. South Africa has always - in its external relations - put heavy emphasis on the principle of non-interference in other states' domestic affairs. Non-interference does not, however, imply indifference to conditions which concern the Republic's interests directly or which may influence it. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Rhodesian government has continually been advised, through the appropriate channels, of the urgent necessity for a constitutional settlement. The attainment of an acceptable settlement with the blacks in Rhodesia is of primary importance for the momentum of the policy of détente in Southern Africa.*

REFERENCES

1. de Smith, S.A., *The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions*, Stevens and Sons, London, 1964, p. 71.
2. *Rhodesian Commentary* (2 June 1969), Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism, Government Printer, Salisbury, p. 2.
3. See Good, R.C., *UDI : The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion*, Faber and Faber, London, 1973, pp. 150 and 177.
4. See *Ibid.*, pp 192 and 193.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
6. In any constitution there are certain clauses which are specially entrenched and which can only be amended by a two-thirds or three-quarters majority vote in the legislature. A "minority group" can prevent retrogressive amendment of the constitution and protect its particular interests by ensuring that it controls at least a third plus one, or a quarter plus one, of the seats in Parliament. That is why mention is made of a "blocking third" or "blocking quarter" of seats, which prevents retrogressive amendment; i.e. it serves as a blocking mechanism.
7. The fairly complicated system of cross-voting gave each voter on the "A" Voters' Roll a quarter vote in an electoral district for the "B" Voters' Roll. On the other hand, every voter on the "B" Voters' Roll was given a quarter vote in a constituency for the "A" Voters' Roll. In this manner the one voters' roll has a marginal influence on the other (25 percent), a method by which - it was hoped - the *de facto* racial characteristic of the system of dual voters' rolls would be slightly tempered.
8. See *Rhodesia: Statement on Anglo-Rhodesian Relations (December 1966 to May 1969)*, Government Printer, Salisbury, pp. 3, 4 and 8.
9. Good, R.C., *op. cit.*, pp. 279 - 280.
10. See *Rhodesia: Statement on Anglo-Rhodesian Relations, op. cit.*, pp. 14 - 15.
11. See *Ibid.*, pp. 18 - 19.
12. See "Anglo-Rhodesian Relations: Prime Minister's Address to Parliament, 25 November 1971", in *Rhodesia: For the Record, No. 15*, Government Printer, Salisbury, pp. 1 - 2.
13. Prime Minister's Statement on the Constitutional Dispute, Settlement Proposals and African Opinion, 19 June 1974, in *Rhodesia: For the Record, No. 23*, Government Printer, Salisbury, p. 4.
14. "Anglo-Rhodesian Relations: Prime Minister's Address to Parliament", in *Rhodesia: For the Record, No. 15, op. cit.*, p. 2.
15. See *Ibid.*
16. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

17. See *Rhodesia : Statement on Anglo-Rhodesian Relations, op. cit.*, p. 1.
18. Muzorewa, A., "The Role of the ANC", in *Zimbabwe Now* (Edited by S. Wilmer), Rex Collings, London, 1972, p. 116.
19. See *Rhodesia: Report of the Commission on Rhodesian Opinion under the Chairmanship of the Right Honourable the Lord Pearce (May 1972)*, Cmnd. 4964, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, pp. 83 - 84.
20. *African Development* (London), Vol. 8., No. 10, October 1974, p. 21.
21. "Prime Minister answers Questions posed by Clive Small of the BBC and Dr. L. Meysels, Senior Editor, Wochenpresse, Vienna, 4 June, 1975", in *Rhodesia: For the Record*, No. 27, Government Printer, Salisbury, p. 11.
22. Chambati, A.M., "The African National Council and the Rhodesian Situation", in *Rhodesia: Mid- 1974*, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, July 1974, p. 8.
23. "The Prime Minister, the Hon. I.D. Smith, replies to the Debate on the Pearce Commission, June 1972", in *Rhodesia: For the Record*, No. 19, Government Printer, Salisbury, p. 9.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
25. See "Prime Minister's Statement on the Settlement Issue, 29 June 1973", in *Rhodesia: For the Record*, No. 22, Government Printer, Salisbury, p. 1.
26. See Chambati, A.M., *op. cit.*, pp. 11 - 12.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
28. See "Prime Minister's Statement on the Settlement Issue", in *Rhodesia: For the Record*, No. 22, *op. cit.*, p. 2.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
30. *Ibid.*
31. "Prime Minister's Statement on the Constitutional Dispute, Settlement Proposals and African Opinion", in *Rhodesia: For the Record*, No. 23, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
32. See *Ibid.*, p. 6.
33. See Chambati, A.M., *Détente - An External View* (paper delivered at a conference on "South Africa in Africa: An Evaluation of Détente", on occasion of the 46th Annual Council Meeting of the South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 21 - 23 January, 1976), p. 12.
34. See "Prime Minister's Statement on the Constitutional Dispute, Settlement Proposals and African Opinion", in *Rhodesia: For the Record*, No. 23, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
35. *Ibid.*

36. See Chambati, A.M., "The African National Council and the Rhodesian Situation", in *Rhodesia: Mid-1974*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
37. *African Development* (London), Vol. 8, No. 10, October 1974, p. 21.
38. See "Statement to Parliament on 26 August 1975 by the Rhodesian Prime Minister, the Hon. Ian D. Smith, concerning the Victoria Falls Conference of 25 August 1975", in *Southern Africa Record* (Number Four), South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, February 1976, p. 9.
39. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Vol. 21 (October 20 - 26, 1975), Keesing's Publications, London, p. 27399.
40. "Prime Minister's Statement to Parliament on the Victoria Falls Conference: Tuesday, August 26, 1975", in *Rhodesia: For the Record*, No. 28, Government Printer, Salisbury, p. 5.
41. See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, *op. cit.*, p. 27400.
42. See "Prime Minister's Statement on the Constitutional Dispute, Settlement Proposals and African Opinion", in *Rhodesia: For the Record*, No. 23, *op. cit.*, pp. 9 - 10.
43. See "Prime Minister answers Questions posed by Clive Small of the BBC and Dr. L. Meysels, Senior Editor, Wochenpresse, Vienna", in *Rhodesia: For the Record*, No. 27, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
44. See *Africa Research Bulletin*, Vol. 12, No. 9 (October 15, 1975), Africa Research Limited, Exeter (England), p. 3766.
45. Later a so-called "Third Force" emerged - a sixteen member Military High Command, of which the main task was to conduct the guerrilla offensive under the leadership of people like Robert Mugabe.
46. See *Africa* (London), No. 52, December 1975, pp. 86 - 87.
47. "Prime Minister's Statement to Parliament, 20 February 1976", in *Rhodesia: For the Record*, No. 32, Government Printer, Salisbury, p. 3.
48. *Africa* (No. 52), *op. cit.*, p. 87.
49. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, *op. cit.*, p. 27101.
50. See *Africa* (London), No. 55, March 1976, p. 79.
51. See *Ibid.*
52. See *Africa Research Bulletin*, Vol. 13, No. 3. (April 15, 1976), Africa Research Limited, Exeter (England), p. 3969.
53. See *Ibid.*, p. 3970.
54. See *Ibid.*
55. *Africa* (London), No. 56, April 1976, p. 9.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

57. "Press Interview with the Prime Minister of Rhodesia, the Hon. Ian Douglas Smith, 20 March 1976", in *Rhodesia: For the Record*, No. 33, Government Printer, Salisbury, p. 4.
58. See *Ibid.*, p. 1.
59. See *Africa Research Bulletin* (Vol. 13, No. 3), *op. cit.*, p. 3971.
60. *The Times* (London), 23 March, 1976.
61. See *Africa South of the Sahara 1975*, Europa Publications Limited, London, p. 674.
62. See "The New Initiative: Broadcast to the Nation by the Prime Minister, Mr. Ian Smith, 27 April, 1976", in *Rhodesia: For the Record*, No. 35, Government Printer, Salisbury, pp. 4 - 5.
63. See Good, R.C., *op. cit.*, pp. 193 and 274.
64. See *Africa* (No. 55), *op. cit.*, p. 82.
65. *Ibid.*
66. See Chambati, A.M., *Détente - An External View*, *op. cit.*, pp. 6 - 7.
67. See "The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa, April 1969", and the "Dar es Salaam Declaration on Southern Africa, 10 April 1975", in *Southern Africa Record* (Number Two), South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, June 1975, pp. 5 and 40.
68. Chambati, A.M., *Détente - An External View*, *op. cit.*, pp. 11 - 12.

TABLE 1

RHODESIA: FRANCHISE QUALIFICATIONS

1961 CONSTITUTION

(Cross-voting influence of 25 percent between "A" and "B" Voters' Rolls)

"A" VOTERS' ROLL

CATEGORY	INCOME (per annum, during each of two years preceding registration)	PROPERTY (fixed)	EDUCATION	OFFICIAL STATUS
1	£792	£1650	-	-
or				
2	£528	£1100	Primary education	-
or				
3	£330	£ 550	Four years Secondary education	-
or				
4	-	-	-	Chief or Kraal head

"B" VOTERS' ROLL

CATEGORY	INCOME (during six months preceding registration)	PROPERTY (fixed)	EDUCATION	OFFICIAL STATUS
1	£264	£ 495	-	-
or				
2	£132	£ 275	Two years Secondary education	-
or				
(thirty years and above)				
3	£132	£ 275	Primary education	-
or				
4	£198	£ 385	-	-
or				
5	-	-	-	Kraal head with a following of twenty or more heads of families
or				
6	-	-	-	Ministers of religion

1965 CONSTITUTION

(Cross-voting influence of 25 percent between "A" and "B" Voters' Rolls)

"A" VOTERS' ROLL

CATEGORY	INCOME (per annum, during each of two years preceding registration)	PROPERTY (fixed)	EDUCATION	OFFICIAL STATUS
1	£792	£1650	-	-
or				
2	£528	£1100	Four years Secondary education	-
or				
3	£330	£ 550	Four years Secondary education	-
or				
4	-	-	-	Chief or Kraal head

"B" VOTERS' ROLL

CATEGORY	INCOME (during six months preceding registration)	PROPERTY (fixed)	EDUCATION	OFFICIAL STATUS
1	£264	£ 495	-	-
or				
2	£132	£ 275	Two years Secondary education	-
or				
(thirty years and above)				
3	£132	£ 275	Primary education	-
or				
4	£198	£ 385	-	-
or				
5	-	-	-	Kraal head with a following of twenty or more heads of families
or				
6	-	-	-	Ministers of religion

1966 HMS TIGER PROPOSALS (British Demands)

(Cross-voting influence of 25 percent between "A" and "B" Voters' Rolls)

"A" VOTERS' ROLL

CATEGORY	INCOME (per annum, during each of two years preceding registration)	PROPERTY (fixed)	EDUCATION	OFFICIAL STATUS
1	£792	£1650	-	-
or				
2	£528	£1100	Primary education	-
or				
3	£330	£ 550	Four years Secondary education	-
or				
4	-	-	-	Chief or Kraal head

"B" VOTERS' ROLL

All blacks over the age of thirty.

1968 HMS FEARLESS PROPOSALS

(Cross-voting influence of 25 percent between "A" and "B" Voters' Rolls: *British Proposal*). (Cross-voting influence of 10 percent between "A" and "B" Voters' Rolls: *Rhodesian Proposal*).

"A" VOTERS' ROLL

CATEGORY	INCOME (per annum, during each of two years preceding registration)	PROPERTY (fixed)	EDUCATION	OFFICIAL STATUS
1	£792	£1650	-	-
or				
2	£528	£1100	Primary education	-
or				
3	£330	£ 550	Four years Secondary education	-
or				
4	-	-	-	Chief or Kraal head

"B" VOTERS' ROLL

British Proposal: All blacks over the age of thirty.

Rhodesian Proposal: Retention of franchise qualifications for "B" Voters' Roll as in 1961 Constitution. (If *British Proposal* is accepted only 10 percent cross-voting influence between "A" and "B" Voters' Rolls, or sliding scale varying between 25 and 10 percent cross-voting influence according to specific qualifications for "B" Voters' Roll.)

1969 Salisbury Proposal: All blacks over age of thirty. (Higher Section with franchise qualifications of "B" Voters' Roll of 1961 Constitution; Lower Section for all other blacks over thirty years, but without any cross-voting influence.)

1969 CONSTITUTION

WHITE VOTERS' ROLL

CATEGORY	INCOME (per annum, during each of two years preceding registration)	PROPERTY (fixed)	EDUCATION	OFFICIAL STATUS
1 or 2 or 3	£900 £600 -	£1800 £1200 -	- Four years Secondary education -	- - Ministers of religion

BLACK VOTERS' ROLL

1 or 2 or 3	£300 £200 -	£ 600 £ 400 -	- Two years Secondary education -	- - Ministers of religion
-------------------------	-------------------	---------------------	--	------------------------------------

1971 PROPOSALS (Smith-Home Agreement)

WHITE VOTERS' ROLL AND HIGHER VOTERS' ROLL FOR BLACKS

CATEGORY	INCOME (per annum, during each of two years preceding registration)	PROPERTY (fixed)	EDUCATION	OFFICIAL STATUS
1 or 2	£1800 £1200	£3600 £2400	- Four years Secondary education	- -

LOWER VOTERS' ROLL FOR BLACKS

1 or 2 or (thirty years and above)	£600 £300 -	£1100 £ 600 -	- Two years Secondary education -	- -
3 or 4 or 5	£300 £430 -	£ 600 £ 800 -	Primary education - -	- - Kraal head with a following of twenty or more heads of families

1974/75 MUZOREWA-SMITH NEGOTIATIONS (Basis: 1971 Proposals)

ANC DEMAND: Lowering of qualifications for the Higher Voters' Roll for Blacks.

GOVERNMENT POSITION: Equal qualifications for White Voters' Roll and Higher Voters' Roll for Blacks.

1976 NKOMO-SMITH NEGOTIATIONS

ANC DEMAND: Interlinked "A", "B" and "C" Voters' Rolls determined by personal income, job security and educational qualifications, but with universal adult suffrage - would result in overall majority in Parliament (no details of franchise qualifications available).

GOVERNMENT OFFER: Abolition of income tax payable as regulating device on black representation, as determined by 1961 Constitution. Retention of White Voters' Roll and Higher Voters' Roll for Blacks and the introduction of a Common Voters' Roll with high franchise qualifications - would guarantee white majority in Parliament (no details of franchise qualifications available).

1976 STATUS QUO

WHITE VOTERS' ROLL

CATEGORY	INCOME (per annum, during each of two years preceding registration)	PROPERTY (fixed)	EDUCATION	OFFICIAL STATUS
1	£900	£1800	-	-
or				
2	£600	£1200	Four years Secondary education	-
or				
3	-	-	-	Ministers of religion

BLACK VOTERS' ROLL

1	£300	£ 600	-	-
or				
2	£200	£ 400	Two years Secondary education	-
or				
3	-	-	-	Ministers of religion

TABLE 2

RHODESIA: REPRESENTATION

1961 CONSTITUTION

(Unicameral Parliament: 65 members)

HOUSE	TYPE OF CONSTITUENCY	NUMBER OF SEATS
Legislative Assembly (65 members)	"A" Voters' Roll (Constituencies)	50 (<i>de facto</i> white)
	"B" Voters' Roll (Electoral Districts)	15 (<i>de facto</i> black)

1965 CONSTITUTION

(Unicameral Parliament: 65 members)

HOUSE	TYPE OF CONSTITUENCY	NUMBER OF SEATS
Legislative Assembly (65 members)	"A" Voters' Roll (Constituencies)	50 (<i>de facto</i> white)
	"B" Voters' Roll (Electoral Districts)	15 (<i>de facto</i> black)

1966 HMS TIGER PROPOSALS (*British Demands*)

(Bicameral Parliament: 93 members)

HOUSE	TYPE OF CONSTITUENCY	NUMBER OF SEATS
Legislative Assembly (67 members)	"A" Voters' Roll	33 (<i>de facto</i> white)
	"B" Voters' Roll	17 (<i>de facto</i> black)
Senate (26 members)	Reserved white seats	17
	White seats	12
	Black seats	14
	Elected Senators	(8)
	Chiefs	(6)

1968 HMS FEARLESS PROPOSALS

(Bicameral Parliament: 93 (89) (95) members)

HOUSE	TYPE OF CONSTITUENCY	NUMBER OF SEATS		
		<i>British Proposal</i>	<i>Rhodesian Proposal</i>	<i>1969 Salisbury Proposal</i>
Legislative Assembly (67 (65) (67) members)	"A" Voters' Roll	33 (<i>de facto</i> white)	35 (<i>de facto</i> white)	33 (<i>de facto</i> white)
	"B" Voters' Roll	17 (<i>de facto</i> black)	15 (<i>de facto</i> black)	17 (<i>de facto</i> black)
	Reserved white seats	17	15	17
Senate (16 (24) (28) members)	White seats	12	12	14
	Black seats	14	12	14
	Elected Senators Chiefs	(8) (6)	(-)(6) (12)(6)	(8) (6)

1969 CONSTITUTION

(Bicameral Parliament: 89 members)

HOUSE	TYPE OF CONSTITUENCY	NUMBER OF SEATS
House of Assembly (66 members)	White Voters' Roll (Constituencies)	50
	Black Voters' Roll (Electoral Districts)	16
	Directly elected members (four each from Mashonaland and Matabeleland)	(8)
	Indirectly elected Tribal Chiefs (four each from Mashonaland and Matabeleland)	(8)
Senate (23 members)	Indirectly elected white Senators	10
	Tribal Chiefs nominated by Council of Chiefs (five each from Mashonaland and Matabeleland)	10
	Senators nominated by Head of State	3

1971 PROPOSALS (Smith-Home Agreement)

(Bicameral Parliament: 89 (123) members)

HOUSE	TYPE OF CONSTITUENCY	NUMBER OF SEATS
House of Assembly (66 (100) members)	White Voters' Roll and Higher Voters' Roll for Blacks	50
	Lower Voters' Roll for Blacks	16 + (2 x 17) = 50+
Senate (23 members)	Indirectly elected white Senators	10
	Tribal Chiefs nominated by Council of Chiefs (five each from Mashonaland and Matabeleland)	10
	Senators nominated by Head of State	3

1974/75 MUZOREWA-SMITH NEGOTIATIONS (Basis: 1971 Proposals)

ANC DEMAND: Immediate parity in Parliament (1974); immediate majority in Parliament (1975).

GOVERNMENT OFFER: Six seats in advance on 1971 terms; less than *blocking third*.

HOUSE	TYPE OF CONSTITUENCY	NUMBER OF SEATS	
		ANC Proposal	Government Proposal
House of Assembly (66 (100+) (72) members)	White Voters' Roll	50	50
	Black Voters' Roll	50 (+)	22 (16 + 6) (Blocking third: 25)

+ Two black seats are added every time the number of voters on the Higher Voters' Roll for Blacks equals 6 (12) (18) (24) etc. percent of the voters on the White Voters' Roll. These increases continue until parity is reached (16 + 34). Additions are alternated with directly elected and indirectly elected members. On the attainment of parity, the black voters will get an opportunity to decide by means of a referendum, whether the indirectly elected members are to be replaced by directly elected members.

1976 NKOMO-SMITH NEGOTIATIONS

ANC DEMAND: Immediate and overall majority in Parliament.

GOVERNMENT OFFER: Parity in Cabinet; *blocking third* in Parliament.

HOUSE	TYPE OF CONSTITUENCY	NUMBER OF SEATS ANC Proposal	Government Proposal
House of Assembly (66 (109+) (75) members)	"A" Voters' Roll	36 (<i>de facto</i> white)	
	(White Voters' Roll)		25 (<i>de facto</i> white)
	"B" Voters' Roll	72 (<i>de facto</i> black)	
	(Black Voters' Roll)		25 (16 + 9) (<i>blocking third</i> : 25) (<i>de facto</i> black)
	"C" Voters' Roll	1 + (?) (<i>de facto</i> black)	
	(Common Voters' Roll - National seats)		25 (<i>de facto</i> white)

1976 STATUS QUO

(Bicameral Parliament: 89 members)

HOUSE	TYPE OF CONSTITUENCY	NUMBER OF SEATS
House of Assembly (66 members)	White Voters' Roll (Constituencies)	50
	Black Voters' Roll (Electoral Districts)	16
	Directly elected members (four each from Mashonaland and Matabeleland)	(8)
	Indirectly elected Tribal Chiefs (four each from Mashonaland and Matabeleland)	(8)
Senate (23 members)	Indirectly elected white Senators	10
	Tribal Chiefs nominated by Council of Chiefs (five each from Mashonaland and Matabeleland)	10
	Senators nominated by Head of State	3