


THE IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSKEIAN INDEPENDENCE

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An on-going study group on *The International Implications of Homeland Independence* was established in August, 1975. So far this group has concentrated on aspects of the Transkei's forthcoming independence. This paper was initially presented, as a short working paper, to a meeting of the group at Jan Smuts House on 17 September, 1975. It is intended that this should be the first paper in a series on the Transkei.

It should be noted that, as the Institute is precluded by its Constitution from itself expressing an opinion on any aspect of international affairs, opinions expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and not of the Institute.

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Over the years much doubt has been cast on the South African Government's proclaimed intentions towards the Transkei. Even the goal of independence for the Transkei has often been greeted with quite incredulity, not only in Opposition circles, but also among some Government supporters. Now however, it is clear that the Transkei's independence is about to become a reality, and that in October, 1976, the cluster of Southern African states will be joined by a new Republic of the Transkei.

The implications of Transkeian independence run deep and will reach out to all the peoples of Southern Africa. Yet, because of the years of doubt and incredulity, the implications are neither widely nor fully appreciated. Furthermore there is a lack of informed opinion on what independence for the Transkei holds, or should hold for those immediately concerned. In the months remaining before independence, as well as thereafter, this gap needs to be filled. This study group of the Institute will attempt to make a modest contribution towards this end.

From the South African point of view the most important implications of the Transkei's independence are:

- That Transkeian independence should in itself be successful and, moreover, lead to peaceful and friendly relations between the established and the new states. This is in turn *vital to a successful unfolding of South African Government policy*. This is a hinge upon which much of the Government's future stance will turn - both with regard to race relations in South Africa proper, and South Africa's position and credibility in the rest of Africa.
- That Transkeian independence should be successful is of course of supreme importance to the Transkei itself; but this is in turn of *cardinal importance to the position of Blacks in South Africa, as well as Black political attitudes generally*.

For the purpose of this paper, one may define successful independence not only as a sustained ability to provide good, orderly government, but also the ability to create a climate for sufficient economic growth to satisfy Transkeian aspirations. This, of course, must be accompanied by at least a generally acceptable amount of individual freedom.

Good relations between the two governments after independence are in a further sense vital to both countries:

- A well-disposed Transkei can help provide White South Africa with what it needs most - security, particularly the security which it requires to sustain economic growth for everyone.

- Similarly a well-disposed South Africa can in turn help provide the Transkei with what it needs most - economic growth. South Africa's support in this respect, by way of capital investment, technical aid, and other assistance, could be decisive. For, looking at the rest of Black Africa, it is clear that assistance from elsewhere, from both East and West, is limited and insufficient.

In view of these considerations, it follows that independence for the Transkei should, paradoxically, increase fair dealing and interchange between the established and the new states. A Transkei isolated by independence bodes ill for all.

A number of special factors also attach importance to the Transkei's coming independence:

The first is that, in this particular case, *independence should be seen as also conferring equality*. Because of an intertwined past; because of all the racial implications; because of African and international considerations, the Transkei's independence is inescapably interlocked with the whole question of Black/White equality. In consequence independence should also mean equality, or at least a definite, unquestioned and irrevocable move towards equality. This is perhaps the nub of all matters relating to post-independence relations between the two peoples.

With independence the Transkei will, of course, move into a position of formal equality with the South African Government, in accordance with international law and custom. But in the international world it is only too obvious that some nations are, in practice, more equal than others. In the context of Southern Africa this painful but hard fact has at times become apparent in South Africa's relations with the BLS countries. This is rather unfortunate, but understandable in terms of their separate historical backgrounds, tutelage and emancipation.

However, one must distinguish between equality in fact (in respect of a country's population figures, differing levels of skills, its resources and the development it generates), and equality in treatment (in respect of how a country is dealt with by others, how it is accepted, or paid attention to).

When it comes to reality, the Transkei - like other countries bordering on South Africa - will be manifestly unequal to the Republic. Nonetheless, because the Transkei is of South Africa's own making, duly emancipated by the Republic, with all the concomitant responsibilities, and moreover with a real bond of mutual self-interest, there should be a consistent attempt on the part of South Africa at equal treatment. Furthermore, the peoples of the Transkei should be offered as much assistance as possible by South Africa towards equality in fact, especially with aid in the development of their skills and resources.

The United States, for example, may be able to accord more cursory equality of treatment to, say, Sri Lanka, and offer it some desultory aid to nudge it towards equality in fact. But South Africa cannot do this with regard to the Transkei - their destinies are too closely interlinked. The Republic needs to treat the Transkei as its equal; it will be in difficulties if it does not.

The second special consideration affecting Transkeian independence concerns the international position of both countries. *There must be no justification for regarding the Transkei as nothing more than a satellite of South Africa* - for the Transkei's own sake and for that of the Republic. This problem involves not only the difficult question of recognition of the Transkei internationally (a matter in which the attitude of the African states will be of cardinal importance), but also the long-term credibility of the Republic with regard to its racial policies. Internationally, therefore, a certain degree of dissociation between the Transkei and South Africa would seem to be required, and to be understood by both sides - clearly with certain internal political benefits to be gained by the Umtata Government as well.

Then there are the very special considerations which arise from the extraordinary and complicated mutual involvement of the peoples and economies of the Transkei and South Africa - Transkeians living in the Republic; South Africans living in the Transkei; a single, inextricably intertwined economy; a great number of services to be shared, etc., etc. All these involve constant political interplay. The interstate relations will in some cases be even closer than is the case in the European Economic Community.

Here a number of questions vital to the future co-existence of the two countries come to the fore. They raise a number of political, economic and social issues. For example:

- Are there going to be common institutions for both communities? Will these be brought together under one consultative and/or policy-making umbrella? Will new joint institutions thus be created? Or will there be Transkeian representation on, or consultation with, existing South African institutions, for example the Board of Trade and Industry, the Reserve Bank, Escom, the Post Office, SA Railways, etc.?
- Then again, what sort of economic arrangement should be jointly arrived at? A Customs Union, in line with the BLS Agreement or the European Common Market? An Economic Union such as exists in the United States? Or a Free Trade Area, following the lines of EFTA? Or various permutations of these three possibilities? The indications are that a Customs Union would be desirable, and this obviously requires some institutional arrangements.
- In addition there will be agreements pertaining to labour, the marketing of agricultural produce, common commercial, company and taxation arrangements, provision for a joint monetary policy, etc.
- Another crucial question concerns the rights of Transkeians in South Africa and of South Africans in the Transkei. What about discrimination against Transkeian citizens in the Republic? What about safeguards for South Africans against expropriation in the Transkei? What about transnational exercise of political rights on the part of citizens of both countries, and the unravelling of citizenship? This is perhaps the field most fraught with difficulties, and the one which will be watched very closely when it comes to the question of equal treatment; and paradoxically it is the field in which South Africa may give and receive most.

- Furthermore, there is the question of economic and technical aid from South Africa in all the possible forms it could take. Should there be outright budgetary subvention? Should aid be project-orientated? What kind of controls should there be over the use of such monies? What sort of arrangement should be made to evaluate such aid? What strings, if any, should be attached?
- Should the approach reflect the idea of "Sharing the Wealth of South Africa" or rather that of "Helping Them to Help Themselves"?
- Just as important, how should aid from outside be regarded and handled? Should there be an overall Transkeian Development Plan taking all these aspects into account? On what basis should the Transkei's economy be organised? What about the seconding of personnel from South Africa, or from elsewhere?
- There are also a number of legal questions too. These range from the succession by the Transkei to South African treaty rights and obligations, through to pension rights for civil servants. And of course there is the interesting question of what type of constitution the new Transkei will eventually adopt.
- Finally, in respect of all the issues affecting Transkei/South African relations, there is the fundamental question of how these issues will be resolved? This will involve distinguishing between points of agreement and disagreement, hopefully maximizing the former and minimizing the latter. A great deal of patience will, however, be needed on both sides. To make the relationship successful, South Africa, for its part, will not only have to show a considerable degree of flexibility - in other words, adopting an open-ended approach -, but also keep Transkeian aspirations in mind.

There should be a continuing and healthy bargaining process, with few rigid principles initially and a lot of *ad hoc* negotiation. Out of this may ultimately - and hopefully - emerge a sense of common purpose, as well as institutions, treaties and conventions to embody the concept of a plurality of peoples; and, of course, it will always have to be remembered that the Transkei's independence will pave the way for the independence of the other Homelands.