TOWARDS A NEW PAX AFRICANA:
MAKING, KEEPING, AND BUILDING
PEACE IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA

POLICY RESEARCH SEMINAR REPORT
SPIER HOTEL, STELLENBOSCH, SOUTH AFRICA
DATE OF PUBLICATION: MAY 2014
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RAPPORTEURS
DAN KUWALI AND DAWN NAGAR
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About the Organiser

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa, was established in 1968. The organisation has wide-ranging experience in conflict interventions across Africa and is working on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations. Its policy research focuses on Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in Africa; Region-building and Regional Integration on the continent; Africa and the European Union (EU); and Achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa.

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Executive Summary

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a policy research seminar in Stellenbosch, South Africa, from 28 to 30 August 2013 on “Towards a New Pax Africana: Making, Keeping, and Building Peace in Post-Cold War Africa”.

The meeting convened about 30 leading practitioners, scholars, and civil society activists from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and North America to assess the progress being made by the African Union (AU) and Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) in managing conflicts and operationalising the continent’s peace and security architecture. The seminar also sought to assist these bodies in building peace in countries emerging from conflict.

1. Pax Africana: Past and Present

Since the creation of the United Nations (UN) Security Council in 1945, Africa has played a key role in shaping the nature of the world body’s efforts to maintain international peace and security, particularly after the UN Security Council’s credibility as an impartial actor was damaged by its intervention in the Congo from 1960 to 1964. After the end of the Cold War by 1990, and following fatal UN passivity and the preventable genocide of 800,000 people in Rwanda in 1994, Africans led efforts to stop such mass atrocities in future. The idea of an international “responsibility to protect” (R2P) was incorporated into the Constitutive Act of the African Union in 2000, and into the continent’s new peace and security architecture. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) undertook major peacekeeping missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire between 1990 and 2003. The AU launched its own missions in Burundi (2003-2004), Sudan’s Darfur region (2004-2007), and Somalia (since 2007), but the first two as well as the ECOWAS missions were taken over by the UN, exposing the continental body’s logistical and financial weaknesses. The United States (US), France, and Britain – as three of the five veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council – have often marginalised Africa in decision-making on the Council. In 2014, this triumvirate held the pen on 15 of the 18 African cases on the Security Council’s agenda.

2. Conflict Prevention in Africa

Many African conflicts stem from divisions created during colonial and post-colonial state-formation and nation-building, which often divested local communities and ethnic groups of their indigenous autonomy and many of their means to sustain their own livelihoods, replacing these with centralised authority. After overweening power was assumed at independence from the 1950s by certain privileged individuals and groups, identity-related conflicts, which related closely to inequitable access to political and economic opportunities, proliferated. However, the promotion of equal citizenship is an objective for which all African governments must strive. Accordingly, where states fail to protect their own populations, the international community has a duty to intervene.

Although the Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC) seeks to end impunity for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression, its conflict prevention role is limited. The Court may have a deterrent and normative impact that discourages people from committing such crimes, but it can only act after the event, and its remedies are strictly judicial. Indeed the ICC’s trials and threats of prosecutions may
sometimes exacerbate conflicts, and the UN Security Council’s use of the Court often seems to be political and to prioritise international justice over peace and security. In 2014, the ICC was involved in eight conflict situations, all of which were in Africa – Central African Republic (CAR); Côte d’Ivoire; Sudan’s Darfur region; the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); Kenya; Libya; Mali; and Uganda. The Court has been criticised for its exclusive focus on African cases. Three of the Council’s veto-wielding permanent members – the US, China, and Russia – are also not themselves members of the ICC.

3. Peacemaking in Africa

The fears of Western countries such as the US over rising Islamic radicalism and global “terrorism” have shaped renewed international engagement in Africa, particularly in Somalia and Mali. The prospects of success for interventions overseen by the AU, Africa’s sub-regional bodies, and the UN will depend on developing effective divisions of labour for these operations, and mobilising appropriate logistical and financial resources. A commitment to sustained post-conflict peacebuilding will also be required.

Conflicts in Africa have their own distinct characteristics, and there is no single effective approach to mediation on the continent. Local ownership of mediation processes and genuine cooperation among regional and external actors are, however, crucial. A key factor in the short-term success of the mediation process in Kenya following a disputed and violent 2007 national poll, was that it was linked to an institutional process – the adoption of a new constitution – that sought to address the proximate causes of the conflict.

4. Africa’s Evolving Peacekeeping Architecture

After its creation in 2002, the African Union established a continental security architecture consisting of a 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC) which authorises peacekeeping missions; an AU Commission which coordinates operations; a Panel of the Wise which advises and engages mediation efforts; a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) which gathers information on potential conflicts; an African Standby Force (ASF) which is to be operationalised by 2015; and a Peace Fund which supports peacekeeping activities. The AU’s deployments to Burundi, Sudan, and Somalia demonstrated its commitment to peacekeeping. However, all three missions also revealed institutional, logistical, and financial deficiencies, which were again exposed by the crises in Mali and CAR from 2012. In addition, although the PSC is charged with working closely with African human rights and governance mechanisms to fulfil its mandate, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) lacks preventive measures for managing simmering conflicts, and the AU has been criticised for adopting a “fire brigade” approach to resolving conflicts. The continental architecture also depends greatly on the efforts of Africa’s sub-regional bodies – in particular the material contributions made by regional hegemons like Nigeria and South Africa to the sub-regional peacekeeping brigades that form the core of the ASF. The prevalence of HIV/AIDS among African militaries poses a further potential challenge to the continent’s security efforts.

5. The Practice and Perceptions of Peacekeeping in Africa

Although Nigeria led the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975 in order to reduce French influence in West Africa, Paris continues to exercise greater clout than Abuja in the Francophone countries of the sub-region. In the last decade, despite continuing to contribute to international peacekeeping, Nigeria’s foreign policy clout has declined and its international voice has become muted as domestic concerns stemming from terrorist attacks by Boko Haram, have taken precedence. Meanwhile, France has successfully multilateralised its previously
unilateral neo-colonial interventions through the UN in Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, and CAR. In Mali, the UN Security Council refused to provide sufficient support to the African-led mission in the country (AFISMA) in 2012 - although the world body’s backing materialised and a UN mission was mandated soon after France intervened in the conflict in 2013. The inability of ECOWAS and the AU to exert more influence in Mali also exacerbated tensions between the two organisations.

In relation to perceptions of peacekeeping, Hollywood often contrasts Western “civilisation” and African “barbarism” in an attempt to resolve the contradiction often inherent in “military humanitarianism” which seeks to use violent means for peaceful ends. Africans are often depicted as either victims or ruthless fighters in films like Black Hawk Down and Blood Diamond; while the fictional “saviours” often come from the West. Such Manichean characterisations reinforce the paradigm of humanitarian assistance – a powerful West “saving” a weak Africa - which hinders the development of approaches to peacekeeping that emphasise genuine cooperation and international responsibility.

6. Peacekeeping Partnerships and Problems in Africa

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides for cooperation between the UN Security Council and Africa’s regional organisations to maintain international peace and security. The 22,000-strong AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) represents a promising peacekeeping framework established by a regional organisation with the world body. However, other regional initiatives have lacked the capacity to be effective. The ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia were taken over by the UN in 2000 and 2003 respectively, as were the AU missions in Burundi and Darfur in 2004 and 2007 respectively. Effective burden-sharing between the UN and Africa’s regional organisations, therefore, remains an urgent priority. The AU must capacitate its office at the world body in New York sufficiently in order to engage the UN effectively on African peace and security issues. Africa’s leaders should also seek greater diplomatic status for the relationship between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN’s Security Council in order to enhance the legitimacy of the continental body’s peacekeeping role.

The militaries of Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh contributed over 24 percent of all UN peacekeepers in March 2014 partly because of a principled commitment to peacekeeping, but also due to a quest for international influence, and for the material benefits that can accrue to their own militaries. Concern for Africa occupies an incidental role in these Asian countries’ rationales for peacekeeping deployments. UN peacekeepers have been accused of serious crimes in missions in the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. However, most troop-contributing countries (TCCs), which bear the final responsibility for disciplining their own peacekeepers, have failed to hold them to proper account. The UN should also take steps to inculcate a culture of accountability and to punish perpetrators of abuses during peacekeeping missions.

7. The Practice of Peacebuilding in Africa

Peacebuilding as a practice cannot be neatly separated from peacemaking and peacekeeping - no peace can be built without it first having been made and kept. Building on a strategy that linked political and security issues, the civil war in Somalia has been managed since 2007 through a connected series of peacemaking and peacebuilding processes in which the AU Mission in Somalia played a crucial role. By contrast, peacebuilding efforts in Sudan’s Darfur region since 2004 remain weak, with internally displaced persons (IDPs) constituting 2 million of the western province’s population of 7 million. In Chad/CAR, peacekeeping interventions by
regional and international actors including the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the European Union (EU), and the UN since 2007, have failed to deliver the security necessary for effective peacebuilding. In addition, disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programmes in Africa have received insufficient financial, human-resource, and training support for implementation.

8. European Powers: France and Britain in Africa

France’s strategic engagement in peace processes in Africa has centred on its use of military power, and has often been motivated by economic self-interest and a concern to enhance its prestige in its former colonial spheres of influence. Although Paris’s intervention in Côte d’Ivoire effectively put an end to the conflict there in 2011, the recent conflicts in Mali, Chad, and CAR have not been resolved by the French approach of using military force, and past Gallic support for autocratic governments has often contributed to these conflicts. Britain, like France, has preferred to participate in UN-authorised, rather than UN-led, peacekeeping missions, and has used its permanent membership of the Security Council to shape peacekeeping operations in areas of strategic interest like Sierra Leone and Somalia. However, London has placed greater rhetorical emphasis than Paris on peacebuilding – for example, through security sector reform (SSR) efforts in Sierra Leone from 2000.

9. The United States and the UN Security Council in Africa

Since 2007, the United States has sought to use its global fight against terrorism to pursue its parochial interests in Africa and to promote demands for the militarisation of the continent through its Africa Command (AFRICOM). Although Washington seeks to portray AFRICOM as a force for humanitarianism and development, the Germany-based body has focused on terrorism and was involved in “regime change” in Libya in 2011. American interests on the continent often contradict Africa’s own security agenda which emphasises longer-term peacebuilding.

Africa has provided the context for innovative UN approaches to maintaining peace and security, but the systematic application of these new rules and mechanisms beyond the continent remains partial. Furthermore, the UN Security Council has at times shunned the AU Peace and Security Council and instead sometimes sought cooperation with Africa’s sub-regional organisations that it deems to be more in tune with the interests of its powerful members. Unless the Council is reformed to share power more equitably between the rich North and “global South”, its responses to conflicts on the continent will remain inadequate and its legitimacy will continue to be questioned.

Policy Recommendations

The following 10 policy recommendations emerged from the Stellenbosch policy research seminar:

1. The root causes of conflicts in Africa need to be clearly identified and addressed in order to prevent mass atrocities. To this end, African leaders must promote cultural diversity as an integral part of their nation-building efforts;
2. Resolution of the crises in Somalia and Mali will require sustained political and economic commitment to national dialogues that seek to develop long-term power- and resource-sharing mechanisms, and promote strategies to integrate marginalised societies; provide effective delivery of basic services; and reform security sectors in both countries;

3. Nation-building efforts in South Sudan must promote inclusivity, equality, and dignity for all ethnic groups, without discrimination. Sudan should also address the genuine grievances of its marginalised regions such as Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan, and Abyei. The African Union and the United Nations must further seek to foster representative, inclusive, and legitimate processes in both countries;

4. The AU should avoid appointing incumbent national leaders who are not seen as impartial mediators. Mediation efforts must also include implementation mechanisms and ensure the compliance of warring parties with peace agreements. The AU Panel of the Wise should develop uniform standards for mediation; oversee the appointment of mediators; and document lessons learned from peace processes;

5. The African Peace and Security Architecture must be urgently reviewed as recommended by the 2007 “High-Level Panel Audit Report of the African Union”. The AU should further apply the principle of “variable geometry” to its creation of the African Standby Force, whereby sub-regional forces that are close to brigade-readiness can be deployed first and share experiences with others. In order to initiate more timely interventions to prevent conflicts on the ground, the early warning systems of Africa’s sub-regional bodies and the African Union need to be more closely coordinated;

6. African peacekeeping missions must be properly resourced, trained, and equipped to ensure the effective implementation of peace agreements. In order to promote greater African control over such operations, the continent’s institutions need to take greater responsibility for funding them, with customs duties and taxes providing a potential source of finance. In addition, an international mechanism for holding peacekeepers who commit atrocities accountable must be established;

7. The United Nations and the African Union should seek ways of working more effectively to enhance security on the continent. African leaders should seek greater diplomatic status for the relationship between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council in order to enhance the legitimacy of the AU’s role in shaping and implementing peacekeeping missions on the continent. African countries that contribute troops to peacekeeping missions must also help to develop the mandates and implementation of these operations while greater resources must be devoted to post-conflict peacebuilding efforts;

8. Africa should adopt a realistic view of the UN Security Council – that it is an agency that has primary responsibility, rather than primary concern, for global peace and security. African leaders must promote the representation of their interests on the Council more effectively and challenge the parochial bias of Western powers. The 120-member Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) caucus on the Security Council should also be strengthened in order to influence the Council’s decision-making more in favour of African interests;
9. Nigeria should work more closely with other sub-regional powers such as Algeria and South Africa as well as the UN to bolster the effectiveness of African peacekeeping missions and to eliminate the need for external interventions such as those led by politically interested powers such as France. Prejudiced Western perceptions of Africa as a conflict-ridden continent must also be urgently altered; and

10. The AU and the UN should integrate HIV/AIDS prevention into the policy frameworks of the African Standby Force, and the design and command structures of peacekeeping missions on the continent. Adequate staffing and material resources must be made available for HIV/AIDS and safe-sex training in African militaries, which should be conducted by peer educators. Voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) must also be enhanced, and the governments of troop-contributing countries should devise mechanisms to monitor the impact of HIV/AIDS on their peacekeepers.
Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a policy research seminar in Stellenbosch, South Africa, from 28 to 30 August 2013 on “Towards a New Pax Africana: Making, Keeping, and Building Peace in Africa”. This report is based on discussions at this meeting as well as on further research.

The main objective of the Stellenbosch seminar was to assess the progress being made in peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding by the African Union (AU) and Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) – the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). The meeting also sought to assist these bodies in building peace in countries emerging from conflict. The Cape Town meeting aimed in particular to explore issues of conflict prevention and peacemaking; the peacekeeping relationships between Africa’s regional organisations and the United Nations (UN); the role of the United States (US), France, and Britain, and their contributions to African peacekeeping efforts; and the regional and international dimensions of the challenges to peacebuilding, state-building, and post-conflict reconstruction. The seminar also considered the lessons from UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding cases in Africa and how these could inform the establishment of an effective division of labour between Africa’s fledgling security organisations, which require urgent strengthening, and the UN.

The August 2013 meeting, which brought together about 30 leading policymakers, scholars, and civil society actors from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and North America, drew on CCR’s significant experience and expertise of engaging on issues related to conflict management on the continent. The Centre has organised eight major policy and research seminars and produced three volumes on peacebuilding-related issues: From Global Apartheid to Global Village: Africa and the United Nations, in 2009; UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts, in 2011; and Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa, in 2012. The Stellenbosch seminar built on this work.

Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, Africa has played a key role in shaping the nature of the world body’s efforts to maintain international peace and security, particularly after the end of the Cold War by 1990. Following fatal UN passivity in Rwanda in 1994 and the utterly preventable genocide of about 800,000 people there, Africans were at the forefront of efforts to actualise the concept of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) to prevent such crimes against humanity in future. As Western governments were reluctant to place their troops in harm’s way to keep peace on the continent following UN peacekeeping debacles in Somalia (1993) and Rwanda (1994), ECOWAS undertook major peacekeeping efforts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire.
between 1990 and 2003. Subsequently, the African Union, which replaced the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2002, was equipped with greater powers of intervention than its predecessor in cases of egregious human rights abuses and unconstitutional changes of government. The continental body’s rhetorical shift from ‘non-intervention’ to ‘non-indifference’ was accompanied by the adoption of a greater peacemaking role by African leaders such as South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki and Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo. This period also saw the launch of AU peacekeeping interventions in Burundi (2003-2004), Sudan’s Darfur region (2004-2007), and Somalia (since 2007), as well as plans to create a 15,000-strong African Standby Force (ASF) by 2010 (later postponed to 2015) to support future peacekeeping missions.

Furthermore, the concept of peacebuilding gained greater support on the continent – in particular through the fledgling post-conflict reconstruction frameworks developed by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Union in 2005 and 2006, respectively. On the global stage, the Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC) was founded in 2002 to address genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression; while the UN Peacebuilding Commission was established in 2005 to help to redress the high rates of relapse into conflict. The World Bank has also adopted a state-building focus for its post-conflict reconstruction work.

The first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed a resurgence of military interventions on the continent led by external actors, including the US, France, and Britain, some of which, as in Libya in 2011, have been controversial. In February 2014, about 75 percent of the world body’s 98,344 peacekeepers were deployed on the continent. With the establishment of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (CAR) in April 2014, nine of the UN’s 17 peacekeeping missions were in Africa. While conflicts persist, or have recurred, in CAR, Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan, the politics of making, keeping, and building peace – and who should lead and fund these efforts – continue to create tensions between African and external actors.

The four key objectives of the August 2013 CCR seminar were to consider:

1. Conflict prevention and peacemaking in Africa, with a focus on preventing mass atrocities on the continent; the role of the International Criminal Court; and the nature and impact of mediation and peacemaking processes in Africa, particularly in Kenya, Mali, and Somalia;
2. Peacekeeping in Africa, including the political factors that shape peacekeeping interventions; the accountability of peacekeepers; the roles of the African Standby Force and regional brigades in peace support operations; managing HIV/AIDS in such missions; the roles played by Nigeria and France in West Africa; and Hollywood’s portrayal of peacekeeping efforts in Africa;
3. Peacebuilding in Africa, including the practice of peacebuilding (particularly in Somalia and Central African Republic), and the impact of economic aid on efforts to build peace in post-conflict countries; and
4. The peace and security role of external actors in Africa, including the roles played by the UN, the US, France, and Britain; as well as the role of South Asian peacekeepers on the continent.
1. *Pax Africana*: Past and Present

The concept of a *Pax Africana* derives from the title of Kenyan scholar, Ali Mazrui’s seminal 1967 study, *Towards a Pax Africana*. The idea asserts that “the peace of Africa is to be assured by the exertions of Africans themselves ... ‘Pax Africana’ is the specifically military aspect of the principle of continental jurisdiction.”

In other words, Africans should resolve the disputes that arise on their continent themselves without depending on external powers. After the end of the Cold War, in his 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace*, the first African UN Secretary-General, Egyptian scholar-diplomat, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, argued for proactive conflict resolution and peacemaking by the world body. This document sought to enable the UN to respond quickly and effectively to threats to peace and security in the post-Cold War era, and identified four major areas of activity: preventive diplomacy; peacemaking; peacekeeping; and post-conflict peacebuilding. The report envisaged a continuum between these activities: from efforts to resolve disputes before they become violent; talks to stop ongoing conflicts; and the use of third-party armed forces to secure peace deals; to the long-term process of rebuilding war-affected communities through identifying and supporting structures to consolidate peace. In particular, Boutros-Ghali promoted the idea that peacebuilding, if effectively undertaken, can help avoid further interventions through early prevention of potential conflicts. However, the inadequacy of UN efforts to make, keep, and build peace in Africa in the following two decades led to the idea of *Pax Africana* being given concrete form on the continent by Africa's sub-regional and regional bodies, including the African Union from 2002.

When the United Nations was conceived by the US, Russia, China, and Britain at the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks conference in Washington D.C., the organisation was established to act as a guarantor of world peace with the assistance of regional bodies and employing a range of methods along a continuum from preventive diplomacy to peace enforcement. Since the UN Security Council’s creation in 1945, Africa has helped to shape the nature of the world body’s peacekeeping efforts. Between 1948 and 2013, over 40 percent (28 out of 68) of the UN's peacekeeping and observer missions have been deployed in Africa; and almost half (27) of the world body’s 55 missions launched in the post-Cold War era have been on the continent. However, the world body’s founding Charter made no specific provision for peacekeeping. It was originally envisaged that all military actions by the UN would be authorised by the Security Council and implemented with the assistance of a Military Staff Committee as provided for in Chapter VII of the UN Charter (which deals with peace enforcement). It was only later that the permanent five (P-5) veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council – the US, Russia, China, France, and Britain – became frustrated with increasing difficulties in gaining consensus, and made the Council directly responsible for security issues. However, the Cold War made it extremely difficult for the Security Council to operate as originally envisaged.

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10 This paragraph and the following two are largely based on the presentation made by James Jonah, ‘A Life in Peacekeeping’, at the CCR policy research seminar, ‘Towards a New Pax Africana: Making, Keeping, and Building Peace in Africa’, Spier Hotel, Stellenbosch, South Africa, 28-30 August 2013.
Armed peacekeeping as a tool was first employed by the UN during the 1956 crisis over control of Egypt’s Suez Canal, when Britain, France, and Israel launched a military intervention to seize the canal. Following the 1950 “Uniting for Peace” resolution which granted the UN General Assembly the power to step in whenever peace and security was threatened by the inability of a divided Security Council to take appropriate action, the world body established a UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) to prevent a renewal of hostilities along the Suez Canal.\footnote{UN, “Middle East – UNEF I: Mandate”, website page (accessed on 29 November 2013 at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unef1mandate.html).} UNEF I was modelled on previous observer missions of unarmed military personnel established in the Middle East to oversee truce agreements with Israel from 1948 – the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO)\footnote{UN, “United Nations Truce Supervision Organization: Background”, website page (accessed on 29 November 2013 at http://untso.unmissions.org).} – and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) along the Jammu and Kashmir border between the two countries in 1949.\footnote{UN, “United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan: UNMOGIP Background”, website page (accessed on 29 November 2013 at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmogip/background.shtml).} In 1960, the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was created to oversee the withdrawal of Belgian forces from the country, to restore stability, and later to prevent civil war.\footnote{UN, “Republic of the Congo – ONUC: Background”, website page (accessed on 29 November 2013 at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onucB.htm).} The mission, which was established with the help of UNTSO, set the template for future peacekeeping operations initiated by the world body: unarmed observer forces supported by mobile, lightly armed contingents operating with the consent of the host country. However, unlike the UN Emergency Force, which generally achieved its goal of separating warring parties – Egypt and Israel – the situation in the Congo was more protracted.

The Congo intervention, which lasted for four years from 1960 to 1964, alerted the UN to the complex nature of peacekeeping. It also highlighted important issues about the authorisation, financing, and management of peacekeeping missions. At the time, Sweden’s UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld (1953–1961), was seen as a dynamic figure in driving the efforts of the world body’s most powerful organ: the UN Security Council. He initiated ONUC, and had enormous influence on the politics of the Council. However, Hammarskjöld’s role was compromised by the perception that the UN was seeking to run the Congo through its intervention there, and was taking sides with the West in a proxy war contested between Western powers such as the US and Belgium, and Russia. This conflict was exacerbated by the attempted secession of mineral-rich Katanga with the connivance of Brussels. The mission to bring security to this huge politically unstable African country raised serious questions over the world body’s role, capacity, and effectiveness in keeping peace on the continent. Russia argued that the Security Council should have exclusive responsibility for security matters at the UN; while the US, Britain, and France held the position that the Council had only a primary, rather than exclusive, responsibility in this area. Both sides also differed over which organs of the world body should manage peacekeeping operations and how they should be financed, with Russia and France among others, arguing that countries should only pay for peacekeeping missions on a voluntary basis, and not as part of assessed contributions.

A number of African states lost faith in the UN’s ability to serve as an impartial guarantor of global peace and security after the world body failed to prevent the assassination – with Belgian and American connivance – in January 1961 of the Congo’s new pan-African prime minister, Patrice Lumumba. African reservations over the use of the powers vested in the UN Security Council and the P-5 accelerated the creation of Africa’s own continental body – the Organisation of African Unity – in 1963. However, despite the decision by African states to try and solve problems on the continent by African means – the quest for Pax Africana – they continued to support the world body, which safeguarded their independence through its promotion of the principle of the sovereign equality of all states. The new continental body further protected African sovereignty by forbidding interference in the internal affairs of its member states, which led to serious violations of human rights being ignored in some African countries.
In 1965, the UN General Assembly established a Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and called on all members of the world body to volunteer funds to ease the financial burden imposed by such operations. Few states made meaningful contributions. The Committee proposed that peacekeeping should be accompanied by peacemaking, and also set up a working group to prepare a model for peacekeeping operations. In 1965, Russia supported the establishment of a UN mission to keep peace in Cyprus in order to pre-empt the possible deployment of a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) force there. However, Moscow imposed limits on the duration of the operation’s mandate – which has since become common practice – in order to avoid making an open-ended commitment to a mission that it could potentially come to oppose, as occurred in the Congo.

Since the “Congo Crisis” of the 1960s, when the UN Secretary-General was seen as taking the lead in managing security issues, the roles have reversed. The P-5 members of the Security Council now largely control decision-making on peacekeeping. The end of the Cold War by 1990 also resulted in increased cooperation between the US and Russia, which facilitated the deployment of UN peacekeepers to Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, and Somalia.17 However, the enthusiasm of Western governments to place their troops in harm’s way in Africa waned following peacekeeping disasters in Somalia in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994, after 18 American and 10 Belgian peacekeepers respectively, were killed. In addition, although the UN Charter mandates the Security Council to harmonise global security, it does not oblige its most powerful organ to prioritise the interests of ordinary people trapped in conflicts. For example, during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda in which an estimated 800,000 people died, political antipathy to peacekeeping action in Africa led to fatal UN passivity, and the US and Britain in particular not only forced the Council to withdraw UN troops from the country, they also blocked the entire mission.18 Subsequently, UN Secretary-General, Egypt’s Boutros Boutros-Ghali, contrasted the UN’s reluctance to intervene in conflicts in Africa with its apparent willingness to remain involved in a “rich man’s war” in the former Yugoslavia.19

Following the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, Africans were in the forefront of efforts to develop and implement the concept of the “responsibility to protect” to prevent and halt mass atrocities in future. In 2002, the creation of the African Union established a 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC) and vested the continental organisation with the power to intervene in a member state in cases of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity upon the decision of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The AU and Africa’s sub-regional blocs have therefore become important producers, as well as consumers, of peace and security. Between 1990 and 2003, ECOWAS undertook major peacekeeping efforts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire. Between 2003 and 2007, the African Union launched its own missions in Burundi, Sudan’s Darfur region, and Somalia, again in reaction to the international community’s failure to respond to crises in these countries.

As the number of wars in Africa has fallen by 50 percent since the 1990s, and their scale has reduced,20 conflict prevention efforts have increasingly focused on cases of civil wars, and transnational links among terrorists.3 However, the capacity of the UN to manage such conflicts effectively in Africa has often been compromised by the preference of powerful Western actors to tackle the manifestations of insecurity rather than the root causes and

underlying economic issues that lead to these conflicts. For example, the UN Security Council’s current engagement in Somalia has increased as fears over terrorism there have mounted. The world body’s support for peacekeeping interventions in Africa is further shaped by the parochial interests of the P-3 – the US, France, and Britain – on the Security Council and the resulting power-play between these countries. Washington tends to seek to determine the role played by the African Union and Africa’s RECs in peacekeeping missions on the continent and often defers to Paris and London on the leadership and nature of such interventions, thus replicating neo-colonial spheres of political influence in Africa. Recent peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone, Somalia, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and CAR represent attempts by Britain and France to exert control in countries where they have historically wielded power.

In April 2014, nine of the UN’s 17 peacekeeping missions were deployed on the continent – in Western Sahara, Mali, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, South Sudan, and Sudan’s Darfur and Abyei regions. About 60 percent of the UN Security Council’s deliberations are focused on the continent. However, peacekeeping in Africa sometimes resembles an apartheid system in which Africans and Asians risk their lives on the frontline, while powerful Western nations foot some of the bills. None of the top-ten funders of UN peacekeeping operations are among the top-ten troop-contributing countries, all of which are African or Asian.

In 15 of the 18 African cases on the UN Security Council, France, Britain, and the US write all the resolutions and control the major decisions. In April 2014, France was the penholder on Burundi, CAR, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, and Mali; as well as Central Africa and the Great Lakes. Britain was the penholder on Libya, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Darfur. The US was the penholder on Liberia, Sudan’s Abyei region, South Sudan, and the Western Sahara. Nigeria was the penholder on Guinea-Bissau, West Africa, and Peace and Security in Africa. Furthermore, nationals of powerful Western countries effectively run the UN Secretariat: the US – the UN’s Department of Political Affairs (DPA); France – the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO); and Britain – the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The nature of decision-making on the UN Security Council – with the US, or ‘P-1’, occupying a pre-eminent position at the centre of a series of concentric circles of membership – marginalises Africa. For example, the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) established in 2007, the first such mission under dual control in Africa, is not seen as a success by P-3 representatives, who cannot wield power over it as easily as missions with a single UN command.

Nevertheless, in contrast with the glaring and tragic lack of political will from the most powerful members of the UN Security Council to intervene to stop the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the Council has shown greater commitment to action in Sudan’s Darfur region since 2004. As a result, although the conflict has led to over 200,000 deaths, the AU and the UN have sought to act together as peacekeepers since the deployment of the AU/UN hybrid force in 2007, which numbered 19,192 peacekeepers in February 2014. Notwithstanding, the cooperation between the continental and world bodies in this case, the Council has failed to make effective use of

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20 Africa is currently faced with instability in: Algeria against the Armed Islamic Group (GIA); Central African Republic (CAR); Côte d’Ivoire; the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); Mali; Nigeria; Libya; Somalia; South Sudan; and Sudan/Abyei region.
22 Adekeye Adebajo, ‘Conclusion’, in Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa, pp. 227-244.
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on mandating the UN to work with regional organisations, and has instead focused on Chapter VI (dealing with peacemaking) and Chapter VII (focusing on peace enforcement). Chapter VIII of the UN Charter should also be applied robustly, and greater engagement between the AU and the world body promoted. However, unless the Security Council is reformed in terms of its membership and its methods to share power more equitably between the rich North and ‘global South’ and grant greater substantive representation to Africa, the UN’s responses to major conflicts on the continent are likely to remain inadequate and unaccountable.

Since the establishment of the AU in 2002, the concept of Pax Africana – the idea that peace on the continent is ‘to be assured by the exertions of Africans themselves’ – has started to take material shape in the form of the African Standby Force. However, the ASF is still a long way from being able to undertake its ambitious goals, and the deadline for its operationalisation was postponed from 2010 to 2015. Meanwhile, the AU often has to rely on regional hegemons to implement some of its decisions on peace and security within a clear legal framework. African countries should strengthen their own mechanisms for making, keeping, and building peace on the continent through the AU and sub-regional bodies such as SADC, ECOWAS, IGAD, ECCAS, and AMU. In line with this principle of subsidiarity, sub-regional bodies – such as ECOWAS under the guiding hand of Nigeria, and SADC under South Africa – have sought to keep peace in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the DRC. However, regional hegemons sometimes have to compete with external actors over peacekeeping interventions. Conversely, the reluctance of powerful countries to put their troops in harm’s way enables warring parties to continue fighting. In addition, peacekeeping efforts will have only a limited effect if they are not supported by peacebuilding initiatives that seek to improve the lives of ordinary people in conflicts. In this regard, UNAMID, which comprises 19,192 peacekeepers and costs $1.3 billion a year (most of it spent on the mission itself), has made no significant impact on the ground in this crucial area. Africa faces severe funding constraints and must urgently strengthen its peacekeeping capacity, including its ability to provide strategic airlift as required. The continent’s leaders must also find ways of funding and taking ownership of Africa’s peacekeeping efforts in order to ensure that such missions promote African rather than parochial external interests. The continent’s international partners also need to offer continuing understanding and support – both political and financial – to this end.
2. Conflict Prevention in Africa

Although African independence movements represented collective struggles for self-determination that promoted notions of national unity, most of the African constitutions inherited at independence were not rooted in African realities and did not build on indigenous values and institutional structures. Rather, they were based on European political models that the colonialists had not even applied to themselves during the colonial era to moderate their authoritarian rule.

Most subsequent African conflicts stem from divisions that were created during the traumatic experience of colonial and post-colonial state-formation and nation-building. The colonial state brought together diverse groups that had been separate and offered them unequal opportunities for education, development, and employment. Ethnic groups were thus divided by artificial national borders. Colonial institutions divested local communities and ethnic groups of much of their indigenous autonomy and many of their means to sustain their own livelihoods, and replaced these with centralised authority. These weakened social and economic structures were inherited by many post-colonial African states, which failed to recognise and manage their ethnic diversity constructively; and failed to create unity by building on indigenous cultural values, institutions, and operational patterns. With the assumption of overweening power at independence by certain privileged individuals and groups, identity-related conflicts – in which an “in-group” enjoyed the rights of citizenship, while an “out-group” was denied those rights – proliferated. The consequent unequal access to political control, national wealth, services, and development opportunities, which was often based on configurations of identity, was violently contested in many cases. This led to gross violations of human rights, denial of civil liberties, disruption of national economic and social life, and the frustration of efforts to promote socio-economic development. As the Cold War raged between 1960 and 1990, these domestic struggles for power and resources became proxy conflicts in the bi-polar ideological confrontation between the US and Russia.

For example, the crisis in Sudan emanated from an assumption of an “Arab” identity by a dominant group among the population and the projection of this as the identity of a nation, which fundamentally discriminated against those who did not see themselves as “Arabs” and were not Muslims. The case of this country, which is now divided into Sudan and South Sudan, represents an extreme example of mismanaged diversity, and illustrates the need to shift from marginalisation of populations to inclusivity and the constructive management of diversity.

Since identity conflicts tend to be zero-sum, they can also be genocidal. It is not the mere fact of being different that causes these conflicts, it is rather the extent to which differences are managed or not – how people are differentiated and politically, economically, and socially stratified. Indeed, it is often impossible to identify clearly who belongs, or is supposed to belong, to which side in conflicts such as those in Rwanda and Burundi, as well as in Sudanese regions such as Darfur, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile. Countries like Burundi and Rwanda have sought to transcend diversity by creating political and social systems that recognise and manage ethnic differences. For example, people in Rwanda are officially told no longer to emphasise their ethnic differences, but rather to view themselves as Rwandans. Ignoring ethnicity is, however, unlikely to prove an effective way to manage diversity in the long run.

29 This paragraph and the following three are partly based on the presentation made by Francis Deng, “Preventing Mass Atrocities in Africa: The Case of the Two Sudans”, at the CCR policy seminar, “Towards a New Pax Africana: Making, Keeping, and Building Peace in Africa”, Stellenbosch, 28-30 August 2013.
Efforts to prevent mass atrocities in Africa must identify and address the root causes of such violence. Steps to prevent such conflicts should include promoting inclusivity, equality, and the dignity and rights associated with citizenship. However, if citizens are denied fundamental rights and freedoms by autocratic systems that practice political exclusion, such groups may turn to the international community for support and protection. In his 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace*, then UN Secretary-General, Egypt’s Boutros Boutros-Ghali, argued for a need to re-think the balance between sovereignty and the protection of human rights.32 After the 1994 Rwandan genocide in which an estimated 800,000 people were killed, the Canadian-sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) put forward the principle of the “responsibility to protect” in 2001, building on the idea of “sovereignty as responsibility” originally articulated by South Sudanese scholar-diplomat Francis Deng in 1996.33 Although R2P is still a controversial concept globally, it has been given its most concrete expression on the continent in the African Union’s Constitutive Act of 2000. Article 4(h) of the Act grants African countries the collective right to intervene in a member state to prevent mass atrocities, marking a significant departure from the Organisation of African Unity’s attachment to the principle of non-intervention.34 Subsequently, in 2005, the UN General Assembly agreed on a three-pillared responsibility to prevent, and to protect populations from, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. This is to be done through peaceful means, state capacity-building, and, if necessary, coercive measures. Promoting equality of citizenship is an objective which most African governments must support. Africans should build on what is best and adaptable from their own indigenous cultural values and systems in their efforts to construct stable, legitimate, and peaceful states. In cases where governments fail to discharge the responsibility that comes with sovereignty to protect their own populations, the international community has a duty to intervene to prevent or halt such atrocities, as long as this does not become merely an excuse for powerful states to launch “regime change” military interventions as France, Britain, and the US did in Libya in 2011.

Justice is an essential component of sustainable peace.35 However, the experiences of the Hague-based International Criminal Court show that pursuing the interests of justice in conflict situations in which gross human rights atrocities have been committed often generates tensions during peacemaking processes.36 The ICC, which is concerned with crimes that have already been committed, is essentially *ex post facto* rather than preventive in its mandate. The Rome Statute of 1998, which came into force in 2002, governs the International Criminal Court and seeks “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of [the] crimes [within the Court’s jurisdiction] and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes”.37 As an instrument of international criminal law, the ICC can also potentially deter war crimes through its application of the principle of “command responsibility”, which holds superior officers and officials in authority accountable for failing to prevent crimes committed by their subordinates. The Rome Statute further criminalises efforts to commit international crimes “by taking action that commences its execution by means of a substantial step”,38 thus potentially

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32 Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*.
33 Francis M. Deng, “From ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’ to the ‘Responsibility to Protect’,” *Global Responsibility to Protect: Special Issue: Africa’s Responsibility to Protect*, pp. 353-370.
38 See “Rome Statute,” Article 25 (f).
promoting early preventive interventions by the Court. In addition, by bringing perpetrators to book, the Court could directly prevent them from fuelling further conflicts.

As part of an international order, the Court’s action in one state could possibly deter potential offenders in another. Furthermore, the ICC’s intervention may, theoretically, trigger other international actions. For example, the bringing of charges of genocide reminds all states of their obligations under the Genocide Convention of 1951 to ‘prevent’ this crime, possibly encouraging them to intervene militarily in egregious cases of atrocities. The Court may similarly sound the alarm for the international community in cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The International Criminal Court’s preventive effect is further enhanced by the principle of complementarity which shapes its engagement with its member states. Under this principle, a case can be brought before the ICC only if it has not been investigated or prosecuted by a state, or if its consideration by the Court would encourage more states to investigate and prosecute international crimes. In either case, the risk of being tried for such crimes is increased, which amplifies the ICC’s deterrent and normative impacts.

However, although the ICC seeks to end impunity and to discourage others from committing war crimes, which indirectly contributes to conflict prevention efforts, the Court’s preventive role is limited. The crimes that the court prosecutes may be the results rather than the causes of conflicts – the ICC’s role can only start after violence has already occurred. Furthermore, the individuals who commit such crimes may believe that they are acting in the best interests of their countries or of specific groups. The Court is also limited by its exclusively legal perspective, only analysing situations through the lens of criminal law and responding with judicial remedies rather than tackling the root causes of conflicts directly. In addition, in certain cases, the prevention of crimes and ending of impunity may be perceived as obstructing peace processes. For example, trials can promote social divisions rather than reconciliation; and threats of prosecution may hinder the conclusion of peace agreements. In such cases, the Court is likely to prioritise the ending of impunity, which requires that each and every international crime should be punished, over the pursuit of peace and stability.

Nevertheless, the Court’s capacity to deter the commission of war crimes through the threat of prosecution can potentially promote respect for international humanitarian law and human rights, which can then contribute to desirable objectives such as greater freedoms; security; justice; rule of law; and political stability. For example, to the extent that impunity is a root cause of some conflicts, the ICC prosecutions in Kenya may have contributed to the peaceful elections there in May 2013. However, the Court’s impartiality is undermined by the powers of referral granted under Article 16 of its founding Rome Statute to the US, China, and Russia as permanent members of the UN Security Council. These three countries are not actually signatories to the ICC and thus fall outside its jurisdiction. The fact that these powerful states can initiate prosecutions, although their own government officials and citizens cannot be prosecuted by the Court, is a clear case of double standards. There have also been criticisms that Africa is being turned into an experimental guinea-pig by the ICC, even as abuses...
go uninvestigated elsewhere such as in Sri Lanka, the Gaza Strip, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In 2014, the Court was
involved in eight conflict situations, all of which were in Africa – CAR; Côte d’Ivoire; Sudan’s Darfur region; the
DRC; Kenya; Libya; Mali; and Uganda – involving 27 African indictees. It is worth noting that the situations in
CAR, the DRC, Mali, and Uganda are self-referrals by the states involved, while the investigations in Darfur and
Libya have been requested by the UN Security Council. Furthermore, arrest warrants issued by the Court
against two sitting African heads of state – Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta and Sudan’s Omar Al-Bashir – and the
presence at the Hague of a third – former Ivorian leader, Laurent Gbagbo – raise complex and unprecedented
political and legal challenges, and appear to many Africans to be examples of selective justice.45

The UN Security Council remains the only institution that can authoritatively demand the ICC not to continue
its proceedings, although the Council can only insist on temporarily deferring proceedings – for an initial
maximum period of 12 months, with the possibility of further renewals by the Council under the same
condition.46 However, the UN Security Council has been reluctant to use this prerogative. In this regard, it
seems that the aim of promoting international justice has become an autonomous Security Council objective,
regardless of whether this promotes peace and security, or even as an alternative to this goal.

46 Article 16 of the Rome Statute states that: “No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of
12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to
that effect, that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.”
3. Peacemaking in Africa

Mediation is defined as a “process of conflict management related to, but distinct from, parties’ own negotiations in which those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider to change their perceptions or behaviour and to do so without resorting to force or invoking the authority of law”.  

The end of the Cold War and resulting proliferation of conflicts in countries such as Liberia, Somalia, and Sierra Leone, and the appearance of R2P as an emerging norm, led to an increased interest in mediation as a form of conflict prevention. In 2006, the UN Mediation Support Unit (MSU) was established to provide support to international mediators in their peacemaking efforts, and to serve as a repository of mediation experiences and lessons learned. However, conflicts in Africa have their own distinct characteristics, and there is no single approach to mediation on the continent. Local ownership of mediation processes, and coordination between the AU, Africa’s sub-regional organisations, and the UN, as well as influential external actors, is thus important. In some cases, the UN may have the comparative advantage in mediating a dispute in Africa, while in others, it might be the AU or one of Africa’s sub-regional organisations. The AU Panel of the Wise has been involved in advising several recent mediation initiatives. The relative success of African-led mediation in ending post-election violence in Kenya and Zimbabwe generated increased support for mediation as a form of conflict resolution. However, the failures of AU mediation efforts in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire in 2011 illustrate the challenges of mediating conflicts in Africa in which external actors such as France, Britain, and the US continue to pursue parochial security interests.

Kenya

Governments of national unity (GNU) formed after disputed elections, such as those in Kenya in December 2007, and Zimbabwe in March 2008, can store up problems for future electoral processes by appearing to offer impunity to, and even reward, parties unwilling to accept the results of democratic elections. The failure to address the root causes of the 2007/2008 post-electoral violence in Kenya, in which 1,500 people were killed and 600,000 internally displaced, cast a cloud over the 2013 national elections there. Although a power-sharing agreement was brokered between president Mwai Kibaki and opposition leader Raila Odinga in February 2008, it failed to address the governance issues that were the root causes of the crisis. However, the process of mediation led by Ghanaian former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, after the disputed and violent 2007 poll in the country, provided important lessons of how to end violence and to secure political agreement in the case of contested elections. First, all external and internal stakeholders in the process should demonstrate unity of purpose, and acknowledge the potential benefits of successful mediation. Second, a credible, impartial, and highly respected mediator with the leverage to persuade the conflicting parties should lead the process. Third, effective mediation depends on sustained political commitment, as well as adequate time and sufficient

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49 CCR, United Nations Mediation Experience in Africa.
50 This paragraph is largely based on Wamai, ‘The 2008 Kenyan Mediation Process: Lessons for Conflict Prevention in Africa’.
resources – including the funding of a single, unified African-led mediation team. In the Kenyan case, Nairobi and the international community failed to allocate sufficient time and resources to developing a comprehensive agenda for deliberations that included the need for instituting compliance mechanisms and counselling to implement the outcomes of the mediation process. However, establishing such mechanisms is necessary to overcome Kenya’s political challenges in addressing the root causes of the 2007/2008 post-election violence. A key contributing factor to the short-term success of the mediation in Kenya was that it was linked to an institutional process – the adoption of a new constitution – that sought to address the proximate causes of the conflict. Civil society, women’s groups, and religious organisations should also play a greater supporting role in mediation processes like the one in Kenya.

**Somalia and Mali**

The fears of Western countries such as the United States, Britain, and France over rising Islamic radicalism and global ‘terrorism’ have shaped their renewed international engagement in Africa, particularly in Somalia and Mali. Somalia was abandoned by the international community between 1993 and 2004 following the ‘Black Hawk Down’ debacle, when 18 American soldiers were killed during a military raid in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, in October 1993. In 2006, the International Contact Group (ICG) on Somalia was established by the US and Norway. After the US funded Uganda to deploy troops to Somalia, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was created in January 2007. Following the Djibouti Agreement of 2008, the creation of an inclusive Somali-Somali dialogue within a secure environment provided by the AU mission in Somalia has been integral to beginning the long-term process of political reconciliation in the country. In 2013, consideration was being given to “rehatting” AMISOM, which comprised 22,126 peacekeepers in February 2014, as a United Nations mission. The UN and the AU have sought to facilitate consultations among Somalia’s leaders on their country’s political future – broadly, whether it should remain a centralised state with power over resources controlled by a political elite in Mogadishu, or become a federal state with power and resources shared among clan groups in the country’s north and south.

Political instability has also been a serious issue in Mali since the country won independence from France in 1960. Military coups in 1968 and 1991 interspersed long periods of one-party military rule by the Democratic Union of the Malian People (UDPM). After the removal of the elected president, Amadou Toumani Touré, by soldiers in March 2012 and the installation of a transitional government by ECOWAS a month later, a French-led military intervention waged war against Islamic rebels in the country’s north in February 2013. Many Malians have pointed to the incompetence of the political class as a leading cause of the continuing national crisis. However, many members of the ancien régime in Bamako have remained in positions of power with their hands still on the financial levers that control the funds expected to flow into Mali for post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The military junta which led the 2012 coup under Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo still has much influence over the security sector. (Sanogo was, however, arrested by the elected government of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in December 2013.) In addition to the continuing stalemate and political crisis in Bamako, the causes of the uprising in the north persist: the historical marginalisation of Tuaregs in the area stoked by migration from Libya.

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of armed Tuaregs and Islamists following the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. In April 2013, the UN established the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), with 12,640 peacekeepers, to support the political process in Bamako and to bring security to the country.

The immediate benefits of the large AU and UN military presence in Mali and Somalia remain unclear. However, the long-term success of both missions will depend on the continental and global bodies, and other important regional players – such as ECOWAS in the case of Mali and IGAD in Somalia – developing clear lines of responsibility for their operations, and mobilising appropriate logistical and financial resources. The tensions over how these responsibilities and operational burdens should be shared will need to be addressed openly and resolved between ECOWAS, IGAD, the AU, and the UN. A commitment to sustained post-conflict peacebuilding will also be required in order to achieve long-term stability in both countries. Meanwhile, peacemaking processes should engage all parties in national dialogues; facilitate power-sharing; include mechanisms for equitable distribution of resources; and seek to address the concerns of marginalised groups. Transparent delivery of services, anti-corruption campaigns, and security sector reform – especially of the Malian army – are also crucial to successful peacebuilding efforts. In addition, peacemaking processes should focus on the regional dimension of the conflicts, such as the politically sensitive role of Ethiopian troops in Somalia. International engagement in these countries should also not be shaped by parochial interests such as those of France in West and Central Africa, and the US interest in focusing on its “War on Terror” on the Horn of Africa.

ABOVE: Ambassador John Hirsch, former United States Ambassador to Sierra Leone
MIDDLE: Ambassador Welile Nhlapo, Chairperson, Kimberley Process; former Special Representative of South Africa to the Great Lakes Region; and former National Security Advisor to the South African President
RIGHT: Ms Njoki Wamai, Gates Cambridge Scholar, University of Cambridge
4. Africa’s Evolving Peacekeeping Architecture

Africa’s Peace and Security Architecture

The 1993 Continental Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution was established by the Organisation of African Unity to, among other things, anticipate and prevent conflicts. The OAU had earlier restricted its efforts to settling border disputes and adjudicating ideological differences resulting from the Cold War. Partly as a response to the ineffectiveness of the OAU security mechanism, the architects of the African Union constructed the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) with an intervention regime so that the AU could take action if the United Nations Security Council proved unwilling or unable to do so, as occurred during the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The idea of establishing the APSA was in line with the views of Egypt’s former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 An Agenda for Peace report. The document argued that regional organisations should play a more robust security role, not only as means of alleviating the UN’s peacebuilding burden, but also to contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus, and democratisation in international affairs. The 2002 “Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union” outlined the mechanisms to be established under the new security architecture: the AU Peace and Security Council which makes the key political decisions on peacekeeping missions; the AU Commission which oversees and coordinates the continental body’s operations; the Panel of the Wise which advises and engages all mediation efforts; the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) which gathers and analyses information on potential and nascent conflicts; the African Standby Force which includes military, police, and civilian components (and was to be established by 2010, but this was later postponed to 2015); and the Peace Fund which seeks to fund peacekeeping operations. The interaction between the Peace and Security Council and other AU organs such as the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), as well as between the pan-continental body and civil society organisations, was also envisaged as crucial to the promotion of peace and security on the continent. This evolving architecture depended on the efforts of Africa’s sub-regional bodies such as SADC, ECOWAS, IGAD, ECCAS, and AMU – in particular their contribution of peacekeeping brigades to the African Standby Force – and on the creation of effective sub-regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, and resolution.

Although the deployment of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) from 2004, which constituted about 7,730 peacekeepers by 2005, provided concrete evidence of the AU’s commitment to maintaining peace and security on the continent, it also exposed the logistical and financial deficiencies of the continent’s peace and security architecture. AMIS was eventually folded into the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur in 2007. The AU mission in Burundi (2003-2004) was also taken over by the UN, as were ECOWAS missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia between 1999 and 2003. More recently, the crises in Mali and CAR since 2012 have shown that Africa

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57 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace.

often lacks the capacity to take effective action in complex conflicts and still looks to self-interested European actors such as France to intervene in such situations. Institutional weakness constitutes an additional challenge: although the APSA includes early warning and response mechanisms, it lacks preventive measures for dealing with simmering conflicts, and has been criticised for adopting a reactive “fire brigade” approach to peacekeeping. In this regard, the APSA should work closely with African human rights and governance mechanisms, including the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and NEPAD,\(^59\) and should focus more on addressing structural causes of conflicts than on responding after the fact. Africa’s evolving security system should thus reinforce national mechanisms for timely and adequate prevention, monitor the implementation of international humanitarian law on the continent, and stem the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The quest for Pax Africana is likely to remain elusive as long as African states are unable or unwilling to mobilise sufficient resources for the continent’s peace and security agenda.\(^60\)

**Africa’s Regional Brigades**

The idea of an African High Command to maintain peace and security on the continent was first advocated by Ghana’s leader, Kwame Nkrumah, at the 1958 All African People’s Conference held in Accra, and resurfaced in 1963 during the founding summit of the Organisation of African Unity. However, since most African states continued jealously to guard their newly established sovereignty and refused to support the creation of a supranational mechanism with powers of intervention, the idea was never implemented. Six decades after the founding of the OAU and 10 years after plans to create an African Standby Force were formally agreed by the AU in 2004, a continental high command is yet to be established.\(^61\) The failure to implement the African Standby Force has resulted in African states improvising ad hoc interventions. In February 2013, II African states signed a peace, security, and cooperation framework agreement for the DRC which is designed to bring peace to eastern Congo. A SADC brigade (consisting of South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi) deployed a 3,000-strong Neutral Intervention Force (NIF) to the eastern Congo in May 2013. The mission was authorised to conduct offensive peacekeeping operations, protect civilians, and neutralise armed groups – particularly the M23 rebel movement that operated in the North Kivu region, which the SADC force duly routed.

Meanwhile, the deadline for the establishment of the African Standby Force has been extended from 2010 to 2015. The ASF is envisaged as an integrated 15,000-strong pan-African force consisting of five sub-regional standby brigades\(^62\) in Southern, Eastern, West, Central, and North Africa ready for rapid deployment\(^53\) to execute a wide range of missions from disaster relief to traditional peacekeeping operations as well as peacebuilding activities. The AU’s roadmap for the operationalisation of its five sub-regional brigades outlines a range of scenarios which

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59 The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is a socio-economic development plan devised by African leaders in 2001 to attract aid, investment, and trade in exchange for democratic political and economic governance.

60 Adebajo, “Prophets of Pax Africana”. See also Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana.


include deploying stand-alone or joint observer and peacekeeping missions with the UN and/or sub-regional forces within 30 days; as well as more complex multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions within 30 to 90 days. A final scenario envisages that the AU would have the capability to deploy a robust military force within 14 days in situations of genocide in which the international community does not act promptly. In order to implement this roadmap, the continental body sought the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, while Africa’s sub-regional organisations were charged with developing the capacity to deploy mission headquarters for urgent AU and sub-regional peacekeeping interventions. However, the roadmap for, and design of, the African Standby Force has three fundamental flaws. First, it requires African governments to contribute sufficient military and police forces and logistical support to operationalise the five sub-regional brigades. Since national governments through a lack of capacity, budgetary restrictions, or inadequate political will, have failed to provide these military resources or to develop effective policies in support of their sub-regional brigades, the creation of the ASF has been impeded. Second, the ASF’s design is based on an inappropriate Nordic model for a Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), which was created in 1996 as a rapidly deployable multinational force for use in UN operations. Third, the AU has adopted an “all-or-nothing” mode of planning with the ASF’s establishment proceeding at the pace of its slowest brigade, rather than applying a “variable geometry” approach to creating an ASF that would allow it to be brought into existence, even if some of Africa’s sub-regions had not fulfilled their operational obligations to the force. Since some states and sub-regions such as North and Central Africa continue to lack the capacity to make their military contributions to the continental force, and since the AU is yet to create the mechanisms required to operationalise the sub-regional brigades at the continental level, it is unrealistic to expect that the ASF will be established by its 2015 deadline. Meanwhile, the ASF now relies heavily on regional hegemons like South Africa in the Southern African brigade (SADCBRIG), and Nigeria in the West African brigade (ECOBRIG) to support its logistics. In January 2014, South African president, Jacob Zuma, noted that the AU Summit had discussed the operationalisation of an interim 5,000-strong African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC), which would act as a stopgap until the ASF could be established. South Africa, Ethiopia, and Uganda have since pledged troops to this force.64

HIV/AIDS in African Peace Support Operations

The emergence of new African security mechanisms since 2002 has coincided with the continued proliferation of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.65 In 2013, 69 percent of those living with HIV/AIDS globally were on the continent. An estimated range of 20-60 percent of troops in African armies are afflicted by the virus.66 In 2000, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1308, highlighting the severity of the HIV/AIDS pandemic globally and the threat it posed to peace and security, particularly in Africa.67 Although the HIV/AIDS pandemic has become a

global phenomenon and is not limited to Africa’s forces per se, the disease’s prevalence among African militaries, which are major contributors to peacekeeping missions, poses a particular threat to national and human security on the continent. Over half of the UN’s peacekeeping missions (nine of 17) were in Africa in 2013. Since 2000, a range of policy mechanisms have been put in place by African governments at national, sub-regional, and continental levels to address the security implications of the pandemic. The AU HIV/AIDS Continental Strategic Plan of 2005 called for an Africa-wide response.68 In 2012, the African Union, NEPAD, and the UN adopted a Roadmap on Shared Responsibility and Global Solidarity, which focused on health governance; diversified financing; and access to medicines.69 However, many of the plans that have been drafted are yet to be implemented by African governments.

The litany of potential consequences ensuing from HIV/AIDS illnesses and deaths for peacekeeping on the continent include: a heavy toll on decision-making command structures; rising costs in retraining highly-skilled personnel; and delayed deployment to peacekeeping theatres. An additional concern is the vulnerability of peacekeepers to HIV within conflict zones, and the risk of these troops – who generally fall within the age range of the most vulnerable group for HIV (15 to 49 years) – spreading the virus among civilian populations at home and abroad.70 The early illness or death of senior officers within militaries, who are central to political life and have important skills and knowledge, can also hamper the building of national forces. The weakening of national militaries by HIV/AIDS can undermine efforts to build an effective ASF for peacekeeping on the continent. Timely diagnosis of the virus and prescription of appropriate medication can, however, help to reduce the impacts and costs of HIV/AIDS on African militaries.

The majority of African governments have established HIV/AIDS programmes within their militaries. The Namibian military, for example, has engaged with a range of military and civil society players to develop a comprehensive HIV/AIDS policy involving HIV awareness-raising activities; voluntary counselling and testing (VCT); and the provision of anti-retroviral treatment.71 While many such African initiatives are under-resourced and limited in scale, they hold promise for mitigating the pandemic’s long-term impact on Africa’s evolving security architecture. The UN also promotes voluntary counselling and testing before deployment of troops to peace operations; and routine HIV screening as part of health assessments is an established policy among militaries across all of Africa’s five sub-regions. In most militaries, a sero-positive individual will not be deployed to a peacekeeping mission, but can continue to serve in other functions. National governments should also seek to devise mechanisms to enable effective monitoring of the impact of HIV/AIDS on peacekeepers, which may include mandatory and voluntary testing programmes. Reliable data on the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and proper testing can help to reduce the impact of the pandemic among militaries and civilian populations in areas in which they are deployed. However, routine HIV screening in defence forces presents a number of challenges relating to the human rights of people living with HIV/AIDS.72 Although troops for the ASF will be drawn from various countries, each with its own HIV epidemic and strategy for containing the disease, these diverse strategies have yet to be properly documented and co-ordinated at the sub-regional and continental levels.73

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71 CCR, HIV/AIDS and Militaries in Africa, p. 20.
A series of media and research reports have noted that peacekeepers are often identified as perpetrators of sexual abuse by local populations in host countries.74 Such voices have also been critical of the UN for often failing to deter a sexually predatory culture among its peacekeepers, and have even accused the world body of encouraging such abuses through the distribution of condoms.75 These allegations and the reported evidence of sexual abuse by peacekeepers – for example in Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Liberia, and Sudan76 – raise important questions about the ethical nature of sexual relations between peacekeepers and members of host populations.

74 “Peacekeepers or Sexual Abusers?” Carte Blanche television documentary, M-Net broadcast, 11 August 2013.
5. The Practice and Perceptions of Peacekeeping in Africa

Nigerian and French Peacekeeping in West Africa

The 1993 prophesy by Kenyan scholar, Ali Mazrui, of an expansionist Pax Nigeriana displacing the French gendarme in West Africa remains unfulfilled two decades after it was made, despite praiseworthy Nigerian-led peacekeeping missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau since 1990. However, Abuja’s response to the growing conflict in Mali in 2012 was weak, even though it had an immediate existential interest in defeating the terrorists there, since members of the Boko Haram terrorist group in Nigeria have fought alongside insurgents in northern Mali. Abuja also had a real stake in seeking a reduced French role in its West African sub-region. Instead, France was able to use its seat as one of the five veto-wielding permanent members on the UN Security Council to protect its parochial interests in Mali and neighbouring Niger (where it sent troops to guard uranium mines).

Although Nigeria led the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975 in order to reduce French influence in West Africa (after the Gallic power had supported Biafran secessionists during Nigeria’s civil war of 1967-1970), Paris continues to exercise greater clout than Abuja in the sub-region. France has pursued a neo-colonial 50-year relationship with Africa known as Françafrique to promote its interests on the continent. Although all Francophone African countries were eventually granted nominal independence by 1963, most signed military and economic pacts that gave Paris continued influence over their sovereign affairs. However, France is not a Great Power globally – it is only in Africa that it wields such influence. Following the decolonisation of Africa, France intervened over 50 times after 1960 to prop up or depose autocratic regimes in countries such as CAR, the DRC, Gabon, and Togo. However, as France’s economic growth has slowed and its military spending has reduced (with its armed forces being decreased from 88,000 to 66,000 by 2013), Paris has sought to multilateralise its previously increasingly discredited unilateral neo-colonial interventions in Africa through the United Nations. Since 1994, France has used UN-sanctioned missions in Rwanda, CAR, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali to subsidise and legitimise interventions that promote its parochial interests on the continent. Paris has also sought to “Europeanise” its military engagements and unilateral interventions by convincing its 27 European Union (EU) partners to bear political responsibility for the missions that it initiates, and to share their financial costs. A French military project to provide training and equipment to support peacekeeping by Africans – Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP) – has been transformed into a European initiative – EURO RECAMP – which has the stated goals of fostering collaboration with regional training and operational centres on the continent, and assisting the AU in deploying peacekeepers.
In 2011, France as a veto-wielding permanent member of the UN Security Council and the penholder on Côte d’Ivoire, sought an increase in the size and scope of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). The Council concurred, although with some reservations. Meanwhile, Paris maintained control over its own 900 troops in the country outside the UN chain of command. In 2013, France sought to reproduce the Ivorian “model” of peacekeeping in Mali - another country on which it holds the pen on the UN Security Council - again using the world body to subsidise stability in a country in which Paris has long-term political, strategic, and economic interests. The case of Mali has exposed the extent to which support, or the lack of it, for peacekeeping interventions can be manipulated to achieve parochial ends. The under-capacitated 3,300-strong African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), established in 2012 under the auspices of a Nigeria-led ECOWAS, was unable to deploy to Mali due to a lack of logistical and financial support to sustain its operations in the field. Both ECOWAS and the AU sent letters of protest to the UN after their requests for a logistical and financial package for AFISMA’s transition into United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali in July 2013, and for a peace-enforcement mandate for the new mission, were rebuffed. In addition, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon continued to defy African opinion by appointing non-African diplomats to important roles on the continent when he recruited an Italian politician, Romano Prodi, as Special Envoy for the Sahel in 2012, and former Dutch minister for development cooperation, Albert Gerard Koenders, as the Special Representative of the new UN mission in Mali. The inability of ECOWAS and the AU to exert more influence in the deployment in Mali also exacerbated tensions between the two organisations. Based on the principle of subsidiarity, ECOWAS saw itself as being in the lead in peace efforts on Mali, and felt that the AU should have been coordinating rather than implementing peacemaking efforts. The issue of which organisation had the mandating authority over AFISMA thus remained ambiguous, creating confusion for the UN. In addition, both ECOWAS and the AU had their own special envoys in Mali (Aboudou Touré Cheaka, and Pierre Buyoya respectively); both announced the creation of separate political offices in Bamako; and both scrambled to deploy military and human rights observers in the country: a wasteful duplication of efforts that would have been better left to the UN. However, as soon as France intervened in the conflict in 2013, the support which had previously been denied the African-led mission quickly appeared. AFISMA was transformed into MINUSMA, and its complement of peacekeepers was tripled to 9,500.

The UN’s failure to offer appropriate support for AFISMA echoes a reluctance to back African-led missions in Liberia (1990-1998), Sierra Leone (1991-1999), Burundi (2003-2004), and Darfur (2004-2007). The motives behind the French-led intervention in Mali were widely questioned across Africa, and the UN was accused of failing to acknowledge regional efforts to make and keep peace in the country. The autocratic government of Idriss Deby in Chad, which has historically been buttressed by Paris, also played a crucial role in the French-led intervention in Mali. N’Djamena contributed 2,000 troops to fight alongside French troops. On the UN Security Council, the US administration of Barack Obama, which had previously trained the leaders of the 2012 coup in Bamako, has generally backed rather than challenged French neo-colonial interventions on the continent.

Meanwhile, Abuja has been preoccupied with domestic challenges and has failed to make a significant contribution to sub-regional peacekeeping efforts recently, including those in Mali in 2013. In fact, it has been Burkina Faso, rather than the sub-regional hegemon, Nigeria, that has driven African mediation efforts in Mali. Abuja’s previously impressive peacekeeping record built up over five decades has suffered greatly in the last decade. Nigeria’s foreign policy has declined, and its international voice has become muted. Nigerian
governments have been criticised for not incorporating UN peacekeeping into broader foreign and security policy goals in a coherent manner. Critics have also pointed to poor coordination between key policymakers in Abuja’s ministries of foreign affairs, defence, and police affairs, which has led to the lack of a clearly articulated rationale of the national interest involved in promoting sub-regional peacekeeping efforts. The quality of Nigerian peacekeepers has further been questioned; its military and police contingents have often not been equipped to UN standards; its armoured personnel carriers (APCs) have broken down in mission areas; and Abuja has been slow to modernise its weapons and lacks the capacity to repair and service them.

Hollywood’s Portrayal of Peacekeeping in Africa

Linked to the practice of peacekeeping in Africa are perceptions of conflict situations on the continent. Hollywood’s interest in Africa has expressed itself through the deployment of a polarised code of “self” and “other”, which contrasts “Western civilisation and African “barbarism”. This approach is used to attempt to resolve the inherent contradiction in “military humanitarianism” which seeks to use violent means to attain peaceful ends. As three examples will shortly demonstrate, the West and Africa have generally been portrayed by the American film industry as polar opposites in a “good-versus-evil” dichotomy. Recently, this core message has been conveyed using the promotion of “human rights” as its frame of reference. The 2001 movie Black Hawk Down made by Ridley Scott with the assistance of the Pentagon (the US Defence Department) portrays Somalis as either helpless victims, drugged warlords, or violent enemies who do not discriminate between military and civilian targets. By contrast, the American soldiers in the film are portrayed as courageous, complex, and fully human. Although generally described – and clearly conceived – as a war movie, the film’s subject matter is, ironically, a peacekeeping mission. Furthermore, in its attempts to justify the modus operandi of American peacekeepers in Somalia in 1993, the film paradoxically highlights the mission’s failure to promote cooperation with Somalis; its strategic ignorance of the local culture and terrain; and its inherently prejudiced view of local political actors. The movie further fails to provide any historical and political context for the conflict in Somalia, and offers no Somali perspectives on the war and the brutal and aggressive role adopted by American peacekeepers in the country. For example, one scene depicts a woman picking up a rifle and shooting a US soldier – but fails to interrogate why such an act would take place in light of the American killing of Somali civilians which is dismissed as “collateral damage”. Awkward questions over the legitimacy of an increasingly belligerent peacekeeping mission that was exacerbating the civilian death toll in the country remain unexamined – over 200,000 Somalis were killed in the civil war triggered after the American-backed autocrat, Siad Barre, was toppled from power in 1991.

The 2004 movie Hotel Rwanda by Terry George adopts a different narrative point of view – telling the story of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda from the point of view of its African hero, Paul Rusesabagina, who attempts to rescue his fellow citizens from the massacre. Notwithstanding this narrative framework, the film itself focuses as much on the West’s trauma about its failure to intervene to prevent the killings, as it does on the Rwandan
context for, and experience of, the genocide. Western actors play key roles in the story, and the film provides no proper context and explanation for the genocide which is portrayed simplistically as a product of hatred and insanity. Although Hotel Rwanda may seek to provide a more human account of an African conflict, its underlying dehistoricisation and depoliticisation of the 1994 genocide reinforces the familiar Manichean approach that tends to characterise Hollywood movies.\(^\text{87}\)

Another recent ‘humanitarian’ tale of contemporary conflicts in Africa produced by Hollywood is set during Sierra Leone’s civil war after 1996. The film Blood Diamond by Edward Zwick seeks to expose how the commercial imperatives of multinational corporations fuel wars on the continent. However, although the 2006 film is meant to increase support for the boycott of “blood diamonds” and other natural resources that have exacerbated conflicts in Africa, its message is delivered through the mouths of Western heroes, while its African characters are relegated to a supporting cast.

In all three movies, Africans are rarely seen as agents of humanitarian change, but rather as either victims or ruthless fighters; while the fictional ‘saviours’ come from the West. Such characterisations reinforce the paradigm of humanitarian assistance – a powerful West helping weak Africans. This view permeates external representations of conflicts and interventions on the continent, hindering the development of alternative approaches to international peacekeeping based on ideas of cooperation, collaboration, and solidarity. Africans must seek to use their own cultural power – through words and images – to change this narrative and to represent themselves more fully, thus shaping perceptions to create policies that can better serve Africa’s interests.

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6. Peacekeeping Partnerships and Problems in Africa

The UN and Africa’s Regional Organisations

Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter of 1945 provides the basis for cooperation between the UN Security Council and Africa’s regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security. However, after UN failures in Angola, Somalia, and Rwanda in the 1990s, the Security Council’s reluctance to authorise robust peacekeeping interventions led both the AU and ECOWAS to craft security mechanisms that controversially allow the deployment of regional peacekeepers without prior authorisation from the UN Security Council.88 Since the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the African Union in 2002, the UN has sought to support the continental body in creating and implementing effective security and development programmes.89 The UN’s Department of Political Affairs helped the AU to develop the rules and procedures for its Peace and Security Council established in 2003. Three years later, led by UN Secretary-General, Ghana’s Kofi Annan, the world body signed a memorandum of understanding with the AU Commission to build the continental organisation’s capacity over ten years and enhance the complementarity of their operations.90 The 2006 framework has been used for cooperation between the UN and other regional bodies such as the European Union in Brussels, where the world body has established an office which has a comparable function to the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU). This 63-strong bureau was established at the AU’s headquarters in Addis Ababa in July 2010.

The engagement of regional actors in the management of conflicts in their own sub-regions has encouraged strategic cooperation with the UN. The AU Mission in Somalia, established in 2007, represents an example of a peacekeeping framework established by a regional organisation in collaboration with the world body. However, these regional peacekeeping missions continue to lack sufficient financial, technical, and logistical capacities to be truly effective. The ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia were taken over by the UN in 2000 and 2003 respectively, as were the AU missions in Burundi and Darfur in 2004 and 2007 respectively.91 Effective burden-sharing between the UN and Africa’s regional organisations remains an urgent priority. In addition, the lack of a clearly defined strategic relationship between the security bodies of the UN and the AU has impeded the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, rendering this approach to peacekeeping largely ineffective. Against this background, it has become imperative that the AU office in New York should seek to create effective strategic partnerships with the world body to deal with conflicts in Africa. However, in the case of the Mali conflict of 2012/13, there was resistance from the AU Peace and Security Council which, in coordination with ECOWAS, sought to maintain the autonomy and authority of African actors over the continent’s peace and security agenda. The AU’s strong resistance to ceding leadership of peacekeeping missions to the UN also partly stems from a lack of understanding of how to engage the world body effectively, and a real concern that the UN Security Council will seek to dictate how the continental organisation should expend its resources. The AU also generally regards its bureau in New York as merely a

88 Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa, p. 234.
90 Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa, p. 234.
channel for transmitting diplomatic messages, and has failed to capacitate it sufficiently with the financial and logistical support and staff that it requires to engage the world body effectively. The office only had about 12 employees in 2013.\textsuperscript{92} Meanwhile, although the UN Security Council appears to have been emphasising the benefits of partnership in its more recent relations with the AU, the African diplomatic community in New York has expressed concern that the Security Council’s engagement, particularly with the AU’s Peace and Security Council, is more rhetorical than substantive. Africa’s leaders should seek greater diplomatic status for the relationship between the AU’s Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council in order to enhance the legitimacy of the AU’s role in shaping and implementing peacekeeping missions on the continent.

The benefits of creating strategic partnerships between the AU and the UN have been demonstrated by the establishment of an African-led peacekeeping office in the Central African Republic’s capital, Bangui, with the world body’s support.\textsuperscript{91} Following the eruption of religious violence in CAR after Francois Bozize was toppled by largely Muslim Seleka rebels in March 2013, the UN Security Council authorised the ‘rehatting’ of ECCAS peacekeepers there in December 2013 as part of the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA).\textsuperscript{93} This 6,000-strong force from Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon, worked alongside 2,000 French troops stationed in CAR in April 2014. The experience in CAR has highlighted the need for the AU to invest in building strong partnerships with Africa’s regional economic communities such as ECCAS. The European Union has also funded ECCAS through the African Peace Facility (APF) with €225 million between 2008 and 2013.\textsuperscript{95} A further example of AU/UN cooperation is the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), which was established in Dakar, Senegal, in 2001, to strengthen security cooperation with ECOWAS and to promote an integrated approach to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding in the sub-region.

**Asian Peacekeepers in Africa**

Over the past decade, the most consistent and largest contributors of peacekeeping personnel to the UN have been Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India.\textsuperscript{96} The militaries of these three Asian countries have a combined strength of 21 million,\textsuperscript{97} and contributed over 24 percent of all UN peacekeepers in 2014.\textsuperscript{98} South Asian contributions to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa have also included specialised assets such as engineering units, field hospitals, and combat helicopters. These countries provide peacekeepers partly due to a principled commitment to the purposes of the world body’s peacekeeping mandate, but also in a quest for influence and prestige, and for the financial and institutional benefits that can accrue from UN deployments for their own national militaries. However, with the limited exception of India, which has a national economic interest in enhancing its engagement in Africa’s development due to trade with the continent of over $70 billion in 2012, concern for the...
continent occupies a somewhat incidental role in the other two Asian countries’ rationales for deploying peacekeepers. In the case of Pakistan, where the military is a dominant social and political institution in society, the primary rationale for contributing to UN peacekeeping is the quest for a positive self-image by the armed forces, as well as for greater influence for the country within the UN. This has allowed Islamabad to raise the issue of its border dispute with India in Kashmir consistently and more effectively at the world body. For Bangladesh, the motivation is financial reward for its military - both institutionally and at the level of the individual soldier - and the improved prospects for its own democracy that may flow from the participation of its armed forces in peacekeeping missions. India’s pro-peacekeeping habit was rooted at first in the 1950s in an historical belief in the values and purposes of the UN and Afro-Asian solidarity, and later in its own self-interest, in particular the prospect of wielding greater global influence by occupying a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. In order to achieve this diplomatic ambition, India needs broad support – including from countries in Africa which make up a quarter of the UN’s General Assembly – for its candidature.

Notwithstanding such motives, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India continued to contribute to UN peacekeeping even when others have withdrawn in the face of deteriorating security conditions, most notably in Somalia. India, however, withdrew its peacekeepers from the UN mission in Sierra Leone in 2000, while Pakistani peacekeepers were held hostage by rebels in the same mission. However, relations between the Asian sub-continent’s peacekeepers and local communities remain a major challenge. South Asian troops deployed to the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) have struggled to interact with the people whom they are mandated to protect. Most of the peacekeepers cannot speak any of the local languages or French, which has hampered their ability to achieve mission objectives and to implement projects to enhance civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). In addition, Indian Blue Helmets were accused of sexual misconduct in the DRC.99

In order to strengthen African-owned peacekeeping efforts, the continent’s security mechanisms and organisations should form partnerships between their training centres such as the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana, and those that train peacekeepers in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh such as India’s Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (CUNPK) in New Delhi; the Pakistani Centre for International Peace and Stability in Islamabad; and the Bangladesh Institute for Peace Support Operations Training (BIPSOT) in Dhaka.

Accountability of Peacekeepers

Although UN peacekeepers are generally praised for their conduct, they have also been accused of serious misconduct in missions in the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia.100 No international mechanism currently exists to make peacekeepers accountable for the crimes of violence, sexual exploitation and abuse; arms trafficking; and large-scale theft and corruption that have allegedly been committed during peacekeeping missions in Africa.101 Reports of such incidents cite an estimated 6,000 babies illegitimately fathered by troops

101 This paragraph is partly based on the presentation made by Kwame Akonor, “Accountability of Peacekeepers in Peacekeeping Missions”, at the CCR policy seminar, Towards a New Pax Africana: Making, Keeping, and Building Peace in Africa, Stellenbosch, 28-30 August 2013.
from the ECOMOG mission in Liberia between 1990 and 1998. There have also been allegations of rape involving AMISOM troops in Somalia. In addition, peacekeepers have taken advantage of the economic deprivation and poverty caused by conflicts to solicit prostitution – offering food in exchange for sex. Such crimes and exploitation doubly burden victims already suffering the depredations of violent conflict. However, most troop-contributing countries (TCCs), which bear the final responsibility for disciplining their own peacekeepers, have failed to hold their soldiers to proper account for the exploitation and crimes that they have committed. UN resolutions that “request”, “encourage”, and “strongly urge” these countries to toughen and standardise their laws for UN peacekeepers have had only a limited effect. In order to end impunity, policies which exempt troops from prosecution by the judiciaries of host countries should be changed in order to exclude actions performed outside the line of duty, such as the sexual exploitation of local women. A resolution on Criminal Accountability of UN Officials and Experts on Mission, which was adopted by the Legal Committee of the UN General Assembly in November 2012, must also be broadened to apply more generally to all personnel involved in peacekeeping operations, including troops and police. Furthermore, appropriate mechanisms to ensure that perpetrators are prosecuted in their home countries should be established. The creation of such bodies should address: variations in what may be considered acceptable behaviour by peacekeepers; the difficulties in dealing with such incidents and atrocities in the field during conflicts; problems of jurisdiction; and widely disparate definitions of, and penalties for, the crimes and abuses committed. Governments could seek to adopt a convention of standardised rules and norms governing the behaviour of peacekeepers, as well as the establishment of an international special court to prosecute them as required. Meanwhile, the United Nations should take concrete steps to instil a culture of accountability in its peacekeepers, particularly around issues of gender-based exploitation and violence; and should seek to expose and punish perpetrators for their crimes. Special reports by the UN Secretary-General focusing on peacekeepers as perpetrators of such violence should also be tabled on a regular basis to the UN Security Council.

7. The Practice of Peacebuilding in Africa

During the Cold War from 1960 to 1990, about 40 civil wars in Africa killed 10 million people and displaced another 10 million. By 1992, long-running conflicts had subsided in some parts of the continent such as Mozambique and Namibia, but continued in others such as Somalia and Sudan. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, conflicts in Burundi, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were brought to an end through regional and UN peacekeeping efforts.

The recent reduction in war in Africa has provided a window of opportunity to address the root causes of conflicts and to build a more durable peace on the continent. Peacebuilding as a concept was popularised by the publication in 1992 of An Agenda for Peace by UN Secretary-General, Egypt’s Boutros Boutros-Ghali. This important report defined peacebuilding as the medium- to long-term process of rebuilding war-affected communities through identifying and supporting structures to consolidate peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Peacebuilding currently involves the process of rebuilding the political, security, and socio-economic dimensions of societies emerging from conflict. The concept also entails the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of former fighters; the reform of security forces; and the establishment of structures of governance and the rule of law in order to consolidate reconciliation, reconstruction, and development. Increasingly, scholars and policymakers have highlighted the complementarity between peacebuilding and state-building in line with a growing recognition that well-capacitated states are needed in order to promote development, peace, and security in Africa.

A wide range of local, regional, and international actors have established programmes and mechanisms to build peace, with varying degrees of success. In 2005, the UN established the Peacebuilding Commission as a subsidiary body of the Security Council and the General Assembly. The World Bank, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and other international bodies have also created special units to deal with post-conflict reconstruction. In Africa, NEPAD and the AU separately developed post-conflict reconstruction frameworks – in June 2005 and July 2006 respectively – which have included the participation of African civil society actors. The AU’s current strategy is based on the premise that each country should adopt a peacebuilding plan that fits its own context. It has been suggested, however, that the AU and Africa’s sub-regional bodies should establish a division of labour, where they would focus on peacemaking and peacekeeping – as well as leveraging their comparative advantage in areas such as strengthening state institutions and enhancing socio-economic development. Meanwhile, the better-resourced and more experienced UN, World Bank, and African Development Bank (AfDB) could carry more of the burden for post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Africa.

105 Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa.
106 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace.
107 Curtis and Dzinza (eds.), Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa.
Peacebuilding strategies tend to pursue four key goals: greater security; political institutions that are broadly accepted; a revitalised economy; and a mechanism for dealing with past injustices and violence. The specific way in which these peacebuilding elements are put together will vary from case to case, and might not correspond to the dominant formulas put forward by international actors. Furthermore, peacebuilding as a practice cannot be neatly separated from peacemaking and peacekeeping – no peace can be built without it first having been made and kept. As the cases of Angola, Liberia, Sudan, and South Sudan have demonstrated, states can also easily return to conflict, even after a peace agreement has been signed, unless the challenges posed by the implementation of such deals are resolved. The civil war in Somalia since 1991, which is the longest-running in sub-Saharan Africa, has been addressed through a combination of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding approaches. In particular, from 2009 to 2012, the conflict was managed through an intricate series of peacemaking and peacebuilding processes in which the AU Mission in Somalia played a crucial role. AMISOM, which comprised 22,126 peacekeepers from Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria in April 2014, built on the consensus among Somalia’s neighbours for a peacekeeping strategy that linked political and security issues. As a result, the mission succeeded where many other previous attempts to create peace, which had taken place outside the country, had earlier failed. Although the al-Qaeda-linked terrorist rebel movement, al-Shabaab, still refused to enter any peace processes and remained politically and militarily in control of areas of the country’s south in April 2014, the Somali national government – with the support of AMISOM – strengthened and expanded its presence in the capital of Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab aside, the inclusivity of the peacemaking process which engaged Somali civil society, both domestically and among its relatively powerful and wealthy Diaspora, was instrumental in enabling the government’s transition from an interim to a constitutionally-established institution in August 2012. The country’s peace agenda has continued to be shaped by peacebuilding and state-building concerns, with Somalia facing key challenges relating to the development of the security sector; the promotion of the rule of law; the establishment of human rights bodies; and the creation of effective institutions of governance to bolster the state which has remained fragile. Other efforts to build peace and nurture development have included: the establishment of cellphone networks for enhanced communications and business links between Somali residents and their Diaspora which ease the flow of remittances and result in economic opportunities; and the creation of a new national football league to help bridge clan divides.

By contrast, peacebuilding efforts in Sudan’s Darfur region remain weak, with internally displaced persons (IDPs) constituting 2 million of the western province’s population of 7 million. In 2012, donors failed to contribute funding to vital water projects there, despite pledges made at an aid conference for Darfur. The international donor community has also avoided even discussing early recovery in Darfur, where underlying structural problems such as the lack of infrastructure and widespread instability have inhibited the prospects for socio-economic development. Efforts to rebuild countries to prevent conflicts and sustain peace should ensure that fundamental issues of social justice are urgently addressed. Such an approach stands in contrast to the neo-liberal and market-driven peacebuilding initiatives that sometimes accompany international peacemaking efforts.
The Central African Republic has been wracked by instability since it gained independence in 1960 and has been prey to the political machinations of former colonial power France which supported the delusional autocracy of “Emperor” Jean-Bédel Bokassa until it toppled him in 1979, flying his replacement, David Dacko, to Bangui in a French military aircraft. Although CAR has an abundance of natural resources including timber, cotton, and diamonds, government corruption exacerbated socio-economic problems and created a crisis in 1996, as public debt mounted to reach $276 million.119 The national army mutinied repeatedly over the non-payment of salaries to most troops; and schools closed and many medical supplies became scarce when teachers and health staff went on strike.120 Ange-Félix Patassé, who was elected president in 1993, requested external assistance, and the governments of France, Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, and Mali mediated between his government and rebel movements which had grown in strength during the mutinies of 1996. A peace deal was signed in January 1997, and a French-funded force of 800 troops from Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, and Mali—the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB)—was deployed in Bangui the following month to monitor the agreement’s progress. However, the conflict deteriorated and calls for help from Gabon’s president, Omar Bongo, and Patassé, which were strongly supported by France, led to the UN Security Council approving a 1,350-strong UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) in 1998. This operation consisted largely of MISAB troops with reinforcements from Togo and Senegal.121 Meanwhile, 1,400 French troops who had been based in the country since 1998 left, and the military base (which had seen demonstrations from the population) was closed.122

However, many civil servants had still not been paid their salary arrears by 2000 and, following a further unsuccessful coup, the conflict became regionalised as Libya and Chad backed rebels and the government in CAR respectively. With the support of Tripoli, former army chief of staff, General François Bozizé, overthrew Patassé and was elected president in 2005 under a new constitution. A subsequent Libyan-backed rebellion in the country was defeated using French air power, and new peace talks led to the signing of an agreement in Gabon’s capital, Libreville, in 2008 between the government and armed opposition groups—the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) and the Popular Army for the Restoration of Democracy (APRD). This included a disarmament, demobilisation, and rehabilitation component. The ousting of François Bozizé in March 2013 followed the failure of his government to fulfil its pledges under the Libreville peace deal, which the UN Peacebuilding Commission had promoted. Continuing instability in CAR appears to validate concerns that local actors there have not been empowered to own the peacebuilding processes in their country. In addition, peacekeeping interventions supported by regional and international actors including ECCAS, the European Union—and the UN, have failed to deliver the security necessary for effective peacebuilding.

Meanwhile, in order to maintain stability in Chad, France manipulated the deployment of an EU bridging force (EUFOR) in the border area of Chad and CAR between 2008 and 2009, before using its permanent seat on the UN Security Council to ensure the deployment of a UN force between 2009 and 2010—the 2,159-strong

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120 In 1997, a UN study found that 65 percent of adults in CAR were living below the poverty line with an annual income of less than $100; 42 percent of the population had access to potable water; and 75 percent of children aged between two and 12 years of age were suffering from malnutrition. See UN, “Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 1136”, S/1998/66.
UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). In both cases, Paris was effectively multilateralising its previous unilateral interventions in Africa, which had become widely discredited after the Rwandan genocide of 1994, co-opting European partners and the broader international community to finance the continued rule of the autocratic but fragile regime of Chad’s Idriss Déby. The UN mission trained Déby’s security forces, patrolled refugee camps, and protected UN humanitarian convoys seeking to assist 255,000 refugees and 137,500 internally displaced persons in eastern Chad.

By December 2013, the UN’s Peacebuilding Fund had helped to mobilise a total of over $560 million. In addition, the Peacebuilding Commission’s strategy to align the efforts of donors had resulted in the World Bank and the African Development Bank pledging a further $500 million. However, the Fund remains dwarfed by the $5 billion a year that the UN spends on peacekeeping (about 90 percent of this on its own missions rather than on post-conflict peacebuilding efforts), and the demand for resources for comprehensive peacebuilding remains largely unmet. The UN Peacebuilding Fund had allocated $37 million to CAR. A first amount of $10 million was granted in June 2008. A second round of funding of $21 million, which was approved in 2010, sought to support political and electoral reforms in CAR. However, these are paltry sums in relation to the huge needs, and DDR programmes in the country never received the financial, human-resource, and training support required for implementation. As a result, conflicts have flared, particularly in the country’s north-east. The lack of DDR has also exacerbated instability in CAR’s neighbours, in particular Chad and Sudan. The continuing weakness of the state in CAR in 2014 has exacerbated fears that the country remains at risk of mass atrocities with armed groups instigating violence between Christians and Muslims, despite the presence of 2,000 French and 6,000 Central African peacemakers in April 2014.
8. European Powers: France and Britain in Africa

France

As one of the five veto-wielding permanent members on the UN Security Council, France’s strategic engagement in peace processes in Africa has centred on peacekeeping and the use of “hard” power in the form of armoured personnel; artillery; satellite surveillance; helicopters; and paratrooper commandos, although Paris has also sought to employ the tools of “soft” power such as aid; humanitarian relief; and trade with local partners. As a result of its emphasis on keeping – rather than making or building – peace, France has often created merely “negative peace” – the absence of conflict - rather than “positive peace”, which is a developmental concept that emphasises addressing and resolving the root causes of conflicts. In addition, the French use of military resources, in particular its artillery, has been seen as sometimes exacerbating conflicts.

France has often been motivated in its interventions in Africa by economic self-interest – in particular its exploitation of the continent’s natural resources such as oil in Algeria, Gabon, Chad, and Congo-Brazzaville; natural gas in Tunisia; uranium in Niger and Mali; phosphate in Mauritania; and bauxite in Guinea – as well as a concern to enhance its prestige in its former colonial spheres of influence. In Côte d’Ivoire in 2002, Paris invoked bilateral cooperation accords with the country to deploy French forces in Opération Licorne in order to separate Northern rebels and Southern government forces. The following year, France brokered a peace deal between Ivorian president Laurent Gbagbo and the rebels; and, in 2004, pushed for a new 8,000-strong United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire in order to facilitate the implementation of this agreement. However, following the refusal of then president Laurent Gbagbo to cede power to Alassane Ouattara after defeat in national elections in 2010, Paris employed naval and air power and French troops to protect Ouattara and to isolate and capture Gbagbo, with UN support. Notwithstanding the neo-colonial nature of the military intervention in Côte d’Ivoire, which was initiated by then French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, the mission effectively put a temporary end to the conflict there.

By contrast, the January 2013 intervention in Mali has created fewer prospects for a durable peace. Unlike in its intervention in Côte d’Ivoire, where France was seeking to put a new president in power, Opération Serval was launched in Mali in January 2013 in support of an interim government in Bamako against rebel Tuareg forces and external Jihadists with links to Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger. By the end of the month, the rebel push towards Bamako had been halted by the French deployment of overwhelming air power and armed troops, and Paris had declared its peacekeeping operation a success. In addition to providing France with a platform to market the effectiveness of its military hardware, the UN-sponsored mission in Mali also legitimised the continuing costly use of French force as an adjunct to international peacekeeping operations on the continent. However, France’s approach failed to address the persistent nature of the conflict in the country. French president, François Hollande, subsequently promoted a “road map” for peace in the country. Although this recommended some state-building, it failed to address the underlying economic, social, political, and...
humanitarian challenges facing Bamako. Mali, which is rich in gold and uranium, has continued to seek Paris’s engagement to support its state-building efforts. France now provides humanitarian, military, technical, and diplomatic assistance to Bamako.

The French response to continuing violent conflict, and an extensive illegal trade in drugs, arms, and people from Central Africa to the east of Mali, has been linked to its interest in Chad and CAR. Paris has backed Chadian autocrat, Idriss Déby, in his fight against cross-border rebels, and supported the regime of CAR’s former leader, François Bozizé, before withdrawing support from him by 2013. In relation to the continuing violence in the Great Lakes region, France has also lost credibility and political clout through its strong support for Rwanda’s autocratic leader, Paul Kagame. In all these cases, the root causes of the conflicts have not been addressed by the essentially military approaches adopted by France. In order to reduce dependence on external interventions such as those led by Paris, African organisations should define more clearly the exact nature of the support required to launch and sustain their own peacekeeping missions effectively.

Britain

Britain has proved less practised than France in mobilising the governments of former African colonies on the UN Security Council. However, not unlike Paris, London has preferred to participate in UN-authorised, rather than UN-led, peacekeeping missions. Successive British governments have also used permanent membership of the UN Security Council to leverage control and influence over peacekeeping operations in areas of strategic interest to them, while providing a small number of Blue Helmets and training support packages for other UN troop-contributing countries. Nevertheless, London’s agenda for the use of British military force on the continent has been more limited, placing greater rhetorical emphasis on peacebuilding – for example, through security sector reform (SSR) efforts in Sierra Leone from 2000. With the personal backing of former British prime minister, Tony Blair, London played a supportive role in the successful implementation of the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement by deploying an 800-strong military operation to strengthen a crumbling UN mission in Sierra Leone between May and June 2000. Britain subsequently led security sector reform efforts in Freetown, focusing on neo-liberal state-centric reform of national security agencies – including the armed forces, the police, and intelligence services, as well as the legislative, judicial, ministerial, and statutory bodies overseeing these institutions. London’s most critical contribution to these efforts was in restructuring, retraining, and equipping the country’s police, intelligence services, army, and defence ministry. These reforms, which were also supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, were informed by the argument that security and development are inextricably linked.

Britain also sought to include a broader range of actors and institutions such as civil society in these efforts. However, these initiatives were damaged by friction between the Britons responsible for the security sector reform efforts at the State House in Freetown and members of the Creole ethnic group. These efforts were also compromised by a clandestine arms deal to pro-government forces approved by Whitehall mandarins in London in December 1997 which sought to provide military support to the ousted president Ahmed Tejan

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Kabbah’s forces in exchange for diamond and mining concessions. Nevertheless, Britain used its position as one of the five veto-wielding permanent members on the UN Security Council to promote international support for regional peacekeeping efforts in Sierra Leone. However, it ensured that its own two-month contribution to the UN mission there – a battalion of paratroopers and five warships to support the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) – remained outside the world body’s chain of command.132 London backed agreements brokered by ECOWAS and the subsequent Nigerian-led intervention by the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group to restore Kabbah’s government to power in 1998, just over a year after he had been ousted by rebels. During this period, Britain promoted the Kabbah government’s continued participation in international fora like the UN General Assembly and the Commonwealth Summit in Edinburgh, Scotland, in October 1997. The UN peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone from 1999 to 2005 cost about $5 billion and formally ended with UN-monitored elections only in May 2002, after a difficult peacemaking and peacekeeping process.133 The security sector reform promoted by London in Sierra Leone provided important lessons on the need for accountability and the engagement of civil society groups in reform efforts, as well as the benefits that a needs-based community policing approach can offer. Such efforts, however, proved to be grossly insufficient to addressing the long-term needs of the country in this vital sector.

133 Adehajjo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa, pp. 148-152.
9. The United States and the UN Security Council in Africa

The United States

Following the United States’ withdrawal from the UN mission in Somalia (UNOSOM II) in 1994 and its lobbying of the world body to end its engagement in Rwanda during the genocide there six months after the death of 18 American soldiers in Somalia in October 1993, Washington adopted a cautious stance towards intervention in Africa. In 1996, the US military established the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) with the ostensible goal of supporting humanitarian efforts and promoting stability. However, Washington’s position changed after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York in September 2001. In 2002, the US, under the belligerent administration of George W. Bush, updated its ACRI plans to organise the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA), which provided African troops with weapons including rifles, machine guns, and mortars. The Africa Regional Peacekeeping Programme was also established in order to equip, train, and support troops from selected African countries involved in peacekeeping operations. Additionally, the US government launched a Pan-Sahel Initiative in 2002 (superseded by the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative in 2005). In 2008, these programmes were incorporated into the Germany-based US Africa Command (AFRICOM) which had been launched in 2007.

With the support of a network of researchers who are integrated into the United States Military Strategists Association (USMSA), Washington has developed a militarised conception of security in Africa that serves the interests of a section of the American foreign policy establishment, rather than those of the continent. The US has sought to promote demands for the militarisation of Africa by emphasising the international threat posed by terrorism on the continent, and by championing a peace and security narrative in which Western militarists are presented as peacemakers and peacebuilders, while African leaders are sometimes demonised and their states characterised as having “failed”. The US has accordingly been accused of engaging in disinformation campaigns to exaggerate the scale and potential impact of this threat, and has also sought complicity from compliant African regimes. AFRICOM and private-sector suppliers of military services and products have been used as tools in a strategy that seeks access to the continent’s strategic resources. The US military has sought to promote AFRICOM as a force for humanitarianism and development in Africa, although the body only has a staff of just over 30 and is primarily responsible for administering the tendering of private military contracts, and pursuing the militarisation of Africa. AFRICOM was involved in the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011, and has also prioritised combating piracy and oil-bunkering in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as fighting drug-trafficking in West Africa. Other US military engagements in Africa have included the dispatch of drones by the Barack Obama administration to Libya, Mali, and Somalia; the deployment of about 100 American Special Forces to the Great Lakes region to hunt down Ugandan warlord, Joseph Kony; and the maintenance of a 1,500-strong army base in Djibouti to track terrorists on the Horn of Africa.

In general, American interests on the continent contradict Africa’s own security agenda which seeks to promote reconstruction and transformation in order to develop the continent. Africans must emphasise the centrality of their own remedies for insecurity, which should include: seeking to provide adequate education; healthcare; infrastructure; water supplies; agricultural support; environmental sustainability; people-centered leadership; and independent, assertive African representation in world politics. American strategies to use the fight against terrorism to pursue its parochial interests in Africa should be opposed by African governments and civil society. The activities of US private security actors on the continent should also be carefully regulated to ensure that they do not promote insecurity on the continent.

The UN Security Council

Although the UN Security Council is by design a conservative body, it has been innovative in Africa, using the continent as an arena to implement a range of diverse approaches to peacekeeping in pursuit of its mandate to maintain international peace and security. For example, in 1956, armed peacekeeping was invented in an African context with the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force along the Suez Canal. In 1961, the UN Security Council innovated again by adopting a resolution to use “all appropriate measures” in its peace-enforcement mission in the Congo. The world body’s most powerful organ held its first meeting outside the UN’s New York headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1963. Subsequently, the use of sanctions as a tool to put pressure on pariah regimes was introduced by the Security Council specifically to address African cases: Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), which was not a member of the UN, in 1968, and South Africa, which did belong to the world body, in 1977. Furthermore, the provision of aid to countries adversely affected by their adherence to sanctions regimes was first authorised by the Security Council under Article 50 of the UN Charter for three African countries: Botswana, Mozambique, and Zambia. After the end of the Cold War by 1990, Africa remained the primary destination for UN peacekeeping interventions: 27 of the world body’s 55 missions launched since then have been on the continent. The UN’s first deployment of 368 military observers alongside a regional body – the 16,000-strong ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group – took place in Liberia between 1993 and 1997. The world body’s first hybrid mission with a regional organisation – the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur which numbered 19,192 peacekeepers in March 2014 – was authorised by the Security Council in 2007. All the six cases on the agenda of the UN Peacebuilding Commission have been in Africa: Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone – five of which, with the exception of Guinea, were placed there by the Security Council. Furthermore, both the cases referred to the International Criminal Court by the Council have been African: Sudan’s Darfur region and Libya.

Africa has provided the context for innovative forms of UN peacekeeping interventions; the creation of new bodies (such as the UN Peacebuilding Commission) and forms of consultation to manage conflicts; as well as the operationalisation of international judicial mechanisms to address mass crimes and terrorism. Although these actions have created precedents and instruments for the Security Council to address the maintenance of peace and security globally, the systematic application of these new rules and mechanisms beyond the continent remains partial. In the absence of any permanent members from Africa on the UN Security Council, the continent is often devoid of consistently strong representation. The country-specific agendas of the three non-permanent African members on the Council are often not subordinated to their roles in representing Africa’s interests. As long as France, Britain, and the United States continue to hold the pen on 15 out of 18 African cases, as they do in

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140 In April 2013, the Security Council authorised a second hybrid deployment: the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) under Resolution 2100.
April 2014, on the Security Council’s agenda, these powerful Western countries will determine the Council’s role on the continent. Indeed, it has been these three Western powers, rather than African members of the Security Council, that have questioned the new approaches to peacekeeping that the organ has historically promoted. African acquiescence in such innovations has made the continent the weakest link in the international system. At the same time, the increasing number of effective regional organisations on the continent has provided the UN Security Council’s powerful members with opportunities to go “forum-shopping” for the body that may best promote their interests.141 Although the AU’s Peace and Security Council is by design, composition, and jurisdiction the most legitimate counterpart to the world body on the continent, the UN Security Council has at times shunned the continental body and instead sought cooperation with African sub-regional organisations like ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD that its powerful members deem more in tune with their interest. This approach has sometimes exacerbated tensions between the AU and its sub-regional blocs, as they contend with issues of primacy and subsidiarity similar to those that bedevil the relationship between the UN Security Council and regional organisations more generally.

When the Charter of the United Nations was adopted in San Francisco in 1945, only four of the 51 founding member states were from Africa – Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa. However, African membership of the world body has subsequently grown tremendously – in 2014, 54 countries from the continent belonged to the UN’s 193-strong membership. Africa has gradually moved from being the object of the games that powerful countries play to becoming a player on the UN Security Council. To this end, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) caucus on the Council must be strengthened to improve the body’s decision-making. However, despite the evolution of the AU and Africa’s sub-regional organisations, the Council is likely to continue to exert its right to primacy in maintaining peace and security globally. The UN Security Council reminds the AU Peace and Security Council of its primacy every time they meet for their annual consultative meetings; and its powerful members, like the US, have opposed any official reference that would suggest a meeting of equals. In the absence of permanent members from Africa that can consistently and credibly hold the five veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council to account – a prospect that remains remote as long as the 2005 “Ezulwini Consensus” continues to hold Africa hostage to an almost unattainable maximalist position of three veto-wielding permanent seats – the Council cannot be deterred from wielding the power that it has historically exercised over Africa, and Pax Africana will remain an elusive quest.

141 Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa , p. 237.
Policy Recommendations

The following 10 policy recommendations emerged from the Stellenbosch policy research seminar:

1. The root causes of conflicts in Africa need to be clearly identified and addressed in order to prevent mass atrocities. To this end, African leaders must promote cultural diversity as an integral part of their nation-building efforts;

2. Resolution of the crises in Somalia and Mali will require sustained political and economic commitment to national dialogues that seek to develop long-term power- and resource-sharing mechanisms, and promote strategies to integrate marginalised societies; provide effective delivery of basic services; and reform security sectors in both countries;

3. Nation-building efforts in South Sudan must promote inclusivity, equality, and dignity for all ethnic groups, without discrimination. Sudan should also address the genuine grievances of its marginalised regions such as Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan, and Abyei. The African Union and the United Nations must further seek to foster representative, inclusive, and legitimate processes in both countries;

4. The AU should avoid appointing incumbent national leaders who are not seen as impartial mediators. Mediation efforts must also include implementation mechanisms and ensure the compliance of warring parties with peace agreements. The AU Panel of the Wise should develop uniform standards for mediation; oversee the appointment of mediators; and document lessons learned from peace processes;

5. The African Peace and Security Architecture must be urgently reviewed as recommended by the 2007 “High-Level Panel Audit Report of the African Union”. The AU should further apply the principle of "variable geometry" to its creation of the African Standby Force, whereby sub-regional forces that are close to brigade-readiness can be deployed first and share experiences with others. In order to initiate more timely interventions to prevent conflicts on the ground, the early warning systems of Africa’s sub-regional bodies and the African Union need to be more closely coordinated;

6. African peacekeeping missions must be properly resourced, trained, and equipped to ensure the effective implementation of peace agreements. In order to promote greater African control over such operations, the continent’s institutions need to take greater responsibility for funding them, with customs duties and taxes providing a potential source of finance. In addition, an international mechanism for holding peacekeepers who commit atrocities accountable must be established;

7. The United Nations and the African Union should seek ways of working more effectively to enhance security on the continent. African leaders should seek greater diplomatic status for the relationship between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council in order to enhance the legitimacy of the AU’s role in shaping and implementing peacekeeping missions on the continent. African countries that contribute troops to peacekeeping missions must also help to develop the mandates and implementation of these operations while greater resources must be devoted to post-conflict peacebuilding efforts;
8. Africa should adopt a realistic view of the UN Security Council – that it is an agency that has primary responsibility, rather than primary concern, for global peace and security. African leaders must promote the representation of their interests on the Council more effectively and challenge the parochial bias of Western powers. The 120-member Non-Aligned Movement caucus on the Security Council should also be strengthened in order to influence the Council’s decision-making more in favour of African interests;

9. Nigeria should work more closely with other sub-regional powers such as Algeria and South Africa as well as the UN to bolster the effectiveness of African peacekeeping missions and to eliminate the need for external interventions such as those led by politically interested powers such as France. Prejudiced Western perceptions of Africa as a conflict-ridden continent must also be urgently altered; and

10. The AU and the UN should integrate HIV/AIDS prevention into the policy frameworks of the African Standby Force, and the design and command structures of peacekeeping missions on the continent. Adequate staffing and material resources must be made available for HIV/AIDS and safe-sex training in African militaries, which should be conducted by peer educators. Voluntary counselling and testing must also be enhanced, and the governments of troop-contributing countries should devise mechanisms to monitor the impact of HIV/AIDS on their peacekeepers.
Annex I

Agenda

Day One: Wednesday, 28 August 2013

09:00 – 09:30 Welcome and Opening Remarks

Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa

09:30 – 11:00 Session I: Peacekeeping in Africa: Past And Present

Chair: Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse, Member of the African Union (AU) Panel of the Wise

Speakers: Ambassador James Jonah, former United Nations (UN) Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs, New York, United States

“A Life in Peacekeeping”

Professor Ibrahim Gambari, former Joint Special Representative for the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), and former Foreign Minister of Nigeria

“The Politics of Peacekeeping”

11:00 – 11:15 Coffee Break

11:15 – 12:45 Session II: Conflict Prevention in Africa

Chair: Ambassador Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Executive Director, Security Council Report, New York, and former Foreign Minister of Costa Rica

Speakers: Ambassador Francis Deng, Permanent Representative of South Sudan to the UN, New York

“Preventing Mass Atrocities in Africa: The Case of the Two Sudans”

Dr Sarah Nouwen, University Lecturer in Law, University of Cambridge, England

“The Hammer and the Nail: The International Criminal Court and Conflict Prevention in Africa”

12:45 – 13:45 Lunch
**13:45 – 15:15 Session III: Peacemaking in Africa**

**Chair:** Ambassador Welile Nhlapo, Chairperson, Kimberley Process; former Special Representative of South Africa to the Great Lakes Region; and former National Security Advisor to the South African President, Tshwane (Pretoria)

**Speakers:**
- **Ambassador John Hirsch,** former US Ambassador to Sierra Leone
  “Peacemaking in Somalia and Mali”
- **Ms Njoki Wamai,** Gates Cambridge Scholar, University of Cambridge

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**17:30 – 20:00 CCR Public Dialogue to Launch the Book** *Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa* **edited by Devon Curtis and Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa,** **and to Screen The Peacekeepers directed by Paul Cowan**

**Venue:** The Labia Theatre, 62 Orange Street, Gardens, Cape Town

**Chair:** Professor Ibrahim Gambari, former Joint Special Representative for the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur; and former Foreign Minister of Nigeria

**Speakers:**
- **Dr Devon Curtis,** Lecturer, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge
- **Dr Augustine Mahiga,** former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Somalia
- **Professor Margaret Vogt,** former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA)
Day Two: Thursday, 29 August 2013

09:30 – 11:15 Session IV: Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture

Chair: Professor Ibrahim Gambari, former Joint Special Representative for the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur; and former Foreign Minister of Nigeria

Speakers: Dr Dan Kuwali, former Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
"Squaring the Circle: The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)"

Ms Dawn Nagar, Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
"The African Standby Force (ASF) and Regional Brigades in Peace Support Operations"

Mr Paul Mulindwa, Senior Project Officer; and Mr Oscar Siwali, former Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
"Managing HIV/AIDS in Peace Support Operations"

11:15 – 11:30 Coffee Break

11:30 – 13:00 Session V: The Practice and Perceptions of Peacekeeping in Africa

Chair: Dr Musifiki Mwanasali, Senior Advisor, Bureau of the Chairperson, African Union Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Speakers: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
"Pax Nigeriana versus Pax Gallica: ECOWAS and UN Peacekeeping in Mali"

Dr Ines Mzali, Department of English Studies, University of Montreal, Canada
"Staging the Peacekeeping Narrative: Hollywood’s Portrayal of Peacekeeping Efforts in Africa"

13:00 – 14:00 Lunch

14:00 – 15:30 Session VI: The Practice of Peacebuilding in Africa

Chair: Ambassador Francis Deng, Permanent Representative of South Sudan to the UN, New York
Speakers:  Dr Augustine Mahiga, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Somalia  
“The Practice of Peacebuilding in Somalia”

Professor Margaret Vogt, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic  
“Building Peace in the Central African Republic”

Day Three:  Friday, 30 August 2013

09:30 – 11:15  Session VII: Peacekeeping Partnerships and Problems in Africa

Chair:  Dr Monde Muyangwa, Independent Consultant, Washington D.C., United States

Speakers:  Professor Margaret Vogt, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic  
“The UN and Africa’s Regional Organisations”

Dr Kudrat Virk, Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town  
“Asian Peacekeepers in Africa”

Dr Kwame Akonor, Associate Professor of Political Science, Seton Hall University, New Jersey, United States  
“Accountability of Peacekeepers in Peacekeeping Missions”

11:15 – 11:30  Coffee Break

11:30 – 13:00  Session VIII: European Powers: France and Britain in Africa

Chair:  Dr Ulrich Golaszinski, Director of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Botswana Office, Gaborone

Speakers:  Professor Douglas Yates, Professor of Political Science, American University of Paris, France  
“The French Peacekeeping Role in Africa”
Professor Ismail Rashid, Professor of History, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, New York
‘Britain’s Role in Promoting Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone’

13:00 – 14:00 Lunch

14:00 – 15:30 Session IX: The UN Security Council and the United States in Africa

Chair: Ambassador James Jonah, former UN Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs, New York

Speakers: Ambassador Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Executive Director, Security Council Report, New York; and former Foreign Minister of Costa Rica
‘The Role of the UN Security Council in Africa’

Professor Horace G. Campbell, Professor of Political Science and African American Studies, Syracuse University, New York
‘The US and Security in Africa’

15:30 – 16:00 Coffee Break and Completing Evaluation Forms

16:00 – 17:00 Session X: Policy Recommendations and Producing the Book Volume

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Rapporteurs: Dr Dan Kuwali, former Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
Ms Dawn Nagar, Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
Annex II

List of Participants

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   New Jersey, United States

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   New York, United States

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   United States

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    Director  
    Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Botswana Office  
    Gaborone, Botswana

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    Senior Adviser  
    International Peace Institute  
    New York, United States

12. Ambassador Professor Iqbal Jhazbhay  
    Ambassador of South Africa to Eritrea  
    Asmara, Eritrea

13. Ambassador James Jonah  
    Former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs  
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Cape Town, South Africa

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Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

20. Dr Ines Mzali
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University of Montreal
Canada

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Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution
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22. Ambassador Welile Nhlapo
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Tshwane, South Africa

23. Dr Sarah Nouwen
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Cambridge University
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24. Professor Ismail Rashid
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New York, United States

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Consulate-General of Germany
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Security Council Report
New York, United States

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Cambridge University
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Germany
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   Juba, South Sudan

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   France

34. Dr Agostinho Zacarias  
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   United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Resident Representative  
   Tshwane, South Africa

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   Cape Town, South Africa

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   Cape Town, South Africa

37. Ms Liliane Limenyande  
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   Cape Town, South Africa
Annex III

List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACHPR</td>
<td>African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACIRC</td>
<td>African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRI</td>
<td>Africa Crisis Response Initiative (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOTA</td>
<td>African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>African-led International Support Mission in Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>Africa Command (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>AU Mission in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>AU Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Armoured personnel carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APF</td>
<td>African Peace Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRD</td>
<td>Popular Army for the Restoration of Democracy (CAR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWA</td>
<td>Aids Watch Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIPSOT</td>
<td>Bangladesh Institute for Peace Support Operations Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-military cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCR</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System (AU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUNPK</td>
<td>Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (India)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOBRIp</td>
<td>ECOWAS Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>EU Force</td>
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<td>FES</td>
<td>Friedrich Ebert Stiftung</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIA</td>
<td>Armed Islamic Group (Algeria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of national unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Contact Group (on Somalia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINURCA</td>
<td>UN Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISAB</td>
<td>Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISCA</td>
<td>African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSU</td>
<td>Mediation Support Unit (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIF</td>
<td>Neutral Intervention Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIIA</td>
<td>Nigerian Institute of International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>UN Operation in the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-1</td>
<td>Permanent one member of the UN Security Council (the US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-3</td>
<td>Permanent three members of the UN Security Council (the US, France, and Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-5</td>
<td>Permanent five members of the UN Security Council (the US, China, Russia, France, and Britain)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAP</td>
<td>Pan-African Parliament (AU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council (AU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional economic community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECAMAP</td>
<td>Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCBRIG</td>
<td>SADC Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Standby High-Readiness Brigade (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security sector reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>STI</td>
<td>Sexually-transmitted infection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop-contributing country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDPM</td>
<td>Democratic Union of the Malian People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFDR</td>
<td>Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (CAR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>UN Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF I</td>
<td>UN Emergency Force I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOAU</td>
<td>UN Office to the African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>UN Operation in Somalia II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOWA</td>
<td>UN Office for West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>UN Truce Supervision Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMSA</td>
<td>US Military Strategists Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCT</td>
<td>Voluntary counselling and testing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIF</td>
<td>Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (Centre for International Peace Operations)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other Publications in this series
(Available at www.ccr.org.za)

VOLUME 1
THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S SECURITY
THE UNITED NATIONS, REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND FUTURE SECURITY THREATS IN AFRICA
The inter-related and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security within the framework of United Nations (UN) reform were the focus of this policy seminar, held from 21 to 23 May 2004 in Claremont, Cape Town.

VOLUME 2
SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRICA
THE POST-APARTHEID DECADE
The role that South Africa has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa’s domestic transformation 10 years into democracy were assessed at this meeting in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 29 July to 1 August 2004.

VOLUME 3
THE AU/NEPAD AND AFRICA’S EVOLVING GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
The state of governance and security in Africa under the African Union (AU) and The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) were analysed and assessed at this policy advisory group meeting in Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004.

VOLUME 4
A MORE SECURE CONTINENT
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN HIGH LEVEL PANEL REPORT, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY
African perspectives on the United Nations’ (UN) High-Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change were considered at this policy advisory group meeting in Somerset West, Cape Town, on 23 and 24 April 2005.

VOLUME 5
WHITHER SADC?
SOUTHERN AFRICA’S POST-APARTHEID SECURITY AGENDA
The role and capacity of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) were focused on at this meeting in Oudtshoorn, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005.

VOLUME 6
HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY
AN AGENDA FOR AFRICA
The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and the potential role of African leadership and the African Union (AU) in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.

VOLUME 7
BUILDING AN AFRICAN UNION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES (RECs), NEPAD AND CIVIL SOCIETY
This seminar in Cape Town, held from 20 to 22 August 2005, made policy recommendations on how African Union (AU) institutions, including The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), could achieve their aims and objectives.

VOLUME 8
THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 October 2005, explores civil society’s role in relation to southern Africa’s democratic governance, its nexus with government, and draws on comparative experiences in peacebuilding.
VOLUME 9
WOMEN AND PEACEBUILDING IN AFRICA
This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations (UN) in 2000.

VOLUME 10
HIV/AIDS AND MILITARIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This two-day policy advisory group seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.

VOLUME 11
AIDS AND SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA
BUILDING A COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE
This policy and research seminar, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 March 2006, developed and disseminated new knowledge on the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in the three key areas of democratic practice; sustainable development; and peace and security.

VOLUME 12
HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA
This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS in South Africa and southern Africa from a human security perspective.

VOLUME 13
SOUTH SUDAN WITHIN A NEW SUDAN
This policy advisory group seminar on 20 and 21 April 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2006 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A).

VOLUME 14
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION
This meeting, in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3 and 4 August 2006 examined the relevance for Africa of the creation, in December 2005, of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission and examined how countries emerging from conflict could benefit from its establishment.

VOLUME 15
THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CENTRAL AFRICA
This sub-regional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.

VOLUME 16
UNITED NATIONS MEDIATION EXPERIENCE IN AFRICA
This seminar, held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006, sought to draw out key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa, and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations (UN) newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).
VOLUME 17
WEST AFRICA’S EVOLVING SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
LOOKING BACK TO THE FUTURE
The conflict management challenges facing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the areas of governance, development, and security reform and post-conflict peacebuilding formed the basis of this policy seminar in Accra, Ghana, on 30 and 31 October 2006.

VOLUME 18
THE UNITED NATIONS AND AFRICA
PEACE, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SECURITY
This policy advisory group meeting, held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 14 to 16 December 2006, set out to assess the role of the principal organs and the specialised agencies of the United Nations (UN) in Africa.

VOLUME 19
AFRICA’S RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
This policy seminar, held in Somerset West, South Africa, on 23 and 24 April 2007, interrogated issues around humanitarian intervention in Africa and the responsibility of regional governments and the international community in the face of humanitarian crises.

VOLUME 20
WOMEN IN POSTCONFLICT SOCIETIES IN AFRICA
The objective of the seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 and 7 November 2006, was to discuss and identify concrete ways of engendering reconstruction and peace processes in African societies emerging from conflict.

VOLUME 21
AFRICA’S EVOLVING HUMAN RIGHTS ARCHITECTURE
The experiences and lessons from a number of human rights actors and institutions on the African continent were reviewed and analysed at this policy advisory group meeting held on 28 and 29 June 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa.

VOLUME 22
PEACE VERSUS JUSTICE?
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS AND WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS IN AFRICA
The primary goal of this policy meeting, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 May 2007, was to address the relative strengths and weaknesses of ‘prosecution versus amnesty’ for past human rights abuses in countries transitioning from conflict to peace.

VOLUME 23
CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICTS IN AFRICA
This report, based on a policy advisory group seminar held on 12 and 13 April 2007 in Johannesburg, South Africa, examines the role of various African Union (AU) organs in monitoring the rights of children in conflict and postconflict situations.

VOLUME 24
SOUTHERN AFRICA
BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
This report is based on a seminar, held in Tanzania on 29 and 30 May 2007, that sought to enhance the efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to advance security, governance and development initiatives in the sub-region.
TOWARDS A NEW PAX AFRICANA: MAKING, KEEPING, AND BUILDING PEACE IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA

VOLUME 25
PREVENTING GENOCIDE AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
CHALLENGES FOR THE UN, AFRICA, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
This policy advisory group meeting was held from 16 to 18 December 2007 in Stellenbosch, South Africa, and focused on six African, Asian and European case studies. These highlighted inter-related issues of concern regarding populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, ‘ethnic cleansing’ or crimes against humanity.

VOLUME 26
EURAFRIQUE?
AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY
This seminar, held from 31 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt), peacekeeping and military cooperation, and migration.

VOLUME 27
SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
This seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 8 to 10 June 2008, brought together a group of experts – policymakers, academics and civil society actors – to identify ways of strengthening the capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to formulate security and development initiatives for southern Africa.

VOLUME 28
HIV/AIDS AND MILITARIES IN AFRICA
This policy research report addresses prospects for an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic within the context of African peacekeeping and regional peace and security. It is based on three regional advisory group seminars that took place in Windhoek, Namibia (February 2006); Cairo, Egypt (September 2007); and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (November 2007).

VOLUME 29
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND PEACEBUILDING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
CIVIL SOCIETY, GOVERNMENTS, AND TRADITIONAL LEADERS
This meeting, held on 19 and 20 May 2008 in Johannesburg, South Africa, provided a platform for participants from Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe to share insights on sustained intervention initiatives implemented by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in the three countries since 2002.

VOLUME 30
CROUCHING TIGER, HIDDEN DRAGON?
CHINA AND AFRICA
ENGAGING THE WORLD’S NEXT SUPERPOWER
This seminar, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 September 2007, assessed Africa’s engagement with China in the last 50 years, in light of the dramatic changes in a relationship that was historically based largely on ideological and political solidarity.

VOLUME 31
FROM EURAFRIQUE TO AFRO-EUROPA
AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY
This policy seminar, held from 11 to 13 September 2008 in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, South Africa, explored critically the nature of the relationship between Africa and Europe in the political, economic, security and social spheres.

VOLUME 32
TAMING THE DRAGON?
DEFINING AFRICA’S INTERESTS AT THE FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA CO-OPERATION
This policy seminar held in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa on 13 and 14 July 2009 – four months before the fourth meeting of the Forum on China-Africa co-operation (FOCAC) – examined systematically how Africa’s 53 states define and articulate their geostrategic interests and policies for engaging China within FOCAC.

60 | TOWARDS A NEW PAX AFRICANA: MAKING, KEEPING, AND BUILDING PEACE IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA
TOWARDS A NEW PAX AFRICANA: MAKING, KEEPING, AND BUILDING PEACE IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA

VOLUME 33
PEACEBUILDING IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA
PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS

This policy research seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana from 25 to 28 August 2009 took a fresh look at the peacebuilding challenges confronting Africa and the responses of the main regional and global institutions mandated to build peace on the continent.

VOLUME 34
STABILISING SUDAN:
DOMESTIC, SUB-REGIONAL, AND EXTRA-REGIONAL CHALLENGES

This policy advisory group seminar held in the Western Cape, South Africa from 23 to 24 August 2010 analysed and made concrete recommendations on the challenges facing Sudan as it approached an historic transition – the vote on self-determination for South Sudan scheduled for January 2011.

VOLUME 35
BUILDING PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

This policy seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 25 to 26 February 2010 assessed Southern Africa’s peacebuilding prospects by focusing largely on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its institutional, security, and governance challenges.

VOLUME 36
POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC)

This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 19 to 20 April 2010 sought to enhance the effectiveness of the Congolese government, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), civil society, the United Nations (UN), and the international community in building peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

VOLUME 37
STATE RECONSTRUCTION IN ZIMBABWE

This policy advisory group seminar held in Siavonga, Zambia, from 9 to 10 June 2011 assessed the complex interlocking challenges facing the rebuilding of Zimbabwe in relation to the economy, employment, health, education, land, security, and the role of external actors.

VOLUME 38
SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA, AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 13 to 14 December 2011, focused on South Africa’s role on the UN Security Council; the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the Council; the politics of the Council; and its interventions in Africa.

VOLUME 39
THE EAGLE AND THE SPRINGBOK:
STRENGTHENING THE NIGERIA/SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONSHIP

This policy advisory group seminar held in Lagos, Nigeria, from 9 to 10 June 2012 sought to help “reset” the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa by addressing their bilateral relations, multilateral roles, and economic and trade links.

VOLUME 40
SOUTH AFRICA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 19 to 20 November 2012 considered South Africa’s region-building efforts in Southern Africa, paying particular attention to issues of peace and security, development, democratic governance, migration, food security, and the roles played by the European Union (EU) and China.
TOWARDS A NEW PAX AFRICANA: MAKING, KEEPING, AND BUILDING PEACE IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA

VOLUME 41
THE AFRICAN UNION AT TEN: PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS

This international colloquium held in Berlin, Germany, from 30 to 31 August 2012, reviewed the first ten years of the African Union (AU); assessed its peace and security efforts; compared it with the European Union (EU); examined the AU’s strategies to achieve socioeconomic development; and, analysed its global role.

VOLUME 42
AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE UNITED NATIONS’ SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 12 to 13 December 2012, considered Africa and South Africa’s performance on the United Nations (UN) Security Council; the politics and reform of the Security Council; the impact of the African Group at the UN; and the performance of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

VOLUME 43
GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTHERN AFRICA

This report considers the key governance and security challenges facing Southern Africa, with a focus on the 15-member Southern African Development Community (SADC) subregion’s progress towards democracy, and its peacemaking, peacemaking, and peacebuilding efforts.

VOLUME 44
ACHIEVING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDGS) IN AFRICA

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 13 and 14 May 2013 considered the progress that Africa has made towards achieving the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and sought to support African actors and institutions in shaping the post-2015 development agenda.

VOLUME 45
THE AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN, AND PACIFIC (ACP) GROUP AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU)

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 29 to 30 October 2012 considered the nature of the relationship between the ACP Group and the EU, and the potential for their further strategic engagement, as the final five-year review of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 between the two sides approaches in 2015.
Notes
African sub-regional and continental organisations have increasingly shaped the nature of efforts to make, keep, and build peace on the continent in a quest for Pax Africana. In August 2013, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, convened about 30 leading policymakers, civil society actors, and scholars to assess the progress being made by the African Union (AU) and Africa's regional economic communities (RECs) in managing conflicts and operationalising the continent's peace and security architecture. The meeting also sought to assist these bodies in building peace in countries emerging from conflict. The Cape Town meeting further explored the peacekeeping relationships between Africa's regional organisations and the United Nations (UN); the role of the United States (US), France, and Britain in African peacekeeping efforts; and the regional and international dimensions of peacebuilding, state-building, and post-conflict reconstruction.