FROM EURAFRIQUE TO AFRO-EUROPA
AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY

CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION
CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

POLICY SEMINAR REPORT

11 – 13 SEPTEMBER 2008, PROTEA HOTEL, STELLENBOSCH, CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

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RAPPORTEURS

KAYE WHITEMAN AND DAWN NAGAR

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Acknowledgements

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, would like to thank the governments of Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden, as well as the United Kingdom's (UK) Department for International Development (DFID), for their generous support that made possible the holding of the policy research seminar in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 11 - 13 September 2008.

About the Organiser

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

The Centre for Conflict Resolution is affiliated to the University of Cape Town (UCT) in South Africa. Established in 1968, the organisation has wide-ranging experience in conflict interventions in the Western Cape and southern Africa and is working increasingly on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa's regional organisations, as well as on policy research on Southern Africa's Peacebuilding Challenges; Post-conflict Peacebuilding: the AU, the UN, and Civil Society; HIV/AIDS and Post-conflict Societies; and Peacebuilding: Africa and the European Union.

The Rapporteurs

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Executive Summary

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, held a policy and research seminar in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 11 to 13 September 2008 on the theme, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century".

The main objective of the Cape Town policy seminar was to bring together about 40 African and European scholars, policymakers, and civil society actors to explore critically the nature of the relationship between both continents and the potential for further strategic engagement between them. The meeting built on CCR's earlier policy advisory group seminar held from 31 October to 1 November 2007, also in Cape Town, on the theme, "*Eurafrique*? Africa and Europe in a New Century", just before the European Union (EU)-Africa Summit in Lisbon, Portugal, in December 2007.

Nine years have passed since the Africa–Europe Summit was held in Cairo, Egypt, in April 2000. Since then, many geo-political developments have impacted on the relationship between the two continents. These include: the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000, and the initiation of trade talks between Africa and Europe, namely the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations. The same period has seen the stalling of the Doha Development Round in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) talks by 2007 (a round that has yet to be completed), the rise of the Aid for Trade programme of 2005, and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of the same year.

The development and security agendas in the Africa-Europe relationship have also shown themselves to be closely connected, and the issue of migration has become increasingly thorny. The firm policy belief in "no foreign boots on African soil" has given way to numerous successful and unsuccessful military interventions in African conflict situations involving the African Union, the United Nations (UN), and the European Union. Increasingly, the rich North and the poor South are being confronted with issues of climate change, renewable energy, and, most recently, the global financial and food crises. The world is also becoming ever more aware of the catastrophic impact of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria on Africa's development and security agenda.

1. The Politics of North/South Relations

Relations between Africa and Europe have for some time been considered as a laboratory for North-South relations. This was certainly the case in the 1970s, the era of the "New International Economic Order", when the Lomé Convention of 1975 was in first bloom. The relationship has increasingly become a "dialogue of the deaf". The term "partnership" has, often, been used to characterise the relationship. However, in most cases, the partnership has been unequal and shows more a situation of uneasy co-existence than a harmonious give-and-take relationship.

For example, the new EU Strategy for Africa in 2005 sought to provide the framework for a comprehensive integrated long-term relationship, but was almost completely prepared by the European Commission in Brussels, Belgium, without much input from African states. The Joint Strategy agreed between Africa and Europe in Lisbon in December 2007 involved African input and contained valid ideas on creating an environment for sustainable and inclusive development in Africa. Europe and Africa should, however, become more business-like in their relations, and stop drawing up grand scenarios that are hard to implement.

A classic case history of the mismanagement of North-South relations can be found in the Economic Partnership Agreements that are central to the current state of EU-Africa relations. There is, however, a problem of co-ordination in that the Strategy approved in Lisbon in 2007 made no reference to the Cotonou Agreements of 2000, despite covering similar ground. While the objectives of the reciprocal but asymmetrical EPAs to foster sustainable economic and social development among the 79-member African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) and to promote their gradual integration into the world economy are clear, how to achieve these goals are in dispute, especially on the "development component". African countries are increasingly disappointed at the lack of financial commitments accompanying the EPAs, and the EU's insistence that development finance and EPAs are separate issues. Few African countries are willing to include services investment and trade-related aspects such as competition and public procurement in the negotiations, arguing that these are not development-related.

If the EPAs form the heart of the "trade, growth and development" of the EU strategy for Africa, most African countries would doubt that they meet the values of this strategy of "ownership, joint accountability and equal partnership". Those who signed the EPAs only did so because not signing would have been seen by Brussels as "anti-development", implying the immediate loss of valuable EU preferences. If African countries do not regard compliance with the EPAs to be in their best interest, implementation will depend on the EU Commission's ability to prove and sanction cases of non-compliance. Such "enforcement" would violate the basic principles of the EU strategy for Africa, and is much less likely to be durable than an outcome that is mutually acceptable to both sides.

2. Building Pan-Continental Institutions

The success of regional integration is dependent on the willingness shown by African states to surrender some of their sovereignty. Civil society needs to be involved, but to participate in such processes, effective mechanisms are needed such as strengthening the 1990 African Charter on Popular Participation. The African Union's Pan-African Parliament's (PAP) functions are limited in capacity, while the African Union (AU) is dominated by heads of state. National parliaments and courts are dominated by strong executives, which often prevent them from playing an effective role.

The PAP needs to be de-linked from national parliaments, and the role of ombudspersons strengthened. As in Europe, Africa's fledgling pan-continental parliament is intended to ensure the exercise of a broader, more inclusive democratic process. Article 17 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union of 2000, established the PAP in March 2004. In its first five years, the parliament is intended to operate primarily as an AU advisory body. Thereafter, the PAP is to develop full legislative powers with members elected from the AU's 53 members.

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights was adopted by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1981. In 1998, the OAU also adopted the Protocol for establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights which was institutionalised in 2004. Twenty-four African governments have ratified the newly-established African Union Commission's African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) that can learn some lessons from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The ECHR is well resourced with attorneys, professional judges, and interpreters.

3. The Security and Governance Roles of the African Union and the European Union

Security and governance are of considerable importance to the EU-Africa relationship. Co-operation is increasing between the EU and Africa in the related fields of security and governance, from the first inclusion of human rights in the Fourth Lomé Convention in 1989, to the comprehensive governance provisions in the 2000 Cotonou Agreements, and the beginning of security co-operation between the EU and the newly-constituted African Union after 2002.

The different mechanisms that the EU has supported include the 15-member African Peace and Security Council (PSC), the African Peace Facility, and the planned African Standby Force (ASF), due to come into existence in 2010. On the European side, there was the *Artémis* operation in Bunia in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2003 (the first ever joint European security exercise in Africa); the European Police Mission (EUPOL) and European Forces (EUFOR) at the time of the elections in the DRC in 2006/2007; and the EUFOR intervention in Chad and Central African Republic (CAR) in March 2008. Both *Artémis* and the EUFOR initiatives succeeded in their limited missions because they had narrow time-frames with clear objectives and exit dates. EUFOR Chad/CAR became MINURCAT (UN Mission in Central African Republic and Chad) in March 2009.

Although these exercises in the DRC were particularly pushed by the French, who have always been in the forefront of involving the EU in African peacekeeping exercises, they were accepted by other member states, and received the blessing of the AU. The EUFOR operation in Chad and CAR came under particular scrutiny, especially as this was an ongoing operation, not due to end until March 2009, when it was transformed into a UN force. The complex and inscrutable decision-making processes in Brussels have come under scrutiny, especially the fact that internal EU politics, rather than objective assessments of needs, often determine the outcome of policy decisions. EUFOR won European support because of the need for the EU to be seen to be "doing something" about the six-year-old Darfur rebellion in Sudan.

Another key issue was the role of the French in EU peacekeeping, partly as a result of the failure of France's earlier neo-colonial policies and military interventions in Africa. Opinions were expressed that the entire attempt to involve the EU in peacekeeping in Africa may be a disguised (or transferred) form of neo-colonialism redolent of the old idea of *Eurafrique*, and not in keeping with new ideas of partnership. The persistent denial by donors of much-needed helicopters to the United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was seen to be symptomatic of the suspicion that the whole business of intervening in both Sudan and Chad/CAR was a game of "liars' poker".

4. The EU Roles of Britain and Portugal

The roles of Britain and Portugal, two EU member states that have long had relations with Africa, were highlighted. For most of the first 40 years after Africa's independence, Britain engaged in damage limitation and minimising political problems particularly in southern Africa. British entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 was a means of disengaging from its Commonwealth obligations which were absorbed into Europe's budding development policy, especially through the Lomé Convention of 1975. The end of apartheid in South Africa represented a milestone, but Africa continued to be regarded as a marginal British foreign policy interest,

even after the Labour Party's ascendance to power in 1997. In Tony Blair's second term, his 2001 speech describing Africa as a "scar on the conscience of the world" was offensive to many Africans and marked the discovery of an Africa policy, of which the Commission for Africa of 2005 was a centre-piece. However, the implementation of the Commission's report was disappointing. British development aid increased through the new Department for International Development (DFID), but Africa was never really a top foreign policy priority like the Balkans, Iraq, or Afghanistan. The Sierra Leone intervention of 2000 was part of Blair's efforts to promote an "ethical foreign policy," as 300 British troops helped to stabilise a faltering United Nations peacekeeping mission.

For Portugal, in spite of the trauma of decolonisation in the 1970s, once it had joined the European Economic Community in 1986, Lisbon came to see itself increasingly as a bridge between Europe and its former African colonies. Portugal was used by the Americans in Angola and Mozambique to "decouple" talks at the end of the Cold War. Relations between Portugal and Angola improved after elections in 1992, and the death of the controversial rebel leader Jonas Savimbi in 2002. From 1995 onwards, Portugal saw Africa as a means of giving a small country in Europe a stronger voice. This approach was developed through the proposal for EU-Africa summits, which were held in Cairo (2000) and Lisbon (2007). However, most African lusophone countries were marginal to Portugal, except for its second largest export market: oil and diamond-rich Angola.

5. EU Relations with the Mediterranean

Apart from the ACP-EU framework, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process) of 1995 has seen a number of North African countries – Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria – enter into bilateral trade deals and development co-operation with the EU, and commit to a broader vision of democratic reform and regional integration across the Mediterranean. Efforts by French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, to establish an exclusive Mediterranean relationship with selected European and North African states from 2007 also resulted in tensions with Germany, forcing a more inclusive approach. The muscle-flexing of the EU as a global player has extended particularly to Asia, and the negotiation of "strategic partnership" agreements is a crucial "soft-power" tool for the projection of EU influence and power that accompanies "hard-power" crisis management and peacekeeping missions, as much in Asia as in Africa. Brussels' focus on the two continents is part of a drive to build a stronger network of allies across the globe to tackle challenges of peace and security, even if the strategic partnership agreements are often about meetings, communiqués, and speeches rather than about substance and content. Building stronger bonds with the EU is in the interest of African and Asian nations seeking to break away from the influence of one over-arching power, whether this be the United States (US), Japan, or China. But, just as European countries too often expose their divisions in dealing with international flashpoints, engaging the EU also takes much time, energy, and patience.

6. Identity and Migration

Migration is central to Africa-Europe relations. A major tragedy has been unfolding with thousands of young men from Africa trying to enter Spain and other Mediterranean countries of the EU on rickety boats, just as questions of immigration have been dominating political debates across Europe. A contradiction was perceived here: while the free movement of goods and capital is consistently advocated by Brussels, the people who contribute to producing them are prevented from entering "Fortress Europe". Is this southern European "humanitarian disaster" the result of an increasing externalisation of migration management to points outside the EU, mostly in North Africa?

Migration from Africa, including North Africa, has been an increasing pre-occupation of the EU which has, over the years, increasingly tried to devise a concerted policy, because this was clearly an issue which could not be handled solely at a national level. There has been an evident tension between the perception of migration as danger, and migration as potential. The most developed statement of the principles underlying the migration partnership between Africa and Europe can be found in the Cotonou Agreement of 2000, which specifies that migration partnership involves in-depth dialogue consonant with commitments in international law to respect human rights. The EU's approach to building this dialogue extends to residence and employment questions that include fair treatment of third country nationals, addressing root causes through poverty reduction, training and education, as well as the fight against illegal immigration. Migration dialogue also features in the EU-Africa Lisbon Strategy of 2007, but there is no cross-referencing to the relevant sections of Cotonou.

Policy Recommendations

The following 12 key recommendations emerged from the policy seminar:

- First, it is important for both Africa and Europe that their relations should transcend the burdens of the past, in order to make the paradigm shift from "Eurafrique" to "Afro-europa". Europe has to respect that Africans will always hold dear the guiding principles of pan-Africanism of freedom and unity, and Africa has to recognise that unity needs a realistic and sustainable framework of integration based on development, co-operation, and democratic governance;

- Second, the new global balance of forces, taking into account particularly the growing importance of Asia – and especially the growing role of China, which has become the third largest investor in Africa after Europe and the US – must be taken into account when considering the future of Africa-Europe relations. Members of the African Union need to focus on strengthening, rationalising, and funding the organisation as well as Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs);

- Third, the new EU-Africa Joint Strategy approved in Lisbon in 2007 deserves backing as far as it truly supports Africa's own strategic objectives. It is important that its structures should be sustainable and its action plan capable of realistic implementation;

- Fourth, it is critical that the present disconnect between the Lisbon strategy and the operations of the Cotonou Agreements of June 2000 be bridged. The trade provisions of Cotonou, including the Economic Partnership Agreements, need to be integrated into the Lisbon Strategy. The African Union could become the focal co-ordinating point of negotiations for EPAs between Africa's RECs and the EU;

- Fifth, the disunity caused in Africa between individual states and within its RECs is to be wholeheartedly deplored, as is the mercantilist approach that the EU has shown since insisting on the EPA provisions in Cotonou, especially the abandonment of the hitherto sacrosanct principle of non-reciprocity between rich and poor countries. Ways should be found to re-fashion the relationship in view of the damage caused by the EPAs not just to Africa-Europe relations, but to Africa's own attempts at regional integration;

- Sixth, the intensive monitoring of EU aid by independent international authorities is essential, beyond donor organisations and ministries of finance. It would be advantageous for Africa to have its own independent monitoring of the aid disbursement that is a treaty obligation under the Cotonou Agreements of 2000;

- Seventh, it is important that the AU's Pan-African Parliament should embark on a concerted popularisation effort to ensure that its programmes and activities are well known and supported by various segments of African populations, including civil society organisations. Aside from strengthening co-operation with the European Parliament, the PAP could also learn lessons from the European Parliament's legislative and oversight role;

- Eighth, migration should be made a priority in the Europe-Africa agenda. European countries should limit externalising migration management outside Europe, notably in North Africa. The emphasis should be on "migration dialogue", as outlined in both the Cotonou Agreements of 2000 and the 2007 EU-African Strategy, rather than the "migration danger" that is too frequently perceived;

- Ninth, the Mediterranean Union promoted by President Nicolas Sarkozy of France could negatively affect the more traditional bilateral and multilateral ties that Europe has forged in the southern and eastern Mediterranean, and must be rethought. Lack of progress in regional co-operation in North Africa – a by-product of the excessive extraversion of trade – should also be rectified;

- Tenth, Europe's support for the African Union's security mechanisms should be conditionally welcomed, and appropriate lessons should be drawn from EU peacekeeping support in the DRC, Sudan's Darfur region, and Chad/CAR;

- Eleventh, there should always be scrutiny by the AU of the motives of the EU's security interventions, to examine their convergence with African interests. The EU needs to be careful in using Africa as a testing ground for its own evolving security strategy, as is often the case with its military operations. African charges of France using the EU as multilateral cover for the discredited unilateral interventions of the past must also be closely scrutinised; and

- Finally, the AU must be aware of the limitations of the EU in co-ordination due to the lack of an over-arching central authority. While European offers of assistance should not automatically be refused by Africans, the UN remains the most legitimate international peacekeeper, and the EU must strengthen, not weaken, the world body's role in Africa.

1. Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) in Cape Town, South Africa, held a research and policy seminar in Stellenbosch, Western Cape, from 11 - 13 September 2008 on the theme, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century".

The aim of the seminar was to examine the historical and contemporary relationship between Africa and Europe, and to investigate whether this relationship is one of habit or one of real strategic importance for both continents. The seminar explored the unfolding economic relationship between the two continents and discussed issues of regional integration, peacekeeping, military co-operation, and migration. It further assessed the interests of Europe in Africa, the growth of institutional linkages between the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU), and the political, economic, and security roles that Africa expects Europe to play on the continent. The meeting drew on the expertise of about 40 policymakers, civil society activists, and scholars. Twenty-five African and European authors produced papers and received feedback on their respective inputs at the seminar. The seminar papers will form the basis of chapters to be included in an edited volume, and will be widely disseminated in Africa, Europe, and beyond.

Seminar Themes

The following six key themes formed the basis for presentations and discussions during the meeting:

1. The History of Relations between Africa and Europe;

2. Regional Integration and Identity in Africa and Europe;

3. Trade, Aid and Development;

4. The AU and the EU's Security and Governance Roles in Africa;

5. The EU roles of Britain and Portugal in Africa; and

6. Human Security and Migration.

2. From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century

Although the focus of the Stellenbosch seminar was on Europe's efforts at forging post-colonial relations with Africa, these ties were situated in the context of a troubled history. Europe is the most economically developed continent in the world, and has, over a period of 400 to 500 years, integrated itself into the world on the basis of unequal exchange.

Hence, the 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa now constitute a group of their own – the "periphery of the periphery" or the "Fourth World". Africa is probably the only continent that has failed to recognise and exploit the nexus between economic growth and holistic human development; the elimination of large-scale structural unemployment; and the focus on the creation of wealth as the only way to eradicate poverty. In other words, the imperative of socio-economic and political "deconstruction" and transformation has not been fully grasped by African leaders. Unfortunately, Europe, which had gone through its process of industrialisation in preceding centuries, contributed to diverting Africa's attention from development to growth.[1]

The theme of "growth without development" is important, as the high growth achieved in Africa in the last decade was due largely to high commodity prices, high inflation, and some relief of Africa's external debt of $290 billion. In other words, this was "growth without development", or "dependent development" which, according to Immanuel Wallerstein, "leads nowhere fast".[2] Africa has woefully failed to "deconstruct" the colonial economy it had inherited at independence in the 1950s and 1960s. Marching towards its future hand in hand with its colonial inheritance represents no dignified future at all. Africa has no alternative development strategies to those that are an imitation of strategies and lifestyles developed elsewhere for other societies with different backgrounds.

Inter-ethnic divisions and "tribal" conflicts aided and abetted colonialism. Seafaring European adventurers and their nations exploited Africa's separatism and irredentism to their advantage, beginning with concluding "treaties" with "friendly natives" for ports of call, *entrepôt* trade, refueling stations, and naval bases. Under competitive pressure, territorial authority and protectorates were established, with two systems – *colonies du peuplement* (colonies of people) and *colonies d'exploitation* (colonies of exploitation). Most of the 53 member states of the African Union – previously the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) – are the product of some form of integration introduced by the colonial powers, notably the British and the French, who even tried federating their African territories: a system which largely collapsed at independence.

French efforts at loading their ex-territories with a cumbersome network of scores of co-operation entities at both bilateral and multilateral levels meant that francophone African countries bore the heavy cost of the abolition of the West and Central African federations. At the same time, efforts made to close the divide between these countries and their Anglophone neighbours were consistently sabotaged by France. Gallic post-colonial ties were extended in the 1960s to the newly-created European Economic Community (EEC), to reinforce ways of keeping these countries closely tied to France's apron-strings through the two Yaoundé Conventions of 1963 and 1969, providing aid, technical assistance, and trade preferences.

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1 Adebayo Adedeji, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century", keynote address at the CCR seminar, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century", Stellenbosch, Cape Town, 11-13 September 2008.

2 Peter C. Gutkind and Immanuel Wallersten (eds.), *The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa* (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1976), pp.30-57.

After British entry into the EEC in 1973, African trade ministers decided to negotiate collectively with the Community, which resulted in the Lomé Convention of 1975. This was very much the product of the strong geo-political power of the current 79-member African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) countries in the context of the Cold War, the 1973 oil crisis, and the demand for a "New International Economic Order" of the 1970s. Built on the rock of equal partnership, the Accord conceded to the ACP responsibility for its own development, a lead role in managing Lomé's resources, predictable aid flows, and non-reciprocal trade benefits, as well as innovations on commodities – Stabex for agriculture and, in Lomé II of 1979, Sysmin for minerals. Between 1975 and 2000, three new Lomé Accords were agreed, each significantly altering the relations of the parties involved, to the detriment of the ACP countries concerned. This led to a dwindling perception of mutual interdependence; increasing European insistence on human rights and the structural adjustment conditionalities of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the decline of the ACP position in the European market despite preferential access; the failure of the ACP to diversify from traditional exports; and a fall in the ACP share of European aid.

The successor agreement to Lomé, signed in Cotonou between the ACP and the European Union in June 2000, reflects poignantly the worsening of the vulnerability of the nations of the South, especially in Africa. The increased dependence of Africa on Cotonou was seen in the new conditionality of "good governance"; direct access of donors to non-state actors and local governments; and programming of aid resources as a strategic management tool. Above all, the ending by 31 December 2007 of all ACP non-reciprocal tariff arrangements and their replacement by reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) marked this growing dependence. In these extended negotiations, while the EU took part as one entity, the ACP states were broken down into six regions – a tactic some viewed as reminiscent of imperial "divide and rule" approaches – four of them in Africa. The AU, in existence since 2002, has not been engaged in this process as an appropriate negotiating partner.

Professor Ali A Mazrui, Institute of Global Cultural Studies, Binghamton University, New York, United States, left; Ms Romy Chevallier, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, South Africa

It is increasingly felt in Africa that the EU abuses its vast negotiating power and budget to isolate and exploit individual states and to open their markets to unfair penetration by European farmers and manufacturers. The EPAs deny African countries the ladder to development used in the past by Europe, the United States (US), and the Asian "tigers" – Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan – to modify tariffs and to foster diversification. Brussels has also created a "spaghetti bowl" of overlapping bilateral and regional EPAs operating at different liberalisation speeds and time-frames that cut across existing regional blocs. This is history repeating itself, raising the spectre of the fragmentation and balkanisation of the decolonisation period. The ACP states have repeatedly protested at the word "partnership", and complain that the EU has instead been imposing the EPAs on them unilaterally.

There is a grim analogy with the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 at which the rules for Africa's partition were consolidated. The main difference is that this time, the European powers are not in competition with themselves but with the US, Japan, China, and India. Old habits die hard. Future relations being forged with Africa are hardly different from those over the centuries: market access for European goods and services; a slice of the market in government procurement; opportunities for European corporations that are losing their comparative advantage; and protected access to ACP markets through intellectual property rights.

The countries of Western Europe are constantly urging Africa to forge its own future. Yet, when African leaders have taken the initiative to craft their own indigenous strategies and policies, they have been ignored and frustrated, as with the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, and with programmes put forward by the United Nations (UN) in the 1980s and 1990s: the UN Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986-1990 (UNPAAERD); and the UN New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF). Since the beginning of the millennium, when Africa has again been pursuing economic and political integration through a resurgent campaign for freedom, dignity, and unity within the AU and the 2001 New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), Europe has chosen to look backward rather than forward. Many Europeans have to be weaned off their prejudiced mind-sets. One test will be whether Europe is able to overcome its own distorted protectionism in agriculture – EU subsidies are over $50 billion a year – and give substance to the much traduced and sabotaged Doha "development round" of talks on trade liberalisation at the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

Another question raised has been how to redress the historic imbalance represented by the fact that in 1960, Ghana and Nigeria were at the same level of development as South Korea and Malaysia, and are now far behind. The Japanese "flying geese" model had facilitated the spread of industrialisation in Southeast Asia, laying the foundation of the "Asian miracle". Europe should have employed this model for Africa rather than that of EPAs.

The African Union is much more than an imitation of the European Union, since the AU is a political and economic continental polity in waiting. Africa's pan-continental body also promotes more than just trade liberalisation or customs union. The Lagos Plan of Action of 1980 was based on the fundamental proposition that economic growth, though essential, will neither be sufficient nor possible without a fundamental transformation in the debilitating distortions in economic and social structures. This would involve an aggressive and sustained policy of productive employment, and the maintenance of a sustainable resource base, accompanied by the restructuring of a fragmented continent into more coherent and stronger regional and

sub-regional economic entities. At the moment, however, the AU's internal audit of December 2007[3] shows that the pan-continental body continues to suffer from internal incoherence and disarray and the ineffectiveness of its various organs. The Audit recommended that the AU Commission should assume the overall responsibility for Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) conferred on it by the Accra Summit of 2007, which sought to streamline the work of the RECs with a view to achieving greater synergies. The AU should also take over the RECs' negotiations of EPAs with the European Commission.

The AU audit, largely approved at its summit of July 2008, also proposed accelerators for the African integration process: free movement across borders; the development of transcontinental and inter-regional infrastructure; multi-nationalising African firms to accelerate integration; and the early establishment of continental financial institutions (central bank, monetary fund, and an investment bank).

Among the Audit's benchmarks for monitoring progress towards integration were the popularising of core values underpinning the AU Constitutive Act of 2000; the mobilisation of the 800 million Africans for unity and integration; the rationalisation of RECs; and the orientation of the African entrepreneurial elite towards regional and continental investments that can advance unity and integration.

The true test for Europe will be the extent to which it accepts playing a role in both the accelerators and the benchmarks for African integration, since these constitute nothing less than redressing the deeds of the Berlin Conference and its aftermath. Since the 1970s, the UN has been promoting economic co-operation among developing countries, also known as South-South co-operation. After more than three decades of lull and inaction, both China and India have begun to play a proactive role in this field.[4] Unfortunately, the reaction of European countries to this development has been more apprehensive than positive, fearing a new "Scramble for Africa" in which Europe might be the loser.

There is still an ideal of the right kind of "Afro-Europa", which will not happen as long as Africa remains a supplicant of Europe. There is thus an urgent need for a new alliance for implementing Africa's roadmaps for political unification and economic and market integration. The AU audit report of 2007 argued that the diversity and multiple players of African society must be harnessed as a whole. Pan-Africanism must thus be based on the fulcrum of collective self-reliance and self-sustainment. A psychological paradigm shift is needed for the peoples of Africa to be disabused of the naïve belief that their deliverance will come from outside the continent. Outsiders are welcome to help Africa, but not to take over the continent. The questions will continue to be asked: Will Europe and the EU contribute to this paradigm shift and refrain from blocking African initiatives? Will Europe consider Africa an equal partner, abandoning the mind-sets that have shaped European relations with Africa for centuries? Will Europe treat Africa as a player and not a plaything?[5]

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3 *Audit of the African Union: Towards a People-Centred Political and Socio-economic Integration and Transformation of Africa* (Addis Ababa: African Union, 2007).

4 Sanusha Naidu, "India's Growing African Strategy", in *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 35, No. 115, March 2008, pp.116-128; and Adam Habib, "Western Hegemony, Asian Ascendancy and the New Scramble for Africa", in Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu (eds.) *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China* (Scottsville, South Africa: University of Kwazulu-Natal Press, 2008), pp.259-277.

5 This section has largely summarised Adebayo Adedeji, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century", keynote address at the CCR seminar, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century", Stellenbosch, Cape Town, 11-13 September 2008.

3. The History of Relations between Africa and Europe

This section focuses on history, and how the divisions of modern political Africa were created by European powers in the colonial period, as well as how Africa's efforts to overcome the divisions and build a new unity were not always assisted by Europe's own political preoccupations and priorities.[6] Nonetheless, in the 21st century, the two continents faced real challenges of how to co-operate in the era of globalisation.

In assessing relations between Africa and Europe, much prominence must be given to the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, which is often seen as marking the definitive beginning of the full period of European colonisation in Africa. This was a seminal event that symbolised the deep flaws running through the whole history of relations between Africa and Europe. The German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, posing as an "honest broker", convened 14 mostly European powers and the United States and Turkey to a conference in the German capital to regulate the growing competition for colonies and "spheres of influence" that had come to be known as "the Scramble for Africa".[7] No African leaders were represented in Berlin.

Officially called to consider the question of free trade in the Niger and Congo basins, as well as the issue of effective jurisdiction over "protectorates", the Berlin Conference proved to be an exercise in carving out "spheres of influence", without taking ethnic, social and cultural differences into account, and often even in defiance of geography. The borders that largely resulted 20 years after Berlin reflected compromises born of the political rivalries in Europe rather than African political realities. African territories were still pawns on Europe's geo-strategic chessboard. The European curse of artificial borders invoked in Berlin has caused untold suffering in post-colonial Africa, with border conflicts and secessionist wars in many parts of the continent resulting in over 40 civil wars, ten million deaths, and ten million refugees since 1960.

By 1910, the partition of Africa was almost complete, even of the new territories, colonies, and protectorates that were not yet subdued or "pacified". At the same time, there was an increasing struggle for mastery in Europe, with the rise of Germany's ambitions and military and naval power. This, in turn, led to Britain and France playing out their differences in Africa, seen at their worst in the Fashoda stand-off on the upper Nile in 1898/1899. The Entente Cordiale of 1904 between Britain and France was very much concerned with settling diverse colonial frontiers in Africa, as well as mutual acceptance of the British in Egypt and the French in Morocco.

After the devastatingly brutal conflict of the First World War (1914-1918), in which Africa was one of the theatres of conflicts, and African troops were dragooned into helping European powers (especially France) fight their battles, the Peace of Versailles in 1919 showed that nothing much had changed. The elimination of Germany as a colonial power was reflected in a series of border changes that, like Berlin, reflected the balance of power in Europe in which African peoples counted for naught. If, on the face of it, this looked like the high summer of the

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6 Adekeye Adebajo, "Towers of Babel? The African Union and the European Union", paper presented at the CCR seminar, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century", Stellenbosch, Cape Town, 11-13 September 2008; and Kaye Whiteman, "The Rise and Rebirth of Eurafrique: From the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 to the EU-Africa Summit of Lisbon, December 2007", paper presented at the CCR seminar, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century", Stellenbosch, Cape Town, 11-13 September 2008.

7 Thomas Pakenham, "Welcome to a New Philanthropist", in *The Scramble for Africa* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), pp. 239-256.

European imperial presence in Africa, the Versailles conference, in fact, also contained the seeds of change, in that the US presence was infinitely stronger after its involvement in the First World War, and the insistence of American President Woodrow Wilson on the self-determination of European peoples in the context of the League of Nations – the precursor to the United Nations – (even while continuing to deny the most basic rights to the US's own black population) was a portent for the future. The mandating to the League of Nations of the territories of Togo, Cameroon, Tanganyika, Rwanda, Burundi and South-West Africa – now Namibia – (all former German colonies) put down a marker for independence, even if they were handed over to "colonial powers": Britain, France, Belgium, and South Africa.

Moving to the concept of pan-Africanism, this idea represented one of the great movements of the 20th century and had a direct impact on the movement for decolonisation and independence, as well as the eventual birth of the Organisation of African Unity, later transformed into the African Union. Just as the movement for European unity was rooted in the blind limitations of 19th century nationalism, and the horrendous conflict of two world wars, so pan-Africanism was forged in the crucible of the consequences of the slave trade and European colonialism.

The Pan-African Conference was held in London in 1900 and was mainly initiated by descendants of slaves in the New World such as the Trinidadian lawyer, Henry Sylvester Williams, and the African-American scholar, W.E.B. Du Bois, who used the occasion to utter the remarkably prescient prophecy that the 20th century would be defined by the "colour line". Five pan-African congresses were held between 1919 and 1945, increasingly joining those from the African Diaspora in the western hemisphere with Africans, especially from West Africa. At the fifth congress in Manchester in 1945, figures such as Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, Obafemi Awolowo, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Peter Abrahams, Wallace Johnson, and Hastings Banda would be involved. If initially the demands of the early pan-Africanists were limited to education for Africans, economic development and racial equality (radical enough at the time); in time, the doctrine came to embrace the worth and strength of African cultures. The importance of African unity was that these cultures might flourish in freedom, unhampered by the damaging influences of western colonial rule and cultural hegemony.

By the time of the fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester in 1945, not only had the Second World War (1939-1945) shifted the global balance of power away from the imperial European powers, but the pan-African movement had shifted its centre of gravity into Africa itself, dominated by continental Africans such as Nkrumah, Nigeria's first president Nnamdi Azikiwe, Awolowo, Kenyatta and Banda who later led their countries to independence. Du Bois was the only African-American present in Manchester, though still many Caribbeans such as George Padmore, another Trinidadian intellectual, also attended. Nkrumah picked up the torch of pan-Africanism from Du Bois, who spent the last years of his life in the new Ghana, as did Padmore, helping Nkrumah with his pan-African dream. If the fall of Nkrumah in February 1966 seemed to set back the integrationist dream, the succeeding decades have proved the strength of his ideas, which are now universally used as the reference for all ideas of African unity, following the successful political liberation of the continent. Indeed, it was the arrival of freedom in South Africa in 1994, the completion of the liberation objective, that gave a new impetus to a new pan-Africanism that took shape through the African Union in 2002.

At the same time, during the 1920s – the imperial heyday – ideas were developing in Europe to forge a more permanent domination of Africa. If the notion of *Eurafrique* was born of French thinking in the 1920s based on the idea of a continuous area of French hegemony from Algeria to the Congo basin, it was not unlike the

scheme of the 19th century imperialist Cecil Rhodes for an area of continuous and contiguous imperial rule from the Cape to Cairo, fed by railway development. The concept of *Eurafrique* was also promoted by propagandists on the Italian right, and more consequentially fed into Germany's ideas of how to reclaim its lost colonies by being part of a concerted European bid to maintain Africa as a reserve of raw materials to sustain Europe's industries.[8]

The idea of *Eurafrique* retained a particular appeal to the French, who, from the Vichy regime of the Second World War onwards, felt the need for a balance to Germany's power, a notion revived in a different form as the loss of Indo-China in 1954 and Algeria by 1962 made sub-Saharan Africa more valuable to Paris. The newly-formed European Economic Community, with an economically revived Germany as one of its main players, seemed the ideal vehicle for a new, more subtly modified version of the same notion that found its supporters not just in France, but in French-speaking Africa. The Yaoundé Conventions of 1963 and 1969 in particular gave birth to a new surge of advocacy of *Eurafrique*, especially around the concept of "association", which made a virtue of the reciprocal nature of the Convention's trade provisions that, it was spuriously argued, conferred equality of status, despite the asymmetrical nature of the agreement.

The entry of Britain into the EEC in 1973 and the paradigm shift of the Lomé Convention of 1975 – which posited a more equal relationship and significantly ended reciprocity – saw an end to the prominence of *Eurafrique* in European thinking. But the concept was not totally dead. The weakening of Africa in the power equation with Europe meant that the reciprocity principle of the Yaoundé accords was reintroduced, thus limiting the room for African economies to control their own development. Cotonou also saw the fragmenting of African, Caribbean and Pacific unity in the Economic Partnership Agreements. Although for a time, *Eurafrique* dared not speak its name, French President Nicolas Sarkozy began pushing the idea soon after he came to power in 2007, on his first African visit to Senegal and Gabon. If under criticism, Sarkozy has not pursued the idea further, the Elysée adviser who planted it in Sarkozy's head, Henri Guainou, continues to justify its use and to advocate

From left: Professor Adebayo Adedeji, African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies, Ijebu-Ode, Nigeria; Professor Ben Turok, Member of Parliament, Cape Town, South Africa; Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa

8 Judith Diane Trunzo, "Eurafrica – Counterpart? Counterpoint?", graduate dissertation at the University of Virginia, United States, 1973.

it.[9] *Eurafrique* appears to be central to that other Sarkozy project – the Mediterranean Union – apparently planned to be a trial for a wider union between Europe and Africa. Thus Kenyan scholar Ali Mazrui, when he wrote in 2003[10] that the French idea of *Eurafrique* foresaw both continents being integrated into an international sub-system, was probably being prescient rather than backward-looking.

The story of the creation of the Organisation of African Unity can be traced to a compromise between the "core" of the true believers in the movement's end goal and the "periphery", the majority of conservative states that sought more limited objectives. In this idea propounded by the American political scientist, Immanuel Wallerstein,[11] the "radical" minority (Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Egypt and Morocco) reluctantly accepted that they had to move at the pace of the slowest, and that unity was more important than momentum. The OAU Charter of 1963 did not even mention pan-Africanism or political union. Its summits were little more than "talk shops" with no implementation mechanisms. The Accra summit of 1965 effectively buried Kwame Nkrumah's dream of African continental government, and an African military High Command for two generations in favour of a more gradualist approach through regional integration.

After 1945, the Cold War was a deeply inhibiting factor, as it generated competing allegiances that Africa had to fight hard to resist in order to preserve its fragile unity. The "Thirty Years War" between 1963 and 1993 was a struggle at that time to impose a *Pax Africana* in which Africans themselves would resolve their own conflicts.[12] These aspirations were further weakened by "proxy wars" waged by the superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union – and the adventures of the French *gendarme* in Africa (over 20 military interventions in 30 years). While the OAU's legitimisation of Cuba's 1975 intervention in Angola was consistent with its anti-apartheid South African stance, it was also an acknowledgement, from the point of *Pax Africana*, of its own military impotence.

In the post-Cold War era, the OAU soon became aware that it could not pursue its integrationist goals unless it ended conflicts in Africa. In 1993, the summit approved a proposal by its Tanzanian Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim, for a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Resolution, which formed the basis of the security structures that emerged through the AU. And in creating the AU in 2002, it seemed that African leaders had finally realised that grandiose plans, ad hoc committees, and numerous lofty resolutions could not bring about economic and political integration. These could simply not be legislated into existence.

The end of the Cold War, the achievement of continental liberation with South Africa's political freedom in 1994, as well as the fear of continental marginalisation, gave further impetus to the death of the OAU and the birth of the AU. These events were accompanied by talk of an African Renaissance, most notably by then South African President Thabo Mbeki. One of the AU's early acts was the establishment in 2004 of a 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC) to make decisions on conflict resolution and peacebuilding, with its centrepiece being the creation of an African Stand-by Force (ASF) by 2010. But, like the OAU, the AU has yet to define a proper division of labour between itself and its security mechanisms. Although it is mandated to co-ordinate the activities of Africa's sub-regional mechanisms, the AU lacks the financial and management capacity

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9 See, for example, an article by Henri Guaino, special adviser to President Sarkozy, in *Le Monde*, 27 and 28 July 2008, p.19. He writes: "Let us stop going over the past, and turn to face the future. This future has a name: *Eurafrique*, of which the Mediterranean Union is the first stage."

10 Ali A. Mazrui, "The Language of *Francophonie* and the Race of the Renaissance: A Commonwealth perspective", in Chris Alden and Guy Martin (eds.), *France and South Africa: Towards a New Engagement with Africa*, (Johannesburg: Protea Book House, 2003), pp.145-162.

11 Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Politics of African Unity* (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p.15.

12 Ali A. Mazrui, *Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

to co-ordinate itself. The fact that the UN took over struggling AU missions in Burundi (2004) and Darfur (2007) were further signs of Africa's continuing military deficiencies and the limitations of *Pax Africana*.

With the new, reinvigorated pan-African organisation in existence, it was inevitable that new proposals would be made to accelerate the pace of political and economic integration. Libya's mercurial leader, Muammar Qaddafi, pursued his 1999 proposal for a "United States of Africa" at the July 2007 AU summit in Accra, Ghana. It had qualified support from Senegal's President Abdoulaye Wade, but the debate was ahistorical, quixotic, and impractical. The majority of African states favoured moving towards a "Union government" by 2015 rather than an immediate "United States of Africa". Federalist schemes were rejected as lacking in priority, sequence, or reality. Domestic houses still needed to be put in order with strong economies and stable democracies. Qaddafi became Chair of the AU in February 2009, and continued his efforts at federating the continent.

The roots of European integration go back to the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, often seen as the beginning of the European nation state. In the early 19th century, French "emperor" Napoleon Bonaparte, like his distant predecessor, Charlemagne, had sought to unite Europe by force of arms. Real European integration came only after another more violent unity imposed by Germany's Adolf Hitler during the Second World War, after which France and Germany said "never again", and created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. Although the French National Assembly sabotaged a proposed European Defence Community in 1954, the impetus for integration continued, and led eventually to the creation of a common market in the shape of the European Economic Community (alongside the Coal and Steel Community and Euratom) in the Treaty of Rome in 1957, as the foundations of an "ever closer union". This was, however, essentially a deal between French agriculture and German industry as a way of bringing peace to Europe. Where pan-Africanism was an ideology of liberation, pan-Europeanism was an ideology of peacemaking.

The path was not smooth, proceeding from the paralysing detour of French President Charles de Gaulle's retrogressive *Europe des patries* (Europe of nation states), and suspicion of passing powers to the Brussels bureaucracy. De Gaulle blocked British entry into the EEC in 1963. The EEC was eventually enlarged, first to nine members in 1973 and to 12 in 1984. Gradually over the years, this number increased to the present 27. At the same time, after a period of "Eurosclerosis" in the 1970s, in which new moves for integration were limited to direct elections to the European Parliament, the creation of a European Monetary System, and the greater substance given to the European Court of Justice, there was a "leap forward" under Jacques Delors as President of the European Commission between 1985 and 1995, above all with the giant step forward of the creation of a single market.

These efforts, in turn, led to the treaties of Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1997) which enlarged community powers in many sectors, created new pillars of defence and foreign policy, internal security, and freedom of movement, alongside the Community, with the whole process being renamed the European Union. The launch of the Euro – the common currency – in 1999 was one of the most decisive acts of consolidation. Even if not all members opted to join it, after a few stumbles, it grew into one of the world's major currencies, remaining a currency of choice even in the present global financial meltdown in 2007/2008. Even if the EU still does not carry the support of many of its 500 million citizens, and often seems to be losing its way, its progress in 50 years has been remarkable, which is why it still sometimes seems to have value as a model for other regions.

Europe's real achievement has been to move towards integration through the agency of technocrats and intellectuals like the founding fathers Frenchman, Jean Monnet, and German, Walter Hallstein, rather than those in the past, like Napoleon and Hitler, who sought to unite Europe by force of arms. In the same way, the real current heroes of African integration are figures like Nigerian political economist Adebayo Adedeji, who moved from being the "Founding Father of the Economic Community of West African States" to using his role at the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) between 1975 and 1991 to further regional integration and battle against the damaging structural adjustment policies of the two Bretton Woods institutions: the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Consideration was also given to the comparison of the "hegemons" of the two groupings – France and Germany in the case of the EU, and Nigeria and South Africa in the case of the AU. The roles of Britain as a "spoiler" in Europe and of Libya as one in Africa, were also examined.[13]



TOP : *From left:* Mr Ibrahim Nawar, Al Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, Egypt; Professor Gilbert Khadiagala, Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa; Mr Liam Halligan, Prosperity Capital Management, London, England; Dr Khabele Matlosa, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa; Mr Langa Malimela, University of Cape Town, South Africa; and Mr Jeremy Astill-Brown, Department for International Development, Tshwane, South Africa

ABOVE : Professor Chris Landsberg, University of Johannesburg, South Africa, left; Professor Adebayo Adedeji, African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies, Ijebu-Ode, Nigeria

RIGHT: Mr Jeremy Astill-Brown, Department for International Development, Tshwane, South Africa, left; Professor Jeremy Sarkin, Hofstra University, New York, United States

13 Much of the above sections are based on Adekeye Adebajo, "Towers of Babel? The African Union and the European Union", paper presented at the CCR seminar, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century", Stellenbosch, Cape Town, 11-13 September 2008.

Returning to the 1970s, in the period prior to the establishment of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group, and the negotiations that led to the Lomé Convention of 1975, there had been important contacts between Europe and the Organisation of African Unity. The OAU Summit of May 1973 had given all sub-Saharan African states a mandate to negotiate collectively with Brussels. Indeed, OAU support for a group negotiation was an essential prerequisite for the new relationship, and formed the basis of the new deal that Lomé represented. Even countries that had no former colonial ties with European countries such as Liberia and Ethiopia participated in the negotiations, as well as countries that were in the process of being decolonised by Portugal such as Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Saõ Tomé and Principe, and Mozambique, as well as, eventually, Angola. This represented a considerable scoop for the EEC and its Commission, and paved the way to develop contacts with liberation movements in countries not yet liberated, such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa.

The signing of Lomé in 1975 was also an essential prerequisite for the creation of the Economic Community of West African states, which was seen as an important step for healing the division that was particularly acute in West Africa between former French and English-speaking countries.[14] But the process was facilitated by the provisions of ten per cent of Lomé funds for regional co-operation. The enthusiasm in Brussels for supporting African integration (often more rhetorical than practical) was, however, not matched by any meaningful contacts with the OAU. There was mutual suspicion between the two organisations: partly because of the colonial hangover, and partly because there were those in Europe who were prejudiced against the pan-African organisation. This coolness was duplicated in the difficult relations between the European Commission and the Addis Ababa-based UN Economic Commission for Africa, due, in part, to rival views of how to regulate African economies. The disarray in the OAU in the early 1980s and the difficult nature of the Ethiopian regime that housed the OAU in Addis Ababa, also did not facilitate smooth relations between Africa and Europe.

This gradually changed when it became clear that in Salim Ahmed Salim (OAU Secretary General from 1989-2001) the OAU had a chief executive of statesman-like stature. His efforts to give the organisation an economic programme (seen in the signing of the African Economic Community in 1991), as well as a coherent security profile, evident in the beginnings of a security mechanism in 1993, did much to persuade the international community that the OAU was an organisation worth engaging in dialogue. The events of the mid-1990s (the fiasco of the US intervention in Somalia in 1993 and the international failure during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 in which 800,000 people were killed) led to a revision of ideas both in Africa and internationally. The end of the Cold War also encouraged new ideas on intervention, and the fact that Africa needed to establish a new *Pax Africana*. In the meantime, the Portuguese and French began to think in terms of embarking on a serious dialogue with Africa, although there had not been much enthusiasm for this either in Europe or within the OAU.

The first result was the holding of the Europe-Africa Summit in Cairo in 2000. This meeting was held with a great deal of flourish, but it was a summit without much immediate follow-up, despite institutional contact at a lower level. The problem of the British with the presence of Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe was another obstacle, which prevented the holding of the next summit planned for Lisbon in 2003.

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14 See Adebayo Adedeji, "ECOWAS: A Retrospective Journey", in Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid (eds.), *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2004), pp.21-50.

There was progress on other fronts, especially the creation of the African Union in 2002. The reinforcement of a security role for the AU and the establishment of an African Peace and Security Council in 2004 led to meaningful talks on security issues and the decision in Brussels to support both the Council and the African Peace Facility. Ironically, the funding for this support in 2003 came from the European Development Fund (EDF) of the Cotonou Agreements, although these agreements did not specifically cover security issues.

The relationship between Africa and Europe took a new turn, encouraged by the renewed British interest in Africa under Prime Minister Tony Blair, which developed after 2000 (when Britain intervened militarily in Sierra Leone). The main manifestation of this interest was the creation of a Commission for Africa in 2004 to establish priorities for the donor community, in response to some of the representations made by African leaders responsible for NEPAD. The "Blair Commission's" recommendations[15] in such fields as economy, security, education, and culture were incorporated into the resolutions of the July 2005 Group of Eight (G8) Industrialised Countries Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, the most notable of which was the recommendation for a massive doubling in international aid to $50 billion by 2010.

Blair's Africa concern was also a priority during his tenure of the six-month presidency of the EU between July and December 2005. One of the main results of these efforts was the preparation, for adoption by EU leaders in December that year, of a new strategy for Africa entitled, "The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership".[16] The purpose of this strategy is to develop a comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework for guiding Europe's relations with Africa. However, the policy document was widely criticised as being one-

Dr Mareike Meyn, Overseas Development Institute, London, England, left; Mr Liam Halligan, Prosperity Capital Management, London, England

15 Commission for Africa report, *Our Common Interest: An Argument* (London: Penguin, 2005).

16 The full document can be accessed from the EU website following links to Africa from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ ; the full PDF document can be accessed at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/87673.pdf. See also Daniel Bach, "The AU and the EU", in John Akokpari, Angela Ndinga-Muvumba and Tim Murithi (eds.), *The African Union and its Institutions* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2008), pp. 355 – 270.

sided, having been developed and refined at the EU Commission in Brussels, with little or no input from partner states in Africa. African commentators have often lamented that the Africa-Europe relationship is caught in traditional patterns in which Africa reacts to policy directives emanating from Europe, rather than Africa setting the agenda as an equal partner, and actively participating in policy developments that will fundamentally affect the continent.

The opportunity to rectify this situation came with new plans for a second EU-Africa summit. This meeting had, in fact, been seven years in the making. It was the prospect of the Portuguese (always the main champions of the idea of the summit) holding the EU Presidency in the second half of 2007 that caused it to happen. Lisbon intended to hold the meeting regardless, and despite the continued "Zimbabwe problem". Cover was provided by the fact that the AU was firm in its insistence that President Mugabe as an AU member should attend. Most EU members accepted the Portuguese position, and among major EU leaders, only British Premier Gordon Brown refused to attend, though a delegation was sent on his behalf. The summit, while in many respects a well-attended show that approved all the strategy papers and declarations about a strategic partnership that had been intended for some time, had a mixed impact. This was in part due to the fact that, although the development of a partnership with the AU may have seemed a straightforward and desirable development, the ghosts of the past could not be totally escaped.

As stated in the Lisbon Declaration of 2007, the summit sought to overcome the "traditional" donor-recipient relationship that has often guided the interactions between Europe and its former colonies. The statement outlined the "fundamental commitments" at the core of the EU-African Joint Strategy. Among these were five key goals:

1. The attainment of the UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) seeking to halve global poverty by 2015;
2. The establishment of a robust peace and security architecture in Africa;
3. The strengthening of investment, growth, and prosperity through regional integration and closer economic ties;
4. The promotion of "good governance" and human rights; and
5. The creation of opportunities for shaping global governance in an open and multilateral framework.[17]

These commitments are to be pursued under the first Action Plan, which envisions a three-year work period between 2008 and 2010. The AU has already appointed a representative to liaise with the EU Commission in Brussels, while the EU has also named a special representative to the AU in Addis Ababa. Specific "Africa-EU Partnerships" have outlined priority areas for immediate engagement between various actors within the AU and the EU. These actors include: the AU and EU Commissions; the AU and EU Ministerial Councils; the EU Council Secretariat; African states and EU members; African and EU Parliaments; African civil society organisations; research institutes; the private sector; and the EU. According to the First Action Plan, these "Africa-EU Partnerships" will be funded in part through the European Development Fund. Among the various partnership priorities are projects dedicated to peace and security; democratic governance and human rights; trade and regional integration; the MDGs; energy security; climate change; migration, mobility and employment; and

17 See www.africa-union.org/root/AU/Conferences/2007/December/eu-au/docs/EAS2007_lisbon_declaration_en.pdf (accessed 3 June 2008).

aerospace programmes. As the EU accounted for about 30 per cent of the world's nominal gross domestic product (GDP) at about $16.8 trillion in 2007, and remains Africa's largest trading partner, there is much to gain from implementing these plans for mutual benefit.

In the new documents, there was virtually no reference to the existing Cotonou Agreements, despite the fact that the latter contained negotiated provisions on a range of subjects raised for consideration in Lisbon, such as governance, human rights, and security. This could only have been because of the unfortunate coincidence that Lisbon took place at the worst point in the protracted discussions in the EPAs, about which there was much disgruntlement in Africa. If the Portuguese had hoped they could insulate the 2007 summit from this issue, these hopes were disappointed. There were fiery speeches from a number of African leaders, notably President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal condemning Europe's unreconstructed approach towards Africa. Although Wade focused on both the concept of EPAs and the way they were being handled, his indictment was across the board.

These criticisms generally echoed the fact that Europe's relationship with Africa has too often been characterised by a pervasive power-dynamic that has persisted since the colonial era. Recently, there have been calls by European scholars to reconceive Europe's place in a newly multi-polar world, including the suggestion that Europe's self-perception as an "ethical and normative power" ought to be reformulated using the language of European "global responsibilities".[18] In this way, Europe might succeed in engaging its African counterparts with fruitful strategies rather than antagonising them with directives that are perceived to be concocted in Brussels and dumped on Africa.

The real problem with the Lisbon Strategy, however, was not so much one of continued misplaced Eurocentricity as its staggering revelation of dysfunctional policymaking in Europe. It is hard to conceive that those who drew up the Africa strategy saw no need to make reference to the EU's major treaty relationship with Africa – the Cotonou Agreements of 2000 – which had been based on the experience of the previous 25 years of the Lomé Convention. The incoherence of European policymaking was also evident in the reaction of the EU Commission to the delays in implementing the EPAs, which had partly arisen from its own lack of forward-planning, although the ACP, never enthusiastic for the EPAs in the first place, bore a greater share of responsibility arising from their own inferior negotiating capacity.

Africans have been upset at the effect, probably unintended, that the EPA proposal had on the regional groupings that the continent has, for some years, been trying to put together: the RECs. This caused more divisions when, in fact, the policy was meant to further the cause of regional unity. Although the return to reciprocity had been negotiated away in 2000 (under the rules of the World Trade Organisation), and was accepted as unavoidable, the strong-arm tactics of Brussels commissioners such as trade commissioner Peter Mandelsohn caused great offence that is likely to have lasting consequences on the Africa/Europe relationship.

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18 Hartmut Mayer, "Is it still called 'Chinese Whispers'? The EU's Rhetoric and Action as a Responsible Global Institution", *International Affairs* 84:1 (January 2008), pp.61-79.

Remarks by Mandelsohn made in November 2007 that Nigeria and South Africa were obstructing the EPA talks, were particularly impolitic.[19] The comment of ACP ministers ten days after Lisbon regretting that "the EU's mercantilist interests have taken precedence over the ACP's developmental and regional interests", contained the bitter truth, even if some of them were obliged to go ahead and sign the EPAs because of their own short-term national interests of not losing access to the European market. These were the real issues, as opposed to the high-sounding good intentions about "strategic partnership" of the Lisbon Declaration of 2007 and its strategy papers.

The EU's perceived bullying tactics in trying to compel the ACP members to sign EPAs were a major source of tension and mistrust between the ACP and Brussels. While regional groupings are favoured by the ACP, issues of overlapping membership were seen to be problematic. There were calls for Africa to investigate greater trade flexibility with Europe. It was further argued that Africa's external debt of $290 billion should be annulled. A key factor in achieving development objectives is to deepen trust between the two continents and to allow Africa a greater role in setting the agenda to shape its own development goals, which can then be supported by the EU and other external donors. It is also important to strengthen institutions at the national level. The Lisbon EU-Africa Summit in December 2007 attempted to remedy the disturbing absence of African contributions to the EU-Africa strategic partnership of 2005. Europe's need for involvement and interest in Africa was now being increasingly questioned.



Professor Ali A Mazrui, Institute of Global Cultural Studies, Binghamton University, New York, United States, left; Professor Francis M Deng, Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General for the Prevention of Genocide, New York, United States

19 Quoted in *World Trade News*: Newsletter for WTO Reference Centres, No. 1665, 6 November 2007. The remarks were made to European parliamentarians.

4. The Politics of North/South Relations

Relations between Europe and Africa have for some time been considered a laboratory of North-South relations. This was certainly the case in the 1970s, the era of the New International Economic Order, when the Lomé Convention was in first bloom.

The relationship has increasingly become a "dialogue of the deaf". However, the term "partnership" has been used to characterise the relationship, though, in most cases, the partnership has been unequal and is more a situation of uneasy co-existence rather than a harmonious give-and-take relationship.[20]

For example, the new EU strategy for Africa in 2005 was meant to provide the framework for the new, comprehensive EU-Africa integrated long-term relationship with Africa, but was prepared entirely by the European Commission, without substantial input from African governments. This is the state of play, even if the Joint Strategy that Europe and Africa agreed in Lisbon in December 2007 contained some sound ideas on how to create an environment for sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development in Africa. But Africa and Europe should become more business-like in their relations, and stop drawing up grand scenarios, the outcomes of which cannot be verified in practice.

Europe needs to have a better understanding of Africa, while Africa needs more world-class research institutes that can generate policy ideas for the continent's development and security needs. The academic world has not yet found a model to analyse the progress of EU-Africa relations other than in the separate disciplines of development studies and international relations. A useful model might also come from the private sector, where companies have clear criteria for management, including particularly vision, the implementation of which requires leadership, patience, and perseverance. The EU and the AU share a high capabilities-expectations gap that is not helped by frequent changes in personnel dealing with these issues. By the same token, a propensity for delay in both the EU, but more particularly the ACP, exacerbated the problems with the EPAs.

A fundamental flaw in international co-operation is the lack of clear accountability mechanisms. There are so many players to take blame or claim success that results-based management becomes complex, leading to a non-committal attitude. The modern evaluation sector is regarded by some as a multi-billion dollar spending/earning industry with very little to show for itself. If both sides do not start measuring impact on the basis of a proper methodology with baseline surveys as a starting point, Africa and Europe will continue to grope in the dark. This is becoming less and less credible both for those who pay for interventions through taxes and membership fees, and for the recipients who need successful projects. The donor-recipient architecture has become very complex and wasteful because of the duplication of efforts, making it hard to reform. Africa does not seem to realise that, in the end, this architecture is not in its interest. Short-term gains like the provision of international jobs and the continuous flow of funds are often favoured over longer-term gains that can be achieved by the fundamental reform of this system.

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20 This section is partly based on the presentation by Rob de Vos, "Europe and Africa: The continuing Dialogue of the Deaf", paper presented at the CCR seminar, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century", Stellenbosch, Cape Town, 11-13 September 2008.

A classic case history of the mismanagement of North-South relations can be found in the story of the EPAs, already referred to extensively, but central to the current state of relations between Africa and the EU. While the objectives of the reciprocal but asymmetrical trade agreements – to foster sustainable economic and social development in the ACP and to promote the smooth and gradual integration of its members into the world economy – are clear, the tools for attaining these objectives are in dispute. The battle on what the "development component" of EPAs should entail continued through the five-year negotiating process, without being resolved. African countries were increasingly disappointed at the lack of financial commitments accompanying the EPAs, as well as by the EU's insistence that development finance and the EPAs were separate issues.

Few African countries were willing to include services, investment, and trade-related aspects such as competition and public procurement in the EPA negotiations, doubting that they were development-related. Although the Cotonou Agreements of 2000 regard regional integration as a key element in the integration of ACP countries into the world economy, "the EC's seemingly relentless promotion of regional integration among ACP countries betrays an inherently Eurocentric view of the world and neglects the inherent difficulties faced by the ACP countries".[21] The effect of the regional groups introduced in Cotonou was mixed; although the EPA facilitated integration in East Africa; in southern Africa this goal was undermined. In West and Central Africa, integration remained a "work in progress" as few countries in the two sub-regions had signed the EPAs.

For the purpose of negotiating free trade agreements with the ACP, the group was split into six negotiating units: Western, Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa, as well as the Caribbean and the Pacific. This move alone was problematic for the ACP, as its members feared that these divisions would mean an erosion of the bloc's negotiating power and strategic position within the EU's network of foreign relations.[22] While regional groupings have been strongly favoured by the ACP in principle, there have been vexatious problems of overlapping membership from the beginning of the Lomé Convention.

Ambassador Rob de Vos, Embassy of Netherlands, Tshwane, South Africa, left; Professor Chris Landsberg, University of Johannesburg, South Africa

21 Mareike Meyn, "An Anatomy of Economic Partnership Agreements between Africa and Europe", paper presented at the CCR seminar, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century", Stellenbosch, Cape Town, 11-13 September 2008.

22 For more details, see also "Negotiating EPAs between African sub-regions and the EU: Some Concrete Suggestions on Market Access", ILEAP (International Lawyers and Economists Against Poverty), in *Trade Negotiations Insights*, Vol. 3, No. 4, July 2004.

The alternatives to EPAs are either a WTO Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), which is less attractive to the ACP and the GSP plus, and for which no ACP country qualifies. Over half of the ACP members qualified under the EU's Everything But Arms (EBA) Scheme introduced for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in 2001, apparently offering full access to the EU market for "everything but arms". Those in the EBA therefore have no interest in signing the EPAs, which form the heart of the EU's "trade, growth and development" strategy. Most African countries would, however, probably object if asked whether the EPAs meet the values of the EU strategy for Africa of "ownership, joint accountability, and equal partnership". Those that signed EPAs only did so because not signing would have been seen as "anti-development", implying the immediate loss of valuable EU preferences. To date, the interim African EPAs are hardly more than standardised European templates, to which African countries' hastily drawn up liberalisation schedules have been appended.

If African countries do not regard compliance with the EPAs to be in their best interest, the implementation will depend on the EU Commission's ability to prove and sanction cases of non-compliance. Such "enforcement" does not only violate the basic principles of the EU strategy for Africa, but is also much less likely to be durable than an outcome that is mutually acceptable to both parties.

It has been argued that Europe's shift to Economic and Monetary Union between July 1990 and January 1999 was politically – rather than economically – motivated.[23] Nine years since the launch of the euro, some have argued that there are few discernible economic benefits: in its first six years, the euro fluctuated up to 35 per cent against the dollar. Germany – the Eurozone's largest economy – also suffered from a stalling economy. Germany's Helmut Kohl and France's François Mitterrand's vision of a federalised (or federalising) Europe has undoubtedly been advanced through the birth of the euro. However, the economic implications of a still-expanding union bound by a common currency and monetary policy, and by the decrees of the European Central Bank (ECB), remain unclear. The global financial crisis of 2007/2008, however, led to the euro gaining some allure as a potentially stable currency in a volatile economic climate.

What, then, are the prospects for African monetary union based on the European experience? At present, Africa has two functioning sub-regional monetary unions: the first is the *Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale* (CEMAC) – the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa; the second is the *Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine* (UEMOA) – the West African Economic and Monetary Union. Both were created and underwritten by a now increasingly burdened French treasury. Four more sub-regional monetary unions are currently planned: the West African Monetary Zone within ECOWAS is planned for December 2009 (following several delays); the East African Community (EAC) plans to reconstitute itself as the East African Federation with a common currency by 2009; the Southern African Development Community and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) plan a common currency by 2016; while a currency for the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is planned for 2025. These planned monetary unions in Southern, West and Eastern Africa bring to the fore the complications of overlapping state membership as an obstacle to achieving monetary union and economic integration. Rationalisation and a

23 See Desmond Dinan, *Origins and Evolution of the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

rethinking of Africa's sub-regional organisations is sorely needed if monetary union – regionally or sub-regionally – is to stand any realistic chance of success.

While the African Union undoubtedly represents a more convincing gesture towards African unity than did its predecessor, the OAU, economic union for political ends might not be appropriate in the African context. The African Economic Community (AEC) scheduled to be created by 2028 as an economic and monetary union complete with its own central bank, remains a dim prospect at best, given the political and economic factors militating against continental currency stability. As is evident in the European case, even where regional stability has been achieved, the EMU has provided no simple panacea for achieving effective monetary union. In the African case, economic and monetary union should be treated with caution as such arrangements are unlikely to deliver the stability that has, as yet, proved elusive in other more fundamental areas.



ABOVE : Dr Sheila Bunwaree, Faculty of Social Studies and Humanities, University of Mauritius, Réduit
LEFT : Dr Winrich Kühne, Centre for International Peace Operations, Berlin, Germany, left; Dr Mareike Meyn, Overseas Development Institute, London, England
CENTRE: Professor Ali A Mazrui, Institute of Global Cultural Studies, Binghamton University, New York, United States

5. Global Africa and the New Regionalism

The vexed and persistent issue of EPAs has three objectives: removal of the (previous) non-reciprocal clause that would give free access to markets of African states; the establishment of new trading blocs among African states that negotiate Free Trade Areas (FTAs) with Europe; and the improved co-ordination of EU aid programmes with the EPAs.

Currently, the states of Eastern and southern Africa can negotiate EPAs with Europe dependent on their regional grouping either within SADC, the East African Customs Union (EACU), East and Southern Africa (ESA), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, or the East African (EA) grouping.[24] The most serious threat to Africa in the current form of the EPAs, with the reciprocity principle, is the ultimate threat that EPAs will pose for Africa's small and medium-scale farmers and traders, which estimates say could affect 50 to 60 per cent of employment possibilities.

Much scepticism was voiced about the role of the two Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, as well as their credibility in Africa, based on the history of what were perceived to be failed structural adjustment programmes implemented since the 1980s. The EU's $50 billion-a-year Common Agricultural Policy (recently under re-appraisal) and US agricultural subsidies ($108.7 billion in 2005) were particularly criticised for hampering Africa's development prospects, as an estimated 70 per cent of Africa's population work in this sector.

It was strongly argued that governments should not use aid as a means of achieving political ends. More optimistically, Africa has grown by an average of between about five to six per cent over the last decade, and there is thus hope and potential for socio-economic development on the continent, though such optimism has since been dampened by the scale of the global financial crisis of 2007/2008. There are doubts about whether regional integration through privatisation is the way forward: Africa needs strong functional states that can deliver solid services and build effective infrastructure. Given the large and diverse membership of the ACP group and its pioneering political position, the ACP-EU relationship had been significant historically, particularly to developing countries.[25] However, during the 1980s and 1990s, the ACP group's political standing, and the operation and rationale of both the trade and aid aspects of Lomé, were steadily eroded.

Although Europe has apparently been generous in its offer to East and Southern African states who signed the EPAs (5 billion euros for infrastructure development assistance), there is a severe sting in the tail. The removal of all quotas and tariffs for ACP countries' access to the European market to cover products such as dairy, cereals, fruit and vegetables, with a phase-in period for rice and sugar, would cause Africa's farmers serious difficulties in accessing the EU market because of the tough competition with Europe's over-subsidised agricultural farmers.

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24 Gilbert Khadiagala, "Regionalism in Europe and Africa", paper presented at the CCR seminar, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century", Stellenbosch, Cape Town, 11-13 September 2008.

25 European Centre for Development Policy Management, "Cotonou Infokit: History and Evolution of ACP-EU Cooperation (3)", Maastricht, 2001.

Over the last few decades, development aid has become a fiercely debated issue, with western critics pointing out that, despite millions of euros being poured into development in Africa, the continent has not been able to discard the shackles of under-development, corruption, poverty, and instability. There are calls from Africa for a strategy to end aid dependency and the endless EU policy directives and documents that do little to change conditions on the ground. The motives behind some donors' selection of recipients are also suspected of having political and strategic ends, rather than targeting socio-economic development and poverty alleviation goals.

Concurrently, there has been renewed scepticism over what aid can achieve in an era in which the the World Bank and the IMF are losing international credibility. This comes amid growing efforts to establish alternative strategies for financing development, as reflected in the "Monterrey Consensus" of 2002. Most recently, in April 2008, development efforts were renewed at the Special High-Level Meeting held in Doha, Qatar, under the auspices of the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which involved the World Trade Organisation, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Bretton Woods institutions, among others.

ABOVE : *From left:* Dr Paul D Williams, George Washington University, Washington, DC, United States; Mr Alex Vines, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, England; Dr Garth le Pere, Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand, South Africa

LEFT: *From left*: Professor Ali A Mazrui, Institute of Global Cultural Studies, Binghamton University, New York, United States; Dr Sheila Bunwaree, Faculty of Social Studies and Humanities, University of Mauritius, Réduit; Mr Ibrahim Nawar, Al Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, Egypt

However, while development aid has serious limitations, it is still part of the solution rather than part of the problem.[26] EU and US agricultural subsidies were particularly criticised for hampering Africa's development prospects. The decline in development aid from 0.33 per cent of gross national income to 0.22 per cent between 1990 and 2001, despite a UN target of 0.7 per cent set as far back in 1970 has been criticised, as has the large percentage of aid that returns to donor countries in the form of the purchase of goods and technical assistance from donor countries. Calls have been made for donors as well as recipients to be held accountable. A key factor in achieving development objectives is to deepen trust between Africa and Europe, and to allow Africa a greater role in shaping its own development goals, which could then be supported by the EU and other external donors.

Despite the recent nervousness in international investor confidence, Africa is fast becoming the newest financial frontier for foreign investors – and, likely, the last investment frontier that the world has to offer.[27] As earlier noted, the past decade has seen average African economic growth of between five and six per cent, almost double that of the West. The rise of specialist funds offering international investors opportunities for African investment has, in some cases, pre-empted the creation of national stock markets in Africa. However, many now speculate whether, in the wake of Kenya's post-electoral crisis of December 2007, and South Africa's xenophobic attacks (which reached a fever pitch in May 2008), the prospects for African investments could plummet even before having had an opportunity properly to take off. But, with the EU, China, and the US competing for extraction concessions over Africa's raw materials, and with these external actors growing ever more eager for sustained engagement with the continent, global eyes will undoubtedly be trained on Africa as a huge potential market of 800 million citizens and a site of investment opportunities for the foreseeable future.

The increasing dimension of Asia as a key player in the EU's global posture is also pertinent, especially in relation to Africa. The muscle-flexing of the EU as a global player has extended particularly to Asia. The negotiation of "strategic partnership" agreements is a crucial "soft-power" tool for the projection abroad of EU influence and power that accompanies "hard-power" crisis management and peacekeeping missions. This is as much the case in Asia as in Africa. Many of the EU's partnership agreements with Asia and Africa take their cue from the ground-breaking European Security Strategy adopted by EU governments in 2003.[28] The focus on the two continents is part of a drive to build a stronger network of friends across the globe to tackle challenges to peace and security, even if the "strategic partnership" agreements are often about meetings, communiqués, and speeches, rather than about substance and content. Building stronger bonds with the EU is in the interest of Asian and African nations seeking to break away from the influence of one over-arching power: whether the US, Japan, or China. But, just as EU countries too often show their divisions in dealing with international flashpoints, engaging the EU also takes much time, energy, and patience.

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26 "Eurafrique? Africa and Europe in a New Century", report of a joint CCR/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 31 October and 1 November 2007 (available at www.ccr.org.za).

27 Liam Halligan, "Global Africa: The Last Investment Frontier?", paper presented at the CCR seminar, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century", Stellenbosch, Cape Town, 11-13 September 2008.

28 The European Commission, "A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy", Brussels, 12 December 2003.

6. Building Pan-Continental Institutions

The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) may be able to learn some lessons from the European Parliament. The establishment of the PAP in March 2004 sought to promote popular participation in Africa's efforts towards continental integration.[29]

The current form of the PAP – a purely advisory and consultative body with no legislative powers – requires a fundamental transformation for the body to play an effective regional role in Africa. Also important are the functions and power of the PAP, its major challenges, and its efforts towards transformation. The European Parliament played an important role in driving integration in Europe, though the institution is not widely treated with great reverence in Europe itself. Africa needs to prioritise integration and ensure that the PAP can contribute to this process. The current constraints on the PAP and its challenges include: limited capacity; the transitory nature of its membership; and the absence of a structure to interface with African leaders, the AU Commission, the RECs, and Regional Parliamentary Fora (RPF). Other problems include: a lack of political will among AU leaders, and ineffective mechanisms to implement PAP decisions. The success of the PAP will strongly depend on how it co-ordinates its efforts with Africa's RECs and regional parliamentary fora such as the Algerian Consultative Council of the Arab Maghreb Union in Algiers; the ECOWAS parliament in Abuja, Nigeria; the East Africa Legislative Assembly in Arusha, Tanzania; SADC's Parliamentary Forum in Windhoek, Namibia; and Equatorial Guinea's Inter-Parliamentary Commission for the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States.

The success of regional integration is dependent on the willingness shown by African states to surrender some of their sovereignty. Here, Africa's civil society also needs to be part of the discussions. For people to participate in such processes, mechanisms such as the 1990 African Charter on Popular Participation need to be implemented. National parliaments and courts are often dominated by strong executives, which prevent them from playing an effective role. The PAP needs to be de-linked from national parliaments, and the role of ombudspersons must be strengthened. In consonance with the vision of economic integration described above, there must be a drive towards continental legislative harmony and common standards of governance across

From left: Dr Khabele Matlosa, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa; Mr Leon Levy, Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration, Cape Town, South Africa; Professor Jeremy Sarkin, Hofstra University, New York, United States

29 Khabele Matlosa, "Towards Transformation of the Pan-African Parliament as a Key Agent for Political Integration in Africa: Lessons from the European Union", paper presented at the CCR seminar, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century", Stellenbosch, Cape Town, 11-13 September 2008.

borders. As in Europe, Africa's fledgling pan-continental parliament is intended to ensure the exercise of a broader, more inclusive, democratic process on the continent. The PAP, provided for by Article 17 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union of 2000, was established in March 2004. In its first five years (until 2009), the parliament is intended primarily to be an advisory body to the AU. Thereafter, the PAP is expected to develop full legislative powers, with elected members drawn from the AU's 53 member states.[30]

As with all of the AU's organs, funding is the perennial problem that could prevent the PAP from assuming its full mandated powers and capacity. However, recent initiatives, and, in particular, direct contacts with counterparts in the European Parliament, seem to have injected new energy into the PAP. The joint statement issued by the European Parliament and the Pan-African Parliament during the Lisbon EU-Africa Summit of December 2007 was particularly significant, both in mapping out the PAP's participation in connection to the EU-Africa Joint Strategy of 2007, but also in terms of its continental role. The statement noted, with regret, how the Joint Strategy had been conceived outside of African and European parliaments, and asserted the need for this approach to change as far as implementation and monitoring are concerned. The statement ended with both the PAP and the European Parliament pledging to establish a joint parliamentary delegation as a body in which the relationship between Africa and Europe can be debated and democratically shaped.

While it still remains to be seen how successful the Pan-African Parliament will be on assuming its full legislative powers by 2009, contact with the European Parliament represents an opportunity beyond collaboration and the pursuit of joint objectives. There are, as the Joint EP-PAP statement of 2007 shows, African needs and prospects for developing "financial, technical, technological and human resource capacities". Furthermore, the African Charter of Human and People's Rights was adopted by the Organisation of African Unity in October 1990.[31] In 1998, the OAU also adopted the Protocol for establishing the African Court on Human and People's Rights which was institutionalised in February 2004, with 24 African governments having ratified the newly-established African Commission's African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR). The European Court of Human Rights is well resourced with a host of attorneys, professional judges, interpreters, and a well-financed budget. The ACJHR is currently divided into two functions – one a human rights institution, and the other a human rights court function. This court could also benefit from the judicial experiences of the ECHR.[32]

While there is some hope for the human rights situation in Africa, a dire need still exists for strong judges with adequate resources, as well as better judicial independence. With the role of the United Nations, the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the world has witnessed the first pioneering examples of the enforcement of international criminal justice.[33] The protection and promotion of human rights in Africa can learn from other institutions such as the European Human Rights Commission and the European Court of Justice. While it is important to learn from other institutions, it is also important not to overload the African Court. Furthermore, these pan-African institutions also need to be provided with sufficient budgets and capacity.

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30 See Baleka Mbete, "The Pan-African Parliament: Progress and Prospects", in John Akokpari, Angela Ndinga-Muvumba and Tim Murithi (eds.), *The African Union and its Institutions* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2008), pp. 307-315.

31 Jeremy Sarkin, "The African Commission on Human and People's Rights and the African Court of Justice and Human Rights: Comparative Lessons from the European Court of Human Rights", paper presented at the CCR seminar, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century", Stellenbosch, Cape Town, 11-13 September 2008.

32 See John Akokpari and Daniel Shea Zimbler (eds.), *Africa's Human Rights Architecture* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2008).

33 See Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay (eds.), *Peace versus Justice? The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009).

7. The Security and Governance Roles of the African Union and the European Union

The two subjects of security and governance are of great importance to the EU-Africa relationship. The first inclusion of human rights in the Fourth Lomé Convention in 1989, to the comprehensive governance provisions in the Cotonou Agreements of 2000, represented the first such efforts in this area.

These initiatives also have to be seen in the context of the "new social contract" in Africa, which became enshrined in the AU Constitutive Act in 2000. This ran parallel to, and drew synergies from, the beginning of security co-operation between Africa and the European Union.

In the new formulation and building on the lessons of Lomé and Cotonou, the new EU-Africa strategy seeks to avoid the "conditionality trap" by stressing the importance of dialogue, "ownership", and negotiation for arriving at shared governance agendas. Much of the EU's governance assistance has taken place within NEPAD's African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in which 29 African countries are currently participating, as well as other AU mechanisms such as the Common African Position on the UN Millennium Development Goals. The EU's Africa strategy document of 2005 (later incorporated into the Lisbon Agreement of 2007) contains a solemn declaration of commitment to "work with the African Union, sub-regional organisations and African countries to predict, prevent and mediate conflict, including by addressing its root causes",[34] while stressing the EU's commitment to strengthen the African peace facility and to develop the African Standby Force. This echoed the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence policy which offered "direct support to the AU, sub-regional or UN efforts to promote peace and stability" and to send "military and civilian crisis management missions, including potential deployment of the EU battle groups".[35]

There is, however, a palpable contradiction of motives on the part of the EU, between ethical aspirations and practical politics. While the EU serves as the main platform for pursuing a pan-European agenda of common and shared interests that has led it to become more of a global actor, Brussels also sees itself as an "ethical power" and a "force for good" in the world. Nowhere is this more contradictory than in the EU's neo-mercantilist trade policies and the thrust of its development strategies.

The different security mechanisms in which EU support was involved have overshadowed governance initiatives. These have included the African Peace and Security Council, the African Peace Support Facility, and the planned African Standby Force due to come into existence in 2010. On the European side, the *Artémis* operation in Bunia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), took place in 2003 (the first ever joint European security exercise in Africa). This was followed by the EUPOL (European Police Mission) and EUFOR (European Forces) missions at the time of the DRC elections in 2006/2007, as well as the EUFOR intervention in Chad and Central African Republic (CAR) in March 2008. Both the 2003 *Artémis* and the 2006 EUFOR succeeded in their limited missions because they had narow time-frames with clear objectives and exit dates.

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34 http://europafrica.org/lisbon-summit/ and www.europafrica.org

35 Garth le Pere, "AU/EU Security and Governance Cooperation", paper presented at the CCR seminar, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century", Stellenbosch, Cape Town, 11-13 September 2008.

TOP: *From left:* Mr Aldo Ajello, former EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region; Dr Garth le Pere, Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand, South Africa; Ambassador Abdelrahim A Khalil, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Dr Winrich Kühne, Centre for International Peace Operations, Berlin, Germany
ABOVE: Ms Romy Chevallier, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, South Africa, right; Professor James Karioki, Consultant, Johannesburg, South Africa
RIGHT: Ambassador Rob de Vos, Embassy of Netherlands, Tshwane, South Africa

The huge problems of the DRC[36] go back to the grim nature of the Western-backed Mobutu Sese Seko dictatorship from 1965, which came to an end in 1997 with the surprise coming to power of rebel forces led by Laurent Kabila. The rebels were backed mainly by Uganda and Rwanda, which subsequently fell out with their protégé, and in 1998, launched an invasion in support of other rebel groups. This drew in a number of other African countries (notably Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia) to support Kabila, leading to a military stalemate and a number of peacemaking initiatives. In July 2002, then South African President Thabo Mbeki brokered the Pretoria accord between the DRC and Rwanda, by which Kigali agreed to withdraw from the DRC in exchange for Kabila's promise to track down and disarm militias that had launched attacks on Rwanda from the Congo. A month later, Angola brokered the Luanda accord between the DRC and Uganda, by which Kampala agreed to withdraw from the Congo.

36 Aldo Ajello, "The EU Security Role in the Great Lakes Region", paper presented at the CCR seminar, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century", Stellenbosch, Cape Town, 11-13 September 2008.

In December 2002, Congolese parties meeting in Tshwane (Pretoria) signed an accord that called for a two-year transition during which Kabila would remain president, running the country with four vice-presidents named by the government; the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD); the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC); and the unarmed opposition. Many Congolese expressed concern at the lack of support for this warlords' government of self-serving political office-holders from Mobutu's discredited dictatorship.

In July 2003, the UN Security Council mandated its 17,000 peacekeepers to use force to implement its mandate in Ituri and Kivu provinces, and imposed an ineffectual arms embargo. Between June and September 2003, the EU's French-led *Opération Artémis* was deployed to Bunia in eastern Congo to help support the UN's efforts in the volatile Ituri province. The mission was deemed a success because it was localised and contained the problem. The EU also sent a small, 1,400-strong EUFOR force to the DRC in 2006 to monitor the elections and to contribute to a peaceful environment in support of the 17,000 troops already there under UN control. Twenty-five million potential Congolese voters took part in the elections, which cost an estimated $422 million, with the EU providing much of these funds. With such a small force, the EU could not have been expected to make much of a difference to the situation on the ground. The deployment of the EU force was, however, important in defining the approach and potential future role of the EU in Africa.[37]

The resurgence of rebellion in eastern Congo in 2007 led to new concerns within the international community at the new threat of humanitarian disaster. The mobilisation of mediators from several institutions, including the EU and the UN, helped to bring about yet another peace deal signed in Goma, eastern Congo, at the end of January 2008. This involved over 20 groups, including the army of the ethnic Tutsi "general", Laurent Nkunda, which asserted itself increasingly during the year, provoking more international concern at continued instability and displacement of persons in a country that had seen an estimated five million deaths from civil conflict in 12 years.

The success of the accord, however, still depended on whether the Rwandan government was satisfied that the accord addressed the problem of surviving members of the *Interahamwe*, the Hutu militia that was largely responsible for the 1994 Rwandan genocide that resulted in 800,000 deaths. Early in 2009, after months of stalemate, a surprise accord was reached between the DRC and Rwandan governments for a joint operation to put an end to the *Interahamwe* operations against Rwanda's government that had been launched from eastern Congo. At the same time, the Rwandan government of Paul Kagame detained Nkunda, whose relations with Kagame had apparently deteriorated. It was speculated at the time that there had been a deal between Kigali and Kinshasa for Kigali to halt the threat to the Congo from Nkunda, in exchange for the DRC allowing Rwanda to enter Congolese territory to deal with the former Hutu *génocidaires*.

The EU has, for some time, made the Congo (alongside Sudan) a key area of priority in Africa. Apart from Artémis, EUPOL and EUFOR, the EU has been involved in a joint action to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the DRC within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy. This mission is aiming to contribute to a successful integration of the Congolese army. A proposal, in December 2008, for a new European force in the DRC to act as a stabilising presence in the volatile Great Lakes region was vetoed by some member states, including Britain.[38] Although French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, publicly

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37 This paragraph and the two preceding it are summaries from Adekeye Adebajo, "The United Nations", in Gilbert M. Khadiagala (ed), *Security Dynamics in Africa's Great Lakes Region* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2006), pp.141-161.

38 See Ian Traynor and Julian Borger, "UK Blocking European Congo Force: Miliband rejects calls for EU troops to avert humanitarian catastrophe", *The Guardian* (London), 12 December 2008, p. 1. See also, Natalie Nougayrede, "The European Union is balking at sending a peacekeeping force to North Kivu", *Le Monde*, 21 and 22 December 2008, p.11.

expressed his opposition to further intervention, there is no doubt that some member states, and some officials in the EU Commission – not to mention the Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon – are likely to continue to press for European intervention in eastern DRC.

While these exercises in the DRC were often particularly interesting to the French who have been at the forefront of involving the EU in African peacekeeping initiatives, they were also accepted by the other member states, and received the blessing of the logistically and financially handicapped AU. In view of the evolving common European defence and security policy, EU member states should not only seek to intervene under the EU umbrella, but must also seek UN authority and African support. It was felt that future missions would be well advised to avoid suspicions of parochial French political agendas, and to ensure that the primacy of the world body in maintaining international peace and security is not undermined through EU actions. The French also appear to be increasingly concerned that future operations should be under a UN umbrella, as is the case in Côte d'Ivoire.

There were many practical difficulties for EU operations both in Brussels and in the field,[39] including a certain reluctance among EU member states to provide funds for security operations that were thought to have been earmarked in the European Development Fund for tackling poverty alleviation. Reference was made to the example of the World Bank in this matter, which has strict rules on the subject of spending of development funds on security matters. Some saw this as a 21st century paradigm shift arising from the evolving recognition that no development is possible without security. The EUFOR operation in Chad and CAR was transformed into

Ambassador James Jonah, former UN Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs, left; Professor Adebayo Adedeji, African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies, Ijebu-Ode, Nigeria

39 Winrich Kühne, "The EU Security Role in Chad and the Central African Republic", paper presented at the CCR seminar, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century", Stellenbosch, Cape Town, 11-13 September 2008.

a UN force by March 2009. The complex and inscrutable decision-making processes in Brussels also came under examination, and it transpired that often it was internal EU politics, rather than an objective assessment of needs on the ground, that determined the outcome of policy decisions.

The Chad/CAR EU force had an extremely limited mandate for monitoring the refugee camps along the border with Sudan in both countries. However, that had not prevented rebel forces in Sudan trying to pre-empt the force by staging an unsuccessful attack on the Chadian capital of Ndjaména in February 2008. The attack was reportedly repelled with French assistance. This delayed the arrival of the force by one month. Sending EUFOR, however, did not address the problem of the political weakness and unpopularity of the Idriss Déby regime in Ndjaména. It was clear that dispatching the force had European support because of the need for the EU to be seen to be "doing something" about the four-year-old Darfur rebellion in Sudan. The March 2009 deadline for the renewal of the mandate was a defining moment for this EUFOR operation.

This situation was thus seen as part of a wider pattern of conflict in the "Greater Horn of Africa", a fluid zone of contiguous fragile countries that includes Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Uganda, Chad, and CAR. The only peacemaking success in the area had been the 2005 peace agreement in South Sudan (resulting in the deployment of 10,000 UN peacekeepers), which, if it were ever to break down, could seriously escalate the situation in the entire region. Peacekeeping exercises are no substitute for political solutions to conflict situations. The mandates of most of the missions discussed here were felt to be too restricted, and capabilities in terms of troops and other personnel, as well as military hardware, in particular helicopters and other high-value elements, were woefully insufficient. The hope that peacekeeping partnerships between multilateral organisations in Africa would improve military effectiveness has not yet materialised. The role of the French in EU peacekeeping missions is said to be partly a result of the failure of France's earlier neo-colonial unilateral military policies in Africa. Doubts were expressed that the entire attempt to involve the EU in peacekeeping in Africa might be a disguised (or transferred) form of neo-colonialism redolent of the old idea of *Eurafrique*, and not in keeping with new ideas of partnership. The persistent denial by donors of much-needed helicopters to UNAMID (United Nations/African Union Mission to Darfur) was also seen to be symptomatic of the suspicion that the business of intervening in both Sudan and Chad/CAR was a game of "liars' poker".

While the commitments of the EU, reiterated in the Strategy for Africa, are not always followed by adequate action in crisis prevention and post-conflict security building situations, its performance in supporting African peacekeeping roles has been limited but largely commendable. Despite many obstacles and reservations, the EU's own peace facility was speedily adopted and renewed in 2007. At the same time, the EU's peace facility was not a long-term solution to security problems. This should not be the only source of funding for African military operations, which can be more effectively undertaken by the UN. Indeed, a substantial long-term flexible sustainable and reliable mechanism, including funding, political support, technical and logistical assistance, should be set up under the UN framework.

8. The EU Roles of Britain and Portugal

Britain and Portugal are two EU member states that have long had relations with Africa. Although Britain had historically had one of the most important colonial empires in Africa, for most of the first 40 years after African independence, the country was engaged in damage limitation and minimising political problems, especially in southern Africa.

British entry to the EEC in 1973 was seen as a means of disengaging from a number of Commonwealth obligations that were absorbed into Europe's budding development policy, especially through the Lomé Convention of 1975. The end of the apartheid regime in South Africa in 1994 was a definite milestone, but Africa continued to be thought of as a marginal British foreign policy interest, even with the coming to power of the Labour Party's Tony Blair in 1997. Africa continued to be seen as a region of low priority, although, as was said at the time, "more than ever before the discourse on Africa's marginality is a nonsense".[40] In his second term, Blair discovered an Africa policy through his military intervention to stabilise a faltering UN mission in 2000, as well as through a 2001 speech describing Africa as the "scar on the conscience of the world".

The Commission for Africa launched by Blair in 2004 was well publicised, although there was not much follow-through. British development aid had increased under Blair from £300 million in 1997-1998 to £1.25 billion in 2006-2007, although this was not expected to reach the UN target of 0.7% of Gross National Income until 2013-2014.[41] This increase was helped by the high profile of the new Department for International Development (DFID), but Africa was never really a top foreign policy priority in the manner of the Balkans, Iraq or Afghanistan. The Sierra Leone intervention of 2000 was part of Blair's efforts at promoting an "ethical foreign policy", but should also be seen in the context of assisting a troubled UN operation. Despite the upgrade that Blair seemingly gave to Africa, and its place in British policies on counter-terrorism and conflict prevention, real leverage was in reality small, as was evident over Zimbabwe where regional actors like South Africa played the key role.

From left: Mr Alex Vines, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, England; Mr David Monyae, Development Bank of Southern Africa, Midrand, South Africa; Dr Paul D Williams, George Washington University, Washington, DC, United States

40 Jean-François Bayart, "Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion", *African Affairs*, No. 99, 2000, p.267.

41 See Tom Porteous, *Britain in Africa* (London: Zed Press and Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008), p.103.

In spite of some of the stirring rhetoric on Africa under Blair, the depressing reality was one of closing embassies and shrinking personnel – an erosion rather than a strengthening of the position. Even the state of African studies in Britain was one of wondering about the future of funding.[42]

For Portugal, in spite of the trauma of decolonisation in the 1970s, once it had joined the then European Economic Community in 1986, Lisbon came to see itself increasingly as a bridge between Europe and its former lusophone African territories. Portugal had already been used by the Americans in "decoupling" talks at the end of the Cold War in Angola and Mozambique. Even Portugal's difficult relations with Angola improved after the 1992 elections, and especially after the death of the controversial rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi, in 2002.

From 1995 onwards, Portugal saw Africa as a means of giving a small country in Europe a stronger voice. This was developed through Portugal's own proposal for EU-Africa summits – the first in Cairo in 2000 and the second in Lisbon in 2007. The summits heard many lofty declarations and passed several resolutions, but it was unclear where the process was heading. In fact, the majority of lusophone African countries were marginal to Portugal, except for oil and diamond-rich Angola, which was Portugal's second largest export market.[43]

From left: Ms Dawn Nagar, Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa; Ambassador James Jonah, former UN Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs; Mr Kaye Whiteman, Consultant, London, England

42 See Paul D Williams, "Britain, the EU and Africa", paper presented at the CCR seminar, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century", Stellenbosch, Cape Town, 11-13 September 2008.

43 See Alex Vines, "Portugal, the EU and Africa", paper presented at the CCR seminar, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century", Stellenbosch, Cape Town, 11-13 September 2008.

9. Identity, Migration, and European Union Relations with the Mediterranean

Moving to issues of migration and identity, the peoples of the Mediterranean have always had a common history, and experienced mobility of people, goods, ideas, wealth, and culture.

Despite centuries of conflict, more recently intensified in the 20th century following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, there has always been a quest for peace, stability, and prosperity in this region, encompassing Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Cyprus, Malta, Greece, Albania, Montenegro, Croatia, Italy, France, Spain and Portugal.[44]

Since the inception of the EEC, there have been efforts to develop relations with the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. However, these ties really only began to take shape as Europe began to raise its sights towards developing countries in the 1970s. By the beginning of the 1980s, there were a series of bilateral association accords with the Maghreb and Mashrek countries, which consolidated the important and diverse trade relations between countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, as well as the European countries to the North. Since 1995, exports to the EU from what are called the Euro-Med countries to the south and east have doubled since 1995, and halved the region's total deficit with the EU to 10 per cent of total trade. On the other hand, the North African region has one of the lowest intra-regional trade volumes of any regional grouping. To that end, the Agadir Arab-Mediterranean Free Trade Agreement of 2004 was seen as a step towards improving South-South trade.

At the same time, following the oil crisis of 1973 that tripled global prices, Europe saw the need for a deeper relationship with the Arab world in particular. This realisation led to the Euro-Arab Dialogue, an initiative that never made much headway. It was only with the liberating change in international circumstances following the end of the Cold War by 1990, concurrently with the moves in Europe with the Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1997) treaties which had the beginnings of a real political dimension, that the newly-created European Union began to raise its profile in this region.

The Barcelona Process of 1995 was an attempt to kick-start an overall development of a Mediterranean policy involving economic, cultural, and political relations. But the process had structural defects that meant that it was unable to move very far. Two years (1998-2000) were spent trying to draft a charter on peace and stability which ended in failure. The stagnation was the responsibility of both sides: bureaucratic restrictions and feeble implementation produced very slow delivery. Barcelona was also intimately affected by the ups and downs of EU involvement in the interminable Middle East peace process, although Europe had always played second fiddle to the US involvement, ever since Camp David in 1978. After 1990 and the subsequent Oslo agreements of 1993, efforts have been made to be seen to be contributing to this vital international effort. The EU has, however, always been more of a paymaster than a peacemaker. There has been a slow increase in European involvement, with EU participation in the quartet (with the US, the UN, and Russia) since 2005, and bilateral agreements with both Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

44 The Mediterranean Union Summit of July 2008 officially invited all EU member states, and for the Southern Mediterranean, Mauritania was included, but not Sudan.

The new Mediterranean Union promoted by French President Sarkozy finally met at a 53-nation summit in Paris in July 2008.[45] German Chancellor Angela Merkel had obliged Sarkozy to turn his idea into a full EU-Mediterranean meeting, with northern and eastern European non-Mediterranean countries also present. This inevitably rendered the whole process both top-heavy and more opaque. Although the summit produced a "strategic ambition" in its final communiqué for a future of peace, democracy, and prosperity in the Mediterranean, and affirmed the role of the Barcelona Process, there was still speculation as to whether the very existence of the new forum might not subtly undermine Barcelona. At the same time, concern was expressed at the ambiguous aims of the Mediterranean Union, in particular, the implications for the African Union of the new body, especially in view of reports from Paris that the forum was seen as logically extending itself to a relationship with the AU. The question was asked whether the Mediterranean Union had a migration sub-text, in view of attempts at externalisation of migration control and, if not, why Mauritania was included in the summit.

The migration issue is central to Europe-Africa relations. A major tragedy has been the attempts of thousands of young men from Africa in rickety boats trying to get to Spain and other Mediterranean countries of the EU, just as questions of immigration have been dominating the political debate in Europe. A contradiction was perceived here, in that, while the free movement of goods and capital is consistently advocated, the people who contribute to producing these are often prevented from entering "Fortress Europe".

A further question therefore is whether the "humanitarian crisis" in southern Europe is the result of an increasing externalisation of migration management to points outside the EU, and, for the most part, in North Africa. Immigration matters are moving increasingly from European Justice and Internal Affairs ministries to External Affairs, and treated as foreign policy issues. This gave rise to questions about the depth of the EU commitment to a real partnership with Africa on migration issues, about the use of migration as a development tool for African countries, and about the promotion of democratic governance and a human rights culture.

ABOVE: Mr Ibrahim Nawar, Al Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, Egypt, left; Mr Liam Halligan, Prosperity Capital Management, London, England

RIGHT: *From left:* Ms Romy Chevallier, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, South Africa; Mr Wouter Jurgens, Embassy of Netherlands, Tshwane, South Africa; Ms Aurelia wa Kabwe-Segatti, French Institute of South Africa, Johannesburg

45 Ibrahim Nawar, "The EU, the Mediterranean Union and North Africa", paper presented at the CCR seminar, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century", Stellenbosch, Cape Town, 11-13 September 2008.

More positively, migration from Africa has been an increasing preoccupation in the EU, which has, over the years, increasingly tried to formulate a coherent policy, since this was clearly a broad issue that could not be handled only at the national level. There has been tension between the perception of "migration as danger" and "migration as potential" for development. The most developed statement of the principles underlying the migration partnership between Africa and Europe can be found in the Cotonou Agreement of 2000, which specifies that migration partnership involves in-depth dialogue consonant with commitments in international law to respect human rights.

The EU approach to building this dialogue includes residence and employment questions, involving fair treatment of third country nationals; addressing root causes of conflicts through poverty reduction; training and education; and the fight against illegal immigration. Migration dialogue also figures in the EU-Africa Lisbon Strategy, considered to be a more logical forum for discussion since this involves the states of North Africa, which are not part of Cotonou. But, as in other aspects of its content, the Lisbon Strategy still has no cross-referencing to the relevant sections of Cotonou.

These efforts have transformed the nature and form of migration politics in Europe, especially since the EU increased its membership from 15 to 27 between 2004 and 2007, with many poorer countries from Central and Eastern Europe joining the club. There are asymmetries and imbalances in migration relations between North Africa and Europe that can lead to a perception that EU action is solely driven by the concerns of its member states to inhibit "unwanted" flows of asylum seekers and "illegal" immigrants, rather than by a desire to establish genuine dialogue with the Maghreb and Egypt. There is still considerable tension between "migration as a threat" and migration dialogue; a reflection of internal tensions on migration within EU member states.

Another question that gave rise to concern was why the "sovereignist" or national security agenda was so dominant in these debates. Migration issues are the most important aspect of North Africa's relations with the EU, although the countries of the region might disagree with this Eurocentric approach, and would prefer to assess holistically all aspects of relations between the North and South Mediterranean. These issues were thought to represent the imbalance between the North and South Mediterranean. The continued extraversion of trade was not helpful to any regional integration process in North Africa. Also, the implications for the Southern Mediterranean of the harmonisation of its immigration policy were considered in the context of an independent and regionally consistent policy framework. The view was strongly expressed that Europe could do with a little more humility in its approach to other regions, especially in a changing world of many centres of power. Europe should also stop pretending that it could always provide a model for others to follow. Immigration was seen as an acid test of Europe's goodwill towards Africa, and its willingness to enter into a real partnership of a kind envisaged in the Lisbon Strategy of 2007.

10. Barack Obama and the Black Atlantic: Towards a Post-Racial Global Africa[46]

The search for a post-racial society and the salience of culture on this development, was another important topic in linking Africa, Europe, and the Atlantic. The issue of race relations is critical to debates in this area.

The importance of understanding war and peace in the context of a post-racism to a post-racial society can also not be ignored. In understanding this concept, the seminar discussed metaphorically William Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice* and *Othello*. On the one hand, prejudice based on differences in culture and, on the other hand, prejudice based on cultural variations were seen to be a derivative of the differences in physical skin colour. The significance of then United States presidential candidate Barack Obama – who became the first African-American US President in January 2009 – and the world's acceptance of this fact, are historic.

The central question posed was whether, at the global level, the world is returning to Shakespearean societal patterns, in which race often mattered less than culture: Are colour and racism losing salience in human behaviour? Are we witnessing a resurgence of culture prejudice? Though racial systems have been dismantled, post-racialism has meant that there has recently been more emphasis on cultural dichotomies. Discussions also extended to the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US, which exacerbated anti-Arab and anti-Muslim prejudices: essentially a problem of culture. Also highlighted was the way the United States, in accepting a black political leader, was seen to be moving much more progressively than Europe. Was the United States shedding racism faster than Europe? The dynamics of Europe in relation to the United States encompassed the ending of the slave trade, and at the same time, the tardiness in Europe to accept black political figures. This has possibly been offset by the worst forms of racism being historically perpetrated in America.

Also discussed was the suggestion that, in a post-racial society, the divide among cultures can become what American academic Samuel Huntington described as the "Clash of Civilisations"[47] and whether these issues could be better addressed in a seminar on global Europe and global Africa. In the post-racial age, the divorce of Barack Obama's parents may come to be seen to be as historic as that of Henry VIII and Anne Boleyn, which created the Church of England in a secession from the powerful Roman Catholic Church. If Obama's parents had remained together, the young Barack would have been raised more as an African in the black Diaspora of post-coloniality and less as a full-blooded American, and his credentials to be President of the US would have been drastically reduced. Having been raised by a single white mother changed that, and established the link between Africa, Europe and the Atlantic which Obama embodies through his family heritage.

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46 Ali A. Mazrui, "Barack Obama and the Black Atlantic: Towards a Post-Racial Global Africa", special address to the CCR seminar, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century", Stellenbosch, Cape Town, 11-13 September 2008.

47 Samuel P. Huntington, 1993, "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs* 72, 3, pp. 22-49.

Policy Recommendations

The following 12 key recommendations emerged from the policy seminar:

- First, it is important for both Africa and Europe that their relations should transcend the burdens of the past, in order to make the paradigm shift from "Eurafrique" to "Afro-europa". Europe has to respect that Africans will always hold dear the guiding principles of pan-Africanism of freedom and unity, and Africa has to recognise that unity needs a realistic and sustainable framework of integration based on development, co-operation, and democratic governance;

- Second, the new global balance of forces, taking into account particularly the growing importance of Asia – and especially the growing role of China, which has become the third largest investor in Africa after Europe and the US – must be taken into account when considering the future of Africa-Europe relations. Members of the African Union need to focus on strengthening, rationalising, and funding the organisation as well as Africa's Regional Economic Communities;

- Third, the new EU-Africa Joint Strategy approved in Lisbon in 2007 deserves backing as far as it truly supports Africa's own strategic objectives. It is important that its structures should be sustainable and its action plan capable of realistic implementation;

- Fourth, it is critical that the present disconnect between the Lisbon strategy and the operations of the Cotonou Agreements of June 2000 be bridged. The trade provisions of Cotonou, including the Economic Partnership Agreements, need to be integrated into the Lisbon Strategy. The African Union could become the focal co-ordinating point of negotiations for EPAs between Africa's RECs and the EU;

- Fifth, the disunity caused in Africa between individual states and within its RECs is to be wholeheartedly deplored, as is the mercantilist approach that the EU has shown since insisting on the EPA provisions in Cotonou, especially the abandonment of the hitherto sacrosanct principle of non-reciprocity between rich and poor countries. Ways should be found to re-fashion the relationship in view of the damage caused by the EPAs not just to Africa-Europe relations, but to Africa's own attempts at regional integration;

- Sixth, the intensive monitoring of EU aid by independent international authorities is essential, beyond donor organisations and ministries of finance. It would be advantageous for Africa to have its own independent monitoring of the aid disbursement that is a treaty obligation under the Cotonou Agreements of 2000;

- Seventh, it is important that the AU's Pan-African Parliament should embark on a concerted popularisation effort to ensure that its programmes and activities are well known and supported by various segments of African populations, including civil society organisations. Aside from strengthening co-operation with the European Parliament, the PAP could also learn lessons from the European Parliament's legislative and oversight role;

- Eighth, migration should be made a priority in the Europe-Africa agenda. European countries should limit externalising migration management outside Europe, notably in North Africa. The emphasis should be on "migration dialogue", as outlined in both the Cotonou Agreements of 2000 and the 2007 EU-African Strategy, rather than the "migration danger" that is too frequently perceived;

- Ninth, the Mediterranean Union promoted by President Nicolas Sarkozy of France could negatively affect the more traditional bilateral and multilateral ties that Europe has forged in the southern and eastern Mediterranean, and must be rethought. Lack of progress in regional co-operation in North Africa – a by-product of the excessive extraversion of trade – should also be rectified;

- Tenth, Europe's support for the African Union's security mechanisms should be conditionally welcomed, and appropriate lessons should be drawn from EU peacekeeping support in the DRC, Sudan's Darfur region, and Chad/CAR;

- Eleventh, there should always be scrutiny by the AU of the motives of the EU's security interventions, to examine their convergence with African interests. The EU needs to be careful in using Africa as a testing ground for its own evolving security strategy, as is often the case with its military operations. African charges of France using the EU as multilateral cover for the discredited unilateral interventions of the past must also be closely scrutinised; and

- Finally, the AU must be aware of the limitations of the EU in co-ordination due to the lack of an over-arching central authority. While European offers of assistance should not automatically be refused by Africans, the UN remains the most legitimate international peacekeeper, and the EU must strengthen, not weaken, the world body's role in Africa.

Participants of the CCR seminar, "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century", Stellenbosch, South Africa, 11-13 September 2008

Annex I

Agenda

Day One Thursday 11 September 2008

9h30 – 9h45 Welcome and Opening

Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Keynote Address: "From Eurafrique to Afro-europa: Africa and Europe in a New Century"

9h45 – 11h15 Chair: Professor Ben Turok, Member of Parliament and Director, Institute for African Alternatives in South Africa, Cape Town

Speaker: Professor Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Director, African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies, Ijebu-Ode, Nigeria; Chair of the African Peer Review Mechanism Panel of Eminent Persons

11h15 – 11h30 Coffee Break

11h30 – 13h00 Session I: The History of Relations between Africa and Europe

Chair: Professor Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Director, African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies, Ijebu-Ode, Nigeria

Speakers: Mr Kaye Whiteman, former Editor, "*West Africa*", London
"The Rise and Fall and Rebirth of Eurafrique: From the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 to the EU-Africa Summit of Lisbon, December 2007"

Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, "Towers of Babel? The African Union and the European Union"

13h00 – 14h00 Lunch

14h00 – 15h30 Session II: The Politics of North/South relations

Chair: Professor Chris Landsberg, Department of Politics, University of Johannesburg, South Africa

	Speakers:	H.E. Rob de Vos, Ambassador of the Netherlands to South Africa, "Europe and Africa: The Continuing Dialogue of the Deaf?"
		Dr Mareike Meyn, Overseas Development Institute, London, "An Anatomy of the Economic Partnership Agreement between Africa and Europe"
15h30 – 15h45		Coffee Break
15h45 – 17h15	**Session III: Global Africa and the New Regionalism**	
	Chair:	Dr Sheila Bunwaree, University of Mauritius, Réduit
	Speakers:	Professor Gilbert Khadiagala, Professor of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, "Regionalism in Africa and Europe"
		Mr Liam Halligan, Chief Economist, Prosperity Capital Management, London, "Global Africa: The Last Investment Frontier?"
17h15 – 17h30		Coffee Break
17h30 – 19h00	**CCR Book Launch: "South Africa, Nigeria, China, and Africa's Security and Governance Architecture"**	
	Chair:	Ambassador James Jonah, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs
	Speakers:	Professor Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Director, African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies, Ijebu-Ode, Nigeria, "The African Union and its Institutions"
		Professor Francis Deng, Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General for the Prevention of Genocide, New York, United States, "Africa's Human Rights Architecture"
		Professor Chris Landsberg, Department of Politics, University of Johannesburg, "South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era"
		Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, "Gulliver's Troubles: Nigerian Foreign Policy after the Cold War"
		Dr Garth le Pere, Executive Director, Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand, Johannesburg, "Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China"
19h30		Dinner

Day Two Friday 12 September 2008

Special Address: "Barack Obama and the Black Atlantic: Towards a Post-Racial Global Africa"

9h30 – 11h00	Chair:	Professor Francis Deng, Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General for the Prevention of Genocide, New York, United States
	Speaker:	Professor Ali A Mazrui, Director, Institute of Global Cultural Studies, Binghamton University, New York
11h00 – 11h15	Coffee Break	

11h15 – 12h45 Session IV: Building Pan-Continental Institutions

	Chair:	Mr Leon Levy, Commissioner, Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration; and Chairperson of the Board of Governors, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
	Speakers:	Dr Khabele Matlosa, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, Johannesburg, "The Pan-African Parliament: Lesson from the European Parliament?"
		Professor Jeremy Sarkin, Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Hofstra University, New York, "The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the African Court of Justice and Human Rights: Comparative Lessons from the European Court of Human Rights"
12h45 – 13h45		Lunch

13h45 – 15h30 Session V: Identity, Migration, and European Union Relations with the Mediterranean

	Chair:	Professor Abdoulaye Bathily, former Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly, Dakar, Senegal
	Speakers:	Dr Harmut Mayer, Fellow and Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, England, "Europe's Post-Colonial Self-Perception"
		Ms Aurelia wa Kabwe-Segatti, Researcher, French Institute of South Africa, Johannesburg, "Breaching Fortress Europe? African Migration to Europe"
		Mr Ibrahim Nawar, Al Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, Egypt, "The EU, the Mediterranean Union, and North Africa"
15h30 – 15h45		Coffee Break

15h45 – 17h15 **Session VI: The EU Roles of Britain and Portugal**

Chair: Mr David Monyae, Researcher, Development Bank of Southern Africa, Midrand, Johannesburg

Speakers: Dr Paul D Williams, Associate Professor, George Washington University, Washington DC, United States, "Britain, the EU and Africa"

Mr Alex Vines, Head of the Africa Programme, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, "Portugal, the EU and Africa"

19h30 Dinner

Day Three Saturday 13 September 2008

09h30 – 11h15 **Session VII: The Security and Governance Roles of the African Union and the European Union**

Chair: Ambassador Abdelrahim A Khalil, Director, Conflict Early Warning Response Mechanism, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Speakers: Dr Garth le Pere, Executive Director, Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand, "AU/EU Security and Governance Co-operation"

Mr Aldo Ajello, former EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region, "The EU Security Role in the Great Lakes Region"

Dr Winrich Kühne, Director, Centre for International Peace Operations, Berlin, Germany, "The EU Security Role in Chad and the Central African Republic"

11h15 – 11h30 Coffee Break

11h30 – 12h00 **Session VIII: How to produce an Academically-rigorous and Policy-Relevant Book from the Seminar**

Chair: Dr Sheila Bunwaree, University of Mauritius, Réduit

Speakers: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Mr Kaye Whiteman, former Editor, "*West Africa*", London

12h00 – 12h15	Completion of evaluation forms	
12h15 – 12h30	Coffee Break	
12h30 – 13h15	**Session IX: Rapporteurs Report and the Way Forward**	
	Chair:	Ambassador James Jonah, former UN Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs
	Rapporteurs:	Mr Kaye Whiteman, former Editor, "West Africa", London
		Ms Dawn Nagar, Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
13h15 – 14h15	Lunch	

Annex II

List of Participants

1. Dr Adekeye Adebajo
   Centre for Conflict Resolution
   Cape Town, South Africa

2. Professor Adebayo Adedeji
   African Centre for Development
   and Strategic Studies
   Ijebu-Ode, Nigeria

3. Mr Aldo Ajello
   Former EU Special Representative
   for the Great Lakes Region

4. Mr Jeremy Astill-Brown
   Department for International Development
   Tshwane, South Africa

5. Professor Abdoulaye Bathily
   Former Deputy Speaker of the
   National Assembly of Senegal

6. Dr Sheila Bunwaree
   Faculty of Social Studies and Humanities
   University of Mauritius
   Réduit

7. Ms Romy Chevallier
   South African Institute of International Affairs
   Johannesburg, South Africa

8. Professor Francis M Deng
   Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General for
   the Prevention of Genocide
   New York, United States

9. Ambassador Rob de Vos
   Embassy of Netherlands
   Tshwane, South Africa

10. Mr Liam Halligan
    Prosperity Capital Management
    London, England

11. Ambassador James Jonah
    Former UN Undersecretary-General
    for Political Affairs

12. Mr Wouter Jurgens
    Embassy of Netherlands
    Tshwane, South Africa

13. Professor James Karioki
    Consultant
    Johannesburg, South Africa

14. Professor Gilbert Khadiagala
    Department of International Relations
    University of the Witwatersrand
    Johannesburg, South Africa

15. Ambassador Abdelrahim A Khalil
    Intergovernmental Authority on Development
    Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

16. Dr Winrich Kühne
    Center for International Peace Operations
    Berlin, Germany

17. Professor Chris Landsberg
    University of Johannesburg
    South Africa

18. Dr Garth le Pere
    Institute for Global Dialogue
    Midrand, South Africa

19. Mr Leon Levy
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration
Cape Town, South Africa

20. Mr Langa Malimela
University of Cape Town
South Africa

21. Dr Khabele Matlosa
Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
Johannesburg, South Africa

22. Dr Hartmut Mayer
University of Oxford
Oxford, England

23. Professor Ali A Mazrui
Institute of Global Cultural Studies
Binghamton University
New York, United States

24. Dr Mareike Meyn
Overseas Development Institute
London, England

25. Mr David Monyae
Development Bank of Southern Africa
Midrand, South Africa

26. Mr Ibrahim Nawar
Al Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies
Cairo, Egypt

27. Mr Manfred Öhm
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
Maputo, Mozambique

28. Professor Gerrit Olivier
University of Johannesburg
South Africa

29. Professor Jeremy Sarkin
Hofstra University
New York, United States

30. Professor Ben Turok
Member of Parliament
Cape Town, South Africa

31. Mr Sandile Tyini
Department of Trade and Industry
Tshwane, South Africa

32. Mr Jan van Vollenhoven
Department of Foreign Affairs
Tshwane, South Africa

33. Mr Alex Vines
Royal Institute of International Affairs
London, England

34. Ms Aurelia wa Kabwe-Segatti
French Institute of South Africa
Johannesburg, South Africa

35. Mr Kaye Whiteman
Consultant
London, England

36. Dr Paul D Williams
George Washington University
Washington, DC, United States

CCR Staff

37. Mr Yazeed Fakier

38. Ms Noria Mashumba

39. Ms Elizabeth Myburgh

40. Ms Dawn Nagar

41. Mr Siphiwe Ndlovu

42. Ms Margie Struthers

43. Mr Gerard Voges

44. Ms Selma Walters

Annex III

List of Acronyms

ACJHR	African Court of Justice and Human Rights
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
AEC	African Economic Community
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ASF	African Standby Force (AU)
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
CCR	Centre for Conflict Resolution
CEMAC	*Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale* (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa)
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
EACU	East African Customs Union
EBA	Everything But Arms (EU)
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa (UN)
ECB	European Central Bank
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council (UN)
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDF	European Development Fund
EEC	European Economic Community
EPAs	Economic Partnership Agreements
ESA	East and Southern Africa
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Forces
EUPOL	European Police Mission
FTAs	Free Trade Areas
G8	Group of Eight Industrialised Countries
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GSP	Generalised System of Preferences
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MINURCAT	UN Mission in Central African Republic and Chad
MLC	Movement for the Liberation of Congo
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PAP	Pan-African Parliament (AU)
PSC	Peace and Security Council (AU)
RCD	Rally for Congolese Democracy
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RPF	Regional Parliamentary Fora
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
UCT	University of Cape Town
UEMOA	*Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine* (West African Economic and Monetary Union)
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur
UNCTAD	UN Conference on Trade and Development
US	United States
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Other publications in this series

(available at www.ccr.org.za)



VOLUME 1
THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S SECURITY

THE UNITED NATIONS, REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND FUTURE SECURITY THREATS IN AFRICA

The inter-related and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security within the framework of UN reform were the focus of this policy seminar, held from 21 – 23 May 2004 in Claremont, Cape Town.

VOLUME 2
SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRICA

THE POST-APARTHEID DECADE

The role that South Africa has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa's domestic transformation 10 years into democracy were assessed at this meeting in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 29 July - 1 August 2004.



VOLUME 3
THE AU/NEPAD AND AFRICA'S EVOLVING GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY ARCHITECURE

The state of governance and security in Africa under the AU and NEPAD were analysed and assessed at this policy advisory group meeting in Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004.



VOLUME 4
A MORE SECURE CONTINENT

AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN HIGH-LEVEL PANEL REPORT,
A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

African perspectives on the United Nations' (UN) High-Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change were considered at this policy advisory group meeting in Somerset West, Cape Town, on 23 and 24 April 2005.



VOLUME 5
WHITHER SADC?

SOUTHERN AFRICA'S POST-APARTHEID SECURITY AGENDA

The role and capacity of the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) were focused on at this meeting in Oudekraal, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005.



VOLUME 6
HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY:

AN AGENDA FOR AFRICA

The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and the potential role of African leadership and the African Union in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.



VOLUME 7
BUILDING AN AFRICAN UNION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES (RECS), NEPAD AND CIVIL SOCIETY

This seminar in Cape Town from 20 – 22 August 2005 made policy recommendations on how the AU's institutions, including NEPAD, could achieve their aims and objectives.



VOLUME 8
THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

This meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 October 2005, explores civil society's role in relation to southern Africa, democratic governance, its nexus with government, and draws on comparative experiences in peacebuilding.



VOLUME 9

WOMEN AND PEACEBUILDING IN AFRICA

This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations in 2000.



VOLUME 10

HIV/AIDS AND MILITARIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

This two-day policy advisory group seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.



VOLUME 11

AIDS AND SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA:

BUILDING A COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE

This policy and research seminar, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 March 2006, developed and disseminated new knowledge on the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in the three key areas of: democratic practice; sustainable development; and peace and security.



VOLUME 12

HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA

This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS in South Africa and southern Africa from a human security perspective.



VOLUME 13

SOUTH SUDAN WITHIN A NEW SUDAN

This policy advisory group seminar on 20 and 21 April 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A).



VOLUME 14

AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION

This meeting, in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3 and 4 August 2006, analysed the relevance for Africa of the creation, in December 2005, of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, and examined how countries emerging from conflict could benefit from its establishment.



VOLUME 15

THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CENTRAL AFRICA

This sub-regional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.



VOLUME 16

UNITED NATIONS MEDIATION EXPERIENCE IN AFRICA

This seminar, held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006, sought to draw out key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa, and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations' newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).



VOLUME 17

WEST AFRICA'S EVOLVING SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

LOOKING BACK TO THE FUTURE

The conflict management challenges facing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the areas of governance, development, and security reform and post-conflict peacebuilding formed the basis of this policy seminar in Accra, Ghana, on 30 and 31 October 2006.



VOLUME 18

THE UNITED NATIONS AND AFRICA: PEACE, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SECURITY

This policy advisory group meeting, held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 14 to 16 December 2006, set out to assess the role of the principal organs and the specialised agencies of the UN in Africa.



VOLUME 19

AFRICA'S RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

This policy seminar, held in Somerset West, South Africa, on 23 and 24 April 2007, interrogated issues around humanitarian intervention in Africa and the responsibility of regional governments and the international community in the face of humanitarian crises.



VOLUME 20

WOMEN IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES IN AFRICA

The objective of the seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 and 7 November 2006, was to discuss and identify concrete ways of engendering reconstruction and peace processes in African societies emerging from conflict.



VOLUME 21

AFRICA'S EVOLVING HUMAN RIGHTS ARCHITECTURE

The experiences and lessons from a number of human rights actors and institutions on the African continent were reviewed and analysed at this policy advisory group meeting held on 28 and 29 June 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa.



VOLUME 22

PEACE VERSUS JUSTICE?

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS AND WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS IN AFRICA

The primary goal of this policy meeting, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 May 2007, was to address the relative strengths and weaknesses of "prosecution versus amnesty" for past human rights abuses in countries transitioning from conflict to peace.



VOLUME 23

CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

This report, based on a policy advisory group seminar held on 12 and 13 April 2007 in Johannesburg, South Africa, examines the role of various African Union (AU) organs in monitoring the rights of children in conflict and post-conflict situations.



VOLUME 24

SOUTHERN AFRICA:

BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

This report is based on a seminar, held in Tanzania on 29 and 30 May 2007, that sought to enhance the efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to advance security, governance and development initiatives in the sub-region.



VOLUME 25
PREVENTING GENOCIDE AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

CHALLENGES FOR THE UN, AFRICA, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

This policy advisory group meeting was held from 13-15 December 2007 in Stellenbosch, South Africa, and focused on six African, Asian and European case studies. These highlighted inter-related issues of concern regarding populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, "ethnic cleansing" or crimes against humanity.

VOLUME 26
EURAFRIQUE?

AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY

This seminar, held from 31 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt); peacekeeping and military co-operation; and migration.



VOLUME 27
SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

This seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 8-10 June 2008, brought together a group of experts – policymakers, academics and civil society actors – to identify ways of strengthening the capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to formulate security and development initiatives for southern Africa.



VOLUME 28
HIV/AIDS AND MILITARIES IN AFRICA

This policy research report addresses prospects for an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic within the context of African peacekeeping and regional peace and security. It is based on three regional advisory group seminars that took place in Windhoek, Namibia (February 2006); Cairo, Egypt (September 2007); and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (November 2007).



VOLUME 29
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND PEACEBUILDING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA:

CIVIL SOCIETY, GOVERNMENTS, AND TRADITIONAL LEADERS

This meeting, held on 19 and 20 May 2008 in Johannesburg, South Africa, provided a platform for participants from Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe to share insights on sustained intervention initiatives implemented by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in the three countries since 2002.



VOLUME 30
CROUCHING TIGER, HIDDEN DRAGON? CHINA AND AFRICA:

ENGAGING THE WORLD'S NEXT SUPERPOWER

This seminar, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 September 2007, assessed Africa's engagement with China in the last 50 years, in light of the dramatic changes in a relationship that was historically based largely on ideological and political solidarity.

Notes

Notes

The development and security agendas in the relationship between Africa and Europe have become closely connected, with the migration question increasingly gaining prominence. The rich North and the poor South are also being confronted with issues of climate change, renewable energy and, most recently, the global food and financial crises. The seminar on which this report is based explored critically the nature of the relationship between Africa and Europe and the potential for further strategic engagement between both continents.

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