



STATE RECONSTRUCTION IN ZIMBABWE



CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

POLICY SEMINAR REPORT

9-10 JUNE 2011, SIAVONGA, ZAMBIA

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CAPE TOWN • SOUTH AFRICA

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POLICY ADVISORY GROUP SEMINAR REPORT

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RAPPORTEURS

OLLEN MWALUBUNJU AND ELIZABETH OTITODUN

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), and the Rapporteurs	5
Executive Summary	6
Introduction	12
1. Structural Transformation of the Zimbabwean Economy	15
2. Socially Inclusive Growth and Employment	17
3. Land Reform	19
4. Restoring the Health Sector	22
5. Reviving the Education Sector	24
6. Security Sector Reform	26
7. The Role of SADC	27
8. The Role of External Donors	29
Conclusion	31
Policy Recommendations	32

Annexes

I. Agenda	35
II. List of Participants	39
III. List of Acronyms	41

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Acknowledgments

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, would like to thank the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Zimbabwe, for their generous support that made possible the holding of the policy advisory group seminar in Siavonga, Zambia, from 9 to 10 June 2011. CCR would also like to thank the main funders of its Africa Programme: the governments of the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden, as well as the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC).

About the Organiser

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa, was established in 1968. The organisation has wide-ranging experience in conflict interventions in the Western Cape and Southern Africa and is working on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa's regional organisations. Its policy research has focused on post-conflict peacebuilding involving the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), and African civil society; Southern Africa's peacebuilding challenges; the European Union's (EU) engagement with Africa; and HIV/AIDS in relation to post-conflict societies.

The Rapporteurs

Ollen Mwalubunju is a Senior Manager, and Elizabeth Otitodun a Researcher, at the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa.

Executive Summary

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa hosted a policy advisory group seminar at Lake Safari Lodge, Siavonga, in Zambia, from 9 to 10 June 2011 on the theme “State Reconstruction in Zimbabwe”. The policy dialogue was made possible through the support of the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Zimbabwe.

The meeting explored some of the most important challenges currently facing state reconstruction efforts in Zimbabwe, and considered strategies to accelerate the process. It also developed concrete recommendations to complement initiatives led by the government of Zimbabwe, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU), and external donors in Zimbabwe following a disputed election process in June 2008, which led to a Global Political Agreement (GPA) three months later. In particular, the seminar sought to build on the achievements of this accord, which enabled the establishment of a transitional Government of National Unity (GNU) in February 2009 between the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the two formations of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The Zambia meeting focused on eight main themes: 1) Structural Transformation of the Economy; 2) Socially Inclusive Growth and Employment; 3) Land Reform; 4) Restoring the Health Sector; 5) Reviving the Education Sector; 6) Security Sector Reform; 7) the Role of SADC; and 8) the Role of External Donors.

1. Structural Transformation of the Zimbabwean Economy

In addition to increasing political repression, Zimbabwe experienced an economic crisis between 2000 and 2008, as cumulative real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell sharply by 40 percent. Hyperinflation peaked at 500 million percent in December 2008, and nominal GDP stood at a mere \$3.5 million in 2009. As a result, living standards and life expectancy for the population of 12 million fell more rapidly than anywhere else in the world. The country’s external debt was estimated at \$6.9 billion in December 2010. In view of these developments, the GPA of 2008 identified the restoration of economic stability and growth as a key issue to be addressed by Zimbabwe’s new power-sharing government. The government launched a Short-Term Economic Recovery Plan (STERP) in 2009, and has since formulated a Medium-Term Plan (MTP) for 2010-2015. Hyperinflation has been curbed, and capacity use in the manufacturing and service sectors has improved. But fundamental challenges persist, relating to constrained infrastructural capacity, foreign currency reserves, investment and liquidity levels, skills shortages, government finances, and corruption.

2. Socially Inclusive Growth and Employment

At independence in 1980, the Zimbabwean government inherited a dual economy which was dominated by a wealthy white minority, with a large informal sector composed of the majority black population. The right to work remains unrealised for most Zimbabweans as a result of this economic legacy. A decade of macroeconomic instability saw structural unemployment rise to about 80 percent in 2008, with only 720,000 (six percent) of the population formally employed – a significant decrease from the 3.6 million people (30 percent) employed in 2003. Between 2004 and 2009, the country’s once dynamic economy had shrunk by more than 50 percent. With improved economic activity and effective capacity utilisation, the number of formally employed Zimbabweans could potentially rise to an estimated 1.4 million. Most people rely on the informal economy for survival, and even formally employed workers are often unable to support their families, pay school fees, and afford health services.

3. Land Reform

In 1980, when Zimbabwe gained its independence from Britain, it inherited a colonial pattern of unequal land ownership. The provisions of the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979, which set conditions for the post-independence government, made it difficult to address speedily economic and social inequalities that had resulted from colonial and white minority rule. In 2000, 42 percent of the country's agricultural land was controlled by about 4,500 white commercial farmers (0.03 percent of the population), while most of the black population remained landless, with only about 1.2 million black people subsisting on 41 percent of the country's total area of about 390,000 square kilometres. Land reform is therefore fundamental to Zimbabwe's long-term political stability and socio-economic development. However, the hasty implementation of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in 2000, which targeted about 3,000 farms for resettlement by black beneficiaries, led to international sanctions being imposed by the European Union (EU), the United States (US), Australia, and New Zealand; the loss of jobs for most farm workers; and a decline in agricultural production.

4. Restoring the Health Sector

At the time of the inauguration of the inclusive government in 2008, Zimbabwe's health sector had almost completely collapsed due to the country's political and economic crises as well as deep cuts in social spending imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank's Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) from the early 1990s. It is unlikely that Zimbabwe's efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set by the UN in 2000 of reducing child mortality by two-thirds and maternal mortality by three-quarters by 2015 will be achieved. Cholera outbreaks have become more frequent, the incidence of tuberculosis has risen and in 2009, malaria was the third leading cause of hospital admissions. However, HIV/AIDS rates among adults have fallen recently: between 2001 and 2009, the prevalence of the disease among adults (people aged 15 and above) declined from 23.7 percent to 13.7 percent. The health sector, however, continues to face critical challenges including: infrastructure collapse; skills and human resource shortages; inadequate equipment and technology; poor working conditions; the politicisation of training institutions; and a lack of proper planning.

5. Reviving the Education Sector

By the mid-1990s, Zimbabwe had almost achieved primary education for all of its citizens. The country was on track to become one of the first African countries to achieve the Millennium Development Goal, set in 2000, of providing universal primary education by 2015. However, these gains have been reversed by a series of political and economic crises that lowered the morale of teachers, resulting in many neglecting their responsibilities. Government funding for schools was cut, and the faltering economy deprived parents of the means to educate their children. By the time the inclusive government was established, the sector had nearly ground to a halt. School attendance had rapidly declined from over 85 percent in 2007 to a mere 20 percent by 2008. Although the unity government has taken steps since 2009 to reopen schools and improve the wages of teachers, the sector remains critically underfunded, with already overburdened parents expected to supplement teachers' salaries. Reviving the education system is thus a major challenge for Zimbabwe's state reconstruction efforts.

6. Security Sector Reform

Zimbabwe's inclusive government faces a range of security sector challenges. The engagement of the military, intelligence and policing agencies in politics increased after the closely contested parliamentary elections of

June 2000 when the Movement for Democratic Change entered the political arena. ZANU-PF thereafter began to engage the security sector in order to sustain its power, increasingly rewarding key serving and retired military officers with important posts and contracts in commerce, parastatals, and national ministries, as well as through land acquisition opportunities. The relationship between political and security elites, which is based on collective decision-making and a common ideology, has been characterised by partisanship and human rights violations. Reform of the security sector cannot therefore be achieved without complementary reform of the political sector.

7. The Role of SADC

The 15-member Southern African Development Community has sought to provide sustained institutional support for the intra-Zimbabwe dialogue between ZANU-PF and the two formations of the MDC. SADC, the Facilitator of the Intra-Zimbabwe dialogue (represented by South African President, Jacob Zuma), and the African Union, are the guarantors of the Global Political Agreement of 2008. SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) has periodically reviewed the agreement's implementation. The regional body has taken an increasingly firm stance towards the situation in Zimbabwe, particularly at a summit held in Livingstone, Zambia, in March 2011, when SADC heads of state criticised state intimidation and violence, issuing a strong call for the speedy completion of the parliament-led constitutional reform process. Southern African economies are estimated to have lost more than \$36 billion in potential investments in Zimbabwe as a result of the crisis in the country. It therefore remains in SADC's interests to ensure that the GPA is fully implemented and remains in place until Zimbabwe's political and economic stability can be ensured.

8. The Role of External Donors

Financial support from external donors and international organisations currently helps to fund important reconstruction projects and economic recovery plans in Zimbabwe. An estimated \$760 million of such assistance was estimated to have been disbursed in 2008 and 2009. The Government of National Unity has, however, said that it needs \$10 billion a year for these reconstruction efforts. Contrary to widespread expectations within Zimbabwe following the signing of the GPA in 2008, the government has so far failed to attract significant funds from external donors, with Western governments demanding more governance and regulatory reforms before providing direct support. Donors have faced a series of dilemmas: whether to provide humanitarian aid or long-term development assistance; and whether to channel funds through the state or through civil society. Western donors have a crucial role to play in assisting efforts to implement the commitments made under the GPA. However, donor involvement has also demonstrated that sustainable recovery in Zimbabwe must be locally driven to be truly effective, and that sanctions, while easy to impose, are often hard to manage and even more difficult to remove.

Policy Recommendations

The policy advisory group made 30 recommendations in the eight sectors covered by the seminar.

1. Structural Transformation of the Zimbabwean Economy

- The parties to the Global Political Agreement must demonstrate a common vision, harmonise efforts to address the critical issues that affect Zimbabwe's economic recovery, and work together to enhance the confidence of international investors and the donor community;
- Sustained institutionalised social dialogue is needed to develop trust between the political leadership and citizens in order to enhance popular, effective participation in policy processes and to encourage local ownership of national reconstruction policies across Zimbabwean society;
- The macroeconomic framework developed by the Zimbabwean government should prioritise the basic needs of the poor: food security, healthcare, education, housing, transport, and basic utilities;
- The consolidation of macroeconomic stability should be implemented through expanding the national tax base and increasing the efficiency of government spending; harmonising economic, budgetary, and fiscal planning; re-engaging the international community; adopting a sustainable debt strategy; promoting a "developmental state"; and advancing democratic governance;

2. Socially Inclusive Growth and Employment

- Employment-intensive growth should be prioritised as a national economic policy strategy, while more research should be conducted on promoting socially inclusive growth and creating employment opportunities in the informal and formal sectors of medium- to large-scale industries in Zimbabwe;
- Employment policy should be developed in line with international agreements such as the 1976 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which provides the right to decent and full employment;
- Zimbabwe should develop an effective empowerment policy drawing on global best practices in order to protect the socially vulnerable segments of society. In this regard, the country's National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board (NIEEB) should mobilise resources to implement broad-based empowerment programmes;

3. Land Reform

- The government of Zimbabwe must develop a land use system that can guarantee security of tenure and the collateral value of land, while ensuring more equitable land distribution. The implementation and completion of a land audit will be an important step towards urgently addressing issues of insecurity of land tenure and compensation to displaced farmers;
- Agrarian reform should be viewed as a tool for generating sustainable livelihoods, transferring skills, and creating new markets. Farmers on resettled land should be assisted to achieve their productive potential;
- Increased financing for the country's agricultural sector by financial institutions that operate in Zimbabwe will be vital, especially in ensuring adequate inputs. SADC should therefore support efforts to identify measures to increase international lines of credit for this important sector;

4. Restoring the Health Sector

- The Zimbabwean government should implement the Abuja Declaration of 2001 which calls for 15 percent of national budgets to be allocated to the health sector. Additional funds could be generated from levies and fees in order to finance this vital sector;
- Health services and facilities in Zimbabwe must be improved, and proper human resource plans implemented in order to retain trained medical and health staff, many of whom have been lost to foreign countries;
- Primary healthcare needs to be effectively supported and promoted, in particular, by institutionalising community health programmes on a national basis;

5. Reviving the Education Sector

- National education curricula must be developed in Zimbabwe to cater for the different needs of diverse learners. In particular, artisan and technical skills in the fields of agriculture, engineering, and information technology should be promoted to support the development needs of the national economy;
- Peacebuilding and conflict resolution knowledge and skills should be integrated into all levels of education and training. In-service teacher and school-management training must also be implemented to develop a core of committed educators;
- Zimbabwe's seven state universities should be granted greater managerial and academic autonomy, overseen by a strengthened National Higher Education Council, to ensure institutional accountability and sound governance. Innovative fundraising efforts must also be developed by higher education bodies, which could include developing mechanisms to recover loans and bursaries from students. The harmonisation of higher education standards enabling qualifications to be easily transferred throughout Southern Africa - institutionalised through a SADC protocol - could usefully encourage the interchange of students among the regional body's 15 member states;
- The goal of universal primary education must be adequately funded by ensuring a predictable and adequate state budget for the education sector. Issues of early childhood development (ECD) and high drop-out rates at secondary level should also be urgently addressed by providing adequate ECD facilities and increasing the number of specialist teachers in early childhood education; addressing chronic malnutrition (which has been linked to high drop-out rates); and ensuring the inclusion of vocational and technical skills training at secondary school level;
- The government should increase the salaries of teachers to ensure decent living standards, and must act decisively to safeguard the physical safety of educators in the face of political violence;

6. Security Sector Reform

- A white paper should be produced by the Zimbabwean government with the aim of transforming the security sector from the dominant influence of the ruling ZANU-PF party into a more accountable national institution that can act on behalf of, and enjoy the credibility of, all Zimbabweans. *The White Paper for The National Defence of South Africa* of 1996 which tackled related issues of transformation, could possibly provide some useful lessons for such a policy;
- It is critical that the process for reforming the security sector is agreed by all sides. Reaching agreement on reviving and properly staffing the military civil service would represent a useful means of building trust to start this process;

- A Zimbabwean-led dialogue should be established on the reform of the security and defence sectors, seeking possible lessons from other African countries that undertook such reforms including South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Frameworks developed by SADC and the African Union for security sector reform could also provide useful lessons;
- Parliamentary oversight of Zimbabwe's security sector must be strengthened, and local civil society monitoring of the reform process should be enhanced;

7. The Role of SADC

- Clear political agreement on SADC's role in Zimbabwe is needed to increase the Community's effectiveness in building peace and promoting state reconstruction efforts in the country through more effective regional integration;
- Governments and civil society groups in Southern Africa must ensure that the decisions of the Community's bodies such as the SADC Tribunal are respected and implemented;
- SADC should continue to support full implementation of the Global Political Agreement until the country's political and economic stability can be ensured. Pre-election processes in Zimbabwe should therefore be closely monitored, and the country's political parties held responsible for any human rights violations. SADC should ensure that constitutional reform is prioritised as a precondition for holding credible elections, using the Community's *Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections* of 2004;
- SADC's institutional structures and operational capacity (including its Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation) need to be strengthened to enable it to address issues of peace and security in Zimbabwe and the broader sub-region more effectively;

8. The Role of External Donors

- Coordination of aid for Zimbabwe must be improved in line with the 2005 *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* which highlighted the need to align donor support to national development priorities, placing emphasis on pro-poor policies and national ownership of aid programmes. Consensus must also be reached among bilateral and multilateral donors about their respective roles and the form that their support should take in the reconstruction of the country, taking into account the Zimbabwean government's support for the African Development Bank's (AfDB) role in rebuilding the country's infrastructure;
- Advantage should be taken of the widely held view of the United Nations as an "honest broker" to develop and support initiatives that could be jointly funded by external donors, with the world body also acting to ensure the effective administration of local programmes;
- The capacity of key state ministries and institutions in Zimbabwe needs to be urgently enhanced to ensure the effective coordination of donor funds. Donors should therefore support the effective implementation of national government initiatives such as the Zimbabwe Humanitarian and Development Assistance Framework (ZHDAF) adopted in 2008, and its aid coordination policy launched in May 2009. Partners should also continue to prioritise the country's efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015; and
- External donors should carefully consider the viability of continued sanctions which have severely restricted Zimbabwe's access to aid and loans, and have contributed to the country's ongoing financial crisis.

Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa hosted a policy advisory group seminar at Lake Safari Lodge, Siavonga, in Zambia, from 9 to 10 June 2011 on the theme “State Reconstruction in Zimbabwe”. The meeting was made possible through the support of the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Zimbabwe.

The seminar explored some of the most important challenges presently facing state reconstruction efforts in Zimbabwe, and considered strategies to accelerate the process. It also developed concrete recommendations to complement initiatives led by the government of Zimbabwe, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU), and external donors in Zimbabwe following a disputed election process in June 2008, which led to a Global Political Agreement (GPA) three months later. In particular, the meeting sought to build on the achievements of this accord, which enabled the establishment of a transitional Government of National Unity (GNU) in February 2009 between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the two formations of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The advisory group found that, since Zimbabwe represents a unique case study for state reconstruction, innovative and creative solutions are needed to address these challenges. The Zambia meeting focused on eight key themes: 1) Structural Transformation of the Economy; 2) Socially Inclusive Growth and Employment; 3) Land Reform; 4) Restoring the Health Sector; 5) Reviving the Education Sector; 6) Security Sector Reform; 7) the Role of SADC; and 8) the Role of External Donors.

Objectives

The June 2011 policy advisory group seminar’s seven key objectives were to:

1. Explore a range of credible policies and strategies for revitalising Zimbabwe’s economy and society;
2. Assess critically Zimbabwe’s land reform process;
3. Examine the prospects of restoring the health sector in Zimbabwe;
4. Explore strategies to revive the education sector as an integral pillar of state reconstruction;
5. Assess security sector challenges in Zimbabwe, and propose how these can be effectively addressed to ensure stable governance;
6. Devise policies on how to enhance SADC’s role in promoting peace, security, and development in Zimbabwe; and
7. Discuss the key roles of external donors in state reconstruction efforts in Zimbabwe.

The seminar’s discussions aimed to assist key figures in Zimbabwean government and civil society, relevant SADC officials, external donors, and other policymakers to devise effective policies for addressing state reconstruction challenges in Zimbabwe.

Background

Zimbabwe's history has been shaped by its experience as a British colony between 1923 and 1980,¹ as well as by its role in the struggle against apartheid South Africa as a leading member of the Front Line States (FLS) after independence under democratic majority rule in 1980. The country, previously known as Southern Rhodesia, had been controlled by the Rhodesia Front, a white-only political party led by Ian Smith which declared unilateral independence from Britain in 1965 and maintained white settler minority rule until 1980, when majority independence rule was won following an armed struggle that left more than 40,000 people dead.² After a decade and a half of war led by two military wings of national liberation movements – the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) headed by the late Joshua Nkomo, and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led by Robert Mugabe – ZANU emerged victorious following the 1980 general election. This ushered in a new era of multi-party rule and democracy; and during the post-1980 period, ZANU successfully steered the country towards economic and political stability.

However, underlying socio-political and economic problems persisted.³ Equitable and timely redistribution of land disproportionately owned by the families of former white settlers did not take place, confounding expectations for many of the 70 percent of Zimbabweans dependent on subsistence agriculture. The failure of a World Bank-directed Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) which was adopted and implemented in the 1990s, marking a policy shift from socially-inclusive to market-oriented economic development, was exacerbated by three key political decisions:⁴ first, the dispensation of cash payments to veterans of Zimbabwe's civil war in 1997 to quell their public discontent, which sparked an inflationary spiral; second, Zimbabwe's military intervention in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1998, which was costly to the national fiscus; and third, the implementation of "Fast Track" land redistribution in 2000, which damaged the vitally important agricultural sector and prompted the imposition of sanctions by the European Union (EU), the United States (US), Australia, and New Zealand.

The overall result was that Zimbabwe's economic output subsequently decreased dramatically between 1998 and 2008⁵ while living conditions, including the availability of basic social services and human rights, deteriorated. This led to the emigration of thousands of Zimbabweans.⁶

To curb the potential threat that the country's decline posed for regional stability, the African Union, the Southern African Development Community, the United Nations (UN), and other actors – including the Commonwealth, the EU, Western governments (especially Britain and the US), and China, as well as international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – attempted to intervene in the crisis. Mediation efforts to bring together bitterly opposed political parties after a disputed election process in June

1 Blessing Chebundo, "Zimbabwe in a Nutshell: Political, Economic, Social and OSH (occupational safety and health) issues", *OSH and Development*, published by the Swedish Association for Occupational and Environmental Health and Development, May 2002 (available at www.ufa.se/publikationer/OSHD4/6zimbabwe.html).

2 Karolina Werner and Knox Chitiyo, "Reform of the Security Sector in Zimbabwe: Challenges and Opportunities" in Hany Besada (ed.), *Zimbabwe: Picking Up The Pieces* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 39.

3 Southern African Regional Poverty Network, "Social, Economic and Political Context of 'Operation Murambatsvina' (Operation Restore Order)", July 2005 (available at www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001387/UN_Zimbabwe_July2005_part1.pdf).

4 Ibid.

5 Lauren Ploch, "Zimbabwe: The Transitional Government and Implications for US Policy", Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report RL 34509, July 2010 (available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34509.pdf).

6 Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA), "Country Profile: Zimbabwe", September 2011 (available at <http://www.actsa.org/Pictures/Uplimages/pdfs/Zimbabwe%20Country%20Profile%20September%202011.pdf>).

2008 in which more than 300 people were estimated to have been killed, 11,000 seriously injured, and tens of thousands displaced as a result of the repression by Mugabe's securocrats,⁷ were mandated by SADC and led by the South African president, Thabo Mbeki. The talks resulted in the signing of the Global Political Agreement in September 2008 which was guaranteed by SADC and the AU. The deal made provision for a Government of National Unity, which was inaugurated in February 2009. With the formation of the new government – in which Mugabe remained president, Morgan Tsvangirai became prime minister, and Arthur Mutambara became deputy prime minister – important steps were taken towards rebuilding Zimbabwe's political system and shattered economy. All three coalition parties – ZANU-PF, the Movement for Democratic Change formation led by Tsvangirai (MDC-T), and the MDC formation headed by Mutambara (MDC-M) – were thus forced to work together. The introduction of multi-currency dollarisation in 2009 stabilised the economy and created new opportunities for entrepreneurship and public-private sector partnerships. However, the security sector, which represents a cornerstone for national unity and sustainable development in Zimbabwe, remains largely untransformed and disengaged from the process of national reconstruction.

Zimbabwe represents a unique case study for state reconstruction. In some respects, it could be characterised as a post-conflict country, but the necessary international interventions and regional efforts that should be employed in such countries have not been applied to Zimbabwe. The establishment of effective, accountable systems and institutions of government remains critical to the realisation of sustainable political recovery, stability, and inclusive socio-economic development. As Zimbabwe embarks on state reconstruction efforts, effective policies will be needed to revive key sectors of the economy. In addition, in light of continuing constitutional reforms and as national elections approach (possibly in 2012), regional actors, including SADC and the AU, as well as external donors, must devise and implement effective policies for the reconstruction of the Zimbabwean state.



ABOVE: Ms Kathrin Meissner, Regional Director, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Harare, Zimbabwe
MIDDLE: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa
RIGHT: Mr Takawira Musavengana, Programme Manager: Human Rights and Democracy Building, Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa

7 Amnesty International, 'Attack on Activists Sparks Fears of New Wave of Zimbabwe Violence', 29 June 2010 (available at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/attack-activists-sparks-fears-new-wave-zimbabwe-violence-2010-06-29>); see also International Crisis Group, 'A Way Forward for Zimbabwe', *CrisisWatch*, June 2011 (available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-issues/a-way-forward-for-zimbabwe.aspx>).

1. Structural Transformation of the Zimbabwean Economy

At independence in 1980, Zimbabwe inherited a dual economy split into formal and informal sectors. National budgets have continued to focus on the formal sector, ignoring the informal economy in which the majority of Zimbabweans eke out a living.

During the first decade of independence between 1980 and 1990, real gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaged three to four percent a year, reaching a peak of seven percent in 1990.⁸ Public expenditure was geared towards the social welfare sectors, including health and education, and rural infrastructure was expanded during this period, with the aim of reducing social inequalities. Zimbabwe's education and health sectors improved substantially as a result.

However, the 1990s witnessed a reversal of economic fortunes, exacerbating structural problems of continuing high poverty and inequality. The decline was caused partly by recurring droughts and floods, and partly by the failure of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, which was introduced in 1990 in response to poor macroeconomic indicators. The programme emphasised export-led policies; monetary policy reforms in the form of liberalised interest-rate and exchange-rate regimes; government divestiture from public enterprises; and liberalisation of labour markets.⁹

By 1997, the Zimbabwean government replaced ESAP with the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST), 1996-2001.¹⁰ Notwithstanding the introduction of ZIMPREST, the economy continued to decline due to new land reform measures; a decline in commercial agricultural outputs; falling exports and inputs for the manufacturing sector; an expanding national budget; and severe foreign exchange shortages.

In addition to increasing political repression by the Mugabe government, Zimbabwe also experienced an economic crisis between 2000 and 2008, as cumulative gross domestic product fell sharply by 40 percent.¹¹ Hyperinflation peaked at 500 million percent in December 2008, while nominal GDP stood at a mere \$3.5 million¹² in 2009.¹³ In 2008, Zimbabwe's budget deficit was estimated to be more than 200 percent of GDP, and the country had the world's worst credit rating. It also suffered a massive skills exodus, with an estimated 3 million to 4 million people emigrating between 2000 and 2010.¹⁴ Foreign exchange earnings fell sharply from \$3.6 billion in 1995 to \$1.3 billion in 2008.¹⁵ Life expectancy dropped to 37 years for men and 34 for women,¹⁶ while living standards for the estimated population of 12 million fell more rapidly than anywhere else in the world. Furthermore, the country's external debt was estimated at \$6.9 billion by December 2010.¹⁷

8 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "2010 Millennium Development Goals Status Report Zimbabwe" (available at http://www.undp.org/africa/documents/mdg/zimbabwe_2010.pdf).

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 All monetary sums quoted in dollars (\$) refer to US dollars, not Zimbabwean dollars.

13 UNDP, "2010 Millennium Development Goals Status Report Zimbabwe".

14 Ploch, "Zimbabwe", p. 2.

15 John Robertson, "A Macroeconomic Policy Framework for Economic Stabilization in Zimbabwe" in Besada (ed.), *Zimbabwe: Picking Up The Pieces*, p. 83.

16 Bob Herbert, "Zimbabwe Is Dying", *The New York Times*, 16 January 2009 (available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/17/opinion/17herbert.html>).

17 Deprose Muchena, "Forgive Us Our Debts: The Albatross Around Zimbabwe's Neck", *Open Space*, published by the Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa (OSISA), June 2011 (available at http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/sup_files/Forgive%20us%20our%20debts%20-%20The%20albatross%20around%20Zimbabwe's%20neck.pdf).

In view of these developments, the GPA of 2008 identified the restoration of economic stability and growth as a key issue to be addressed by Zimbabwe's new power-sharing government. The government developed and launched a Short-Term Economic Recovery Plan (STERP), which it set out to implement in 100 days.¹⁸ Hyperinflation was curbed, and capacity use in the manufacturing and service sectors improved. But fundamental challenges relating to constrained infrastructural capacity, insufficient foreign currency reserves, inadequate investment, skills shortages, a restricted tax base, and poor liquidity, all continued to blight the economy which also faced persistent corruption and high levels of poverty and unemployment.

The need to address Zimbabwe's economic challenges led to the formulation of the Medium-Term Plan (MTP) 2010-2015¹⁹ which sought to steer the country towards sustainable growth, rebuild its human capital, revive employment, and reverse the decline in social indicators. Recent statistics show that salaries for Zimbabwean workers are below the poverty line of \$467 a month for a family of five,²⁰ set by the country's National Statistical Agency. However, in response to demands from civil servants for increased wages, the Zimbabwean government has responded by arguing that it cannot afford to pay more than \$186 per month, which is the current base rate.²¹

A range of priority areas must be identified that can drive Zimbabwe's economic recovery, including tourism, agriculture, and mining. Public works programmes need to be created to generate economic development and employment opportunities. Support for the country's reconstruction programme should also be sought from the highly skilled Zimbabwean Diaspora. The parties to the GPA will need to have a shared vision and unity of purpose to accelerate Zimbabwe's economic recovery. Furthermore, restored investor confidence could be assured if respect for key property and business rights were to be entrenched in a new national Constitution.



ABOVE: Dr Simba Makoni, former Minister of Finance of Zimbabwe, former SADC Executive Secretary, and President, Mavambo Kusile Dawn party, Harare, Zimbabwe
RIGHT: Professor Holger Bernt Hansen, Centre for African Studies, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

18 Republic of Zimbabwe, Office of the Prime Minister, "The Government of Zimbabwe 100-Day Plan", 28 April 2009 (available at http://www.kubatana.net/docs/demgg/goz_100_day_plan_090428.pdf).

19 UNDP, "2010 Millennium Development Goals Status Report Zimbabwe".

20 Voice of America (VOA) News, "Salaries of Ordinary Zimbabweans Far Beneath Country's Poverty Line", 2 February 2011 (available at <http://www.voanews.com/zimbabwe/news/Zimbabwe-Salaries-Way-Below-Poverty-Line-115120964.html>).

21 Ibid.

2. Socially Inclusive Growth and Employment

At independence in 1980, the Zimbabwean government inherited a dual economy which was dominated by a wealthy white minority, with a large informal sector composed of the majority black population. The right to work remains unrealised for most Zimbabweans as a result of this economic legacy.

The adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme by the Zimbabwean government in 1990 introduced a policy shift in which development priorities were focused on the market instead of on social equality. The programme failed to deliver the desired growth, economic transformation, and employment,²² and caused great suffering for most of the population, eroding many of the social and economic gains that had been achieved since 1980.

Subsequently, a decade of macroeconomic instability saw structural unemployment rise to about 80 percent in 2008²³, with only 720,000 (six percent) of the population formally employed – a significant decrease from the 3.6 million people (30 percent) employed in 2003. Most people continued to rely on the informal economy for survival, and in 2011, even formally employed workers have often been unable to support their families, pay school fees, and afford health services. Between 2004 and 2009, the country's once dynamic economy shrunk by more than 50 percent²⁴. This led, particularly among the employable urban population, to an increasing reliance on remittances from friends and family overseas, estimated at more than \$260 million in 2010.



From left, Dr Amy Tsanga, Deputy Director, Women's Law Centre, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe; Ms Kathrin Meissner, Regional Director, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Harare; and Mr David Chapfika, Chairman, National Indigenisation Economic Empowerment Board, Harare

22 David Chapfika, "Socially Inclusive Growth and Employment", paper presented at the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) policy advisory group seminar *State Reconstruction in Zimbabwe*, Siavonga, Zambia, 9-10 June 2011, p. 13.

23 UNDP, "2010 Millennium Development Goals Status Report Zimbabwe".

24 Eric Chiriga, "Zim Unemployment At 70%", *Daily News*, 16 April 2011 (available at <http://www.dailynews.co.zw/index.php/business/35-business/2145-zim-unemployment-at-70.html>).

Increasingly Zimbabweans resorted to self-employment in the absence of waged employment between 2000 and 2011. Sectors that have seen a particular rise in self-employment have included: mining, agriculture, cross-border trade, retail, and catering.

Although Zimbabwe has signed international agreements that provide the right to decent and full employment, the country lacks a viable employment policy.²⁵

With improved economic activity and effective capacity utilisation, the number of formally employed people could potentially rise to 1.4 million. Economic policies will need to be targeted specifically at the poor and make effective use of the potential of Zimbabwe's well educated society in order to deliver sustainable growth. Furthermore, policymakers should consider the introduction of a genuinely socially inclusive right to employment that does not discriminate by age, social status, gender, disability, or race.



ABOVE: Mr Takawira Musavengana, Programme Manager: Human Rights and Democracy Building, Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa

RIGHT: Mr Ollen Mwalubunju, Senior Manager: Regional and National Training Programmes, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa

²⁵ Amy Tshanga, 'Socially Inclusive Growth and Employment', paper presented at the CCR policy advisory group seminar *State Reconstruction in Zimbabwe*, Siavonga, Zambia, 9-10 June 2011.

3. Land Reform

In 1980, when Zimbabwe gained independence from Britain, it also inherited a colonial pattern of unequal land ownership. The provisions of the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979, which set conditions for the post-independence government, made it difficult to address speedily economic and social inequalities that had resulted from colonial and white minority rule.

In 2000, 42 percent of the country's agricultural land was controlled by about 4,500 white commercial farmers (0.03 percent of the population), while most of the black population remained landless, with only about 1.2 million black people subsisting on 41 percent of the country's total area of about 390,000 square kilometres. Land reform is therefore fundamental to Zimbabwe's long-term political stability and socio-economic development.²⁶ The significance of land lies both in its economic value and its political importance as a resource over which struggles have been waged in the colonial and post-independence eras.²⁷ Market-based land reform in Zimbabwe after 1980 failed to transform ownership patterns which have been historically skewed by the control of vast swathes of agricultural land by white colonial settlers and their heirs. The failure to tackle the issue effectively eventually led to land-based conflict in which the government of Robert Mugabe expropriated 11 million hectares held by 4,500 white commercial farmers in a compulsory land redistribution programme in 2000.²⁸ The Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), which targeted about 3,000 farms for resettlement by black beneficiaries, reflected a radical shift from the more gradualist approach that had been adopted by the government between 1980 and 1996. The FTLRP's hasty implementation followed a failed referendum in February 2000 which the ZANU-PF government had hoped would grant approval for constitutional reforms that included a strengthened presidency and allowed for the institutionalisation of land acquisition without compensation.²⁹ The Movement for Democratic Change, a new political party at the time, effectively opposed the referendum and the majority of Zimbabweans voted "No" to the proposed changes. The FTLRP was a key factor that led to international sanctions being imposed on Harare by the EU, the US, Australia, and New Zealand; the loss of jobs for most farm workers; and a decline in agricultural production.

However, the land reform process also created benefits such as the acquisition of land as a resource by thousands of small and black commercial farmers.³⁰ Furthermore, while the politicisation of the land issue accelerated Zimbabwe's deepening political and economic crises after 2000, the country's implosion was also sparked by other factors. Between 2000 and 2002, Zimbabwe was one of several countries in the sub-region that faced low harvests as a result of floods and droughts.³¹ The HIV/AIDS pandemic affected the productivity of

26 See Sam Moyo and Ruth Hall, "Conflict and Land Reform in Southern Africa: How Exceptional is South Africa?" in Adekeye Adebajo, Adebayo Adedeji, and Chris Landsberg (eds.), *South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007), pp. 150-176; and International Peace Institute (formerly International Peace Academy), "Democracy and Land Reform in Zimbabwe", Workshop Report, New York, 25 February 2002 (available at <http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/zimbabwe020508.pdf>).

27 International Peace Institute, "Democracy and Land Reform in Zimbabwe", p. 3.

28 See Moyo and Hall, "Conflict and Land Reform in Southern Africa"; and International Peace Institute, "Democracy and Land Reform in Zimbabwe".

29 Klaus Deininger, Hans Hoogeveen, and Bill Kinsey, "Benefits and Costs of Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Implications for Southern Africa", paper presented at a conference on *Understanding Poverty and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa* organised by the Centre for the Study of African Economies, 18-19 March 2002 (available at <http://www.csa.e.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2002-UPaGiSSA/papers/Hoogeveen-csae2002.pdf>).

30 Sam Moyo, "Land Reform and State Reconstruction", paper presented at the CCR policy advisory group seminar *State Reconstruction in Zimbabwe*, Siavonga, Zambia, 9-10 June 2011.

31 Other countries included Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Swaziland, and Lesotho. Between 1999 and 2000, Zimbabwe experienced erratic rains, a cyclone, and flooding. Human Rights Watch, "The Politicisation of Food in Zimbabwe", *Human Rights Watch*, October 2003, Vol. 15, No. 17(A), pp. 9-10 (available at <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/10/23/not-eligible>).

especially adult farm workers.³² Ineffective economic policies also led to a decline in productivity and destroyed prospects for a sustainable livelihood for millions of Zimbabweans. Increased poverty levels exacerbated by massive pay-offs to war veterans in 1997 fuelled popular discontent. The economy was placed under further strain by the huge costs (estimated at \$2 billion over four years until troops were withdrawn in 2002)³³ incurred by Zimbabwe's military intervention into the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1998, along with Angola and Namibia. In addition, economic instability was heightened by violent attacks against political opponents and members of civil society which undermined the rule of law and eroded the legitimacy of the ruling government. The administration in Harare continues to grapple with the challenge of defining a land-use system that can guarantee security of tenure and collateral value, while ensuring a more equitable distribution of land. Zimbabwe failed to secure international support for its land reform programme. The 1998 Land Donor Conference, which was organised by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), was widely seen as a missed opportunity for implementing effective land redistribution. Unfortunately, agreements on a government resettlement programme, a provision for testing alternative private sector programmes, and plans for the establishment of a task force of government and donor representatives, were not implemented due to political differences between the governments of Britain and Zimbabwe over the country's land acquisition strategy and macroeconomic policy.³⁴ After the Zimbabwean government agreed to some recommendations made by the UNDP Technical Mission of 2000, years of negotiations to support the country's land reform process involving the UNDP failed to yield positive results and the Programme's report was rejected by the government in 2001.³⁵

In addition to the issue of reforming land ownership patterns, the agricultural sector has faced a range of other key challenges. The trade of Zimbabwean farm products continues to be threatened by the terms of the EU's Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs); by the potential outcomes of the World Trade Organisation's (WTO) Doha Development Round which started in 2001,³⁶ by food commodity speculation; by international lending and aid constraints; and by the neo-liberal regionalism adopted by SADC and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) of 2001.³⁷ Internally, Zimbabwean farmers have also been left vulnerable to unfair competition from Brazilian, Argentinian, Chilean, and Canadian farmers due to a lack of effective state protection and support from Harare. Several domestic measures have also proved counter-productive: government policies, for example, allow the duty-free importation of basic commodities such as maize and cooking oil, when local production of these commodities could have created substantial economic benefits.³⁸

32 An estimated 13 million Zimbabweans are reported to be living with HIV/AIDS. United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), "Humanitarian Action Report 2008: Zimbabwe" (available at http://www.unicef.org/har08/files/har08_Zimbabwe_countrychapter.pdf).

33 Jacob Chikuhwa, *A Crisis of Governance: Zimbabwe* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2004), p. 274.

34 An estimated £75 million and \$200 million were pledged in relation to the Lancaster House Agreement, and other sums were later promised during negotiations led by the UNDP. Margaret Lee, "The Western Response to the Crisis in Zimbabwe", Working Paper No. 3, 2003, Centre for Development and the Environment, Oslo, p. 5. (available at http://www.kubatana.net/docs/opin/lee_western_response_to_zim_crisis_030330.pdf); see also Embassy of Zimbabwe, Sweden, "Background to Land Reform in Zimbabwe" (available at <http://www.zimbembassy.se/documents/Land.pdf>).

35 Sam Moyo, "Neoliberalisation of the Land Question in Southern Africa", in Chris Landsberg and Shaun Mackay (eds.), *Southern Africa Post-Apartheid? The Search for Democratic Governance* (Cape Town: Centre for Policy Studies, Institute for Democracy in Africa, and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, 2004), p. 183. The UNDP at the onset of the crisis had also mediated on land issues between Zimbabwe and Britain, unveiling plans for gradual, controlled land reform in Zimbabwe. Britain during this mediation pledged to finance legal land distribution in Zimbabwe, but refused to fund the programme, blaming the actions of the Mugabe regime.

36 Ian Fergusson, "World Trade Organization (WTO) Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda", Congressional Research Service, July 2006 (available at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/69477.pdf>); see also Antoine Bouët and David Laborde, "The Potential Cost of a Failed Doha Round", International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), July 2009 (available at <http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ifpri00886.pdf>).

37 Moyo, "Land Reform and State Reconstruction".

38 Crispin Sukume, "Agricultural Policy Issues", paper presented at the CCR policy advisory group seminar *State Reconstruction in Zimbabwe*, Siavonga, Zambia, 9-10 June 2011.

Increased Chinese involvement in Zimbabwe's agricultural sector has also become an important development in recent years. China is Zimbabwe's second largest investor and trading partner after South Africa. In 2011, China's Development Bank announced plans to fund investments worth \$10 billion in Zimbabwe's mining, agriculture, and infrastructure sectors.³⁹ Beijing thus threw a lifeline to Zimbabwe's agricultural sector: China is the largest consumer of Zimbabwean tobacco, and also imports much of its cotton.⁴⁰

Land reform remains a key development issue for addressing poverty in Zimbabwe. Eighty percent of the nation's food is produced by smallholders. The 2008 GPA recognised that disputes over land – as well as differences over issues such as the rule of law, respect for human rights, and democratic governance – have been central to much of Zimbabwe's recent conflicts. In addition, the country's land reform process holds important lessons for neighbouring countries such as Namibia and South Africa, where politically controversial land redistribution has been underway since 1990 and 1994 respectively.



ABOVE: Dr Tendai Murisa, Coordinator, Trust Africa, Dakar, Senegal

MIDDLE: Professor Sam Moyo, Executive Director, African Institute for Agrarian Studies, Harare, Zimbabwe

RIGHT: Dr Crispin Sukume, Independent Consultant, Harare, Zimbabwe

39 Agence France-Presse (AFP), "Zim Hikes Mining Exploration Fees To \$1m", *Mail and Guardian* online, 9 February 2011 (available at <http://mg.co.za/article/2011-02-09-zim-hikes-mining-exploration-fees-to-1m>).

40 Lloyd Sachikonye, "Crouching Tiger, Hidden Agenda? Zimbabwe-China Relations", in Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu (eds.), *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008), pp. 124-137.

4. Restoring the Health Sector

After independence in 1980, Zimbabwe boasted a healthcare system that met many of the needs of both its urban and rural populations. However, by the time of the inauguration of the country's inclusive government in 2008, Zimbabwe's health sector had almost completely collapsed due to its political and economic crises as well as deep cuts in social spending imposed by the IMF and the World Bank's Economic Structural Adjustment Programme from the early 1990s.

Between 1990 and 1996, government spending on healthcare declined as a share of the national budget from 6.4 percent to 4.3 percent, and as a share of GDP from 3.1 percent to 2.1 percent.⁴¹ Zimbabwe's economic crisis subsequently damaged the health sector. The healthcare system struggled to contain a nationwide cholera outbreak in 2008 and 2009 that had claimed 4,276 lives by May 2009.⁴² In 2009, malaria was ranked the third leading cause of hospital admissions in Zimbabwe, despite a government pledge to reduce such cases by 50 percent between 2000 and 2010.⁴³ In recent years, maternal and infant mortality rates have worsened. Under-five mortality stood at 82 deaths for every 1,000 births in 2005,⁴⁴ and increased to 90 deaths for every 1,000 births in 2009,⁴⁵ while maternal mortality has risen from 560 for every 100,000 live births between 1997 and 2006 to an alarming 790 deaths for every 100,000 live births in 2008.⁴⁶ It is unlikely that the country's efforts to meet the Millennium



From left, Dr Douglas Gwatidzo, Emeritus Chairperson, Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights, Harare, Zimbabwe; and Dr Dumisani Moyo, Programme Manager: Media and Information and Communication Technologies, Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa

41 Robert Naiman and Neil Watkins, "A Survey of the Impacts of IMF (International Monetary Fund) Structural Adjustment in Africa: Growth, Social Spending, and Debt Relief", Centre for Economic and Policy Research, United Kingdom, April 1999 (available at <http://www.cepr.net/index.php/a-survey-of-the-impacts-of-imf-structural-adjustment-in-africa/>). See also Rogers Dhlwayo, "The Impact of Public Expenditure Management under ESAP (Economic Structural Adjustment Programme) on Basic Social Services: Health and Education", Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network, March 2001, University of Zimbabwe (available at http://www.saprin.org/zimbabwe/research/zim_public_exp.pdf).

42 World Health Organisation (WHO), "Cholera in Zimbabwe", WHO Global Alert and Response, 9 June 2009 (available at http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009_06_09/en/index.html).

43 UNDP, "2010 Millennium Development Goals Status Report Zimbabwe".

44 Ibid.

45 UNICEF, Zimbabwe Statistics, updated 2 March 2010 (available at http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/zimbabwe_statistics.html#80).

46 Ibid.

Development Goals (MDGs) set by the UN in 2000 of reducing child mortality by two-thirds and maternal mortality by three-quarters by 2015, will be achieved. The incidence of tuberculosis (TB) has also risen, with Zimbabwe ranking seventeenth out of the world's 22 high-burden TB countries in 2009.⁴⁷ The incidence of tuberculosis increased from 97 cases per 100,000 people in 2000, to 411 per 100,000 people in 2004, and reached 782 per 100,000 in 2007.⁴⁸ This situation has been attributed to the high incidence of HIV/AIDS: it is estimated that 72 percent of all TB patients are co-infected with HIV.⁴⁹ However, HIV/AIDS rates among adults have recently fallen: between 2001 and 2009, the prevalence of the disease among adults (people aged 15 and above) declined from 23.7 percent to 13.7 percent.⁵⁰

In addition, the health sector continues to face other critical challenges including: infrastructure collapse; skills and human resource shortages; inadequate equipment and technology; poor working conditions; the politicisation of training institutions; and a lack of proper planning.



ABOVE: Ms Elizabeth Otitodun, Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa
RIGHT: Mr Sydney Chisi, Director, Youth Initiative for Democracy in Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe

47 WHO, "Global Tuberculosis Control 2009: Epidemiology, Strategy, Financing" (available at www.who.int/tb/publications/global_report/2009/en/index.html).

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 UNDP, "2010 Millennium Development Goals Status Report Zimbabwe".

5. Reviving the Education Sector

By the mid-1990s, Zimbabwe had almost achieved primary education for all of its citizens, with the net enrollment ratio for primary schools peaking at 99 percent in 2004.⁵¹ The country was on track to become one of the first African countries to achieve the second Millennium Development Goal (set in 2000) of providing universal primary education by 2015, after the Mugabe administration implemented the 1987 Education Act offering free tuition to all primary schoolchildren.⁵²

However, these gains have subsequently been reversed by a series of political and economic crises that lowered the morale of teachers, resulting in many of them neglecting their duties. The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme implemented during the 1990s, and requiring cuts to education and health spending, has also contributed to the sector's deterioration. Government funding for schools was cut, and the faltering economy deprived parents of the means to educate their children. Teachers who protested over salary cuts and job losses were victimised and harassed. By the time the inclusive government was established in 2009, the education sector had nearly ground to a halt. School attendance had rapidly declined from over 85 percent in 2007 to a mere 20 percent by 2008.⁵³

While it is widely expected that Zimbabwe can achieve the second MDG, reviving the education system remains a major challenge for the country's state reconstruction efforts. Medium-term government plans have prioritised the reintroduction of free primary education, including the provision of school lunches. Since 2009, the inclusive government has taken positive steps such as ensuring that schools are reopened and that basic and improved salaries have been offered to teachers. A 2010 strategic plan was prepared by the Zimbabwean government for the education sector which identified five critical areas: restoring the professional status of teachers; improving educational infrastructure; restoring the quality of teaching and learning; reinvigorating governance within the education system; and focusing on disadvantaged learners.⁵⁴

However, adequate government financing for this important sector remains a critical issue, and already overburdened parents are expected to supplement teachers' salaries. In urban areas, parents have been contributing at least \$20 to \$25 a month towards teachers' salaries, while in rural areas, similar contributions have been made in kind. In 2009, the Zimbabwean government's Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM) – a social-assistance-with-education initiative for vulnerable groups – catered for about 600,000 children. However, assistance to pupils has not been consistent or financially adequate.⁵⁵ A range of donor-driven and local initiatives have been established to address the sector's development. For example, the Education Transitional Fund, a partnership between Zimbabwe's Ministry of Education, Sports, Arts, and Culture (MoESAC) and international donors, has improved pupil-to-textbook ratios with the distribution of about 13 million primary school textbooks.⁵⁶

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

53 UNICEF Zimbabwe, "Immediate Needs of Children and Women Affected by the Cholera Outbreak and Collapse of the Health and Education Systems", 8 December 2008 (available at <http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&dclid=1097040>).

54 Zimbabwe Ministry of Education, Sports, Arts and Culture, "Education Interim Strategic Investment Plan 2011" (available at www.ochaonline.un.org).

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid, p.13.

The financing and management of higher education also remains an important challenge. The number of state universities in Zimbabwe increased from three to seven between 1999 and 2011. Their autonomy, accountability, and governance can be improved by reviewing the composition, role, and power of university councils and through strengthening the statutory regulatory body, the National Higher Education Council. University councils can also contribute to efforts to strengthen the sector by reinforcing the capital base of their institutions; establishing fund-raising and development mechanisms; and introducing other finance tools to recover loans from students, to source endowments, and to create scholarship programmes. Harmonisation of standards for university education throughout the SADC region could further support educational development in Zimbabwe. A 1997 SADC protocol on Education and Training⁵⁷ that encourages the interchange of students among its 15 member states is already in place. The challenge now is to ensure that all qualifications are transferable among SADC countries.⁵⁸

The role of education in fostering national economic development and security remains critical. Many young Zimbabweans cannot find work after they leave school.⁵⁹ This is a particularly urgent challenge, since youth unemployment has been shown to play a significant role in fuelling and prolonging conflicts. Youth militias have been implicated in political violence in Zimbabwe, particularly during the national elections conducted in 2000 and 2008. In December 2010, about 80 percent of young Zimbabweans were unemployed, up from 70 percent a year earlier. Zimbabwe's youth constitutes more than a third of the country's population of 12 million. To address this issue effectively, education strategies should be aligned to broader national development strategies which must include the creation of youth employment.



ABOVE: From left, Professor Rukudzo Murapa, Director, Africa Linkages, Khulisa Management Services, Johannesburg, South Africa; and Mr David Chapfika, Chairman, National Indigenisation Economic Empowerment Board, Harare, Zimbabwe
RIGHT: Ms Mary Ndlovu, Independent Consultant, Zimbabwe National Education Advisory Board (member), Bulawayo, Zimbabwe

57 Southern African Development Community (SADC), "SADC Protocol on Education and Training" (Gaborone: SADC Secretariat, 1997) (available at <http://www.sadc.int/key-documents/protocols/protocol-on-education-and-training/>).

58 Rukudzo Murapa, "Higher Education", paper presented at the CCR policy advisory group seminar *State Reconstruction in Zimbabwe*, Siavonga, Zambia, 9-10 June 2011; see also Fay Chung, "Reviving the Education Sector", paper prepared for the CCR policy advisory group seminar *State Reconstruction in Zimbabwe*, Siavonga, Zambia, 9-10 June 2011.

59 Chung, "Reviving the Education Sector", p. 7.

6. Security Sector Reform

Zimbabwe's security sector forms an integral part of the country's political, ideological, economic, and military life. The Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF), which comprise the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), the Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ), the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), and the Zimbabwe Prison Service (ZPS), are the key security agencies in the country.

Zimbabwe's inclusive government faces a range of security sector challenges. The engagement of military, intelligence, and policing agencies in politics increased after the closely contested parliamentary elections of June 2000 when the Movement for Democratic Change entered the political arena. ZANU-PF thereafter began to engage the security sector in order to sustain its power, increasingly rewarding key serving and retired military officers with important posts and contracts in commerce, parastatals, and national ministries, as well as through land acquisition opportunities. In the run-up to the June 2002 presidential elections, all five ZDF service chiefs declared that they would not salute or recognise any leader without "liberation war credentials" – a veiled reference to MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai.⁶⁰ In 2009/2010, an estimated eight percent of government expenditure was allocated to defence.⁶¹ Reform of the security sector cannot be achieved without complementary reform of the political sector. Since the creation of the Government of National Unity in 2008, the issues of the rule of law and the role of the military in Zimbabwe have been widely debated across the country. These discussions have demonstrated that many Zimbabweans, especially in rural areas, strongly support the need for security sector reform.⁶² While the establishment of the National Security Council in 2008 to discuss such reform is a step in the right direction, the body has been hampered by political differences in discharging its mandate effectively. Simultaneous reform of the political and security sectors could help to reprofessionalise key national institutions and to safeguard human rights. However, statements by senior Zimbabwean defence officials in 2011 that any proposals for security sector reform will be rejected, has heightened tensions between the ruling ZANU-PF and MDC, which has called for such reform to take place before elections can be held.⁶³



ABOVE: From left, Mr Trevor Maisiri, Senior Researcher, African Reform Institute, and Programme Director, Africa Leadership and Management Academy, Harare, Zimbabwe; and Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa
RIGHT: Dr Martin Rupiya, Executive Director, African Public Policy Research Institute, Tshwane, South Africa

60 Martin Rupiya, "The Crisis in Zimbabwe: A Case for Root and Branch Security Sector Reform?", article produced by the Institute for Democracy in Africa's States in Transition Observatory, January 2009 (available at <http://www.idasa.org/media/uploads/outputs/files/Zim%20a%20case%20for%20SSR%20Reform.pdf>).

61 See Rupiya, "The Crisis in Zimbabwe"; and Knox Chitiyo, "The Case for Security Sector Reform in Zimbabwe", Royal United Services Institute Occasional Paper, September 2009 (available at www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Zimbabwe_SSR_Report.pdf).

62 Werner and Chitiyo, "Reform of the Security Sector in Zimbabwe", p. 48.

63 Zoli Mangena, "Mugabe and Generals Playing Last Card", *The Zimbabwe Mail*, 8 May 2011 (available at <http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/zimbabwe/8012-mugabe-and-his-generals-playing-last-card.html>).

7. The Role of SADC

The 15-member Southern African Development Community has sought to provide sustained institutional support for the intra-Zimbabwe dialogue between ZANU-PF and the two formations of the MDC. SADC, the Facilitator of the Intra-Zimbabwe dialogue (represented by South African President, Jacob Zuma), and the African Union, are the guarantors of the Global Political Agreement of 2008. SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) has periodically reviewed the agreement's implementation.

SADC has been divided on how to respond to the crisis in Zimbabwe. Most of the Community's members were supportive of Mugabe, with the notable exception of Zambia's late president Levy Mwanawasa and, more recently, Botswana's president Ian Khama. Initial attempts by SADC to intervene in Zimbabwe were hampered by several factors. The relatively new protocols and principles of the regional body (its OPDSC was established in 1996) limited the effectiveness of its response to the situation in Zimbabwe. SADC's strategy of "constructive engagement" with Mugabe's regime and its lack of open criticism of his leadership at the start of the crisis was seen by critics as a form of appeasement that contributed to a lack of political progress.⁶⁴

SADC has more recently taken an increasingly firm stance towards the situation in Zimbabwe, particularly at a summit held in Livingstone, Zambia, in March 2011, when SADC heads of state criticised state intimidation and violence, issuing a strong call for the speedy completion of the parliament-led constitutional reform process. The Livingstone summit also made clear that SADC's *Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections* of 2004 should continue to provide a critical frame of reference for the credibility of forthcoming polls. At a summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, in June 2011, SADC insisted that its planned timetable for a new Zimbabwean Constitution and elections be finalised as a matter of urgency, although issues of security sector reform and electoral oversight remained unsettled.⁶⁵ At the June 2011 meeting, SADC leaders committed themselves to continue to encourage Western powers to lift economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe in 2000.⁶⁶

The regional body has been criticised for failing to finalise a report on a SADC Tribunal ruling in 2008, which found that 78 white Zimbabwean farmers had been unfairly targeted because of their race, and ruled that they could keep their land. Widespread concerns have been expressed that a failure to uphold the judgment of the tribunal may damage the credibility of SADC itself.⁶⁷ In South Africa, local courts have recognised the SADC judgment and seized and auctioned Zimbabwean government properties to cover the farmers' legal costs.⁶⁸

64 See, for example, Victoria Graham, 'How Firm the Handshake? South Africa's Use of Quiet Diplomacy in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2006', *African Security Review*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2006.

65 Tichaona Sibanda, 'Zimbabwe: Zuma Stands Up To Mugabe During SADC Summit', AllAfrica.com, 13 June 2011 (available at <http://allafrica.com/stories/201106140035.html>).

66 Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), South Africa, 'Communiqué: Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Southern African Development Community', Sandton, Johannesburg, 11-12 June 2011 (available at <http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2011/sadc0613.html>).

67 Alexandra Lesieur, 'SADC Summit Mulls Zim Land-Reform Case', *Mail and Guardian*, 17 August 2010 (available at <http://mg.co.za/article/2010-08-17-sadc-summit-mulls-zim-landreform-case>).

68 Ibid.

South Africa has played an important mediation role in Zimbabwe, despite much criticism of its policy of “quiet diplomacy”. Former president, Thabo Mbeki, led the mediation process that led to the signing of the GPA in 2008. Tshwane’s approach has been guided by experience which has taught it the value of working within multilateral frameworks.⁶⁹ South Africa has tended to avoid the role of domineering regional hegemon, preferring to act under the authority of SADC, or other bodies such as the AU, thus forestalling criticisms that it was acting as a regional bully.⁷⁰

South Africa also remains an influential partner as Zimbabwe’s most important investor and trading partner.⁷¹ The country continues to be of strategic importance in the further development of the sub-region.⁷² Southern African economies are estimated to have lost more than \$36 billion in potential investments in Zimbabwe as a result of the crisis in the country,⁷³ which was, before these events, the second largest economy in SADC after South Africa. Zimbabwe still holds the world’s second largest platinum reserves and possesses vast diamond fields.⁷⁴ In 2009, SADC countries provided \$200 million of credit to the country.⁷⁵ In June 2011, Botswana agreed a credit line of \$76 million to assist struggling Zimbabwean companies. In October 2011, the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) granted a \$206 million loan for a road development project in Zimbabwe.



ABOVE: Dr Simba Makoni, former Minister of Finance of Zimbabwe, former SADC Executive Secretary, and President, Mavambvo Kusile Dawn party, Harare, Zimbabwe
RIGHT: Professor Mwesiga Baregu, St Augustine University of Tanzania, School of Graduate Studies, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

69 South Africa suffered a setback in relation to its attempts to intervene in a crisis in Nigeria in 1995, during which Ogoni leader and human rights activist Ken Saro Wiwa and eight colleagues were executed by the regime of General Sani Abacha despite moves by South African president Nelson Mandela to spare his life. The failure resulted in Tshwane adopting a more cautious approach to peacemaking on the continent and underscored the need for South Africa to act within a multilateral framework. Tshwane did not want to risk a repeat of the negative responses it received from African governments at the time, nor did it wish to risk being isolated within the region or continent.

70 Chris Landsberg, “Mbeki’s External Initiative on Africa and the Global South”, *Africa Insight*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2000.

71 Holger Bernt Hansen, “Donors and the Crisis in Zimbabwe: Experiences and Lessons Learned” in Besada (ed.), *Zimbabwe: Picking Up The Pieces*, p. 256.

72 African Development Bank (AfDB), “Zimbabwe Country Brief”, 2010, p. 8 (available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Zimbabwe%20Country%20Brief_02.pdf).

73 International Crisis Group, “Zimbabwe’s Election: The Stakes For Southern Africa”, *Africa Briefing*, II January 2002, p. 9 (available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/files/africa/southern-africa/zimbabwe/b008%20zimbabwe%20election%20the%20stakes%20for%20southern%20africa.pdf>).

74 Reuters, “SADC Says Zimbabwe Rivals Must Move Faster On Reforms”, 13 June 2011 (available at <http://af.reutersmedia.net/article/topNews/idAFJ0E75COBB20110613>).

75 *The Herald* (Zimbabwe), “\$400 Million Credit Lines Secured”, AllAfrica.com, 29 April 2009 (available at <http://allafrica.com/stories/200904290349.html>).

8. The Role of External Donors

Financial support from external donors and international organisations currently helps to fund important reconstruction projects and economic recovery plans in Zimbabwe.⁷⁶ An estimated \$760 million of such assistance was estimated to have been disbursed in 2008 and 2009.

The Government of National Unity has, however, said that it needs \$10 billion a year for its reconstruction efforts. Contrary to widespread expectations within Zimbabwe following the signing of the GPA in 2008, the government has so far failed to attract significant funds from the West and China. While external donors continue to support governance changes prescribed by the GPA and the plans developed by the Government of National Unity, Western governments in particular have adopted a cautious approach, demanding more reforms before providing direct support.

External aid crumbled in the wake of sanctions imposed by the IMF, the World Bank, the EU, the US, Australia, and New Zealand in 2000. Aid misallocation, non-repayments, and the country's deteriorating political climate are among the key reasons for the suspension of funding and other assistance to Zimbabwe. Prior to this action, the country had a good record of prompt debt repayment and was highly rated in international financial markets. The IMF withdrew the provision of technical assistance to Zimbabwe in 2002, and suspended the country's voting rights in the organisation in 2003. In response to Western sanctions imposed in 2002 and 2003,⁷⁷ Zimbabwe's ZANU-PF government adopted a "Look East" foreign policy strategy that sought to strengthen its ties with China.⁷⁸ Sanctions, including indirect measures such as the withdrawal of aid, have often been cited by the Mugabe regime as the major cause of Zimbabwe's economic crisis. Donor support, development assistance, and grant inflows to the country declined significantly from an annual average of \$138 million in the 1990s to \$39.9 million between 2000 and 2006. Some foreign missions in Harare were also closed or down-scaled.⁷⁹

Donors have faced a series of dilemmas: whether to provide humanitarian aid or long-term development assistance; and whether to channel funds through the state or through local civil society groups. External assistance is currently being distributed mainly through non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and UN agencies, and not directly through the government, largely due to donor concerns about poor governance; widespread politically motivated violence and arrests; a perceived failure by Mugabe to adhere to bilateral deals protecting external investments; and delays in implementing policies on issues agreed under the GPA such as media freedom, respect for human rights and the rule of law, a land audit, and mining standards.⁸⁰

76 The main active and potentially active donors in Zimbabwe include: the AfDB, the European Union (EU), Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the World Bank. UN-related agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, the Food and Agriculture Organisation [FAO], the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], the World Food Programme [WFP], and the Global Fund) are also active in Zimbabwe.

77 Hansen, "Donors and the Crisis in Zimbabwe: Experiences and Lessons Learned", p. 251.

78 See Sachikonye, "Crouching Tiger, Hidden Agenda? Zimbabwe-China Relations"; CCR, *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? China and Africa: Engaging the World's Next Superpower*, seminar report, Cape Town, South Africa, 17 and 18 September 2007 (available at www.ccr.org.za); and Jeremy Youde, "Why Look East? Zimbabwean Foreign Policy and China", *Africa Today*, Vol. 53, No. 3, Spring 2007.

79 Hansen, "Donors and the Crisis in Zimbabwe: Experiences and Lessons Learned", p. 251.

80 Doreen Munyati-Nyamukapa, paper presented at the CCR policy advisory group seminar *State Reconstruction in Zimbabwe*, Siavonga, Zambia, 9-10 June 2011; AfDB, "Zimbabwe Country Brief", p. 6; the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), "Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations", 2007 (available at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/28/5/43463433.pdf>).

However, since 2008, some donors have shifted their policies towards closer engagement with the Zimbabwean government, with some adopting a Humanitarian Plus strategy which aims to narrow the gap between humanitarian and development aid.⁸¹ During 2008 and 2009, an estimated \$400 million was used to fund humanitarian programmes, while \$170 million was earmarked for healthcare and nutrition initiatives.⁸² Nordic countries often prefer engagement to non-engagement, but Britain, which traditionally adopted a hard-line stance towards Robert Mugabe's government, has often dominated EU decision-making. Multilateral donors such as the United Nations Development Programme did not support the policy of sanctions and instead continued to engage with the Zimbabwean government. However, many external donors have shown a tendency to commission expensive reviews rather than implementing aid support speedily.

An external debt estimated by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe at \$6.9 billion in December 2010 and a failure to secure comprehensive relief on this indebtedness, are viewed as major impediments to effective donor support.⁸³ The Government of National Unity launched a coordination policy in May 2009⁸⁴, based on the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*⁸⁵ of 2005, in order to provide a coherent framework for interaction between the government and its external partners. Western donors have a critical role to play in assisting efforts to implement the commitments made under the GPA. However, donor involvement has also demonstrated that sustainable recovery in Zimbabwe must be locally driven to be truly effective, and that sanctions, while easy to impose, are often hard to manage and even more difficult to remove. Aid programmes should also seek to develop longer term strategies for sustainable peace and development, and encourage the involvement of civil society in policy processes.⁸⁶



ABOVE: Ms Doreen Munyati-Nyamukapa, Programme Analyst, United Nations Development Programme, Harare, Zimbabwe
RIGHT: Professor Sam Moyo, Executive Director, African Institute for Agrarian Studies, Harare, Zimbabwe

81 Hansen, 'Donors and the Crisis in Zimbabwe: Experiences and Lessons Learned', p. 260.

82 Ibid.

83 AfDB, 'Zimbabwe Country Brief', p. 6.

84 Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance, 'Mid-Term Fiscal Review', 14 July 2010 (available at www.zimra.co.zw).

85 OECD, *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*, 2005 (available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf).

86 European Partnership for Democracy, 'Zimbabwe: The GPA (Global Political Agreement) Needs To Be Implemented Before Free and Fair Elections Can Take Place', 10 December 2010 (available at <http://www.epd.eu/zimbabwe-the-gpa-needs-to-be-implemented-before-free-and-fair-elections-can-take-place>).

Conclusion

Zimbabwe's economy and development have improved significantly since the desperate months of 2008. The Global Political Agreement signed in September 2008 and the establishment of a Government of National Unity in February 2009 may eventually lead to the country emerging from its political, economic, and humanitarian crises. The introduction of multi-currency dollarisation in 2009 has stabilised the economy and created new opportunities for entrepreneurship and public-private sector partnerships.

However, despite the progress that has been made, fundamental socio-economic and political problems persist, relating to constrained infrastructural capacity, foreign currency reserves, investment and liquidity levels, skills shortages, government finance, and corruption. Political cooperation within the Government of National Unity has often been difficult, and concerns remain about president Robert Mugabe's frail health and splits within ZANU-PF, with possible tensions increasing within the party following veteran leader and struggle hero Solomon Mujuru's mysterious death in August 2011. Land reform and transformation of the security sector, which are necessary to anchor national unity and sustainable development in Zimbabwe, remain key challenges that can impede the process of reconstruction. In addition, the restoration of Zimbabwe's health and education sectors are critical, as is the creation of an environment conducive to socially inclusive growth and employment. Zimbabwe's economic recovery would also benefit from enhanced relations with external donors. As guarantors of the GPA, SADC and the AU have provided sustained institutional support for intra-Zimbabwean dialogue. Their continued support is necessary to ensure that the GPA is speedily implemented and, that the agreement remains in place until the country's political and economic stability can be ensured. SADC's recent criticism of state intimidation and violence, and its strong calls for the timely completion of a Parliament-led constitutional reform process in advance of elections possibly scheduled for 2012, indicate the importance of the need for regional vigilance in implementing the GPA.

The challenges facing Zimbabwe remain huge and complex, and a clear demonstration of common political will by the parties to the GPA will be needed in efforts to reconstruct the state.



Participants of the policy advisory group seminar "State Reconstruction in Zimbabwe", Siavonga, Zambia

Policy Recommendations

The policy advisory group made 30 recommendations in the eight sectors covered by the seminar.

1. Structural Transformation of the Zimbabwean Economy

- The parties to the Global Political Agreement must demonstrate a common vision, harmonise efforts to address the critical issues that affect Zimbabwe's economic recovery, and work together to enhance the confidence of international investors and the donor community;
- Sustained institutionalised social dialogue is needed to develop trust between the political leadership and citizens in order to enhance popular, effective participation in policy processes and to encourage local ownership of national reconstruction policies across Zimbabwean society;
- The macroeconomic framework developed by the Zimbabwean government should prioritise the basic needs of the poor: food security, healthcare, education, housing, transport, and basic utilities;
- The consolidation of macroeconomic stability should be implemented through expanding the national tax base and increasing the efficiency of government spending; harmonising economic, budgetary, and fiscal planning; re-engaging the international community; adopting a sustainable debt strategy; promoting a "developmental state"; and advancing democratic governance;

2. Socially Inclusive Growth and Employment

- Employment-intensive growth should be prioritised as a national economic policy strategy, while more research should be conducted on promoting socially inclusive growth and creating employment opportunities in the informal and formal sectors of medium- to large-scale industries in Zimbabwe;
- Employment policy should be developed in line with international agreements such as the 1976 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which provides the right to decent and full employment;
- Zimbabwe should develop an effective empowerment policy drawing on global best practices in order to protect the socially vulnerable segments of society. In this regard, the country's National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board (NIEEB) should mobilise resources to implement broad-based empowerment programmes;

3. Land Reform

- The government of Zimbabwe must develop a land use system that can guarantee security of tenure and the collateral value of land, while ensuring more equitable land distribution. The implementation and completion of a land audit will be an important step towards urgently addressing issues of insecurity of land tenure and compensation to displaced farmers;
- Agrarian reform should be viewed as a tool for generating sustainable livelihoods, transferring skills, and creating new markets. Farmers on resettled land should be assisted to achieve their productive potential;
- Increased financing for the country's agricultural sector by financial institutions that operate in Zimbabwe will be vital, especially in ensuring adequate inputs. SADC should therefore support efforts to identify measures to increase international lines of credit for this important sector;

4. Restoring the Health Sector

- The Zimbabwean government should implement the Abuja Declaration of 2001 which calls for 15 percent of national budgets to be allocated to the health sector. Additional funds could be generated from levies and fees in order to finance this vital sector;
- Health services and facilities in Zimbabwe must be improved, and proper human resource plans implemented in order to retain trained medical and health staff, many of whom have been lost to foreign countries;
- Primary healthcare needs to be effectively supported and promoted, in particular, by institutionalising community health programmes on a national basis;

5. Reviving the Education Sector

- National education curricula must be developed in Zimbabwe to cater for the different needs of diverse learners. In particular, artisan and technical skills in the fields of agriculture, engineering, and information technology should be promoted to support the development needs of the national economy;
- Peacebuilding and conflict resolution knowledge and skills should be integrated into all levels of education and training. In-service teacher and school-management training must also be implemented to develop a core of committed educators;
- Zimbabwe's seven state universities should be granted greater managerial and academic autonomy, overseen by a strengthened National Higher Education Council, to ensure institutional accountability and sound governance. Innovative fundraising efforts must also be developed by higher education bodies, which could include developing mechanisms to recover loans and bursaries from students. The harmonisation of higher education standards enabling qualifications to be easily transferred throughout Southern Africa – institutionalised through a SADC protocol – could usefully encourage the interchange of students among the regional body's 15 member states;
- The goal of universal primary education must be adequately funded by ensuring a predictable and adequate state budget for the education sector. Issues of early childhood development (ECD) and high drop-out rates at secondary level should also be urgently addressed by providing adequate ECD facilities and increasing the number of specialist teachers in early childhood education; addressing chronic malnutrition (which has been linked to high drop-out rates); and ensuring the inclusion of vocational and technical skills training at secondary school level;
- The government should increase the salaries of teachers to ensure decent living standards, and must act decisively to safeguard the physical safety of educators in the face of political violence;

6. Security Sector Reform

- A white paper should be produced by the Zimbabwean government with the aim of transforming the security sector from the dominant influence of the ruling ZANU-PF party into a more accountable national institution that can act on behalf of, and enjoy the credibility of, all Zimbabweans. *The White Paper for The National Defence of South Africa* of 1996 which tackled related issues of transformation, could possibly provide some useful lessons for such a policy;
- It is critical that the process for reforming the security sector is agreed by all sides. Reaching agreement on reviving and properly staffing the military civil service would represent a useful means of building trust to start this process;

- A Zimbabwean-led dialogue should be established on the reform of the security and defence sectors, seeking possible lessons from other African countries that undertook such reforms including South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Frameworks developed by SADC and the African Union for security sector reform could also provide useful lessons;
- Parliamentary oversight of Zimbabwe's security sector must be strengthened, and local civil society monitoring of the reform process should be enhanced;

7. The Role of SADC

- Clear political agreement on SADC's role in Zimbabwe is needed to increase the Community's effectiveness in building peace and promoting state reconstruction efforts in the country through more effective regional integration;
- Governments and civil society groups in Southern Africa must ensure that the decisions of the Community's bodies such as the SADC Tribunal are respected and implemented;
- SADC should continue to support full implementation of the Global Political Agreement until the country's political and economic stability can be ensured. Pre-election processes in Zimbabwe should therefore be closely monitored, and the country's political parties held responsible for any human rights violations. SADC should ensure that constitutional reform is prioritised as a precondition for holding credible elections, using the Community's *Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections* of 2004;
- SADC's institutional structures and operational capacity (including its Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation) need to be strengthened to enable it to address issues of peace and security in Zimbabwe and the broader sub-region more effectively;

8. The Role of External Donors

- Coordination of aid for Zimbabwe must be improved in line with the 2005 *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* which highlighted the need to align donor support to national development priorities, placing emphasis on pro-poor policies and national ownership of aid programmes. Consensus must also be reached among bilateral and multilateral donors about their respective roles and the form that their support should take in the reconstruction of the country, taking into account the Zimbabwean government's support for the African Development Bank's (AfDB) role in rebuilding the country's infrastructure;
- Advantage should be taken of the widely held view of the United Nations as an "honest broker" to develop and support initiatives that could be jointly funded by external donors, with the world body also acting to ensure the effective administration of local programmes;
- The capacity of key state ministries and institutions in Zimbabwe needs to be urgently enhanced to ensure the effective coordination of donor funds. Donors should therefore support the effective implementation of national government initiatives such as the Zimbabwe Humanitarian and Development Assistance Framework (ZHDAF) adopted in 2008, and its aid coordination policy launched in May 2009. Partners should also continue to prioritise the country's efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015; and
- External donors should carefully consider the viability of continued sanctions which have severely restricted Zimbabwe's access to aid and loans, and have contributed to the country's ongoing financial crisis.

Annex I

Agenda

Day One Thursday 9 June 2011

09.00 – 09.30 Welcome and Opening

Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution,
Cape Town, South Africa

Ms Kathrin Meissner, Regional Director, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Harare, Zimbabwe

Mr Takawira Musavengana, Programme Manager, Open Society Initiative for Southern
Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa

09.30 – 11.00 Session I: The Structural Transformation of Zimbabwe's Economy

Chair: Professor Holger Bernt Hansen, Centre for African Studies, University
of Copenhagen, Denmark

Speakers: Dr Simba Makoni, former Minister of Finance of Zimbabwe, and
former SADC Executive Secretary
Ms Naome Chakanya, Senior Researcher and Economist, Labour and
Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe, Harare

11.00 – 11.15 Coffee Break

11.15 – 12.45 Session II: The Role of SADC

Chair: Dr Simba Makoni, former Minister of Finance of Zimbabwe, and
former SADC Executive Secretary

Speaker: Professor Mwesiga Baregu, St Augustine University, and
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

12.45 - 13.45 Lunch

13.45 – 15.15 Session III: Socially Inclusive Growth and Employment

Chair: Ms Kathrin Meissner, Regional Director, Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung, Harare, Zimbabwe

Speakers: Mr David Chapfika, Chair, National Indigenisation and Economic
Empowerment Board, Harare, Zimbabwe
Dr Amy Tsanga, Deputy Director, Women’s Law Centre, University of
Zimbabwe, Harare

15.15 - 15.30 Coffee Break

15.30 – 17.00 Session IV: Land Reform

Chair: Dr Tendai Murisa, Coordinator, Trust Africa, Harare, Zimbabwe

Speakers: Professor Sam Moyo, Executive Director, African Institute for Agrarian
Studies, Harare, Zimbabwe
Dr Crispen Sukume, Independent Consultant, Harare, Zimbabwe

19.00 Dinner

Day Two Friday 10 June 2011

09.15 – 10.15 Session V: Restoring the Health Sector

Chair: Dr Dumisani Moyo, Programme Manager, Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa

Speaker: Dr Douglas Gwatidzo, Emeritus Chairperson, Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights, Harare, Zimbabwe

10.15 – 10.30 Coffee Break

10.30 – 12.00 Session VI: Reviving the Education Sector

Chair: Mr David Chapfika, Chair, National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board, Harare, Zimbabwe

Speakers: Professor Rukudzo Murapa, former Vice-Chancellor, Africa University, Mutare, Zimbabwe
Ms Mary Ndlovu, member of the Zimbabwe National Education Advisory Board, Harare, Zimbabwe

12.00 – 13.00 Lunch

13.00 – 14.30 Session VII: Security Sector Reform

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa

Speakers: Dr Martin Rupiya, Executive Director, African Public Policy and Research Institute, Tshwane, South Africa
Mr Trevor Maisiri, Senior Researcher, African Reform Institute, and Programme Director, Africa Leadership and Management Academy, Harare, Zimbabwe

14.30 – 14.45 Coffee Break

1445 – 16.15 Session VIII: The Role of External Donors

Chair: **Professor Sam Moyo**, Executive Director, African Institute for Agrarian Studies, Harare, Zimbabwe

Speakers: **Professor Holger Bernt Hansen**, Centre for African Studies, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
Ms Doreen Munyati-Nyamukapa, Programme Analyst, United Nations Development Programme, Harare, Zimbabwe

16.15 – 16.45 Completing Evaluation Forms and Coffee Break

16.45 - 17.45 Session IX: Rapporteurs' Report and Way Forward

Chair: **Mr Takawira Musavengana**, Programme Manager, Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa

Rapporteurs: **Mr Ollen Mwalubunju**, Senior Manager, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa
Ms Elizabeth Otitodun, Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa

19.00 Dinner

Annex II

List of Participants

1. Dr Adekeye Adebajo
Executive Director
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2. Professor Mwesiga Baregu
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Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
3. Ms Naome Chakanya
Senior Researcher and Economist
Labour and Economic Development Research
Institute of Zimbabwe
Harare, Zimbabwe
4. Mr David Chapfika
Chairman
National Indigenisation and Economic
Empowerment Board
Harare, Zimbabwe
5. Mr Sydney Chisi
Director
Youth Initiative for Democracy in Zimbabwe
Harare, Zimbabwe
6. Dr Douglas Gwatidzo
Emeritus Chairperson
Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for
Human Rights
Harare, Zimbabwe
7. Professor Holger Bernt Hansen
Centre for African Studies
University of Copenhagen
Denmark
8. Mr Aaron Jeremiah
General Manager: Finance and Administration
National Indigenisation and Economic
Empowerment Board
Harare, Zimbabwe
9. Mr Mark MacGinty
Senior Manager: Finance
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Cape Town, South Africa
10. Mr Trevor Maisiri
Senior Researcher
African Reform Institute; and
Programme Director
Africa Leadership and Management Academy
Harare, Zimbabwe
11. Dr Simba Makoni
President
Mavambo Kusile Dawn party
Harare, Zimbabwe
12. Ms Kathrin Meissner
Regional Director
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
Harare, Zimbabwe
13. Dr Dumisani Moyo
Programme Manager: Media and Information
and Communication Technologies
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14. Professor Sam Moyo
Executive Director
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15. Ms Doreen Munyati-Nyamukapa
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United Nations Development Programme
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 16. Professor Rukudzo Murapa
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 17. Dr Tendai Murisa
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 18. Mr Takawira Musavengana
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 19. Mr Ollen Mwalubunju
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 20. Ms Dawn Nagar
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Cape Town, South Africa
 21. Ms Mary Ndlovu
Independent Consultant
Zimbabwe National Education Advisory Board
(member)
Bulawayo, Zimbabwe
 22. Ms Elizabeth Otitodun
Researcher
Centre for Conflict Resolution
Cape Town, South Africa
 23. Dr Martin Rupiya
Executive Director
African Public Policy Research Institute
Tshwane, South Africa
 24. Dr Crispen Sukume
Independent Consultant
Harare, Zimbabwe
 25. Dr Amy Tsanga
Deputy Director
Women's Law Centre
University of Zimbabwe
Harare, Zimbabwe
- Seminar support staff**
26. Ms Chantal Milne
Research Assistant
Centre for Conflict Resolution
Cape Town, South Africa
 27. Ms Kathy Banda Sikombe
Programme Coordinator
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
Lusaka, Zambia
 28. Ms Anne Schmitt
Intern
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
Lusaka, Zambia

Annex III


List of Acronyms

ACTSA	Action for Southern Africa
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFP	Agence France-Presse
AFZ	Air Force of Zimbabwe
AIDS	Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
AU	African Union
BEAM	Basic Education Assistance Module
CCR	Centre for Conflict Resolution
CIO	Central Intelligence Organisation (Zimbabwe)
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CRS	Congressional Research Service (US)
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECD	Early childhood development
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FES	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
FLS	Front Line States
FTLRP	Fast Track Land Reform Programme
GDP	Gross domestic product
GNU	Government of National Unity
GPA	Global Political Agreement
HIV	Human immunodeficiency virus
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDC - M	Movement for Democratic Change led by Arthur Mutambara
MDC - T	Movement for Democratic Change led by Morgan Tsvangirai
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MoESAC	Ministry of Education Sport, Arts, and Culture
MTP	Medium-Term Plan
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-governmental organisation

NIEEB	National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPDSC	Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (SADC)
OSH	Occupational safety and health
OSISA	Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
STERP	Short-Term Economic Recovery Plan
TB	Tuberculosis
UN	United Nations
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNESCO	UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR	Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
US	United States
VOA	Voice of America
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WTO	World Trade Organisation
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZDF	Zimbabwe Defense Forces
ZHDAF	Zimbabwe Humanitarian and Development Assistance Framework
ZIMPREST	Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army
ZPS	Zimbabwe Prison Service
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic Police

Other publications in this series


(available at www.ccr.org.za)



VOLUME 1 THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S SECURITY

THE UNITED NATIONS, REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS, AND FUTURE SECURITY THREATS IN AFRICA

The inter-related and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security within the framework of United Nations (UN) reform were the focus of this policy seminar, held from 21 to 23 May 2004 in Claremont, Cape Town.



VOLUME 5 WHITHER SADC?

SOUTHERN AFRICA'S POST-APARTHEID SECURITY AGENDA

The role and capacity of the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) were focused on at this meeting in Oudekraal, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005.



VOLUME 2 SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRICA

THE POST-APARTHEID DECADE


The role that South Africa has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa's domestic transformation 10 years into democracy were assessed at this meeting in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 29 July to 1 August 2004.



VOLUME 6 HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY


AN AGENDA FOR AFRICA

The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and the potential role of African leadership and the African Union (AU) in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.



VOLUME 3 THE AU/NEPAD AND AFRICA'S EVOLVING GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The state of governance and security in Africa under the African Union (AU) and The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) were analysed and assessed at this policy advisory group meeting in Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004.



VOLUME 7 BUILDING AN AFRICAN UNION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES (RECS), NEPAD AND CIVIL SOCIETY


This seminar in Cape Town, held from 20 to 22 August 2005, made policy recommendations on how African Union (AU) institutions, including The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), could achieve their aims and objectives.



VOLUME 4 A MORE SECURE CONTINENT


AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN HIGH-LEVEL PANEL REPORT, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

African perspectives on the United Nations' (UN) High-Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change were considered at this policy advisory group meeting in Somerset West, Cape Town, on 23 and 24 April 2005.




VOLUME 8 THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

This meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 October 2005, explores civil society's role in relation to southern Africa, democratic governance, its nexus with government, and draws on comparative experiences in peacebuilding.




**VOLUME 9
WOMEN AND
PEACEBUILDING IN
AFRICA**

This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations (UN) in 2000.



**VOLUME 13
SOUTH SUDAN WITHIN
A NEW SUDAN**

This policy advisory group seminar on 20 and 21 April 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A).




**VOLUME 10
HIV/AIDS AND
MILITARIES IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

This two-day policy advisory group seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.



**VOLUME 14
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES
ON THE UN
PEACEBUILDING
COMMISSION**

This meeting, in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3 and 4 August 2006, analysed the relevance for Africa of the creation, in December 2005, of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission, and examined how countries emerging from conflict could benefit from its establishment.



**VOLUME 11
AIDS AND SOCIETY
IN SOUTH AFRICA**


BUILDING A COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE

This policy and research seminar, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 March 2006, developed and disseminated new knowledge on the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in the three key areas of: democratic practice; sustainable development; and peace and security.




**VOLUME 15
THE PEACEBUILDING
ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
IN CENTRAL AFRICA**

This sub-regional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.




**VOLUME 12
HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN
SECURITY IN SOUTH
AFRICA**

This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS in South Africa and southern Africa from a human security perspective.



**VOLUME 16
UNITED NATIONS
MEDIATION EXPERIENCE
IN AFRICA**


This seminar, held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006, sought to draw out key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa, and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations (UN) newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).



VOLUME 17
WEST AFRICA'S
EVOLVING SECURITY
ARCHITECTURE


LOOKING BACK TO THE FUTURE

The conflict management challenges facing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the areas of governance, development, and security reform and post-conflict peacebuilding formed the basis of this policy seminar in Accra, Ghana, on 30 and 31 October 2006.



VOLUME 21
AFRICA'S EVOLVING
HUMAN RIGHTS
ARCHITECTURE


The experiences and lessons from a number of human rights actors and institutions on the African continent were reviewed and analysed at this policy advisory group meeting held on 28 and 29 June 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa.



VOLUME 18
THE UNITED NATIONS
AND AFRICA

PEACE, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SECURITY


This policy advisory group meeting, held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 14 to 16 December 2006, set out to assess the role of the principal organs and the specialised agencies of the United Nations (UN) in Africa.



VOLUME 22
PEACE VERSUS JUSTICE?


TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS AND WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS IN AFRICA

The primary goal of this policy meeting, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 May 2007, was to address the relative strengths and weaknesses of "prosecution versus amnesty" for past human rights abuses in countries transitioning from conflict to peace.




VOLUME 19
AFRICA'S
RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT

This policy seminar, held in Somerset West, South Africa, on 23 and 24 April 2007, interrogated issues around humanitarian intervention in Africa and the responsibility of regional governments and the international community in the face of humanitarian crises.




VOLUME 23
CHILDREN AND ARMED
CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

This report, based on a policy advisory group seminar held on 12 and 13 April 2007 in Johannesburg, South Africa, examines the role of various African Union (AU) organs in monitoring the rights of children in conflict and post-conflict situations.



VOLUME 20
WOMEN IN POST-
CONFLICT SOCIETIES IN
AFRICA


The objective of the seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 and 7 November 2006, was to discuss and identify concrete ways of engendering reconstruction and peace processes in African societies emerging from conflict.



VOLUME 24
SOUTHERN AFRICA

BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY


This report is based on a seminar, held in Tanzania on 29 and 30 May 2007, that sought to enhance the efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to advance security, governance and development initiatives in the sub-region.



**VOLUME 25
PREVENTING GENOCIDE
AND THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT**


CHALLENGES FOR THE UN, AFRICA, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

This policy advisory group meeting was held from 13 to 15 December 2007 in Stellenbosch, South Africa, and focused on six African, Asian and European case studies. These highlighted inter-related issues of concern regarding populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, 'ethnic cleansing' or crimes against humanity.



**VOLUME 28
HIV/AIDS AND
MILITARIES IN AFRICA**

This policy research report addresses prospects for an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic within the context of African peacekeeping and regional peace and security. It is based on three regional advisory group seminars that took place in Windhoek, Namibia (February 2006); Cairo, Egypt (September 2007); and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (November 2007).



**VOLUME 26
EURAFRIQUE?**

AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY


This seminar, held from 31 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt); peacekeeping and military co-operation; and migration.



**VOLUME 29
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
AND PEACEBUILDING IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**


CIVIL SOCIETY, GOVERNMENTS, AND TRADITIONAL LEADERS

This meeting, held on 19 and 20 May 2008 in Johannesburg, South Africa, provided a platform for participants from Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe to share insights on sustained intervention initiatives implemented by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in the three countries since 2002.



**VOLUME 27
SECURITY AND
DEVELOPMENT IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

This seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 8 to 10 June 2008, brought together a group of experts – policymakers, academics and civil society actors – to identify ways of strengthening the capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to formulate security and development initiatives for southern Africa.



**VOLUME 30
CROUCHING TIGER,
HIDDEN DRAGON?
CHINA AND AFRICA**

ENGAGING THE WORLD'S NEXT SUPERPOWER


This seminar, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 September 2007, assessed Africa's engagement with China in the last 50 years, in light of the dramatic changes in a relationship that was historically based largely on ideological and political solidarity.



VOLUME 31
FROM EURAFRIQUE TO
AFRO-EUROPA

AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY

This policy seminar, held from 11 to 13 September 2008 in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, South Africa, explored critically the nature of the relationship between Africa and Europe in the political, economic, security and social spheres.



VOLUME 34
STABILISING SUDAN:
DOMESTIC, SUB-REGIONAL, AND
EXTRA-REGIONAL CHALLENGES

This policy advisory group seminar held in the Western Cape, South Africa from 23 to 24 August 2010 analysed and made concrete recommendations on the challenges facing Sudan as it approached an historic transition – the vote on self-determination for South Sudan scheduled for January 2011.




VOLUME 32
TAMING THE DRAGON?
DEFINING AFRICA'S INTERESTS AT THE
FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA CO-OPERATION

This policy seminar held in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa on 13 and 14 July 2009 – four months before the fourth meeting of the Forum on China-Africa co-operation (FOCAC) – examined systematically how Africa's 53 states define and articulate their geo-strategic interests and policies for engaging China within FOCAC.



VOLUME 35
BUILDING PEACE IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA

This policy seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 25 to 26 February 2010, assessed Southern Africa's peacebuilding prospects by focusing largely on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its institutional, security, and governance challenges.



VOLUME 33
PEACEBUILDING IN
POST-COLD WAR AFRICA

PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS

This policy research seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana from 25 to 28 August 2009 took a fresh look at the peacebuilding challenges confronting Africa and the responses of the main regional and global institutions mandated to build peace on the continent.



VOLUME 36
POST-CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION IN THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
THE CONGO (DRC)

This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 19 to 20 April 2010 considered how to enhance the effectiveness of the Congolese government, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), civil society, the United Nations (UN), and the international community, in consolidating peace and security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Notes

Following the establishment of a transitional Government of National Unity in February 2009 between the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the two formations of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), state reconstruction efforts in Zimbabwe have faced serious challenges. The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, brought together about 25 high-level mostly Zimbabwean practitioners and scholars to build on the achievements of the Global Political Agreement of 2008 that created the unity government and to assess the complexity of rebuilding a country seeking to emerge from political and economic crises that have lasted for over a decade. The meeting focused on key issues relating to the economy, employment, health, education, land reform, security, and the role of external actors.



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