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**WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION, THE SUPER-POWERS AND
THE AFRO-ASIAN OCEAN REGION**

Dirk Kunert

SPECIAL STUDY

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The Cold War, Détente and "Peaceful Coexistence"

The heady days of East-West détente are gone. The *Wall Street Journal* - the voice of US business and industry - and the AFL-CIO - representing the American labour movement - are unanimous in their verdict that "détente is dead". There is thus a growing feeling that détente has never been an effective two-way street; that it has worked solely to the Soviet benefit; that, far from having diminished Soviet military adventurism, it has actually encouraged Soviet Russia to take new initiatives; that it has helped the Communist ruling groups in Central and Eastern Europe not only to contain, but to annihilate the internal forces working for liberalisation; that it has strengthened the hand of the Politbureau domestically; and that, by injecting Western financial and technological blood transfusions into the sagging Soviet economic structure, it has enabled the Soviet planners to avoid introducing badly needed internal reforms, and to generate the indispensable resources necessary to fuel the Kremlin's massive armaments programmes. Détente has furthermore failed to achieve its primary objective of bringing about genuine world-wide relaxation of tensions. Cassandras had foreseen all this when the cheering started at the beginning of the 1970's; that détente would, however, trip along the inhospitable terrain from Ruacana Falls to Luanda at the turn of 1975/76, nobody could have predicted then. It was the second scramble for Africa that eventually untangled the threads of fiction and fact wrapping the détente package.¹

Alexander Solzhenitsyn, whom the KGB tried to muffle and on whom the instinctively *gauchiste* Western intelligentsia often tried to pin the "fascist" label, is no longer the lone voice crying in the wilderness. Though his warnings have often been derided as the utterances of a disgruntled emigré and the neurotic verbalisations of a "cold worrier" - and though he was reminded, in all seriousness, that international politics had moved from "old myths" to "new realities" - the Russian novelist, it seems, had the better of his critics when he countered: "... after Angola, I just can't understand how one's tongue can utter the word détente". Since having issued his warnings, a host of political analysts, commentators and politicians have either busily been writing obituaries on the much heralded détente policy, or have announced the impending political demise of this venture from "confrontation to negotiation". The winds of change, engendered by Soviet Russia's scramble for African real estate, have even caused a draught in the White House. It suddenly occurred to President Ford to re-christen his foreign policy, inasmuch as "détente" had become, in the words of George Will, a "snicker-producer The public has come to understand that the Administration can neither define the word nor defend the policy that the word denotes." After all, declared Gerald Ford in March 1976: "Détente is only a word that was coined. I don't think it is applicable any more."² Though a substantive shift in US foreign policy has yet to be spelt out, the terminological adjustment has meanwhile issued in "Peace through Strength", which has caused an Israeli wit to define American policy as "Taking it lying down with strength".

The Angolan events have jolted many people in the West out of their mood of complacency and euphoria, which official self-delusion had nurtured to the effect that the cold war had died of senility sometime

during the 1960's. Soviet Russia, it was asserted, was fast moving toward "liberalisation" domestically, and was embracing peace as its main objective externally. Books entitled "The Cold War as History" now graced college libraries' shelves. Brian Crozier captured the grand delusion when he put it: "The world had become safe for ostriches to coexist peacefully with bears."³ The "end-of-the-cold-war" syndrome, often fostered by liberal verbalists, triggered off a "Finlandisation-from-within" process which had its counterpart in the global environment. It was this resultant, with its far-reaching dangerous implications, that Norman Podhoretz of *Commentary* had in mind when he lamented that détente policy was doing its best "to make the world safe for Communism".⁴

Wracked by self-doubt and with its self-confidence badly shaken, the psychological structure of the Western world had weakened to such an extent that the will to sustain the vigilance, characteristic of past decades, was gradually eroding. With the belief gaining ground that the American and Soviet socio-economic systems were converging to a point of close mutual resemblance, a continuation of "cold war policies" seemed anachronistic. The notion even gained ground that the "cold war" was merely an hallucination. It became increasingly common to use the term "cold war" in the Soviet sense, whereby any criticism of the USSR was labelled "a return to the cold war". To the Western mind, cold war had signified the sum total of hostilities, enmities and suspicions on either side of the demarcation line - short of actual shooting. The most favoured Soviet term to render meaningful the Kremlin's activities, comprised in the wider Western connotation of cold war, is "peaceful coexistence".

However, to piece together the world jigsaw puzzle, one must grasp the intent and effect of the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence. This, in turn, presupposes the viewing of the continuous ideological iterations emanating from Soviet functionaries - speaking *ex cathedra* - as a presumption of commitment on the part of the Kremlin leaders to certain fundamental ideological doctrines. To regard Soviet doctrinal pronouncements at party congresses of the CPSU - for instance, establishing the "general line" while still allowing for zigzags, compromises and retreats - as mere phraseology and simply as convenient fictions and myths to which the Politbureau pays lip service has led to lots of wishful thinking. To view Soviet values and thinking as mirror-images of the Western *Weltanschauung*, or even as mere prismatic refractions of our own world view, tells us as much about the analyst's ingenuity as about his critical faculties of making judgments. The assumption that Marxism-Leninism merely is an ideological Potemkin village is fundamentally wrong; and so is the widely assumed notion, circulated by the *Simpromduzenten*⁵ (Helmut Schelsky) of the liberal leisure class, that the Soviets have lost interest in pursuing their global aspirations, which allegedly spring from their doctrinal credo. However, the Communist ideology is the only basis for the legitimacy of the Bolshevik regime.⁶ Sixty years of the Soviet Gulag Archipelago can only be rationalised on the basis of the universal goals of Marxism-Leninism.

The fallacious ratiocinations that all too often characterise the intellectually chic seminarians of the liberal "priest-caste", have been dealt with by Hugh Seton-Watson when he sarcastically observed: "What 200 000 Communist Party officials, from Brezhnev down to the secretaries of party branches in factories or collective farms tell their subjects, is all camouflage. The real view of the Soviet leaders are what some nice guy from the Soviet delegation at the UN said over a drink or what

an itinerant Midwestern scientist heard from some friendly academician in Novosibirsk⁷; or - one may hasten to add - what readers might surmise constitutes the Soviet outlook by viewing Moscow's activities through the tinted lenses of scribes writing for the *New Statesman*, *The Nation*, *The New Republic*, *Der Spiegel*, etc.; or of authors churning out publications that follow the battle-line drawn by the intellectual cavalry of the New Left "Revisionists".

The policy of "peaceful coexistence", elevated from a lowly Leninist-Stalinist "tactic" to the primary "strategy" by Khrushchev, was promulgated against the background of "temporary stabilisation" of the non-Communist Western world, with its formidable military alliance system, its deterrence policy of "massive retaliation", its awesome thermonuclear weapons, and its intercontinental bombers and missiles. This military and political posture ruled out any Soviet breakthrough in Europe. The design of the "peaceful coexistence" policy was "to dismantle this structure of might and the will that sustained it".⁸ Early in July 1955, Khrushchev signalled the broad shifts in Soviet policy when he argued at a closed plenum of the CPSU Central Committee that since Western determination to resist any incursions into its sphere of influence necessitated an avoidance of conflict and a reduction of tensions with the West, the Soviet policy momentum could be sustained by channelling the revolutionary energies into the under-developed world.⁹ It was Khrushchev's firm intention to achieve victory over the West by penetrating the Third World. It was the intermediate objective to strengthen the "socialist camp" and, simultaneously, to weaken the anti-Communist "imperialist camp".

The policy of "peaceful coexistence" was therefore calculated to lull the West, to cause it to lower its guards, and to project the image of a benign Soviet power, posing no real and immediate threat. The Communist offensive was carried into the under-developed world by means of subversion, ideological intrusion, project aid, credits, economic assistance, and cultural and political diplomacy. The militariat in the *coup d'état*-prone Third World was especially courted with sometimes massive supplies of military hardware, thereby enabling the indigenous military oligarchies to rout their competitors in the race to power and to tie the new ruling elites to the Soviet bloc - the arsenal sustaining the military bureaucracies in their newly-won power position. Soviet bloc aid was especially lavished on those Third World countries occupying strategic areas.¹⁰ However, in order not to arouse Western suspicions or to undermine the rationale underlying its policy of "peaceful coexistence" - as addressed to Washington and its allies - the USSR decided to remain in the background, while at the same time directing its campaign in the under-developed world. As in the Angolan case, when Moscow's proxies supplied the cannon fodder, the Soviet bloc's economic and military aid diplomacy was initially carried out via the Kremlin's client state Czechoslovakia.¹¹ The Politbureau wanted the best of both worlds:

- to court and mobilise the "socially relevant forces" in Western industrial societies in order to extract financial, economic and technological concessions from the rival powers; and
- to deal the "imperialist camp" a possibly decisive blow in the Third World in order to throw the West back on its own scarce resources and, thus, to provoke the often prophesied "world capitalist crisis" that promises to spell ultimate victory for the Soviet Union.¹²

To embark on a long-winded citological course might be tedious, but it is necessary, however, to capture the meaning implied in the Soviet term "peaceful coexistence" - often interchangeably employed with that of *détente*. This policy was long in the making and the principle of "peaceful coexistence" was officially proclaimed at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, with further details being added at the 21st Party Congress in 1959, at the meeting of 81 Communist parties in November/December 1960, and at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961. Already at the 20th Party Congress, Khrushchev declared that the "chain of capitalist encirclement" had been broken and that the Moscow-inspired and controlled world-wide revolution had begun to enter the final phase of human history - "the transition from capitalism to socialism on a world-wide scale". The peaceful coexistence strategy was decidedly offensive as it aimed at the overthrow of the non-Communist world and the establishment of world-wide Communist rule. Khrushchev had promulgated the "strategic line" that was to lead, by zigzags if necessary, to the realisation of Marxist-Leninist global aspirations. The policy of peaceful coexistence merely refers to inter-governmental and inter-state relations, but does not envisage a parallel development of the opposing socio-economic systems of "Capitalism" and "Communism". As a matter of fact, peaceful coexistence is viewed as an "intense struggle" between these fundamentally opposed systems. Boris Ponomarev, a member of the Soviet Politbureau, defined peaceful coexistence as the "highest form of the class struggle" - with this principle now joining the key concepts of "revolution" and "war" in an unholy trinity. Peaceful coexistence is therefore regarded as a constituent part of the world revolutionary process.¹³

From the various Soviet definitions of the term, it would appear that peaceful coexistence does not accord with the meaning of the word "peaceful". In a major declaration, issued as the "Statement of the 81 Communist and Workers' Parties" in December 1960, the full implications of this principle came into sharp focus: "The policy of peaceful coexistence is a policy of mobilising the masses and launching vigorous action against the enemies of peace. Peaceful coexistence of states does not imply renunciation of the class struggle In conditions of peaceful coexistence favourable opportunities are provided for the development of the class struggle in the capitalist countries and the national liberation movement of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries. In their turn, the successes of the revolutionary class and national liberation struggle promote peaceful coexistence (Communists) will do their utmost for the people to weaken imperialism and limit its sphere of action by an active struggle for peace, democracy and national liberation".¹⁴ Furthermore, in an article published in the authoritative Soviet journal, *Voprosy filosofii*, the point was emphasised that whereas the "general line of the world-wide Communist movement ... has been determined in ... 1957 and 1960", there remained the task of "further working out, deepening, making more concrete problems of this line", including "strategy and tactics of the Communist movement ... in countries, in which the national liberation movement has gone underway or has already succeeded".¹⁵

The blunt definition of peaceful coexistence given by Nikita Khrushchev in his famous speech of 6 January 1961, has since been reiterated by his successors in the Kremlin. The former Secretary-General of the CPSU stressed that "the policy of peaceful coexistence as regards its social content, is a form of intense economic, political and ideological struggle of the proletariat against the aggressive forces of imperialism

in the international arena".¹⁶ The late US President John F. Kennedy, considered this speech to be "one of the most significant speeches ever made by Khrushchev - indeed, a Red blueprint for eventual world domination".¹⁷ Peaceful coexistence is therefore not to be understood as a "tactical manoeuvre designed for some limited span of time, but as the strategic line designed for the whole period of the transition from capitalism to socialism on a world scale".¹⁸ It is not to be confused either with "peace", or with the preservation of the *status quo*, or with a no-war situation. This point has been made again and again, more often expressed in a forthright manner than couched in Aesopian language. "Some try to reduce the notion of peaceful coexistence to the renunciation of war. But peace and peaceful coexistence are not the same thing." Peaceful coexistence does not mean "a temporary and unstable armistice between two wars, but something more complex". It is "the general line of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries" and does not imply "a temporary absence of war, or a breathing space between clashes. Not at all." In the past, peaceful coexistence "has been understood and at least tacitly implemented as a respect for the *status quo*, which means: what is controlled by the West must remain under Western control We cannot accept this kind of interpretation."¹⁹

V.N. Egorov, an official Soviet ideologist, elaborates on the implications of the declaration issued on the occasion of the World Communist Meeting of 1960 in his 1971 publication "Peaceful Coexistence and the Revolutionary Process", when he states: "... while political and ideological disputes between states should not lead to war, the concept of peaceful coexistence means intensification of the struggle of the working classes, of all the Communist parties, for the triumph of socialist ideas". He goes on to stress the point that peaceful coexistence, as practised by the Soviet bloc countries "promotes the development and intensification of the world revolutionary process, and the development of both peaceful and non-peaceful forms of the struggle".²⁰

On the heels of the Nixon visit to Moscow - where the former US President accepted the Kremlin's meaning of peaceful coexistence in the Soviet-American joint declaration on the basic principles²¹ - the General-Secretary of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev (at a dinner in Moscow in honour of Fidel Castro, on 27 June 1972), authoritatively summed up his notion of the concept: "While pressing for the assertion of the principle of peaceful coexistence, we realise that successes in this important matter in no way signify the possibility of weakening the ideological struggle." On the contrary, he intoned: "We should be prepared for an intensification of this struggle and for it becoming an increasingly more acute form of the struggle between the two social systems. We have no doubt as to the outcome of this struggle, because the truth of history and the objective laws of social development are on our side."²² Since the 24th Party Congress in Moscow²³, Brezhnev has sounded a more strident, more ominous note; he has been insisting that the ideological struggle has sharpened and that the Soviet Union is waging an "ideological war" against the Western world.²⁴

Détente and peaceful coexistence are interchangeable and co-terminous with what in the Western world, used to be termed Soviet cold war activities. As a matter of fact, détente and peaceful coexistence policies are a continuation of cold war policies by slightly different means. The flow of hostilities from the Communist-Soviet bloc has not diminished. On the contrary, under the umbrella of détente and peaceful

coexistence, the scope of Soviet activities has significantly expanded. The record of the past thirty years, Pavel Auersperg - member of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and Executive Editor of *World Marxist Review* - succinctly observes, has shown that "the class and national liberation struggle, which determines the character of international relations, hews a way for itself, both in cold war and détente climates". Détente, peaceful coexistence and the class struggle are therefore dialectically interconnected. While "the peoples' liberation struggle and internationalist support for this struggle" are fully compatible with détente and peaceful coexistence, the "imperialist policy of trying to crush the revolutionary movement under the cover of détente" is diametrically opposed to these principles. From a Communist vantage point, neither the continuation nor the "mounting intensity" of the ideological struggle contradict the policy of peaceful coexistence: "Quite the reverse, the one presupposes the other." Since the basic class antagonism - on the national, as well as global level - is inevitable, détente directs this relentless conflict into "more peaceful channels", preventing the eruption of major military conflagrations.²⁵

The revolutionary thrust of Moscow's policy of peaceful coexistence was again highlighted by Brezhnev when addressing the 25th Party Congress of the CPSU on 24 February 1976. He specifically pointed out that détente and peaceful coexistence "have to do with inter-state relations", by which he meant "... disputes and conflicts between countries are not to be settled by war, by the use or threat of force". Détente, however, does not signify "in the slightest" the abatement of class struggle - in the national arena or on a global scale. The Marx-divined "laws of the class struggle" are immutable and eternally operative, the Secretary-General of the CPSU stressed. He made no secret of the fact that Moscow regards détente as "the way to create more favourable conditions for peaceful socialist and communist construction" and this "confirms that socialism and peace are indissoluble".²⁶ Only with the ushering in of a globalised Communism will a state of perfect peaceful coexistence prevail.

When Khrushchev realised that his "hit-and-run" approach of the late 1950's and early 1960's had failed to net Soviet Russia any significant political dividends, he resolved to lessen tensions with the West by adopting a policy of "speaking more softly while getting a big stick". Moscow's policy of détente was the outgrowth of power realities, as these confronted the Soviet leadership. The tactical shift did not, however, result in a modification of the strategic line, which continued to aim undeviatingly at the vanquishing of the "imperialist camp".²⁷ New instruments were forged and old ones perfected to accomplish the Kremlin's global aspirations. Western influence within the Third World was to be eroded by a sharp increase in Soviet aid to "national liberation movements". Détente was seen, *inter alia*, as a means to speed up the victory of these movements and organisations. As a commentator on Radio Moscow stated on 2 June 1975: The policy of "relaxation of tensions" had created "a general, favourable background for fundamental changes in Portugal and its overseas possessions".²⁸ Within the dialectical Soviet foreign policy-making process, the rhetorically defensive and operatively offensive aspects of détente and peaceful coexistence meshed. Leap-frogging in the Third World was co-ordinated with soft-peddalling Soviet Russia's global ambitions in Brezhnev's parleys with European governments and the leaders of the United States. But, the First World remained Moscow's main enemy, whom the Kremlin intended to weaken by enticements and pressures. As the Secretary-General of the

CPSU confided to his Eastern European allies, his détente policy was calculated to tap Western technological know-how and economic resources to strengthen the USSR, and to bring about a political atmosphere in which not only the disintegration of the Western alliance system would be accelerated, but the socially and politically relevant forces in the United States would be encouraged to disengage US military forces from the European continent. The long-range objective, to be furthered by détente moves, aimed at establishing Soviet predominance over the Eurasian heartland. Soviet Russia would then move into an almost unchallengeable position *vis-à-vis* the United States, by exerting direct and/or indirect control over the world island and by penetrating the Third World via the establishment of "Marxist-Leninist" regimes, remote-controlled by Moscow as the eruptive centre of the world revolutionary movement.²⁹

"National Liberation Movements"

By the mid-1950's, Third World countries became the major focus for Chinese and Soviet revolutionary warfare. The under-developed areas of the world were singled out as theatres for "wars of national liberation" and the "anti-imperialist struggle". The validity of the Leninist thesis of the inevitability of conflict between the Western "exploiting nations" and the "exploited peoples" was reaffirmed.³⁰ A Soviet grand design was thus launched in the Third World. Anti-Western nationalism was to be harnessed to Moscow's revolutionary cause and Khrushchev, therefore, co-opted the Third World into the so-called "zone of peace", in which the USSR was to exert a major influence. Throughout this vast region, Western influence was accordingly to be reduced and eventually eliminated. Ten years before Lin Piao was to harangue the world with his rousing "Long Live the Victory of the People's War!"³¹, Khrushchev spelt out the most promising line of attack against the West in terms of "the rural areas of the world" (Africa, Asia, Latin America) encircling "the cities of the world" (North America and Western Europe).³²

The 1956-promulgated policy of "peaceful coexistence" had an indispensable international dimension: the so-called "national liberation movement". This interconnection was clearly established in a series of resolutions adopted either at Party Congresses or Meetings of Communist and Worker's Parties following the threshold year of 1956.³³ In the declaration of the 1960 Moscow Conference, the world communist system was viewed as a "reliable shield for the independent national development of the liberated countries", and the claim was staked out that "the forces of world socialism" had "decisively contributed to the fight of the peoples in colonies and dependent countries for liberation from imperialist oppression".³⁴ This point was reaffirmed in a major article published in the *World Marxist Review* three years later, when the historical significance of the twin concept of peaceful coexistence and national liberation movements was brought into sharp focus; "peaceful coexistence" was termed "a principle of relations between states, and not only does it not restrict the unleashing of class warfare of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie in capitalist countries ... but on the contrary makes that struggle possible by shielding peoples and states from any interference from aggressive forces of imperialism from without".³⁵ Though Moscow still lacked the military muscle to follow through on these injunctions, the ideological underpinning for the USSR's Third World strategy had been provided. Once having graduated from a position of military inferiority to that of military "parity"³⁶ and marginal superiority, it was possible for the Soviet Union by the mid-1970's to make deeds conform to verbal pledges.

On an ideological plane, the Politbureau's long-term objectives were formulated by the mid-1950's - in many respects merely amounting to an adaptation of Leninist-Stalinist aspirations to newly emergent international power realities. Given time, Marxist eschatology would come true. While the non-Communist states were to be contained within the "zone of war"³⁷ - with their strength and influence within that arena gradually being whittled down - they were to be deterred from advancing into the "zone of peace" whose occupants, in turn, were to wage revolutionary wars, supported by the Soviet Union and its proxies, against the remnants of "imperialism". On the other hand, the Marxist "laws of history" sanctified the extension of the "zone of peace" and the encroachment of the "progressive forces" upon the "zone of war". Doctrinally, Soviet intervention in support of wars of national liberation was thus sanctioned.

In his 1956 address to the Communist Party Congress and in his January 1961 speech - in which Khrushchev ruled out the "inevitability of war" - he distinguished four categories of war: "world wars", "local wars", "national liberation wars" and "popular uprisings". Communists, he added, are opposed to world wars and local wars³⁸, but have "a most positive attitude" towards national liberation wars and popular uprisings.³⁹ The fundamental Marxist-Leninist axiom of the interconnection between war⁴⁰ and revolution had already issued into the shaping of operational Soviet policies during the Lenin and Stalin eras.⁴¹ With justification, Marx and Engels have been called "the fathers of modern total war", especially because of their keen perception of war and revolution "in their fundamental and continuous interrelationship".⁴² War - any kind of war - confronts the regimes engaged in it with a crisis of maximum magnitude. As Cyril Black observes: "Soviet theorists have ... concluded from their own experience that wars and military crises have provided the most fertile soil for revolution".⁴³ Historically, Communist strategy has therefore aimed at utilising all movements of revolutionary potential and character for the advancement of Communist objectives. The "national liberation movement" thus constitutes one of the three key elements comprising the "world revolutionary process", the other two being the Communist states, and the Communist parties within the non-Communist countries.⁴⁴

The Communist strategy of protracted conflict seeks to avoid a general, direct, decisive encounter with the enemy. The Soviets, in spite of the lulling rhetoric of peaceful coexistence and détente, still consider the United States as their primary adversary. They are therefore utilising every weapon in their arsenal to crush this major opponent in the global arena. The Politbureau also views American "imperialism" as "the chief bulwark of reaction" and an "enemy of the peoples of the whole world".⁴⁵ Furthermore, the "liberation movements" in Africa, Asia and Latin America are playing "a decisive role", in concert with the Communist states and Communist parties, in the shaping of current events. These movements have become "one of the most important forces in the world struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism".⁴⁶ To avoid a nuclear conflagration with the United States and yet vanquish the "bulwark of imperialism", the USSR has resorted to indirect, irregular and unconventional strategies, i.e. wars of national liberation. Revolutionary warfare is of such a nature that it lends itself to the "useful calibration and gradual build-up of a violent challenge (that) ... skirts the tripwires of major nuclear conflict".⁴⁷

Taking his clue, by way of apostolic succession, from Lenin, Stalin

and Khrushchev, Brezhnev - in his report to the 24th Party Congress in March 1971 - concluded his exhortations on Soviet foreign policy by pledging "undeviating support to the people's struggle for democracy, national liberation and socialism".⁴⁸ Brezhnev's foreign policy guidelines reflected the growing world power consciousness of the Soviet elite and the determination of the majority of the Politbureau members to deal from a position of a global "policy of strength" with the West. The influence of the orthodox ideologists became even more pronounced in the 1974-76 period. In tandem with the "military-industrial complex"⁴⁹, Suslov, Ponomarev and Sarodov, editor-in-chief of *World Marxist Review: Problems of Peace and Socialism*, have increasingly emphasised the world revolutionary aspects of Soviet détente policy. At the 25th Party Congress⁵⁰, Brezhnev tilted towards the revolutionary phalanx within the Central Committee of the CPSU. A major part of the Secretary-General's report on domestic and foreign policies was devoted to the world revolutionary process and the historical importance of the national liberation movements in hastening the day of global Communism. Boris Meissner put the point well when he observed: "It must be viewed as a particular note of the 25th Party Congress that it laid more emphasis on world revolution than any other Congress of the CPSU since the Thirties."⁵¹

When reviewing the world situation and the international activities of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Brezhnev gave prominence to the USSR's relations with the so-called "socialist countries". But relations with the less-developed world had also gained importance in the overall strategy of the Politbureau. While relations with the "capitalist states" only ranked third in terms of significance, the second place was prominently occupied by Moscow's relations with the Third World countries.⁵² Since 1971, the ties between the USSR and the developing countries have multiplied and grown ever stronger. Of particular importance was the fact, the Secretary-General pointed out, that "the political content of our ties has grown richer".⁵³ The dialectical aspect of Moscow's relations with the Third World also came into focus, when Brezhnev paid lip service to the concept of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. He stressed the "immutable principle of our Leninist foreign policy to respect the sacred right of every people, every country, to choose its own way of development. But we do not conceal our views. In the developing countries, as everywhere else, we are on the side of the forces of progress, democracy and national independence, and regard them as friends and comrades." By projecting the image of the USSR as a political Samaritan walking with seven-league boots through the global arena, he pledged continuous Soviet support to "peoples fighting for their freedom". The Soviet Union was not looking for advantages, "does not hunt for concessions, does not seek political domination, and is not after military bases". The Soviets were engaged in a grand act of self-abnegation: "We act as we are bid by our revolutionary conscience, our Communist convictions."⁵⁴ Implicit in all these statements was the ideology and "scientifically"-rooted commitment to an eventual Communist takeover of the "progressive" and "revolutionary democratic forces" in the Third World.

The "correlation of forces" was therefore tilting in favour of the USSR and the "world socialist community"; the capitalist world was in a state of disarray. Brezhnev must have realised - and this partly accounts for his optimism - that the United States is on the whole a withdrawing power in the global arena, and that its conduct of foreign policy is one of flitting from crisis to crisis, patching up cracks. The Watergate affair, particularly, must have struck the Soviet elite as a highwater mark of American decadence.⁵⁵ Also, from the Kremlin's vantage point,

the contrast between American and Soviet policy strategies could not be more reassuring: US tactical advances in order to stage a strategic retreat (Indochina, Near East, Southern Africa) vs. Soviet strategic advances occasionally punctuated by tactical retreats. The thrusting forward of Soviet world-wide influence has become "the main direction in mankind's social progress".

These developments were being played out against the background of "socialism's power of attraction" and the "deepening of the general crisis of capitalism". Significantly, and in full accord with Suslov's and Ponomarev's perception of the international situation and the revolutionary process, Brezhnev appropriately discussed the concept of détente in context with the activities of the Communist Party of the USSR and the "stepped-up class struggle" in the international arena. The contemporary world is thus likened to an "epoch of radical social change", with the struggle waged by the Soviet Union being lubricated by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. It proceeds "from the general laws governing the development of the revolution and the building of socialism and communism". Consequently, the world-wide influence of the "socialist world system" is growing ever stronger and more expansive. The victories of the national liberation movements are opening up "new horizons for countries that have won independence The scale of the revolutionary democratic, anti-imperialist movement is steadily growing." Taken as a whole, "this signifies development of the world revolutionary process".⁵⁶

Peking, Moscow and the Third World

The ultimate triumph of Moscow's foreign policy and drive for global hegemony is perceived as being contingent upon the outcome of the relentlessly waged contest for influence throughout the Third World. As the authoritative journal *Voprosy istorii KPSS* puts it: "The fate of human progress depends upon whom seventy under-developed countries choose to follow. This is a matter of great historical significance."⁵⁷ The historical importance was underlined when the new Party Programme of the CPSU, adopted at the 22nd Congress in 1961, devoted a section to the "national liberation movement" - "Fraternal alliance with the peoples who have thrown off colonial or semi-colonial tyranny is a cornerstone of the foreign policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."⁵⁸

These sentiments were echoed by Lin Piao, when he insisted: In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population."⁵⁹ However, after some initial and over-hasty spurts into the Third World arena, Peking began to slow down its involvement in the under-developed regions and has meanwhile reorientated its policy from a militantly revolutionary stance to the more orthodox approach of inter-state and government-to-government relations. This shift in policy coincided with the explosive situation building up along the Sino-Soviet frontier by 1969; the opening of Peking's "ping-pong"-diplomacy; and the beginning of a Sino-American rapprochement during the early 1970's. For the time being, the revolutionary approach - reaching its zenith by the mid-1960's - has yielded its position of primacy to the element of national interest in Peking's foreign policy. In recent years, its Third World strategy has consequently undergone an agonising reappraisal. Instead of actively undermining waning Western influence throughout this region, China is tacitly co-operating with the non-Communist powers. Anti-Western propaganda in Africa and Asia has thus also been moderated. Presently,

Peking's above-board activities in the Third World merely have a nuisance value and its overall involvement remains marginal. On the other hand, influencing the turn of events is one of the foremost tasks of Soviet foreign policy.

Mao Tse-Tung therefore repeatedly voiced his fears about growing US isolationism and Western retreat in the face of Soviet aggression. Mao was convinced that Moscow aimed at Soviet predominance in, if not conquest of, all of Europe, Asia and Africa.⁶⁰ From Peking's vantage point, it would presently be supreme folly to weaken Western influence, since the United States is being viewed as the major countervailing force to Moscow's global aspirations. But this state of affairs has only come about as a consequence of Peking and Moscow parting ways - steering on a collision course by the late 1960's. Among a host of reasons that caused the rift between China and Soviet Russia, their respective and divergent strategies in the Third World ranked foremost.

From the organisational point of view, both the Chinese and the Soviets began paying close attention to the waging of national liberation wars during the 1950's. Initially, there were indications that both powers would co-ordinate their onslaught on "the rural areas of the world" in order to encircle, and then crush, "the cities of the world". Mao had already pinpointed the vast regions of Asia, Africa and Latin America as "the most vulnerable areas under imperialist rule and the storm-centres of world revolution dealing direct blows at imperialism". Having singled out the "oppressor" vs. "oppressed" constellations as the primary contradiction in contemporary world affairs, it was just another step on the rungs of the ideological ladder to conclude that the "whole cause of the international proletarian revolution hinges on the outcome of the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of these areas".⁶¹ The Third World thus provided the greatest potential for revolutionary upheaval and change.

On this - and yet another crucial point - the Soviets and Chinese were in basic agreement. The United States was seen as the main enemy of the revolutionary forces and was to be selected as the target of the broadest possible united front, encompassing the USSR, China and the anti-imperialist movements of the Third World.⁶² Furthermore, the United States was characterised by Mao as a "paper tiger" and imperialism as a "colossus with feet of clay". In Peking, the conviction had gained ground - as early as 1946 - that the "East Wind" would prevail over the "West Wind". When the Soviets achieved their first successful intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test in August 1957, the Chinese insisted that "a decisive change has taken place in the international situation that favours our socialist construction, the socialist camp, the cause of world peace and the progress of mankind". Chou En-lai insisted at the Party Congress in February 1958, that Moscow's technological breakthrough had brought about "a new change in the long-standing superiority of the forces of socialism over those of imperialism". The Chinese were jubilant that the socialist camp had finally gained military "superiority" over the West.⁶³ Peking urged Moscow to exploit this alleged superiority and take the offensive against the "imperialist" forces. However, it was their basic disagreement over the funeral arrangements - of how best to bury the capitalist countries - that finally brought Moscow and Peking to blows.⁶⁴

In spite of the psychological and therefore political mileage that Moscow got out of its technological - and thus military - breakthrough,

the Soviet leadership had no illusions about the existing correlation of forces. The USSR still operated from a position of decided military inferiority *vis-à-vis* the West. Khrushchev realised that in order to get at the United States eventually, he had to take a detour. Horelick and Rush have formulated the Soviet rationale succinctly: "... historical experience strongly indicates that the Soviet leaders do not want a lasting understanding with the United States for its own sake, but only as an accompaniment of American acquiescence in the global expansion of Soviet power, influence and control". The Soviet Union's strategic inferiority "lessens the prospects for securing such acquiescence and makes a policy of détente seem more attractive, at least for the time being". This very point was made by Khrushchev in his increasingly hostile exchanges with the Chinese, who were pushing for offensive Soviet moves against the West. Countering the Chinese charges of the USSR having abandoned its revolutionary ardour, the late Soviet Secretary-General ridiculed Peking's accusation of the USSR having mellowed: "... if it depended only on our desire to make revolution, comrades, I guarantee you that the Central Committee (voice rising to a shout) would have done everything to see that the bourgeois world was no more and that the red flag flew over the whole world (applause). But, comrades, let us not indulge in fantasies about this, but act like people able to think realistically. The desire by itself is little ... even the party's desire is little ...".⁶⁵

In his exchange with the Chinese leadership, Khrushchev also made two admissions - both implicitly and explicitly. First, Soviet overtures to the Western powers were necessitated by Soviet Russia's position of strategic inferiority. Moscow's détente policy - and the antecedents go back to the late 1950's⁶⁶ - was motivated by the urgency to gain a breathing spell in order to ready the socialist camp for the major encounter with the non-Communist world, comprising the "zone of war". Secondly, Khrushchev signalled that it was the unalterable determination of the Politbureau to vanquish the "capitalist camp" eventually.

Khrushchev's realistic and shrewdly reasoned policy script fell on deaf ears in Peking. The Chinese leadership grew highly apprehensive when it began to sense that Moscow was moving in the direction of arranging a détente deal with the United States. In order to blow this policy design out of its tracks, Peking stepped up its insistence on Moscow provoking the "paper tiger". The Chinese were bent on preventing Soviet and American "hegemonisms" from linking up with each other⁶⁷; the Soviets grew impatient with Peking's failure to see through the ruse of Moscow's détente strategy. But the Politbureau also got alarmed that Chinese pressuring tactics - if they ever succeeded in disrupting Soviet-American parleys - might bring about a confrontation between Washington and Moscow, which the Soviets dreaded. The Kremlin all along suspected Peking of itching for Soviet-American relations to reach rock-bottom, if not to plummet to a level of hostility where both powers would confront each other on the battlefield.⁶⁸

As the Soviet-American détente policy grew apace, the Sino-Soviet cleavage began to widen. Ironically, as a result of these developments Peking staged a public *volte face* following an agonising reappraisal, behind closed doors, of Chinese foreign policy options. The rapprochement between Peking and Washington has confronted the Soviets, in turn, with a major predicament. However, in their contest for the allegiance of the Third World, the Chinese do not pose a deadly challenge to the Kremlin. On the other hand, while Sino-Soviet competition is going on

throughout this area, the Western world cannot watch the spectacle from the gallery. Even if the struggle between the two Communist powers for mastery over the Third World were to heat up, the outcome would always be to the detriment of Western interest. Feeling compelled to reciprocate any Chinese advance in the under-developed world, the Soviets are most likely to emerge victorious in view of their potential and organisational skill. Moscow is therefore quite confident that its recent advances in the Third World have inaugurated a reversal of the strategic equilibrium *vis-à-vis* the West. The Soviets are no less elated about having routed the Chinese from the strategic regions of Africa.⁶⁹

The grand design of the Third World strategy was initiated by the Soviet Politbureau of its own accord, and not as a response to Chinese pressures. The concept of the national liberation struggle is of long standing, stretching back to the days of Lenin. In spite of Chinese vituperations, hurled against the Kremlin with increasing stridency and vehemence during the late 1950's and reaching a crescendo by 1963/64, Moscow closely adhered to the cause charted around 1955. The initially cautious and defensive approach was largely conditioned by the realisation that the USSR was still dealing from a position of military inferiority. The Chinese, on the other hand, argued in favour of giving priority to violent revolutionary struggle in the Third World. But by 1964, Peking's *coups-d'état* strategy in less-developed countries had suffered serious setbacks. The Soviets continued to encourage Third World states to pursue the "non-capitalist path", initially within the conceptual framework of "national democracy" and then through that of "revolutionary democracy" - the latter concept being introduced in 1963. In spite of the terminological juggling, the ultimate objective of Moscow's strategy aimed at the "building of socialism" in under-developed countries. Co-operation of radical nationalists with the Soviet Union would therefore guarantee socialist development of Third World regimes. *Pravda* declared that "non-capitalist development", eventually leading to a Communist takeover, might occur without the initial existence of a Communist party "in countries where the proletariat has not yet taken shape as a class or where it has not yet become a sufficiently powerful force ... but then only by the influence of the world socialist system".⁷⁰ But there were some early pointers that the revolutionary ideologists, Suslov and Ponomarev - though willing to compromise temporarily - would continue pushing for the USSR to operate through "Marxist-Leninist" organisations, in order to hasten the day of Communist penetration of the Third World.⁷¹

Once the USSR had graduated from a position of inferiority to the level of military parity with the West, the world revolutionary aims of Soviet foreign policy became more pronounced. By the mid-1970's, the defensive Soviet approach to the less-developed countries in Asia and Africa yielded to an offensive posture. Soviet Third World strategy has become "sinocised" and with Western influence and determination contracting, Soviet foreign policy activities have expanded in scope. The realistic Soviet appraisal of the "correlation of world forces" necessitated a rejection of Mao Tse-tung's violent revolutionary militancy during the 1950's and 1960's. The subsequently growing world power consciousness of the Politbureau has meanwhile been reflected in Moscow's "Maoist" Third World strategy.

Two of the major contentious issues which played an important role in mutual Sino-Soviet antagonism in the past have meanwhile been removed from the ideological agenda. Firstly, Moscow has veered closer to China's

revolutionary Third World strategy; and secondly, both Peking and Moscow have improved their respective relationships with Washington.⁷² It is not beyond the realm of possibility that future developments along the Peking-Moscow axis might result in a re-emergence of a Sino-Soviet détente, however tenuous and diluted in form. Though personalities have contributed to the aggravation of tensions between the USSR and China, Khrushchev's ouster failed to bring about a lowering of the level of tensions between both powers. The death of Mao Tse-tung might likewise not be sufficient to relax the charged atmosphere prevailing between Moscow and Peking. From the Kremlin's vantage point, the removal of Mao Tse-tung from the political scene has, however, been regarded as a necessary if not indispensable prerequisite for haphazard overtures to mature into a policy of rapprochement. Peking is likely to reciprocate Soviet attempts at reconciliation once China's initial expectations of the non-Communist world - foremost the United States - resisting Soviet expansionist drives fail to materialise. With Western will and determination flagging, Peking's *raison d'être* for having opened itself to participation in Kissinger's triangular balancing act will have lost its rationale.

Especially since 1975, with the passing away of the octogenarian Mao being merely a matter of time, the Soviets have opened the Kremlin's gates to prospective Chinese visitors. Without letup, however, the members of the Politbureau have also emphasised their "principal and irreconcilable struggle" against Maoism. They have repeatedly stressed that no major antagonisms separated the Soviet Union from the Chinese people; it was only the person of Mao that constituted the major stumbling block. Brezhnev therefore signalled his readiness to come to terms with Mao's successors in his report to the Party Congress in February 1976: "... we can say with assurance that if Peking returns to a policy truly based on Marxism-Leninism, if it abandons its hostile policy towards the socialist countries and takes the road of co-operation and solidarity with the socialist world, there will be an appropriate response from our side and opportunities will open for developing good relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China consonant with the principles of socialist internationalism. The matter rests with the Chinese side".⁷³ However, close co-operation between Peking and Moscow, if it ever materialises, is still far off in the future. Both powers might still clash while pursuing their possibly irreconcilable ambitions in Asia; the *Kameraderie* of the past will not be revived. But any collaboration below this level will confront the Western world with major predicaments; the problems then facing the non-Communist bloc throughout the Third World will be formidable. Whatever the relationship between Peking and Moscow, however, the USSR will continue to be the more powerful, the more determined and the more menacing competitor.

Stepped-up Organisational Preparations

It was Khrushchev's firm resolve to overtake the Western world. He was convinced that Soviet strategic forces could be employed as a potent instrument in furthering the foreign policy objectives of the USSR. Moscow's Third World strategy was therefore viewed as a corollary in this overall design of inflicting damage on the West.

During the 1956-1962 period, Khrushchev, while gradually intruding into the less-developed areas of the globe, exploited Soviet technological accomplishments (like the launching of the first Sputnik) in order to foster the impression of superior Soviet missile development. This

technological bluff actually was calculated to hide the weaknesses in Soviet Russia's missile programme. The United States responded with its own technological crash-programme to close the gap that was allegedly opening up between the super-powers. By mobilising its superior resources, the United States rapidly surged ahead, but to pre-empt Washington's strategic advance Khrushchev staged yet another bluff. To get at US territory and to be able to use the construction of missile bases on Cuba as a potent leverage on the United States, the Soviet leader ventured his most risky political gamble, which backfired when the US Navy forced Khrushchev to pull out of the sugar island. During the subsequent five-year period, the United States out-distanced the Soviet Union in the field of intercontinental and submarine-launched missiles. Realising that their Cuban bluff had been called, the Soviet leaders now resolved to catch up with the United States' strong lead in strategic missiles, and to neutralise America's overwhelming position on the high-seas by rapidly building up its own naval forces. By 1972, the USSR had realised its first objective: its operational delivery systems for intercontinental ballistic missiles surpassed those of the United States numerically. The growing Soviet high-seas fleet furthermore successfully challenged the United States' "sole presence" on the oceans.⁷⁴

By 1964, strategic parity with the Western alliance system was still in the distant future. But the Soviet leaders were fully determined to mobilise all their resources, in order to redress the strategic balance and eventually upstage the United States. The failure of the Cuban missile venture compelled Khrushchev to adjust his policy tactics to existing strategic realities. His bluff having been called, he decided to downgrade Soviet Russia's strategic forces as an instrument of foreign policy, and embark on détente. But at the same time a new strategy crystallised - the USSR increased its aid policy to Third World countries. As long as Moscow had not caught up on the strategic force level with the Western powers, Soviet foreign policy objectives could best be furthered by impinging upon non-Communist influence in Asia, Africa and Latin America. But, by the early 1970's these two prongs converged. Under the umbrella of strategic forces parity, national liberation movements could now operate more effectively and more daringly. Western psychological and therefore political advantages, derived from military superiority, were gone forever. During the intervening, defensive phase, the Soviets carefully prepared the ground for the long-planned offensive throughout the Third World and by the mid-1960's plans were mapped out. The new strategy aimed at stepped-up revolutionary warfare and at getting the United States more deeply drawn into the Vietnam quagmire. The resultant international atmosphere was highly conducive of intensifying the world-wide war of subversion and terror, as well as the national liberation struggle directed against the United States and those powers that were either allied or associated with, or aligned to America.

In January 1966, the Tri-Continental Conference convened at Havana. The Soviets were gradually converting the Cuban capital into the revolutionary headquarters - managing, supervising and inspiring national liberation movements operating in Latin America and Africa. Moscow was actually transforming the island republic into a Soviet satellite - Cuba's security and intelligence organisations, foremost the *Dirección General de Inteligencia* (DGI), came under Moscow's tight control⁷⁵; economically, Cuba's integration into the Soviet bloc was soon to reach a point of total dependence⁷⁶; and ideologically, Castro was becoming Moscow's staunchest ally. The island dictator was pledging to send

Cuban forces abroad to spearhead foreign revolutionary movements⁷⁷ and it became apparent by the mid-1960's that Cuba was destined to play a leading role in the Kremlin's stage-managed Third World drama. Thus, in January 1966, 600 delegates from Communist countries and radical nationalist movements, operating in non-Communist states, converged on Havana. The Tri-Continental Conference was designed to link the three continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America together in a co-ordinated struggle against "US imperialism" - the "common enemy" of mankind. In the general declaration of the conference, the representatives of 82 Asian, African and Latin American countries left no doubt that the Communists intended to foment insurrections throughout the three continents.

On 9 December 1965, a month before the delegates assembled at Havana, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A Gromyko had made it quite clear that the USSR was acting as the chief planner of the Tri-Continental Conference. He briefed the Supreme Soviet on the forthcoming revolutionary event: "The Soviet Union (stated *Tass*), in taking part in the Havana conference ... will do everything it can to help consolidate the front of the struggle against imperialist aggression". Gromyko lauded the participants as "an ample forum of representatives of anti-colonialist countries and anti-imperialist forces". Brezhnev pledged the Soviets to continue to "strengthen the fraternal links of the CPSU with the communist parties and revolutionary democratic organisations in Asia, Africa and Latin American countries". He reiterated that the success of Communism in the world was "bound up with the successes of the national liberation movement".⁷⁸ Likewise, Sharaf R Rashidov - a candidate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR and First Secretary of the Party Central Committee of Uzbekistan - who headed the 40-man Soviet delegation to Havana, declared: "Our purpose is the formation of a united front against the common enemy ... (and) international imperialism, headed by the United States".

The conference furthermore reaffirmed its commitment to "peaceful coexistence". "This doctrine", the resolution reads, "applies only to relations between states with different social and political systems. It cannot apply to relations between the social classes, between the exploited and the exploiters within separate countries, or between the oppressed peoples and their oppressors". The final conference resolution merely parroted the words uttered by Rashidov and a committee was set up to act as the central policy and strategy body for wars of national liberation (Committee of Assistance and Aid for the Peoples Fighting for Their Independence).⁷⁹ According to Lionel Soto, a member of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, the Tri-Continental Conference marked "a new, higher stage in the liberation movement (It) will be a powerful catalyst, also strategically. It will spur on social revolution in the capitalist countries".⁸⁰

The content of the resolutions was quite explicit and blunt; the tone was strident and the intent was stated in a forthright manner. Soviet Russia meant to employ the national liberation movements as one of its most potent instruments in fomenting hatred against the West; in creating chaos and upheaval in selected target areas within the Third World, and in seizing political power. The Tri-Continentalist revolutionaries issued a virtual declaration of war against all non-Communist regimes in the less-developed regions of the world. The old Leninist thesis of getting to Paris via New Delhi was re-tailored to meet contemporary developments, i.e. the Politbureau had moved from its defensive aim of impairing Western influence in the states and regions of the Third

World to the offensive objective of extending Soviet influence in the developing world: to get to Washington, Paris, Bonn and London one had to touch base at Mogadishu, Berbera, Aden, Maputo, Luanda, Salisbury, Kampala, Pretoria, Windhoek, Conakry, Kabul. Since the mid-1960's, the offensive pattern had therefore become ever more accentuated. Moscow began to display an aggressive pattern, according to which the Kremlin "sought to encourage their clients and/or recipients of aid to maintain an anti-Western or anti-American posture in international affairs; to strengthen their military capability *vis-à-vis* their local opponents, particularly if they received Western support; and to encourage them in sustaining a militant or aggressive policy towards such adversaries. By retaining a high level of tension, the Soviet Union hoped to increase the client's dependence on the USSR for weapons and to undermine Western interests in regional stability".⁸¹

The Tri-Continental Conference at Havana also coincided with Soviet politico-strategic stocktaking and ideological soul-searching. By the mid-1960's, the Politbureau, while realising that its activities in Third World regions had contributed to the weakening and impairing of Western influence, had to face up to the somewhat unpleasant fact that it had fared rather poorly in pushing Asian, African and Latin American countries onto the road leading to "scientific socialism" (in the Marxist-Leninist meaning of the term) and the establishment of the "dictatorship of the proletariat". So-called "national democratic" and "revolutionary democratic regimes", following the "non-capitalist path", had nonetheless come to power. But subversion, trade, aid and cultural diplomacy had yielded meager results. With the exception of Cuba, Soviet efforts to "Marx-Leninise" the economic foundations of less-developed countries had failed. Nor had Moscow's endeavours to bring about Communist-inspired changes in the less-developed countries' political and cultural "superstructure" netted positive results. After the ouster of Khrushchev, his successors - Brezhnev and Kosygin - realised that the lavish courtship of the Third World had yielded minimal political returns. As things turned out, Soviet boasting of the early 1960's, to the effect that in Africa things were working out according to the Marxist-Leninist pattern, had been over-confident.⁸² The Soviet leadership, when reading their Third World balance sheet, had to face the unpleasant fact that the credit and debit columns did not tally.

An element of doubt consequently crept into Soviet calculations, which was reflected in Brezhnev's report to the 23rd Party Congress when he called for "versatile" relations with less-developed states and regions of the world. Viewed in terms of the major Communist objective, i.e. the establishment of "Marxist-Leninist" regimes in the Third World, the overall results of Moscow's involvement in those areas could qualify only as mediocre, even disappointing, by the mid-1960's. The Kremlin strategists began to realise that their ultimate objective in the Third World was unattainable by peaceful means alone, i.e. diplomatic efforts, economic aid and military assistance.⁸³ As a result, the Politbureau's temptation to resort to armed struggle and intervention was bound to become stronger. The international process towards de-polarisation and détente-cum-multipolarity - a Western notion partly grounded in reality and partly the consequence of self-deception - offered the USSR an opportunity, which its ruling clique decided to exploit in order to apply coercive pressures on less-developed countries and territories.

The resolutions passed by the Tri-Continentalist revolutionaries in January 1966, also provided a clue about the direction in which the

Soviets intended to strike out. On the organisational and preparatory level, Soviet Russia's Third World policies were shifting ground, moving from the pursuit of initially defensive to long-planned offensive aims. By installing "Marxist-Leninist" regimes in strategically located Third World regions, by way of Soviet and/or proxy intervention on the side of national liberation movements, the USSR would be assured control over base facilities, essential to the deployment of interventionary-type forces in future sorties. This would also increase Moscow's world-wide mobility, especially for its rapidly expanding naval forces.⁸⁴ In the past, political considerations had militated against the USSR making effective use of overseas naval bases and/or airfields because of the unreliability of its clients. The political instability of "national democratic" and/or "revolutionary democratic regimes", to which the USSR had been hitching its star, had driven home this very point. The ousting from power of Nkrumah and Ben Bella, who had just been declared a "Hero of the Soviet Union", came as a traumatic shock to the Soviet ruling group. To safeguard against these sudden and dramatic setbacks in future, direct Soviet influence had to be secured. To avert drastic reversals, Soviet ideological, political, economic and military dominance had to be super-imposed upon those Third World countries, in which "Marxist-Leninist" movement-regimes - constituting only a tiny minority, facing strong opposition and lacking legitimacy - were geared to seize power. As in post-war Eastern Europe, where the "friendly" disposition of these states towards the USSR was only assured after pliant regimes had been installed, the overt Stalinist strategy was revived, to be applied to the politically fluid Third World in the post-Khrushchev period of re-Stalinisation.⁸⁵

The Impact of the Vietnam War

Of crucial importance, particularly from a psychological point of view, in speeding up the tempo and broadening the scope of revolutionary and/or national liberation wars in pursuit of Moscow's global aspirations, was the necessity for a victorious outcome of the Indochina conflict. The Vietnam war had been billed as the prototype of a war of national liberation against a super-power. If the United States could be brought to its knees⁸⁶, a successful outcome would be the most powerful demonstration that wars of national liberation could triumph over vastly superior technological and military power and this would mean a tremendous boost to Third World strategists of revolutionary wars.

Hanoi's immediate objective was aimed at unifying North and South Vietnam. This objective had eluded the ruling clique in the North after its first round of waging revolutionary war against colonial France. Of more far-reaching importance, however, especially in the wider context of the activities of the world revolutionary movement, was the second objective aimed at inflicting a humiliating defeat upon the United States as the most powerful country of the "imperialist camp". If proof was needed that "armed struggle" would yield results that a "legal struggle" could not deliver, the Vietnam conflict was a case in point.⁸⁷ The Indochina conflict was a powerful lesson to all revolutionary forces engaged in wars of national liberation. With the United States thoroughly discredited and the British hastily withdrawing from east of Suez, the Soviet penetration of the Afro-Asian region was likely to gather momentum,

In terms of the power constellation and on-going global confrontation between the United States and Soviet Russia, the Vietnam conflict had therefore yielded profitable dividends for Moscow. It had been cal-

culated that America's involvement in the Indochina conflict amounted - in terms of cost - to 3 percent of the US Gross National Product and consumed nearly one-third of the total military budget. As a consequence of US intervention in South East Asia, not only was the image of American invincibility severely tarnished, but the unchallengeable military superiority of the United States was also destroyed, not likely to be regained in the foreseeable future. Because of the exorbitant costs of the Vietnam war, Washington had to scale down and even halt its quantitative build-up of intercontinental missiles at the 1967 level. The Soviet "military-industrial complex", though, was surging ahead and by 1972 the USSR was able to catch up militarily with its arch-enemy. Not affected by the subliminally suicidal tendencies of a non-producing class of liberal verbalists⁸⁸, the USSR has been spending 20 percent of its Gross National Product on arming its military forces, while the United States reluctantly devoted 6 percent to the same purpose. According to the considered judgment of Lieut-Gen. Daniel O. Graham - Director of the Defence Intelligence Agency of the United States until his resignation, together with Secretary of Defence Schlesinger on 3 November 1975 - "US technological superiority in some areas reduces the awesomeness of the bare figures, but in terms of sheer military weight, the Soviets have taken the lead".⁸⁹ The overall military superiority that the United States enjoyed even during the late 1960's, has thus gradually been eroded.

To stabilise the constellation - and the panting after arms limitations with the USSR reflected the breakdown of the American psychological structure - Washington entered into SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) in 1972. Since the SALT I agreement of May 1972, the Soviet-American military imbalance has moved significantly in favour of the USSR. If the SALT II agreements are permitted to codify such an unfavourable asymmetry, "the failure of SALT would be preferable to a treaty that allows the Soviet Union to maintain the momentum of its current strategic programmes, while hand-cuffing the United States in a way that will guarantee its further military decline".⁹⁰ The Vietnam war, however, not only finally destroyed American military superiority; the impact of the conflict on the domestic psyche compelled the Nixon-Kissinger team, inheriting the unenviable legacy of the preceding Democratic Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, to reassess US options externally and reshape American policy in order to bring it into line with the prevailing internal mood. Consequently, the recasting of US foreign policy had far-reaching implications for America's attitude to wars of national liberation in the Third World.

The Implications of the Nixon Doctrine

The break with the Dulles policy of "massive retaliation"⁹¹ was long in the making and a significant departure from this policy course actually occurred already during the Kennedy Administration. In his inaugural speech, the then in-coming President called upon Moscow "to explore what problems unite us instead of belabouring those problems which divide us".⁹² Realising that the tenuous Soviet-American dialogue might be disrupted by the USSR lurching into the Third World, especially Africa⁹³, Kennedy was determined to keep the less-developed regions outside the immediate range of the Soviet-American contest, in order to prevent the super-powers from coming to blows in those politically fluid areas, and to push on from the probationary to the mature stage of détente. But Kennedy was caught in a quandary; while he desired, as a long-term objective, a rapprochement with Moscow, he could not be like an ostrich and stick his head into the Third World sand. There was the ever present danger that

European "colonial control" might pass away "to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny".⁹⁴ To combat possible Soviet incursions into the Third World region, the Kennedy Administration placed a premium on developing its own counter-insurgency strategy. But the Kennedy and Johnson Democratic Administrations became conditioned by their doctrine to the point of being mesmerised by "counter-insurgency" theories. They failed to come to grips with the fact that local insurgency was fuelled and lubricated by Soviet Russia: indigenous insurgency actually amounted to camouflaged Soviet aggression. Washington's intentions to reach an agreement with Moscow, while showing its determination to fight insurgency, were therefore working at cross purposes, and the overall effect of Democratic foreign policy thus had a paralysing impact upon America's international posture. In a negative sense, Johnson was aware of Moscow's method of waging war by remote control against the United States and/or Western influence throughout the crucial regions of the Third World, and he desperately tried to get Soviet help in assisting him to extricate the United States from the Indochinese quagmire. Instead of being able to draw the USSR into a far-reaching policy arrangement, negotiating from a position of strength, the United States felt compelled to meet Soviet demands in order to persuade Moscow to get Hanoi to offer it "peace with honour" in the big print of the Le Duc Tho-Kissinger agreement of January 1973 - merely to see "honour" taken away in the small print of the same settlement terms.⁹⁵ Having been defeated in a contest of wills, and fighting "counter-insurgency" warfare when Soviet proxy aggression should have been combatted, the United States "threw the baby out with the bathwater".

The Kennedy-Johnson "counter-insurgency" chickens were, however, coming home to roost at the turn of 1975/76. When the singular opportunity offered itself to alter or even reverse the strategic equilibrium in Angola, the powerful lobby of the liberal verbalists cried "Vietnam", and the policy-making bodies of the United States drew back in horror. Largely responsible for having disastrously fashioned US policy during the pre-Nixon-Kissinger era, they seemed to be successful in moulding US policy while officially out of power. By clouding facts with the fiction of Angola engulfed in a national liberation war, they again failed to see the forest of Soviet-Cuban overt aggression for all the "insurgency" and "counter-insurgency" trees. As someone observed, it would have taken a single elderly US aircraft carrier off Luanda, even with one boiler down for repairs, to stop Moscow from implanting the MPLA regime in the Angolan capital. "Vietnam" was a lesson never learnt.

It was this basic malaise, inherited from the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations, that Nixon and Kissinger had to contend with. Even before his nomination as the Republican Party's presidential candidate, one conclusion had impressed itself upon Nixon. He was to reiterate this fact, implicitly or explicitly, in all his subsequent policy statements - i.e. the psychological structure of the United States had weakened to such an extent that the American people would never tolerate forceful US intervention on a large scale, lest the United States' vital interests be directly affected. Referring to the Vietnam legacy, Nixon maintained in 1967: "If another friendly country should be faced with an externally supported Communist insurrection - whether in Asia, or in Africa, or even in Latin America - there is serious question whether the American public or the American Congress would now support a unilateral American intervention, even at the request of the host government I am not arguing that the day is past when the United States would respond militarily to Communist threats in the less stable parts of the world, or that a unilateral response to a unilateral request for help is out of the

question. But other nations must recognise that the role of the United States as world policeman is likely to be limited in the future."⁹⁶

The Nixon Doctrine was therefore conceived long before Henry Kissinger ever thought that he would be asked to offer his talents as a political "mid-wife". The doctrine was still in its embryonic stage when President Nixon met the former President of South Vietnam, Nguyen van Thieu, at Guam in 1969. It was born with Nixon's Report to the Congress of the United States, entitled "A New Strategy for Peace"⁹⁷, and with his 1971 Report - "Building for Peace"⁹⁸ - the doctrine had grown into a healthy infant. Further progress was registered with the Presidential Report - "Shaping a Durable Peace"⁹⁹ - but severe teething problems set in with the "Watergate" infection. Diagnosing America's past performance - "two centuries ago our mission was to be a unique example of freedom"; "two decades ago it was to take up world-wide burdens of securing the common defence, economic recovery and political stability"; and "today we seek a new and stable framework of international relationships" - the presidential physician prescribed "partnership" with America's allies, a position of "strength" from which the United States was "to conduct its foreign policy", and a "willingness to negotiate with our adversaries". Two major conclusions, *inter alia*, crystallised from this:

- The United States conceded the right of the USSR to great power status, including the expansion of Soviet power; and
- US armed forces were to be reduced.

The two propositions were inextricably linked. Nixon and Kissinger were making a virtue of what they perceived to be a necessity: the American people would no longer be willing to support an interventionist policy, but only to underwrite those measures necessary to ensure the survival of US vital interests.

With Soviet Russia having finally become a super-power in the true sense of the word, especially in view of Moscow rapidly building up its naval forces, this newly won power status would most likely tempt the Soviets to flex their muscles and embark on an expansionist drive. As Nixon realised: "By virtue of its size and geography, the USSR has traditionally had important security interests in Europe and East Asia. Her undoubted status as a global power obviously creates interests in other areas where Russia has not traditionally been a factor."¹⁰⁰ This observation was accompanied by a presidential warning to the effect that "the natural expansion of Soviet influence in the world must not distort itself into ambitions for exclusive or predominant positions".¹⁰¹ As long as the USSR was willing to abide by these ground rules, the United States would not intervene to assist "counter-revolutionary" forces in their struggle against insurrectionary, Communist-backed movements. This corollary of the Nixon Doctrine was spelt out in connection with the force structure envisaged by the President. During the McNamara era, the United States adhered to the so-called "2½ war concept", according to which US forces could deal with a major conflict in Asia, a war in Europe and a minor contingency elsewhere. After 1969, to bring US policy into line with the newly emergent international situation reflected in Nixon's intention to build a "structure of peace", the Republican Administration switched over to the so-called "1½ war doctrine", according to which the United States would in peace-time maintain "general purpose forces adequate for simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia and contend-

ing with a contingency elsewhere".¹⁰²

Two conclusions issued from these various reports by the Chief Executive and the Secretary of Defence:

- Firstly, the new "1½ war doctrine" can only mean a decline in security for America's allies.
- Secondly, this war concept - though including "provisions" for meeting "future guerrilla and subversive threats" - limited US assistance to "economic and military (means) to supplement local efforts where our interests are involved".

The burden of defence therefore had to be shouldered by those governments threatened by national liberation movements. Local regimes are told to "pre-empt" such conflicts "through economic development and social reforms and to control them with police, para-military and military action". However, whether - in view of Soviet Russia's declared policy of fostering wars of national liberation - local loyalist forces actually are in a position to pre-empt revolutionary wars seems highly doubtful. Frank N. Trager puts into focus some of the implications flowing from the Nixon Doctrine and the so-called "1½ war concept", when he observes that the new strategy means that "we have now placed declared limits on our willingness to use military force to oppose Communist military expansion. It follows that we will have considerably less military force to deploy in the event that the guideline proposed by the President respecting wars of national liberation requires implementation because we discover at a future date that our interests are involved." Thus, in view of the fact:

- that South East Asia, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, the African sub-continent and Latin America have become arenas of revolutionary warfare;
- that some of the countries in the Indian Ocean Plateau region have already come under Soviet Communist sway; and
- that the United States has signalled Moscow that US deterrence would not be brought into play to contain Soviet penetration, as long as the Kremlin ruling clique stopped short of establishing its hegemonic position,

the Indian Ocean could well become a *mare Sovieticum*.¹⁰³

Turning the Spotlight on Africa

The outcome of the Vietnam war has whetted Soviet appetite, which has more likely than not increased with the eating of the Mozambique and Angola *hârs d'œuvres*. Against the background of an isolationist mood, the Nixon Doctrine and a new US force structure, American reaction to events in Angola and Mozambique were woefully inadequate, as one might have expected. While the United States was winding up its engagement in South East Asia by the late 1960's, the Soviets were already turning the spotlight on Africa - at least by way of organisationally preparing the ground for future national liberation warfare. The regions rimming the Indian and South Atlantic oceans were singled out as military-political theatres over which Moscow was determined to establish its control, while countries in the hinterland were also selected as targets.

In 1969, the USSR therefore organised a liberation conference at Khartoum sponsored by two Soviet front organisations, the World Council of Peace and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (WCP and AAPSO respectively; by this time AAPSO had already totally come under Soviet domination). The meeting was attended by representatives of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), ZAPU of Rhodesia, SWAPO of South West Africa, MPLA of Angola, PAIGC of Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde, and FRELIMO of Mozambique. Locked in struggle with Red China, the Soviets were determined to clinch control over the national liberation movements. At Khartoum most of the African national liberation movements eventually sided with the Soviets against the Chinese and having scored a psychological breakthrough, Moscow immediately moved into the next phase. The Kremlin's control was tightened, ideological indoctrination intensified and organisational planning co-ordinated. Having lined up the more important of the revolutionary organisations behind its cause, the balance of power within the Socialist-Communist camp had thus decisively tipped in favour of the USSR.¹⁰⁴

Likewise, at Alma Ata in October 1969, the Soviets sponsored a well-attended international "symposium" on the theme of "The Leninist Teaching on National Liberation Revolutions and the Present Stage of Socialist Progress in the Developing Countries". However, the delegates, assembling at the capital of Soviet Kazakhstan, were not attending a political science congress; whatever expertise the conference participants could muster had been gained by way of field work, and in most cases, they were battle-tested and battle-hardened revolutionaries. Delegates came from fifty Third World countries, the strongest contingent being from the Black African continent. Greatest prominence was quite significantly given to the representatives of six African liberation movements who had only recently forged closer ties with the USSR: the MPLA, PAIGC, FRELIMO, ZAPU, ANC (South Africa) and SWAPO. Several of these movements have since then hoisted their revolutionary banners in the capitals of their countries, while the remaining Soviet front organisations - according to intermittent progress reports issued by Moscow - are "on the way to victory". All these movements are employed to advance Soviet Russia's strategic objectives in Africa.¹⁰⁵

For a number of reasons, therefore, the 1969-71 period was of historic importance.

- Firstly, the USSR reached "parity" with the United States.
- Secondly, the presence of Soviet naval forces on the oceans had become very noticeable allowing Moscow to exploit its sea power for political purposes¹⁰⁶, and to "effectively utilise the world oceans in the interest of building Communism",¹⁰⁷
- Thirdly, the Brandt-Scheel *Ostpolitik* - hastily improvised and implemented¹⁰⁸ - finally confirmed Stalin's territorial conquest.
- Fourthly, public declarations by Soviet leaders increasingly reflected a growing world power consciousness.¹⁰⁹
- Fifthly, Moscow's dialectical foreign policy approach, cast in Orwellian language, was promulgated in the "Peace Programme" adopted at the 24th Party Congress; Soviet foreign policy operated on two levels, as reflected in the "co-operative-competitive dyad"¹¹⁰ - the *modus vivendi* with the United States and Western Europe, and stepped-

up efforts to oust the West from the Third World. The "Peace Programme" signalled Soviet determination to wage the "struggle against imperialism ... firmly rebuff intrigues and subversion of aggression ... (and) support the struggle of the peoples for democracy, national liberation and socialism".¹¹¹ It is therefore quite clear that détente is perceived by the Kremlin rulers as a double-edged policy. Thus, members of the "military-industrial complex" increased their representation in the Central Committee and the Politbureau, and Viktor Grishin - a political warfare expert of long standing - was elevated to the highest ruling body of the Soviet Union in 1971. As a former Vice President of the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions, he had played a prominent, if not a leading role in conferences in Moscow and Budapest involving European and African revolutionary cadres. Already at these 1959 meetings, the long-range strategy for Africa was laid down. Furthermore, immediately after the conclusion of the 24th Party Congress a manual, which is in essence a handbook on national liberation warfare for the African continent, was published in Moscow.¹¹²

- Sixthly, within the short timespan from 1969-1971, Cuba was completely Sovietised and, in view of Castro's revolutionary proclivities, there were strong indications that the military forces of the island dictator would sooner or later be employed to do Moscow's martial biddings on foreign battlefields.

Geopolitics and Raw Materials

While the Soviet Union's external policy course - in spite of the internal rot of the Bolshevik system - is characterised by vigour, determination, tenacity and an unflinching commitment to its global objectives, that of the United States depends neither on reflection nor choice, but on accident and force.¹¹³ In the post-World War II environment, America's dilemma has been heightened by the disparity and conflict between objective power and subjective, liberal ideology.¹¹⁴ Moreover, in recent years a "wide psychological canyon" has opened up between Soviet Russia and the United States, the former lurching forward and the latter with its stamina fading. There is the real danger that "the Soviet leaders will now see opportunities for political exploitation around the globe that were not available before, and that they will be tempted to take greater risks. The mere availability of a new global military capability can generate pressures for its use".¹¹⁵ Today, Soviet Russia is the indisputable conventional power on the Eurasian continent¹¹⁶, and - after having caught up with the United States in terms of strategic weaponry - is presently reaching for strategic and naval superiority.

In the course of the last few years, the Soviets have succeeded in marrying Mackinder to Mahan. In 1919, the foremost British representative of the school of *Geopolitik* predicted: "Who rules East Europe commands the heartland; who rules the heartland commands the world island; who rules the world island commands the world."¹¹⁷ The "heartland" significantly overlaps with the geographical area occupied by the USSR. In addition, Captain Mahan - the American naval strategist - is reputed to have stated: "Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the Seven Seas. In the 21st Century the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters."¹¹⁸ Though technological advances may have nullified many of the advantages derived from geographical configurations under contemporary general war conditions, one possibly credible interpretation of Soviet strategy crystallises from this, namely

"... the progressive extension of economic influence, direct or indirect, over resources, especially energy resources, essential for one or two generations at least to the economic development of Europe, Africa and Asia".¹¹⁹ Yet, under non-general war conditions, with the USSR "peaceably" expanding its sphere of influence and domination, Mackinder's aphorism has not lost much of its validity.

Thus, the Soviet leaders see control over strategic minerals as part of the world balance of power conflict. Moscow's resource strategy in the Indian Ocean Plateau region is therefore closely tied to its championing of national liberation movements, which has its roots in Marxist-Leninist ideology. The energy crisis of 1973 has furthermore highlighted the importance of raw materials to the industrialised capitalist world. As long ago as 1957, Major-General A. N. Lagovskiy - a Soviet specialist in economic warfare - pointed out the almost complete Western dependence on various critical raw materials. The deficiency in some of the important strategic minerals constituted the "weak link" in the Western power chain and he impressed upon the Kremlin leadership the urgency of exploiting this weakness.¹²⁰ Since the "proletariat" has woefully failed to fulfil its - according to Marxist-Leninist "scientific socialism" - predestined role of bringing about the *Aufhebung* of the bourgeois world order¹²¹, Moscow's activist, voluntaristic and aggressive policy has to serve as a substitute and catalyst for the allegedly immutable Marxist laws of history. The Soviet naval intrusion into the Indian Ocean region, extending from the east coast of Africa, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Indian sub-continent to South East Asia, only assumes menacing proportions if it is seen in the context of the Kremlin's economic, military and political activities and its determination to exploit the unsettled conditions throughout this vast area. During the entire post-war period and with shifting emphases, the strategic regions - from a geographical and raw materials point of view - of Indochina, the Middle East and Southern Africa have been the main targets of Soviet Russia's forward policy.

To back up their raw materials strategy, the Soviets have been engaged in a ceaseless search for base facilities throughout the Afro-Asian theatre.¹²² The establishment of naval and air base facilities merely serves as stepping stones towards the creation of a Soviet-controlled world energy delivery system, embedded in the projected world socialist planned economy, with the USSR as the strategic middleman. This objective, according to Lincoln Landis, underlies Soviet penetration of the Middle East. Soviet raw materials strategists are keenly aware of the crucial importance of Middle East petroleum to the industrialised capitalist world: "... northern Iranian oil ... (is related to) the world struggle between the forces of democracy and the forces of reaction (The Middle East region with) the richest oil deposits in the capitalist world ... is also an extension zone of the Arab national liberation movement (Oil in Iran has) in our time become one of the vital questions of international politics (Oil concessions are) the foundation of the entire edifice of Western political influence in the world, of all military bases and aggressive blocs. If this foundation cracks, the entire edifice may begin to totter and then come tumbling down".¹²³ Likewise, Soviet strategists are acutely aware of the singular importance of Southern Africa's resources to the industrialised world. Having forced their way into Mozambique and Angola, they are now primed to force their access to the vast resources of the remaining countries of the sub-continent. "Africa holds a leading position in the world both in reserves and output of many kinds of raw materials. The deposits of some of the minerals in Africa are unique ... most of them

concentrated in Southern Africa Specialists say (South West Africa) has enough resources to meet the needs of half the continent Mozambique is relatively rich in minerals but makes practically no use of them. Deposits of coal, iron ore, copper, fluorite and manganese have been discovered in the Zambesi Valley; chrome, nickel and bauxites have been found. Gas deposits have been surveyed in some parts of the country, including Pande, about 100 kilometers from Beira ...".¹²⁴

Politico-strategic supremacy of one of the super-powers in the Indian Ocean region will spell global disaster for the losing side, as Captain Mahan perceptively realised almost three-quarters of a century ago. In contemporary affairs, this region comprises most of the Third World which has meanwhile been converted into a hunting ground for the USSR and Red China - jointly during the 1950's and separately since the widening Sino-Soviet schism at the beginning of the 1960's - in close co-operation with indigenous revolutionary forces. The Indian Ocean Plateau realm is about to join the trade-dependent maritime world - with the maritime ring of the United States as its core - and the Eurasian continental world - with the USSR's industrialised triangle as its core - as the third geostrategic region. Within the existing two geostrategic regions, maritime Europe and Red China have emerged as second power nodes. In world affairs, the geostrategic regions play a strategic role, while the geopolitical regions - as subdivisions of the geostrategic ones - perform a tactical part. Two "shatterbelts" divide the trade-dependent maritime from the Eurasian continental geostrategic region: the Middle East and Indochina (South East Asia). With either the US or the Soviet core area absorbing one or the other of the "shatterbelts", that power's global hegemonic position would thus be unchallengeable. "If, for example, the Middle East were to lose its current shatterbelt characteristics and fall completely under Moscow's domination, the arena of contention would shift directly to Africa, thereby placing maritime Europe in mortal danger."¹²⁵

Throughout the last three decades, overt and clandestine Soviet foreign policy has concentrated on one major task, namely swallowing up the Middle East and South East Asian "shatterbelts", which rim the Indian Ocean at the strategically located Red Sea and Indonesian water passages respectively. As a consequence of the disastrous outcome of the Indochina war, and the intrusion of Communist totalitarian power into Laos and Vietnam¹²⁶, the paramount geopolitical position of the United States in the international arena has been dangerously eroded. Having suffered possibly only a temporary setback in the Middle East, the Soviets have therefore doubled their efforts to proxy-conquer the African sub-continent that reels under the impact of selective moralistic paroxysms. The brazenness of Soviet imperialism in Southern Africa is often being minimised, played down, or even exculpated - especially in leftwing and "liberal" circles - because "white regimes" constitute the target of revolutionary activities. The USSR furthermore reaps benefits from the fact that the white-ruled states hardly enjoy the respect of the so-called international community, which perceives these regimes as pariahs and members of the international whipping boy club, together with Israel, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Chile, Argentina, Spain, etc. "Anti-racism" is often more than an inspiration; it has become a veritable, sometimes profitable and prestigious occupation to oppose it vehemently. It is this subjective, ideological domain-assumption that leads its spokesmen to denigrate, often in a subtle way, the strategic importance of the sub-continent to the Western world.¹²⁷

The Political Effectiveness of Military Power

The success of Moscow's foreign policy and drive for global hegemony is contingent upon the outcome of the struggle for influence in, and eventual dominance over the Afro-Asian Ocean region. Consequently, the last two decades have witnessed a progressive extension of the blue-water operations of the Red Navy. This was largely due to the realisation that sea-power had an important role to play in international politics, and that naval forces can have a political impact as "maritime power" in war, as well as in times of peace. For centuries, the political utility of navies has been demonstrated by Britain and the United States. Even Mussolini's Italy, though only for a fleeting moment, succeeded in making the fullest and most effective political use of its highly visibly displayed naval power; a peace-time naval presence netted *Il Duce* political dividends that the actual war-time combat capabilities of his floating Potemkin village could never have yielded. What counts, however, is the fact that the decision-makers of the littoral states perceived the displayed naval capabilities as imposing and invincible. The psychological element of perception, though impossible to quantify, therefore seems to be of greatest importance. "In time of peace, a superior warship on the spot can achieve results not obtainable in other ways and without regard to the purpose for which the ship was built. What counts is the existence of the Soviet Navy, not the original motives of its builders. To be precise, what counts is the existence of ocean-going surface warships ... when the object is to threaten force rather than use it and, if you have to employ violence, to do it at a level which will not provoke (nuclear) war".¹²⁸ Latent suasion, as a consequence of projected sea-power, affects the perception and reaction of allies/clients and enemies. In the former case, it demonstrates one's capabilities to render assistance in a crisis situation. In the latter case, Soviet gunboat diplomacy can influence the political attitudes of Moscow's adversaries, especially small Third World countries, by deterring them from supporting "counter-revolutionary forces" in neighbouring states; by paralysing their intention to resist aggressive, revolutionary activities; and by causing them eventually to tow the Kremlin line in world politics, since continued opposition is made to appear futile and self-defeating.¹²⁹ To clinch its case, the Soviet politico-strategic leadership may even resort to an actual, though symbolic use of armed force, for "... no firm dividing line can be established between the use of threats and the actual infliction of damage albeit in small doses. As long as the purpose and context of the use of force remains political, i.e. intended to evoke suasion effects rather than to destroy enemy forces or values, it cannot be arbitrarily excluded from the range of political instrumentalities provided by naval forces in 'peace-time'".¹³⁰

At an increasing rate, the Red naval forces have thus been employed to further Soviet interests in the Third World. With utmost bluntness, V.M. Kulish - editor of a volume entitled "Military Force and International Relations" (1972) - has expressed the Kremlin's determination to gain most mileage out of the "peace-time" use of Soviet Russia's military power: "In connection with the task of preventing local wars and also in those cases wherein military support must be furnished to those nations fighting for their freedom and independence against the forces of internal reaction and imperialist intervention, the Soviet Union may require mobile, well-trained and well-equipped armed forces. In some situations the very knowledge of a Soviet military presence in an area in which a conflict situation is developing may serve to restrain the imperialists and local reaction, prevent them from dealing out violence to the local populace

and eliminate a threat to overall peace and international security. It is precisely this type of role that ships of the Soviet Navy are playing in the Mediterranean Sea.... The actual situation may require the Soviet Union to carry out measures aimed at restraining the aggressive acts of imperialism. Practical steps towards resolving the problem of regional military opposition to imperialist expansion by expanding the scale of Soviet military presence and military assistance furnished by other socialist states, are being viewed today as a very important factor in international relations."¹³¹ Thus, Soviet naval forces have developed a political punch as maritime power not necessarily *qua* naval power, but in proportion to the growing effectiveness of Soviet Russia as a global super-power.

Naval power, however, merely constitutes a component of the overall power arsenal of the USSR. As Britain in the past, the USSR may well gain an ever-increasing freedom of action overseas by paralysing its rivals. Traditionally, Britain's successful continental policy neutralised its European competitors in the struggle for overseas mastery. Britain only succeeded in exploiting its naval supremacy for imperial expansion whenever it embroiled its adversaries in internecine continental warfare.¹³² Traditionally, the Soviets have pursued a similar strategy of divide-and-rule. However, in contrast to Britain, Soviet Russia's position - from which Moscow can wage its struggle for global hegemony - is much more formidable. The USSR is impregably entrenched in its Eurasian continental fortress. Its overweening conventional military presence and its high visibility of military forces, poised against Western Europe and far exceeding its defensive requirements, is presently exerting a paralysing effect upon its Western neighbours. Thus, Moscow's détente policy may be calculated to minimise the Soviet threat, to lessen European dependence on the United States, and to strengthen the domestic American forces that have pressed for a far-reaching US disengagement from its European commitments. The Soviets may also well intend to turn the political and economic energies of the capitalist countries against each other. Having gleefully diagnosed the "general crisis of capitalism" and having gauged, since the early 1970's, "an economic and political competitive struggle of increasing sharpness" among the "main centres of imperialist rivalry" - the United States, Western Europe and Japan - the Kremlin's détente policy is meant to aggravate the contradictions among these powers.¹³³

Against this back-drop of international affairs, as perceived by the Soviet leadership, Moscow's Third World grand design is being carried out, on an ever-increasing scale and with a spiralling aggressiveness. This strategy was long in the making - Khrushchev not only formulated this rationale in 1955, but also laid the foundation for its implementation. He realised that successful Soviet intrusion into and penetration of the less-developed regions of the globe was contingent upon the rapid expansion of the Soviet armed forces, which had to be sufficiently strong and mobile to be credible as a means of strategic deterrence and flexible response in all parts of the world. Since the mid-1950's, the Soviets were striving to achieve "maximum freedom of action beyond (their) frontiers, a more effective base for political infiltration into the countries of the Third World and a more decisive counter-threat to intervention by Western powers in localised political and military conflicts".¹³⁴ On the heels of Khrushchev's decision to mobilise the Third World against the "capitalist camp", he resolved to construct a modern surface fleet¹³⁵, in order to provide a high degree of world-wide mobility and to fashion a potent instrument for projecting Soviet power globally. A significant upgrading of the Red Navy's strategic capabilities thus occurred at the

turn of 1961/62 - the Cuban fiasco merely acted as a catalyst - and by 1970, the Soviet Navy was no longer a Potemkin village on a raft. The Soviet Navy became a service branch in its own right and the strengthening of the Red Navy's strategic task was complemented by the build-up of interventionary-type forces.

Traditionally, throughout the Tsarist, Leninist, Stalinist and early Khrushchev eras, the Russian/Soviet Navy had been assigned shore-defense missions. However, since 1964, Soviet naval planning has made strident advances towards achieving a "forward deployment posture" and an "expanding deployment pattern".¹³⁶ The creation of the Soviet Navy, also capable of interventionary-type actions against enemy bases and other targets in war- and peace-time, plainly signalled Soviet Russia's intention to expand its dominion over the globe. There was a growing realisation that the mere existence of naval capacity would yield great peace-time psychological advantages.¹³⁷ The political value, arising from the capacity to assert a presence, has meanwhile increased with the launching of helicopter and aircraft carriers. The amphibious capacity has been strengthened and the Soviet marines have been reorganised and re-equipped with transport and landing craft, light amphibious tanks and personnel carriers, helicopters and rocket launchers, while the use of "fleet trains" and floating bases has also been improved. The quality of airborne forces has been upgraded and aircover for distant operations has become available.¹³⁸ Naval and air bases have meanwhile been constructed on the territory of Soviet clients fringing the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet Navy, committed to its immediate task of repelling any enemy attacks against the socialist base of world revolution, has thus assumed additional responsibilities. Consequently, Soviet naval activities and operations off the West African coast, in the Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean are aiming at three objectives:

- The protection of Soviet resources operating in these theatres;
- The active defense of Soviet proxies/clients against domestic and external foes; and
- The furthering of Soviet political influence with non-clients.

According to Weinland: "It is no accident that the three-fold classification of (Soviet Russia's naval) activities in the defence of state interests ... is given in order of what might be termed ascending adventurousness - from reaction to initiative, from self-protection to, at least, internationalism if not rank imperialism. This is the direction in which (the Soviets) appear to be going, and it appears to be the result of conscious choice on their part".¹³⁹ Contemporary Soviet strategy indicates a very different and - from a Western vantage point - highly menacing outlook from Stalin's old land-based, continental concentration. The Soviet Union today is in a position to project its power beyond its frontiers, in the far-flung corners of the globe. Especially in the still contested regions of the Third World, modern and mobile Soviet naval units, emphasising visibility often at the expense of technological perfection, convey persuasive evidence of the military strength and - as perceived by the political decision-makers of less-developed countries in the Afro-Asian Ocean region - technological prowess of the Soviet bloc. The USSR has meanwhile also developed credible means of providing the various national liberation movements with military backing against "counter-revolutionary" groups. Moreover, the recently conducted Soviet

world-wide manoeuvres (OKEAN), have illustrated the availability and effectiveness of Soviet interventionary-type forces, and the Soviet/Cuban intervention in Angola has further underscored Moscow's unflinching commitment to revolutionary movements.

With awesome military power at their command, Soviet leaders have become increasingly blunt in stating their intentions and aspirations. Soviet Admiral of the Fleet S.G. Gorshkov - Commander-in-Chief of the Red Navy - remarked in 1967 that the USSR has "initiated the creation of a well-balanced navy. By a well-balanced navy we mean one whose composition and armaments is such that it is capable of fulfilling its missions in a nuclear or non-nuclear war and of protecting state interests on the seas in peace-time ...".¹⁴⁰ Brezhnev - in a major speech to graduates of the Soviet military academies - and Gromyko - in an interview with the press organ of the Italian Communist Party, *L'Unita* - alarmed the West when they claimed that the Mediterranean and the Middle East are forming part of the Soviet sphere of influence.¹⁴¹ That Soviet interests are world-wide, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs plainly announced to the Supreme Soviet in June 1968 - "The Soviet Union is a great power situated on two continents, Europe and Asia, but the range of our country's international interests is not determined by its geographical position alone.... The Soviet people do not plead with anybody to be allowed to have their say in the solution of any question involving the maintenance of international peace, concerning the freedom and independence of the peoples and our country's interests. This is our right, due to the Soviet Union's position as a great power. During any acute situation, however far away it appears from our country, the Soviet Union's reaction is expected in all the capitals of the world." Furthermore, on the occasion of the Soviet naval manoeuvres in the Atlantic in the spring of 1969, Admiral Gorshkov inveighed that Britain and the United States "had still not accustomed themselves to the idea that the Western powers had lost their superiority at sea".¹⁴²

These pronouncements by members of the Politbureau reflect an optimism that the USSR has the best prospects of emerging victorious in the ceaseless struggle with the United States. It is realised that the contest between the supreme exponents of the competing socialist and capitalist camps, the Soviet Union and the US, constitutes the overriding issue of the 20th Century. The Soviet leaders are confident, however, that the Socialist-Communist bloc is going to predominate in the Third World region by diplomatic and subversive means, and with no more than limited wars not directly involving the Soviet Union. They expect the emerging strategic global balance eventually to tilt drastically in their favour, and thereby signifying a decided change for the worse for their capitalist enemies - the United States and Western Europe.¹⁴³

The Shifting Balance of Power

By the beginning of the 1970's, the Soviets were finally prepared to demonstrate their determination to make assertive use of their mobile naval power, which was projected with progressive aggressiveness into the international arena. Naval forces were being utilised to promote Soviet interests in the Third World and employed to carry out a policy of "active counter-action to imperialist aggression", in line with the long-term policy design charted in the "Peace Programme" promulgated at the 24th Congress of the Communist Party in 1971.

The Soviet force structure has been dramatically transformed since

the immediate post-war era, when Stalin lamented the fact that the USSR was severely hamstrung in pursuing an aggressive and expansive policy in the Mediterranean region, because - as the dictator put it - "We have no war fleet". That the Kremlin even then coveted North African territory and Somalia as bases for operations on the Black continent, Molotov bluntly informed his American counterpart, Secretary of State Byrnes.¹⁴⁴ However, under the then existing circumstances of the West's clear-cut strategic superiority, prevailing well into the 1960's, Soviet aggressive schemes were compelled to go "underground". But Stalin's vision of Soviet global hegemony continued to beckon on. As long as the USSR remained manifestly inferior, America's undisputed superiority left no doubts in the Kremlin leaders' minds about the high risks they were running when pushing their offensive policies. But parity has provided the Soviet Union with a secure platform from which to wage its aggressive political warfare against the West, especially in the Third World where no clear lines of demarcation between the opposing camps have yet been drawn. American strategic superiority has furthermore, until recently, neutralised the fundamental aggressiveness of Soviet policy designs. Since the early 1970's, however, a new strategic balance has emerged wherein both the United States and the Soviet Union are credited "with genocidal retaliatory capabilities". This posture favours Moscow in conducting highly provocative foreign policies.¹⁴⁵

Kissinger's contention that the very existence of awesome destructive capabilities available to decision-makers in Washington and Moscow, is considerably reducing the likelihood of nuclear conflict between the super-powers and greatly increasing the security of smaller powers, is highly debatable if not faulty. Commanding assured mutually destructive capabilities does not in itself "preclude the use of nuclear weapons in some capacity in local military conflicts, interventions or initiatives". It could to the contrary "ensure that local conflicts, whether nuclear or not, would not escalate to the stage of involving either super-power's 'home area'". Strategic bipolarity "might in fact not militate against either's involvement in local conflict areas (through fear of escalation and destruction), but rather encourage involvement, since its inherent corollary would inhibit the other from escalating beyond the local confines".¹⁴⁶ The basic thrust of this argument has received supportive affirmation from Sir Robert Thompson, who contends that the major advantage derived from revolutionary warfare as a policy instrument in an age of genocidal retaliatory capabilities "was to be that it avoided direct confrontation". Though the United States and the Soviet Union "might be ranged on opposing sides, revolutionary wars could safely be waged without fear of real escalation". Thus, for the Communist powers, he maintains, "revolutionary war was a low-risk war".¹⁴⁷

The all too apparent credibility of the USSR's countering capabilities, assisted by the power and growing prestige of that country, is therefore acting as a powerful deterrent against US intervention in wars of national liberation. In the post-SALT strategic environment, the Soviet Union has gained a greater amount of freedom of action, which enables Moscow to push forward its ideologically rooted global hegemonic schemes. With SALT I, Washington foreclosed its option of building up a powerful and technologically highly advanced Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defense posture. This has rendered US undertakings less credible, especially in view of the fact that its population is exposed to Soviet nuclear weapons. Until the 1960's, the United States was able to sustain its position and to back up its political demands vis-à-vis the USSR because of its strategic superiority. Soviet parity, if not superiority, in

offensive striking capability has, however, drastically diminished America's will to bargain, especially on behalf of its allies. The United States' new force structure, as encapsulated in its "1½ war concept", furthermore imposes severe limitations on its interventionary policies. Washington has therefore virtually indicated that the United States will only activate its nuclear forces in case of a Soviet attack on home territory.¹⁴⁸

Meanwhile, the Soviets have accelerated their armaments programme, while pursuing détente. They have acquired a "counterforce" capability, maximum deterrence and usable conventional forces for interventionary-type operations; they are reaching for outright superiority and have achieved assured survivability; they have rejected the Pentagon's "assured mutual destruction" doctrine and have emphasised Soviet "war-fighting" capabilities; they insist that nuclear war will not destroy the USSR, but contend that they can wipe out the capitalist countries; they have significantly upgraded the availability of forces below the strategic nuclear level, and there are signs of Soviet preoccupation "both with nuclear *blitzkrieg* and with sustained conventional operations - for which Soviet forces are trained and for which improved logistical preparations are being made". The "military-industrial complex" has thus gained a greater say in the shaping of Soviet foreign policy, as is reflected in the elevation of Ustinov and Romanov to membership in the Politbureau. Erickson records the "paradoxical" fact that "it is not the soldiers who have become politically ambitious" - though this observation needs modification in view of recent changes in the upper echelon of the Central Committee - but rather "the civilian leadership which has acquired quasi-military attributes and a leading role in military policies ...".¹⁴⁹ Significantly from a symbolic viewpoint, Nikolai V. Podgorny, President of the USSR, conferred the rank of Marshall of the Soviet Union on Brezhnev on 10 May 1976, in appreciation of the General-Secretary having infused "vitality" and "strength" into Soviet policy.¹⁵⁰ Brezhnev gratefully accepted this award, viewing it as a recognition of "my contribution to the actions of our splendid Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War and my activity in strengthening the defence capacity of our country.... It is, primarily, a high assessment of the historic merit of the Leninist Communist Party and Soviet State in the struggle for a lasting peace on earth in the interest of all humanity. It is also an expression of fervent gratitude to the entire Soviet people for its heroism in upholding the freedom and independence of our Socialist Homeland and in liberating the peoples from fascist oppression ...".¹⁵¹ Marxism-Leninism has always been a combative ideology: from Marx to Brezhnev, the revolutionary and martial-combative traits have been the most outstanding characteristics of the Marxist-Leninist leadership group. Podgorny awarding the highest Soviet military rank to the General-Secretary is merely in keeping with this singular historical fact.

The Brezhnev era coincided with Moscow forcing a radical shift in the East-West balance of power in favour of the USSR, thus moving into unchallengeable defensive (active and passive) and offensive positions. To be able to employ their military forces - demonstrating great versatility - as a potent instrument in furthering Soviet Russia's political objectives and to venture offensive policies, the Soviets have made their defence posture highly credible. They have given searching thought to the "unthinkable": if necessary, they are ready to wage and are determined to win a nuclear war. They are convinced that a nuclear exchange with the United States will keep the Soviet casualty rate below the number of Soviet citizens killed during World War II. Consequently, in

recent years, they have embarked on a massive civil defence preparedness campaign, with massive evacuation plans, fall-out shelters and the construction of facilities for storing 2,5 billion bushels of grain in rural areas, enough to feed the entire Soviet population of 250 million people for three hundred days - "long enough for the time-cycle of events after a nuclear attack to go through ...". Unless the American people are awakened to this situation, Carsten M. Haaland - a physicist at Oak Ridge National Laboratory - and Eugene P. Wigner - a member of the Department of Physics at Princeton University and winner of the Nobel Prize for Physics in 1963 - warn, "within the next few years the Soviets may very well engineer a serious confrontation in which they would be ready to emerge the victor". Only massive American counter-evacuation plans and a significant improvement in the US civil defence system, as already envisaged by former Secretary of Defence James Schlesinger, will re-establish American credibility vis-à-vis the risk-taking Soviet leaders.¹⁵² In the overall strategic planning of the Kremlin rulers, an important shift has thus occurred from Khrushchev to Brezhnev - away from minimum deterrence and non-contemplation of nuclear war because of the resultant "destruction of world civilization" including Soviet Russia, to insisting that "there is profound erroneousness and harm in the disorienting claims of bourgeois ideologues that there will be no victor in a thermo-nuclear world war". Brezhnev already asserted in 1967: "Let it be known to all that in a clash with any aggressor the Soviet Union will win a victory worthy of our great people."¹⁵³

National Liberation Movements and World Socialism

As a result of their determined efforts to upstage the West, the Soviets have gone a long way in effecting a possibly "irreversible" shift in the overall balance of power. In order to break down Western resistance to Moscow's expansive global policy and to demoralise "capitalist" leaders and peoples, the Soviets have developed a psychological momentum of success and prestige conveying to the outside world the impression of invincibility. Western inaction and indecision have, however, mainly been responsible for making the Soviets look successful. As the former Director of the US Defence Intelligence Agency, Daniel O. Graham, succinctly observed: "Successful, expanding tyrannies garner support from those they tyrannise."¹⁵⁴ Among other factors, the shift in the balance of world forces therefore largely depends on the intensification and expected success of national liberation movements in the Afro-Asian Ocean region in their "anti-imperialist struggle" against the United States and its already wavering allies. Soviet spokesmen are claiming that the balance of world forces is definitely shifting in favour of the Socialist-Communist bloc and the "progressive forces", and that "in our time, the main content, the main direction and the most outstanding peculiarities of world development are determined by the Soviet Union, the fraternal socialist countries and all present revolutionary forces". The political changes in the Third World are regarded as resulting from the "increased might of the Soviet Union ...". The power of the Red Army and Red Navy represent "an essential condition and guarantee for the most successful forward movement of the world revolutionary process".

It is therefore evident that Soviet Russia's military force structure is exerting a paralysing effect upon the West's ability to assist anti-Communist groups in the Third World. As General Yepishev, Head of Political Administration of the Soviet Armed Forces, remarked in 1974: "One cannot fail to see that the military might of the socialist community serves as an obstacle to the export of counter-revolution by the imperialists and thus objectively promotes the development of revolutionary and

liberation movements." Détente has certainly facilitated the upsurge of revolutionary and national liberation struggles and Moscow takes credit for having thwarted Western counter-revolutionary efforts aimed at suppressing and defeating national liberation movements. Therefore, the mobilising of revolutionary forces in the Third World has become one of the most potent weapons in the Soviet arsenal. The climate of détente has been utilised and exploited, according to Brezhnev's own admission, in order to convert "world socialism and the national liberation movement into an irresistible force". Soviet armed forces are furthermore viewed as a potent instrument in furthering Soviet foreign policy objectives. According to General Yepishev: "... in the present era ... a deepening of the external function of the Soviet Armed Forces has logically taken place". He goes on to argue that "by its social nature and historical design, the army of the Soviet socialist state represents part of the international revolutionary liberation forces... Today the defence of the socialist fatherland is closely tied to giving comprehensive assistance to national liberation movements, progressive regimes and new states who are fighting against imperialist domination".¹⁵⁵

Admiral Gorshkov on "Navies in War and Peace"

In the context of the external peace-time mission of the Soviet Armed Forces, the Red Navy has clearly come into its own following its spectacular development over the last decade. Soviet naval forces have been fashioned into a powerful instrument and are increasingly being employed in direct support of Moscow's revolutionising activities in the Third World. Admiral Gorshkov, for example, has stressed that the navy should be regarded as a "military factor which can be used in peacetime" and as "the solitary form of armed forces capable of protecting the interests of a country overseas". In a series of articles, carried in eleven instalments by *Morskoi Sbornik* (Naval Digest) in 1972/73 - comprising 56 000 words - he further elaborated on "Navies in War and Peace".¹⁵⁶

Gorshkov's articles have been compared to the seminal works on strategy by A. Svechin and Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiy. The Red Admiral explicates on the trends and principles of the change "in the role and position of navies in wars and also in their employment in peacetime as an instrument of state policy". He argues that the construction and maintenance of a viable and visible navy is required for status as a world power, and castigates the Tsars for having failed to grasp "the importance of a navy in the achievement of political objectives". Throughout, Gorshkov is keenly aware of the importance of overseas facilities and bases to the efficient combat operations of a blue-water fleet by any nation pursuing global responsibilities. He also fully realises that a system of overseas bases permits efficient peacetime deployments and sustained combat operations in war-time. Furthermore, he emphasises the effectiveness of carrier-strike forces in local, limited wars. The construction and launching of helicopter and aircraft carriers has therefore been a signal feature of recent Soviet naval developments. Having long ago evinced a growing awareness of the need for aircover for distant operations, the Soviet airforce has meanwhile undergone significant expansion, and its medium- and long-range airlift capacity has rapidly been improved. The Angolan intervention is a case in point - the Soviets have effectively demonstrated their ability to move in on short notice, and transport combat forces to sustain the struggle of indigenous revolutionary Communist movements on distant battlefields. Attention is also given to interventionary-type forces, to amphibious warfare and support forces.

Gorshkov is also acutely aware of the peacetime use of naval forces and insists that the navy reflects the level of "economic and scien-

tific-technical development of the state". Thus, in peace-time, deployed over the oceans of the world, it is "a unique indicator of the level of development and economic might of a country, and ... one of the factors of its ability to firmly hold a definite place among the world powers". Naval forces can ideally be employed to advance Soviet Russia's political objectives by "making a visible demonstration of force", putting "political pressure on other states" and supporting "the diplomatic moves of one's own country to deter potential enemies". The significance of spreading Communist ideological influence by visibly deploying Soviet naval units in Third World regions, is "impossible to over-estimate". As an instrument of a "policy of peace and friendship of peoples ... and a decisive opposition to the threats of the security of peace-loving peoples", the Red Navy - through official visits and port-calls - is "making a significant contribution to improving mutual relations between states and peoples and in strengthening the international authority of the Soviet Union".

In view of the slighting of the importance of the Cape sea route in recent writings by authors critical of South Africa's internal policies, it is highly revealing to record the considerable attention that Gorshkov devotes to maritime communications in the First and Second World Wars - and, by implication, in future conflicts. In his 1967 article, also published in *Morskoi Sbornik*, the Red Admiral highlighted the fact that "disruption of the ocean lines of communications, the special arteries that feed the military and economic potentials of these countries (the aggressive imperialist countries), has continued to be one of the most important of the fleet's missions". In contrast to the military doctrines that prevailed during the Khrushchev era, Gorshkov implies that future wars will be wars of attrition and prolonged military conflicts. Gorshkov's explanations and Soviet capabilities and deployment patterns, writes Woolridge, indicate "a tendency toward an offensively oriented doctrine".¹⁵⁷

In line with Gorshkov's injunctions, the Soviets are rapidly forging a military infrastructure in a host of littoral countries strategically located in the Afro-Asian Ocean region. They are strengthening their military posture in order to be prepared for any contingency - for limited conflicts and a long drawn-out global war. If developments continue to operate below the thresh-hold of military conflagration, the Soviet force structure in the Indian Ocean Plateau region will be a constant reminder of Soviet prowess, which offers a leverage to exert political pressure in shaping the destiny of Third World nations. The Soviets are going ahead to construct air and naval bases, bunkering, refuelling, storage and repair facilities; they are making arrangements in the defence sector and are implementing political decisions that must, as they are keenly aware, be taken before troops are actually given their marching orders in case of limited and global conflicts; and they are improving the command structure, linking the USSR to their client states in the region, with the objective to lend each other logistical support. As a consequence of massive military aid to Third World countries in this theatre, they are standardising arms and equipment of their Quisling armed forces, while communications and intelligence systems are also being brought into line. As a result of Soviet officers training the guerrilla and combat troops of their clients, the Soviets are furthermore standardising command principles and procedures. Moreover, and this point has repeatedly been stressed by Soviet spokesmen, the ideological indoctrination of the Third World armed forces is making rapid progress.

However, Western reaction to the USSR denying the "capitalist bloc" crucial strategic key positions, and to the Soviets thrusting forward with maritime expansion, has been lethargic. Moscow is acutely aware of the

West's dependence on sea-borne traffic and of the vital importance of essential minerals to its industrial development. The Kremlin's politico-military strategy is aimed at dramatically affecting the world balance of power. With the USSR being firmly entrenched in the Afro-Asian Ocean region, the Soviets would then have their hands on the West's jugular vein. What is therefore at stake is global power and Western weakness, disunity and vacillation bode ill for the survival of its end-values. If the Western world wants to maintain and revitalise its position, the risk for the opposing party must remain incalculable even in peace-time. The Soviet bloc forces though have been transformed into an increasingly powerful, flexible and responsive instrument with the aim of backing Soviet policy objectives all over the globe, taking advantage of crises and successfully backing up its proxies in waging war. The Communist bloc's military build-up serves the purpose of steeling the Bolshevik regime in its declared aim of becoming the world's predominant power. Moscow is trying to extend its influence in any possible way, and to realise this aspiration in the long-run, Gorshkov is teaching the Russian bear to swim.

Soviet Penetration of the Afro-Asian Ocean Region

With the general perception of US prestige battered on the Indochinese battlefields, and due to its failure to fulfil its responsibilities to its South Vietnamese ally - the American retreat from South East Asia had psychological, military, diplomatic and geopolitical domino effects upon the credibility of the United States throughout the world¹⁵⁸ - many regional powers, formerly closely co-operating with Washington, drew back from the United States.¹⁵⁹ But, in the wake of Soviet imperialistic ventures into the Afro-Asian region, many of these countries are now again seeking American support. Several of the littoral powers are fearful of Soviet attempts to envelope the African continent. Nevertheless, they voiced their concern about the credibility, reliability, steadfastness, consistency and direction of American foreign policy in general, and they were "appalled" by the United States' failure to take decisive actions in Angola. When Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller visited Tunisia, Iran, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand in March and April 1976, the political leaders of those countries impressed upon him the need to strengthen the American military presence in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean regions. The request to maintain and expand US naval capacity was one of the constant themes that Rockefeller encountered on his journey. The Shah of Iran specifically expressed the hope that the United States would build up its naval forces in the Afro-Indian Ocean.¹⁶⁰

The United States' perceived status as a world power has constantly been eroded. The widespread apprehension about American willingness and ability to sustain US commitment to counter Communist challenges to countries threatened by Soviet imperialism is understandable not only against the background of the Indochina debacle, but also in the light of the decline of visible American military power. The size of the US fleet has dropped from 976 ships at the height of the Vietnam war, to the present level of 479 combat and support ships and submarines, and is now at its smallest since the Second World War. The Navy has insisted that it needed at least 600 ships to offset the growing threat presented by the Red Star rising at sea. Chiefs of Naval Staff have repeatedly pointed to the fact that the Soviet fleet has, in the course of the last decade, acquired a capability to operate far from Soviet shores. Studies by the Joint Chiefs of Staff have placed the US requirement at about 750 ships. While the United States launched 263 naval vessels between 1962 and 1972, the USSR constructed 911. Some US naval planners have voiced the

opinion that the Red Fleet is now close to equalling the US Fleet, while some observers have argued that the Soviet Navy is already superior. All agree, however, that the Soviet naval leadership under Admiral Gorshkov is absolutely determined to wrest from the West what has long been regarded as their assured supremacy at sea. A recent estimate shows 2 050 naval vessels for the USSR and 508 for the United States, although this numerical imbalance is somewhat compensated for by the superiority of US naval technology, experience, quality of leadership and professional skills.¹⁶¹ The unfavourable balance has to some extent also been offset by the improvement in armaments, such as the latest US cruise missile.

Upon his retirement as US Chief of Naval Operations in 1975, Admiral Zumwalt had warned that if the 1973 Middle East war had escalated into a Soviet-American naval confrontation in the Mediterranean, the US fleet would have been defeated. He was quite emphatic that with forces supported by reduced Fiscal Year 1973 guidance, the US Navy could not - in case of maritime conflict with the USSR

- come to the assistance of Japan;
- would be compelled to abandon the Mediterranean and Western Pacific;
- and could only defend continental United States and overseas US territories.¹⁶²

Zumwalt's successor, Admiral James Holloway, informed Congress in 1975 that "if the United States is to maintain the (slim) margin of maritime superiority that we enjoy (over the Soviets) today, ... we must have a minimum of 600 active ships by the mid-1980's".¹⁶³ For budgetary reasons the US Defence Department, however, abandoned the long-standing objective of building up the Navy to 600 ships by the mid-1980's, which was still the intention in January 1976. On the heels of Moscow's imperialistic thrust into Africa though, Washington reappraised its position. President Ford asked Congress to add 1 200 million dollars to the budget in order to take the first step towards upgrading the Navy. When presenting his proposals to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld insisted that the United States still commanded "superior" naval power, but he went on to warn that Moscow was making every effort to reverse the still favourable maritime balance.¹⁶⁴ The US Congress, however, stalled.

Whether the United States is willing and in a position to act in a manner commensurate with the perceived status of a leading world power, must therefore be evaluated in the light of the erosion of American will-power, and within the context of the overall strategic military balance between the USSR and the United States. One stark fact immediately comes to mind, namely that the Soviet Union has rapidly surged ahead over the last ten years, and is in the process of overtaking the United States in strategic weaponry. In terms of numbers of ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles), the Soviets lagged 600 behind the United States in 1962, but have meanwhile forged ahead by 600. While in Polaris-type submarines they were 16 behind, they are presently 13 ahead. The United States' lead in heavy bombers has been reduced from 400 to 300, and in conventional-theatre forces, the Soviets have overcome an American headstart of 2 500 tactical aircraft - their production output has actually resulted in a Soviet lead of 350. Their already formidable lead in ground forces has also considerably increased, with another 21 divisions having been added.¹⁶⁵

The decade of the 1960's has therefore witnessed a dynamic expansion of Soviet conventional and strategic weapons systems, and a thrusting forward of Soviet maritime power in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. According to one authoritative source: "Between 1963 and 1966, Soviet Mediterranean forces increased tenfold." Soviet submarine operating days in the Mediterranean have reportedly been increased by 2 000 percent during the same period. A 1969 survey recorded that "the number of Soviet vessels in the Mediterranean varies between 25 and 60 and has included vessels which can land tanks, and a helicopter cruiser". Another survey of the same year contended that the overall Soviet maritime expansion had already made the Red Navy "larger than all the navies of Western Europe put together".¹⁶⁶ Likewise, Lord Balniel - British Minister of State - when opening the Parliamentary debate on government policy on 19 November 1970, pointed out: "Five years ago the average number of Soviet vessels (in the Mediterranean) was 3 surface warships, 3 submarines and 10 auxiliaries. This year it was 24 surface ships, at least 13 submarines and 24 auxiliaries. Five years ago there were no Soviet naval vessels in the Indian Ocean. This year there were 7 surface warships, at least 4 submarines, and 9 auxiliaries. The Soviet Union builds a nuclear submarine every 5 weeks."¹⁶⁷ Thus, the year 1969 actually marked the beginning of a tremendous build-up in Soviet naval power in the Afro-Asian Ocean region. US naval activity was rapidly falling behind Soviet naval operations in this theatre: USSR ship-days increased from 1 760 in 1968 to 8 543 in 1973, as compared with a similar increase in US ship-days from 1 688 in 1968 to 2 154 in 1973. Port-calls by Soviet vessels - as registered in 1968 and 1973, respectively - were 42 and 153, as against 71 and 115 US port-calls.¹⁶⁸

While the Soviet naval presence in the north-western region of the Afro-Asian Ocean was initially undoubtedly motivated, among other reasons, by defensive considerations - i.e. countering the potential threat emanating from Polaris submarine-launched missiles targeted on the central Soviet industrial heartland from this corner of the ocean - Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean have meanwhile assumed a decidedly offensive thrust, geared to assist revolutionary forces and to deter so-called counter-revolutionary operations that Western powers might be tempted to launch. The defensive aspect of Soviet naval activities in this region has fallen away, as a result of the United States having deployed submarine-launched missiles on its new generation of nuclear submarines with double the range of out-phased missiles. Following the Polaris system, the Poseidon nuclear submarines have become the backbone of US strategic capability. The new Trident system, furthermore, represents a substantial technological and strategic advance even over the Poseidon system. The long Trident submarine is faster and quicker than the Polaris submarine and it will carry 24 SLBM's (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles) - instead of the 16 of the Polaris/Poseidon submarines - each equipped with the General Electric Mk 500 MARV warhead (Manoeuvrable Re-entry Vehicle). The Trident missile will have a true intercontinental range of more than 5 000 nautical miles, or 5 750 statute miles. As Desmond J. Ball observes: "... the Trident submarines will virtually always be 'on station' - even while in port".¹⁶⁹ The Trident's SLBM-system therefore no longer necessitates the deployment of US strategic nuclear submarines in the north-western corner of the Afro-Asian Ocean. Because of its intercontinental range, the new generation of Trident submarines can operate from the Pacific Ocean, reaching any target in the Soviet Union. Its deadly power is increased further by the fact that the Trident system has a hard-target counterforce capability.¹⁷⁰

Since a degree of historical continuity in Tsarist and Soviet Mediterranean, Middle East and, by extension, Indian Ocean objectives can be presumed to affect Soviet interests in the regions to the south of the USSR, it should be stressed that developments since 1917 have brought about a variety of new conditions. While natural heirs to the Tsars' aspirations in these areas, Bolshevik Russia fashioned its own approach to, and charted its own course of action in these regions, in keeping with the bold aspirations of Soviet imperial Communism. Several routes, traversed by Soviet naval units, actually lead into the Afro-Asian Ocean:

- through the Atlantic around the Cape (Northern Fleet via the Cape route: 11 200 miles, and via the Suez route: 7 300 miles; the Baltic Fleet via the Cape route: 10 800 miles, and via the Suez route: 6 900 miles);
- from Vladivostok through the Indian Ocean, past Japan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore; and
- from the Black Sea through the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal and the Red Sea (Black Sea Fleet via the Cape route: 10 400 miles, and via the Suez Canal and Red Sea route: 3 300 miles).

In view of the relatively short distance from Black Sea ports into the Indian Ocean, Soviet naval planners and political strategists have therefore worked incessantly towards exerting influence over the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East. Besides the strategic implications, the Soviets have unfailingly recognised the importance of the Middle East's petroleum wealth. Patiently, persistently and step-by-step, Moscow has - over the last three decades - with varying degrees of success attempted to secure the strategic "penetration axis" from the Black Sea across the Mediterranean, and from there through the Suez Canal into the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. While Soviet naval operations along this strategic line will most likely be disrupted and severed by Western maritime power in times of war, Soviet naval power will be able - within the contemporary international environment of nuclear stalemate and strategic "parity" - to render far-reaching assistance to the Kremlin leaders in their determined drive to extend Soviet influence by the well-tested means of wars of national liberation, subversion, fomenting of instability and chaos, military aid and hot diplomacy.¹⁷¹

Hampering and/or halting the flow of Middle East petroleum westward and to Japan has always been one of Moscow's main objectives in the pursuit of its Middle East policy. In line with this goal, the Kremlin has done its utmost to keep the Middle East in turmoil. For this reason, one could have expected the USSR to do everything in its power to wreck Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" in the Middle East, as the Soviets assisted the North Vietnamese in demolishing the South East Asian "peace" settlement of January 1973. Although the Soviets have suffered setbacks in recent years in the Arab world - with the United States having seemingly made inroads and recouped some of its lost prestige and influence - "it is the ultimate failure of US Middle East policy on which the Soviet Union counts, with considerable reason, and for which she is waiting".¹⁷²

Since the Arab fiasco in the Six Day War of 1967, the Soviets have made every effort to gain a toehold, then to establish a foothold, and finally to consolidate their presence in the Red Sea and in the Horn of Africa, where the USSR presently seems firmly entrenched.¹⁷³ Today, Moscow

is wielding almost total control over Somalia and the so-called Democratic Republic has been virtually converted into a Soviet satellite. Having swept away the old regime in October 1969, the military junta has since then introduced revolutionary policies with the objective to create a system based on "Marxism-Leninism".¹⁷⁴ President Barre has furthermore turned to the USSR for aid in implementing his revolutionary programme. In a speech in July 1972, at the Halane Political Orientation Centre for Somali officials, he rejected "African Socialism" and all other forms of socialism - except Marxism-Leninism - outright, as the foundation on which to base Somalia's socio-political structure. Yuri Andropov, chairman of the KGB, also visited the capital Mogadishu to aid the Barre regime in reorganising the intelligence and security services of Somalia; dissident officers were deported to the USSR for "training" - a euphemism for brainwashing; Somali students were drilled in organisational and ideological tasks in Soviet Russia; and three-month political "orientation programmes" were carried out under Soviet direction. In addition, some 60 percent of Somalia's officer corps has been trained in the USSR. In February 1972, Soviet Defense Minister Grechko visited Mogadishu where he signed an agreement which was to have far-reaching implications; he promised assistance in improving the airstrip and the port of Berbera in return for future access to these facilities. Consequently, Berbera is presently the one port where Soviet naval units operating in the Indian Ocean can anchor at will for replenishment of supplies and emergency repairs.

Collaboration between Moscow and Mogadishu climaxed in the signing of the Soviet-Somali Friendship Treaty of July 1974. Soviet President Podgorny reportedly presented Somalia with a squadron of seven MIG-21 fighters, bringing the total number of Somalian combat aircraft to about 50. Somalia's 17 000-man armed forces are well-equipped with Soviet weapons and an estimated 2 500 Soviet military advisers are swarming across the country. Bunkering and refuelling facilities for the Red Navy have been constructed in the strategically located deep-water port of Berbera, with part of the area closed off to Somalians. Commenting on Podgorny's visit and the signing of the Soviet-Somali Friendship Treaty, V. Shmarov stated that the event would serve as "an example of a new type of inter-governmental relations" based on the "unity of goals in the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle and on a common stand on many current international issues". All this had created "objective prerequisites for bringing the friendly ties between the two countries to a qualitatively new and higher stage".¹⁷⁵

Thus, the closing of the Suez Canal caused the Soviets to concentrate on transforming Somalia into a client-state. The realisation that Egyptian airbases and port facilities might sooner or later be closed to them also compelled Moscow to search for more pliant collaborators. When reports were published in the international press to the effect that the Soviets were constructing bases in Somalia, President Barre rejected these allegations as "lies and utter nonsense".¹⁷⁶ But in April 1975, the US Defence Department received information confirming rumours that the Soviets were stockpiling missiles in the Berbera naval installation, ranging from the SS-N-1 (range 200 miles) to the SS-N-5 (range 700 miles). Some analysts even voiced their fears that the Soviets were in a position to block the exits from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea in times of crisis. But, while Moscow and Mogadishu denied these reports vehemently, Washington was not placated. President Barre subsequently invited two US congressional delegations for an on the spot investigation. According to Senator Dewey F. Bartlett, the first delegation - which in-

cluded several military officers and a Pentagon official - discovered evidence which "absolutely confirmed" that the USSR was installing a missile facility in Berbera.¹⁷⁷ It seems therefore that the Soviet entrenchment in Somalia is a major gain for Moscow's Africa and Indian Ocean policy.

To avoid future embarrassments - such as confronted the Kremlin when it unleashed Castro's brigades on Angola - Moscow may well contemplate giving one of its African clients the marching orders, and instructing Somalia's President Barre to dispatch his fighting forces to the embattled sub-continent. According to reports, Presidents Nyerere of Tanzania and Machel of Mozambique have already tried to persuade Barre to make his 2 700-man airforce, with its 52 Soviet combat aircraft, available for the struggle against Rhodesia. Yet, Moscow is keeping Barre on the leash and it seems that the Somali armed forces will only be engaged in the Southern African conflict once the Kremlin is assured of OAU support. Moscow thus insists on Black Africa taking the lead¹⁷⁸ - any Western intervention would then pit the United States against Black Africa, assembled under the umbrella of the OAU. The threatening implications of antagonising the Black continent is therefore calculated to deter any so-called counter-revolutionary activities on the part of the "capitalist bloc". To force Black African states to take sides and openly declare their solidarity with the Kremlin, was really behind Moscow's lobbying and rounding up potential supporters for its Angolan client at the emergency meeting of the OAU at Addis Ababa in January 1976.

Major upheavals have occurred in Ethiopia, Somalia's neighbour. In September 1974, the monarchy was toppled and a revolutionary provisional government was set up, while socialism was proclaimed to be the guiding principle of the revolution. As Berhau Bayith, member of the Ethiopian Provisional Military Administrative Council, bluntly stated: "Our irreversible aim is socialism, and when we speak of socialism we mean scientific socialism based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the doctrine of proletarian dictatorship ...".¹⁷⁹ Meanwhile the Dergue - the Ethiopian military committee - is energetically pushing towards achieving its aim of converting the country into yet another Soviet base on the African continent. The US communications station in Ethiopia has already been closed down, while Kenya's position might become ever more untenable, threatened as it is by being sandwiched between both pro-Soviet Somalia and Uganda. With Kenya constituting the only American fallback position on the African Indian Ocean coast, this nation is likely to become the target of increasing revolutionary activities.¹⁸⁰

Cuban pilots and combat forces are not only stationed in Somalia, but they have meanwhile joined Soviet military personnel in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf area as part of a general build-up of Soviet strength.¹⁸¹ Cuban pilots are reported to be training airmen in the southern part of Yemen, and Cuban advisers reinforced Arab guerrillas fighting Omani forces in the Dhofar district of Oman, located on the strategic Straits of Hormuz. In the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), the Soviets have also established a foothold. United States, Western European and Israeli intelligence sources are unanimous in their agreement that Soviet and Cuban activities in this region are aimed at securing military superiority and at establishing a beachhead to support revolutionary movements in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf area. To intimidate and possibly cajole the policy-makers of the littoral states, Soviet naval power is furthermore prominently displayed. Moscow has therefore moved major naval units into the north-western region of the Afro-Asian Ocean.

The 18 000 ton missile-armed helicopter cruiser, Leningrad, is making regular port-calls in Somalia and also Mauritius.¹⁸² The Soviets have also been keen to acquire naval facilities in the PDRY, especially to establish control over Aden by making this port a link between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Already in 1973, a Soviet naval group was reported to have inspected the Mukallah coastline. Today the Soviets enjoy special privileges in Aden; Soviet vessels no longer require permission to enter the harbour or to follow safety precautions. In February 1973 too, Soviet submarines paid a series of visits to Socotra. Subsequently, large quantities of fuel were stored there for refuelling purposes; the airstrip at Ras Karma was extended, and large stocks of Soviet aviation fuel were bunkered near the former Royal Air Force barracks at Muri, north of Ras Karma.¹⁸³

The Soviet-backed Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) is threatening the Dhofar district, neighbouring the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Because of the strategic position of Oman, the Shah of Iran dispatched troops to fight off the insurgents, and to counter Soviet influence along the southern rim of the Arabian Peninsula, Oman and Iran have entered into a naval agreement, thereby extending Teheran's presence in the Straits of Hormuz. The declared aim of the agreement is to contain subversion and to repel aggressive intruders. None of the Indian Ocean littoral countries, however, can match the power and capabilities of the major external nations that can project overwhelming technological superiority. Especially for a super-power like Soviet Russia, the advantages of establishing paramountcy appear very tempting. The only regional power that has the political, military and economic capacity to play a major role in Indian Ocean affairs therefore clearly seems to be Iran.¹⁸⁴ And so, in order to undermine the revolutionary momentum of radical activists and to gain the allegiance of the masses, the Shah has promulgated his so-called "White Revolution". This is complemented by an ambitious foreign policy, radiating out in concentric circles from Teheran, of which the final objective is to propel Iran into the ranks of the global powers. The Shah has furthermore demonstrated his determination to shape a favourable political situation throughout the Afro-Asian Ocean region, which extends from the Persian Gulf into the Middle East and South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.¹⁸⁵

The Shah is primarily concerned with creating regional security and stability, and fighting off Soviet-inspired revolutionary activities and subversion. Traditionally, Iran has faced a major threat to its security from the north, i.e. from Tsarist Russia and Bolshevik Russia. In 1920, Soviet armed forces invaded the country; in 1945/46, approximately 50 000 Soviet troops were stationed on Iranian territory, actively involved in backing up the revolutionary secessionist movement; at the beginning of the 1950's, Moscow supported the Mossadegh regime and the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party in their combined onslaught on the monarchy. Though on the surface Soviet-Iranian relations have improved - partly necessitated by the Shah's perceiving a loss of will and steadfastness on the part of the United States - the monarch's deep-seated suspicions¹⁸⁶ of Moscow's long-range objective in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf area have been aroused by the Kremlin's stepped-up overt and clandestine activities, often carried out by its proxies and agents. Iran's security interests are, moreover, directly affected by the bellicosity of the Soviet-backed Iraqi Baath regime, and the escalation of guerrilla warfare on the Arabian Peninsula.

Disturbing developments are also happening on Iran's eastern border.

In 1973, Sardar Mohammed Daud toppled the monarchy and proclaimed a republic in Afghanistan. Moscow immediately extended diplomatic recognition, while *Pravda* announced that this act was guided by "unfailing feelings of friendship for the Afghan people".¹⁸⁷ Moscow radio applauded "the desire of Afghan patriots to achieve more rapid advancement" and lambasted "imperialist propaganda" for portraying the coup as "a victory for the Soviet Union over the USA and China".¹⁸⁸ Western analysts immediately reacted with alarm; Walter Schwarz of *The Guardian*, reflecting the viewpoint of Western diplomats, commented on the fact that the coup was regarded as a setback for the West and a distinct advantage for the USSR - the new Head of State was actually known to be pro-Soviet.¹⁸⁹ C.L. Sulzberger, of *The International Herald Tribune*, argued that the dramatic changes in Afghanistan might well tip the ultimate power balance in the region: "Under both czars and commissars Russian authority has been lurching gradually southward toward the Indian Ocean for a century. It has clearly aimed at weakening Afghanistan's neighbour, Pakistan, since that state was formed in 1947 when the Indian sub-continent was partitioned."¹⁹⁰ The Chinese were highly disturbed by the coup, "viewing it as another move in a Soviet drive southward to the Indian Ocean", and were convinced that the coup had been instigated by Moscow as part of a Soviet move to oust US influence from the region.¹⁹¹

Afghanistan indeed occupies a geopolitical and strategic position of greatest significance, bordering on Iran, China, the USSR and Pakistan. Since the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, both Teheran and Islamabad have paid increasing attention to the attitude adopted by the Daud regime in Kabul. Consequently, the coup was interpreted as yet another step towards the ultimate objective of encircling Iran. Soviet aid to Kabul exceeds that of all other donor nations combined and the Afghan armed forces are Soviet-trained and equipped with Soviet weaponry. Thus, Teheran views with heightened alarm the distinct possibility of the USSR driving a wedge south towards the Indian Ocean by mobilising and exploiting the irredentist feelings of the Pashtunis sprawling along the Afghan-Pakistan border. President Daud has already opened the Pashtunistan Pandora's box by staking out his claims to Pakistani territory and since the coup, Afghan-Pakistani relations have been strained to breaking point.¹⁹² To contain Soviet influence from extending further and entrenching itself in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf region, Afghanistan and India, the Shah has actively been trying to wean these countries away from the USSR by rendering financial and economic assistance, thereby reducing the nations' dependence upon Soviet aid. The Shah's "historic" visit to Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia and India has signalled his intention to extend Iranian influence throughout the Afro-Asian Ocean region.¹⁹³

A Soviet network of naval and air facilities, communications centres, mooring buoys and floating harbours spans the Indian Ocean. Moscow has entered into an agreement on technical assistance and fisheries with the Prime Minister of Mauritius, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam. The Soviets are casting covetous eyes on the Seychelles Islands, Singapore and the Maldives. In Singapore, Soviet involvement in the economic and financial life of the nation has been augmented. Soviet-oriented Communists are enlarging their underground activities, increasingly penetrating the country's seamen's and docker's unions. The Sri Lanka Government, in spite of its non-aligned status, is towing Moscow's line on substantive foreign policy issues. India's bias in favour of the USSR has become ever more pronounced since the signing of the Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty of 1971. While castigating US naval activities, however limited, in the Afro-Asian

Ocean, former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi commented repeatedly on the peaceful intentions of Soviet maritime operations in the region. She is reported to have stated in Cuttack (Orissa, India) on 9 February 1974, that on foreign policy issues the ruling Congress Party and the Soviet-controlled Communist Party of India were in basic agreement. The dictatorial Indian regime was furthermore providing naval facilities for Soviet vessels and submarines, and Soviet "naval engineers" were attached to Indian dockyards. The increasingly outspoken anti-American and anti-British posture adopted by the former Prime Minister was moreover applauded by the Communist Party of India, which was confident that the "emergency" legislation that empowered Indira Gandhi to wield almost total power would significantly brighten the party's prospects of pushing its designs.¹⁹⁴

However, having trounced the Congress Party in the March 1977 national election, the four-party opposition alliance of the Janata (People's) Party might be less inclined to pursue Indira Gandhi's indulgent and sometimes benevolent policy towards Soviet Russia. Even during the tail-end of the former Prime Minister's tenure of office, suspicions and doubts began to creep into what had been a self-deluding conception about the nature of the domestic and external Communist alliance partners. Soviet influence, having operated via the transmission belts of the CPI (Indian Communist Party) and the left-wing elements of the then ruling Congress Party, will probably now be diminished. The incoming administration of Prime Minister Morarji Desai is committed to a policy of strict non-alignment, which might necessitate a reassessment of the implications flowing from the Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty concluded by its predecessor. Desai has already issued a warning that is bound to upset the long-range calculations of the Kremlin strategists: "If the Treaty involves any threat to our friendship with other powers, then it will have to change. It would then be for Russia to do whatever it wants." The new Prime Minister therefore seems to be quite reluctant to ride the Red Bear, whose claws - clutching to the littoral regions of the Afro-Indian Ocean - might well be clipped. With the possible threat of Moscow losing its influence in the Indian sub-continent, the Kremlin rulers will do everything in their power to consolidate their position in the western sphere of the Afro-Indian Ocean. With setbacks in India looming, Soviet Russia is likely to tighten its grip on the littoral states of East Africa and, thereby, cancel out its losses by stepped-up penetration of those parts of the African sub-continent which control the strategic waterways from the Afro-Indian to the Atlantic Ocean.¹⁹⁵

Towards the East, Moscow's proxies are vigorously pursuing their revolutionary aims in Thailand and Malaysia. The immediate objectives of the guerrilla forces aims at the weakening and then the destruction of the state apparatus of these countries, to be replaced by the "dictatorship of the proletariat".¹⁹⁶ Fully aware of the fact that any turbulence in the Indian Ocean is going to affect Australian interests and security, the Fraser Government has reversed the appeasement policy of the Labour regime headed by the former Prime Minister Gough Whitlam. Canberra is thus co-operating more closely with regional powers and the United States.¹⁹⁷ Similarly, some pro-Western littoral countries are well disposed towards the United States using Diego Garcia - an atoll in the middle of the Indian Ocean - as a communications centre, as well as a naval and air base. They have also approved the announcement made by the former US Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger, that the American Navy would establish a "pattern of regular visits into the Indian Ocean and we expect that our presence there will be more frequent and more regular than

in the past".¹⁹⁸ Also of great significance in the drive to regain the momentum that has been wrested from the Western powers by the USSR, are the 1974 naval manoeuvres "Midlink", involving the most up-to-date naval units of Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Britain and the United States. These manoeuvres re-invigorated the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). The French intention of joining Britain in patrolling the Indian Ocean and protecting the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope also testifies to France reactivating its interests in the region.¹⁹⁹

Flashpoints have erupted all along the extended rim of the Afro-Asian Ocean in recent years. But the most dramatic unfolding of Moscow's imperialistic designs has occurred in Southern Africa. From aggravating disorder and fomenting chaos, the Soviet Union has moved to the overt imposition of "Marxist-Leninist" regimes on Mozambique and Angola, and economic and military aid is flowing into these states to bolster the shaky regimes. Their past experience in Eastern Europe, in Cuba and in Somalia has convinced the Soviets that the eventual consolidation of totalitarian power largely hinges not on winning the allegiance of the masses, but on foisting a tightly organised security and intelligence system upon the hapless nations. Consequently, Soviet and East German security specialists are actively engaged in creating this very infrastructure in Mozambique and Angola.²⁰⁰ Determined efforts to secure the internal position of the Neto and Machel regimes are reinforced by tying these countries to the Soviet bloc economically, by structuring the armed forces along the lines of the Soviet pattern, and by making their dependence on Soviet military aid complete. The Angolan-Soviet Friendship Treaty of October 1976, and the joint Soviet-Mozambique agreements of May 1976, are signposts pointing in this direction.²⁰¹

Moscow has come a long way since the Leipzig Congress (East Germany) issued its declaration in 1957: "The imperialists, chased out of Asia, have found in Africa sources of profit which could give them time to catch their breath."²⁰² Once having established bases in Angola and Mozambique, the Soviets are provided with means for waging revolutionary warfare against Rhodesia, South West Africa and the Republic of South Africa. For them, their bid for power in the sub-continent could not have come at a more appropriate time. With growing apprehension Moscow has closely watched the meandering course of Pretoria's "dialogue" and "détente" policies. The Kremlin leaders feared that the outward-reaching policy might have worked in time, with both White and Black Africans gaining mutual benefits. However, the seizure of power by Neto and Machel has assured Moscow of being able effectively to block and wreck any attempt at fostering long-term reconciliation among the antagonists on the sub-continent. Thus, Moscow's intention to sharpen the polarisation and to hasten the process of radicalisation has already borne fruit at the Dar-es-Salaam meetings of the so-called "front-line presidents" in September and November 1976.²⁰³ In return for its "fraternal" assistance, the Luanda and Maputo regimes will grant the USSR naval and air bases and facilities that will improve Moscow's ability to achieve a stranglehold on the Cape route and the South Atlantic. With alarm Western experts have reacted to reports that the USSR is embarking on constructing an air refuelling and servicing base on Bazaruto Island, off the Mozambique coast between Beira and Maputo. The Soviets would thus not only be in a position to threaten a large area of Southern Africa, but they would also be strategically placed - from a psychological viewpoint - to deter any South African "counter-revolutionary" moves in case of a massive Soviet-inspired, Black Africa-fuelled onslaught on the whole of the sub-continent.²⁰⁴ The Soviets are also eyeing the most important deep-water

port of Nacala in Mozambique, which is not only the finest natural harbour in the world, but is also linked to the African rail network and has a first rate airport. Nacala moreover commands the channel between Madagascar and Mozambique.²⁰⁵ From Lobito, Luanda and Benguela, the Soviets will likewise be able to project their power and influence throughout the South Atlantic Ocean region.

Thus, while the West is in disarray, the Soviet leaders are supremely confident about their ability to shape the destiny of the huge masses of the Third World. Western weakness and vacillation and Soviet power-consciousness have been high-lighted by Brezhnev, when addressing the Meeting of European Communist and Workers' Parties in East Berlin on 29 June 1976: "An important distinguishing factor of the period we are living in is the fact that these changes in today's Europe are taking place against a background of the deepening general crisis of capitalism. It should be emphasised here that this is by no means solely an economic crisis, it is also a political and moral crisis. It is increasingly convincing the masses that capitalism is a society without a future and is thereby augmenting the number of advocates of the other, socialist path There is no doubt that the contribution of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America to the cause of peace and progress is growing".²⁰⁶ The Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee, evaluating the results of the East Berlin conference, identified "the main revolutionary forces, the socialist states, the workers' movement in the capitalist countries and the national liberation movement ... (as) capable, together with all democratic peace-loving forces, of overcoming the resistance of reaction ...".²⁰⁷ Moscow has thus signalled its firm determination to torpedo any resolution of the Southern African conflict situation that fails to yield results conducive to the Kremlin's long-range Third World policy. Likewise, the Soviet-controlled ANC of South Africa and the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) held an important meeting, entitled "The Emergency International Conference of Solidarity with the Peoples of South Africa", where a revolutionary strategy was charted which aimed at overwhelming the last bastions on the sub-continent resistant to Moscow's policy of conquest. It was the biggest international conference of Communists ever held in Africa: 160 delegates from 60 countries and 16 international organisations assembled at the *Africa Unity Hall* in Addis Ababa, the birthplace of the OAU. The "Programme of Action" called for the closest co-operation among the "national liberation movements" in their last battle against "racism" in Rhodesia, South West Africa and the Republic of South Africa.²⁰⁸

World Communism may be a myth - and has probably always been a myth - but Soviet Communist imperialism has become a stark reality in contemporary international politics. Milovan Djilas, a former member of the Politbureau of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, has termed the USSR "the only imperialist state" left in the world. It has kept "all pillage gained during Stalin's reign"²⁰⁹, and is presently reaching out to add to its imperial spoils. Flowing from its claustrophobic mania, the Soviet ruling clique has always felt embattled and endangered, and it can only cure this deep-seated sense of insecurity by continuous expansion. There is therefore no real distinction to be drawn between the national interest of the Soviet Union and the claims of Moscow's revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideology - they are merely two sides of the same coin. Peaceful coexistence may be the Kremlin's slogan, but struggle, war and the aggravation of tensions are Soviet totalitarianism's political sustenance.

There is therefore a distinct danger that the Soviet chain, forged out of political, ideological, military, economic and naval links - already enveloping the Afro-Asian Ocean region - will be pulled ever tighter. If the USSR succeeds in establishing its paramountcy in this vast theatre, then Captain Mahan's prediction that the Afro-Asian Ocean realm has the greatest potential to produce major shifts in the global balance of power may prove to be disastrously accurate. The revolutionary Third World movements, with their deeply ingrained animosity towards the West, will act as catalysts in helping Moscow to deal a devastating blow to the prestige and authority of the West globally. The Third World neurosis will not be cured, but the pain will be soothed by finally being able to humble the Occidental World. Soviet naval power will thus be instrumental as a "midwife" in the creation and shaping of a de-Europeanised and oriental despotic Afro-Asian World.²¹⁰

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28. Institute for the Study of Conflict, *Angola after Independence: Struggle for Supremacy* (Conflict Studies No. 64), November 1975. See also Osipov, V., "Détente and its Opponents", *Izvestia*, 22 May 1976, p. 4; "Détente is not a Barrier on the Path of National Liberation Movements and Progressive Social and Political Transformations ...", abstracted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XXVII, No. 22, 25 June, 1976, p. 8; and on détente favouring the various national liberation movements, *USSR and Third World*, Vol. 4, 1974, p. 43.
29. On Brezhnev's dialectical approach to détente with Europe, see Kaplan, Morton A. (ed.), *Isolation or Interdependence? Today's Choice for Tomorrow's World*, The Free Press, New York, 1975, p. 22; "Secret Speech: Did Brezhnev come Clean?", *Boston Globe*, 11 February, 1977, as cited in *National Review*, 4 March, 1977, pp. 248-49; also Rühle, Hans, "Sicherheitspolitische Probleme der Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit (KSZE)", *Politische Studien*, Vol. 24, 1973, pp. 246ff.
30. On Lenin's and Stalin's attitude towards the colonial world, see Thornton, Thomas Perry (ed.), *The Third World in Soviet Perspective:*

Studies by Soviet Writers on the Developing Areas, Princeton University, Princeton (NJ), 1964, *passim*.

31. The text of Lin Piao's speech has been reprinted in Griffith, Samuel B., *Peking and People's Wars: An Analysis of Statements by Official Spokesmen of the Chinese Communist Party on the Subject of Revolutionary Strategy*, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966, pp.51-114.
32. The terminology is that used in Lin Piao's speech.
33. Stackelberg, Georg A. von, "Peaceful Coexistence between the Communists and the National Bourgeoisie", *Bulletin* (Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich), Vol. VII, July 1960, pp. 3-10.
34. As quoted by Stackelberg, Georg A. von, "The Soviet Concept of the Revolutionary Democratic State and its Political Significance", *Bulletin* (Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich), Vol. XIII, No. 4, April 1966, p. 12.
35. *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 6, No. 6, June 1963, p. 4.
36. Soviet writers are loath to use this term that has gained credence in the Western world, particularly in the United States, during the Nixon era.
37. Khrushchev's speech to the 20th Party Congress, 1956.
38. Korean-type wars were uppermost in Khrushchev's mind.
39. Sokolovskiy, Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D., *Soviet Military Strategy* (edited by Harriet Fast Scott), Crane, Russak and Co., Inc., 1975. This is the third edition of Sokolovskiy's by now classic study on military strategy. The Marshal closely follows Khrushchev's and his successors' definition of national liberation wars when he states: "... national liberation wars, civil wars and other popular wars aimed at the repulsion of aggressive predatory attacks of the imperialists, at the fight for freedom and independence. Such wars are the opposite of imperialist wars and are just, liberating and revolutionary. Both imperialist and national liberation civil wars in size, are small, local wars", *ibid.*, p. 183.
40. Since the mid-1950's, the range of "just" wars has been reduced to wars of national liberation and to popular uprisings and/or civil wars.
41. This aspect has been more fully explored by Kunert, Dirk, "National Socialism and Soviet 'Peace' Policy: On the Origins of the Cold War: The Interwar Years" (60pp.), edited by Professor C. Carey of Georgetown University, Washington, DC, and to be published in an anthology on the "Cold War".
42. Neumann, Sigmund, "Engels and Marx: Military Concepts of the Social Revolution", in Earle, Edward M., Craig, Gordon and Gilbert, Felix (eds.), *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ), 1941, p. 156.
43. Black, Cyril E. and Thornton, Thomas P. (eds.), *Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Use of Political Violence*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ), 1964, p. 426.

44. Early in his chequered, fundamentally callous career - on this aspect, see Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandre, *Lenin in Zurich*, Farr, New York, 1976 - Lenin had stressed the importance of mobilising the "oppressed peoples" under the banner of Communist-led national liberation movements. See Page, Stanley W., *Lenin and World Revolution*, New York University Press, New York, 1959, pp. 135ff; and also Lenin, V., *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, International Publishers, New York, 1939, originally published during the First World War. Already in 1916, Lenin had castigated Rosa Luxemburg's, Liebknecht's and Mehring's notion that wars of national liberation were invariably wrong in that they played into the hands of imperialists and reactionaries. "Wars of national liberation against the imperialist powers" he insisted, "are not only possible but probable; they are inevitable, progressive and revolutionary", as quoted in Pomeroy, William J. (ed.), *Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism*, International Publishers, New York, 1968, pp. 107-108. Similar points were made by Stalin, Joseph, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question: A Collection of Articles and Speeches*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1936. There is thus an uninterrupted commitment to wars of national liberation, from Lenin through Stalin and Khrushchev to Brezhnev.
45. Declaration of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties Meeting, Moscow, 1960.
46. Tri-Continental Conference, Havana (Cuba), January 1966.
47. Strausz-Hupé, Robert, et. al., *Protracted Conflict: A Challenging Study of Communist Strategy*, Harper and Row, Colophon Books, New York, 1963, p. 54.
48. Ponomarev, Boris, *op. cit.* On Soviet foreign policy guidelines, as adopted at the 24th Party Congress, see also Meissner, Boris, "Foreign Policy at the Moscow Party Congress", *op. cit.*, pp. 270ff.
49. Increasingly, the Soviet "military-industrial complex" is exerting influence upon the shaping of Bolshevik foreign policy; its representation in the Central Committee and in the Politbureau has been strengthened over the last few years; and a functionary of this formidable group, Dimitri Fyodorovich Ustinov, has succeeded the late Marshal Grechko as Defence Minister - *Pravda*, 30 April, 1976, and *Izvestia*, 1 May 1976. Scholarly discussion on this issue has been carried out in a series of articles; see Aspaturian, Vernon V., "The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex - Does it Exist?", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 26, 1972, pp. 1ff; Lee, William T., "The Politico-Military-Industrial Complex", *op. cit.*, pp. 73ff; Jacobs, Walter D., "Soviet Strategic Effectiveness", *op. cit.*, pp. 60ff; Mackintosh, Malcolm, "The Soviet Military's Influence on Foreign Policy", and McDonnell, John, "The Soviet Defense Industry as a Pressure Group", in McCwire, Michael, et. al., *Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1975, pp. 23ff and pp. 87ff; Mackintosh, Malcolm, "The Soviet Military", *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 22, 1973, pp. 1ff; and Drachkovitch, Milorad M., "The Selling of the Soviet Pentagon", *National Review* (New York), 29 June, 1971, pp. 694-96.
50. Moscow, 24 February to 5 March, 1976.

51. Meissner, Boris, "Foreign Policy at the 25th Congress of the CPSU", *Aussenpolitik*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1976, p. 145. On the influence wielded by Ponomarev, Suslov and Sarodov, Senior Editor of the authoritative Communist journal *World Marxist Review*, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-47. For a recent revolutionary volley by Politbureau member and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, M.A. Suslov, see his "Our Epoch is the Epoch of the Triumph of Marxism-Leninism" (address to the general meeting of the USSR Academy of Science), *Pravda*, 18 March, 1976, as reprinted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 11, 14 April, 1976, p. 1f. On factionalism in the Politbureau, see Kaplan, Morton A., *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22.
52. Brezhnev, L.I., Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Affairs", *op. cit.*, pp. 8ff - "1. Further Strengthening of Friendship and Co-operation with Socialist Countries", pp. 15ff; "2. Greater Co-operation with the Liberated Countries: Their Increasing Role in World Development", pp. 20ff; and "3. Development of Relations with the Capitalist States".
53. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
54. *Ibid.*
55. For the legion of, one is almost inclined to say, professional "Nixon-haters", the Watergate affair had something of a self-fulfilling prophecy, i.e. Watergate was manipulated into an affair finally to prove that the often bandied around epithet "tricky Dick" was more than an expression of a deep-seated prejudice on their part. Many practitioners of power were "at a loss why one could make so much fuss about such an affair" - Mao Tse-tung to Pompidou, Peking, 12 September, 1972. The transcript of the Mao-Pompidou conversation has been published under the heading "Ich begreife das chinesische Volk nicht ganz", *Der Spiegel*, No. 39, 20 September, 1976, p. 142. Mao also confided in Pompidou that Kissinger did not strike him as being "very intelligent", *op. cit.*, p. 144. This assessment is not only intuitively felt by many observers, but is shared by one of Kissinger's more brilliant colleagues who judges the Secretary of State a shallow intellect; see Liska, George, *Beyond Kissinger: Ways of Conservative Statecraft*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1975. In a for some infuriatingly sober judgment, Max Beloff argues that once we have gained some kind of perspective, "... the main comment of historians (on Watergate) would concern the utter triviality of the issues". Beloff's characterisation of the *Washington Post* is as forthright as it is devastating - "... little more for most of the time than a dreary parish magazine: if one is confined to it as a source of news, one soon forgets not only the rest of the inhabited world but even the rest of the United States"; and on *The New York Times* - "... (it) can hardly avoid doing better, but it is so poorly written and set out, is so clearly an example of the evils of progressive elephantiasis - helped by its virtual monopoly position - that no one can regard it as a source of intellectual stimulation"; Beloff, Max, "America after Watergate: The Dangers of Constitutional Utopianism", *The Round Table*, No. 257, January 1975, pp. 32-33.
56. Brezhnev, L.I., *op. cit.*, pp. 32ff - "5. The CPSU and the World Revolutionary Process".

57. *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 3, 1967, p. 113.
58. Shinn, William T., Jr., "The National Democratic State: A Communist Programme for Less-Developed Areas", *World Politics*, Vol. 15, No. 3, April 1963, pp. 387-88; Morris, Milton D., "The Soviet Africa Institute and the Development of African Studies", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 11, 1973, pp. 247ff. The Director of the Africa Institute in Moscow, Professor Solodovnikov, was appointed Soviet Ambassador to Lusaka in 1976; he has not only been instrumental in shaping the Kremlin's policy strategy towards Africa, but - according to British and West German intelligence information - he also played a decisive role in inspiring Cuban-Soviet intervention in Angola at the turn of 1975/76.
59. Quotations are excerpted from Lin Piao's "Long Live the Victory of People's War", as cited in Van Ness, Peter, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1970, p. 29; see also Nolte, Ernst, *Deutschland und der Kalte Krieg*, Piper and Co. Verlag, Munich, 1974, pp. 570-74.
60. Transcript of Mao-Pompidou conversation, *Der Spiegel*, *op. cit.*, p. 141. On the meandering course of Peking's policy towards the Third World, see the articles by Dutt, V.P., Halpern, A.M. and Taylor, George E., "China's New Diplomacy", *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 21, 1972, pp. 51ff; Ogunsanwo, Alaba, *China's Policy in Africa, 1958-1971*, Cambridge University Press, 1974; Hutchinson, Alan, *China's African Revolution*, Hutchinson, London, 1975; Larkin, Bruce D., *China and Africa 1949-1970*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1971; and Weinstein, Warren (ed.), *op. cit.*, Chaps. 1-3.
61. This was Peking's position as stated in the CCP Central Committee letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU, dated 14 June, 1963, as cited in Van Ness, Peter, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
62. Van Ness, Peter, *op. cit.*, pp. 58ff; and Larkin, Bruce D., *op. cit.*, pp. 110ff.
63. Larkin, Bruce D., *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.
64. Kulski, W.W., *The Soviet Union in World Affairs: A Documented Analysis 1964-1972*, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1973, pp. 354ff.
65. Khrushchev addressing the Soviet-Polish Friendship Rally in Moscow, on 15 April, 1964, as cited by Horelick, Arnold L. and Rush, Myron, *op. cit.*, p. 179.
66. Ulam, Adam B., *The Rivals: America and Russia since World War II*, Allen Lane, London, 1973, Chapt. 10; Löwenthal, Richard, "Vom Kalten Krieg zur Ostpolitik", in Löwenthal, Richard and Schwarz, Hans-Peter (eds.), *Die Zweite Republik: 25 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Eine Bilanz*, Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart, 1974, pp. 665ff; and Marantz, Paul, "Prelude to Détente: Doctrinal Change under Khrushchev", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 4, December 1975, pp. 501ff. On the détente aspect, see also Clemens, Walter C., Jr., "The Impact of Détente on Chinese and Soviet Communism", *Journal*

of *International Affairs*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1974, pp. 13ff.

67. On Peking's opposition to "hegemonism", see Adie, W.A.C., *Oil, Politics and Seapower: The Indian Ocean Vortex*, Crane, Russak and Co., Inc., New York, 1975, Chapt. 1.
68. These hints have been made repeatedly. See, *inter alia*, Alexandrov, I., "Peking and Soviet-Chinese Relations", *Information Bulletin* (World Marxist Review Publishers), No. 9, 1976, p. 49 - "The Maoists are clearly counting on inciting mankind, and, first of all, the peoples of the USSR and the USA, to mutual extermination in the conflagration of a new world war." This article was originally published in *Pravda*, 28 April, 1976.
69. Pahad, Essop and Dansoko, Amath, "Maoism Self-Exposed in Africa", *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 19, No. 4, April 1976, pp. 75-80 - "Maoist attacks on the Soviet Union and other members of the socialist community are fittingly rebuffed on (the African) continent today."
70. "For the Unity and Solidarity of the International Communist Movement", *Pravda*, 6 December, 1963. On the concepts of "national democracy" and "revolutionary democracy", see Schiebel, Joseph, *op. cit.*; Stackelberg, Georg A. von, *op. cit.*; Shinn, William T. Jr., *op. cit.*; Kulski, W.W., *op. cit.*, pp. 169f and pp. 180f; Griffith, William E., *Sino-Soviet Relations 1964-65*, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass), 1967, pp. 48ff; and Thornton, Thomas P., "Peking, Moscow and the Under-Developed Areas", *World Politics*, Vol. XIII, No. 4, July 1961, pp. 491-504.
71. Griffith, William E., *op. cit.*, p. 54; and Meissner, Boris, "Foreign Policy at the 25th Congress of the CPSU", *op. cit.*, pp. 146-47.
72. Hinton, Harold C., *Three and a Half Powers: The New Balance in Asia*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1975.
73. Brezhnev, L.I., *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15; Alexandrov, I., *Pravda*, 28 April, 1976; Ra'anana, Uri, "The Washington-Moscow-Peking Triangle: A Re-Examination of Chinese and Soviet Concepts", and Scalapino, Robert A., "The Dragon, the Tiger and the Wolf - Sino-Soviet Relations and Their Impact on Asia", *Orbis*, Vol. XIX, No. 3, Fall 1975, pp. 827ff and 838ff; Janssen, Karl-Heinz, "Lockruf am Ussuri: Hat die Entspannung Moskau-Peking eine Chance?", *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), No. 42, 8 October, 1976, p. 1; Heizing, Dieter, "New Look in Peking-Moscow Relations", *Aussenpolitik*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1976, pp. 300ff; and "China's stinging Soviet Rebuke", *The Star*, 6 October, 1976.
74. Rohwer, Jürgen, "Strategische Konzepte und Schiffsbauprogramme der Vereinigten Staaten und der Sowjetunion seit 1945 unter Berücksichtigung Grossbritanniens und Frankreichs", in Mahncke, Dieter and Schwarz, Hans-Peter (eds.), *Seemacht und Aussenpolitik*, Alfred Metzner Verlag, Frankfurt, 1974, pp. 256-58.
75. Crozier, Brian, "The 25th Party Congress - Bad News", *National Review*, 14 May, 1976, p. 506. Similar techniques were employed in Chile when the Allende regime, with Cuban and Soviet assistance, subverted the democratic structure; see Puelma, Mario, *Chile 1970-1973: Die Zerschlagung einer Demokratie*, Verlag Schweizerisches Ost-Institut, Bern, 1975.

76. Gonzalez, Edward, "Castro and Cuba's New Orthodoxy", *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXV, January-February 1976, pp. 9ff. At the 25th Party Congress, Castro delivered a hard-hitting "Marxist-Leninist" speech; see "Speech by Comrade Fidel Castro Ruz, First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee and Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba", *Pravda*, and *Izvestia*, 26 February, 1976, p. 6.
77. Van Ness, Peter, *op. cit.*, p. 113. Brezhnev and Castro reiterated their commitment to the national liberation movements in their "Joint Declaration" of 1 February, 1974 in *USSR and Third World*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 14 January - 3 March, 1974, pp. 114-121. Castro declared that the Cuban armed forces "are at the service not only of our national cause, but also of the cause of our sister peoples of Latin America in their struggle against imperialism, and we are on the side of the peoples who face up to imperialism in all parts of the world", *Granma* (Havana), 1 December, 1974, p. 1. Two years later, the dictator's combat forces - amounting to approximately 10 percent of the total of the island's armed forces - were actively engaged in imposing a Black minority regime on the Black majority in Angola.
78. *Information Bulletin* (World Marxist Review Publishers), Nos. 70/71, pp. 23-24.
79. An extensive coverage of the Tri-Continental Conference is offered by Bethel, Paul D., *The Losers*, Arlington House, New Rochelle (NY), 1969, pp. 11ff.
80. Soto, Lionel, "First Conference of the Peoples of Three Continents", *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 9, No. 4, April 1966, p. 13.
81. Joshua, Wynfred and Gibert, Stephen P., *op. cit.*, p. 150.
82. See, for instance, the remarks by the Soviet commentator Brutens, K., "The October Revolution and Africa", *New Times* (Moscow), No. 45, 1962, p. 10.
83. Tarborsky, Edward, *Communist Penetration of the Third World*, Robert Speller and Sons, New York, 1973, pp. 463, 466. See also Ojha, Isjwer C., "The Kremlin and Third World Leadership: Closing the Circle?", in Duncan, W.R. (ed.), *Soviet Policy in Developing Countries*, Ginn-Blaisdell, Waltham (Mass), 1970, pp. 9-28, esp. pp. 21ff.
84. For a discussion on "bases", see Mahncke, Dieter, "Stützpunkte als Faktor maritimer Macht", in Mahncke, Dieter and Schwarz, Hans-Peter, (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 414ff.
85. On the process of re-Stalinisation, see the report prepared by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, *New Trends in Kremlin Policy*, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, August 1970, pp. 26f, 70f. For recent favourable comments on Stalin, see Yalkin, Anatoly, senior editor of *Moskva*, "My Love and My Pains". Thoughts on Ivan Stadnyuk's Novel "War", *Moskva*, No. 11, November 1974, pp. 214-18, abstracted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XXVII, No. 11, 9 April, 1975, p. 16.

86. Mack, Andrew J.R., "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict", *World Politics*, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, January 1975, pp. 175ff. Brezhnev and Kosygin have drawn analogies between the Vietnam war and the on-going wars of national liberation; see Brezhnev's speech at the Kremlin Palace, "The Soviet People's Great Exploit, Ceremonial Meeting at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses Devoted to the 30th Anniversary of the Soviet People's Victory in the Great Patriotic War", *Pravda*, and *Izvestia*, 9 May, 1975, pp. 1-3, reprinted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XXVII, No. 19, 4 June, 1975, pp. 1-5, esp. p. 4; also Kosygin's toast to Abdul Salam Jallud, member of the Revolutionary Command Council and Prime Minister of the Libyan Arab Republic in Tripoli, "In a Friendly Atmosphere", *Pravda*, 14 May, 1975, pp. 1, 4, reprinted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XXVII, No. 20, 11 June, 1975, esp. p. 11. Jose Lava, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines, and editorial council member of the *World Marxist Review*, "A New Era in the History of Vietnam", *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 19, No. 9, September 1976, pp. 18ff.
87. Thompson, Sir Robert, *No Exit from Vietnam*, McKay Co., Inc., New York, 1969, p.26.
88. According to William A. Rusher, the liberal verbalists are "centered in the federal and state bureaucracies, the principal media, the major foundations and research institutions, and the nation-wide educational establishment, to run the United States for the benefit of interests (notably their own, and those of a huge welfare constituency) comfortable to that world view", in "A New Party: Eventually, Why Not Now?", *National Review*, 23 May, 1975, pp. 550-51 - excerpts from his book "The Making of the New Majority Party". Similar points, tailored to the West German scene, have been made by Helmut Schelsky, one of the most outstanding German sociologists, in *Die Arbeit tun die anderen: Klassenkampf und Priesterherrschaft der Intellektuellen*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen, 1975, esp. Part II.
89. Graham, Daniel O., "Détente Adieu", *National Review*, 3 September, 1976, p. 947. On the impact of the Vietnam war on America's force structure, see Rohwer, Jürgen, *op. cit.*; and Jacobsen, C.G., *Soviet Strategy - Soviet Foreign Policy: Military Considerations affecting Soviet Policy-Making*, The University Press, Robert Maclehose and Co., Glasgow, 1972, p. 67.
90. Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. and Davis, Jacquelyn K., *SALT II: Promise or Precipice?* (Monograph in International Affairs), Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1975.
91. By far the most scholarly assessment of the late US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, has been presented by Guhin, Michael A., *John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and his Times*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1972. See also Peeters, Paul, *Massive Retaliation: The Policy and its Critics*, Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, 1959.
92. Hartley, A., "John Kennedy's Foreign Policy", *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1971, pp. 77-87.
93. Recapturing the tense mood prevailing in Washington when the Congo crisis burst upon the scene, Schlesinger, former presidential speech-

- writer, comments: "Overshadowing everything was the prospect that Soviet meddling in the chaos might lead to a Russian base in the heart of Africa" - Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1965, p. 575. On Kennedy's Africa policy - though one doubts that there actually existed a reasoned-out and realistic approach - see *ibid.*, Chapt. XXI.
94. Kennedy's inaugural speech, January 1961.
 95. On the Kennedy-Johnson policy rationale and its failure, see Hartley, A., *American Foreign Policy in the Nixon Era* (Adelphi Paper No. 110), International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Winter 1974/1975, pp. 3-4. On the long-range and devastating impact of the Democratic Party-promulgated "counter-insurgency" doctrine, see Hannah, Norman, "Vietnam: Now we Know", *National Review*, 11 June, 1976, pp. 612-16; and also Westmoreland, General William, *A Soldier Reports*, Doubleday Co., Garden City (NY), 1975.
 96. Nixon, Richard M., "Asia after Viet Nam", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XLVI, October 1967, pp. 113-14.
 97. *US Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace*, 18 February, 1970.
 98. *US Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace*, 25 February, 1971.
 99. *US Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace*, 3 May, 1973.
 100. *1971 Report*, p. 158.
 101. *Ibid.*
 102. *1970 Report*, pp. 127f; and also the Report of the Secretary of Defence, James R. Schlesinger to the Congress, *On the Fiscal Year 1975 Defence Budget and Fiscal Years 1975-1979 Defence Programme*, p. 85.
 103. Trager, Frank N., "Wars of National Liberation: Implications for US Policy and Planning", *Orbis*, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, Spring 1974, pp. 50-105 (quotation on p. 104).
 104. On the Khartoum conference, see Hutchinson, Alan, *op. cit.*, pp. 238f. On Moscow and Peking vying for influence in the proliferating national liberation movements, see Larkin, Bruce D., *op. cit.*, *passim*.
 105. Adie, W.A.C. and Hutton-Williams, B., *The Communist Powers in Africa* (Conflict Studies No. 10), Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, December-January 1970/71, p. 20; also Traeger, Frank N., *op. cit.*, pp. 85-86.
 106. Luttwak, Edward N., *The Political Uses of Sea Power* (Studies in International Affairs, No. 23), Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1974.
 107. Gorshkov, Admiral Sergei, *The Sea Power of the State*, as cited in *National Review*, 17 September, 1976, p. 990.

108. Wirsing, Giselher, *Der abwendbare Untergang: Die Herausforderung an Menschen und Mächte*, Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf, 1975, Chapt. IV; Nolte, Ernst, *op. cit.*, pp. 579-89; and Korbel, Josef, *Détente in Europe: Real or Imaginary?*, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ), 1972.
109. Meissner, Boris, "Foreign Policy at the Moscow Party Congress", *op. cit.*, p. 277.
110. Kelley, Anne M., "The Soviet Naval Presence during the Iraq-Kuwait Border Dispute", in MccGwire, Michael, *et. al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 296. On the 1971 "Peace Programme" see Panomarev, Boris, "Under the Banner of Marxism-Leninism and Proletarian Internationalism", *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 14, No. 6, June 1971, pp. 1-6, esp. p. 5.
111. *Ibid.*
112. This information was supplied by Professor James D. Atkinson of the Department of Government at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, in a letter to the author, dated 15 April, 1971.
113. This criticism was levelled against America's policy conduct by Alexander Hamilton, almost two centuries ago; see Lippmann, Walter, *US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1943, p. 3.
114. Burnham, James, *Dialectic of American Foreign Policy*, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 1966; and Burnham, James, *Suicide of the West: An Essay on the Meaning and Destiny of Liberalism*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1965, *passim*.
115. Pierre, Andrew J., "America Down, Russia Up: The Changing Political Role of Military Power", *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1971, p. 182.
116. Pipes, Richard (ed.), *Soviet Strategy in Europe*, Macdonald and Jane's Publishers Ltd., London, 1976.
117. Mackinder, Sir Halford, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1942 (first published in 1919), p. 150. The "world-island" comprises Asia, Europe and Africa.
118. As cited by Millar, T.B., "Geopolitics and Military/Strategic Potential", in Cottrell, Alvin J. and Burrell, R.M. (eds.), *The Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic and Military Importance*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1972, p. 76, fn. 1.
119. Sprout, Harold and Sprout, Margaret, *Toward A Politics of the Planet Earth*, Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., New York, p. 276. On Mackinder's geopolitics, see also Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. and Dougherty, James E., *Contending Theories of International Relations*, J.B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, 1971, p. 54.
120. Lagovskiy, A.N., *Strategy and Economics*, Moscow, 1957.
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