

China's growing presence in Africa wins largely positive popular reviews

Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 122 | Mogopodi Lekorwe, Anyway Chingwete, Mina Okuru, and Romaric Samson

Summary

Strategic collaboration with Africa has become a priority in the global North, East, and West. Powers that once saw the African continent primarily as a source of raw materials now focus on "partnership" and "development," following the lead of the U.S. African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) in highlighting mutual benefits of investment and trade. China, in particular, has rapidly increased its ties to the continent in recent years, with the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), formed in 2000, as the primary institutional vehicle for its strategic engagement with sub-Saharan Africa (Pigato & Tang, 2015). China's trade with Africa has increased from about \$10 billion in 2000 to \$220 billion in 2014 and was approaching \$300 billion in 2015 (China Daily, 2015). Steven Kuo (2015) reports that because of Africa's price-sensitive market, the continent's telecommunications and infrastructure development has become reliant on Chinese technology, which is competitively priced and enjoys strong back-up service compared to its Western competitors. Africa has also seen huge growth in smaller Chinese investors in food outlets, retail shops, and textiles. China, on the other hand, mainly imports minerals from Africa, along with smaller amounts of oil and agriculture products. It is also estimated that more than 1 million Chinese, most of them labourers and traders, have moved to Africa in the past decade (Lu, 2013).

Like trade arrangements with the West, China's growing role in Africa has drawn criticism. This has included claims that China is in Africa only to access natural resources, that it wants to buy up Africa's land, and that it mainly employs Chinese rather than local labour (Esposito & Tse, 2015), although some researchers describe these claims as "myths" (Brautigam, 2015). Other critics have argued that many Chinese companies provide sub-standard services and products and under-sell and weaken local competitors. China has also been severely criticized for its willingness to work with autocratic or less-than-transparent regimes, as in Zimbabwe and Zambia.

How do Africans see China's foreign investment and influence in their countries? Findings from Afrobarometer's 2014/2015 surveys in 36 African countries, which included a special series of questions on China, suggest that the public holds generally favourable views of economic and assistance activities by China. Africans rank the United States and China No. 1 and 2, respectively, as development models for their own countries. Remarkably, in three of five African regions, China either matches or surpasses the United States in popularity as a development model. In terms of their current influence, the two countries are outpaced only by Africa's former colonial powers.

Public perceptions not only confirm China's important economic and political role in Africa but also generally portray its influence as beneficial. China's infrastructure/development and business investments are seen as reasons for China's positive image in Africa, though that image is tainted by perceptions of poor-quality Chinese products.

Afrobarometer survey

Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues across more than 30 countries in Africa. Five rounds of surveys were conducted between 1999 and 2013, and findings from Round 6 surveys (2014/2015) are currently being released. Afrobarometer conducts face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondent's choice with nationally representative samples that yield country-level results with a margin of sampling error of +/- 2% (for a sample of 2,400) or +/- 3% (for a sample of 1,200) at a 95% confidence level.

Round 6 interviews with almost 54,000 citizens in 36 countries (see list in the Appendix) represent the views of more than three-fourths of the continent's population.

Key findings

- On average across 36 African countries, the United States of America is the most popular model for national development (cited by 30% of respondents), followed by China (24%). About one in 10 respondents prefer their former colonial power (13%) or South Africa (11%) as a model.
- Countries and regions vary widely in their admiration for various development models. In Southern and North Africa, China matches the United States in popularity, and in Central Africa, China takes the lead (35% vs. 27% for the United States). In five Southern African countries (Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia, Malawi, and Zimbabwe), South Africa is the most highly regarded development model.
- A plurality of Africans see their former colonial power as wielding the greatest external influence in their country (28%), followed by China (23%) and the United States (22%). France is seen as particularly influential by its former colonies, including Côte d'Ivoire (where 89% of citizens see France as the greatest external influence), Gabon (80%), and Mali (73%). China's influence is perceived to be highest in Zimbabwe (55%), Mozambique (52%), Sudan (47%), Zambia (47%), South Africa (40%), and Tanzania (40%).
- Almost two-thirds (63%) of Africans say China's influence is "somewhat" or "very" positive, while only 15% see it as somewhat/very negative. Favourable views are most common in Mali (92%), Niger (84%), and Liberia (81%).
- A majority (56%) of Africans also see China's development assistance as doing a "somewhat" or "very" good job of meeting their country's needs.
- The most important factors contributing to a positive image of China in Africa are its infrastructure/development and business investments and the cost of its products, according to survey respondents, while the quality of its products gives its image a black eye. Political and social considerations rank low among factors affecting China's image on the continent.

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Perceptions of China in Africa

36 countries | 2014/2015

China ranks 2nd

- as a development model (after the U.S.)
- as greatest external influence (after the former colonial powers)

Top factors contributing to:

- a **positive**

image of China:
 Investments in infrastructure and business development




- a **negative**

image of China:
 Poor quality of products

China is a “somewhat” or “very” positive influence in their country:

63%

(average all countries)




AFRO BAROMETER

Africans' preferred model of national development

Asked which country offers the best development model for the future of their own country, close to one-third (30%) of respondents cite the United States of America, while China follows with 24%.¹ One in eight African citizens (13%) say their former colonial power offers the best model for future development. South Africa, the continent's second-largest economy, attracts support from 11% of African citizens (Figure 1).

¹ Citizens in all 36 surveyed countries were asked about their perceptions of “China” as a development model and an influence on their country. In the three African countries that maintain diplomatic ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan) rather than the People’s Republic of China (mainland China) – i.e. in Swaziland, Burkina Faso, and São Tomé and Príncipe – responses may be shaped to some degree by this relationship. In addition, respondents in Swaziland (which unlike Burkina Faso and São Tomé and Príncipe has little Chinese presence or investment) were asked about “Taiwan” rather than “China” with regard to the extent and quality of influence, positive/negative image, and the utility of foreign assistance.

Figure 1: Best model for national development | 36 countries | 2014/2015




Respondents were asked: *In your opinion, which of the following countries, if any, would be the best model for the future development of our country: United States? China? [Former colonial power]? India? South Africa? Another country?*

While some countries look mostly west, others focus more on the “look east” strategy as the best path toward development. Majorities in Liberia (67%) and Cape Verde (52%) see the United States as the best model, as do pluralities of more than four in 10 citizens in Kenya, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Uganda. Conversely, fewer than two in 10 citizens regard the United States as the best model for development in Lesotho, Mozambique, Egypt, Benin, and Mali (Figure 2).

China is the most popular model for development in Cameroon (48%), Sudan (36%), Mozambique (36%), Mali (36%), Tanzania (35%), and Zambia (32%). But fewer than one in six citizens look to China in Morocco (10%), Mauritius (13%), Ghana (15%), Malawi (17%), and Burundi (17%).

South Africa is the mostly highly regarded development model in Lesotho (38%), Swaziland (32%), Namibia (31%), Malawi (31%), and Zimbabwe (27%). As the former colonial power, France takes first place as a development model in Tunisia (30%), Niger (27%), Benin (27%), and Mauritius (25%) and makes a strong showing as well in Mali (33%), Madagascar (29%), and Burkina Faso (27%). Former British colonies are less likely to cite their ex-colonial power as their preferred development model, ranging from lows of 4% in Lesotho and 5% in Egypt to highs of 14% in Namibia and 13% in Sierra Leone. India scores well as a development model in Mauritius (13%) and Algeria (10%). (See Appendix Table A.2 for a breakdown for all surveyed countries.)


Figure 2: United States and China as best models for development | 36 countries
 | 2014/2015



Respondents were asked: In your opinion, which of the following countries, if any, would be the best model for the future development of our country: United States? China?

By region², the United States is most strongly favoured as a development model in East Africa (41%) and West Africa (36%), while China matches the United States in Southern and North Africa (where both countries are picked by about one in four respondents) and surpasses it (35% vs. 27%) in Central Africa (Figure 3). The former colonial power is rated at its highest (17%) in West Africa, while South Africa receives its greatest support from countries in its own region (20%).

Figure 3: Best model for national development | by region | 36 countries
 | 2014/2015



Respondents were asked: *In your opinion, which of the following countries, if any, would be the best model for the future development of our country?*

Looking at perceptions of different sociodemographic groups across all 36 countries, preferences for the United States and China as development models are stronger (by 7-9 percentage points) among citizens with at least a secondary-school education than among respondents with no formal education, who are more likely than their better-educated compatriots to favour the former colonial power as a model (Table 1). Poor respondents are more likely to see South Africa as the best model (13%, compared to 8% of the wealthiest respondents). More men (27%) than women (22%) prefer China as a model.

Urban-rural differences are small, with urban residents leaning more toward the United States and China while rural respondents are slightly more likely to choose the former colonial power or South Africa. Compared to their younger counterparts, respondents aged 56 and

² Afrobarometer regional groupings are: Central Africa (Cameroon, Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe), East Africa (Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda); North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia), Southern Africa (Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe), West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo).

above are somewhat less likely to see the United States and China as models and are more likely to say they “don’t know.”

Table 1: Best model for national development | by sociodemographic variables
| 36 countries | 2014/2015


	United States	China	Former colonial power	South Africa
Average	30%	25%	14%	11%
Lived poverty				
No lived poverty	31%	24%	15%	8%
Low lived poverty	31%	26%	13%	11%
Moderate lived poverty	31%	24%	13%	13%
High lived poverty	28%	23%	14%	13%
Place of residence				
Urban	33%	26%	12%	10%
Rural	29%	23%	15%	12%
Education				
No formal education	26%	19%	19%	7%
Primary	29%	23%	14%	14%
Secondary	33%	26%	12%	12%
Post-secondary	32%	30%	11%	10%
Age				
18-35 years	32%	25%	13%	12%
36-55 years	30%	25%	14%	10%
56+ years	25%	20%	15%	11%
Gender				
Men	31%	27%	13%	11%
Women	30%	22%	14%	11%

Respondents were asked: *In your opinion, which of the following countries, if any, would be the best model for the future development of our country?*

Greatest external influence

While former colonial powers are not the most widely admired models for development, they are most frequently perceived as having the greatest influence in African countries: On average across 36 countries, a plurality of 28% of citizens cite their former colonial powers as most influential. China (23%) and the United States (22%) rank second and third, followed by South Africa and international organisations (each 6%) (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Greatest external influence | 36 countries | 2014/2015



Respondents were asked: Which of the following do you think has the most influence in your country, or haven't you heard enough to say? United States? China? [Former colonial power]? India? South Africa? International organisations like the United Nations or the World Bank?

Countries vary widely in their views of external influence (Figure 5). Former French colonies are by far the most likely to see the colonial power as most influential, ranging up to 89% of all citizens in Côte d'Ivoire, 80% in Gabon, and 73% in Mali. Indeed, if surveyed countries are ranked by the proportion of citizens who see the ex-colonial power as the greatest external influence (as in Figure 5), the top 14 countries are all former French colonies.

Former British colonies tend to be far less likely to see the United Kingdom as most influential, instead balancing their assessments between the United States and China (and South Africa, in the case of countries in the Southern Africa region).


Not surprisingly, Liberia overwhelmingly sees the United States as most influential (87%). The United States also takes the top spot in Uganda (40%), Nigeria (39%), Kenya (39%), Burundi (35%), Morocco (35%), Ghana (33%), Malawi (32%), Cape Verde (31%), Egypt (29%), and Botswana (27%).

China's influence is most widely perceived in Zimbabwe (55%), reflecting the government's 2003 "look east" policy, and Mozambique (52%), Sudan (47%), Zambia (47%), South Africa (40%), and Tanzania (40%). In Mauritius, India (33%) is perceived as the most influential external power.

International organisations such as the United Nations and the World Bank are seen as particularly influential in São Tomé and Príncipe (32%) and Burundi (23%). (See Appendix Table A.3 for country results in greater detail.)

Across the 36 countries, one in 10 citizens (11%) say they "don't know" who is most influential in their country, including more than two in 10 Ugandans, Sierra Leoneans, Ghanaians, and Egyptians.


Figure 5: Greatest external influence | 36 countries | 2014/2015



Respondents were asked: Which of the following do you think has the most influence in your country, or haven't you heard enough to say?

Views on the greatest external influence differ significantly by region. The former colonial powers are most widely seen as wielding the greatest influence in Central Africa (55%) and West Africa (45%). The United States is most commonly cited by East Africans (36%) and North Africans (29%), while China receives its highest recognition in Southern Africa (35%) (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Greatest external influence | by region | 36 countries | 2014/2015



Respondents were asked: Which of the following do you think has the most influence in your country, or haven't you heard enough to say?

Perceptions of external influence do not vary dramatically by urban-rural residence, education level, age, or gender. Former colonial powers are somewhat more likely to be seen as influential by poor,³ urban, less-educated, younger, and male respondents than by wealthier, rural, more educated, older, and female citizens (Table 2). In general, older respondents are more likely to say they “don't know” (19%) than their younger compatriots (11%).

³ Afrobarometer assesses poverty through its Lived Poverty Index (LPI), an experiential measure based on how frequently respondents or their families went without five basic necessities (enough food, enough clean water, medicines or medical treatment, enough cooking fuel, and a cash income) during the year preceding the survey. Using response options of “never,” “just once or twice,” “several times,” “many times,” and “always,” LPI scores calculated for individuals or countries reflect the extent of deprivation ranging from no lived poverty to high lived poverty.

Table 2: Greatest external influence | by sociodemographic variables | 36 countries
| 2014/2015


	Former colonial power	China	United States
Average	26%	23%	22%
Lived poverty			
No lived poverty	21%	25%	25%
Low lived poverty	26%	25%	23%
Moderate lived poverty	30%	23%	20%
High lived poverty	35%	19%	19%
Place of residence			
Urban	30%	24%	23%
Rural	26%	23%	21%
Education			
No formal education	35%	16%	18%
Primary	21%	24%	23%
Secondary	24%	26%	23%
Post-secondary	26%	26%	23%
Age			
18-35 years	35%	24%	23%
36-55 years	27%	24%	22%
56+ years	27%	20%	17%
Gender			
Men	28%	24%	23%
Women	24%	22%	21%

Respondents were asked: Which of the following do you think has the most influence in your country, or haven't you heard enough to say?

While earlier Afrobarometer survey rounds did not ask these questions about influence and development models, Round 4 (2008-2009) surveys in 20 countries⁴ did explore citizens' perceptions of the quality of external assistance provided to their countries. A majority of citizens said their countries were helped "somewhat" or "a lot" by assistance from the United States (54%), whilst pluralities applauded the assistance received from China (47%) and their former colonial power (45%) (Figure 7). Across the 20 countries, about two in 10 respondents said such assistance helped only "a little" or "not at all," and about three in 10 said they did not know how much such assistance helped their country.

⁴ Botswana, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Figure 7: How helpful is external assistance? | 20 countries | 2008-2009



Respondents were asked: *In your opinion, how much do each of the following do to help your country, or haven't you heard enough to say?*

Focus on China

In line with China's growing importance as a development partner in Africa, Afrobarometer's Round 6 surveys included a series of questions exploring citizens' perceptions of China's economic activities, its economic and political influence, the usefulness of its development assistance, and the sources of positive and negative perceptions of China in their country.


Extent of China's economic influence

Africans clearly recognize the importance of China's economic activities in their countries: Across 35 countries, more than two-thirds (69%) of respondents⁵ say these activities have "some influence" (27%) or "a lot of influence" (42%) (Figure 8). At the country level, at least eight in 10 citizens in Mali (90%), Gabon (87%), Cameroon (81%) and Niger (80%) believe that China's economic influence have "some" or "a lot" of influence in their country, whilst fewer than half say the same in São Tomé and Príncipe (43%) and Morocco (49%).

Men are somewhat more likely than women to see China as being influential (73% vs. 66% "some" or "a lot") (Figure 9). The same is true of urban residents (73%) compared to rural respondents (67%) and of youth and adults (71% and 70%) compared to older respondents (63%).


⁵ As explained in Footnote 1, respondents in Swaziland were asked about "Taiwan" rather than "China" with regard to the extent and quality of influence, positive/negative image, and the utility of foreign assistance. Responses (not included in this analysis) may be found using Afrobarometer's free online data analysis tool at <http://www.afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis>.

Figure 8: China's economic influence | 35 countries | 2014/2015



Respondents were asked: How much influence do you think China's economic activities in your country have on your economy, or haven't you heard enough to say?

Figure 9: China's economic influence | by gender, age, and urban-rural residence | 35 countries | 2014/2015



Respondents were asked: How much influence do you think China's economic activities in your country have on your economy, or haven't you heard enough to say? (% who say "some" or "a lot")

Quality of China's economic and political influence

In general, Africans welcome China's economic and political influence in their country: Almost two-thirds (63%) of respondents see it as "somewhat positive" (35%) or "very positive" (28%), while only 15% see it as "somewhat" or "very" negative. A significant proportion (22%) see China's influence as neither positive nor negative or say they "don't know."


Countries differ greatly in their assessments of China's economic influence, ranging from only about one-third positive in Algeria (33%), Ghana (34%), and Morocco (35%) to better than four-fifths in Mali (92%), Niger (84%), and Liberia (81%). The countries with the highest negative ratings are Madagascar (39%), Tunisia (39%), Ghana (36%), and Algeria (35%) (Figure 10).

Regionally, the influence of China's economic activities is overwhelmingly seen as positive in West Africa (72%), Central Africa (70%), and East Africa (68%). Views are somewhat less favourable in Southern Africa (59% positive vs. 21% negative) and North Africa (42% positive vs. 29% negative) (Figure 11).

Views on China's economic and political influence are somewhat more favourable among men (66% somewhat/very positive) than women (60%), among more educated respondents (65%-66%) than those with only a primary education (60%) or no formal education (61%), and among younger respondents (65% for ages 18-35) than elders (57% for those aged 56 and above) (Figure 12). Analysis by poverty level shows no significant variation on this question.


Figure 10: Is China's economic and political influence positive or negative?

| 35 countries | 2014/2015




Respondents were asked: *In general, do you think that China's economic and political influence in your country is mostly positive, or mostly negative, or haven't you heard enough to say?*

Figure 11: Is China's economic and political influence positive or negative?
 | by region | 35 countries | 2014/2015



Respondents were asked: *In general, do you think that China's economic and political influence in your country is mostly positive, or mostly negative, or haven't you heard enough to say?*

Figure 12: Is China's economic and political influence positive or negative?
 | by sociodemographic variables | 35 countries | 2014/2015




Respondents were asked: *In general, do you think that China's economic and political influence in your country is mostly positive, or mostly negative, or haven't you heard enough to say?*

China's economic development assistance

China's economic activities include significant economic development assistance to many African countries. When citizens are asked to assess how helpful this assistance is, a majority

say that it does a “somewhat good” (34%) or “very good” (22%) job of meeting their country’s development needs (Figure 13).

Figure 13: How helpful is China’s economic development assistance? | 35 countries | 2014/2015




Respondents were asked: *In your opinion, does China's economic development assistance to your country do a good job or a bad job of meeting the country's needs, or haven't you heard enough to say?*

About one in five respondents (19%) say China's assistance does a "somewhat" or "very" bad job, while 8% describe it as "neither good nor bad," 2% say China provides no development assistance, and 16% say they "don't know."

Citizens are particularly appreciative of China's assistance in Mali (where 88% say it does a "somewhat" or "very" good job), Côte d'Ivoire (81%), Burkina Faso (78%), Niger (77%), Guinea (76%), and Gabon (76%). But fewer than one in three respondents agree in Morocco (21%), Egypt (24%), Ghana (30%), and Algeria (32%). Again Madagascar leads in negative assessments, with 53% of respondents saying Chinese assistance does a "somewhat bad" or "very bad" job of meeting the country's needs.

In line with perceptions of China's influence, about two-thirds of West Africans (65%) and Central Africans (64%) praise China's development assistance, compared to only 36% of North Africans (Figure 14). Again, respondents with more education, men, and younger respondents are more likely to see China's assistance as helpful to their country (Figure 14).

Figure 14: How helpful is China's economic development assistance? | by sociodemographic variables and regions | 35 countries | 2014/2015



Respondents were asked: *In your opinion, does China's economic development assistance to your country do a good job or a bad job of meeting the country's needs, or haven't you heard enough to say? (% who say assistance does a "somewhat good" or "very good" job of meeting the country's needs)*


What shapes China's image in Africa?

In addition to assessing the positive or negative nature of China's influence, survey respondents were asked to identify specific factors that contribute positively and negatively to China's image in their country. Responses show that economic factors weigh most heavily in shaping both positive and negative impressions, while political and social considerations rank far lower.

Factors contributing to a positive image

Respondents were asked to identify which of six factors contributes most to a positive image of China in their country. The most frequently cited factors are China's investments in infrastructure and other development projects (cited by 32% of respondents), the low cost of its products (23%), and its business investments (16%) (Figure 15). Few respondents cite China's support for their country in international affairs (6%), its hands-off approach to the country's internal affairs (5%), or their appreciation of the Chinese people, culture, and language (2%).


Figure 15: Factors contributing most to a positive image of China | 35 countries | 2014/2015



Respondents were asked: Which of the following factors contributes most to positive images of China in [your country], or haven't you heard enough to say?

If China's investments in infrastructure/development and business are most widely seen (by 47%⁶ of respondents) as contributing to a positive image, this perception is strongest in Central Africa (56%) and East Africa (52%) and weakest in North Africa (36%) (Figure 16). In general, citizens place greater emphasis on investments in infrastructure and other development than on business investments.

Figure 16: Investment in infrastructure/development and business as factors contributing to a positive image of China | by region | 35 countries | 2014/2015




Respondents were asked: Which of the following factors contributes most to positive images of China in [your country], or haven't you heard enough to say? (% who say "China's investment in infrastructure" or "China's business investment")

At the country level, at least six in 10 Mauritians (60%), Kenyans (69%), Gabonese (73%), and Zambians (73%) see China's investments in infrastructure/development and business as the factors contributing most to a positive image (Figure 17). In countries whose citizens place less emphasis on China's infrastructure/development/business investments, the low cost of Chinese products is often seen as a top factor in China's positive image, as in Madagascar (50%), Burkina Faso (40%), Senegal (40%), Côte d'Ivoire (34%), and Morocco (33%).

⁶ All numbers are rounded, which explains why categories of 32% and 16% combine to 47%.

Figure 17: Factors contributing most to a positive image of China | by country | 35 countries | 2014/2015



Respondents were asked: Which of the following factors contributes most to positive images of China in [your country], or haven't you heard enough to say?

Factors contributing to a negative image


While in fact citizens generally view China's influence on their country favourably, we also asked them which factors contribute to negative images of China, and again, the responses are primarily economic. More than one-third (35%) of Africans say the poor quality of Chinese products damages China's image. Others cite the concern that China's activities in Africa take jobs or business away from locals (14%), China's extraction of resources from Africa (10%), and Chinese involvement in land grabbing as factors contributing to a negative image (7%) (Figure 18).

While some critics have castigated China for its willingness to work with autocratic governments (Africa Research Institute, 2012), only 4% of survey respondents cite this as a top factor contributing to a negative image of China.

While product quality is the most frequently cited negative factor in 26 of the 35 countries, perceptions of resource extraction as contributing to negative images of China are far stronger in Ghana (43%) and Madagascar (37%) (Figure 19). Resource extraction is also an important consideration in Gabon (22%) and Sierra Leone (20%) – both twice the 35-country average of 10%. “Don't know” is the most frequent response in São Tomé and Príncipe (51%), Sierra Leone (42%), Burundi (37%), Benin (28%), and Togo (26%).


North Africa is the most likely region to perceive the loss of local jobs or business as the top negative factor (21% for the region, including 27% of Algerians and 26% of Egyptians).

Figure 18: Factors shaping negative images of China | 35 countries | 2014/2015



Respondents were asked: Which of the following factors contributes most to negative images of China in your country, or haven't you heard enough to say?

Figure 19: Factors shaping negative images of China | by region | 35 countries
 | 2014/2015



Respondents were asked: Which of the following factors contributes most to negative images of China in your country, or haven't you heard enough to say?

Conclusion

For Africans, China rivals the United States in influence and popularity as a development model. Despite considerable criticism in the media of China's interests and operations in Africa, Africans view China's emergence as an addition to the economic playing field. In particular, its investments in infrastructure and business development, along with its low-cost products, contribute to positive perceptions of China. Majorities value China's development assistance and see its influence as more rewarding than detrimental to their country's development prospects.

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Appendix

Table A.1: Afrobarometer Round 6 fieldwork dates and previous survey rounds

Country	Months when Round 6 fieldwork was conducted	Previous survey rounds
Algeria	May-June 2015	2013
Benin	May-June 2014	2005, 2008, 2011
Botswana	June-July 2014	1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012
Burkina Faso	April-May 2015	2008, 2012
Burundi	September-October 2014	2012
Cameroon	January-February 2015	2013
Cape Verde	November-December 2014	2002, 2005, 2008, 2011
Côte d'Ivoire	August-September 2014	2013
Egypt	June-July 2015	2013
Gabon	September 2015	N/A
Ghana	May-June 2014	1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012
Guinea	March-April 2015	2013
Kenya	November-December 2014	2003, 2005, 2008, 2011
Lesotho	May 2014	2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012
Liberia	May 2015	2008, 2012
Madagascar	December 2014-January 2015	2005, 2008, 2013
Malawi	March-April 2014	1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012
Mali	December 2014	2001, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2013
Mauritius	June-July 2014	2012
Morocco	November 2015	2013
Mozambique	June-August 2015	2002, 2005, 2008, 2012
Namibia	August-September 2014	1999, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2012
Niger	April 2015	2013
Nigeria	December 2014-January 2015	2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2013
São Tomé and Príncipe	July-August 2015	N/A
Senegal	November-December 2014	2002, 2005, 2008, 2013
Sierra Leone	May-June 2015	2012
South Africa	August-September 2015	2000, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2011
Sudan	June 2015	2013

Country	Months when Round 6 fieldwork was conducted	Previous survey rounds
Swaziland	April 2015	2013
Tanzania	August-November 2014	2001, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012
Togo	October 2014	2012
Tunisia	April-May 2015	2013
Uganda	May 2015	2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012
Zambia	October 2014	1999, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2013
Zimbabwe	November 2014	1999, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2012

Table A.2: Best model for national development | 36 countries | 2014/2015

	United States	China	Former colonial power	South Africa	India	Follow own model
Algeria	24%	19%	15%	6%	10%	13%
Benin	18%	26%	27%	8%	2%	4%
Botswana	30%	24%	10%	20%	1%	1%
Burkina Faso*	28%	20%	27%	6%	1%	6%
Burundi	45%	17%	5%	13%	2%	3%
Cameroon	20%	48%	9%	10%	1%	2%
Cape Verde	52%	21%	7%	3%	1%	4%
Côte d'Ivoire	33%	26%	19%	15%	1%	1%
Egypt	17%	29%	5%	3%	6%	11%
Gabon	30%	29%	10%	23%	2%	0%
Ghana	37%	15%	11%	8%	2%	7%
Guinea	39%	22%	20%	4%	1%	5%
Kenya	49%	24%	7%	7%	2%	3%
Lesotho	14%	18%	4%	38%	2%	1%
Liberia	67%	25%	-	2%	0%	2%
Madagascar	31%	24%	29%	7%	1%	4%
Malawi	24%	17%	10%	31%	2%	3%
Mali	19%	36%	33%	3%	1%	4%
Mauritius	22%	13%	25%	5%	13%	10%
Morocco	34%	10%	21%	2%	5%	9%
Mozambique	15%	36%	6%	15%	5%	6%

Namibia	21%	22%	14%	31%	2%	8%
Niger	24%	28%	27%	3%	2%	8%
Nigeria	43%	25%	10%	2%	2%	7%
São Tomé and Príncipe*	29%	28%	12%	5%	1%	6%
Senegal	33%	28%	16%	3%	1%	5%
Sierra Leone	43%	18%	13%	1%	0%	2%
South Africa	36%	26%	12%	-	2%	8%
Sudan	26%	36%	9%	6%	3%	8%
Swaziland*	20%	23%	11%	32%	2%	6%
Tanzania	30%	35%	6%	10%	4%	3%
Togo	33%	19%	14%	15%	2%	1%
Tunisia	21%	24%	30%	5%	2%	2%
Uganda	41%	19%	8%	8%	2%	4%
Zambia	23%	32%	8%	17%	2%	6%
Zimbabwe	25%	20%	9%	27%	1%	8%
Average	30%	24%	13%	11%	2%	5%

Respondents were asked: In your opinion, which of the following countries, if any, would be the best model for the future development of our country?

*See Footnote 1

Table A.3: Greatest external influence | 36 countries | 2014/2015

	United States	China	Former colonial power	South Africa	India	International organisations
Algeria	26%	20%	27%	2%	3%	8%
Benin	7%	15%	54%	1%	1%	5%
Botswana	27%	25%	11%	15%	1%	6%
Burkina Faso*	13%	10%	61%	3%	1%	1%
Burundi	35%	11%	3%	6%	1%	23%
Cameroon	8%	15%	68%	1%	0%	2%
Cape Verde	31%	27%	25%	1%	0%	5%
Côte d'Ivoire	5%	3%	89%	1%	0%	0%
Egypt	29%	25%	5%	1%	3%	5%
Gabon	8%	9%	80%	1%	1%	1%
Ghana	33%	27%	9%	2%	2%	2%
Guinea	12%	13%	62%	1%	0%	0%
Kenya	39%	38%	7%	2%	1%	5%

Lesotho	9%	30%	2%	36%	1%	2%
Liberia	87%	8%	N/A	1%	0%	2%
Madagascar	12%	27%	42%	5%	1%	10%
Malawi	32%	12%	13%	16%	1%	6%
Mali	8%	13%	73%	1%	0%	1%
Mauritius	10%	25%	13%	2%	33%	8%
Morocco	35%	5%	30%	2%	4%	11%
Mozambique	8%	52%	5%	9%	4%	2%
Namibia	14%	35%	7%	31%	2%	7%
Niger	11%	16%	60%	0%	1%	1%
Nigeria	39%	30%	9%	2%	2%	5%
São Tomé and Príncipe*	12%	24%	17%	1%	0%	32%
Senegal	14%	12%	58%	0%	0%	3%
Sierra Leone	23%	22%	24%	1%	0%	6%
South Africa	28%	40%	7%		3%	1%
Sudan	20%	47%	4%	4%	1%	11%
Swaziland*	9%	35%	3%	36%	2%	8%
Tanzania	31%	40%	5%	6%	4%	1%
Togo	6%	7%	62%	2%	0%	8%
Tunisia	35%	2%	47%	0%	0%	8%
Uganda	40%	20%	6%	4%	2%	4%
Zambia	17%	47%	5%	8%	2%	4%
Zimbabwe	14%	55%	5%	12%	0%	1%
Average	22%	23%	28%	6%	2%	6%

Respondents were asked: Which of the following do you think has the most influence on your country, or haven't you heard enough to say?

*See Footnote 1

Other Round 6 global releases

- **Where to start? Aligning sustainable development goals with citizen priorities.** (2015). Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 67. http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno67_african_priorities_en.pdf.
- **Building on progress: Infrastructure development still a major challenge in Africa.** (2016). Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 69. www.afrobarometer.org/publications/ad69-building-progress-infrastructure-development-still-major-challenge-africa.
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- **Good neighbours? Africans express high levels of tolerance for many, but not for all.** (2016). Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 74. <http://afrobarometer.org/publications/tolerance-in-africa>.
- **Off-grid or 'off-on': Lack of access, unreliable electricity supply still plague majority of Africans.** Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 75. <http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad75-unreliable-electricity-supply-still-plague-majority-of-africans>.
- **Lack of safe water, sanitation spurs growing dissatisfaction with government performance.** Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 76. <http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad76-lack-of-safe-water-and-sanitation-spurs-growing-dissatisfaction>.
- **Despite gains, barriers keep health care high on Africa's priority list.** Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 31. <http://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/pp31-despite-gains-barriers-keep-health-care-high-on-africas-priority-list>.
- **Strong public support for 'watchdog' role backs African news media under attack.** Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 85. http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad85-media_in_africa_world_press_freedom_day_2016.
- **Regional integration for Africa: Could stronger public support turn 'rhetoric into reality'?** Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 91. <http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad91-regional-integration-africa-could-stronger-public-support-turn-rhetoric-reality>.
- **Does less engaged mean less empowered? Political participation lags among African youth, especially women.** Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 34. <http://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/youth-day-2016>.
- **Do trustworthy institutions matter for development? Corruption, trust, and government performance in Africa.** Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 112. <http://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/ad112-do-trustworthy-institutions-matter-development-corruption-trust-and-government>.
- **Election quality, public trust are central issues for Africa's upcoming contests.** Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 35. <http://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/pp35-election-quality-public-trust-are-central-issues-africas-upcoming-contests>.
- **Job performance of MPs, local councillors: Are representatives serving voters or themselves?** Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 115. <http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad115-job-performance-mps-local-councillors-are-representatives-serving-voters-or-themselves>.

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