



# AFRO

## BAROMETER

LET THE PEOPLE HAVE A SAY

# How free is too free?

Across Africa, media freedom is on the defensive



By Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz and  
Josephine Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny

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## Introduction

In Africa, as elsewhere, mass media face increasing opportunities and threats. New technologies have made it easier for producers to share content widely and cheaply, resulting in a proliferation and diversification of information sources (Varzandeh, 2018). And broader populations can access content more easily and cheaply than ever before – and contribute to those discussions themselves – through call-in programs on vernacular radio stations, Internet news sites and blogs, and social media such as WhatsApp and Twitter.

On the flip side, new competition and access to cost-free content threaten media organizations' bottom lines. Consumer skepticism of media actors has skyrocketed as more people see media as propagators of falsehoods, bias, and hate speech, particularly when messages are critical of politicians or policies they support. Politicians – in democracies as well as authoritarian regimes – are more than happy to stoke this anger, which provides opportunities for governments to launch increasingly brazen legal and extra-legal attacks on media. Prominent media watchdogs, such as Freedom House, the Committee to Protect Journalists, and Reporters Without Borders, have documented increases in government regulations, censorship, and even violence against media actors in Africa and around the world (Reporters Without Borders, 2018a; Shahbaz, 2018; Simon, 2017).

Where do ordinary Africans – the intended beneficiaries – stand in this fast-moving debate on freedom and limits?

The latest round of the Afrobarometer survey, conducted in 34 countries in all regions of the continent, raises a red flag for free-press advocates: Popular support for media freedom – a majority view just three years ago – is now in the minority, exceeded by those who would grant governments the censor's pencil.

This warning flag also marks a paradox. On the one hand, many Africans believe that media in their countries have more freedoms today than they did several years ago. However, it is not clear that people view these developments positively. In fact, among citizens who see media freedoms as increasing in their country, those calling for increased government restrictions on media significantly outnumber those who support broad press freedoms.

Perhaps more encouragingly, those who see media freedoms as declining in their country are more likely to support freedoms than restrictions. Either way, it appears that a substantial number of Africans are dissatisfied with the current state of the media in their country, at least with regard to the demand for and supply of freedoms.

Even so, nearly all Africans turn to mass media for news. Radio is still the most widely accessed source of news, followed by television, while newspaper readership remains relatively rare on the continent. Access to Internet and social media is expanding, with majorities in some countries reporting regular use. However, there is a large digital divide: Access to digital sources is much higher in some countries than others, and is skewed in favour of wealthier, better-educated, younger, urban, and male citizens.

## Afrobarometer survey

Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues in African countries. Six rounds of surveys were conducted between 1999 and 2015. Findings from Round 7 surveys, conducted with more than 45,000 respondents in 34 countries between September 2016 and September 2018, are currently being released. Interested readers may follow our releases, including our Pan-Africa Profiles series of cross-country analyses, at #VoicesAfrica and sign up for our distribution list at [www.afrobarometer.org](http://www.afrobarometer.org).

Afrobarometer conducts face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondent's choice with nationally representative samples that yield country-level results with margins of error of +/-2 to +/-3 percentage points at a 95% confidence level.

This policy paper draws mainly on Round 7 data, with over-time comparisons for countries surveyed in earlier rounds (see the Appendix for a list of countries and survey dates). The data are weighted to ensure nationally representative samples. Each country is weighted equally; the Africa-wide data below are thus averages of national data, without adjustment for the size of the national populations.



## Key findings


- Popular support for media freedom continues to decline, dropping to below half (47%) of respondents across 34 countries. More Africans (49%) now say governments should have the right to prevent publications they consider harmful.
- Twenty-five of 31 countries tracked since 2011 experienced declines in support for media freedom over that period, including steep drops in Tanzania (-33 percentage points), Cabo Verde (-27), Uganda (-21), and Tunisia (-21).
- Yet more Africans see the media's freedom to investigate and criticize government as increasing (43%) than declining (32%). Countries vary widely in their assessments, from 80% of Gambians who see more media freedom to 66% of Gabonese who see less.
- Africans are generally dissatisfied with the state of the media. Of those who say freedom is increasing in their country, a majority (54%) support increased government regulations. However, among those who assess freedom as decreasing, a majority (54%) support media freedom over government regulations.
- Radio remains the top source for mass-media news, though its dominance is declining: 42% report using it every day, down 5 percentage points from 2011/2013. Television is a daily news source for about one in three Africans (35%), and is the top source for news in nine countries. Only 7% read newspapers daily.
- Reliance on the Internet and social media for news is increasing rapidly. Almost one in five Africans say they use the Internet (18%) and/or social media (19%) daily for news. Use of the Internet and social media for news is significantly higher among younger, urban, and better-educated populations, and there are important differences between countries and regions regarding access.

## A changing media landscape

Recent decades have brought significant positive developments to Africa's media landscape. Restrictions on private radio, television, and print publications declined significantly in the early 1990s, in the wake of broader political changes, and state-run broadcast and print monopolies ended in most countries. Financial liberalization brought new opportunities for private actors to launch radio and television stations, print publications, and, later, websites. These changes meant a proliferation of sources, diversification of voices, and generally broadened access for previously under-served populations, as the number of outlets, especially in vernacular-language radio stations (Okoth, 2015), exploded. Legally, restrictions on speech and press freedoms declined (Bourgault, 1995; Nyamnjoh, 2005). And improved living standards and educational systems in many areas meant more people demanded – and could access – information about politics.

On the other hand, the proliferation of outlets, and the ease of an even wider range of actors to reach mass audiences through the Internet and social media, have enabled apparent increases in biased content, “fake news,” and even incendiary and hateful speech, much of it taking on overt or coded ethnic tones. Politicians, private citizens, and even a number of civil society organizations have called for increased regulation, arguing that, in essence, media have become too free, to society's detriment.

Governments are responding to new media environments in multiple ways, many of which restrict access and freedoms. New laws and regulations limit who can produce and



disseminate content, and define certain kinds of content as problematic. Governments often present these new laws as necessary to enhance order and security, protect vulnerable groups from hate speech and incendiary language, and prevent the spread of misinformation that might be harmful to political discourse and even public safety and health. However, many fear that these laws and regulations are primarily designed to limit anti-government and pro-opposition messages, squelch protests, and generally protect governments from embarrassment or removal.

In East Africa, for example, recent years have seen a spate of new actions limiting media (Internews, 2018). Since 2015, Tanzania has criminalized the publication of statistics without express approval from the National Bureau of Statistics, as well as information deemed false, insulting, or inflammatory (Dahir, 2018). In addition, myriad new rules require content producers, including bloggers, to register (and pay high fees to do so) and in some instances to report *anticipated* content. Just this month, Tanzania detained and then denied entry to Wairagala Wakabi, executive director of the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA), a consistent critic of restrictions on Internet freedoms (Kampala Dispatch, 2019). In neighbouring Uganda, a 2018 law mandating a “social media tax” has reportedly cut down on use significantly, while the Kenyan government shuttered three major television stations that year for a 10-day period for their plans to live-stream the presidential “inauguration” ceremony of opposition leader Raila Odinga (BBC News, 2018; Dahir, 2019).

Increasingly, African governments are using even blunter instruments, such as simply disrupting the Internet and social media during critical periods. According to CIPESA (2019), 22 African countries have ordered the disruption of Internet networks since 2015, and six countries – Algeria, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Gabon, Sudan, and Zimbabwe – ordered such disruptions in the first three months of 2019 alone. In some cases (DRC, Gabon, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, and Sierra Leone), shutdowns have coincided with elections, while in others (Algeria, Burundi, DRC, the Republic of Congo, Sudan, Togo, and Zimbabwe), disruptions have been launched in response to mass protests or, as in Cameroon, violent rebellion. (And in two countries – Algeria and Ethiopia – shutdowns were ostensibly responses to students cheating on exams.) Chad has blocked social media, including Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp, for more than a year. These moves suggest increasing fear, particularly on the part of leaders in less-democratic regimes, of the potential threats that Internet and social media access pose to the status quo.

Worrisome, too, is the targeting of journalists, with politicized prosecutions and violence. In 2015, Cameroonian journalist Ahmed Abba was sentenced to 10 years in prison for promoting “terrorism.” (He was released in late 2017, after 876 days in detention (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2017).) And in January 2019, Ghanaian journalist Ahmed Hussein-Suale, who was involved in the Tiger Eye PI organization’s investigations of corruption, was killed by two gunmen, soon after a member of Parliament exposed his identity and address and called for violence against him during a television interview (Gunter, 2019).

Against this background, citizens’ views on media freedom take on particular urgency. Popular support for media freedoms could help protect media from these kinds of attacks. On the other hand, if the public is skeptical of the media and the value that free media bring to society, those attitudes might provide cover for leaders to implement increasingly severe limitations.

### **Do Africans want free media?**

In three survey rounds since 2011, Afrobarometer has asked respondents to choose sides on the question of media freedom by indicating which of two statements is closer to their own view:


*Statement 1: The media should have the right to publish any views and ideas without government control.*



Statement 2: The government should have the right to prevent the media from publishing things that it considers harmful to society.

In the latest round, for the first time, those supporting media freedom are in the minority: On average across 34 countries, 47% “agree” or “agree very strongly” with the statement supporting media freedom, while 49% support the government’s right to limit certain media messages (Figure 1). Only 4% chose to agree with neither statement, refuse to respond, or say they “don’t know.”

**Figure 1: Support for media freedom** | 34 countries | 2016/2018



**Respondents were asked:** Which of the following statements is closest to your view?

Statement 1: The media should have the right to publish any views and ideas without government control.


Statement 2: The government should have the right to prevent the media from publishing things that it considers harmful to society.

(% who “agree” or “agree very strongly” with each statement)

Majorities in 15 countries support the media-freedoms statement, including more than six in 10 in Madagascar (70%), Malawi (67%), Mauritius (62%), Gabon (62%), and Botswana (62%). But majorities in 18 countries support government limitations, including two-thirds or more of citizens in Senegal (79%), Mali (75%), Liberia (66%), and the Gambia (66%).

Support for media freedom is lowest in West Africa, the only region where a majority support governments' right to prevent publications (Figure 2).<sup>1</sup>

**Figure 2: Support for media freedom** | by region | 34 countries | 2016/2018



(% who “agree” or “agree very strongly” with each statement)


On average across 31 countries surveyed in all three rounds since 2011, support for media freedom declined by 10 percentage points (from 56% to 46%) over seven years, while support for government control increased by the same margin (39% to 49%) (Figure 3).<sup>2</sup>

We see this trend even though Africans offer unequivocal backing for the media's watchdog role over government. In response to a question asked in Round 6 (2014/2015) but not repeated in the most recent survey round, more than two-thirds (69%) of respondents said the news media should “constantly investigate and report on government mistakes and corruption.” In addition, 59% said the news media are “somewhat effective” or “very effective” in revealing government mistakes and corruption, and a slim majority (51%) said the media “rarely” or “never” abuse their freedom by publishing lies (though a substantial 36% said they do so “often” or “always”) (Nkomo & Wafula, 2016).

<sup>1</sup> Regional breakdown of surveyed countries: East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania), West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo), Central Africa (Cameroon, Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe), Southern Africa (South Africa, Botswana, eSwatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe), and North Africa (Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia).

<sup>2</sup> The decline is even steeper – a 30-percentage-point drop over the past decade – if we compare responses across 20 countries surveyed in all rounds since 2008. But we consider that comparison less reliable, because the 2008/2009 survey worded the question differently, asking: “Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Statement 1: Government should be able to close newspapers that print stories it does not like. Statement 2: The news media should be free to publish any story that they see fit without fear of being shut down.”

**Figure 3: Support for media freedom** | 31 countries | 2011-2018



**Respondents were asked:** Which of the following statements is closest to your view?

*Statement 1: The media should have the right to publish any views and ideas without government control.*

*Statement 2: The government should have the right to prevent the media from publishing things that it considers harmful to society.*

(% who “agree” or “agree very strongly” with each statement)

In the most recent survey round, support for unfettered media decreased in 25 of the 31 countries (see Figure 4 and Table A.2 in the Appendix). This includes drastic declines in Tanzania (-33 percentage points) and Uganda (-21), where governments have implemented significant new restrictions on media (Internews, 2018; Dahir, 2018) and discussed other limits on a broad set of content producers (Biryabarema, 2019) and in Tunisia (-21), where top officials, including President Beji Caid Essebsi, have blamed media for exacerbating social turmoil associated with mass protests (Freedom House, 2017a).

In some cases, such as Zimbabwe (-5 points), Benin (-6), Guinea (-6), and Lesotho (-6), these decreases are small, though still statistically significant. Support for media freedom remained unchanged in Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, and Togo. The only country recording an increase in popular support for media freedom (+12 points, from 49% to 61%) is Sudan, which ranks near the bottom (174th out of 180 countries) in the 2018 World Press Freedom Index and has made news with a government crackdown on media freedoms during recent anti-government protests (Reporters Without Borders, 2018b; 2019).

Trends in other countries, such as a 27-point drop in Cabo Verde or persistent weak support for media freedom in Senegal (18% in the most recent survey), require detailed country-level analysis (beyond the scope of this paper) to begin to understand.

**Figure 4: Changes in support for media freedom | 31 countries\* | 2011-2018**





Figure shows change, in percentage points, between surveys in 2011/2013 and 2016/2018 in the proportion of respondents who “agree” or “agree very strongly” that the media should be free of government control. (\* Gabon, the Gambia, and São Tomé and Príncipe were not surveyed in 2011/2013.)

Key socio-demographic groups are nearly evenly divided in their views on media freedom (Figure 5). Men are slightly more likely than women to favour a free press (49% vs. 45%). Support for media freedom decreases slightly as age increases, ranging from 47%-48% among 18- to 45-year-olds to 44% in the above-55 category. Most clearly, support for media freedom grows as education increases. Only 39% of respondents with no formal education support media freedom, vs. 47%-50% of those with formal schooling. Still, even those with higher levels of education are almost evenly divided on the question.



**Figure 5: Support for media freedom** | by socio-demographic group | 34 countries  
| 2016/2018



**Respondents were asked:** Which of the following statements is closest to your view?  
 Statement 1: The media should have the right to publish any views and ideas without government control.  
 Statement 2: The government should have the right to prevent the media from publishing things that it considers harmful to society.  
 (% who “agree” or “agree very strongly” with each statement)

### Are Africa's media becoming more free or less?


Global watchdogs have raised serious concerns about the state of media freedoms around the world (Freedom House, 2018). However, many Africans do not share these assessments, at least about their own country. More Africans believe media freedom to “investigate and report on government mistakes or to criticize government actions or performance” are increasing than decreasing. When asked to compare media freedoms to “a few years ago,” a plurality of respondents (43%) say freedoms have increased, vs. 32% who believe freedoms have decreased and 17% who say they are generally unchanged (Figure 6). In fact, 21% of respondents believe media have “much more” freedom than they did a few years ago.

However, countries and regions vary widely in their perceptions. In 11 countries, more than half of respondents indicate that media freedoms have increased recently, and at least three-fifths of respondents report increasing freedom in five countries: Burkina Faso (60%), Guinea (60%), Ghana (62%), Mali (66%), and the Gambia (80%). Perceptions in the Gambia, fresh from its first electoral turnover in power since a 1994 coup, are particularly striking: Fully six in 10 citizens (60%) say the media enjoy “much more” freedom, while only 8% – the lowest of any country in the sample – say freedoms have decreased. In Ghana, 43% assess the media as having “much more” freedom, and only 10% believe freedoms have decreased. Mali has the fourth-highest proportion of respondents assessing the media as having “much more” freedom (37%), but a not-insignificant number of respondents there (21%) assess freedoms as having declined.

While more respondents believe media freedoms are increasing than decreasing in 24 countries, 10 countries exhibit the opposite pattern: In Côte d'Ivoire, eSwatini, Gabon,

Madagascar, Niger, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, more people assess media freedoms as declining than increasing. (In Botswana, the two views are in a statistical tie, at 41% vs. 42%.) The proportion of respondents who indicate media freedoms have declined is greater than 45% in five countries: Tanzania (46%), São Tomé and Príncipe (46%), eSwatini (47%), Sudan (48%), and Gabon (66%). Gabon is the standout on this measure: 42% of citizens assess the media as having “much less” freedom, and only 17% – fewer than any other country in the sample – assess media freedoms as having increased.

**Figure 6: Do media have more or less freedom now than a few years ago?**  
| 34 countries | 2016/2018




**Respondents were asked:** Please tell me if there is more or less freedom now for each of the following things compared to a few years ago, or are things about the same: The media's freedom to investigate and report on government mistakes or to criticize government actions or performance?

Regional patterns in perceptions of change are quite distinctive (Figure 7). A majority (52%) of West Africans see media freedoms as having increased, while just one-quarter (26%) see them as having decreased. These numbers are essentially reversed in Central Africa, where 49% assess media freedoms as having decreased and only 29% see increases.

Nearly every socio-demographic group examined has more people indicating increased than decreased freedoms. Perceptions of increased freedoms increase slightly with age (42% of those aged 18-35 vs. 46% of those over age 65), and they decrease somewhat with education (47% of those with no formal education vs. 41% of those with post-secondary education).

**Figure 7: Do media have more or less freedom now than a few years ago?** | by region and socio-demographic group | 34 countries | 2016/2018




**Respondents were asked:** Please tell me if there is more or less freedom now for each of the following things compared to a few years ago, or are things about the same: The media's freedom to investigate and report on government mistakes or to criticize government actions or performance?

## How do citizens' perceptions compare to observers' ratings?

While survey responses provide insights into on-the-ground expectations and perceptions of media freedom, it can be instructive to compare these views with those of “expert” observers. Freedom House’s (2017b) Freedom of the Press Report scored countries in terms of the legal, political, and economic environments for media, on a 0-100 scale, with lower values indicating greater freedom. The countries in the Afrobarometer sample with the lowest (best) scores for press freedom in 2016 were Cabo Verde (27), São Tomé and Príncipe (28), and Mauritius (29), while the highest (worst) scores went to the Gambia (87), Sudan (86), and eSwatini (83).

As Figure 8 shows, there is no statistically significant correlation between the share of Afrobarometer respondents in a country who see media freedoms as increasing and the change in Freedom House scores (adjusted so that positive values indicate increased media freedoms) between 2011 and 2016.

**Figure 8: Perceived change in media freedom vs. change in Freedom House scores**  
| 34 countries | 2016/2018



Assessments by Freedom House and by survey respondents seem to match in eSwatini, Sudan, and Tanzania, where both rate freedoms as decreasing. For example, Freedom House’s press freedom score for Tanzania worsened by 9 points between 2011 and 2016, and 45% of Tanzanians rate media freedoms as worse. And significant numbers of respondents rate media freedoms as improving in Malawi, Senegal, and Togo, where Freedom House also rates freedoms as increasing. Malawi’s score, for example, increased by 15 points, the second-largest improvement in the world during that period, and 53% of Malawians assess freedoms in their country as improving.

However, other countries show significant mismatches in the assessments of outside observers and ordinary citizens. Ivorian, Malagasy, and Zimbabwean respondents do not seem to


share raters' assessments that media freedoms in their countries are increasing. Côte d'Ivoire saw the world's largest improvement in press freedom scores between 2011 and 2016 (19 points), but only 29% of survey respondents say they improved; instead, 40% say media freedom diminished. And Gambians, Malians, Ghanaians, Guineans, and Kenyans are likely to rate media freedoms as improving, unlike Freedom House's raters. Ghana's Freedom of the Press score is 5 points worse in 2016 than in 2011, but 62% of Ghanaians see media freedoms as having improved in recent years. (Gambians' assessments of improvements, which were measured in mid-2018, might stem from changes occurring after President Yahya Jammeh's ouster in early 2017, which was after the most recent Freedom House ratings, while Malians might be witnessing more recent improvements as democratic institutions are reinstated after the 2012 coup.) These results suggest that, at least in some countries, populations' metrics for considering what constitutes media freedoms might differ considerably from those of watchdog groups.

Moreover, popular demand for media freedom does not match up with the supply of media freedom as measured by Freedom House scores (adjusted so that higher values indicate greater levels of freedom); as shown in Figure 9, there is no correlation between the two.

In some countries, demand and supply do seem to match. Respondents in Cabo Verde, Mauritius, São Tomé and Príncipe, and South Africa are among the strongest supporters of media freedom, and their countries receive relatively high ratings from Freedom House. At the other end of the spectrum, freedom ratings are low in the Gambia, Cameroon, and eSwatini, and respondents in those countries also do not prioritize such freedoms.

But other countries show significant mismatches between demand and supply. Gabonese, Sudanese, Moroccan, and Zimbabwean respondents express relatively strong support for media freedom, but Freedom House raters assess such freedoms as minimally protected in those countries. And a number of countries – including Ghana, Mali, and Senegal – are assigned relatively high freedom ratings, yet their populations are generally unsupportive of such freedoms.


**Figure 9: Popular support for media freedom vs. Freedom House scores** | 34 countries | 2016/2018






# Do Africans want free media?

34 African countries | 2016/2018



Change in support for media freedom | 31 African countries | 2011-2018



**Respondents were asked:** Which of the following statements is closest to your view? (% who "agree" or "agree very strongly" with each statement)

- Statement 1: The media should have the right to publish any views and ideas without government control.
- Statement 2: The government should have the right to prevent the media from publishing things that it considers harmful to society.


## Do Africans see increasing media freedoms as a hopeful sign ... or a scourge?

These results suggest a potentially troubling paradox. While many Africans see media freedoms as increasing in their countries, support for those freedoms is decreasing, and in some cases tumbling.

In fact, those who say media freedoms are increasing are more likely to support government limitations on media freedoms (54%) than they are to prioritize freedom to publish (43%) (Figure 10). This pattern holds true in 20 of the 34 countries surveyed (see details by country in Table A.3 in the Appendix.) In other words, a majority of Africans who see media freedoms as increasing seem to view that as a negative development.

On the other hand, among those who assess media freedoms as declining, a majority (54%) also see this as a negative development, as they indicate media should be free to publish any views without government interference. A minority (44%) see decreasing media freedoms and simultaneously support government limitations. Of those who see no change in media freedoms, equal numbers support publication freedom and government restrictions (48% each).

**Figure 10: Support for media freedom, by perceived change in level of media freedom**  
| 34 countries | 2016/2018



### Respondents were asked:

Which of the following statements is closest to your view?


Statement 1: The media should have the right to publish any views and ideas without government control.

Statement 2: The government should have the right to prevent the media from publishing things that it considers harmful to society.

(% who "agree" or "agree very strongly" with each statement)

Please tell me if there is more or less freedom now for each of the following things compared to a few years ago, or are things about the same: The media's freedom to investigate and report on government mistakes or to criticize government actions or performance?

These results suggest that dissatisfaction with media environments is widespread in Africa. Fully 40% of respondents indicate such dissatisfaction, in that 23% see media freedoms as increasing but support greater restrictions, and 17% see freedoms as decreasing but support freedom over restriction. Dissatisfaction, as measured in this way, is highest in Mali (56%) and the Gambia (56%) and lowest in Morocco (24%) and Mozambique (31%). Only one-third



(33%) of respondents are satisfied with their country's media environment: 14% who see freedoms as decreasing and support greater restrictions, and 19% who see freedoms as increasing and support freedom. This kind of satisfaction is highest in Malawi (48%) and South Africa (42%) and lowest in Madagascar (25%) and Zimbabwe (20%).

### How do Africans get their news?

Even if dissatisfaction with the current state of the media is widespread, most Africans (89%) say they access some mass media for the news at least once per month. Six in 10 (61%) report using some media for news every day, 18% a few times a week, 6% a few times a month, and 3% about once a month.


Many Africans have multiple potential mass media they can access for news, including radio, television, newspapers, the Internet, and social media. Among all respondents, 16% report accessing all five of these during the previous month, 12% four, 13% three, 21% two, and 25% one. The mean number of types of mass media accessed for news among all respondents is 2.4, although there is significant variation by country, from 1.1 in Niger, 1.3 in Malawi, and 1.3 in Madagascar to 3.3 in South Africa, 3.4 in Cabo Verde, and 3.9 in Mauritius.

### Traditional news sources

Radio remains the most-accessed mass medium in Africa (Figure 11), as has been the case across all Afrobarometer survey rounds. Four in 10 respondents (42%) report getting news from radio every day, and an additional 31% do so at least a few times a month. In 25 of the 34 surveyed countries, more citizens access radio daily for news than any other medium, and majorities do so in seven countries: Senegal (51%), Uganda (52%), Ghana (56%), South Africa (56%), Namibia (63%), Kenya (70%), and Mauritius (89%). (For a breakdown of news sources by country, see Table A.4 in the Appendix). Only 23% of Africans say they never use the radio for news, the fewest non-users for any mass medium.

In 10 countries, however, fewer than one-third of citizens report listening every day, including in Sudan (30%), Zimbabwe (30%), Gabon (28%), Côte d'Ivoire (28%), and Morocco (25%). Many of these countries also have relatively high shares of respondents who say they never listen to the radio for news, including Morocco (34%), Niger (35%), Côte d'Ivoire (37%), Malawi (37%), Gabon (38%), and Tunisia (45%). In most of these countries, while radio listenership is low, other media have relatively high access rates. In Malawi and Niger, however, both radio listenership and access to other mass media are low.

**Figure 11: News media consumption | 34 countries | 2016/2018**




**Respondents were asked:** How often do you get news from the following sources?

Television ranks second among mass media, with 35% of Africans saying they watch news every day. Majorities get television news daily in seven countries: São Tomé and Príncipe (54%), Gabon (60%), Morocco (66%), South Africa (69%), Cabo Verde (73%), Tunisia (73%), and Mauritius (88%). Still, there are 19 countries where fewer than one-third of citizens report watching television news on a daily basis. In fact, fewer than one in six report watching every day in seven countries: Guinea (15%), Madagascar (16%), Uganda (15%), Niger (13%), Sierra Leone (11%), Malawi (7%), and Liberia (6%). On average across 34 countries, 41% of respondents say they never watch television for the news, and this proportion exceeds two-thirds in six countries: Lesotho (68%), Sierra Leone (72%), Madagascar (74%), Liberia (76%), Niger (79%), and Malawi (81%).

Newspapers lag far behind radio and television. Only 7% of respondents say they read a newspaper every day, and 66% say they never do – the greatest proportion of non-users among mass media. In 21 countries, fewer than one in 20 respondents say they read the newspaper every day. Daily newspaper exposure is lowest in Malawi (2%), Sierra Leone (2%), Mali (1%), Niger (1%), Guinea (1%), and São Tomé and Príncipe (1%). Everyday exposure only reaches one in five in three countries: South Africa (20%), Namibia (22%), and Mauritius (33%). Conversely, there are nine countries where more than eight in 10 citizens never read the paper: Benin (82%), Ghana (82%), Sierra Leone (83%), Togo (83%), São Tomé and Príncipe (85%), Burkina Faso (86%), Mali (89%), Guinea (90%), and Niger (92%).

While radio remains king among mass media, its dominance is declining (Figure 12). Everyday exposure to radio news has become less common: Across 31 countries surveyed in all rounds since 2011, 47% of respondents listened every day in 2011/2013, vs. 42% in 2016/2018. Consumption rates for television and newspapers have remained fairly constant.

**Figure 12: Daily news media consumption | 31 countries\* | 2011-2018**



**Respondents were asked:** How often do you get news from the following sources? (% who say “every day”) (\* Numbers for social media are based on 33 countries surveyed in 2014/2015 and 2016/2018.)

### Digital media news sources

Reliance on the Internet and social media for news, on the other hand, is increasing significantly. The percentage of respondents who say they use the Internet every day for news has more than doubled since 2011, from 7% to 18%. Afrobarometer has measured the use of social media for news only since 2014/2015, but reported everyday access has increased significantly over that short period, from 14% to 19%.

And while there is no country where the Internet or social media is the top medium for news, there are six countries where one of these sources comes in second. In Morocco (40% everyday use), Gabon (39%), Sudan (38%), and Liberia (15%), the second-most accessed news source is social media, whereas in Cabo Verde (45%) it is the Internet; in Tunisia, the two sources are tied for second place (43%). In five of these six cases, television is the medium with the most everyday access. The exception is Liberia, where radio dominates.

More than one-third of people use the Internet every day for news in six countries: Sudan (37%), Gabon (37%), Morocco (39%), Tunisia (43%), Mauritius (47%), and Cabo Verde (45%). In these same countries, more than one-third of citizens also report using social media every day for news, as do South Africans (35%).


Still, it is important to note that a majority (62%) of Africans report never using the Internet or social media for news. In fact, there is a clear digital divide on the continent, with higher rates of access in wealthier North Africa, the island states, and Southern Africa and much lower rates elsewhere, particularly in the Sahel. While there are nine countries where at least half of respondents use the Internet or social media with any regularity to access news, there are eight where fewer than one in five do.

### Variations by demographic group

The popularity of news sources varies by region (Figure 13). Radio is the most common news source in East Africa (where 56% report listening every day), Southern Africa (46%), and West Africa (40%). But it is surpassed as a daily news source by television in Central Africa (51%) and North Africa (60%).

Everyday use of the Internet for news is highest in North Africa (40%) and Central Africa (25%) and lowest in West (14%) and East (12%) Africa. North Africa stands out as having particularly high rates of everyday use of social media for news (40%), with Central Africa (25%) next, followed by Southern (19%), West (15%), and East Africa (12%).

**Figure 13: Daily news media consumption | by region | 34 countries | 2016/2018**



**Respondents were asked:** How often do you get news from the following sources? (% who say “every day”)




As might be expected, daily news consumption from all mass-media sources increases with education (Figure 14). Among respondents without formal schooling, 40% use media every day for news, compared to 51%, 68%, and 87%, respectively, of those with primary, secondary, and post-secondary education. One in four respondents without formal education (25%) report never accessing media for news, compared to 16%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, of those with primary education, secondary, and post-secondary education. The number of sources goes up significantly with education, from 1.2 sources used by those with no formal schooling to 1.7, 2.9, and 3.9 sources, respectively, for those with primary, secondary, and post-secondary education.

Differences are especially sharp when it comes to use of the Internet and social media for news. Only 2% of respondents with no formal education report using the Internet for news every day, compared to more than half (52%) of those with post-secondary education. The pattern is the same for social media.

In fact, while radio is the most commonly accessed medium among those at most education levels, citizens with post-secondary educations are more likely to use the Internet, social media, and television every day for their news than they are to tune in to radio news.


**Figure 14: Daily news media consumption | by education | 34 countries | 2016/2018**



**Respondents were asked:** How often do you get news from the following sources? (% who say “every day”)

Men are somewhat more likely than women to get news every day from the radio (a 9-percentage-point gap), newspapers (4 points), the Internet (6 points), and social media (5 points) (Figure 15). Overall, men are more likely than women to report using some kind of media every day (67% vs. 55%), and women are more likely than men to report “never” using media for news (16% vs. 7%). Men also report using more types of media than women (2.6 vs. 2.1).


**Figure 15: Daily news media consumption** | by gender | 34 countries | 2016/2018



**Respondents were asked:** How often do you get news from the following sources? (% who say “every day”)

Urban residents are more likely than their rural counterparts to access all mass-media sources on a daily basis, especially those sources for which higher levels of wealth and education and easier physical access are determining factors: television (a 31-point gap), social media (21 points), the Internet (20 points), and newspapers (7 points) (Figure 16). Three-fourths (74%) of respondents in urban areas report accessing some media for news every day, and only 5% say they never do, vs. 50% of rural residents who are everyday users and 17% who never use media. Urbanites use significantly more types of sources (3.1) than rural dwellers (1.8).


**Figure 16: Daily news media consumption** | by rural-urban residence | 34 countries | 2016/2018



**Respondents were asked:** How often do you get news from the following sources? (% who say “every day”)

Internet and social media are also particularly common news sources for younger Africans (Figure 17).<sup>3</sup> Approximately a quarter of respondents aged 18-35 report using these media every day (22%-25% for Internet, 24%-28% for social media), compared to just 4%-7% for each medium in the over-55 categories. For all the attention paid to the increasing importance of Internet and especially social media as news sources in Africa, it is important to note that radio and television are still considerably more commonly accessed by every age group, including the youngest adults.

**Figure 17: Daily news media consumption | by age | 34 countries | 2016/2018**




**Respondents were asked:** How often do you get news from the following sources? (% who say "every day")

## Conclusion

Against a media landscape of unprecedented opportunity and multi-prong threats, Africans seem to be of mixed views on how much freedom is ideal. Popular support for media freedom has declined precipitously over the past seven years, with strong majorities supporting increased government restrictions in some countries where support for unfettered media was previously widespread.

Paradoxically, Africans are more likely to see media freedom in their country as increasing rather than declining – and they're not sure they like it. Among those who see media freedom as increasing, a majority support greater government restrictions. Meanwhile, it's among those who view media freedom as decreasing that a majority support media freedom rather than government restrictions – as if seeing certain freedoms threatened might prompt people to want to protect them.

<sup>3</sup> Overall media access declines slightly with age: 11% of respondents under age 36 report never using media for news, vs. 12% aged 36-55 and 15% aged above 55. The number of sources used also goes down with age, from 2.6 in the 18-35 category to 2.2 in the 36-55 group and 1.8 among those above age 55.



Newly emergent technologies are creating additional uncertainty as the ways that Africans access news change. Use of digital media (i.e. Internet and social media) can provide access to more pluralistic messages; however, a majority of Africans still do not regularly use these sources, and there are significant regional, gendered, and educational divides inhibiting access for many. Further, these new media are not a panacea, in that many populations and watchdog groups fear they are venues for fake news, hate speech, and other biased content, and governments' strategies for restricting access are becoming increasingly sophisticated and brazen. Unfortunately, recent years suggest that media freedoms, though essential components of democracy, are retrenching, and it is not clear that popular support for those liberties is broad enough in many countries to prevent further backsliding.

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**Do your own analysis of Afrobarometer data – on any question, for any country and survey round. It's easy and free at [www.afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis](http://www.afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis).**


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## Appendix


Table A.1: Afrobarometer Round 7 fieldwork dates and previous survey rounds

Country	Round 7 fieldwork	Previous survey rounds
Benin	Dec 2016-Jan 2017	2005, 2008, 2011, 2014
Botswana	June-July 2017	1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014
Burkina Faso	Oct 2017	2008, 2012, 2015
Cabo Verde	Nov-Dec 2017	2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014
Cameroon	May 2018	2013, 2015
Côte d'Ivoire	Dec 2016-Jan 2017	2013, 2014
eSwatini (Swaziland)	March 2018	2013, 2015
Gabon	Nov 2017	2015
Gambia	July-August 2018	N/A
Ghana	Sept 2017	1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014
Guinea	May 2017	2013, 2015
Kenya	Sept-Oct 2016	2003, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014
Lesotho	Nov-Dec 2017	2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014
Liberia	June-July 2018	2008, 2012, 2015
Madagascar	Jan-Feb 2018	2005, 2008, 2013, 2015
Malawi	Dec 2016-Jan 2017	1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014
Mali	Feb 2017	2001, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2014
Mauritius	Oct-Nov 2017	2012, 2014
Morocco	May 2018	2013, 2015
Mozambique	July-August 2018	2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2015
Namibia	Nov 2017	1999, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2014
Niger	April-May 2018	2013, 2015
Nigeria	April-May 2017	2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2015
São Tomé and Príncipe	July 2018	2015
Senegal	Dec 2017	2002, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2014
Sierra Leone	July 2018	2012, 2015
South Africa	August-Sept 2018	2000, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015
Sudan	July-August 2018	2013, 2015
Tanzania	April-June 2017	2001, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014
Togo	Nov 2017	2012, 2014
Tunisia	April-May 2018	2013, 2015
Uganda	Dec 2016-Jan 2017	2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2015
Zambia	April 2017	1999, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2014
Zimbabwe	Jan-Feb 2017	1999, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2012, 2014

Table A.2: Change in support for media freedom | 31 countries | 2011-2018

	Media should be free to publish			Government should have right to prevent publication		
	2011/2013 (%)	2016/2018 (%)	Change (percentage points)	2011/2013 (%)	2016/2018 (%)	Change (percentage points)
Benin	50	45	-6	48	55	7
Botswana	60	62	2	35	32	-3
Burkina Faso	58	39	-19	33	59	26
Cabo Verde	83	57	-27	10	38	28
Cameroon	37	29	-8	53	61	8
Cote d'Ivoire	48	40	-9	49	51	2
eSwatini	51	41	-10	47	55	9
Ghana	55	36	-18	43	57	14
Guinea	48	41	-6	50	57	7
Kenya	59	50	-9	36	44	8
Lesotho	40	34	-6	57	64	7
Liberia	47	32	-14	52	67	15
Madagascar	70	70	0	18	24	6
Malawi	67	67	0	31	30	-1
Mali	44	25	-19	54	74	20
Mauritius	61	62	1	36	33	-3
Morocco	60	57	-3	30	32	2
Mozambique	59	45	-15	23	44	21
Namibia	53	44	-10	45	53	8
Niger	64	50	-14	33	48	15
Nigeria	57	45	-13	41	55	14
Senegal	30	18	-11	68	79	11
Sierra Leone	60	45	-15	38	52	14
South Africa	61	54	-7	33	43	10
Sudan	49	61	12	46	37	-9
Tanzania	73	40	-33	26	56	30
Togo	55	54	-1	39	42	3
Tunisia	62	41	-21	33	56	23
Uganda	80	59	-21	18	39	21
Zambia	51	42	-9	46	54	8
Zimbabwe	58	53	-5	38	40	2
<b>31-country average</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>-10</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>10</b>

**Table A.3: Support for media freedom, by perceived change in level of media freedom | 34 countries | 2016/2018**



	Among those who see media as having:	% who say media should be free to publish	% who say government should have the right to prevent publication
<b>Benin</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	44%	56%
	Same level of freedom	42%	58%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	47%	53%
<b>Botswana</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	70%	27%
	Same level of freedom	55%	31%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	58%	37%
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	41%	58%
	Same level of freedom	45%	54%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	36%	62%
<b>Cabo Verde</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	65%	30%
	Same level of freedom	56%	37%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	56%	39%
<b>Cameroon</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	37%	59%
	Same level of freedom	30%	66%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	28%	66%
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	47%	44%
	Same level of freedom	39%	52%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	34%	60%
<b>eSwatini</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	48%	51%
	Same level of freedom	43%	55%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	33%	61%

<b>Gabon</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	65%	33%
	Same level of freedom	65%	33%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	49%	51%
<b>Gambia</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	33%	65%
	Same level of freedom	24%	72%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	32%	66%
<b>Ghana</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	39%	56%
	Same level of freedom	38%	59%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	36%	58%
<b>Guinea</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	52%	47%
	Same level of freedom	42%	56%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	40%	59%
<b>Kenya</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	54%	43%
	Same level of freedom	50%	45%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	51%	48%
<b>Lesotho</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	31%	69%
	Same level of freedom	39%	59%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	35%	64%
<b>Liberia</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	32%	67%
	Same level of freedom	34%	65%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	32%	68%
<b>Madagascar</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	77%	20%
	Same level of freedom	76%	22%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	70%	29%




<b>Malawi</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	66%	33%
	Same level of freedom	55%	42%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	71%	27%
<b>Mali</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	30%	70%
	Same level of freedom	23%	77%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	24%	75%
<b>Mauritius</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	68%	28%
	Same level of freedom	68%	28%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	54%	45%
<b>Morocco</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	58%	37%
	Same level of freedom	62%	30%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	62%	32%
<b>Mozambique</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	48%	45%
	Same level of freedom	42%	51%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	47%	46%
<b>Namibia</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	41%	57%
	Same level of freedom	47%	50%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	46%	52%
<b>Niger</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	61%	36%
	Same level of freedom	38%	61%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	44%	56%
<b>Nigeria</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	48%	51%
	Same level of freedom	43%	57%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	43%	56%

<b>São Tomé and Príncipe</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	66%	30%
	Same level of freedom	59%	35%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	55%	41%
<b>Senegal</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	18%	79%
	Same level of freedom	21%	77%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	18%	80%
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	48%	50%
	Same level of freedom	54%	45%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	40%	58%
<b>South Africa</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	52%	45%
	Same level of freedom	43%	54%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	59%	39%
<b>Sudan</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	68%	31%
	Same level of freedom	63%	33%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	51%	49%
<b>Tanzania</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	43%	56%
	Same level of freedom	47%	44%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	38%	61%
<b>Togo</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	62%	37%
	Same level of freedom	62%	33%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	50%	48%
<b>Tunisia</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	44%	53%
	Same level of freedom	43%	53%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	39%	57%


<b>Uganda</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	66%	34%
	Same level of freedom	60%	36%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	53%	46%
<b>Zambia</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	49%	47%
	Same level of freedom	39%	57%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	38%	60%
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	Somewhat/Much less freedom	70%	29%
	Same level of freedom	50%	45%
	Somewhat/Much more freedom	48%	46%

**Table A.4: News media consumption** | 34 countries | 2016/2018

	Medium	Every day	A few times a week/A few times a month	Less than once a month	Never
Benin	Radio	36%	38%	5%	22%
	Television	17%	23%	6%	54%
	Newspaper	5%	8%	5%	82%
	Internet	10%	6%	1%	83%
	Social media	11%	6%	1%	81%
Botswana	Radio	41%	33%	4%	23%
	Television	46%	23%	3%	28%
	Newspaper	19%	46%	8%	27%
	Internet	22%	16%	4%	58%
	Social media	30%	15%	2%	53%
Burkina Faso	Radio	41%	33%	4%	22%
	Television	18%	15%	4%	62%
	Newspaper	3%	7%	2%	87%
	Internet	7%	6%	2%	85%
	Social media	7%	6%	2%	85%
Cabo Verde	Radio	33%	35%	8%	25%
	Television	73%	19%	2%	7%
	Newspaper	12%	17%	10%	60%
	Internet	45%	18%	3%	35%
	Social media	42%	18%	2%	37%
Cameroon	Radio	31%	34%	4%	30%
	Television	38%	27%	4%	31%
	Newspaper	8%	21%	9%	62%
	Internet	20%	24%	4%	52%
	Social media	19%	23%	4%	54%
Côte d'Ivoire	Radio	28%	30%	6%	36%
	Television	38%	26%	6%	31%
	Newspaper	6%	14%	9%	71%
	Internet	10%	17%	3%	70%
	Social media	10%	15%	3%	72%
eSwatini	Radio	41%	29%	4%	26%
	Television	37%	14%	2%	46%
	Newspaper	15%	36%	10%	40%
	Internet	16%	14%	4%	65%
	Social media	24%	13%	3%	59%
Gabon	Radio	28%	29%	6%	38%
	Television	60%	21%	3%	16%
	Newspaper	10%	37%	12%	40%
	Internet	37%	22%	2%	39%
	Social media	39%	19%	2%	39%
Gambia	Radio	43%	39%	6%	12%
	Television	29%	30%	4%	36%
	Newspaper	5%	14%	4%	74%
	Internet	18%	16%	4%	60%




	Social media	24%	15%	4%	55%
Ghana	Radio	56%	29%	4%	12%
	Television	42%	25%	6%	27%
	Newspaper	3%	9%	5%	82%
	Internet	13%	12%	2%	72%
	Social media	15%	12%	2%	69%
Guinea	Radio	41%	37%	2%	20%
	Television	15%	17%	4%	64%
	Newspaper	1%	6%	3%	90%
	Internet	5%	9%	2%	83%
	Social media	5%	11%	2%	81%
Kenya	Radio	70%	17%	2%	11%
	Television	33%	16%	3%	47%
	Newspaper	5%	26%	10%	59%
	Internet	21%	9%	2%	67%
	Social media	20%	8%	2%	69%
Lesotho	Radio	46%	25%	2%	26%
	Television	21%	8%	3%	67%
	Newspaper	3%	14%	5%	77%
	Internet	13%	8%	2%	76%
	Social media	16%	7%	2%	74%
Liberia	Radio	38%	37%	6%	18%
	Television	6%	12%	6%	76%
	Newspaper	5%	20%	7%	68%
	Internet	13%	14%	4%	68%
	Social media	15%	13%	4%	67%
Madagascar	Radio	38%	26%	4%	32%
	Television	16%	9%	2%	73%
	Newspaper	4%	11%	5%	80%
	Internet	3%	4%	2%	91%
	Social media	5%	5%	1%	89%
Malawi	Radio	30%	29%	4%	37%
	Television	7%	9%	3%	81%
	Newspaper	2%	14%	6%	78%
	Internet	5%	4%	2%	88%
	Social media	6%	3%	1%	88%
Mali	Radio	38%	35%	4%	22%
	Television	24%	26%	8%	42%
	Newspaper	1%	5%	4%	89%
	Internet	5%	6%	2%	86%
	Social media	6%	6%	2%	85%
Mauritius	Radio	89%	9%	1%	2%
	Television	88%	12%	0%	1%
	Newspaper	35%	40%	6%	19%
	Internet	47%	14%	2%	36%
	Social media	42%	12%	2%	43%
Morocco	Radio	25%	32%	8%	34%
	Television	66%	27%	3%	4%



	Newspaper	5%	16%	11%	66%
	Internet	39%	15%	2%	41%
	Social media	40%	14%	2%	42%
Mozambique	Radio	36%	35%	5%	23%
	Television	28%	18%	10%	40%
	Newspaper	3%	12%	8%	72%
	Internet	11%	13%	4%	67%
	Social media	11%	13%	3%	67%
Namibia	Radio	63%	24%	3%	11%
	Television	41%	13%	5%	41%
	Newspaper	22%	43%	9%	26%
	Internet	25%	21%	5%	49%
	Social media	26%	20%	4%	49%
Niger	Radio	32%	29%	5%	34%
	Television	13%	8%	2%	76%
	Newspaper	1%	4%	2%	91%
	Internet	6%	3%	1%	88%
	Social media	6%	3%	1%	89%
Nigeria	Radio	44%	37%	8%	11%
	Television	24%	34%	11%	31%
	Newspaper	5%	20%	12%	62%
	Internet	23%	17%	3%	57%
	Social media	23%	17%	3%	57%
São Tomé and Príncipe	Radio	39%	42%	3%	16%
	Television	54%	32%	3%	11%
	Newspaper	1%	10%	3%	85%
	Internet	17%	24%	3%	56%
	Social media	17%	26%	3%	54%
Senegal	Radio	51%	34%	3%	13%
	Television	48%	25%	3%	25%
	Newspaper	8%	18%	4%	70%
	Internet	20%	17%	2%	60%
	Social media	19%	17%	2%	61%
Sierra Leone	Radio	39%	35%	3%	23%
	Television	11%	12%	4%	72%
	Newspaper	2%	10%	6%	82%
	Internet	10%	10%	2%	75%
	Social media	14%	11%	2%	69%
South Africa	Radio	56%	22%	3%	19%
	Television	69%	17%	2%	12%
	Newspaper	20%	32%	8%	40%
	Internet	32%	15%	4%	47%
	Social media	35%	13%	2%	48%
Sudan	Radio	30%	28%	9%	33%
	Television	41%	31%	5%	23%
	Newspaper	9%	24%	16%	50%
	Internet	37%	18%	4%	41%
	Social media	38%	16%	5%	41%





Tanzania	Radio	45%	35%	7%	13%
	Television	23%	24%	14%	39%
	Newspaper	5%	23%	15%	56%
	Internet	8%	9%	3%	78%
	Social media	8%	9%	2%	79%
Togo	Radio	36%	42%	5%	17%
	Television	23%	26%	5%	46%
	Newspaper	3%	7%	6%	83%
	Internet	10%	12%	3%	75%
	Social media	12%	15%	3%	70%
Tunisia	Radio	32%	17%	6%	45%
	Television	73%	14%	3%	10%
	Newspaper	3%	10%	7%	80%
	Internet	43%	10%	2%	44%
	Social media	43%	10%	2%	44%
Uganda	Radio	52%	28%	6%	14%
	Television	15%	13%	8%	64%
	Newspaper	3%	19%	12%	67%
	Internet	7%	8%	2%	82%
	Social media	8%	7%	2%	81%
Zambia	Radio	35%	32%	8%	24%
	Television	26%	19%	7%	48%
	Newspaper	4%	15%	13%	68%
	Internet	10%	9%	5%	76%
	Social media	11%	8%	4%	75%
Zimbabwe	Radio	30%	37%	6%	27%
	Television	20%	19%	8%	52%
	Newspaper	4%	27%	13%	56%
	Internet	8%	16%	4%	72%
	Social media	7%	11%	4%	76%

# AFRO BAROMETER

LET THE PEOPLE HAVE A SAY



**Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz** is associate professor of political science at Michigan State University and editor of the Afrobarometer Working Papers series.

**Josephine Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny** is Afrobarometer regional communications coordinator for anglophone West Africa, based at the Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) in Accra.

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Contact: [jconroy@afrobarometer.org](mailto:jconroy@afrobarometer.org)  
[jappiah@afrobarometer.org](mailto:jappiah@afrobarometer.org)