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Contents

Foreword 5
Jannie Malan

Power, conflict and consensus building in Africa: Ideology revisited 8
Browne Onuoha

Towards an indigenous model of conflict resolution: Reinventing women's roles as traditional peacebuilders in neo-colonial Africa 32
Christopher Isike and Ufo Okeke Uzodike

Culture and conflict in urban Tanzania: Professionals' voices in educational organisations 59
Claude-Hélène Mayer and Christian Martin Boness

Political leadership and conflict resolution: An African example 84
Wallace Warfield and Ashad Sentongo

Post-conflict development in Liberia: Governance, security, capacity building and a developmental approach 105
Edward Banka Gariba

Book Review
Conflict resolution in the 21st century: Principles, methods and approaches 133
Reviewed by Tamara J. Kirkwood

Book Review
Crafting an African security architecture: Addressing regional peace and conflict in the 21st century 136
Reviewed by Martha Mutisi

Foreword

Jannie Malan

In the field of dealing with conflict, as probably in most other fields, there is always an interplay between established methods and innovative ones. On the one hand, there are the approaches and practices that have a mostly undocumented but long history behind them. We take it for granted that from the time of our remotest ancestors there were differences and rivalries – and resulting quarrels and fights. We have indications, however, from which we infer that among our ancestors there were those who discovered the value of talking things out instead of fighting them out. On the other hand, there are the bright ideas and updated methods of the present. Time-proven traditions are modified to meet current needs – as for instance, gender balance. Basic procedures of negotiation and mediation are refined – for instance, in light of our current insights into dialogue and communication skills – and supplemented – for instance, by recently conceptualised specialisation in peacemaking and peacebuilding.

When dealing with conflict situations in our present world, we can therefore be guided by old guidelines, or by new ones, or by both. Whether the conflict concerned appears to be a relatively simple interpersonal one or a highly complicated international one, there will probably be elements of basic human interaction and factors of complex contemporary issues. It is our responsibility, therefore, to have as much knowledge and experience as possible of both conventional methodology and novel pioneering.

The articles appearing in this issue can enhance our expertise in these two directions. In the first article (Onuoha), the tradition of consensus building is approached from a new perspective. The method of encouraging parties with conflicting opinions to work towards a sufficient degree of agreement obviously remains one that can generally be recommended. But in situations where self-interested politicians are wielding power, consensus (thinking and feeling with each other) may be brutally overruled or subtly overturned. In such a context it will be futile to fix idealistic hopes on merely propagating consensus. What the article recommends instead, is nothing less than a reformed state and a virile civil society. A nationalist ideology should be re-invented, which could empower the population and scale down the state from its appropriated absolute autonomy to its actual relative autonomy.

In the second article (Isike and Okeke Uzodike) another tradition is revisited – indigenous methods of peacebuilding, and particularly, the way in which women 'have always been at the centre of peace processes across different pre-colonial African societies'. The questions are asked how and why women have become 'passive observers of politics and peacebuilding in neo-colonial Africa'. The article then points the way towards appreciating the extremely valuable contribution of women to restoring and building peace and social harmony.

The next article (Mayer and Boness) turns our attention to the current education of youth in a cross-cultural context. Here tradition and innovation meet in a different way. Children grow up with the cultural traditions of the group to whom they happen to belong almost unconsciously but firmly embedded in them. When youngsters of one group interact with those of a group moulded into a different pattern, both sides experience shocks, tensions and conflicts. New and ongoing research is therefore recommended into ways of improving the general views and specific insights of educational professionals in order to equip themselves better to prevent or deal with cross-cultural conflicts among their learners/students.

The last two articles (Warfield and Sentongo, and Gariba) are focused on transformational political leadership at all levels from local to national. Encouraging examples from two countries are explored. Warfield and

Sentongo discuss the ways in which traditional indigenous processes are used in Rwanda on its course towards reconciliation. But they highlight a crucial contemporary need among leaders and communities: democratic capacity building. They urgently recommend that reconciliation and stability be pursued through justice, decentralisation and the empowerment of women. Gariba takes the example of Liberia where, under its new, female president, capacity building is taking place, but where more can be done. What he strongly recommends are good governance, security sector reform, ongoing development, and comprehensive capacity building.

Following the articles, the first book review is on a book which, on a similar dual wavelength, presents a 'systematic evaluation of traditional and modern principles, methods and approaches to conflict resolution'.

As we are sending out this issue, we trust that readers will not only find enough ad hoc insights and suggestions, but also an overall message of remaining loyal to long-standing traditional methods *and* becoming committed to transformational approaches needed today. There is indeed very good reason for the recurring emphasis on *reform* and on *women*. Reformational undertakings should not be regarded as foreign imports threatening our established traditions. In an ever-changing world, traditions should be upheld and updated. And women should not be regarded (by narrow-minded men) as outsiders who now suddenly have to be included. They have all the time been a perfectly natural, normal and interrelated component of humanity. They are insiders – ready to work together so that the quality and effectiveness of our work can be built upon the mutually complementary contributions of both genders.

When we are on the job of dealing with conflict, let us then constantly be aware of traditions *and* innovations, and be ready to make the relevant choices or combinations. Such decisions may be needed when initially planning an appropriate procedure, and also when at a later stage of the process surprising moves or possibilities call for adaptations.

Power, conflict and consensus building in Africa: Ideology revisited

Browne Onuoha[*]

Abstract

This paper interrogates and rejects the effectiveness of consensus building as a mechanism for conflict resolution in Africa. Drawing from the conflict/consensus theoretical debates of the 1960s, the paper argues that because of the inherent character of power, and considering the nature of the state in Africa which is subordinated to private interests, the political leaders will not readily bend to consensus. Instead of consensus the paper suggests a reform of the state. But beyond the reform, the paper points out the compelling need for the development of a virile civil society and a corresponding need for the re-invention of a nationalist ideology both of which will induce as well as facilitate the *relative* autonomy of the state. Thereafter, a reformed state in Africa will be better placed to adequately manage power and conflict.

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Introduction

Consensus, though an old concept, has re-entered the lexicon of African political and conflict studies since the 1990s. Other related concepts making similar re-entry are peace-dialogue, peace-building and culture of peace. The sequence of their relationships may be like the riddle of whether the chicken or the egg came first. But it is safe to assume that a culture of peace certainly encourages consensus building. Our focus in this paper is on consensus building.

The concept of consensus building is supposed to represent a mechanism or an approach to be adopted towards resolving some of the many intractable conflicts that have bedevilled Africa, in some instances for over four decades. Consensus as a mechanism being advocated is rightly derivable from the formulations of conflict/consensus social theories which were dominant in the social sciences in the 1950s and 1960s.

As presently applied in Africa, consensus building seems to be a product of knowledge arising from researches carried out in conflict areas in Africa with the help of some United Nations agencies. Often international professional negotiators and mediators are recruited by governments or international agencies to be involved in the processes, including negotiations expected to lead to consensus. The mechanism was encouraged during the negotiations for peace at the end of some of the long civil wars in parts of Africa as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Southern Sudan. Also, consensus is envisaged in the resolution of the on-going racial, ethnic, tribal or religious wars and conflicts in Sudan/Darfur, Somalia and Côte d'Ivoire. It is assumed that consensus building will provide the key to peace in these conflict areas, or at least provide the environment which will enable peace to be built.

In addition to its theoretical roots in conflict/consensus social theories, consensus building is said to adequately fit into several of the elements of the democratisation process evolving in Africa at the same time that these conflicts are escalating. Indeed, the number of non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) devoted to consensus advocacy in Africa has grown as a result of the prospect of evolving peace through the mechanism of consensus. Many of the organisations have attracted generous funding from international agencies to organise conferences, seminars and workshops, and carry out research into dialogue and consensus building programmes focusing on the conflict areas in Africa. In a place like Rwanda, aspects of the educational curriculum are said to have been re-designed with the aim of re-socialising the children and the youth so that they may begin to cultivate attitudes that may, at least in future, create the environment for consensus building in their society (Mwambari and Schaeffer 2008).

The purpose of this article is to scrutinise consensus advocacy, which for nearly twenty years (from the 1990s) has involved the organisation of conferences, seminars and workshops devoted to encouraging consensus building among groups in conflict areas in Africa. Our query derives from the conflict/consensus social theories, but with emphasis on the interface between conflict/consensus and the theory of power. The central argument of the paper is that the type of power struggle at the level of the state in Africa does not submit to consensus as a mechanism for resolving conflict. The paper is of the view that any arrangement and management of the dialogue and consensus mechanism in Africa which does not put the state at the centre, and therefore necessarily brings to the fore the structure of power in that particular society, will have very little chances of success. Most of the conflicts in Africa are politically motivated, even when they appear otherwise as when they seem to be religious. This is because, directly or indirectly, most of these conflicts result from the struggle for access to, control and management of political power. And when that is the case, consensus building becomes still-born.

The paper is done in three parts. The first part explores the two relevant concepts of conflict and consensus, and the theoretical debate about them which is drawn from Ralf Dahrendorf (1965, 1968); and our emphasis relates the debate to the theory of power. The second part analyses the import of power, conflict and consensus within the context of political rivalry and at the level of the state. The paper recounts that at the level of the state, political parties are dominant and remain the major objects of analysis; and that

consistent with their character they do not bend to consensus. In the third part, the paper concludes that while the consensus/dialogue advocacy may not be misleading, the present approaches adopted by some governments, international agencies and NGOs will not achieve results. This is because these approaches are rather intellectual and academic, and are directed mainly at civil society organisations. Instead, the paper suggests that an attempt should be made to re-create the civil society as well as re-invent a nationalist ideology for Africa. Both of these steps will enhance the *relative* autonomy of the state, and prepare the political system to better manage power and conflict.

Conflict, consensus and power

Conflict may be viewed as a form of tension arising from mutually exclusive or opposing actions, thoughts, opinions, or feelings. It is evident when individuals or groups evaluate situations or pass judgments from different perspectives that stem from incompatible differences in their education, social background or socialisation, or knowledge of the issues in contest. Conflict often occurs when people or groups perceive that as a result of a disagreement there may be a threat to their interests. Conflicts may also arise from misinformation, stereotypes, prejudices, contradictory perceptions of justice, differing socio-cultural traditions, personal beliefs or ideologies; and they are of many dimensions: racial, sectarian, ethnic, religious, ideological, cultural, economic, political, social, and others (Kriesberg 1973:1–57; Kriesberg 2006).

According to Dahrendorf (1965:135), conflict also involves manifest clashes between social forces as well as incompatible differences of objectives, such as a desire on the part of both contestants to attain what is available, wholly or in part, only to one of them. He conceptualises social conflict as the great creative and ever-present force that leads to change. He remarks that societies and social organisations are held together *not by consensus* (emphasis mine) but by constraint, not by universal agreement but by the coercion of some by others. Whatever is considered the 'value system' is mostly that of the ruling party and not that of the common people. At any given time, it is usually upheld by enforcement rather than by general acceptance. He identifies conflict, change and a third notion, constraint, as always going together: 'and as conflict

generates change, so constraint may be thought of as generating conflict. We assume that conflict is ubiquitous, since constraint is ubiquitous wherever human beings set up social organisations ... it is always the basis of constraint that is at issue in social conflict' (Dahrendorf 1968:127).

In politics, conflict most often arises during the struggle for access to, control and management of political power, or during the process of determining what, long ago, Harold Lasswell (1990) saw as the essence of politics, which is 'who gets what, when, how'. By logic of action, most conflicts often end up being political, because in most instances their mediation is through some form of 'politics' or public policy. Consensus advocacy is of the view that most conflicts can be resolved through consensus building.

In itself, consensus represents stability, harmony, equilibrium, the universal, or *contrat social*, said to embody a broad agreement which, while not necessarily all-embracing, does embrace the overwhelming majority, involving unity, identity and co-ordination (Dahrendorf 1968:125; Atkinson 1971:236–237).

Consensus refers to a collective opinion expressing acceptance of a 'middle ground' in an outstanding issue or policy of general importance. Thus, it is a position of 'no winner, no loser', 'no victor, no vanquished', or a 'give and take' situation in the African parlance, which may be employed, it is assumed, in the many intractable socio-political crises and conflicts in Africa.

Over time, political thinkers have been concerned about the issue of conflict, particularly when directly or indirectly related to the structure of power in the society in general.

Thomas Bernard (1983) attempted to capture much of the movement of these ideas, from the ancient to the modern theorists, in his comparative analysis of the consensus-conflict debate. In a comparison of seven pairs of theorists on each side of the conflict and consensus divide, Bernard identifies three levels at which there could be conflict/consensus: the human level, the level of the contemporary state of the society, and the ideal society level (Bernard 1983: 12–15). He analyses the position of each pair at those three levels in relation to the predominance of consensus or conflict, and provides a particularly

rigorous comparative analysis of Parsons' and Dahrendorf's consensus and conflict theories respectively (Bernard 1983:30–186, 145–186).

In the debate, the preoccupation of the theorists was (1) how to reconcile conflict and consensus in relation to the enforcement of norms, rules, laws, punishment and sanctions; (2) how to connect the reconciliation with power, authority, policy and the state; and (3) how to reconcile both consensus and conflict at the three levels which he (Bernard) identified (Wrong 1979:89; Bernard 1983: 12–15, 145–225). And according to Dennis Wrong (1979:89), this problem of reconciliation underlined the formulations of the social theories which were employed in the consensus/conflict debate. Dahrendorf is credited with having pioneered the study, highlighting the conflict/consensus divide. This was in reaction at the time to the consensus/equilibrium system maintenance of Talcott Parsons' structural-functionalism (Dahrendorf 1965, 1968; Parsons 1964, 1966, 1968, 1971; Wrong 1979:89–92; Bernard 1983:145–186).

The conflict model views individual or group relationships in all *structures of power* as a struggle which demonstrates some form of an irreducible element of coercion wherever such *power structures* exist (emphasis mine). On the other hand, the consensus model emphasises the predominance of legitimate authority in the society (Wrong 1979:89–91), and sees power as depending 'overwhelmingly on a consensual element, specifically referring to the absence of the use of overt physical force ...' (Bernard 1983:153).

In his analysis, Dahrendorf (1968:173–174) remarks that the functioning of society means that norms regulate human conduct. This regulation is guaranteed by the incentive or threat of sanctions; and he argues that the possibility of imposing sanctions is the abstract core of all power. He goes on to add that established norms are nothing but ruling norms, that is, norms defended by the sanctioning agencies of society and those who control them. Wrong (1979:90) is of the view that this formulation is no different from Hobbes' insistence on law as the command of the sovereign, or Marx's statement that norms are dictated and enforced by the ruling class.

All these remarks emphasise the *structure of power* in the society, as well as the determination of the extent to which consensus or conflict is permitted. However,

according to Bernard, part of the problem of the debate centred round the very broad definitions which each theorist, especially Parsons and Dahrendorf, gave to consensus and conflict. Apart from the problem of definition, and their inability to reconcile consensus/conflict at the three levels of human nature, the contemporary state of the society, and the ideal society, both Parsons and Dahrendorf agree that their two theories represent 'two faces of society', that is, that both conflict and consensus exist in the same society (Bernard 1983: 179–186). And Bernard's conclusion therein is that the consensus/conflict debate is not an empirical debate and cannot be resolved through empirical investigation (Bernard 1983: 217).

Nevertheless, the emphasis in this paper is on *the structure of power* and on the fact that it is most often expressed at the level of 'the contemporary state of the society'. According to Bernard, what is important in examining the theories at the level of the contemporary state of the society is not the question whether there is more consensus or conflict, but the terminology used for the description of the society at the particular point in time (Bernard 1983:15–16). And in Africa the literature is unambiguously replete with terms like 'crisis', 'conflict', 'war', which are all interconnected with *the structure and struggle for power* (emphasis mine). As observed by Parsons himself (Bernard 1983:154–155), these situations, which attract overt and potential uses of force, do not accommodate consensus as a serious political option. The reason is not unrelated to the nature of political power itself, which happens to be central to most issues resulting in conflict, and which intrinsically resists consensus. For, as Thomas Weldon (1962:3) contends, 'we may all hold that rights given by the constitution are sacred (consensus) and still fight one another (political struggle/conflict) because we cannot agree as to what these rights are'. These undefined and unsettled areas (what these rights are), are areas of political ferment, where political power incarnates, and at times get expressed in the most coercively unguarded forms; and most often these may only be resolved within the boundaries of state power which do not readily bend to consensus.

In other words, there may be consensus on some fundamental issues like operating a federation instead of a unitary system of government; a presidential system of government in the place of the cabinet system of government; two

instead of three terms in office; or democratic government instead of military dictatorship. But in a federation, for instance, there are questions about which states/regions are to be created, what the boundaries are to be between federal and state powers, and how tight or loose the federation should be. These questions are difficult to define and resolve. They constitute the issues and essence of political power, which most often are not readily subject to consensus. For instance, in the federal states of the DRC, Nigeria and Sudan, for nearly fifty years, it has been difficult to reach a consensus on how tight or loose the federations should be, or the boundaries between state and federal powers; or indeed whether or not there should be one federal government. The three countries have gone to war at different times to get these issues resolved.

Also, allocation of resources or the spoils of office – the 'who gets what, when, how' issue – triggers crisis and conflict at various levels of the society. This is an area that has created stalemate in Côte d'Ivoire, and the crisis aftermath of general elections in Ethiopia (2005), Nigeria (2007), Kenya (2007) and Zimbabwe (2008).

Thus, as observed by Wrong while reviewing the conflict/consensus debate (1979:91), in social theory it is more helpful to view institutional order as an outcome of past and on-going political conflict than to use system theory that postulates an underlying consensus or a tendency towards integration as a way of measuring order in the society. Wrong (1979:91) points out that this insistence on the importance of political power and its inherent coercive and conflictual aspects was mostly influenced by the writings of Max Weber, and that it was a correction rightly introduced by Dahrendorf to the excessive emphasis on legitimate authority in consensus and system theory.

Related to the issue of power, there are a few basic questions that have been raised in the consensus debate: where do we locate the consensus; who are to be involved, included or indulged in building consensus; and what is the content of the consensus? (Bernard 1983:178) These questions are important, according to the arguments of the community power theorists of the 1960s (Dahl 1961; Hunter 1963; Polsby 1966), because even if consensus were to be achieved it would be meaningless unless it involved those who 'make things

move' in the community or larger society. Answers to these queries emphasise the central question of power, and strengthen the argument that the dialectic of power frustrates consensus, particularly when those who wield power are put into proper (power) perspectives. This is because in order for consensus to be meaningful, it needs to involve those who wield power. It is at the point of 'wielding' that we also examine in the next section the anatomy of power, and demonstrate that in democracy those who most often wield power, the political parties, do not politically behave in ways that significantly concede to consensus. This is particularly the case in Africa since, as already indicated by Lasswell's study of decades ago, there are too little democratic leadership and too few democratic personalities (Lasswell 1967:108–110, 150–152). This character of undemocratic leadership is further confirmed by recent events and studies about the on-going democratisation processes in Africa (Ake 1994, 1996, 2000; Schraeder 2002; Murunga 2002; Joseph 1999; Ottaway 1999; Bratton and Van de Walle 1998; Chole and Ibrahim 1995).

It is also pertinent to observe that in any matter concerning consensus, the state in Africa is ever present and very critical. In one way or another, consensus takes place within state boundaries. Thus the consensus, to a larger or smaller extent, will require the democratic nature of the state to be fully actualised and sustained, even at the lowest levels of the society, whether community, traditional, ethnic or religious. And the most ubiquitous agent of the state is government (the government of the day). In present-day democracies in Africa, unlike in the days of military dictatorship, governments are run by political parties successful at the polls. Where this is the situation, it will be correct to argue that there is no consensus negotiated anywhere within the state which will not meet political parties as the foremost 'stakeholders', even when the issues in demand may appear manifestly non-political. This is the case in Somalia, the DRC, Uganda, Chad, Niger, Southern Sahara, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya and Zimbabwe. In most of these areas, political parties or identified groups with political agendas are those involved in negotiations for consensus. Even when the issues are ethnic, religious, or socio-cultural, those sent to represent constituencies in negotiations for consensus are manifestly or latently political actors. Examples are the genocide in Rwanda (Mamdani 2002; Lemarchand

2008); racial conflicts in Sudan/Darfur (Flint and De Waal 2008); the religious riots in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria (Banjo 2009); and the Niger Delta crisis also in Nigeria.

More fundamentally, in each conflict area, the structure of the political party goes furthest to the grassroots and it is therefore best organised to respond to any negotiations for consensus. Therefore, in each case the party is the most visible organisation, even when the issues involved appear non-political. Thus, in spite of consensus, the members of political parties will not ignore the fact that their parties are struggling for political power, with all the inherent characteristics of political power. This largely explains why most conflicts in Africa seem intractable. Somalia, Sudan/Darfur, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, and the Great Lakes Region (Lemarchand 2008) are apt examples.

Thus, in many political crises since political independence in the 1960s in most parts of Africa, access to, and control and management of power for the purposes of resource allocation have remained the central issues under contest. Other factors such as tribalism or ethnicity (pluralism) have also been identified. But these latter factors manifested in the events of *struggle for political power* (emphasis mine) (Sklar 1966; Lloyd 1970; Ekeh 1975; Markovitz 1977; Nnoli 1978; Young 1993). Therefore, the frequent manifestations of crises and conflicts around the power nexus tend to pose constraints, and at times frustration about consensus building, and thus limit its success as a mechanism for peace. As suggested above, the limitations to consensus are directly related to the structure and dynamics of power, which are explored immediately below.

Anatomy of power and the limits of consensus

Studies indicate that the contest for power has a dynamic that differs from that of other social phenomena. In political studies, political power is the ultimate state craft, and its capture is the most consuming preoccupation of political actors. Several definitions are provided of what political power is, and most of them focus on its influence, force, coercion, manipulation, persuasion, and similar attributes. Other diverse features, types, categories, dimensions and

complexities of power are also provided and examined by scholars (Lasswell 1967; Lasswell and Kaplan 1976; Wrong 1979; Gerth and Mills 1978; Dahl 1970; Galbraith 1985).

In their definition, Lasswell and Kaplan (1976:85) view power as 'the capacity of an individual or group of individuals to modify the conduct of other individuals or groups in the manner which they desire ... the political process is the shaping, distribution and exercise of power ... What men seek in their political negotiations is power ...'. In a similar characterisation, Mills (1964:171) observes that 'all politics is struggle for power; (and) the ultimate kind of power is violence'. Weber has a similar definition of power as 'the possibility of imposing one's will upon the behaviour of other persons' (Gerth and Mills 1978:80). All these characterisations are similar to an observation by Robert Dahl (1970:32, 15) about the complex and awesome nature of power in his remarks that:

> Nothing is more likely to lead to bad political strategies than to misunderstand 'power', to misperceive 'the power structure'; for to be misled about 'power' is to be misled about the prospects and means of stability, change, and revolution. The graveyard of history is strewn with the corpses of reformers who failed not only because of the forces arrayed against them but because the pictures in their minds about power and influence were simplistic and inaccurate.

These features of power identified by scholars show the extent to which power and consensus may be irreconcilable. This is especially so in Africa where several states have been rated as weak.

Lord Acton identified other characteristics of power, warning against its ultimate, centralising and total nature, and showing how these foreclose consensus. This is contained in his widely quoted statement: 'power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely' (Darlberg-Acton 1988:519–521; Hill 2000:300–302). According to Acton, 'great men are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not authority ... among all the causes which degrade and demoralise men, power is the most constant and the most active' (Darlberg-Acton 1988:519–521; Hill 2000:300–302; Dahl 1970:15).

Robert Michels (1968:342–356) in his study stresses that political parties make the winning of power by elections imperative as well as compelling through the oligarchical nature of their structure and organisation. In Africa such electoral victory is often viewed as a 'winner-takes-all' situation. And by the intrinsic characteristics of power identified, such a winner situation may not at the same time accommodate consensus in the control and management of political power. Also, in a rather bewildering expression, emphasising the critical need for political parties to win and maintain power, Weber states that 'parties live in the house of power' (Gerth and Mills 1978:81). Considering all the attributes of power, Weber's 'house of power' is more or less a 'castle of power', especially in many parts of Africa. And by implication, a 'castle of power' which permits 20 or 30 years of rule to one man does not have provision for consensus. This approximates the scenario of power structure and power struggle in Africa until the recent democratisation process as mentioned below.

In his own contribution, Dahrendorf (1968:205) argues that the structure of power which exists in all human societies explains not only how change originates and what direction it takes, but also why it is necessary. He is of the view that 'power always implies non-power and therefore resistance. The dialectic of power and resistance is the motive force of history ... Power produces conflict, and conflict between antagonistic interests gives lasting expression to the fundamental uncertainty of human existence ...' (Dahrendorf 1968:227). Power underlies conflict as well as underpins class differences in every human society (Dahrendorf 1968:227, 1967:17). If we may relate Dahrendorf's formulations to consensus in African politics, he is arguing that power implies inherent imbalance or lack of balance. And if there is imbalance or lack of balance, there will be little or no urge for those holding the power to commit time to consensus building, unless there is a meaningful threat to their control of power. This is also the political sociology of 'winner-takes-all' politics in Africa, particularly because, as we will examine shortly below, in Africa power does not yet check power. In other words, the emphasis drawn from the formulations of the scholars is that the inherently awesome, centralising, possessive, and coercive characteristics of power do not allow consensus building as a meaningful way of resolving political conflict in Africa.

While there are positive attributes of power as observed by Lasswell (1967:9), it is necessary that the elements, dialectic, and dynamics of power be adequately understood in order to appreciate why consensus may not be sustainable as means of resolving conflicts among political contenders in Africa. This is the argument of the next section of the paper.

Power, politics and consensus building in Africa

John Galbraith (1985:19–25, 51–64) identifies three sources from which power is acquired: personality, property, and organisation. All sources of power are interconnected, and all three find most effective expression in Galbraith's analysis of organisation and the state. It is within that analysis that the examination of political parties and power becomes appropriate (Galbraith 1985:65–80, 140–152). In his review Galbraith observes that: 'the modern state unites within its structures all three sources of power ... It has manifest access to all three instruments of enforcement, and these have increased over the years in their absolute and relative importance within the formal structure of government' (Galbraith 1985:140–141).

In a democratic order, the structure of power and instruments of enforcement of the powers of the state are under the control of the ruling political party. This is in spite of all the checks and balances in government. In Africa, with the degree of control that is prevalent, calls for consensus will be 'too simplistic and inaccurate' (Dahl 1970:15). Instead of consensus, Galbraith (1985:81) argues that control of power can only come about through a countering power. Lord Acton, whom we quoted earlier, expresses a similar view that it is only with power that power can be put in check (Darlberg-Acton 1988:521).

As we shall argue shortly, because the state in Africa lacks relative autonomy, state power is captured and seized by a dominant ruling interest. Accordingly, it becomes difficult for power to effectively check power, because the dominant interest that captures the state ensures that it has a monopoly of state power, which hitherto in Africa has been near absolute and overwhelming ('the winner-takes-all' situation/politics). However in more recent times, prospects for challenges to power, though not yet effective, have been increasing with the

emergence of democratisation processes of the 1990s in Africa (Bratton and Van de Walle 1998; Onuoha and Fadakinte 2002; Muranga 2002).

Put differently, it may be argued that countering power with power, as argued by Galbraith, theoretically presupposes that the state possesses the known attributes of 'relative autonomy', and plays the role of an arbiter among group interests within the society (Gramsci 1971; Showstack 1987).[1] But states in Africa lack these attributes (Ake 1985, 1994). The pioneer political leaders who struggled for political independence from the colonial masters in the 1960s appropriated the benefits of political independence, especially through the use of political power to expropriate economic resources, at the same time deploying these resources of the state to consolidate their grip on political power. This trend of thought is an extensive discourse of politics in Africa in the social sciences literature, and has provided a fundamental interpretation of the crises and conflicts in Africa from the 1960s to date (Carter 1966; Rotberg and Mazrui 1970; Lofchie 1971; Markovitz 1977; Ake 1981, 1994; Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Rothchild and Chazan 1988; Fatton 1992; Bayart 1993; Bayart, Ellis and Hibou 1999; Joseph 1991; Joseph 1999). Indeed, the struggle for political power has intensified with the years, attracting a higher premium for every new set of struggle, like during elections, formation of new governments, or even struggle for citizenship (Ake 1994, 1996, 2000; Joseph 1999; Ottaway 1999; Schraeder 2002; Lemarchand 2008).

According to Claude Ake, a more disturbing aspect of this development is that by the beginning of the twenty first century, African political leaders had nothing meaningful in their agenda to reform this character of the state, a

1 'Relative autonomy' raises the question about the extent to which a state under capitalism may be relatively free from domination by the various competing interests within the system. The formulation assumes that no state may be absolutely free from domination. The fundamental concern is that being relatively autonomous is necessary for the state to be neutral, an arbiter, an umpire, and not unduly favouring one particular interest or the other, in enforcing the laws, and thereby defining the extent to which the rule of law may be said to apply. The issue of 'Relative autonomy' of the state, deriving from Antonio Gramsci's formulations, was a stimulating scholarly debate among radical scholars in Europe between the late 1960s and middle of the 1980s, demonstrated in the robust engagements of Nicos Poulantzas and Ralph Miliband. African scholars of radical bent extensively employed the analysis to examine the problem of the state in Africa.

reform which would enhance the state's character of 'relative autonomy' and mediation, and which would enable it to ensure the rule of law and impartially resolve conflicts among the dominant interests in the entire society (Ake 1994:8–9). The reform may not meaningfully take place now, because those controlling the state are beneficiaries of the present character of the state, and are aware of the enormous power of the state under their control. Under such a power imbalance, consensus will not be attractive to those in dominant control of the instruments of state power.

Instead of consensus, there may be party coalitions and alliances of senior and junior partners determined by relative successes at the polls, or ethnic compacts in some cases (Schraeder 2004:106–110). Indeed, in the analyses of power/consensus relationships, a hidden reality is that the demand for consensus arises from the point at which power is assumed to have failed or is failing. In other words, a strong demand for consensus may be an indication that those wielding power are getting weak, and losing control of power, and contenders getting stronger and more confident to challenge power by asking for consensus (Wrong 1979:88).

In addition to the problem of power, there is also the issue of justice in the exercise of political power – which may not be left out in cases of conflict and consensus in Africa. Studies of justice explain the persistent demand for justice as a factor in most conflicts, including those in Africa (Rawls 1971). Thus, even if consensus and stability were regarded as desirable, forms of injustice like corruption, oppression, manifest deprivations, and other forms of violation of human rights, may instigate long-drawn struggles for freedom. And unless the offending issues are resolved, no amount of advocacy or organisation will allow room for consensus building. In his analysis of the subject, Rawls (1971:4–55) stresses that there must be a measure of agreement on what is social justice for there to be a viable human community. He holds the state (the African state in this case) responsible for the provision of the ideal political environment for the enforcement of justice in the rest of society. In a related study, Sen (2004:338–350) argues that these rights include welfare rights, which stand to reason, and are clearly needed, even if the obligation of the state in meeting these rights is an imperfect one. The failure of African leaders to fulfil these

obligations, as well as uphold other larger issues of justice, gives rise to most of the crises and conflicts which are at present perplexing Africa. And with such disregard for obligations, consensus and peacebuilding may not be achieved. In the circumstances, consensus, as much as it is desirable, may be sought elsewhere in the civil society. This is the argument in our conclusion.

Conclusion: The Civil Society Ideology and consensus building

This paper has argued that in Africa, consensus building among political actors may not succeed in most circumstances involving the struggle for power. It is our suggestion that there is a need to adequately understand the theory of power, as it is power that most often underpins conflicts, in order to appreciate the limitations of consensus building in Africa. We further suggest that rather than advocate consensus building, which may not be attainable under the dialectic of political power, there should be an endeavour to reform the state, and above all, build a virile civil society with a dominant nationalist ideology.

Civil society is comprised of various interest and pressure groups, including non-governmental organisations, who in themselves constitute the national sovereign, and whose interactions most of the time are 'outside the state', and on the basis of trust and consensus (Seligman 1992; Harberson, Rothchild and Chazan 1994; Hall 1995). The consensus includes their recognised role as vanguard, the last ditch of protection for human rights, and as promoters of democracy and good governance. According to Lipset (1994:7), private associations (the civil society) are sources of restrictions on the government and serve as major channels for involving people in politics; they are also mechanisms for creating and maintaining the consensus necessary for a democratic order. In other words, because the civil society does not struggle for political power, it is easier for members to function by persuasion, cooperation and compromise, and to become oriented towards consensus in their interactions (Atkinson 1971:236–239). However, in Africa this may not always be the case, because there are times when 'politics' intrudes into and

bogs down the activities of civil society groups. Nevertheless, the features of a stronger civil society make consensus building relatively easier to achieve.

At the same time, it gives cause for grave concern that currently there is no serious endeavour by African governments, through investment in policies, to consciously build the civil society in Africa. Such policies should include good governance first and foremost. Also to be promoted are youth education programmes containing special national values planned and implemented as socialisation processes in schools, youth organisation/association centres, churches, mosques, community centres and professional associations. In the 1990s civil society organisations were active and indeed crucial during the early years of democratic transition in Africa (Olukoshi 1997; Bratton and Van de Walle 1998; Makumbe 1998). But apparently they lost steam after the initial elections that introduced foundation democratic governments at the time. With some exceptions, civil society in Africa seems to be disappointingly weak. Also there is little awareness among the citizens of the relevance of the civil society, and no evidence of their reliance on it as a force that can bring the political actors under control – the type of control which, according to Lipset (1994:7), civil societies exercised in developed countries at that time in history, as watch dog and the ultimate sovereign.

However, it is important to emphasise that there can be no virile civil society without an ideology: a world view, a guide, a value system, a national spirit around which all societal actions revolve; which gives strength, meaning, direction, and interpretation of the world to the whole society (Mannheim 1976; Apter 1965).

According to Friedrich and Brzezinski (1964:71–96), ideology is 'the general system of beliefs held in common by the members of a collectivity; that is … it is a system of ideas and values which are oriented towards the evaluative integration of the collectivity and of the situation in which they are placed, the processes by which they have developed to their given state, the goals towards which the members are collectively oriented, and their relation to the future course of events' (Friedrich and Brzezinski 1964:88). Also confirming the centrality of ideology to national consciousness, direction and philosophy,

Weldon (1962:7) observes that 'inevitably ... unless disputants are agreed on something quite different, namely an abstract *political principle* (ideology), they will, and can lead to no conclusion'.

The issue of ideology and its role in national development is a tested and canvassed subject. In Africa it was an advocated ingredient of development in some countries from the 1960s to the 1980s. Its inclusion in development thinking began to decline with the economic recession of the 1980s, especially when it failed to advance development in those countries which introduced such ideological content and guide to their development efforts, in particular, Nyerere's Tanzania, and some Marxist-oriented economies in Africa (Young 1982; Hyden 1983; Lubeck 1987; Keller and Rothchild 1987; Cohen and Gouldbourne 1991; Hughes 1992; Apter and Rosberg 1994).

Nevertheless, ideology is being reconsidered in the African context because of the quest for a positive, creative, cohesive, and aggregative value system, the type achieved by the Asian Tigers, reputed to be rooted in the values of Confucianism (World Bank 1995; Hill 1997). It is a value system which insists on nationalism, moral values and thrift in the macroeconomic principles of management, openness and equity; thrift/savings and austerity instead of the profligacy and the high level of corruption prevalent in Africa.

The use of ideology in this discussion is deliberately conceived to include all efforts to internalise constructive and guiding principles in the peoples' productive capacities which will enable them to take control of their environment and develop it with their own knowledge and expertise. Here we are suggesting nationalism to be the ruling ideology for African states.

Nationalism refers to collective feelings and identities, emotions, behaviour, norms, and values which develop and elevate a single spirit of nationhood above all other elements and characteristics. Nationalism involves shared beliefs, characteristics, and a common goal as one people. While there may be sub-cultures, there remains a common overarching cultural value which binds the people of a single nationhood; and their attitudes, beliefs and behaviour become influenced by that common cultural value. Nationalism is usually evolved and built by nation-builders who emerge with the values. The values

of the emergent leadership usually become higher and dominant, and are accepted by the majority of the people at the time. In turn, both the leadership and the people stand to maintain and defend the values. In many instances this formation process is related to the idea of building hegemony, and may be studied under that rubric (Gramsci 1971; Gray 1977; Joseph 2002).

However, critical to the success of national ideology is that the ideology necessarily has to be indigenous (Kedourie 1970; Nyerere 1982; Low 1982; Hyden 1983; Neuberger 1986). In a recent paper emphasising indigenousness and autonomy, William Easterly (2007) argues that instead of the 'developmentalist ideology' of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, Africans should develop a *homegrown* path to success, and ignore the 'developmentalists' like the Asians always did in their path to development. But in Africa, one of the weaknesses of previous attempts at building the ideology of development was that none of the ideologies was *'homegrown', o*r sufficiently indigenous to become a national guide. Also, they were not rooted in the culture.

The indications are that without a common ruling ideology, consensus even at the level of the civil society becomes very difficult. If there were a common ideology, even if consensus were not built, political parties could go into accords, coalitions or alliances. In such cases, politically, the preoccupation will be the effort to keep coalition agreements. But political parties in Africa most often do not keep such agreements. The coalitions break down not because consensus was not built, but because the exploitative and accumulative tendencies of most African leaders do not allow them to respect agreements entered into with other political leaders. Certainly, political leaders who cannot keep coalition agreements will be the least disposed to consensus building.

Therefore consensus, strictly speaking, lies outside the context and exercise of party politics. Instead, it is the consensus within the civil society which influences the behaviour and actions of the parties, and which acts as a check on them, and makes them invoke a nationalist ideology as a recourse in cases which otherwise would bring conflict. This is further confirmed by Lipset, referring to Tocqueville's observation that voluntary associations limit the

central power, create new and autonomous centres of power to compete with it, and help to train potential opposition leaders in political skills (Lipset 1994:8).

In conclusion, it is pertinent to observe that at present, the issue of building an ideology is totally missing from the agendas of most African states, and worse still, missing from the research focus in African higher institutions and research centres. There is little evidence of current research on ideology in African institutions and in major current publications on that subject matter.

It is our view in this paper that there is need for research to be directed towards inventing an ideology of nationalism which will guide political party activities, national politics and all aspects of public policy, including the preservation of socio-cultural values. If a nationalist ideology is built, it will support the rule of law, constitutionalism, justice, accountability and good governance which will prevail at the level of the state, while at the level of the civil society, consensus building will still remain under the guiding influence of the same ideology. Of course this recognises the interconnection known to exist between the state and civil society as well as the fact that both reinforce each other.

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Towards an indigenous model of conflict resolution: Reinventing women's roles as traditional peace-builders in neo-colonial Africa

*Christopher Isike and Ufo Okeke Uzodike**

Abstract

Women have always been at the centre of peace processes across different pre-colonial African societies. Their peace agency in these societies can be located in their cultural and socio-political roles as well as their contributions to the overall well-being of these societies. It is noteworthy that women's peacebuilding roles then were reinforced by perceptions which stereotyped women as natural peacemakers, and as being more pacific than men. However, women in neo-colonial African states appear to have lost this myth/sacredness that surrounded their being and social existence in pre-colonial Africa. This is because apart from being marginalised socially, economically and politically, they have increasingly become victims of male violence.

How and why did women transform from being active participants in pre-colonial politics and peace processes to being passive observers of politics and peacebuilding in neo-colonial Africa? And second, given their pre-colonial peacebuilding antecedents, do women have the potential to transform politics and conflict in neo-colonial Africa?

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In building towards an indigenous model of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, this paper contends that the feminist ethic of care (defined by ubuntu) that was appropriated by pre-colonial African women to wage peace and maintain societal harmony, is still very much a part of the core of contemporary African women, and can be appropriated in resolving sub-national conflicts in neo-colonial Africa. Indeed, it is possible to develop it into a model of African feminist peacebuilding which can be utilised as an ideological rallying point to transform politics and create a suitable environment for development in the continent.

Introduction

Traditionally, women have always been at the centre of peace processes – from peacemaking to peacebuilding and even sometimes, preventive diplomacy – across different pre-colonial African societies (Amadiume 1997; Ngongo-Mbede 2003; Mohammed 2003). Women's peace agency in these societies can be located in their cultural and socio-political roles as well as their contributions to the overall well-being of these societies wherein these roles were reinforced by perceptions which stereotyped women as natural peacemakers, and as being more pacific than men.[1] Oftentimes, women were symbolised as paragons of morality, sacredness, goodness and tenderness. Indeed, women's existence and power in pre-colonial African societies were based on an ethic of care that was rooted in their motherhood and their nature, which was tolerant of difference, collaborative, non-violent and, as such, peaceful (see Mazurana and McKay 1999).

However, women in neo-colonial African states appear to have lost the myth/sacredness that surrounded their being and social existence in pre-colonial

1 Such perceptions were found even where women were known to be actively engaged in pre-colonial wars of conquest, initial resistance against colonial rule and the nationalist liberation struggles of the continent. For example, according to Becker (2003:55–56) 'it would be erroneous to assume that women and girls played no role in the encouragement of belligerent attitudes. Nor are there any indications that mothers would have raised their children in a way that would have discouraged their inclination to battle'. However, as Nodding explained, 'women's acceptance of war does not seem to emerge from seeing striving as a virtue but rather from a desire to remain in positive relation with those who worship striving' (Nodding in Van Soest 1995:168).

Africa. This is because apart from being marginalised socially, economically and politically (Amadiume 1997; Nzeogwu 2000; Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf 2002), they have become victims of assorted forms of physical abuse and sexual violence based on a warped understanding of African patriarchies,[2] which has produced negative masculinities in the continent (Isike and Okeke-Uzodike 2008). The negative impact of armed conflict and poverty on women is particularly unacceptable because not only are women disproportionate victims, they are in most cases excluded from peace processes and post-conflict reconstruction in their communities.[3] Africa arguably presents a major challenge and fertile ground for conflict and peace studies because it has been more plagued by violent intra- and inter-state conflict of various kinds since the 1960s than any other continent (Patel 2001:357).

While a multiplicity of factors is responsible for these conflicts, they all reflect the failure of national political systems to prevent them *ab initio*, effectively manage their symptoms or mediate them when they occur. It is pertinent to note that the vast majority of world leaders, of governments and officials at all levels, and of the presidents and boardrooms of transnational corporations are men (Brine 1999:16). It is therefore not far-fetched to make two assumptions: first, that global power is gendered in favour of men, and second, based on this, that armed conflict has a masculine character in terms of causes since men dominate the decision-making structures and mechanisms that produce them in the first place. The question then is how and why did women transform from being active participants in pre-colonial politics and peace processes to being passive observers of politics and peacebuilding in neo-colonial Africa? How do they fare in these conflicts? And given their pre-colonial peacebuilding antecedents, do they have the potential to transform politics and conflict in neo-colonial Africa?

2 Masculinities are fluid and dynamic, and we cannot speak of a single universal African patriarchy. Over the time, different forms of patriarchies existed in different pre-colonial African societies.

3 Also, in moving beyond pacifist and thus essentialist perspectives of women, it should be noted that women's victimhood in conflict extends beyond the feminisation of violence to the feminisation of exploitation. Therefore while it is true that women do play active roles in conflict, we must also ask how they are recruited and drawn into conflict in the first place.

This paper argues that the positive human factor values which defined womanhood in pre-colonial Africa have been corrupted over time by the colonial interruption of Africa's socio-cultural existence leading to the marginalisation, tokenisation and de-feminisation of women in political and peace processes in post-colonial Africa. Excluding women from these processes is an inherent weakness of extant statist and institutional approaches to understanding and resolving conflict in the continent as they undermine the human factor and human security basis of these conflicts. Also, even where women have been mainstreamed into politics in significant numbers, as in Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda, de-feminisation arising from the colonial corruption of gender relations makes their participation and representation in the public domain ineffective. Impliedly, the intervening socio-cultural variables that impede women's political participation and make their representation ineffective must be tackled to curb the incidence of armed conflict in Africa. One way to do this is to develop an African feminist paradigm of peacebuilding that can be appropriated as a practical conflict prevention and resolution model in the continent.

In building towards an indigenous theory of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, this paper therefore contends that the feminist ethic of care (defined by *ubuntu*) that was appropriated by pre-colonial African women to wage peace and maintain societal harmony, is still very much a part of the core of contemporary African women, and can be appropriated in resolving sub-national conflicts in neo-colonial Africa. Indeed, this can be developed into a model of African feminist peacebuilding which can be utilised as an ideological rallying point to transform politics and create an environment conducive for development to take place. This conclusion is aptly supported by empirical findings from a previous study of women, politics and peacebuilding in the Niger Delta in Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa (Isike 2009). However, it is noted that this paper is not in the first instance based on field work, but rather on a study of relevant literature and examples. Therefore, the use of empirical evidence from the above study is merely added as a clinching endorsement.

Conceptual framework of analysis

This paper utilises a number of key concepts which are anchored on a larger human agency/*ubuntu* framework. These include *conflict* and *peace*. A starting point of understanding *conflict* as used in this paper is that it is an inevitable phenomenon in any society. In other words, it is an inherent dimension of human relations, an undercurrent of social relations. It arises out of, and shapes the challenge of how to manage economic, cultural, political and social relations. Underlying this challenge is the problem of scarcity, which necessitates competition, and requires cooperation to resolve. According to the Centre for Advanced Social Science (CASS) (2005), although conflict structures social relations by creating intersecting channels for societal (individual/collective/group) competition and cooperation, it also has to be understood in the context of disagreement over the values/ideals to inform the socio-economic and political organisation of state and society (CASS 2005:6–7). These include the social relations of production and the superstructure of culture, law and political relations, forms and systems of governance, structures and processes, including institutional ones, the distribution of and allocation of scarce resources and the direction and emphasis of public policies (CASS 2005:7). Viewed this way, there are different forms of conflict such as social conflict defined by economic scarcity that manifests in poverty (human insecurity) which impairs human existence. There is also armed conflict defined by socio-political differences over territory and mineral resources which manifests in political assassinations, violent confrontations and low-intensity warfare. Another form of conflict which this paper concerns itself with is inter-gender conflict, which is manifested in male violence against women. All these forms of conflict are rooted in the breakdown of social relations between individuals (i.e. men and women) and groups in societies; between communities over boundary lines and chieftaincy, and between states over territories and sovereignty. Concisely, conflict is inevitable and is rooted in relationships (see Lederach 2005; CASS 2005; Amisi 2008).

In the same vein, this paper conceptualises and utilises a relational notion of *peace*, not as the absence of violence, but as the presence of gender justice, mutual respect, tolerance and inclusion – the outcome of constructive transformation

and resolution of violent conflict. In this light, the paper adopts a modified version of Assefa's (1993) definition of peace as involving three broad elements: the transformation of destructive conflictual interactions into cooperative and constructive relationships; reconciliation, leading to healthy, mature, ecological, social and personal relationships of interdependence; and justice. In this way, peace involves restructuring relationships (male notions of relationships) that promote war so that they can instead advance peace. Our modification of Assefa's conceptualisation of peace is particularly pertinent in terms of the relationship between gender relations and justice. Therefore, while agreeing with Assefa that peace involves the constructive transformation of violence, we add that it must be based on entrenching a politics of gender justice, mutual respect, tolerance and inclusivity which are all hallmarks of *ubuntu*. While these values are also found among men, we will argue that they are more likely to be exhibited by women.[4] In this sense, a critical mass of women in politics can bring them to bear and make the difference between violent conflict and sustainable peace.

Theoretical anchor: The human factor and peacebuilding

The human factor paradigm

The human factor (HF) paradigm is an emerging theory of development which focuses on people-development. Its main exponent is Senyo Adjibolosoo who defines HF as the spectrum of personality *characteristics* and other *dimensions* of human performance that *enable* social, economic and political institutions to *function* and *remain functional* over time (Adjibolosoo 1995:33). According to him, such human characteristics and dimensions sustain the workings and application of the rule of law, political harmony, a disciplined labour force, just legal systems, respect for human dignity (rights) and the sanctity of life (Adjibolosoo 1995:33). The personality traits that enhance human performance in all spheres include integrity, responsibility, trustworthiness, commitment, selflessness, truthfulness, loyalty and discipline. Others are love, tolerance, sharing, wisdom, imagination,

4 We note that not all women have or exhibit these values, just as not all men have them. However, the social construction of gender and differentiated gender roles has generally socialised women to assume these values while men are generally socialised to assume the opposite.

creativity and collegiality. Similarly, the HF theory holds that there are six broad dimensions of human performance and these include *spiritual capital* (knowledge of and connection to the laws of the universe); *moral capital* (sense of right or wrong); *aesthetic capital* (sense of beauty and ugliness); *human capital* (knowledge and skills); *human abilities* (competences) and *human potential* (dormant talents or untapped part of Being). These personality traits and dimensions of human performance are *sine qua non* for the attainment of the development aspirations of any society (Adjibolosoo 1995, 1999; Owusu-Ampomah 2003). Neglecting them in any development paradigm, planning or implementation process is a recipe for failure. As Owusu-Ampomah (2003: 66) puts it, without the HF, the quest for sustainable human development is a wild goose chase, as the human factor represents a paradigm shift that places premium on human values and positive qualities, not capital, institutions or policies.

According to Adjibolosoo (1999:62), human factor decay is the primary cause of the social, economic, political and educational problems of all societies – not lack of capital, inadequate political and economic institutional arrangements, or bad policies. In other words, negative human factor traits and dimensions are a source of underdevelopment, socio-political disorder and conflict, while positive human factor traits and dimensions are a necessary and sufficient condition for good governance, sustained economic growth, human-centred development and peace.

Apart from putting emphasis on human beings as the agency and end of development, the bottom line of the HF theory is that the quality of people who should power or enable the development process also matters. Therefore, the process of good governance must begin with human quality development[5] that will create an environment that is conducive to good governance, which in the context of this study will go a long way in preventing conflict *ab initio*. The summary of Adjibolosoo's thesis therefore is that the absence of truth-telling, integrity, responsibility, accountability, trust, commitment, and transparency

5 In a public lecture, hosted by the School of Politics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, on the human factor and good governance, the guest speaker, Prof Senyo Adjibolosoo, said, 'personal growth in positive human factor qualities such as integrity, accountability, responsibility, commitment, selflessness and truthfulness creates a fertile environment for good governance' (10 July 2009).

creates a fertile environment for serious social, economic, and political problems to thrive (Adjibolosoo 1995, 1999). This underscores the significance of good governance and political leadership in preventing and managing armed conflicts.[6]

The human factor, women and peacebuilding in an African context

As afore-mentioned, the significance of the HF paradigm is that beyond the human security and human rights (people-centred) approaches to development, the quality/type of people who can make peace and development possible also matters. In other words, there is need to focus on the character traits and human dimensions of people who are more likely to make peace and development happen, and appropriate their services accordingly. For example, while according to Adjibolosoo (1995), positive HF qualities such as integrity, accountability, selflessness and truthfulness can create a fertile environment for good governance and development, Lederach (2005) sees relatedness, collaboration, love, empathy and tolerance as necessary and sufficient factors for creating a fertile environment for peacebuilding. According to him, the capacity to imagine and generate constructive responses and initiatives associated with the daily challenges of violence can serve to transcend and ultimately break the grips of those destructive patterns and cycles within which conflict is perpetuated (Lederach 2005:29). Therefore, just as armed conflict takes place within a political context, there is also a political dimension of peacemaking which requires a kind of politics that is crucial for conflict transformation. This is the politics of responsibility, accountability, tolerance, empathy, accommodation, love, truth-telling and forgiveness – all hallmarks of Lederach's moral imagination model of peacebuilding and the HF paradigm.

Certainly, in an African context, both the HF and Lederach's model of peacebuilding resonate well with the African worldview defined by *ubuntu* and

6 In reference to our conceptual framework, conflict arises when those in political positions fail to allocate scarce resources in a manner that wins the goodwill, trust, confidence and loyalty of citizens. Oftentimes, the resultant breakdown in relations between citizens and the state, and within citizens in the competition for access to increasingly scarce resources, manifest in violent conflict.

which itself is based on positive relationships between people. *Ubuntu* captures the human essence of the African personality (male or female) which is validated by and built around its belonging to a collective or organic whole. As we have argued elsewhere, the meaning and practice of *ubuntu* in Southern Africa can be inferred from a Zulu maxim: *umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu* which literarily translates to 'a person is a person only because of other people' (Isike and Okeke-Uzodike 2010:689). The common and inter-related humanity *ubuntu* encapsulates is further underscored by Desmond Tutu when he argues that 'a person with *ubuntu* is open and available to others, affirming of others and does not feel threatened that others are able and good' (Tutu 1999:27). This is because 'he or she has a proper self assurance that comes with knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed' (Tutu 1999:27). In the same vein, Knott (2010:623) contends that 'if the humanity of one is not respected, if a person's desires and experiences, their sentience of being are not recognised and acknowledged, then *ubuntu* (humanity) is undermined and compromised'. In pre-colonial Africa, the dominant worldview of *ubuntu* valued and maintained relationships because it was instrumental to realising the human essence and its survival. It was not one that ill-treated, neglected or humiliated women, since an injury to one was perceived as an injury to all. Rather it made people care for one another. Men did not need to feel threatened by women nor women by men as they both complemented each other in ways that allowed them to function cohesively as a social unit (Isike and Okeke-Uzodike 2010:690). In sum, HF traits and Lederach's prerequisites for peace which both overlap are reminiscent of *ubuntu* as we cannot have a peaceful and developed Africa if HF decay persists and we remain morally unaccountable to each other.

Within this context, the question is who, between men and women, are more likely to approach politics with positive HF traits and dimensions? Women generally are richly endeared with the moral capacity to care and to embrace curiosity and complexity as they are wont to rise above the historic traps of dualistic divisions which drive the cycles of violence, and in this way, transcend orthodox gender stereotypes and the oppressive relations they spew. This is possible because women are more relational than men and as such view the same phenomenon

differently. For instance, women have the capacity to imagine themselves in a web of relationship even with their enemies (see Lederach 2005:34). Are women in Africa sufficiently disposed to the HF characteristics and dimensions which make peace and development possible? In essence, are African women more *ubuntu*-conscious than men? Have African women ever had and do they still have the capacity to perceive things beyond what initially meets the ordinary eye – at a deeper level, leading to a critical turning point that will make the difference between violent protracted conflict and sustainable peace?

Women and peacebuilding in pre-colonial African societies

Women in different pre-colonial African societies had traditional peacemaking and peacebuilding roles as they were involved in mediating and preventing conflict within and between societies. Women's peace agency in these societies, and also their cultural and socio-political roles and contributions to the overall well-being of these societies, were rooted in *ubuntu*. These roles were reinforced by perceptions which stereotyped women as natural peacemakers, as being more pacific than men, and often symbolised as paragons of morality, sacredness, goodness and tenderness. Thus in most pre-colonial societies, virtues of patience, tolerance, humility and subtle persuasiveness were seen as essentially female attributes which were reinforced through socialisation patterns that promote women primarily as child-bearers, good wives, caregivers, arbitrators of conflict and peace promoters in the family and community (UNESCO 2003:8). For example, according to Ntahobari and Ndayiziga (2003), in traditional Burundian society, women were considered to be bridge-builders and symbols of unity between different families, clans, communities and ethnic groups through the institution of marriage. Accordingly, girls were socialised from an early age to be open-minded, adaptable and tolerant (Ntahobari and Ndayiziga 2003:20). This was the case in other societies such as in Nigeria, Cameroon, Namibia, Somalia and Tanzania (Awe 1977; Ngongo-Mbede 2003; Becker 2003; Mohammed 2003; Lihamba 2003). In these societies, women were expected to embody such virtues as compassion, patience, discretion, gentleness, modesty and self-control, which though they were considered inherent in womanhood, required reinforcement through upbringing, so that women could fulfil their role as peacemakers

(Ntahobari and Ndayiziga 2003:20). For instance, Mohammed (2003:103) records that in periods of conflict amongst the Somalis, there were times when a group of young, unmarried women (known as *Heerin*) from one of the warring clans paid visits to the opposing clan without the knowledge or consent of their families. According to him, on arrival, the *Heerin* told the people that they were unmarried women, and that they wanted to be married and 'because this was a well known tradition, the young women were welcomed, and preparations were made to ensure that they were married. This immediately stabilised the situation and set in motion a peace process that eventually resolved the conflict' (Mohammed 2003:103). This kind of peace approach was only possible and successful because of the moral authority women were granted. They also often used these qualities and authority to mediate in disagreements between men by advising their husbands to toe the line of peace knowing that the consequences of violent conflict would especially be borne by them (the women). Such is the potency of this moral authority that women in post-colonial Africa have utilised them to wage peace in the DRC, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, Burundi and South Africa. Barring being essentialist, women have continually drawn on the moral authority granted to them by virtue of their being mothers, as creators of life, to call for peace throughout Africa (Mazurana and McKay 1999:20).

Traditionally, women in pre-colonial African societies were peace agents. According to Nwoye (no date), women engaged in peacebuilding through positive childcare, responsible mothering and nurturing of children in ways that prepared and socialised them towards peaceful co-existence. In most pre-colonial societies, a culture of peace, tolerance and an anti-war tradition are embedded in and transmitted through folktales, proverbs, poetry, songs and dance. Traditionally, women are often seen as the transmitters of these cultural values to their progeny and to future generations through such artistic expressions. For example, Mohammed (2003) used Somali stories, poetry, songs and proverbs to depict the important role of women as transmitters of knowledge and builders of a stable social fabric for society from the pre-colonial through the post-colonial era:

> Mother! Without you
> It would have been impossible to utter the alphabet
> Mother! Without you

> It would have been impossible to learn how to speak
> A child deprived of your care
> Sweet lullaby
> And soft touches
> Would not grow up.
> Mother! You are the source of love
> The epitome of kindness (Mohammed 2003:102).

A very apt Somali proverb says: 'The values with which children are brought up precede their actual birth', and Mohammed (2003) contends that they are transmitted by mothers even while the child is still in the womb. In this regard, Somalians believe that, 'before becoming adults, we attend a basic school, and that school is mother' (Mohammed 2003:102). Indeed, in different pre-colonial societies, women used songs, proverbs, and poetry to transmit positive social capital values upon which peace is predicated. These values include patience, tolerance, honesty, respect for elders, communality and mutuality, compassion, regard for due discretion, gentleness, modesty, self-control, moderation, flexibility, and open-mindedness (Nwoye no date).

Women in pre-colonial societies also engaged actively in conflict mediation. As mentioned before, age was an important social base of political power in these societies and respect was given to the elderly in general, and to elderly women in particular. For instance, Nwoye (no date) reveals from the findings of her study on women and the peace process in six pre-colonial African states that 'the elderly woman' 'was respected by all, and played a key role in crisis management and conflict resolution'. This was the case amongst the Tuburs in Cameroon, for example, where the *Wog Clu* (old women) were solely responsible for conflict mediation and were consulted on problems which disturbed communal peace (Ngongo-Mbede 2003:32). Thus, as Nwoye (no date) argues, 'when a conflict degenerated into armed violence, an appeal would usually be made to a third party of mature years to calm the tension and reconcile the combatants. Such an appeal for mediation was usually made to a woman who enjoyed the consideration and respect of all who knew her'. In the same vein, because of the sanctity attached to womanhood, women, mostly elderly women, were used as peace envoys to

facilitate peace negotiations (Mohammed 2003; Lihamba 2003). This was only possible because during war women were the only ones who could move across the zones of conflict freely and without much danger and as such were used by warring parties to study the situation, assess the prospects for peace, and facilitate contact and communication between the two warring parties.

Women in most pre-colonial African societies also served as intermediaries in conflicts between human beings and nature. For example, according to Ngongo-Mbede (2003), in the land of Mungo of the Cameroon, any misfortune occurring in the community brought the latter to seek the mediation of the *Kalbia* (married women). In these communities, in general, misfortune and calamities were taken to imply the existence of conflicts between the people. For instance:

> … in the philosophy of these communities, such a succession of misfortune was not fortuitous. It was the sign that love and peace were absent from the community, and prompted the women to decide to organize a *Mbabi*. The latter was organized in a grove or on a crossroads, after consultation of the oracles. It was exclusively a meeting of women who had reached the age of the menopause. The ceremony was presided over by a woman of very advanced years whose moral integrity was usually universally acknowledged. Men could on occasion, be associated with the *Mbabi*. Even in such exceptional cases, however, it was the women who organized and presided over the ceremony of reconciling human beings with themselves, with relatives and with nature (Ngongo-Mbede 2003:31).

The study documents that amongst the Beti, Mangissa and the Eton in Cameroon, the *Mbabi* was a common purification rite aimed at restoring peace, and women frequently engaged in it both for peace, community building and development. This is also consistent with the purification rituals (*uutoni*), which women in Northern Namibia performed on soldiers returning from war. The idea was to cleanse them of the guilt and consequences of spilling blood during war, which if not done would have adverse effects for social harmony, peace and stability in their societies (see Becker 2003).

Concisely, as Nwoye (no date) concludes, African women's roles as mothers, wives, and aunts were put to effective use in peacebuilding and conflict resolution

in pre-colonial African societies. Women participated firmly in inculcating the culture of peace in the children and in the practice of conflict mediation among warring factions within the family and the community. They also commanded important positions in conflict resolution rituals and were significant peace activists through their roles as peace envoys in times of conflict. As we will show in the next section, though corrupted by the colonial interruption of Africa's socio-cultural existence,[7] these values which are influenced by *ubuntu* are still alive and can be used for promoting peace among warring families, communities and nations in neo-colonial Africa. They can be developed into an African feminist ethic of peace which can be the cornerstone of effective conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding.

Women waging peace in neo-colonial African states

The African feminist ethic of motherhood and care which drove women's political participation and peace agency in pre-colonial African societies is still very much alive amongst contemporary African women. This is daily being expressed by ordinary women across the continent in the face of their marginalisation and oppression at the private and public levels of society, specifically also in conflict situations. For example, in the heat of the bitter Tutsi and Hutu civil war in Burundi, Hutu women of Busoro near the Burundi capital of Bujumbura, joined their Tutsi counterparts in the neighbouring Musanga village to march peacefully to the local government secretariat where they both demanded an end to the killing. According to Fleshman (2003), one day the women of Musanga got fed up with the chilling consequences of the war and collected what food and clothing they could for victims in Busoro and subsequently rallied their Busoro counterparts to march for peace, clasping their hands to sing 'Give us peace. Give us peace now!' for hours before making their separate dangerous ways back home (Fleshman 2003:1–2). Although, as Fleshman (2003:2) recorded, 'the war continued, something important had changed. The road that divided them

7 For example, according to Amadiume (1997:104), 'Islamic patriarchy in Africa was followed by European imperialism and finally the present subjugation of African societies and people under European-imposed nation-states. It has introduced a new gender politics, favouring men and undermining the traditional system of balance of power politics between African men and women'.

now connected them, and through their local peace group, *Twishakira amahoro* (we want to have peace), the women of the villages have worked to keep the connection strong'.

Another example of neo-colonial African women acting locally and often spontaneously across battle lines in pursuit of peace is the case of Congolese women who overcame partisan, ethnic and other sectional differences to organise for peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Ahead of the UN-initiated formal peace talks (Inter-Congolese Dialogue) in Sun City (South Africa) which included only 40 (12%) women amongst 340 delegates, women from across the DRC, including representatives from the warring parties, government and civil society, gathered in Nairobi to forge a common position of peace. At the end of the Nairobi debate, the women discovered that, 'however deep their differences, they shared an overriding desire for peace, a broad commitment to the Lusaka peace accord and significantly, a common determination to remove constitutional and legislative obstacles to women's equality after the war' (Fleshman 2003:15). This much was contained in a joint declaration and programme of action that offered a gender perspective to the dialogue issued by the women (Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf 2002). Specifically, the declaration and programme of action called for 'an immediate ceasefire, the inclusion of women and their concerns in all aspects of the peace process, and adoption of a 30% quota for women at all levels of government in any final settlement' (Fleshman 2003:15).

Challenged by the lack of a critical mass of women in the actual peace negotiations in Sun City, the women selected 33 of themselves to join the official 40 women representatives to the peace talks as advisers. Excluded therefore from the formal peace talks, the 33 women advisers functioned effectively as facilitators of the peace process as they prepared technical documents and position papers for the official delegates, lobbied the men for peace and generally served as conduit between the masses yearning for peace back home and the peace delegates in Sun City. Of note here is that the women adopted traditional African women's instruments of drama, poetry and appeal to motherly sacredness including, sometimes, civil disobedience to make their presence felt, and tilt the negotiators towards peace. For example, reminiscent of pre-colonial women's power to withdraw conjugal rights from men if they refused to listen to women's appeal for peace during conflict with

neighbouring communities,[8] the Congolese women's caucus subtly threatened to denounce the men back home, telling them that 'if they went back home without peace the people would beat them' (Fleshman 2003:16). And when at the end of the peace talks, the parties could not reach an agreement, 'the women's caucus blocked the doorway and announced to reporters that delegates would have to remain in the meeting hall until peace was agreed'. However, in general, cognisant of the centrality of relationships in enabling sustainable peace and the significance of maintaining their relations with men, which was a main concern of pre-colonial African matriarchy, the women caucus chose to avoid confrontation with the men, knowing that if it was to impact on the process from its outside position, it was necessary to establish and maintain good relations with the men. This was important because men traditionally resented actions that appeared to challenge 'traditional' gender roles and more so that the Congolese men, in the first place, reluctantly agreed to the modest increase in female delegates (Fleshman 2003:16). The account of one of the women caucus members, Ms Bibiane, in this regard is poignant enough to be reproduced:

> At first the men were hostile because there was this group of women entering 'their' space. But we approached them in a way that made them feel secure. In African culture, the woman is your mother. The woman is your wife and your sister. If your mother or sister is talking to you, you have to listen … We didn't demonize the men or try to take their place (Fleshman 2003:16).

Clearly, this resonates well with the moral imagination as the women displayed a capacity to transcend every-day conventions of human relations based on ethnic, partisan or gender sentiments by generating constructive responses and initiatives that, while rooted in the day-to-day challenges of the DRC conflict, would ultimately break the grips of those destructive patterns and cycles within which the conflict is perpetuated and dragged (see Lederach 2005). In this way,

8 See Amadiume (1987, 1997) and Nzeogwu (2000) for more details on how pre-colonial Nigerian women used their conjugal powers to serve as checks on the excesses of male-dominated politics. They contend variously that women in different communities used the threat of their nakedness to leverage policy advantages for themselves and for society in general since oftentimes their needs were communal in focus.

the women laid a foundation for eventual peace as they planted the seed of a 'yes we can' mentality amongst a people whose over 50 years experience of conflict has probably blotted their capacity to imagine that peace is possible.

From Senegal, the conflict-ridden Mano River basin countries of Liberia and Sierra Leone to Burundi, the DRC, South Africa and Mozambique, there are many more such examples across Africa today where women are using their traditional weapons to wage peace, or at least, ask questions of a masculinised and zero-sum politics characterised by corruption, competition, intolerance and conflict, which underlies and perpetuates a cycle of chronic under-development in the continent. The peace work of the Mano River Women's Peace Network (MARWOPNET), a transnational women's organisation consisting of women from Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea, is well known in this regard, especially in mediating the escalating conflict between Liberia and Guinea in 2001. This feat, according to Fleshman (2003:18), demonstrated the potential of women's peacemaking efforts in Africa. Defying nationality differences and rather focusing on the things that hold them together as women, mothers and daughters of Africa, MARWOPNET was able to get presidents Charles Taylor of Liberia, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone and Lansana Conte of Guinea to meet, a feat that previously proved fruitless for the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the sub-regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with the full complement of their diplomatic arsenal. Although the women drew the respect of President Taylor for being 'courageous' enough to meet with him to convince him to attend a regional peace summit with president Conte, it was the women's meeting that was seen as more audacious. According to Fleshman (2003), realising that their strategy of focusing on human insecurity implications of conflict which worked with President Taylor was not working with President Conte who remained adamant that he would not meet with Taylor, the women changed tactics. The women, through one of their representatives, told President Conte point-blank:

> You and President Taylor have to meet as men and iron out your differences, and we the women want to be present. We will lock you in this room until you come to your senses, and I will sit on the key (Fleshman 2003:18).

Fleshman records that when her comments were translated into French for the president, there was a long silence, and then he started laughing after which he commented: 'What man do you think would say that to me? Only a woman could do such a thing and get by with it'. Crediting the women for changing his mind to attend the peace summit, the president said:

> Many people have tried to convince me to meet with President Taylor, but only your commitment and your appeal have convinced (Fleshman 2003:18).

The point of rendering these reports is to underscore the fact that the feminist ethic of care, based on motherhood and women's sacredness that was appropriated by pre-colonial African women to wage peace and maintain societal harmony, is still very much a part of the core of contemporary African women and is constantly being deployed in conflict situations such as in the Niger Delta of Nigeria and KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa (Isike 2009). They can be reinvented and developed into a model of African feminist peacebuilding which women in conflict-torn African states or regions can utilise as an ideological rallying point to transform politics and conflict, and *ipso facto* create an environment conducive to sustaining development.

Converging the past and present: The plausibility of an African feminist ethic of peacebuilding

According to Ifi Amadiume (1997:100), there are two unique contributions that African women have made to world history and civilization: matriarchy and the dual-sex character of African political systems, which is directly related to the matriarchal factor. She contends that African matriarchy was a fundamental social and ideological base on which African kinship and wider social and moral systems, such as *ubuntu* or *ujamaa*, rest (Amadiume 1997). In her view, authentic African matriarchy had 'a very clear message about social and economic justice as it was couched in a very powerful goddess-based religion, a strong ideology of motherhood, and a general moral principle of love' (Amadiume 1997:101). This was opposed to imperialist patriarchy which has a basic masculinist ideology that celebrates violence, valour, conquest and power in varying degrees, and

which, according to Diop (1989), denied women their rights, subjugating and properticising them in a strict hierarchical system of family where the man (husband or father) was supreme and had power of life and death over the woman.

On the other hand, pre-colonial African matriarchy and patriarchy co-existed in what Diop (1989) refers to as a 'harmonious dualism' between men and women, and what Amadiume (1997:93) describes as 'fluid demarcation'. According to her, this 'embodied two oppositional or contesting systems, the balance tilting and changing all the time' (Amadiume 1997:93–94). In this regard, she concluded that genders in pre-colonial African societies were fluid as they were a means of dividing, but also a means of integrating and co-opting in dynamic ways that enabled stability and order based on justice, equity and fairness. This enabled a system where women's power became based on the centrality of their economic role in relation to men, and men's general belief in the sacredness of women as mothers. This was given expression in widespread goddess worship across different communities including those that were patriarchal. According to Amadiume (1997:102),

> In indigenous African religion, mystical powers and worldly prosperity are gifts inherited from our mothers. The moral ideals of this system encouraged the matriarchal family, peace and justice, goodness and optimism and social collectivism, where the shedding of human blood was abhorrent.

Even in pre-colonial patriarchal cultures like those of the Zulus, women were traditionally able to stop fights by falling over the person being beaten. According to a study by Rakoczy (2006:202), one of her respondents indicated that Zulu women's ability to stop fighting in this way may be due to respect for women as 'the persons who bring children', the life-givers. She contends rightly that this tradition is also commonplace amongst the Sotho people, narrating how a woman's brother was rescued by another woman who heard his cry as he was being beaten by several men. The rescuing woman 'stepped into the fray, put a blanket over her brother and probably saved his life' (Rakoczy 2006:202). The rescuing woman did not have to know who the man being beaten was to intervene for the violence to stop. She knew instinctively as a mother who cared for her children that she had to act, more so in the understanding that she is connected to him as a human being

living in the same community. The aggressors on their part knew that they could not continue beating their victim once the woman intervened in the way she did. Continuing would have meant violating the woman as well, and this they were not prepared to do as men because of the socio-cultural implications.

The crux of our argument here is that women's existence and power in pre-colonial African societies were based on an ethic of care that was rooted in their motherhood and their nature, which was tolerant of difference, collaborative, non-violent and, as such, peaceful.[9] Their peace activism and agency was in itself rooted in a broader communal ideology (*ubuntu*, *ujamaa*, *negritude*, humanism or African socialism) which operated on the basis of the mutuality of human interests through a web of relationships where everyone played their part for the good of the collective and the validation of the personal. In these societies, women never saw or placed themselves in a dichotomous relationship with men, rather, gender relations were fluid, dynamic and complementary in difference as Amadiume (1997) espoused. Indeed as Gasa (2007) admonished, there is nothing wrong with Euro-American and Occidental feminist tradition just as there is nothing wrong with or limited about Arab, Asian or African feminisms. However, 'we must acknowledge the different historical and situational realities which may call for a different approach and an adjustment of a particular framework' (Gasa 2007:228). In her view, the connection between the detail, pattern and big picture of African feminism will assist African men and women in 'understanding our location, developing tools of analysis that are appropriate to our own situation, and applying them in a way that illustrates and illuminates rather than obscures our real and lived experiences and their multiple meanings' (Gasa 2007:228). As mentioned before, motherhood qualities of care and nurturing and women's positive dispositions towards collaboration, interconnectedness and peace do not imply weakness. Rather they portray strength, as they are consistent with the affective and relational foundation of people's existence with each other.

9 This is not to say that all women are necessarily pacifist, as there are also records of women who have taken decisions to go to war, and of women who have actively participated as combatants. Even pre-colonial African history shows records of women regents waging war.

According to Nodding (in Van Soest 1995:166–167), these qualities are the foundation of a feminist perspective and ethic of peace rooted in receptivity, relatedness and responsiveness. She contended that such a relational approach to peacebuilding may be more typical of women than men, arguing further that an approach based on law and principle is the approach of the 'detached one' (men who are detached from the experience of nurturing children and community), and therefore suggested that a feminist view, which is concerned with people, is an alternative that men can embrace as well as women. Drawing from the utility of the relational ethic of care, Dorothy van Soest argues that 'a relational ethic concentrates on the moral health and vigour of relationships, not individuals, and recognises that moral judgements and decisions about how to act must take into account the relations in which moral agents live and find their identities' (Van Soest 1995:167).

Supportive empirical evidence

Findings from a study of women, conflict, politics and peacebuilding show that the defining features of such a feminist peace model include a caring and nurturing nature based on motherhood, empathy to community needs (which makes women less corrupt than men), tolerance of difference, sharing and collaboration, all of which are undergirded by the notion of relational mutuality, i.e., that men and women exist in a web of relationships where their existence are intrinsically connected (*ubuntu*). From the study, women respond to conflict by embracing peace and adopting collaborative methods of engagement. The attitude of women to conflict, which underscores their response and the peace-oriented roles they play in conflict resolution, is not unconnected to the African woman's feminist ethic of care which values interrelationships, connectedness and empowerment rather than conflict and competition. For example, according to Mrs Iyoha,[10] while men view conflict as 'struggle or war which must be fought', women tend to see conflicts as 'necessary evils in communities' and only give in to or endorse war after all avenues for peaceful resolution of conflict have been exhausted, and even

10 Interview (13 June 2007) with Mrs F.E. Iyoha, the Clerk of the Legislative Arm and Chief Administrative Officer of Oredo Local Government Area of Edo state, Nigeria, and a former Head of Family Support Programme in the Local Government Area.

then, they tend to hope for and pursue prospects for peace during war. Also, since the injured and dead in conflicts are more often their sons, husbands and brothers, they tend to focus on the cessation of violence and the rebuilding of their homes, families and communities.[11] Indeed, according to Mrs Okolocha,[12] 'because women feel the impact of conflict more than men, they naturally advocate for peace and pursue conflict resolution'. This is corroborated by a cumulative 73% (131 out of 180 responses) of the women in both case studies who were affected by conflict and who said they responded to the conflict in their area by 'creating alternatives for survival' (47), 'working towards peaceful resolution of the conflict' (12), 'accepting their fate and moving on' (62) or 'helping to rebuild community' (10). Another finding (lesson) from King's study in this regard is instructive:

> In performing their tasks with male colleagues, women were perceived to be more compassionate, less threatening or insistent on status, less willing to opt for force or confrontation over conciliation, even it is said less egocentric, more willing to listen and learn – though not always – and to contribute to an environment of stability which fostered the peace process (King 1997:4).

Concisely, women have a positive attitude and approach towards peace. While men spoil for a fight, women toe the alternative route for peace and calm to reign. Apart from interviewee's responses, reasons the questionnaire respondents gave ranged from the population stake of women in the study areas, and women's interest in peace and community development, to the perception that women are less corrupt compared to men and are better suited to consensus building than men as shown in the multiple response table below.

11 Focus group discussion (3 May 2007) with 10 women in Odi, Bayelsa State, Niger Delta.

12 Interview (12 June 2007) with Mrs H.O. Okolocha, a politician, writer and lecturer of English and Literature at the University of Benin, Nigeria.

Table 1: Reasons why women in politics will enhance peacebuilding

Why women in politics will bring peace	Responses	
	N	Percent
Women are more than half the population and should be part of the solution to societal problems	85	22,2
Women are equally capable leaders and will help the quality of decisions that will also address their concerns	102	26,7
Women are equal stakeholders in ensuring peace and development	95	24,9
Women are less corrupt and better suited to consensus building	100	26,2
Total	382	100,0

(Adapted from Isike 2009:249)

Our survey findings reveal that women's peace agency is also rooted in their agency for good governance. An aggregation of responses on the question of women's significant contributions to good governance and development in the study areas show that women are perceived as community developers (having installed electricity and running/tap water, and being concerned about poverty alleviation and community building/development). They are also seen as introducing a caring and sharing approach to politics that is rooted in their femininity and motherhood (showing softness to society, joy and motherly care, remembering everyone, and being not autocratic and corruption free) and as being generally peace-oriented (praying for community peace, bringing harmony and standing against trouble). The significance of their good governance agency for peacebuilding can be understood in the light of the way in which the male dominated leadership's failure to allocate resources

equitably has fuelled social and armed conflict, not only in the study areas, but also in other parts of Africa.

Concluding remarks

Studies have shown that women have the required spectrum of personality characteristics and dimensions of human abilities/capacities that are necessary and sufficient for good governance and peacebuilding (see Van Soest 1995; King 1997; Ngongo-Mbede 2003; Ntahobari and Ndayiziga 2003; Anderlini 2007; Isike 2009). While Lederach (2005) may not have clearly articulated the political dimensions of peacebuilding, the peace process indeed requires a kind of politics which is crucial for its success. This is the politics of responsibility, accountability, tolerance, empathy, accommodation, love, truth-telling and forgiveness. And it is the politics that women generally represent and can bring to bear if they come into politics as women. These are the virtues that bring us to the pregnant moment: the turning point that makes the difference between violent conflict and peace. Applying this to the peace discourse enables us to call attention to the kind of human beings who can make peace and development possible rather than focusing on the kind of institutions, techniques and systems that guarantee peace (Lederach 2005). Within this human-centred framework, research into the realities and potentials of women, who constitute over half of the world's population, as instruments of a more peaceful world, is a worthwhile venture.

Women's peace agency is rooted in the values of their womanhood and an ethic of care that values relationships, inter-connectedness and empowerment from which springs forth empathy, co-operation, tolerance and love. These values are necessary requirements for amicably resolving conflict and for sustaining peace. They worked very well in pre-colonial African societies, especially in matriarchal ones, where women had traditional roles in preventing violence, mediating conflicts and reconciling those in conflict. In some of these traditional societies, gender was defined in flexible terms that allowed men and women to straddle socially constructed male and female spaces. For instance, according to Amadiume (1997), a flexible gender system in pre-colonial Igbo societies in Nigeria was enabled by a flexible language

structure which presented 'no language or mental adjustment or confusion in references to a woman performing a typical male role' (Amadiume 1997:17). Appropriating the utility of a flexible gender system for peacebuilding in Africa, Amisi (2008:11) contends that the idea of a flexible gender system provides for a language that allows a formulation of a concept of peace and also of war in gendered terms that approximates the reality of a number of African societies whose gender relations are similar to those of the Ibos that Amadiume studied.[13] In other words, although the idea of flexible gender and language systems may be alien to some African societies that have a different world-view of gender relations, it offers a valuable model of understanding armed conflict and peace, and 'it can be a resource for the envisioning of peace even in societies that may not be aware of the idea' (Amisi 2008:12). It is more so that in Africa, women are traditionally known to have the critical skills, spiritual and social capital as well as human potential and moral imagination capacity to transform conflict from violence to peace. Indeed, African women were and continue to be an embodiment of the ethic of care and the moral imagination which are very critical to changing the face and essence of politics to be more human-centred. This is expected to have some positive significance for conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding in the continent if properly appropriated.

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Culture and conflict in urban Tanzania: Professionals' voices in educational organisations

*Claude-Hélène Mayer and Christian Martin Boness**

Abstract

This article is interlinked with an article that has previously been published in this Journal (Mayer, Boness and Louw 2008). Since the previous article focused on value-orientations in cross-cultural encounters and mediation in the Tanzanian educational system, this follow-up article provides an overview of cross-cultural conflicts and their professional management in educational organisations in Tanzania. It firstly gives an insight into current theoretical discourses and will, secondly, present selected empirical data and findings from an ethnographic, qualitative study that has been conducted in selected urban areas in Tanzania.

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By presenting qualitative findings, this follow-up study provides further insights into the context-specific professionals' views on conflict and its management in urban educational contexts, and thereby deepens our understanding of the quantitative findings on values and mediation gained and presented in the previous study. The conclusions drawn from the presented findings lead to recommendations for scientists conducting research on the above-mentioned topics and for practitioners working in educational, cross-cultural contexts in Tanzania.

1. Introduction

Educational organisations undergo radical changes globally. They need to transcend national boundaries and accept growing intra-national diversity at the beginning of the new century and therefore face rapidly changing challenges with regard to cross-cultural conflicts and their professional management. How professionals in the educational field experience and manage cross-cultural conflicts in a world with minimised geographic, economic, political and cultural limits is of importance, particularly for African countries.

In this article, it is argued that cross-cultural conflicts and their management require a comprehensive, context-specific assessment of conflicts experienced and professional management strategies to resolve the occurring conflicts effectively and constructively.

This study at hand is linked to a previously conducted study which was published in the *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* (Mayer, Boness and Louw 2008; cf Boness 2002). Since the previous article focused on value-orientations in cross-cultural encounters and mediation in the Tanzanian educational system from a rather quantitative viewpoint, this follow-up article provides an overview on cross-cultural conflicts and their professional management in educational organisations in Tanzania from a qualitative research perspective.

The aim was to present findings by providing emic perspectives of the professionals involved. Regarding this aim, the following research questions will be answered:

- Which cross-cultural conflicts are experienced in Tanzanian educational organisations?
- How are these cross-cultural conflicts managed professionally?

This article provides insight into the culture- and context-specific conflicts experienced and is narrated from an *emic* perspective of interviewees working in selected educational organisations in Tanzania. It, therefore, contributes towards extending an in-depth understanding of conflicts and their management across cultures in Tanzania.

In the academic field, research on conflict and its management across cultures has increased constantly since the past century (Galtung 1996). With special regard to African contexts the body of literature on cross-cultural conflicts and their management has grown (Mayer and Louw 2007; Mayer 2008), but the topic is still underrepresented. At the same time, the need for assessing and understanding experiences of and views on cross-cultural conflict and the management thereof has increased globally (Kriesberg 2003) and specifically also in the Tanzanian context (Mayer, Boness and Louw 2008:39).

There is evidence that diversity, if not well managed, can contribute to cross-cultural conflict (Church 1995:3). Diversity encompasses differences in visible characteristics such as race, gender and ethnicity, but also includes differences that are not necessarily visible, such as religion, professional background and sexual preference (Francesco and Gold 2005:194). In the Tanzanian educational context cultural and religious aspects and their management are important.

The body of literature on conflicts in Tanzanian educational organisations and schools is very small (Mayer 2001; Mayer, Boness and Louw 2008). However, when described, conflicts are often bound to issues of language, class, poverty, economic circumstances, health (particularly HIV/AIDS) or environment (e.g. Rubagumaya 2004; Wijsen and Mfumbusa 2004; Wubs et al. 2009).

This article presents a review of literature on conflict across cultures and its management in the Tanzanian educational context. In addition, the article highlights the research methodology and discusses the empirical research

findings. Finally, a conclusion is drawn and recommendations for researchers and practitioners in the educational context are provided.

2. Conflict across cultures

The early 21st century with its complexities of globalisation and the deconstruction of national cultures in organisational environments requires fundamental transformation in organisational management, thinking and practices (Voelpel, Leibold and Tekie 2006). Due to increasing trends of internationalisation and globalisation – also in educational organisations – conflict and the management thereof need further attention (Kriesberg 2003; Mayer and Louw 2007).

Conflict research, particularly since the 1970s, has been embedded in (social) constructivist theories which view reality as a construct created by the mutual inter-relationships between individuals and the environment (Applefield, Huber and Moallem 2000; Coy and Woehrle 2000; Lederach 2000). In these theories, conflict is viewed as a 'disagreement, a real or perceived incompatibility of interests', different worldviews, or sets of behaviours (Mayer 2000:3). It is defined as episodes that lead to the recognition of the existence of multiple socio-cultural realities (Lederach 1988:39) and are simultaneously connected to intra-personal processes (Rahim 2002:207), created by different parts of the psyche, the value system and the behaviour (Folger, Scott Poole and Stutman 2001:45) as well as affective and cognitive intra-personal dynamics (Mischel and Shoda 1998:251). Conflict begins when an individual or a group perceives differences and opposition between the self and the other about interests, beliefs, needs and/or values (De Dreu, Harinck and Van Vianen 1999).

Conflicts are shaped by individual and cultural meanings (Augsburger 1992; Avruch 1998; Lederach 2000) which are again constructed by 'perceptions, interpretations, expressions and intentions' (Lederach 1996:9). Therefore they are linked to the inner processes of individuals and their relationship with the environment and are accordingly an inevitable part of organisational life.

A wide range of theories and practical tools have been developed for the management of conflict, both internationally (Miall, Ramsbotham and

Woodhouse 2000) and locally. Conflict management is the art of appropriate intervention to achieve conflict settlement (Nye 2005). It is the positive and constructive management of difference and divergence. Rather than advocating methods for removing conflict, conflict management 'addresses the more realistic question of managing conflict, namely, how to deal with it in a constructive way; how to bring opposing sides together in a cooperative process; and how to design a practical, achievable and cooperative system for the constructive management of difference' (Ghai, Bloomfield and Reilly 1998:18). Accordingly, conflict management does not necessarily imply the avoidance, reduction or termination of conflict. Rather, it helps to design effective strategies both to minimise dysfunctions and enhance the constructive functions of conflict, thereby enhancing learning and effectiveness (Rahim 2002:208).

Due to recent global trends, managing diversity becomes a relevant topic in conflict and its management (Horwitz, Bowmaker-Falconer and Searll 1996; Human 1996; Wood and Mellahi 2001), as presented in the following.

3. Managing conflicts cross-culturally

Cultural diversity encompasses differences in visible characteristics such as race, gender and ethnicity (Francesco and Gold 2005:224). Its constructive management includes finding creative solutions for integrating these characteristics, while simultaneously overcoming discriminatory practices and social division by valuing people according to their cultures, economic growth and development (Jackson 2002). According to Horwitz, Bowmaker-Falconer and Searll (1996), diversity management needs to be conceptually integrated to raise the consciousness and awareness of various organisations. This focus can help change individual attitudes and values and create better understanding and tolerance among employees from different societal, cultural and economic backgrounds within each (educational) organisation.

Managing diversity can be understood as having an acute awareness of characteristics common to cultures, races, genders or ages, while at the same time managing employees as individuals (Overman 1991). The complexity

in managing diversity, as well as the restructuring processes in international organisations investing in a country, will impact on cross-cultural conflict experiences and create new challenges for cross-cultural communication and diversity management.

The role of diversity management and its influence on the individual, small groups and management effectiveness have been well documented (Pelled, Eisenhardt and Xin 1999; Thomas and Bendixen 2000). There is evidence that diversity, if not well managed, can contribute to cross-cultural conflict (Church 1995). The often contradictory processes of globalisation have led to wide-ranging changes in identity formation, particularly in teachers' identities in Tanzania (Barrett 2006). These social identity changes are often bound to the changes in perception, experience or definition of social identities (e.g. Korf and Malan 2002) as well as to issues of identity constructions, social norms and power shifts (Booysen 2007; Cilliers and May 2002). In organisational contexts, individuals face the challenge of attempting to bridge differences and conflicts which might be based on societal conflicts that spill over into organisations (Booysen and Nkomo 2007; Chrobot-Mason et al. 2007).

In order to face the challenges of cross-cultural conflicts, understand them and reduce their potential in globalised educational work environments, it is suggested in this article that cross-cultural conflicts and their management need to be assessed.

4. Conflicts and their management in Tanzanian educational organisations

Tanzania is a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic society which is often held up as a 'success story', having 'forged a national identity' based on accommodation and tolerance (Tripp 1999:37). Most of the Tanzanian citizens are of African extraction. The Tanzanian government is secular and is not affiliated with any particular religion. However, in the Tanzanian society, there are three major religious traditions: indigenous, Christian and Islamic. Jews, Buddhists and Hindus form a small minority in Tanzania (Wijsen and Mfumbusa 2004:13–14).

In contrast to its neighbours, Tanzania has enjoyed relative peace during the past years. So far, the 120 ethnic groups have lived without serious friction since independence. In Tanzania, however, 'religion is proving to be quite another matter' (Wijsen and Mfumbusa 2004:15). Another conflictual topic in the Tanzanian educational sector is the matter of language, particularly English and Kiswahili. Rubagumaya (2004) argues that those who are in a better socio-political/economic position have more control of, and better access to, English.

Besides the cultural and religious aspects, students in Tanzania experience 'dating violence' and conflicts in student relationships which are linked to HIV/AIDS issues (Wubs et al. 2009:75). Also, issues such as population growth and internal migration, which are coupled with land tenure and highlight factors such as poverty, alienation from land and resources, drought and lack of local participation, impact indirectly on schools and can cause social and class conflicts in Tanzanian schools (Mwamfupe 1998: 3).

Further conflictive aspects are related to health (Wubs et al. 2009:75), language conflicts (Rubagumaya 2004), management issues and resources (Mayer, Boness and Kussaga 2010). These conflictive issues also impact on the educational context.

5. Research methodology

In this case study it is asserted that human beings inhabit different realities that are socially and culturally constituted and which may, therefore, vary quite dramatically across cultures, time and context (Gonzalez et al. 1994). Multiple selves are individually and socio-culturally constructed by constantly changing relationships (Becvar and Becvar 2006). In this article, conflicts and their management in the educational Tanzanian context are presented, analysed and discussed.

The phenomenological and interpretative paradigms were considered the most relevant approaches in this case study (Collis and Hussey 2003) by referring to the epistemological tradition of constructivism (Berger and Luckmann 2000) and interpretative hermeneutics (Habermas 1999). Thereby, constructivism

implies that all stories or interpretations are equally valid and that no single truth or interpretation exists (Dickerson and Zimmerman 1996).

This qualitative research focuses on exploring a research issue and gaining a deeper understanding of it (Cheldelin, Druckman and Fast 2003) by means of deep data and 'thick descriptions' (Geertz 1987). In order to gain a deeper understanding of the above-mentioned topics, an exploratory study approach was used. This approach was used to assess conflict and its management in the Tanzanian organisational context. Altogether eighteen in-depth interviews were conducted, five of them in educational contexts.

Table 1: Societal contexts of research

Tertiary sector	Organisations	Number of interviewees
Governmental	educational organisations	5
	governmental executive organisations	4
Non-governmental	ecclesiastical organisations	4
	private enterprises	5

Source: Mayer, Boness and Kussaga 2010:58

The interviews were used to achieve a deep understanding of new insights into the issues of conflict and its management in cross-cultural contexts of educational organisations. The interviews were guided by using predetermined research questions, which focused on the subjective experiences of interviewees; thereafter, useful explanations were developed and interpretations of the described subject were given according to four levels of text reconstruction (Ricoeur 1979; Wolff 2000:87). The findings cannot be generalised, but they give an explorative in-depth insight into the described Tanzanian contexts, and they might be replicated in other African countries or in different contexts in Tanzania.

The research aims at analysing cross-cultural conflicts and the management thereof in different societal organisations in Tanzania. Therefore, educational organisations were chosen to study the described phenomenon. The organisations were chosen due to findings of a study that had been conducted in Tanzania (Boness 2002; Mayer, Boness and Louw 2008) and which showed that cross-cultural (value) conflicts occur and can be managed through mediation. The present study was meant to gain deeper insight into the educational contexts and into selected organisations.

The selection of the organisations was based on the following criteria:

- The importance of these educational organisations for the Tanzanian society and the Tanzanian citizen with regard to cross-cultural mediation and conflict management
- Organisational structures in urban Tanzanian contexts
- Permissible access to the organisations chosen
- Representability of organisations in Tanzanian society

From the organisations meeting these criteria a randomised sample was chosen. Altogether 18 interviewees from three different urban centres – Arusha, Moshi and Dar es Salaam – all of them working in Tanzania were interviewed. The sample comprised twelve male and six female interviewees. All interviewees are Tanzanian citizens of different ethnic background. Within the educational organisations, there were teachers and heads of school involved.

The interviews were conducted by a German-Tanzanian research team. An interview structure was developed containing ten questions. Ten interview questions were asked, referring to (managing) cross-cultural conflicts cross-culturally. In parallel to the interviews, organisational documents and secondary literature were also analysed to guarantee triangulation of data. The interviews were recorded in full to ensure precise transcription. The transcripts were viewed as selective constructions that reproduced aspects of the conversation which were transcribed, according to Steinke (2000:327), in a 'manageable' way which is 'simple to write, easy to read, easy to learn and to interpret'. The transcription procedure focused mainly on the verbal aspects

of the communication in the interest of analysis and evaluation controlled by factual words.

To ensure a transparent process of data analysis and reconstruction, data analysis was conducted according to the five-step process of Terre Blanche, Durrheim and Kelly (2006:322–326):

Step 1: Familiarisation and immersion

Step 2: Inducing themes

Step 3: Coding

Step 4: Elaboration

Step 5: Interpretation and checking.

Following these steps in data analysis enhances the 'thick description' (Geertz 1973).

Content analysis involves a subjective process between the text and the person coding the text: 'Verifying the reliability of content analysis is primarily done by inter-individual and intra-individual verification' (Yin 2002:45), as in this explorative study. Objectivity in analysis should therefore be attained by inter-subjective validation, such as adhering to particular rules and regulations and/or verifying that the same (or similar) findings have been attained by different researchers. In this study, the coding of the text and its analysis and re-categorisation are considered this way.

Four major concepts – conformability, credibility, transferability, and trustworthiness – were defined as criteria for judging this qualitative research. Johnson (1997) supports the approach that constructivism may facilitate the aim of qualitative research – which is fundamental to this research – to create a deeper understanding of the research objective with regard to changing multiple-reality constructions (Hipps 1993). Parallel to the interviews, organisational documents and secondary literature were analysed to guarantee triangulation of the data.

With regard to the research methodology, limitations of this research study need to be mentioned. This study is an exploratory pilot study which does not

provide generalisable findings, but rather context-specific insights from which meaningful inferences can be drawn. Research conclusions can be only drawn with regard to the specific context. However, on the base of these explorative findings, in-depth insights can be gained and new research interests can be developed.

6. Research findings

The research findings presented a focus on the Tanzanian interviewees' perspectives with regard to conflicts and their management across cultures in selected educational organisations in three urban centres in Tanzania.

In Swahili, the terms generally used for 'conflict' are 'mapigano' which means 'hitting each other' and 'vita' which means 'war' (Johnson 1995:108). The official translation for 'conflict' in publications by the Tanzanian Government is 'mgogoro' which means 'obstacle' or 'difficulty' (Mayer, Boness and Kussaga 2010).

In the following, the narrated conflicts in Tanzanian contexts will be presented.

6.1 Conflicts in Tanzanian contexts

In total, 40 conflicts were narrated by 18 interviewees. These narrated conflicts were related to the different organisational contexts of:

- Educational organisations (10 narrations)
- Governmental executives (9 narrations)
- Ecclesiastical organisations (6 narrations)
- Private enterprises (15 narrations)

Five types of cross-cultural conflicts can be categorised through content analysis of the 40 interviews: ethnic, religious; gender-oriented; organisational; and internationally based conflicts.

In this article, as a follow-up to the previously published research study (Mayer, Boness and Louw 2008), the focus is put on the educational organisational context. In educational organisations the ten collected narrations mostly

show ethnic, religious and gender types of cross-cultural conflicts. Conflicts narrated by interviewees of the Ministry of Education were mainly ethnically, religiously or internationally based.

Table 2: Educational contexts and conflict categories and topics

Organisation	Conflict Type	Conflict category	Issue of conflict
Educational organisations	Ethnic	Territory/land	Maasai on school compound
Educational organisations	Ethnic Religious/ gender Religious/ gender Ethnic	Culture differences	eating from the floor decorated hijab hijab Western fashion style
Educational organisations	Gender/ethnic Gender Structural Ethnic/racial Structural/ gender	Education and Socialisation	girls don't study girls prostitution for food in a sec. school poor performance of teachers socialisation on race priest abuses student
Ministry of Education	Structural	Personal resources	shortage of teachers no educational questions
Ministry of Education	Religious	Culture differences	hijab covering
Ministry of Education	Ethnic	International relations	school partnership with Finland

Source: authors' own construction

The educational contexts in this research can be divided into educational organisations, such as schools and colleges and the Ministry of Education.

In what follows, selected excerpts of the conflict narrations are presented as examples of the various types of conflict and the particular issue(s) that had caused each conflict.

Firstly, the issue of territory is bound to a conflict between a school and a group of nomads. These nomads use the school compound for religious purposes. The interviewee, a deputy head of a school in Arusha, states that there is a huge conflict between the school and the nomads. The nomads, who were allowed to worship once a week on the compound, erected a building and moved into the newly erected building to live on the school compound on a regular base. This fact led to a conflict about how the use of the territory was divided between the school and the nomads.

[…] The school and the farmers and the […] herdsmen, like Maasai. Ah, sometimes there is conflict regarding […] the plots, the farms. Sometimes […] the farmers claim the, the land is being used by the herdsmen. […] Sometimes the, the herdsmen destroy the, the, the farmers' crops. That's the type of conflicts.

[…] Yeah […] in the college in Arusha there is a place where these Maasai people were allowed to […] to do, to worship [emphasis] […] it was that they should come at least once in a week depending on […] on their time. But, but they were supposed to have that time once a week, but they decided to build, […] to erect a, a building there, […] permanently, which is the land of the gov, for the government, the land for the college, but they, they didn't have the power[…]to do that. The building is there [...] but it has never been solved, to date.

The conflict described is based on the controversy of traditional land use practices of the Maasai on the one hand and the definition of governmental ownership according to the Tanzanian law. The interviewed deputy head of school is very angry about the situation and desperate due to the fact that he does not see any possibility of conflict resolution through legal action. However, he is now involved in mediation sessions between the different parties, trying to resolve the conflict. The different interests and political influences

on this conflictual topic have led to an ongoing discussion concerning the issue of land, education and rights of cultural groups in schools and educational environments.

Secondly, there are the issues about the eating behaviour and school dress codes of people from different ethnic cultures and religions. In the following, a male Christian teacher from a secondary school in Moshi explains what he views as conflictual with regard to religious or cultural behaviour in schools.

You know, the Muslim female students demand covering their heads with a piece of cloth called 'Hijab' as part of their religious practice. But we do have school regulations that these students should look like the others and […] this school regulations require all students to be equal and dress up in the same uniform […] There are these customs and fashion styles in schools nowadays which, ah, you know, reflect Tanzanian cultures…and most of the youth is influenced by Western fashion styles and as a result they…you know, they, they tend to change their appearance in schools, as, as, as students. And the way they put on their uniforms [exclamation!], and, and…how they cut their hair…but we manage, we managed to solve this conflict and we just include the Hijab as optional part of uniform. This was not a big conflict. It is just an option now.

This teacher describes the issue of adequate school clothing of students and the difficulties of integrating exceptional religious, cultural or ethnic clothing. As in this example, many schools face the conflicts of integrating diverse cultural and religious influences and try to resolve them with a maximum of tolerance and acceptance, promoting the values of peace and harmony across cultures in educational contexts.

In another interview, a teacher refers to conflicts caused by differences in cultural behaviour between different ethnic groups and their perception of taboos:

There is conflict between diff, I mean between, ah, behaviour. The way, the way we as a Tanzanian act [emphasis] or as, lets say, we as a certain tribe act sometimes is a problem to the, to the other tribe. For some people they do opposites to the other according to their tribe taboos or tribalism. So such problem, […] it is…

taboo to give someone thing […] using this left-hand side. For some people it is not their taboo, […] but you find such people, in such, ah, such rural area, you find some people will give you with using their left-hand side. So if you find such already there is a conflict.

The taboos of different ethnic and cultural groups are well-known by individuals across the country. They are aware of the conflictual potentials and are able to avoid them. In communication situations individuals exchange ideas on the effects of differences in behaviour. This interviewee highlights particularly the contrast between urban and rural preferences in behaviour – based on taboos and resolved through third party mediation.

Thirdly, with regard to education and socialisation, there is the issue of gender-related education, and the ways that girls earn money to buy food. In the following excerpt, the teacher's performance is described, and issues of race and sexual abuse that cause conflicts in educational organisations in urban Tanzania are pointed out.

Parents, carrying a big burden of assisting the education system. Al, also, the government, due to the lack of poor economic incomes from the parents which can make the schooling to be late or come to school or come to school with the hungry stomachs. How can you expect, there the… some of the girls in our schools, when we talk, why yesterday you are not in school they said, I was finding […] food, for the parents. A form two girl, a form one girl, talking to that stage. And when you go and dig what do they, you know what does it to me, finding food for the pa, for the family. Maybe she's living with the grandparents, the grandmother, who's not able to find something. Then a girl finding a food for the parent means making a prostitute way of finding it, you see [question]. A girl, going anywhere, walking from the house to anywhere [emphasis] provided he, she is supposed to come back at home with food, you know that [question]. And who is the, who is the source of that conflict [question]. Is the government, because our system is different to other systems.

In this short excerpt, a headmistress from a school in Dar es Salaam describes why there is conflict about girls not attending school on a regular basis, and how this conflict is structurally implemented by the governmental and social

system which does not support parents and families regarding their regular income and provision of food and nutrition for the families. She views this conflict as a structural conflict in which mediation does not play a major role. Rather, this conflict needs to be resolved through a radical change in educational and governmental systems.

Interviewees from the Ministry of Education refer to conflicts regarding the shortage of teachers, discourses on educational questions, religious ways of dressing up in schools, girl's education and the way of managing international school partnerships.

Okay, in the working place […] as a head of school, I can say that we have a lot of conflicts, cause I mean, most of the culture conflicts, for example, most of the parents do not like their girls to study. We still, some parents they think that a, a woman is just a, a person to stay at home, being fed by the parent or being fed by the husband and the others are focusing to the traditions of wearing. When you say that a girl should wear a uniform which is planned as a school uniform, they say, no that is my girl, I want, I don't like […] her to be exposed to the uniform so that we must, she might wear a clothes which is not exposure to the boys or so.

Due to religious beliefs there is conflict about the role of women and girls in the society and with regard to education and clothes – as an interviewee from the Ministry of Education explains in the above-mentioned interview excerpt. She defines the role of the headmistress as being mainly involved in mediation on girl's rights in education between school representatives and parents. The debate on gender rights and equality is interlinked with the discussion on human and educational rights and is emphasised as an important issue in mediation across gender.

In the following section, the findings show how the described conflicts are managed in the educational contexts.

6.2 Managing conflicts cross-culturally

Interviewees indicated that maintaining and building peace is of most importance with regard to cross-cultural conflict management in educational organisations. They also highlighted that individuals need to learn how to

reach a consensus and how to shape good and enduring relationships. Cross-cultural conflict management needs to emphasise the promotion of mutual understanding, tolerance, reconciliation and the creation of similar ideologies.

Thereby, interviewees of educational organisations connect conflict management to the objectives of the curricula, such as peacebuilding, consensus, tolerance, fighting against segregating ideologies and racial discrimination ('ubaguzi wa ngozi').

With regard to the educational context, interviewees strongly support the promotion of values, such as understanding, respect, peace, tolerance and non-violence in conflict management processes and mediation situations. At the same time, they regard the value of humility which includes devoted and respectful interaction of individuals as outstandingly important.

Individuals who help to manage conflicts in organisational contexts are expected to hold specific positions in the educational organisations or in the Ministry. They have to have a high social status, such as heads of schools, board members or leaders. They should not be biased towards one party. They, also, should be in a good and healthy condition. They should be able to accept and respect both parties and should be fast in resolving the conflict. They should manage the conflict responsibly, perform their duties faithfully, and be scrupulous, impartial, educated and convincing. Referring to the personality of the mediator, characteristics, such as being self-confident, being wise, being empathetic and sensible for gender balance, are mentioned.

With regard to the characteristics of individuals managing conflicts, being wise is of main importance. Therefore, elderly individuals who have already retired from their jobs are often chosen as conflict managers, because they are expected to have the right knowledge and experience to resolve conflicts (Mayer, Boness and Kussaga 2010).

Interviewees from educational contexts explain that the conflict management structure should reveal the following characteristics: It should be based on the needs of the parties, and the mediator should guide the conflict parties according to their needs and the underlying values of the process. Basically,

conflict management is viewed as a process which represents a special kind of 'team building process', a kind of a 'negotiation or counselling' situation. Elements of mediation, negotiation and counselling are therefore defined as integral parts of cross-cultural conflict management. This means that the conflict manager needs to have different skills which are all integrated in the process of managing cross-cultural conflicts, and that the transitions from one role to the other should flow smoothly. Important aspects in cross-cultural conflict management in educational contexts are therefore:

- bringing people involved to one table;
- identifying key persons in the conflict;
- creating a safe environment;
- treating parties equally; and
- working towards mutual understanding between the parties.

These aspects build part of the base of the conflict management process in educational contexts in urban areas in Tanzania, which is often led by elderly individuals. The cross-cultural aspect in the conflict management sessions is not of outstanding importance. Rather it is viewed as one aspect of the conflict management process amongst others.

7. Discussion and conclusion

The aim of the article was to assess cross-cultural conflicts and their professional management in selected educational contexts in Tanzania. Cross-cultural conflict situations in educational contexts could be identified in the areas of territory, culture diversity, education and socialisation, personal resources and international relations (see table 2 above).

Generally, it can be concluded that interviewees from the educational context in Tanzania have to deal with a broad variety of cross-cultural conflict. These conflicts are influenced by local diversity issues (such as cultural, ethnic, religious and professional ones). They are very much bound to the local cultures and issues of land/territory (economic resource distribution) (Mwamfupe 1998), culture and ethnicity (ways of ingestion of

food, and clothing fashion styles) and religious aspects (religious clothing) (Wijsen and Mfumbusa 2004). The cross-cultural conflicts experienced are bound to particular types of conflicts which were grouped by the interviewees as ethnic, religious, gender-oriented, organisational or international conflicts. Generally, most of the cross-cultural conflicts narrated are interlinked with religion and gender, while fewer are related to ethnicity, organisational or international aspects.

However, diversity aspects and conflicts are linked to the organisational culture, particularly the education of teachers, and organisational aspects of school development and international partnerships. Interviewees confirmed definitions and views found in the literature (e.g. Francesco and Gold 2005; Lederach 2000; Mayer 2000). They define cross-cultural conflicts as shaped by their individual and cultural meanings, particularly in culture diversity and territory/land conflicts.

Referring to the professional management – and resolution – of cross-cultural conflicts in educational contexts it can be concluded that values of peace and harmony, and a constructive approach, are of utmost importance in dealing with such conflicts (Ghai, Bloomfield and Reilly 1998). Therefore, tolerance, mutual understanding and reconciliation build the base for the conflict management process, as described in other words by Jackson (2002) as 'valuing people'. This process of managing cross-cultural conflicts is needs-based and should be guided by an outstanding person with mediation, negotiation and counselling skills and a high degree of professional, educational and life experience.

In conclusion, the cross-cultural aspect does not play an outstanding role in the narrated conflicts. Rather, the religious and gender-oriented aspects are highlighted in detail. However, the individual – not the cultural person – is the focus of the conflict management process, as described in the selected literature on conflict management (Overman 1991). This leads to the assumption that in the described educational contexts, culture is important, but only as an aspect of the individual and not as an outstanding part that needs to gain more attention than other identity aspects of a person.

8. Recommendations

Referring to the aims, the findings and the conclusion of this article, the following recommendations can be given to educational organisations in Tanzania, individuals and institutions working in the field of cross-cultural encounters in the Tanzanian educational sector. They may also apply to cross-cultural trainers, consultants and conflict managers. At the same time, the findings may have implications for scientists and researchers working in conflict management and cross-cultural communication in Tanzanian contexts:

- Researchers and scientists who plan to run research projects on managing cross-cultural conflicts in Tanzanian educational contexts need to be prepared to become pioneers in this field of research. More exploratory research on conflict and its management, and on cross-cultural interaction is needed. The research methodology used with regard to the described issues and contexts should focus on qualitative research methods to gain deeper culture-specific insights into the values within conflict management processes and within the structural components of managing cross-cultural conflicts in education. Particularly, the views of culture and cross-cultural understanding of Tanzanian interviewees need to be explored with regard to concepts of ethnicity, gender, organisation, internationality and with regard to the scientific concepts of (managing) conflict across cultures presented above. Similarities and differences with regard to these concepts need further conceptual and linguistic exploration (Mayer, Boness and Kussaga 2010).
- Cross-cultural conflicts narrated by the interviewees show that the conflicts experienced are mainly influenced by local cultural issues (Maasai conflict), as well as local religious groups (Hijab conflicts) and local economic circumstances (female student prostitution). Therefore, researchers as well as cross-cultural trainers, conflict managers or consultants need to gain contextual and specific cultural understanding to conduct research or trainings with regard to the described contexts.

- Cross-cultural conflict management processes in Tanzanian educational contexts focus on the needs of the individual person involved in these processes and do not focus on culture as a particular aspect that needs to be highlighted. In the centre of the process stands the individual, not the cultural person.
- Cross-cultural trainers and consultants should therefore be clear about the fact that culture as a general issue is a subordinate topic with regard to Tanzanian educational contexts. Rather, aspects of gender and gender equality as well as religion and religious expressions – mainly focussing on Christian and Muslim religious aspects – are experienced as conflictive in educational settings. These aspects are not necessarily highlighted in the Western conflict (management) literature and therefore should also be elaborated in cross-cultural conflict management research with regard to the Tanzanian research context.
- Individuals and groups meeting in cross-cultural encounters in the Tanzanian education contexts should – with regard to the above-mentioned aspects – be trained in managing cross-cultural conflicts with special focus on gender and religion. These trainings should become part of the school curriculum to ensure proper preparation for cross-cultural interactions and exchange as well as globalisation and internationalisation processes in educational organisations and Ministries.

Implementing these practical implications can contribute to advance cross-cultural conflict management research and build a base for fundamental research on the mentioned issues in Tanzanian educational contexts. At the same time it could lead to improving interactions and conflict management across cultures in internationalising and globalising educational contexts.

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Political leadership and conflict resolution: An African example

*Wallace Warfield and Ashad Sentongo**

Abstract

Challenges to post-conflict leadership in African states highlight the need for democratic capacity building, with clear participatory processes involving communities and the leadership as a necessary condition to mitigate new or resurrected conflicts. This article explores transformational leadership and how it relates to democratic capacity building in Rwanda. We argue that community capacity building through grassroots leadership is a necessary and sufficient ingredient for the development and sustenance of democracy in post-conflict societies. Reconciliation through justice, political reforms including decentralisation, and women's empowerment as critical variables in this process characterise a transformational agenda to gradually achieve stability at the grassroots. Despite dilemmas of justice and democracy, transformative leadership in Rwanda continues to evolve at both state and grassroots levels through processes based on indigenous knowledge and practices like *gacaca* and *ingando* to achieve the greater good of reconciliation.

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Introduction

Gardner (1990:1) defines leadership as 'the process of persuasion or example by which an individual induces a group to pursue objectives held by the leader or shared by the leader and his or her followers'. In the African context, it was often the case that post-independence national leadership was of the so-called 'big man' style. In this form of leadership, decision making over the distribution of resources, power, and authority was (and still is to a limited extent) exclusively controlled by the president. To the extent that objectives were participatory, state leaders mainly involved a tightly controlled group of political elites.

In the dawn of the 21st century, the emerging African paradigm reflects a need for democratic capacity building – one that invites diverse communities into a participatory process with leadership. When we speak of diverse communities, we address not so much ethnographic communities (although these are relevant) as we do class communities – in the knowledge that class divisions on the continent create resource-controlling elites. In this context, inter-ethnic grassroots communities remain disenfranchised, becoming the source of new or resurrected conflicts.

If the 21st century African leader (and here we flatten the definition to include a range of leadership at different levels in society) is to stimulate democratic capacity building in communities, this individual must first learn the process of managing or mitigating conflict to build a community's capacity for sustainable peace and development. Burns (1978) recognised that leadership emerges in response to conflict. Indeed, one could argue that conflict gives depth and perspective to leadership.[1] In the African context, this refers not only to the typically understood intra-state conflict, but to the proliferation of conflict taking place at the local level as well. Conflict is a catalytic agent

1 There is a number of examples where leadership has created conflict so as to sustain themselves in their positions. Our focus here is not conflict manipulation by leadership for self-serving ends. Our interest is in examining leadership who see conflict as an opportunity to raise the consciousness and epistemology of a society.

for transformation, and conflict mitigation is the tool that negotiates this transformation.

In this article we explore the nature of transformational African leadership in relation to democratic capacity building, focusing on Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda. We begin with a broad view of African democracy and of how leadership has shaped this phenomenon to respond to the needs of the political state. Then, exemplifying Rwanda, we move to an argument that community capacity building through grassroots leadership is a necessary and sufficient ingredient for the development and sustenance of African democracy. To do so, transformational leadership must exist at various levels of the state in order to mobilise community consciousness. We look at reconciliation through justice, political reforms including decentralisation, and women's empowerment as critical variables in this process, noting the conditions of implementation that create space for levels of leadership to execute a transformational agenda. In doing so, we comment on the tension between justice and democracy and the dilemma these two political concepts pose for a transformational leader such as Paul Kagame.

Lederach (1997:38–39) provides a model of how one can examine leadership at various levels, ranging from top level to leadership at the grassroots. Lederach envisions three levels of leadership. At the top (Level 1) are the regime elites, politicians, religious leaders, and the military who engage in highly visible negotiations at the state level. At Level 2, Lederach locates intellectuals, ethnic leadership, regional or local religious leaders, and heads of recognised non-governmental organisations (NGOs). These are individuals who are most likely to be engaged in negotiations with Level 1 over the implementation of national policy. Such was the case in Rwanda where individuals who headed up humanitarian organisations were involved with Level 1 in the implementation of *gacaca* and *ingando* programmes, as part of the national reconciliation programme. We will be discussing this at length later in the paper. Level 3 is where the grassroots leadership resides. Here we find indigenous community leaders of one sort or another who tend to be engaged in the struggle for bringing more resources to their local population. Of course, these are not rigid divisions. In some post-conflict developing countries there is mobility

as some Level 2 actors will be pulled into Level 1 and Level 3 actors can move to Level 2.

While Lederach's attention is focused on third party interventional analysis, his model becomes an excellent vehicle to describe the gap between how democracy is interpreted and how transformative leadership evolves at the state and the grassroots level. We do this via a case study of Rwanda, showing how transformational leadership following the 1994 genocide is stimulating community capacity building. In Rwanda, democracy, rather than remaining in the realm of abstract ideas, takes on a practical function of helping the state to survive.

African transformational leadership

Gardner (1990) distinguishes between transactional leadership and transformational leadership. In transactional leadership, a leader engages in an exchange process. As Koerner and Bunkers (1994:71) note in citing Burns (1978), there is an 'exchange of valued things'. The leadership process is essentially deal-making guided by the satisfaction of mutual interests through distributive gains. In the classic negotiations schema, this works well when both parties enjoy a rough symmetry of power. However, in many intra-state interactions involving regime and local actors, this is not the case. In the African context, transactional leadership often becomes the fulcrum for tension and unrest, leading to conflict.[2]

Distinctively, Burns (1978:20) notes that transformational leadership occurs 'when one or more persons engage with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and reality'. In this way, transformational leadership involves innovation, change, growth, and empowerment of self and others. Characteristic of this form of leadership, community leaders and followers have similar objectives and needs. A mutual sense of security, identity, recognition, development, and self-actualisation shape the contours of negotiation for change.

2 Note the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

In the African context, it is not possible to talk about transformational leadership divorced from the emergence of democracy. African democracy has been developing since the early 1990s although its transition from dictatorial, 'big man' regimes has been erratic. The current positional jockeying for power in Zimbabwe stands as a good example. Guinea Bissau and Gabon provide two more examples of democracy being thwarted by authoritarianism. Having said that, there can be little argument that a 'second independence' (Joseph 1997) is moving cautiously through the continent. The hallmark of this transition, of course, was the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 after 27 years in prison and the negotiated end to the apartheid regime in South Africa.

Guiding the modern African state can be framed as a tension between *constitutional* democracy and *utilitarian* democracy. The latter is where democracy is interpreted and implemented on the ground in local communities. Utilitarianism can trace its origins to early Greek thought, but the first modernist expression came from Jeremy Bentham who had the idea that the morality of a social contract between a government and its people was determined by whether it provided 'the greatest good for the greatest number of people' (Ebenstein and Ebenstein 1991:596). John Stuart Mill, a libertarian, advanced this philosophic principle, pointing out that the state was no greater than the individuals who composed it (Ebenstein and Ebenstein 1991:630). From this perspective, the normative value of democracy cannot be taken for granted, but depends on the way democracy is utilised. Thus, the ethic of procedural equality comes into play. Procedural equality is about the distribution of scarce resources and decision-making across competing groups, but more importantly, it is about power. As Key (1958:5) put it, power '… [is] fundamentally of relationships of superordination and subordination, of dominance and submission, and the governors and the governed'. Thus, utilitarian democracy has as one of its chief objectives the distribution of state power away from dominance by elites at Level 1 in the Lederach model to greater inclusivity of actors at Levels 2 and 3 (grassroots). Conflict resolution has the potential for levelling the power playing field by giving visibility to narratives embedded in local communities that are essential to the resolution of conflict and the implementation of procedural democracy.

Brief background on Rwanda

The 1994 civil war and accompanying genocide devastated the country, with an unprecedented death toll of close to one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus, leaving thousands of orphans, disabled people, and widows. Half the population fled the country including professionals, and 80% of domesticated animals were killed. Political and economic structures and infrastructures had to be restarted. In a country with more than 85% of the population living in abject poverty, approximately 3,5 million refugee returnees and more than one third of households headed by females or orphans were threatened by HIV/AIDS partly because of widespread rape. However, the extent of achievement in transforming relationships, institutions and communities following the genocide presents a learning opportunity on the nature and role of leadership capacities in transcending selfish and short-term goals, towards a higher order of collective gain and national stability. Many post-civil war countries continue to struggle to determine this role, and how leadership capacities interact with attitudes and institutions in such a setting to cause the desired transformation.

Daunting challenges of national reconstruction and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda persist, and many gains have not come without contest and discontent from various political circles within and outside the country. Central to this debate is the tension between constitutional democracy as enacted by African state elites and preferred in the broader international community,[3] and what as we noted earlier can be called utilitarian democracy, which is people-oriented and seeks to involve grassroots leadership in a more inclusive and participatory manner. As a constitutional democracy, Anastase (2005) notes that Rwanda, throughout its constitutional history, never had a constitution responding to its own expectations as a nation, but often copied the constitutions of foreign countries. In doing so, the realities of political life as played out by the majority were ignored to satisfy the interests of the few.

3 Constitutional democracies are based on an inherent presumption of stability. In the African context, this model frequently produced a fraudulent electoral process that sustained a ruling regime. See Kalu 2009:9–39.

In May 2003, 90% of Rwanda's citizens supported a new constitution for their country, which was eventually promulgated in June 2004. As Anastase further noted, the new constitution was guided by the country's context and challenges. It aims to create equitable power sharing, establish the rule of law to improve people's social justice and welfare, and establish a pluralist democratic system. It further seeks to combat the ideology of genocide in its various manifestations and to eradicate identity-based divisions by promoting national unity, ethnic and gender equality of all Rwandans, and engage in the quest for solutions through dialogue and social consensus.

As noted above, utilitarian democracy takes this approach further, viewing these aims through state actions that add value to the quality of life and maximise the effectiveness of systems and institutions to meet the needs of its citizens. Equally, a number of transformations and reforms involving community, civil society and national level stakeholders and other actors in Rwanda reflect a dominant utilitarian approach to leadership and progress in the country. According to a 2005–2007 Social Cohesion survey conducted by the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), 97% of those who responded from all 416 administrative sectors in Rwanda agreed that the government is doing its best to improve the standards of living. Institutional and policy reforms, aided by various conflict resolution approaches have helped to bring about a closer relationship between the two forms of democracy. While time will be the final arbiter, it is possible to say that Kagame has been comparatively successful in managing the tension between the two forms of democracy – in contrast with many other African countries. We can think of this as a politics of incorporation where political pluralism takes the form of ongoing negotiations. This is particularly notable considering that in the past decade, the country has moved from short-term recovery to more long-term and strategic macroeconomic stabilisation and diversification, decentralised governance and other extensive reform initiatives in remarkable proportions (Kanyarukiga et al. 2006).

While there are claims of increasing authoritarianism on the part of government, the leadership in Rwanda can be perceived as progressively developmental, moving steadily (albeit with a few hic-ups) on a path to sustainable long-term

development (Hayman 2007). The 2007 Social Cohesion survey also showed that the majority of Rwandans believed in the effectiveness of the central government, with 56% of respondents agreeing that decisions that affect communities should be left to the government.

Dorman (2006), explaining 'post-liberation' state behaviour, outlines characteristics that are applicable to Rwanda despite a history of violence, namely, amongst others: a strong government, introduction of distinctive institutional reforms, and rebuilding the nation with emphasis on security and national unity. While the methodology has invoked criticism from some quarters, the issue is whether Kagame's leadership bears utilitarian qualities that have translated into additional value in service delivery and the quality of life among the citizenry. For example, according to the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), Rwanda is working within a structured development framework towards a long-term vision via a poverty reduction strategy bolstered by a strong political commitment from the government (Kanyarukiga et al. 2006).

Genocide experiences provide the over-arching framework within which all these efforts take place and its legacy predisposes some of the priorities in the country's policy processes. Underneath, as Evans et al. (2005) note, is a leadership considered to be genuine in its commitment to socio-economic development as well as good governance, even if it diverges in some respects from western norms.

Following, we exemplify transformational leadership and utilitarian democracy by discussing how Rwanda approaches political reforms, reconciliatory justice, and women's empowerment. While these do not suggest the absence of inter-group differences in a post-conflict setting, they contribute greatly to socio-political transformations necessary for peace and reconciliation.

Political reforms

Post-conflict political reforms are critical to restore integrity, stability and reconciliation. Reform creates the opportunity for new roles and responsibilities to emerge and challenge various aspects of the preceding

political order. Webley (2004) highlights the ongoing debate that locates Rwanda's predisposition to the 1994 genocide in different political orders in the country's history, for instance, the pre-colonial conquest of Hutus and Twa by Tutsi, European colonial rule and state structure, and the pre-genocide government of Habyarimana blamed for the collapse of the 1994 Arusha Accord. Mamdani (2001) argues that these different orders have over the years been more often defined in terms of power struggles to access political and economic opportunities. Political reform in Rwanda has emphasised transformation of systems and structures to expand political inclusion, especially through political party activity, and decentralisation of power through local governments to communities. According to the 2007 survey, 91% of Rwandans believed that they take part in decisions that affect them through established political processes.

Decentralisation of governance (decision-making, fiscal and financial planning and management) to provincial and local levels, and multiparty politics are some of the major political reforms in the country. Respectively, they both engage levels 1, 2 and 3 in the Lederach model and combine two other theoretical models that support this approach to power-sharing in ethnically segmented societies: the consociation model (Lijphart 1968, 1977), and the integrative model (Horowitz 1985). Lijphart emphasises the need for proportionality in government and segmented autonomy in combination with a high degree of self-governance (decentralisation). Horowitz also suggests dispersion of territorial power to take the heat off of a single focal point, and policies to promote moderation, such as electoral laws that encourage pre-election coalitions and alliances in a multiparty setting. Both approaches seem to draw on the logic of 'contact hypothesis' (Allport 1954, Brewer 2000), the idea that prejudice and discrimination can be reduced by contact between parties under conditions that promote equal status. Political reforms in Rwanda seem to reflect these theoretical models through decentralisation and political pluralism.

In 2001, Rwanda held the first local government elections, under the new policy to decentralise governance. Among those elected nationally were 2 765 local council representatives, 106 town and district mayors, and an

additional 424 new town and district executives. The real achievement of the electoral process was the fact that a new leadership was identified at all levels of society and elected. The process of decentralisation has been instituted with numerous adjustments. These include the formation of Community Development Committees (CDCs) and the Rwanda Association of Local Government Authorities (RALGA) to oversee and advise on decentralisation and other policies, and conduct training to improve leadership and decision-making capacities at the local level. Decentralisation also remains the principal gateway for citizens to decide and elect leaders of their preference and influence agendas for local governance and development. Local governments now undertake growth and development work previously handled by the central government, including access to education, health, poverty alleviation, dispute resolution, local elections, and other social and institutional programmes.

The challenges to decentralisation of governance notwithstanding, the 2005–2007 Social Cohesion survey showed that '70%–85% of respondents agreed that the decision-making bodies created through decentralized processes are knowledgeable, autonomous in their decision making and work well together'. Further, many agree that decentralisation has contributed to an improvement of civil society. For example, 41% of respondents belong to saving and credit associations. This has not come without discontent from the political opposition and allies of the Hutu rebels, now reorganised in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Still, decentralisation of power to local governments presents a transformative opportunity that seeks to unite the country, with a large portion of the population that has remained traumatised.

Kagame's resoluteness, given the need to rid the country of conditions that occasioned genocide, has been most visible in reforms to expand space for political participation while guarding against any recourse to pre-genocidal and genocidal practices. Unlike the traditional majoritarian 'winner-takes-all' approach to governance, Andrew England (2006) reports that Rwanda's politics runs on a consensual basis, with all parties represented in government, and according to the 2003 constitution, even the party with a majority of deputies cannot hold more than 50% of cabinet posts. Fluid as it may appear, such increased inclusiveness and participation in decision-making processes and

implementation of programmes in which communities have specific needs are central to stability in post-conflict societies.

The government is also changing genocidal narratives at the national and grassroots levels, focusing on ethnic cooperation and unity, including efforts to make the whole population trilingual in Kinyarwanda, French and English. Kanyarukiga et al. (2006) have argued that this will ultimately help Rwanda to overcome historical linguistic and cultural divides, central to the country's power and ethnic conflicts. The government's anti-segregation ('Barwanda') policy underscores this initiative, designed to head off attempts to divide the population along ethnic lines that could threaten a return to genocide.

Many argue that ethnicity in Rwanda is more about class than language and cultural identity, largely because Rwandans are indistinguishable. Yet these factors are central in the debate seeking to locate predispositions that occasioned such a violent history, and efforts to defuse them. The above political developments, still unfolding, have facilitated individuals, families and communities to participate in judicial and women's empowerment processes and programmes, as critical aspects in transformational leadership and utilitarian democracy. However, it is paramount that Rwanda's leadership at all levels need to de-construct associated conflict narratives, and construct a new discourse to guide the ongoing reconciliation and transformation.

Reconciliation through justice

Through gacaca and ingando, the leadership tapped into indigenous customs and norms to complement traditional western models and mechanisms to achieve reconciliation through justice. Countries that have gone through devastating wars, for example, Liberia and the former Yugoslavia, often singled out perpetrators of crimes and violence on the assumption that justice is done by apprehending them. As Hayman (2007) argued, from the perspective of many, the transformation and reduction of tensions in Rwanda needed a pragmatic approach emphasising reconciliation, and working in concert with a retributive justice system favoured in western norms to bring key actors to trial. Rwanda's approach has combined levels 1, 2 and 3 of the Lederach model,

drawing from international systems and norms to establish a National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) on the one hand, and a moderated local approach at the national/communal level through the gacaca and ingando systems on the other. Despite the unevenness of these mechanisms, many communities have experienced a measure of justice and reconciliation, without undermining mainstream western-based approaches to justice in post-conflict situations.

Gacaca: Reconciliation and justice

Endogenous mechanisms of justice, rooted in local community customs gain their preference in responding to local conflicts because they evolve and are practised for extended periods rather than being imposed or imported into societies (Zartman 2000:7). Lederach (1995:10) has also argued that 'understanding conflict and developing appropriate models of response necessarily needs to be rooted in [the ethnology of a community] and must respect and draw from the cultural knowledge of a people'. The government decision to formalise, moderate and improve gacaca highlights level 3 of the model as a major component of justice and reconciliatory processes across communities.

'Gacaca' is originally a traditional community-based approach to dispute resolution, conducted by elders in predominantly informal settings on issues such as land, theft, marriage, and property. The practice has been in place in major parts of the country since pre-colonial days. In 2002, the Kagame regime adopted gacaca to try lesser crimes of genocide, as an additional layer to provide local justice and involve local communities in the reconciliation process. It operates alongside the national court system and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and at the local, sector, district and province levels of the society. The main feature of the system is the traditional weekly meetings. These serve as local courts, and have been used to handle a number of genocide related cases at the local level. Community members meet on a weekly basis to collectively consider cases and other issues of dispute in the

community, to give evidence and testimony for the elected judges to render their judgement on the matter.

Intended to provide relief to an overwhelmed justice sector with thousands of prisoners who could potentially stand trial, gacaca became a visionary approach to draw grassroots communities into the work of the NURC, but also complement other national efforts to address the legacies of genocide. To date, the gacaca system celebrates its contribution to a high level of awareness about the rule of law at the grassroots, and justice through public testimonies and confessions. The Center for Communication Programs (2001) reported that 90% of the population knew about gacaca and the reconciliation process through election of judges, talk shows, sports competitions, music and drama, and the print media. According to the Social Cohesion survey (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 2008), 96% of survivors and 83% of prisoners believed the gacaca system was a better way of dealing with their cases than traditional courts as a way to eradicate impunity. Some NGOs have noted, however, that the *real* indicator of people's response to and embrace of gacaca is not what they say to surveyors and pollsters, but whether they show up at the weekly gacaca meetings in their communities (Webley 2004).

The system operates in 12 103 cell-level courts across the country, each conducted face-to-face by 169 442 *inyangamugayo* (persons of integrity) as judges elected by local communities and then trained by government (Huyse and Salter 2008:41). While the courts are criticised for lack of fair international trial standards, government argues that 'their fairness could be ensured by the participation of the local population' (Amnesty International 2010:12), yet they also helped to expedite delivery of justice in ways that the majority of the people understood and culturally identified with. From January 2006 to February 2007, a total of 71 405 were tried, 33 233 sentenced to prison, 16 438 put on community service, 15 219 acquitted, and 72 000 appeals were dealt with (Huyse and Salter 2008:43).

This bottom-up approach to redress the legacies of genocide has empowered grassroots leadership to take charge of the local reconciliation process (as they understand it), and offer better utility in moving victim communities

past their grief. Alana Tiemessen (2004) goes on to note that gacaca was resurrected because the cultural norms of international justice have proven to be inadequate to promote reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda, and critical support from the international community must generate a way of retaining gacaca's indigeneity without serving the interests of political regimes or inciting ethnic tensions.

Ingando: A traditional reflective practice

Nantulya and Alexander (2005) report that *ingando* is a Rwandese traditional practice of immobilising regular activities to reflect and find solutions to communal challenges, and the re-integration of convicts into communities through special programmes. In pre-modern times, traditional kings, their armies and community leaders mobilised their subjects to come together and reflect on situations like wars, droughts, diseases and other calamities, and to find collective solutions. With support from the government, NURC revived the practice of ingando to engage convicts and communities in reconciliatory dialogue. As a complement to gacaca, the objective of ingando is to transform relationships from conflict into peaceful coexistence at individual and communal levels. Looked at from a utilitarian perspective, ingando has the capacity to address the greater good implicit in level 3 of the Lederach model.

Initially, ingando participants retreated into residential programmes of between three weeks and two months, to reflect on their crimes and other atrocities and to commit themselves to ways of ensuring that crimes do not re-occur. Themes covered include analysis of Rwanda's problems, history of Rwanda, political and socio-economic issues, rights, obligations, duties, and leadership. It is mandatory for prisoners to participate in this programme before they are released back into their communities. By 2005, 102 909 people (released prisoners, perpetrators, local and community leaders) have been trained (Nantulya and Alexander 2005). To date, the programme takes the form of civic education and has been extended countrywide to also include students, traders, women, youths, leaders and perpetrators of genocide and other crimes. NURC, working through local councils, schools and other community structures, provides logistics and other forms of support.

Approximately 3 000 students attend ingando retreats each year, mostly at the National Ingando Centre in Ruhengeri.

As integrative and indigenous mechanisms, gacaca and ingando demonstrate a unique perspective to approach leadership in post-conflict societies. They exemplify transformation and a utilitarian approach based on consilience or unification of knowledge (Wilson 1998:11), i.e. integrating state processes with local traditions to achieve local peace and national stability. The utilitarian value of the leadership in Rwanda manifests in the recognition of widely acceptable traditions and readily available local capacities. These are legislatively integrated within systems of the state and transformed into institutions to generate reconciliation and accelerate development, yet they remain culturally relevant and meaningful to the everyday life of people at communal level. Therefore, while gacaca takes a judicial approach to enable individuals and communities to account for crime and violations, ingando provides opportunities for reform and reintegration and the enabling environment for this to occur.

Women's empowerment

The social and political roles of women are critical to post-conflict stability and reconciliation. In Rwanda a number of women play prominent roles in judicial, reconciliation and reconstruction processes, which demonstrates a remarkable transformation and improvement in their status in the culture and institutions of the state. Powley (2004:5) explains that 'genocide was committed most heavily upon men, and women by their demographic majority took on multiple responsibilities to rebuild their families and the society'. Many women played critical roles to organise new communities following the genocide, providing resources and other services to meet the needs of victims and survivors. Others single-handedly catered to the needs of families, and found homes for orphans. The restorative role of women in post-conflict Rwanda was (and still is) supported in part by public and private organisations. Most importantly at the policy level, the presence of many women within government '… has contributed to progressive gender policies within the administration' (Powley 2004:7). Reflecting once again

on the Lederach model, women in Rwanda play critical roles at all levels of leadership.

Historically, women have not faired well in constitutional democracies.[4] The Schumpeterarian (Schumpeter 1950) emphasis on voting (until recently upheld in western democracies) has favoured the embedded power of men.[5] As political actors at Level 1, Rwandan women play a central role in the governance, reconciliation and reconstruction of the country. They are constitutionally guaranteed 24 of the 80 deputies, and 30% of the senate. In the 2003 legislative elections, women won 40% of the seats in the chamber. By 2007, there were 9 women in the 26-seat Senate and 38 women in the 80-seat Chamber of Deputies. Nine women also occupied cabinet positions. Extending the input of women in national, regional, and community administration, the country's policy framework assures that as part of the decentralisation of power, one third of executive administrative positions in local government are held by women. To date, women occupy 56% of seats from the September 2008 parliamentary elections (United Nations Development Fund for Women 2008). The potential for women's political empowerment is supported by empirical data that show that as the representation of women increases in representative bodies, so does the legislation that speaks to their needs (Dowding, Godin and Pateman 2004:23). Joseph Sebarenzi, former Speaker of the Parliament, recognises that 'gender representation in Rwanda is an undeniable fact and the government should be credited for it' (Powley 2004:6).

Strong perceptions that disfavour women persist however, and women remain vulnerable to the effects of poverty and other cultural and institutional arrangements that still favour males. Sexual and other forms of abuse and discrimination against women, entrenched over the years in social and cultural systems, continue to challenge the leadership in Rwanda especially when they are wrapped in silence. Many women still need to gain leadership experience after years of discrimination, to learn how to articulate their rights

4 See, for example, Lipset 1990:188–189.

5 This was particularly true during the heyday of political machines in a number of cities in the United States. See, for example, Erie 1988.

and opinions, and how to balance these roles as mothers or family heads faced with strong cultural obstacles. Drawing from Mamdani's (2001) analysis of cultural and political identities in pre- and post-colonial Rwanda, there has been a remarkable transformation of social and political structures that in the past held women in Rwanda passive and insignificant. He states that in the past families and communities maintained a patriarchal approach to build social relationships and structure political institutions. The current outlook of women's involvement in government and the roles they play at national, village and family levels demonstrate a leadership environment that had enabled transformation of such traditions to occur.

To deal with taboos and other hindrances to women's empowerment, a Ministry for Gender, and the National Women's Council were set up in 1995 to ensure their participation even at the lowest village level of leadership (Umudugudu). This is evidenced even in critical sectors like security, where Powley (2004) reports that women have made great contributions. For example, in northern and northwestern Rwanda (Ruhengeri, Gisenyi, and Kibuye provinces), women have been instrumental in stabilising border communities, engaging rebels to return and reintegrate them in Rwandan society.

Critique

Critics question Kagame's style of leadership, noting that it is tainted by the arrest and imprisonment of the former President and ally Pasteur Bizimungu, banning of political parties before 2003 elections, dominating the discourse about genocide to cover up atrocities committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and banning ethnically aligned political activities while maintaining a Tutsi dominated RPF Army and political party. Indeed, a hint of the dialectic haunts the leadership of Rwanda as it maintains a strong voice on its priorities and policies in areas where the government wants to achieve specific goals, all the while, pushing through political reforms and dialogue that eluded the political culture of Rwanda since independence. The 2008 parliamentary elections were held under a coalition of political parties alleged to be allied to the RPF, because other opposition parties refused to participate claiming unlevelled political space.

Residual ethno-political tensions have resulted in administrative and organisational challenges that tend to undermine the reconciliatory value and cultural relevance of Kagame's leadership style. Tiemessen (2004) notes that the system, marred by ethnic tensions, and because of increasing state influence in the selection of judges and general administration, is viewed by many observers to serve and perpetuate Tutsi dominance and power, and silence dissenting voices against government. Particularly, the failure to prosecute alleged perpetrators from the ruling RFP continues to fuel allegations of Hutu witch-hunting, and many Hutus have fled into the DRC and other neighbouring countries claiming persecution. This has complicated the allocation of 'victimhood' in Rwanda based on genocide and post-genocide accounts from participants in the gacaca courts. It reinforces Lerche's (2000) argument in post-conflict reconciliation that there are always competing narratives of victimhood, with all sides having their own version of the truth of 'what really happened'.

Conclusion

Transformative leadership is necessarily equated with what Greenstone and Peterson (1973) call *orthodox* liberalism: essentially, a broad redistribution of goods and services by the state. As we have noted in one way or another, transformative leadership has to balance constitutional democracy (often under pressure from international actors) with utilitarian democracy where needs and interests of grassroots leadership are stimulated. In this sense, transformative [political] leadership can be better described as pragmatic liberalism. Or putting it another way, pragmatic *realism* where procedural democracy (in this instance, the distribution of power) is occasionally sacrificed to produce the 'greater good'. Here, the Kagame regime needs to be wary of undercutting the spirit of utilitarianism by centralising key decision making and creating an illusion of grassroots participation through implementation.

The heart of the matter then, for the transformative leader attempting to establish the greater good in deep-rooted identity conflicts is reconciliation. The data on truth and reconciliation initiatives conducted after intra-state conflicts marked by opposing identity groups suggest that reconciliation is an

uneven process at best. As we noted above in the Rwanda scenario, victims' sense of injustice does not always end at the conclusion of a gacaca hearing. Victims often experience expressions of regret and feel that entreaties for forgiveness are insincere. Or that the retributive justice calculus (where it is in place) does not match the atrocity of the crime. (Avruch and Vejarano 2002; Kriesberg 2003).

In writing about the seemingly alchemic mixture that is producing Rwandan governance, our observations should not be taken as a prescription that sacrifices inherent values of constitutional democracy on the altar of pragmatic realism. Constitutional democracy should have a normative goal of responding to the needs of all who live within its reach. Our emphasis is on the transformative leader who acknowledges the tension, but also the opportunities existing in a broadly participatory political process. Such a leader values the role conflict mitigation can play in managing this tension and building a nation's capacity for sustainable peace and development.

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Post-conflict development in Liberia: Governance, security, capacity building and a developmental approach

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Abstract

This article examines the causes of the Liberian Civil War of 1989–2003, and proposes policy alternatives that the current government can pursue to ensure durable peace and development. The paper argues that bad governance accounted for the conflict. Therefore, if peace, security and development are to be attained, there is a need for the current government to adopt and implement four policy options: good governance, security sector reform, a long-term development approach, and capacity building at the national and local levels. Although the new President of Liberia has taken some critical steps towards implementing some of these policies, more work needs to be done to address

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corruption, and promote transparency, accountability, good governance and development if a relapse into conflict is to be avoided.

Introduction

Post-conflict development/peacebuilding[1] requires all measures that are necessary to help a country move from conflict to sustainable peace. Concerns about the best approaches and policy options available in post-conflict countries to ensure both sustainable peace and development have been the preoccupation of policy makers and development practitioners. Scholars in peace studies and democratic governance have been concerned about whether post-conflict development should be focused on the provision of short-term humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation, and the holding of early elections, or should be anchored in long-term development. Policy makers in war-torn societies should also be concerned about how to deal with ex-combatants and security issues in order to ensure durable peace and economic development for the people.

Following the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as the President of Liberia in 2005, peace has gradually returned to the country. The issue of most importance to policy makers now is how to maintain a durable peace in the country. This article seeks to explore three research questions. Firstly, what political governance and security policies are needed to enable a country like Liberia that has just come out of war to rebuild itself and prevent a relapse into conflict? Secondly, should post-conflict development/peacebuilding be a short-term or long-term development goal? Finally, how should a long-term development goal which includes capacity building at the national level and for local communities be pursued in Liberia?

This article seeks to examine governance and security policies that are needed to help the country achieve durable peace and sustainable development. With regard to political governance, it is argued that there is a need to pursue good governance (political inclusiveness) to ensure balanced representation of the

1 The terms 'post-conflict development' and 'peacebuilding' are used here interchangeably. They refer to measures and structures put in place to build lasting peace and socio-economic and political development in post-conflict societies.

various regional and ethnic groups. In terms of security policy, four policy options are argued and recommended. The first includes the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants into the civilian population. The second is to develop national security and defence policy. The third is to regionalise effective police collaboration with customs officers, which is necessary for controlling cross border proliferation of small and light weapons. Fourthly, a professional army needs to be established. Finally, it is argued that post-conflict peacebuilding requires long-term development goals, including capacity building at the national level and within local communities.

There were several factors that led to the choice of Liberia for this study. Liberia has just returned to democratic rule after long years of violent conflict. The first period of conflict, in 1989–1999, was followed by more violent conflict in 1999 to 2003. There have been two interregnums in government administration. The first was from 1990 to 1996 when Dr. Sawyer acted as interim president, until the 1997 elections where he handed over power to Charles Taylor. The second was from 2003 to 2005 where Gyude Bryant acted as interim president until January 2005 when Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was elected. It is, therefore, worth investigating the following questions: What factors led to the crisis in Liberia after the 1997 election? What policies are needed to maintain durable peace in Liberia, so that it does not relapse into violent conflict following the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf to power?

This article is organised in five parts. The first part offers a brief review of the literature on post-conflict development/peacebuilding. This is followed by an examination of the background to the Liberian Civil War. The third part discusses political inclusiveness (good governance) as a measure against renewed conflict, whilst the fourth section offers security policies needed to promote durable peace and sustainable development. Finally, a long-term development approach to peacebuilding including capacity building for local communities in Liberia is discussed.

Theoretical framework: Post-conflict development/ peacebuilding

The most urgent challenge faced by the international community and humanitarian relief agencies involved in post-conflict development/ peacebuilding has been to find the most appropriate way of putting in place measures to ensure durable peace without a relapse into conflict. Indeed, traditional peacekeeping operations, which were implemented between the end of the Second World War and the end of the Cold War, required peacekeepers to create a buffer zone to separate warring or belligerent parties and prevent them, through their mutual consent, from fighting. Thus traditional or first generation peacekeeping operates according to three principles: consent of the parties to the conflict, impartiality of peacekeepers and minimum use of force (Donald 2002:21). However, with the end of the Cold War, many conflicts emerged in the global system that led to the escalation of violence and human casualties. Prompted by the need to protect human rights, UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, proposed a 'second generation' of UN peace operations in which the mandate of peacekeeping was extended to the deployment of large UN peacekeeping forces, the protection of human rights and the permission to use force (Boutros-Ghali 1995:4; Slim 1996:6)). In this type of peacekeeping operation, peacekeepers are actively involved in the resolving and settling of conflicts – in the cases of both inter- and intra-state conflicts (Williams 1998:1; Richmond 2002:44).

Peacebuilding, as a concept introduced by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his *Agenda for Peace*, involves three components: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping (Boutros-Ghali 1992). He (Boutros-Ghali 1992: par 21) defines peacebuilding as 'action taken to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and consolidate peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict'. For Boutros-Ghali, a comprehensive multidimensional peacekeeping undertaking is inseparable from peacebuilding. For him, comprehensive peacekeeping includes:

> The supervision of ceasefires, the regroupment and demobilization of forces, their reintegration into the civilian life and the destruction of their weapons; the design and implementation of de-mining programmes, the

> return of refugees and displaced persons; the provision of humanitarian assistance; the supervision of existing administrative structures, the establishment of new police forces; the design and supervision of the constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms, the observation, supervision and even organization and conduct of elections and the coordination of support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction (Boutros-Ghali 1995:6).

In the same vein, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed an integrated post-conflict peacebuilding approach. He argued that:

> By post-conflict peace-building, I mean actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation. Experience has shown that the consolidation of peace in the aftermath of conflict requires more than purely diplomatic and military action, and that an integrated peace-building effort is needed to address the various factors that have caused or are threatening a conflict. … It aims rather to build on, add to, or reorient such activities in ways designed to reduce the risk of a resumption of conflict and contribute to creating the conditions most conducive to reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery (United Nations 1998).

Kenneth Bush (1996:76) also argues that post-conflict development entails short-term humanitarian operations and long-term developmental objectives:

> In the broadest term, peacebuilding refers to those initiatives which foster and support sustainable structures and processes for peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuation, of violent conflict. The process entails both short- and long-term objectives, for example, short-term humanitarian operations and longer-term developmental, political, economic and social objectives.

While there appears to be a general consensus of what peacebuilding involves, there has been a lack of commitment by the international community to long-term development goals. Rather, peacekeeping operations are seen as a

short-term development goal or a subset of military operations rather than a long-term development one. In Kenneth Bush's view, the international community's approach to peacebuilding, which is based on 'quick in-and-out operations', is tantamount to 'bungee cord humanitarianism' (Bush 1996:76). This means interventions that merely show presence without addressing the problems. In other words, there is a gap between rhetoric and action on the part of the international community in peacebuilding.

A development scholar, Peter Uvin, views post-conflict development/peacebuilding as premised on three pillars: rehabilitation, reconstruction and development (Uvin 2000:9). James Busumtwi-Sam (2004:317; White and Cliffe 2000) note the same three distinct approaches to post-conflict development along the continuum of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and conventional development. They all acknowledge the utility of humanitarian assistance/relief, rehabilitation and development approaches in providing short- to medium-term needs of individuals, refugees' resettlement, shelter, food and medical attention in post-conflict societies, but they also admit of their shortcomings. For instance, Peter Uvin notes that there has been a lack of financial commitment by the international community towards post-conflict development. As he argues, 'the international community is not willing to or capable of providing the resources of creating a truly functioning democracy' (Uvin 2000:11).

Busumtwi-Sam (2004:340–345) also notes the problems of post-conflict development to include a lack of third window financing, slow responses to peacebuilding (post-conflict development); the gap in making a pledge and making a commitment of financial support, and a lack of sustained commitment where donors tend to disengage once a conflict has receded from public attention.

Another important limitation in post-conflict peacebuilding, as noted by Chesterman and Reilly, has been the rush to hold early elections and exit the war-torn country without putting in proper security policies or addressing the root causes of the conflict (Chesterman 2002:207–209; Reilly 2002:120). In this regard, merely rehabilitating the state and pursuing development policies without addressing the root causes of conflict and security issues cannot bring lasting peace. As Green and Ahmed (2004:319) argue, 'peacebuilding involves the

fundamental questions not only about what to reconstruct but also about how to do so in order not to recreate the unsustainable institutions and structures that originally contributed to the conflict'. Thus, post-conflict reconstruction projects or policies need to, and should, address the underlying causes of the conflict, by dislodging the institutions and structures that caused it and creating new strong institutions and structures that can contribute to a sustainable peace.

The three approaches, humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and a short-term development goal, though necessary, have a lot of weaknesses. Humanitarian assistance is needed to provide shelter, food, clothing and medicine to victims of conflict. This is crucial because securing the lives of the people in anticipation of constructing democracy and the rule of law is of utmost importance in a post-conflict society. Rehabilitation, which concerns immediate tasks that must be undertaken after the cessation of violence to restore a basic semblance of normality and restore the basic functioning of the state, usually takes three to six months (Uvin 2000). Thus rehabilitation seeks to provide physical infrastructure for the reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons. Thirdly, a short-term development approach aims at reconstructing the state by providing temporary shelter, drafting a constitution and putting in place administrative structures. But such measures fail to address long-term development issues.

This article intends to address the above limitations or fill in some of the gaps in the approaches to post-conflict development, especially by addressing the root causes of conflict, and showing how to maintain effective security policies that will prevent a return of conflict. Thus, it argues that post-conflict development requires four approaches: good governance (addressing the root causes of the conflict and establishing inclusive governance), security reforms, a long-term development goal, and building local capacities. These four approaches have either been missing or have not been integrated into peacebuilding or post-conflict development literature. Rather, the emphasis has been on humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and short-term development goals. This article seeks to contribute to the existing knowledge on post-conflict development, by adopting a holistic and an integrative approach in which long-term development goals, capacity building, good governance and security reforms are brought together

to be viewed properly and subsequently addressed. That way, the search for peace in Liberia, as in any post-conflict country, may be guaranteed.

Interrogating the causes of conflict in Liberia

To examine the causes of the conflict in Liberia, a brief background of the country's civil war is needed. The Liberian civil war began in 1989. The country was ruled by Americo-Liberians (American descendants) until 1980 when Sergeant Samuel Doe, a native Liberian, became the first president of Liberia. Liberians for the first time thought they were going to be liberated under Samuel Doe's regime. However, his regime became very authoritarian, discriminatory and abusive of human rights in Liberia. It was as a result of the repressive regime of Samuel Doe that Charles Taylor began an attack in 1989 which finally led to the overthrow of Samuel Doe's government by a break-away faction from the rebels' group of Charles Taylor. This group, known as the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), was led by Prince Johnson in September 1990. The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a regional peacekeeping group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), mediated, and Dr. Sawyer acted as interim president until the 1997 elections when Charles Taylor of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) was elected as president. Two years later, the civil war began with two rebel groups. One emerged from the border between Ivory Coast and Liberia and became known as the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), the other was started by a group of exiled Liberians in Guinea who called themselves Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD).

These two groups that fought Taylor's government destabilised the country. With international pressures and ECOWAS intervention, Charles Taylor was compelled to resign in 2003. He went into exile in Nigeria and his vice-president, Gyude Bryant, was chosen to act as interim president until the 2005 election, when Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was elected and sworn in as the President of Liberia in January 2006.

Given this background of the civil war in Liberia, the questions that need to be asked are: What led to a resumption of conflict following the end of the

war in 1990 and the election of Charles Taylor as president of Liberia in 1997? Were the root causes of the conflicts that led to the first civil war from 1989 to 1990 addressed? If they were not, what lessons can be learned by the present government of Liberia in this post-conflict period, and what policies are needed to maintain peace and stability in Liberia without a resumption of conflict?

Many reasons have been given for this conflict. For Adebajo, the conflict is generally attributed to bad governance. Adebajo identifies six key issues, as indices of bad governance, that contributed to the Liberian War: 'the exclusionary rule of the Americo-Liberian Oligarchy, the brutal and inept rule of Samuel Doe; the deleterious effects that Doe's rule had on the armed forces of Liberia, ethnic rivalries and personal ambitions that resulted from Doe's rise to bloody power; and the destabilizing effects of the withdrawal of the U.S. support from Doe, a strategic Cold War ally' (Adebajo 2002:19).

Given these issues outlined by Adebajo, it can be seen that Liberians suffered from the Americo-Liberian rule in that they were systematically discriminated against in terms of employment, political representation and development projects. But did the situation change when Samuel Doe, a native Liberian, gained power in 1980? It did not. Samuel Doe's government became more repressive, authoritative and abusive of human rights. Indeed, there were political, social and economic factors that led to a resumption of the civil war in 1989. Firstly, after the 1985 elections, instead of establishing inclusive democratic governance, Doe deepened ethnic exclusion by disproportionately appointing his own tribe, the Krahns, and co-opted the Mandingoes, who were the wealthiest business people, into his cabinet to the neglect of the rest of the fourteen tribes of Liberia. Secondly, the extra-judicial execution of Colonel Thomas Quinwokpa and his military men, including the Gios and Manos, brought about counter-reaction. Thirdly, the execution of William Tolbert and several members of his cabinet, and the reckless confiscation of property, led the Americo-Liberians to support Charles Talyor's uprising.

From the above account of the factors that led to the civil war in Liberia, it is sufficiently clear that bad governance was the main reason for the violence that followed. As can be seen in Liberia, a crisis of governance as exhibited in the abuse

of human rights, dictatorial rule, social and ethnic exclusion, and institutional failures led to the overthrow of Doe's government and the turmoil that then engulfed the country. Samuel Doe's regime was very repressive and pursued ethnic discrimination policies. As Amos Sawyer argues, 'Sergeant Samuel Doe ascended to power from the lumpen elements of the Liberian Army. Within a few years, he purged the military of all his rivals and of its trained officers, and relied on an underdisciplined core recruited largely by his Krahn ethnic groups' (Sawyer 2004:444). This means that the professionalism of the military was undermined, and this not only negated merit principles in the military but also weakened the military institution.

The question worth discussing is whether Charles Taylor, after his election in 1997 as the President of Liberia, addressed the socio-economic and political crisis that had led to the civil war. The evidence shows that Taylor failed to address the root causes of the conflict. Instead, leaders of the twelve opposition parties who competed with him in the 1997 elections were harassed and intimidated. This led to a resumption of violent conflict in 1999. The opposition parties went into exile to Guinea and Ivory Coast. It was these exiled groups who formed LURD and MODEL to fight Taylor's government. Indeed, jobs were given to his party supporters, while certain parts of Liberia where his party did not get significant votes were either given no development projects or completely neglected. This led to widespread discontent against the government. The case of Liberia illustrates Nicole Ball's assertion that 'economic and political inequalities form the root causes of conflict in Africa, and until disparities between peoples are reduced, conflict will continue' (Ball 1991:385).

If history is any thing to go by, and surely it is, for history serves as a guide to the future; it enables us to learn from our mistakes and avoid repeating them. That means the current government of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf should address the root causes of conflict (crisis of governance) by pursuing democratic governance and strengthening security policies. What follows is an examination of democratic governance as an antidote to conflict in Liberia.

Democratic governance as an antidote to a resumption of conflict in Liberia

Since poor governance has accounted for conflict in Liberia, the pursuit of responsible democratic governance should promote and consolidate peace in the country. As the World Bank (1989:10) notes, 'underlying the litany of Africa's development problems is a crisis of governance. By governance is meant the exercise of political power to govern a nation's affairs'. For Goran Hyden (1999:185), governance is 'that aspect of politics that aims to formulate and manage the rules of the political arena in which state and civil society actors operate and interact to make authoritative decisions'. This definition stresses the importance of political government, which is the need for political inclusion, transparency and accountability. Joachim Ahrens (2002:120–128) gives a comprehensive definition of political, economic and corporate governance and stresses the interaction of individual actors, social groups, civic organisations, firms and policy makers to implement and enforce public policies and improve private sector coordination. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1997b:2) defines governance as the exercise of political, economic and social authority in a state.

From the above definitions, the main features of democratic governance are the rule of law, freedom of expression and association, electoral legitimacy, a vibrant media, a responsible civil society, gender equality, transparency, accountability and development oriented leadership. Democratic governance also includes such features as voting, participation, public discourse and judgments, civil society participation and decentralised power. The lack of these features in Liberia undermined the state's capacity and legitimacy to rule, which degenerated into violent conflict.

The crisis of governance lies in the failure of the state to address competing demands by relying on the military, as did Liberia during the Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor regimes, to harass, intimidate torture and silence dissidents. But that approach, like Thomas Hobbes' state of nature, which relies on brute force, grants only temporary relief or breathing space. It achieves negative peace (absence of violence) but does not bring in positive peace (justice, security

and development). Indeed, as William Zartman (1997:1) rightly points out, 'governing a state is not only the prevention of violent conflicts from destroying the country; it is the continual effort to handle the ordinary conflicts among many groups and their demands which arise as society plays its role in the conduct of normal politics'. Implied in Zartman's argument is that governance is about negotiation and conflict management; it is not about using state military apparatus to coerce and silence dissent, rather than addressing the demands of the various pressures and civil society groups. Thus preventing future conflicts is not solely about keeping rebels away from the use of violence, but is also about establishing accountable, transparent and participatory systems of governance. The resort to coercion is symptomatic of naked autocracy or totalitarianism, and in the long run, this undermines the capacity and legitimacy of the state to govern.

Given the lessons learned in the previous conflicts in Liberia, the post-conflict situation demands a democratic, all-inclusive governance approach. Nepotism, political patronage, rent-seeking, corruption and identity politics which characterised the previous governments should not be repeated. This will require marshalling the necessary political will to address issues such as identity, participation, distribution, penetration and legitimacy (Binder 1991:373). To overcome the crisis of governance in Liberia, it is imperative that these five issues be dealt with. There is a need for the state to provide an enabling political and regulatory environment for civil society to participate in the policy process and decision-making processes either through their representatives in parliament or by grassroots participation.

One of the crucial policy actions required by the Government of Liberia is to endeavour to ensure equitable distribution of resources to benefit all regions, and that is where penetration is important, because a lack of penetration and the concentration of development projects in some regions to the neglect of others lead to marginalisation and regional imbalances. As Stephen Stedman (1995:37) argues, 'conflict resolution is inherently bargaining and problem solving involving the distribution and achievement of shared values'. Governance also requires that leadership be willing to bargain and incorporate the inputs of the various groups into decision making that reflects broad consensus and values.

Also necessary is the strengthening of civil-military relations in post-conflict Liberia. The military needs to be professionalised, and insulated from political intervention. It is imperative that soldiers are not forcibly retired or dismissed arbitrarily and capriciously by the government in power, but through military discipline and a code of ethics. Nor should the government abuse its power in allowing just one ethnic group to dominate the military. It is sufficiently important that a conscious policy of restraint from the manipulation and politicisation of the ministry be adhered to. Second, there is a need for a civilian regime which legitimises policies that benefit the citizenry, and reflect the democratic values and principles in post-conflict Liberia. As government increases its responsiveness to the social, economic and political demands of the citizenry, its legitimacy in the eyes of the military and its people will increase, diminishing government's vulnerability to violent conflict. Clearly, state legitimacy and adequate capacity are crucial for the maintenance of law and order.

Besides, to consolidate democracy, peace and development in Liberia, the role of civil society is significant. As Stedman (1991:374) argues, 'there is the necessity for democratic reform to reorient state-society relationship so that the political accountability of the rulers is the hub of political life'. The empowerment of civil society will enable them to hold government accountable and ensure transparency. It will also enable civil society to play a watchdog role over the conduct of government to avoid mismanagement of the economy, as well as corruption, political patronage and rent-seeking. To that extent, it is important that civil society has inputs into the policy process, in such areas as the drafting of the national budget and the implementation of policies, development projects and programmes that government pursues. It is important that the tax payers exercise their rights regarding what their monies are used for and how they are used. Indeed, the test of the current leadership and the stability of Liberia will depend on the pursuit of good governance and security policy. What follows now is a discussion of the security policies that will be required to maintain peace in Liberia.

Security governance in post-conflict Liberia

The challenges confronting peacebuilders, security experts, interveners and policy makers in a post-conflict country include finding the best way to integrate ex-combatants into either the civilian population or the military. They also have to deal with the disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons. The whole notion of security sector reform or governance, a term used to describe the transformation of the security system, forms a crucial part of post-conflict development. Without addressing the security dilemma faced by a war-torn state, the prospect of a return to conflict is high.

Security system is defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2004:119) as that 'which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions in working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well functioning security framework'. This means that the role of the armed forces, police, para-military forces, presidential guards, intelligence services, customs authorities, civil defence forces, civil society, the legislature, judiciary and the executive are keys to promoting the security of the state.

The current President of Liberia faces these enormous tasks. The failure of Charles Taylor's government to formulate any real national security policy following the 1997 Peace Agreement, led to violent conflict in 1999 by exiled Liberians who turned themselves into rebels. Addressing security issues, therefore, becomes crucial in a post-conflict state. A durable peace can be secured in Liberia not only by pursuing political governance of inclusion, but also by pursuing effective security policies that address both state security and human security.

The first policy action required of the Liberian government is a proper disarmament, demobilisation, and rehabilitation of ex-combatants into the civilian population. It is important to collect and dispose arms (disarmament), and to persuade ex-combatants to return all military insignia and renounce military status (demobilisation). But thereafter reintegration becomes essential.

Without a proper reintegration of ex-combatants into the civilian population, they are tempted to revert to violence. Guns not collected and destroyed at the time of demobilisation will be used in later wars or sold to combatants in other areas. Therefore, 'any place of effective control of small arms must incorporate provisions for the reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society and for the collection and destruction of their personnel weapons' (Klare 2004:130).

Another important policy choice needed by the current President of Liberia is the adoption of a strong national security and defence policy. The current government requires legislation aimed at controlling weapons in the hands of civilians. Indeed, as part of preventing the flow of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) from circulation in the West African sub-region, there is a need for the current government to re-enact and enforce the *National Firearms Control of Liberia Act*. This act was introduced in 1956 and it prohibits indigenous Liberians from possessing guns. A broad consultation is needed in the review of the Act to include hunters, traditional leaders, members of parliament, civil society and legal practitioners. Since the Act did not make provision for the collection and destruction of illicit weapons and for the tracking of guns, a new Act should make provision for such measures, as well as a role for the police in arms control and a ban on civilian use of military weapons. Also, tough measures are urgently required on the use and possession of arms, such as issuance of licences, criteria for eligibility to use guns for hunting game, and a ban on the local manufacture of guns.

The composition of the military also needs a reform. The military should not only be ethnically balanced, but should also be professionalised. Government should separate itself from unnecessary interference, while retaining control of the military. Promotion and other issues relating to the military should be dealt with according to the military code of conduct and procedures. Adequate training should be provided to the military on civil-military relationships, on the role of the military in the defence of the state against internal and external aggressions, and on helping the state to promote stability to nurture democratic governance. Ensuring the depoliticisation and professionalisation of the military is needed to promote security reform in a post-conflict country like Liberia.

Another security policy option to be pursued by the current government is to strengthen internal security which can contain resistance movements and rebel groups from uprising. There are two ways of doing that. One would be to indigenise security in the various communities, which would give local people ownership and power to control and defend their lives. This would require government supporting local communities to train local militias, vigilantes, community watchdog groups and community self-policing groups to augment the work of police and the national army. This would enable local communities to take the responsibility for protecting their lives and property. However, the danger with this policy option is that this power may be misused. Some of these groups may later turn into armed rebels aiming to destabilise the state. The other way is rather to create security desk offices in the various communities and appoint security officers to monitor early warning signals. Early warning is 'information that provides a timely alert to potential conflicts' (Rupesinghe and Kuroda 1992:217). These officers will then collaborate with chiefs and community leaders to set up intelligence security committees to monitor early warning signals about conflict or simmering tensions. It will also involve security officers collaborating with civil society organisations such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who work with people at grassroots level and know their concerns and problems. Also, collaborating with religious groups and local networks will be strategically successful in gathering information about existing tensions in the various communities. This will enable security officers to report early warning signals to the government, so it can act decisively on the information to prevent the upsurge and escalation of conflict. Some of the early warning signals to be monitored might be ethnic grievances, information on the possession of small and light weapons by some groups in the community, increased use of protests and demonstrations, citizens' dissatisfaction with government works, complaints of unemployment and the politics of exclusion in the distribution of resources and government appointment. The use of such collaborative monitoring and intelligence gathering on the above issues, coupled with prompt government responses to early warning signals, might prevent internal conflict from arising.

Closely related to national security, is the need to have a regionalised collaboration of police and customs officers to regulate the movement of SALWs. Given the porosity of borders within member states of ECOWAS, a threat to one member state is a threat to others. The member states of ECOWAS in its Preamble rightly admit that the community 'cannot attain its objectives save in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding'.[2] The threats to national security posed by the proliferation of small and light weapons cannot be overemphasised. As Ero and Ndinga-Muvumba (2004:227) rightly argue, 'an estimated seven million weapons are circulating in West Africa … Efforts at comprehensive disarmament and weapons collection together with initiatives to reintegrate former combatants into local communities can both be undermined by the ready availability of small arms and light weapons'. Thus, given the spill-over of conflicts and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the West African sub-region, a threat to security of a member state is a threat to all. The maintenance of security becomes crucial if there is to be stability. There is a need for regionalised implementation of the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons which was adopted in Abuja, Nigeria, on 31 October 1998. Its purpose is to curb the proliferation of small arms and light weapons by encouraging collaboration and cooperation among national intelligence services, police and customs officers to control the movement of small arms. Regional stability is contingent on the need to reinforce security along the borders of member states to prevent the passage of unauthorised persons or armed groups.

A long-term development approach

As argued earlier, the literature on post-conflict development/peacebuilding has been concerned with humanitarian assistance in the form of the provision of food, clothing, shelter and medicine by humanitarian relief agencies. It has emphasised, as a short-term development goal, the provision of temporary shelter, and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of refugees, internally displaced persons and child soldiers. These approaches have not been able to guarantee a durable peace. There is, therefore, a need to go beyond

2 See the ECOWAS Preamble

a short-term development goal to a long-term developmental goal, aimed at addressing illiteracy, poverty, underdevelopment and regional inequalities.

Reintegration in the context of post-conflict development involves two aspects: social reintegration and economic reintegration. The social aspect of reintegration involves healing the wounds of victims occasioned by past human rights abuses. Thus, the social aspects of reintegration will require the Government of Liberia to use the reconciliation process and to encourage religious bodies to address issues with regard to the acceptance of ex-combatants into their communities. This involves persuading offenders to admit to their crimes through the hearings of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and for the victims to forgive them for their misdeeds. An alternative would be for the state to institute a retributive justice system in which perpetrators are prosecuted for crimes committed during the civil war. The current government has thus far adopted a reconciliation process. It has also adopted a retributive system for some officials in that Charles Taylor is currently being tried by the International Court of Justice in The Hague for his alleged involvement in crimes against humanity.

On the economic aspects of reintegration, the state needs to provide compensation for those whose properties were confiscated, or who lost relatives. These have been the traditional approaches to reintegration. Though these are necessary, they have been short-lived. I argue that there is a need to pursue a combination of a short- and a long-term development approach that aims simultaneously to address security and development. Because most conflicts exploit short-term dissatisfaction among the populace to initiate conflict, it is imperative for the state to provide short-term jobs or the means of livelihood to all Liberians. However, a long-term development plan is needed to promote sustainable peace and socio-economic development. This can be reached through investment in education by building schools to enable Liberians and ex-combatants to acquire new skills and fully engage in economic activity. Simply forbidding the use of arms does not provide livelihood, and can lead to a return of conflict. Thus, policies are required to promote human security which encompasses survival and the provision of jobs, health care and education. These are the key issues to be addressed by the government that can in the long run address illiteracy, unemployment, poverty and vulnerabilities. This means that peacebuilding is

a long-term process that requires a developmental approach linking security to development. The reintegration of ex-combatants as well as the provision of jobs to Liberians becomes crucial in the country's strides to stability. Post-conflict peacebuilding is a complex, costly and multi-facetted one aimed ultimately at providing security, development and social rehabilitation through institutional transformation, and tackling the root causes of conflict. It needs to address security challenges under which military, DDR, political, social and economic problems are linked.

Development cannot be achieved without security. At the same time, security is not sustainable without development. There is a synergy of development and security. If developmental problems such as poverty, unemployment, regional inequalities, lack of access to health care and education are not addressed in Liberia, the chances for a resumption of conflict are high. Also, if issues such as the professionalism of the military and the domination of the military by one ethnic group are not addressed and the control of SALWs is not done at the borders and internally, the stakes for opportunistic politicians or greedy individuals to hire rebels from other countries to enter the borders and destabilise the stability of the state are also high. There is, therefore, a need to view security and development issues as interwoven and inextricably linked.

National security policy should aim not only at the attainment of state security but also at addressing development issues. This suggests that post-conflict development requires a long-term development approach which, left to the government of Liberia alone, cannot be possible. It demands more time, commitment and financial support. The support of the international community, donors, NGOs, European Union, ECOWAS, philanthropic organisations and the private sector is needed, if Liberia is to undertake meaningful post-conflict development measures.

The success of Sierra Leone's post-conflict reconstruction has shown that where there is the support of the international community, a lot of progress can be achieved. Sierra Leone received much international support, and the role played by Britain, its former colonial master, during and after the war was tremendous. This implies that if the post-conflict reconstruction in Liberia is to succeed it

needs tremendous financial support from the United States (US), since Liberia was founded by American descendants (Americo-Liberians), and has been allied to the US since the Cold War era. It also needs financial support from the international community to help reconstruct the state.

Building national capacities

Liberia has had a functioning government for only five years now. It is still in the post-war reconstruction stage, and capacity building is required to address the poor infrastructural state of public institutions, education, justice, the public sector and the health care system. The UNDP defines capacity building as 'the process by which individuals, organizations, institutions and societies develop abilities (individually and collectively) to perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve objectives' (UNDP 1997a:3). Capacity building is providing individuals, institutions and organisations with the technical, regulatory, political, social and economic tools to empower themselves. Capacity building in Liberia will need to take place at the national and local levels. At the national level, there is a need for two levels of capacity building to be put in place: one that empowers and improves the skills, capabilities, and competencies of the people put in place to manage the country (politicians, policymakers and public servants in the various ministries); and, secondly, a system of rules and frameworks to guide them in the implementation and management of the affairs of the country. As such, a key priority of the government should be to focus on building leadership underpinned with managerial skills, public service values and ethics, integrity and encompassing national interest, and also administrative and technical capacities at various levels both in the public and private sectors.

Arguably, measures urgently required are: building a strong public ethics commission, establishing the office of an ethics commissioner to investigate complaints of unfairness, conflict of interest, abuse of office and authority, unethical behaviour of public servants and workers in public institutions, and introducing an ethical model to train public servants in virtue ethics of excellence of character and of duty and obligations. Workshops and training must focus on ethical standards, a code of conduct for public officials, and duties and obligations required of public servants and leaders, especially politicians,

to fulfil their obligations of the state-citizenship contract. In addition, building strong audit institutions to promote transparency and accountability, and a new leadership underpinned with ethics and managerial skills are urgently required to address the massive levels of corruption which led to the prolonged war and the execution of past presidents in Liberia. A key capacity-building effort will be required to strengthen the General Auditing Commission (GAC) of Liberia established in 2005, by recruiting staff with integrity and solid experience and understanding of audit practice. That would increase the independence of the office of the Auditor-General, and enable it to produce quality audits of the country's public institutions and promote accountability and transparency. The 2005 Amendment makes the office of the Auditor-General independent and removes it from reporting to the president of the national legislature. The newly recruited staff needs to be trained in forensic auditing and forensic accounting. Already the GAC has 'a 33 member Forensic Department that has produced 12 quality high profile forensic audits' (Morlu 2010:5), and it should continue in that direction.

In addition, public institutions and ministries need to provide periodic reports such as annual Reports on Plans and Priorities (RPPs) in which strategic outcomes and expected results are linked to resource requirements. Each department should produce Departmental Performance Reports (DPPs) on their achievements related to the commitments set out in their RPPs for feedback by the Public Service Commission, which will then report back to each department about its strengths and weaknesses and suggest areas for improvement. This will promote real management for accountability and actual results for money. The GAC needs to submit its reports and findings to the Public Accounts Committee of the Liberian National Legislature so that those implicated will be brought to the committee for further hearing and action. Strengthening the auditing institutions is needed to put in place proper systems and internal controls to prevent or limit fraud, financial misappropriation, waste and abuse of public resources, and other forms of corruption. This will promote transparency, accountability and the people's trust in the government and confidence in public institutions, which, in turn, will address the democratic deficit and enhance the legitimacy of the government. In addition, the capacity and independence of

the judiciary needs to be strengthened to enable it to enforce the rule of law, promote human rights, protect contracts and property rights, and to prosecute officials of those implicated in the Auditor-General Report and referred to it by the Public Account Committees for engaging in corruption with impartiality and without fear or favour.

Building local capacities

Building local capacities to participate in policy formulation, implementation and evaluation is vital if Liberia is to attain socio-economic development and sustainable peace. Building local capacity and ownership will engineer sustainable peace and enhance democratisation and the rule of law in a post-conflict society. The best guarantee of stability is to ensure that people do not only have the capacity to govern themselves, but also have control of the structures put in place to govern. Therefore, strengthening local capability through training and the development of skills to analyse government and local budgets, manage and implement policies, and monitor and evaluate government's programmes and projects is urgently required to enable Liberians to participate in the development process.

It also requires decentralising political, administrative and financial structures to enable local communities to administer their own localities, generate revenues to undertake development, and link local development plans into the national development plan. Given that each community is unique and has its own developmental needs and priorities, it is imperative that they should decide about their own development policies and participate in the decision-making process. Building their capacities thus involves leadership training, technical capacities to analyse budgets and knowledge about the policy processes and institutions of governance. Thus, there is a need for the state and development partners in Liberia to invest in equipping local leadership with institutional and technical capacities to participate in the development process.

Conclusion

This article has examined the causes of the Liberian Civil War of 1989–2003 and the policy alternatives that are now available in the country's transitional period to ensure a durable peace and development. It argues that the root cause of the civil war in Liberia was a crisis of governance. By crisis of governance is meant an arbitrary exercise of power (without due regard to the rule of law), authoritarianism, abuses of human rights, the politics of exclusion, the politicisation of the military, inequitable distribution of resources, ethnic discrimination and the suppression of the right to dissent.

It also means the maintenance of the spoils system, a system whereby the ruling government gives government jobs to party supporters as a reward for winning power, and as incentive to keep them in power. This leads to the marginalisation of certain ethnic groups, regions of poverty and inequalities that gradually lead to discontent, revolt and violent conflict. This is what took place during the regimes of Samuel Doe (1980–1989) and Charles Taylor (1990–1999). The case of Liberia, as of many countries in Africa, illustrates the view of Stedman (1991:393) that 'a yawning gap lies in the normative theory of how governments in Africa should act and the explanatory theory of how governments in Africa do act'. This means that the principles of the rule of law, accountability, transparency, independence of the judiciary, press freedom, a robust civil society and a fair distribution of resources, which are the normative principles of democracy, are undermined. As a result, it has led to civil war and the negation of peace and development in Liberia. In this light, there is a need to recognise that democratic consolidation is conditioned by a number of factors (Ayoob 1995:181) as identified by De Nevers (1993:31–32): 'the speed with which ethnic issues are recognized; the level of ethnic tension when the democratization process begins; the size and power of different ethnic groups within the state; the ethnic composition of the previous regime and its opposition; the political positions of the leaders of the main ethnic groups; the presence or absence of external ethnic allies; and the ethnic composition of the military'.

The article makes the case that good governance is the key to addressing the root causes of conflict and to maintaining sustainable peace in Liberia. It

argues for responsible governance that is participatory, inclusive of ethnic groups, accountable, transparent, and supportive of democratic principles as the equitable distribution of resources and the pursuit of the rule of law. It is also imperative that the state builds strong institutions to strengthen security. These security policies should go beyond mere DDR and include economic reintegration, adoption of a strong national security policy and a regionalised collaboration between police and customs officers to control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

More importantly, post-conflict development is more than the temporary cessation of violence, the provision of humanitarian relief and the holding of early elections to enable the exit of peacekeepers and the international community. It is a long-term developmental approach, which requires time and the financial support of the international community and regional actors, to help Liberia undertake the necessary infrastructural reconstruction and the provision of jobs to maintain peace and stability. Thus one cannot but agree with Roger Miller (1992:16) that security and development are so tightly linked that policy makers should move beyond the artificial separation between 'conflict as belonging to the field of security and development as the domain of economics'. There is no denying the fact that enhanced development will promote security. Conversely, the lack of development will trigger insecurity. The policy implication is that security and development are so intertwined that Liberia, like any post-conflict country, should pursue both policies in tandem, if it is to replace conflict through a sustainable peace and prosperous development. It also implies that development policies and programmes should benefit not only the rich but also the poor. It is important that the four pillars of the Liberian Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper launched in 2007, namely (i) Security; (ii) Economic Revitalisation; (iii) Governance and the Rule of Law; and (iv) Infrastructure and Basic Services (Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2008), are vigorously implemented. In particular, the revitalisation of the economy and the provision of infrastructure and basic services need to be implemented to address sanitation and water issues, agriculture and food security and engineer livelihood empowerment for the poor at the rural level.

Though some of the policy recommendations outlined in this paper are being pursued and implemented by the current government of Liberia, they are not fully integrated into a cohesive comprehensive policy or document. Again, the capacity to implement them is limited and so we need to understand and be reminded that policy development and implementation of policy matter. The current government has been able to pursue DDR policies, which are part of the security reforms. What is left to do is to improve the way in which the military is constituted and professionalised. The Ellen Johnson Sirleaf government has also strengthened relations with member states of ECOWAS and relationships with the West, in particular, the United States of America. The President has, therefore, gained international support in her efforts to reconstruct the state.

President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has also declared 'zero tolerance' for corruption in line with the good governance approach, and established a Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) to oversee the economic and political affairs of the state. The main components of the GEMAP include (i) financial management and accountability, (ii) improving budgeting and expenditure management, (iii) improving practices of procurement and granting concessions, (iv) establishing effective processes to control corruption, (v) supporting key institutions, and (vi) capacity building.[3] However, there is a lack of an integrative security and development framework aimed at addressing underdevelopment, expanding infrastructure, building educational, justice and health systems, and building both national and local capacities to enable Liberians to channel their energies and destinies toward the development of the country. Quite frankly, the relative peace currently existing in the country is fragile. It is only guaranteed by the presence of '8,000 soldiers and over 1,000 international police patrolling the country' (Niebel 2011:1). Going forward, the extent to which the Ellen Johnson Sirleaf government is able to address the capacity building hurdles, move beyond pork-barrel politics and political patronage and mobilise Liberians to transfer their ethnic allegiance to the state is key to political stability, peace and development. This is realisable only if the four policy options are pursued and well implemented. If they are not, then Liberia will return to conflict.

3 For a detailed description of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), see <www.GEMAPliberia.org>

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Book Reviews

Conflict resolution in the 21st century: Principles, methods and approaches

Bercovitch, Jacob and Richard Jackson 2009

Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press 2009, 226 pages

ISBN 9780472050628

Reviewed by Tamara J. Kirkwood

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In this book, Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, two internationally recognised experts, undertake the systematic evaluation of traditional and modern principles, methods and approaches to conflict resolution. The authors argue that, in the current context of post-Cold War relations, terrorism and intra-state conflict, the 'toolkit' used for conflict resolution needs to be vastly expanded and improved to include tools from a range of related disciplines in order to successfully address and deal with conflict in the 21st century.

The book is structured into two parts: The Principles and Traditional Approaches, and 21st Century Methods and Approaches. In this way the authors cleverly juxtapose the 'old' against the 'new' in a simple and clear way as they organise relevant subjects into chapters that enable them to systematically examine each tool either 'traditional' or 'new'. These tools are then clearly defined and their purposes and means described in relation to what and where each tool is likely to be most effective and useful for conflict resolution in the 21st century. In examining the 'traditional', the authors cover issues related to negotiation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication, law, the United Nations system, and traditional Peacekeeping issues. These subjects are all described and evaluated for their pragmatic value within the current context of conflicts, and thus the major questions and dilemmas typically raised, for example in debating the United Nations system and its efficacy, are addressed in order to add value to the 21st century toolbox for conflict resolution.

The second part analyses the more current tools that are applicable in the practice of conflict resolution today, such as preventive diplomacy, non-official diplomacy, humanitarian intervention, core issues in justice and reconciliation, and the practice of peacebuilding within the milieu of the nexus between security and development practice. In their examination of these subjects, the authors repeatedly ensure conceptual clarity with reference to the primary literature as well as defining competing schools of thought in a very scholar-friendly manner.

This book therefore brings a wealth of information into the field of conflict resolution (as a discipline in its own right), and enables the reader an opportunity to clearly see the cross-cutting nature of the tools that are needed to undertake the resolution of conflicts today. The authors effectively build their case for what conflict resolution methodologies do, and should look like, as the nature of conflict changes and requires the responses to it to be more dynamic and relevant given the changing global environment. Bercovitch and Jackson's analysis shows why and how a 21st century Conflict Resolution toolkit must therefore include tools related to preventive diplomacy, humanitarian intervention, regional task-sharing, and truth

commissions. This book contributes to the discipline of Conflict Resolution today as it is enriched by further conceptual clarity and understanding about the possibilities of the 'practice' and pragmatic application of the various tools in the kit.

Conflict resolution in the 21st century is very readable, authoritative and astoundingly broad and deep in its content and analysis. This book would be a valuable reference point for scholars, undergraduate students and general readers interested in conflict resolution, and would therefore be well placed as a prescribed introductory textbook in learning institutions. Bercovitch and Jackson offer the readers a very impressive overview of Conflict resolution principles, methods and approaches as they develop into the 21st century within the changing landscape of conflict.

Crafting an African security architecture: Addressing regional peace and conflict in the 21st century

Hany Besada ed. 2010

The International Political Economy of New Regionalism Series

Farnham, Surrey, Ashgate 222 pages.

ISBN: 978-1-4094-0325-8

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Comprising twelve chapters on eclectically chosen topics ranging from Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), Security sector reform (SSR), and Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, this book combines geo-political expertise of the North and the South in an analysis of peace and security challenges facing the African continent. The book provides valuable reading for policy makers, scholars,

and researchers in international relations, political science, peace and security studies as well as conflict resolution. The book assesses African regional security institutions and mechanisms for peace. First, it explores the nature of conflicts in Africa and underscores the observation, common in current literature, about the prevalence and proliferation of intra-state conflicts in Africa since the end of the Cold War in 1989. Second, the book also examines the root causes of conflicts in Africa including poverty, underdevelopment, weak states and crises of governance.

Chapter 1, by Besada, Goertz and Werner, launches into the debate about the Responsibility to Protect by providing a background to the emergence of the concept, and by discussing how African regional organisations are best suited to intervene in conflicts in the continent since they are bound to be more affected security-wise if they do not intervene. The authors credit African regional organisations for possessing knowledge of the local terrain and political dynamics, and of the challenges inherent in selling the concept to national governments and regional organisations. According to the authors, the scepticism that characterises the South's perception of R2P was mainly caused by the way it was introduced in a top-down manner. Although the authors aptly problematise the concept of R2P, they conclude rather loftily that the human security concept is not a good analytical framework for conceptualising R2P. They argue for a better framework that comprises 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' (p. 10). What this means in reality, however, is far from clear.

In Chapter 2, Schmidt compares the European Union (EU) and African Union (AU) approaches to integration, using integration theory as a theoretical framework. In highlighting the strengthening role of the AU, the author unpacks but dismisses the concept of 'the United States of Africa', arguing that the continent is characterised by autocracies, pseudo-democracies and failed states, a reality which differs significantly from the European Union's 'club of democracies' (p. 25). Although Schmidt acknowledges that the AU is an 'unprecedented experiment', which has made great progress in the peace and security realm, he also underscores that 'the AU is largely an elite project that lacks broad participation' (p. 15). He reaches this conclusion from

observations of some of the AU's institutions of peace and security, including the Assembly of the African Union, the Pan African Parliament (PAP), and the African Union Commission (AUC), which he labels as 'ambivalent'. However, one weakness in this analysis is that the actual differences between the AU and EU are not illustrated well.

Chapter 3, by Cilliers, provides an overview of the African peace and security architecture (APSA), focusing on the root causes of the conflicts and the milestones that the African Union has accomplished in institutionalising peace and security. The author attempts to understand why many armed conflicts in the 21st century are taking place in Africa (although he also acknowledges a reduction in the number of violent conflicts in Africa). He employs an economic perspective, and identifies poverty and underdevelopment as key to the prevalence of conflict and instability in the region, apart from the structural weakness of the African state. Case studies of Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia and Zimbabwe are presented as examples of the failure of the state and its linkage with instability. However, on a positive note, Cilliers observes greater involvement by African leaders in fostering peace and security through peacemaking and peacekeeping initiatives in the continent, as evidenced by the work of institutions such as the AU Peace and Security Council, the AU Panel of the Wise and the evolving AU Standby Force. However, Cilliers singles out particular case studies of Kenya and Zimbabwe as instances where African institutions were not as forthcoming, concerted and vociferous in supporting the will of the people in the event of conflict-ridden elections (p. 43).

In Chapter 4, Ebo and Powel discuss the concept of security sector reform (SSR), and call for multilateralism of the people to drive the agenda instead of multilateralism of the states. They also discuss the shift from state-centric and territorial security towards notions of human security which include economic, political and environmental security of all citizens. They highlight the changing nature of SSR – towards more emphasis on poverty reduction, good governance, civil-military relations and increased confidence in state security institutions. Essentially, this chapter draws attention to the need for non-state actors to play prominent roles in SSR programmes, hence

the notions of local ownership and broad-based participation. The authors further analyse the normative frameworks for SSR within the African Union and the United Nations, including the AU's 2007 Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), which underscores the AU's regional approach to SSR and the United Nations' broad conception of SSR as outlined in the Millennium Development Declaration and the 2008 Report of the Secretary-General on SSR, among other documents. Despite observing the wealth of supportive documents on the subject of security, the authors in this chapter are also critical of both the AU and the UN's ad hoc approaches to SSR, limited finances, the challenges of multilateral bureaucracy as well as limited capacities within the institutions' various departments to coordinate the SSR agenda.

Chapter 5, by Gaenzle and Grimm, analyses the geo-strategic importance of Africa to the North, Far East and Middle East, which has led to the renewed interest in and support for the continent's peace and security architecture. Several factors that make Africa a subject of foreign intervention such as the allure of the continent's natural resources and the African population's role as a market for foreign goods, are taken into account. The chapter focuses on bilateral and multilateral forms of support that have been rendered to APSA, including the European Union's increasing role in supporting peace and security initiatives via regional organisations and nation states. The authors also outline a number of key initiatives for peace and security that have been launched by Africans themselves as well as through partnerships with donors. However, the authors are cautious of the conditionalities that often accompany such forms of support, including the westernised models and prescriptions for peace and security that might not always meet the approval of African leaders. In addition, the authors explore the historical legacies of colonialism on the current EU-Africa partnerships in peace and security. The chapter is well written, although it paints quite a pessimistic picture of Africa, given the usage of phrases such as the 'dark continent,' or 'lost continent' (p. 73)

In Chapter 6, Siebert focuses on one of the most under-discussed regional economic communities, namely the Intergovernmental Authority on

Development (IGAD) and its role in the Somalia and Sudan conflicts. He defines R2P and highlights the concept's characteristics or principles, concluding that it is a broad, all-encompassing, multidimensional doctrine that can be utilised and interpreted in various ways (p. 91). Siebert is sceptical about the effectiveness of IGAD, arguing that it is one of the weakest links in the African peace and security architecture. He explains that Sudan is one major hindrance to IGAD's embracing of R2P given the country's vociferous opposition to interference in matters of state sovereignty. He also observes that despite the lack of explicit mention of R2P in IGAD documents, there have been moves towards affirmation of R2P principles by IGAD, as a result of concerted advocacy by civil society in the Horn of Africa. The chapter is well written and presents a precise analysis of the challenges of implementing R2P in a region ridden by conflict and competing interests of member states.

Chapter 7, by Curtis and Nibigirwe, looks at UN-AU cooperation in peacekeeping – using the transition of the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) to the United Nations Mission in Burundi (ONUB) as a case study. The authors hail praises at AMIB, which was deployed in April 2003, as the first case of African peacekeeping which came at a time when international political will towards peacekeeping in Africa was scarce. The chapter is one of the optimistic segments of the book, which acknowledges the role of African peacekeeping missions in setting the tone and context for subsequent UN peacekeeping involvement in the continent. Despite the authors' optimism about AMIB being an epitome of African readiness to conduct peacekeeping in the context of UN's unwillingness and inability, the chapter is cognisant of the challenges of an under-funded and under-capacitated peacekeeping mission, as AMIB was. The authors recount how in May 2004, AMIB was replaced by the United Nations Mission in Burundi (ONUB) and conclude that collaboration of the UN and the AU in Burundi witnessed improvements in coordination and delivery. Overall, this chapter draws our attention to the onerous yet possible task of evaluating success in peacekeeping missions. Finally, the authors satisfactorily highlight the several indicators of success which include maintenance of security, facilitation of the peace process,

enabling of post-conflict reconstruction as well as providing opportunities to transform violence into peace.

Chapter 8, by Mahmoud, focuses on the triadic partnership between the African Union, the United Nations and the South African facilitation team during the peace process in Burundi. The goal of this chapter is clear – to demonstrate how integrated peace processes can have more far-reaching results as each actor brings a unique vantage point into the process. The author emphasises the utmost importance of South Africa's contributions in facilitating first the peace process and later the Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) activities. He highlights the transformations that have been recorded in Burundi since the involvement of the UN, AU and South Africa in various aspects of the peace process, but also acknowledges the fragility of the peace. Currently, Burundi is undergoing post-conflict recovery with the UN Peacebuilding Fund playing a prominent role, and South Africa continuing its facilitation role in Burundi's peace implementation phase.

In chapter 9, Jaye and Pokoo underscore the role of Disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) and SSR in preventing the resurgence of armed conflict in Liberia. The authors argue that threats to security emerge when there are disaffected populations in a country who have access to small arms, and hence they emphasise the imperative for proper DDRR exercises. The chapter analyses the DDRR and SSR processes in Liberia (November 1994 to April 1996 and December 2003 to October 2004), arguing that although the latter process faced incredible challenges of coordination and funding, it has managed to bring relative peace to Liberia. The authors argue that the first DDRR exercise was largely a failure as evidenced by the resurgence of war between forces loyal to Charles Taylor and those loyal to Prince Johnson. They further posit that the second DDRR and SSR process for Liberia has relatively succeeded because the government, the UN and civil society took corrective measures to address challenges faced in the first exercise. With regard to the ongoing SSR processes in Liberia, they discuss the legal and political aspects as well as the specific technical processes involved. They are however critical of the SSR

processes, and particularly the lack of ownership as well as the politicisation of the process due to the need to appease different factions. This chapter provides a good description of how the DDRR and SSR processes in Liberia were implemented, but falls short of making a substantive assessment of the impact of these initiatives. Perhaps, this is not a problem peculiar to this chapter but to several other scholars and researchers wishing to evaluate the impact of highly technical, sensitive and political programmes such as SSR and DDR.

Chapter 10, by Kajee, begins by clarifying the differences between the North Sudan-South Sudan conflict and the North Sudan-Darfur conflict. The author goes to great lengths to contextualise and de-ethnicise the Darfur conflict, dismissing the label of 'state-sponsored genocide' (p. 160) and arguing instead that the war in Darfur represents a 'scorched earth type counter-insurgency aimed at suppressing various armed rebels in the region' (p. 160). Nonetheless, the chapter also analyses some of the contributing factors to the conflict, including marginalisation of the periphery (Darfur), instrumentalisation of tribal conflict by political elites as well as the geo-political and resource significance of Darfur for external players. The Responsibility to Protect theme comes in towards the end of the chapter when the author argues that the international community abrogated its responsibility to protect Darfurians from 2003 to 2005 because of a weakly mandated peacekeeping mission. The author criticises the earlier peacekeeping intervention in Darfur, specifically the African Union Missions in Sudan (AMIS I and II) for their weak mandates, inadequate resources and small stature which contributed to fatalities of the peacekeeping mission and failure to achieve set objectives. The author seems to be more persuaded by the performance of the joint mission, namely the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) whose mission was 'far more robust than that of AMIS' (p. 170). Despite this positive perception of UNAMID, the author raises a number of logistical and political challenges that faced the peacekeeping mission, some of which were peculiar to its hybrid nature, e.g. challenges of coordination, a weak civilian affairs department as well as the politics of deployment. Towards the end of the

chapter, the author criticises the International Criminal Court indictment of President Al-Bashir over war crimes in Darfur, arguing that this was wrongly timed and might even hinder sustainable peace in Darfur.

In Chapter 11, Franke analyses the background to the creation of the African Standby Force (ASF) and the normative framework guiding this formation. The chapter discusses what the ASF is envisaged to look like in terms of structure, composition and operation. The ASF, in essence, is an attempt to link the African Union, regional organisations and member states in the assembly of a pan-African peacekeeping force. While one gains an understanding of what the ASF is envisaged to be, this chapter is somewhat dry as it merely 'spells-out' aspects of the ASF. Nonetheless, towards the end of the chapter, the author gives a critical and substantive analysis of what it means to have a standby force by comparing the ASF to regional brigades such as IGAD's East Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) and the Economic Community for West African States' Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), among others. The author concludes that when it comes to regional efforts towards implementing the ASF agenda, the East African and West African regions score highly. Despite milestone achievements, however, the author is aware of the blight of conflict in the Horn of Africa and the Mano River Region. The chapter also analyses the progress made by SADC in its efforts towards establishing the SADC Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG), but is sceptical in the light of challenges this force has to face. Overall, Franke is satisfied with the progress that has been made with regional standby forces, which are ahead of the African Union's operationalisation of the ASF. He did not articulate, however, why it has been easier for sub-regions to establish standby forces than for the African Union.

In Chapter 12, Hammer focuses on how accountability for peace, governance and security can be fostered in the context of globalisation. He acknowledges the contradictory and double-edged impact of globalisation on political, economic and social life, and cites examples of robust regional organisations that are increasingly playing a role in conflict resolution among their member states. The author discusses the challenges of implementing the doctrine of R2P in cases where the state is unwilling to protect its citizens from human

rights abuses and political abuses, and subsequently points towards the inaction by the international community in conflicts such as Chad, Darfur, Myanmar and Zimbabwe. While Hammer demonstrates that he is a strong proponent of global accountability, he is also aware of the limits of the global governance machinery, especially with regard to ownership of global problems, exclusion of certain voices from the global public sphere, and imbalances that exist between donors and recipients in the global village. Hammer concludes that the trend has been set for promoting accountability at the global level, but challenges regional and international organisations to move beyond fragmented and ad hoc approaches to resolving peace and security problems. The author outlines a series of recommendations targeted at regional and global institutions to ensure that they incorporate public accountability in the delivery of their mandates.

As a whole, this book promotes understanding the transition of the African peace and security architecture and the opportunities for strengthening prevention, resolution and transformation of conflict. The common thread running through the broad range of topics is peace and security in the African continent. It is difficult, however, to identify an overall conclusion of the arguments presented in the 12 chapters. While candidness should be encouraged in analysing Africa's 21st century challenges, the book may be regarded as another example of 'Afro-pessimism' because of the manner in which it reiterates the ineffectiveness of the African peace and security architecture – as a result of the AU's limited capacity, the shortage of resources and the lack of political will. It should be added, however, that the book does share reasons for optimism, as for instance, the increasingly concerted role of regional organisations in institutionalising peace and security in their doctrines, normative frameworks and institutions. While the current developments in North Africa, West Africa and the Horn of Africa may point towards the ineffectiveness and inaction of the African Union, this does not prevent observations of a more robust peace and security architecture which is emerging in the continent.