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The OSSREA Executive Committee Meets

The first regular meeting, for the year 2007, of the OSSREA Executive Committee was held from 14th to 16th May 2007 at the Utalii Hotel, Nairobi, Kenya. At the meeting the Executive Secretary presented a report on activities of the Organisation and the committee discussed a range of policy issues.



OSSREA Executive Committee Members

OSSREA Liaison Officers Meet

The OSSREA Liaison Officers' Summit was held in Nairobi, Utalii Hotel. The meeting was held from 17 – 18 May 2007. All OSSREA Executive Committee members, except Prof Linda E.R. De Vries, attended this assembly. The OSSREA Executive President Prof. Rosalia S. Katapa presided over this meeting.

The deliberations focused on three main items:

- certifying the minutes of the 2006 Liaison Officers' meeting;

- discussion of comprehensive country reports for 2006; and
- planning the way forward.

In this summit, Dr Alfred G Nhema, the Executive Secretary, made the first welcoming address in which he reported on the major activities carried out since the previous meeting of the Liaison Officers was held in April 2006. He said that the secretariat had prepared Human Resource Policy and Procedures, and Financial Policy and Procedures Manuals, which had been subsequently reviewed and approved by the OSSREA Executive Committee. These two manuals have been in operation since January 2007. He also briefed the participants on what have been implemented by the various grants and fellowships programmes and capacity building training in the areas of Social Science Research Methodology and Gender. In reference to seminars and workshops, he reported that OSSREA had organised a major international conference on 'The Social Sciences and HIV/AIDS in Africa: New Insights and Policy Perspectives.' OSSREA also organised workshops in the areas of conflict prevention and management with the African Union as well as jointly organising a Research Capacity Building Workshop on 'Developing Peace Research Skills in Africa' with United Nations University for Peace (UPEACE). This Training Workshop was held from 23 to 27 April in Addis Ababa.

Dr Nhema reiterated that the direction set by the Executive Committee was that the Chapters should focus on publishing their research and workshop outputs as this is the only way to demonstrate the relevance of OSSREA to the academic, research and policy stake-holders in the two sub-regions. Following this, the Executive Secretary invited Prof. Katapa to officially open the Meeting.

In her opening speech, Prof. Katapa reviewed what had transpired in the previous meeting of the Liaison

Officers and the subsequent actions taken by the Executive Committee and OSSREA Management. She underscored the fact that all members and stakeholders of OSSREA should have the interest of OSSREA at heart. She ended her speech by expressing her expectations of fruitful discussions on activities of OSSREA chapters and wished the participants a comfortable stay at Utalii Hotel.

Following the opening speech of Prof. Katapa, an open discussion followed and the Liaison Officers raised various questions for which the members of the Executive Committee provided answers and detailed explanations. After this general discussion, the Liaison Officers held a separate session to enhance horizontal intercourse and augment experience sharing. Later another plenary session resumed the discussion based on the issues raised in the Liaison Officers' session.

On its final day of deliberation, the summit first discussed the comprehensive country reports on 2006 activities. These reports covered the major activities carried out in 2006, activities not carried out, the reasons for not undertaking those activities, the major problems encountered during this planning period, the solutions adopted and the implications for 2007 action plan. After discussing the country reports, the summit approved the Minutes of the 2006 Meeting with some corrections and made main conclusions that emerged from the two days discussions. Following this, Prof. Katapa, President of OSSREA, made the synopsis of the issues pertaining to the way forward, which emphasized, focus on publication, enhancing transparency, consolidating governance structure of OSSREA, streamlining and systematization of the Liaison Officers-Secretariat communication and the upcoming OSSREA Evaluation. Then, Prof. Jotham Momba, OSSREA Vice President, delivered closing remarks. In his remarks, he thanked the participants for their active participation. Finally,

the Liaison Officers passed a motion of unreserved support through their representative Dr De Wet Schutte expressing support for support of the Executive Committee's endeavour in fostering a secure future for OSSREA, which everyone shares.

The following participants attended the summit:

1	Prof. Rosalia S. Katapa	President, OSSREA Executive Committee
2	Dr. Kassahun Berhanu	Resident Vice President
3	Prof. Jotham Momba	Vice President
4	Dr. Alfred G. Nhema	Executive Secretary, OSSREA
5	Dr Idris El Hassan	Executive Committee Member
6	Dr. Grephas Opata	Executive Committee Member
7	Dr Mafela Lily	Executive Committee Member
8	Dr. Godisang Mookodi	Liaison Officer, Botswana Chapter
9	Prof. Abbebe Kifleyesus	Liaison Officer, Eritrea Chapter
10	Prof. Habtamu Wondimu	Liaison Officer, Ethiopia Chapter
11	Dr. Fred Ogola	Representing Kenya Chapter
12	Dr. Tumelo Tsikoane	Liaison Officer, Lesotho Chapter
13	Dr Alister Munthali	Representing Malawi Chapter
14	Dr. Roukaya Kasenally	Liaison Officer, Mauritius Chapter
15	Assoc. Prof. Benigna Zimba	Liaison Officer, Mozambique Chapter
16	Dr Tapera O. Chirawu	Liaison Officer, Namibia Chapter
17	Dr. Herman Musahara	Liaison Officer, Rwanda Chapter
18	Dr De Wet Schutte	Representing South Africa Chapter
19	Dr Munzoul A.M Assal	Liaison Officer, Sudan Chapter
20	Dr Adalgot A. Komba	Representing Tanzania Chapter
21	Dr Mwambia D. Kalabula	Liaison Officer, Zambia Chapter
22	Dr France Maphosa	Liaison Officer, Zimbabwe Chapter



Participants of OSSREA Liaison Officers' Meeting

Consultative Meeting with Civil Society Organisations on the African Union's Decision and Policy on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development

Introduction

The African Union Peace and Security Department (PSD) hosted a Consultative Meeting with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on the African Union's decision and policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) on 12-13 March 2007 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The meeting was convened to discuss the role of civil society organisations in the operationalisation of the Banjul decision adopting the African Union's PCRD policy.

Convened by the AU Commission, the Consultative Meeting was co-hosted by the Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA) and supported by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Participants included members of

various departments within the AU Commission and representatives from multi-lateral agencies and civil society organisations throughout the continent. (For list of participants, see Annex 1).

Participants exchanged views on the Banjul Decision, and then discussed the challenges facing CSOs in post-conflict countries and the opportunities for civil society involvement in post-conflict reconstruction and development. The objective of the Consultative Meeting was to provide an opportunity for civil society groups to input into the AU Commission's plan for the implementation of the AU Policy on PCRD, in particular with regard to the role of civil society; and to contribute to the development of the agenda for a larger consultation on the implementation of the PCRD policy with the AU, Member States, the private sector, CSOs and other stakeholders, to be held in July 2007.

Recommendations made during the meeting will be incorporated into the AU Commission's workplan for the implementation of the PCRD policy and will be incorporated into the development of the agenda for the next consultative meeting on PCRD to be held in Lusaka, Zambia in July 2007.



Participants of the Consultative Meeting with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) at the African Union's Conference

Opening Session

Welcoming remarks were given by Captain Johan Potgieter of the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) of the AU Commission, on behalf of Geoffrey Mugumya, the Director of the Peace and Security Department (PSD) of the Commission. He reminded participants that the goal of the PCRD policy was to ensure sustainable peace and development, highlighted the pivotal role of CSOs in post-conflict countries and underscored the need for the AU to provide strategic leadership of PCRD processes.

Dr. Alfred Nhema, Executive Secretary of OSSREA, also welcomed participants to the meeting. He outlined some of the causes and consequences of conflicts in Africa and stated that by pooling resources, sharing experiences and comparing notes, the CSOs at the consultative workshop would generate important recommendations on how to take PCRD forward in Africa.



Participants in a panel discussion

PANEL I: The African Union's Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy

Dr. Owen Sichone, Head of Research and Publications at OSSREA, was the moderator for the first panel, which examined, "the AU Policy and Decision on PCRD: the Roadmap of implementation".

Dr. Naison Ngoma, Expert on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding at the AU Commission, outlined the process that led to the adoption of the PCRD policy and reminded participants of the objectives of the policy, *inter alia*, to:

1. consolidate peace and prevent relapse of violence;
2. help address the root causes of conflict;
3. encourage and fast-track planning and implementation of reconstruction activities; and
4. enhance complementarities and coordination between and among diverse actors engaged in PCRD processes.

Dr. Ngoma further reminded participants of the six indicative elements of the PCRD policy, which leave room for additional elements according to the specific needs of countries emerging from conflict. These are: security; humanitarian/emergency assistance; political governance and transition; socio-economic reconstruction and development; human rights, justice and reconciliation; and women and gender. The core principles that should underpin all PCRD activities include: African leadership; national and local ownership; inclusiveness, equity and non-discrimination; cooperation and cohesion; and capacity building for sustainability.

Dr. Ngoma outlined the characteristics of "the African battle space", highlighting the prevalence of active and passive conflicts on the continent. The high number of ongoing and recent conflicts, as well as displaced populations, underscores the need for ef-

fective implementation of the PCRD policy. Given this context, the AU Commission has devised a two-track roadmap for operationalisation of the policy. On the strategic/ policy track, key elements include: the creation of an AU Standing Multidimensional Committee (AU SMC) to provide strategic leadership of PCRD processes; the creation of an AU Interdepartmental Taskforce (ITPCRD) within the Commission, which will engage in implementation; the dissemination of the policy throughout the continent as well as to international partners; the development of operational guidelines; and collaboration and coordination with other stakeholders engaged in PCRD processes, including African actors and international agencies such as the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).

On the operational track, key elements include: coordination of African responses to post-conflict situations, including collaboration with regional economic communities (RECs) and CSOs; conducting assessments in post conflict countries, for which a draft template has been developed; the possible establishment of ministerial committees to remain seized with each post-conflict situation; monitoring of performance; communications and advocacy in support of PCRD; and the creation and management of an AU Volunteer programme (AUV). The AU Commission has already commenced work on these activities.

Dr. Monica Juma of SaferAfrica highlighted five key areas for civil society engagement at the strategic level. First, there is a need to frame and clarify PCRD in terms of the emerging continental vision. This involves: a) concretising the strategic concepts in the document such as security sector reform (SSR) or human security, and ensuring that there are appropriate benchmarks and standards for assessing progress in these areas; and b) clarification of what PCRD means for Africa, and attempting to align the vision of international partners with the African vision of PCRD as a long term, transformative process.

Second, Dr. Juma underscored the need to distinguish between political, technical and operational implementation functions. Third, Dr. Juma stressed the need to create synergies between new structures and between new and existing structures and mechanisms, including the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the African Standby Force (ASF) and the various departments of the AU Commission. Fourth, there is a need to utilize existing mechanisms to align ongoing activities on the ground with the policy. Finally, Dr. Juma emphasized the importance of flexibility in responding to the specific needs of countries emerging from conflict.

Additionally, Dr. Juma highlighted some of the challenges facing civil society engagement in PCRD processes. These include: a) the question of the appropriate level of decentralisation of PCRD planning and implementation, in terms of who defines the priorities; b) the need for balance between national, regional, AU, and international mechanisms; and c) the perennial problem of resources for PCRD.

Dr. Befekadu Berhanu, Deputy Regional Representative of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), reminded participants that PCRD is premised on the concept of human security. Dr. Berhanu pointed to a number of advantages of CSOs in post-conflict environments, such as their proximity to people and communities, recognition at grassroots level, ability to organise and mobilise communities, strong understanding of local and regional context, moral leadership, operational experience and technical expertise.

During the discussion that followed, participants raised a number of important issues. Key amongst these was the AU's role in and capacity for implementation of the PCRD policy, with an emphasis on the AU's strategic leadership of PCRD processes and its support for countries emerging from conflict in the international arena. Some of the other issues raised included:

- a. the most appropriate level of engagement (national, regional or continental) for PCRD activities and the need to clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of the AU, the RECs, sub-regional initiatives, national and international actors;
- b. lack of capacity for implementation, at all levels, and how to leverage existing capacity to maximize impact;
- c. the importance of flexibility to address the specific needs of countries emerging from conflict;
- d. the need for political will amongst AU Member States to implement the PCRD policy;
- e. the need to view PCRD within a continuum of mechanisms and activities for conflict prevention, management and resolution, such as the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the African Standby Force (ASF);

Panel II: Integrated Mission Planning

Dr. Sichone was the moderator for the second panel, which examined, "Factoring in the civilian dimension in AU Peacekeeping missions". The presenter was Captain Potgieter and the discussant was Mr. Eustace Chiwombe from the African Civilian Standby Roster for Humanitarian and Peace Support Missions (AFDEM).

Capt. Potgieter explained that, from the perspective of the African Standby Force (ASF), an integrated mission is one whose structure is derived from an in depth understanding of the specific country setting, of the evolving imperatives facing the security, political, humanitarian, and development pillars in that country and of the particular mix of assets and capacities available and/or required to achieve the desired impact. One of the key elements of mission planning is that the role of the military intervention should not be in conflict with or frustrate the long

term objectives of PCRD. Further, the planning should involve all key actors from the early stages, and must include continuous evaluation to ensure flexibility and adaptability to conditions on the ground.

Capt. Potgieter reminded participants that the ASF is made up of five regional brigades, a civilian police component (involving police, gendarmerie, observers and advisors) as well as a civilian component (involving rule of law, civil administration, humanitarian affairs, good governance and other areas of expertise). The ASF planning process, while dependent upon the mandate and strategic objectives of the particular peace support operation, involves political, military, police, rule of law, humanitarian, human rights, gender, legal affairs, public information, civil affairs and other components, which are generally in line with the indicative elements of the PCRD Policy.

Mr Chiwombe highlighted the value of a database of African experts, which would shorten the amount of time required to access the necessary human resources for countries emerging from conflict. Integrated mission planning could identify the required expertise and enable the AU or its partners to commence recruitment, screening, pre-training and placement of expertise on standby.

During the discussion that followed, participants examined a number of issues with regard to the mobilization of human and financial resources in support of PCRD processes generally and the implementation of the Banjul decision adopting the PCRD policy. Some of the key issues discussed included:

- a. The need to align the development of the civilian component of the ASF with the required African expertise for PCRD processes and the AU Volunteers (AUV) programme;
- b. The importance of utilizing and building upon existing rosters and databases, rather than

beginning a new database of African PCRD experts from scratch;

- c. The value in mobilising African (financial and human) resources for PCRD activities, through engagement with the African private sector, harnessing the continent's natural resource wealth and drawing upon the African diaspora;
- d. The role of external actors in triggering and sustaining conflicts in Africa, which needs to be addressed in PCRD processes if they are to succeed in bringing about sustainable peace.

Panel III: The Role of Civil Society in a Post-Conflict Environment

The third panel, which examined "The role of civil society in the implementation of the PCRD Policy and decision", was moderated by Ms. Constance Kunaka of the Women and Gender Directorate at the AU Commission. The panellist was Dr. Juma, and the discussant was Dr. Constantinos Berhe of the African Centre for Humanitarian Action.

Dr. Juma drew participants' attention to paragraph five of the Banjul decision, which, "requests the Commission, in collaboration with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), relevant United Nations (UN) and other institutions and African Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), to take all the necessary steps for the effective implementation of the PCRD Policy Framework". At the strategic level, the steps to be taken by NGOs are aligned to the principles underpinning the PCRD policy.

- a. National and local ownership: the principal objective is to enhance common understanding of a shared vision and to re-engage the population in their own governance, through activities such as civic education;
- b. Inclusiveness, equity and non-discrimination: NGOs have a critical role in terms of protecting

and promoting the rights and needs of vulnerable groups such as women or youth;

- c. Coordination and coherence: this would require clarity in terms of division of roles amongst NGOs and other actors, improved targeting of NGO activities as well as a shift away from the practice of working in silos;
- d. Capacity building for sustainability: this would reduce dependency, lessen the negative impact of future shocks and improve the long-term sustainability of recovery and development.

Dr. Juma also outlined a number of activities to be undertaken by civil society at the national, regional and continental levels (see section on recommendations, below). In addition, she highlighted the role of CSOs in the area of resource mobilisation, where they can engage with and support key international campaigns that affect post-conflict countries, such as debt cancellation. Civil society can also undertake advocacy for: effective financial management structures to avoid wastage of resources; alternative sources of resources for PCRD, such as South-South cooperation; and responsible engagement of the private sector in PCRD processes.

Dr. Berhe highlighted the complexity of PCRD processes and emphasised the need for information and analysis to inform interventions in countries emerging from conflict. He warned participants of the danger that PCRD could become yet another failed development programme in Africa if it is not underpinned by the necessary intellectual base. Research institutes, universities and other civil society actors could provide such a base, while also contributing to the development of rules and institutions in post-conflict settings.

Dr. Berhe raised several key issues that tend to be overlooked in countries emerging from conflict, which would benefit from CSO engagement. These

were: the need to promote the development of sustainable livelihoods; the importance of building entrepreneurial skills amongst communities and establishing the necessary policies and systems to support entrepreneurship; the importance of engaging with all relevant stakeholders and integrating different types of programmes, to maximise impact; and the need to ensure that gender issues are addressed at all stages and levels of PCRD. Dr. Berhe also pointed out that the relative newness of PCRD as an area of expertise meant that there were few examples of best practice for CSOs to emulate.

In the discussion that followed, participants identified a number of issues related to the role of civil society in PCRD processes that deserved further attention. Amongst these were:

- a. The need to clearly define CSOs or NGOs, and to distinguish between local community based organisations and externally based or oriented NGOs. The role of the diaspora, the media and faith-based organisations was also discussed;
- b. The problem of competition for resources and legitimacy amongst NGOs;
- c. The possibility of creating a CSO standby network for deployment to countries emerging from conflict;
- d. The need to build the administrative capacity (including financial management, human resources and strategic planning skills) of CSOs to enable them to participate effectively in PCRD processes. The problem of retaining capacity was also raised; and
- e. The need for CSO coordinating mechanisms at all levels, from national to continental, to maximise impact, improve the process of setting reconstruction priorities and facilitate coordination with governments, RECs, the AU and other partners.

Panel IV: The Way Forward: Recommendations for the 2nd Consultative Meeting with Wider Civil Society

Dr. Berhanu was the moderator of the fourth panel, which made recommendations for areas to be considered at the 2nd consultative meeting on PCRD, to be held in July 2007. The panelists were Professor Paul Nkwi of EthnoNet Africa, Professor Mboy Mekesa of Kinshasa University and Dr. Juma. The panelists made a number of recommendations for: areas for consideration at the meeting; and as well as mechanisms and activities to improve CSO participation in PCRD.

With regard to the planning of the next consultative meeting, participants made the following recommendations:

- a) Background papers should be developed and disseminated prior to the meeting, to ensure that participants approach the issue from a similar point of departure. These papers would:
 1. Locate the PCRD policy and agenda within the African vision of renaissance and the specific African peace and security context;
 2. Examine the role of CSOs in reconstruction efforts on the continent so far, including the mandate for their involvement and examples of successes and challenges;
 3. Consider the question of coordination and coherence, particularly with regard to CSOs, and draw lessons from experiences at national, regional, and continental levels; and
 4. Consider the issue of resource mobilization, including the various sources of

resources that have been mobilized from within and beyond the continent and the various challenges faced by countries emerging from conflict in this regard.

- b) The meeting could be organised in thematic breakaway groups, in line with the elements of the policy;
- c) The meeting should be representative, in terms of geography as well as areas of expertise, and should involve representation at a level that will ensure follow up and commitment. In addition to civil society, representatives of the AU, the RECs, sub-regional initiatives and other relevant stakeholders should be involved;
- d) The meeting should reflect upon the relationship between CSOs and the AU PCRD unit to determine the best means of continued engagement and cooperation;
- e) The meeting should attempt to address some of the obstacles to civil society participation in PCRD processes, including determining the appropriate level of decentralisation and/or engagement; capacity building and retention for CSOs; mobilisation of resources; competition amongst CSOs.

Participants identified a number of actual and potential mechanisms for CSO participation in PCRD processes, which could be discussed in greater detail before and at the next consultative meeting, including:

- a. A database not only of PCRD experts but also of CSO organisations. This could build upon existing databases such as that of AF-DEM;

- a. Creation of national and regional focal points for PCRD, involving NGO participation;
- b. Creation of, or use of existing, national, regional and continental CSO coordinating mechanisms (such as NEPAD CSO think tank, AU Economic Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), etc); and
- c. The development of a CSO standby network, which would involve appropriately trained professionals ready to be deployed when needed.

Participants also pointed out a number of activities that could be undertaken by CSOs prior to the next consultative meeting, including:

- a. popularisation of the PCRD policy amongst other CSOs;
- b. inputting into ongoing AU activities, such as the development of the AUV programme and the database of experts;
- c. commencing research on PCRD as a basis for advice to policy makers and to inform civil society interventions in post-conflict situations;
- d. the generation and dissemination of best practices in PCRD activities;
- e. examination of mechanisms for resource mobilization, assessments, monitoring and evaluation; and
- f. OSSREA and other organizations that promote research could provide funding for research on PCRD in support of the activities outlined above, and could host seminars to disseminate the research.

Closing Session

Dr. Ngoma was the moderator for the closing session, which reviewed the discussions of the previous two days and gave an overview of the way forward for the AU Commission and CSOs with regard to the implementation of the PCRD policy. Recommendations for civil society participation in PCRD processes were based upon the need for people-driven processes and divided the areas of engagement into national, regional and continental level, though some activities would cut across all levels.

At **continental level**, civil society organisations could engage in the following activities:

- a. support the clarification of strategic issues in the PCRD policy, such as economic development, security sector reform, reconciliation, etc;
- b. participate in assessment missions, directly or through provision of information/analysis in support of AU missions;
- c. monitor progress of PCRD processes in Africa, possibly through a shadow report on PCRD to be delivered to the AU;
- d. generate best practices and share of lessons learned, especially from community based organisations from countries emerging from conflict.

At **regional level**, civil society could engage in the following activities:

- a. participate in cascading the policy to the regions, in terms developing operational guidelines that reflect their specific needs;
- b. liaise with other civic organisations to form regional networks to harmonise common practice with regard to PCRD activities, and to promote the use of the policy by existing

regional networks (such as the Manu River Union or the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region);

- c. create institutional mechanisms, such as a regional CSO focal point for PCRD that can monitor harmonisation and synergies across the region.

At **national level**, civil society engagement would be oriented toward shaping the national vision and strategy for PCRD, and promoting national ownership of that vision. This would entail advocacy and lobbying to ensure an inclusive process of determining national needs and priorities. Activities at this level would include:

- a. dissemination of the AU policy;
- b. research and analysis in support of planning and implementing PCRD;
- c. participate in needs assessments and/or promote participation of communities in those assessments;
- d. undertake advocacy in support of vulnerable groups;
- e. sensitise communities with regard to their rights to enable them to participate more effectively in governance;
- f. monitoring of performance/ progress on PCRD;
- g. advocacy and engagement with private sector, especially for resource mobilization and socially responsible investment;
- h. advocacy to align the programmes of international partners with the national vision and needs;
- i. training and capacity building of local community based organizations;
- j. participate in implementation of PCRD activi-

ties across all indicative elements, especially those without sufficient funding.

Dr. Ngoma pointed to a number of activities of the AU Commission that would benefit from CSO engagement, including the establishment of dedicated structures for PCRD; the sensitization of RECs, Member States and other stakeholders on the PCRD policy; the development of policy guidelines for the AUV programme; strengthening the capacities of relevant African CSOs to undertake PCRD activities; and the organization of workshops on PCRD in countries emerging from conflict. In conclusion, he thanked participants for their input and encouraged them to continue to contribute to the process of operationalising the AU policy on PCRD.

The UPEACE-OSSREA Research Capacity Building Workshop: Developing Peace Research Skills in Africa

The Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa, OSSREA, and United Nations affiliated University for Peace, Africa Programme jointly organized a research capacity-building workshop on **‘Developing Peace Research Skills in Africa.’** This joint venture highlights the partnership between UPEACE and OSSREA in accordance with the institutional partnership agreement signed between the two institutions earlier this year.

UPEACE’s headquarters are in Costa Rica, while its Africa Programme is hosted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The university currently offers eight MA Programmes in fields related to peace and conflict studies. Every year more than 100 students from nearly 40 countries graduate with UPeace degrees.

The training workshop was held from 23-27 April at the Addis Ababa Hilton Hotel. The workshop was opened by UPEACE Africa Programme Director, Dr. Jean-Bosco Butera, and OSSREA Executive Secretary, Dr Alfred G Nhema. In their opening remarks both speakers emphasized the exigency of durable peace in Africa, the role of peace research in building capacity towards ensuring a more peaceful world and the significance of enhancing policy-research complementarities in Africa.

The goal of the training workshop was to develop, and in some instances upgrade the skills of experts in the areas of peace and conflict studies to enhance teaching and research capacity of universities and research institutions in Africa. The specific objectives of the workshop were:

- Reintroduce researchers, practitioners and policy workers to the various methodologies of social science research in general and peace research in particular;
- Reorient researchers to contemporary data analytical skills; and
- Acquaint researchers with relevant training methodology pertinent to conflict, peace, development, human rights, gender, environment and other policy-related issues.

The workshop was designed to meet the occupational needs of university staff, researchers in social sciences, particularly those engaged in peace and conflict related research engagements, practitioners especially those in the civil societies and government institutions in charge of policymaking and policy dialogue, and peace and conflict experts in Africa.

This programme brought together African academics, academics in the African Diaspora, researchers and civil society practitioners for a five-day workshop to share and improve research methodologies in the areas of peace and conflict studies. There were 25 par-

ticipants drawn from 18 African countries, namely Cameroon, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Twelve of these countries were from the Eastern and Southern African sub-regions. From the 25 participants, 20 of them (about 80%) came from OSSREA's two geographical zones. The participants have been engaged in managing peace and conflict related programmes and projects, teaching at universities, involved in peace advocacy, working on research undertaking related to peace and conflicts, lecturing different peace and conflict related courses in higher education institutions, coordinating programmes in transnational institutions, and working in the civic society organizations.

In order to give the participants an overview of the current state of peace and conflict studies in Africa and elsewhere, different papers were presented by researchers and scholars. The presenters included Bertha Amisi Kadenyi (USA), Prof. Sulayman Nyang (USA), Dr Monica Juma (Kenya), Dr Edith Naticunda (Uganda), Prof. Marion Keim (South Africa), Dr. Craig Zelizer (USA), Dr. Martin Rupiya (Zimbabwe), Dr Meshesha Shewarega (Ethiopia) and Dr Tony Karbo (Sierra Leone).

On the final day of this training workshop, a general discussion and evaluation was carried out to make preliminary appraisal of the outcome of this workshop. The evaluative discussion was presided over by UPEACE Africa Programme Director Dr Jean-Bosco Butera. In this appraisal, participants expressed their satisfaction based on the following factors:

- The programme is well-structured and integrates social science research and peace research methodologies;

- The linkage between theory and praxis is well-addressed;
- The qualities of the participants and their multi-disciplinary backgrounds enriched the exchanges;
- Gender-balance among the participants also contributed a lot to the quality of the outcome;
- Participatory or participant-centered approach used by the facilitators were greatly appreciated;
- Intensive group involvement and in-depth analysis of issues emanating from group discussion stimulated plans for future research;
- Flexibility of the facilitators and organizers allowed for efficient use of the time;
- Emphasis given to the African tradition of conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanisms was valued by all;
- Very good coordination and logistical supports rendered to the participants by the organizers was praised;
- Excellent spirit of cooperation between OSSREA and UPEACE was much appreciated; and
- Practical examples and cases used in the training were highly valued.

The participants requested OSSREA and UPEACE to continue conducting such workshops as training programmes of this nature are very relevant to the goal of building capacities of researchers in the spheres of peace and conflict studies in Africa.



Participants of the UPEACE-OSSREA Research Capacity Building Workshop

Implementation of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy in Africa

I. BACKGROUND

The AU Executive Council and the rest of the African Union structure, including the African Union commission, have always encouraged the participation by civil society organisations and other stakeholders in the implementation of the African Union policies. This participation has been at various levels of the work plans, from conceptualisation and development of policies to implementation.

In pursuit of this practice, the AU executive council and the rest of the AU structures have been engaging stakeholders on a number of challenges facing the continent. The challenge of post-conflict reconstruction has been one such issue. Faced with critical demands for material and human resources to mitigate the challenges facing countries emerging from conflict, it is evident that the approach would have to be

pluralistic in character. For this reason, therefore, the commission has now convened in Lusaka, Zambia, on 16 – 18 July 2007 this workshop on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) in order to exchange ideas and collectively work out the appropriate means and ways of mitigating post-conflict challenges.

II. RATIONALE

At its 7th ordinary session held in Sirte, Libya, from 28 June to 2 July 2005, the executive council adopted decision ex.cl/dec.228 (vii) on the report of the chairperson of the commission on the conflict situation in Africa. In this respect, the executive council urged the commission to develop an AU policy on post-conflict reconstruction based on the relevant provisions of the Peace and Security Council protocol and the experience gained so far in the continent.

In pursuit of this mandate the commission undertook several meetings, i.e. The 4th brainstorming retreat of members of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and other member states represented in Addis Ababa was convened in Durban, South Africa, from 4 to 5 September 2005; the technical experts meeting on PCRD from 7 to 8 February 2006, in Addis Ababa; and the meeting of governmental experts was convened from 8 to 9 June 2006 in Addis Ababa.

The seriousness with which the AU has been concerned with the challenges in post-conflict countries was further highlighted by the PSC's 39th meeting, held on 30 September 2005, at which the 4th brainstorming retreat report was endorsed and the ministerial support for the PCRD framework document at the Banjul, the Gambia summit in June-July 2006 and the final position taken by the executive council. The PCRD framework became AU policy upon its endorsement by the executive council at its 9th ordinary session with the adoption of the decision ex.cl/dec.302 (ix).

Since the adoption of the PCRD policy, some meetings at various levels have been undertaken with a view of implementing the policy and decision. Notable of these have been a one-day workshop of experts on 26 September 2006 to review a draft strategy for the implementation of the policy and decision. The meeting was attended by Representatives of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the African Development Bank (AfDB), some members of the CSOs and the commission. On 12 and 13 April 2007, the commission held a CSO consultative meeting to discuss the role of CSOs in the operationalisation and implementation of the policy and decision on 12 and 13 March 2007 and discuss the further engagement of wider civil society in the matter. Later on 17 April 2007 there was a briefing session of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) on the progress made in the implementation of the policy.

III. OBJECTIVES

The objective of the workshop is to obtain a buy-in to the implementation of the PCRD policy and decision by the various actors and stakeholders (i.e. Member states, RECs, the AU Commission, the private sector and CSOs) in the mitigation of post-conflict challenges on the African continent.

The workshop is expected to address the following issues and arrive at a common understanding:

- Locate the PCRD policy and agenda within the African vision of renaissance and the specific African peace and security context;
- Examine the role, mandate, successes and challenges of CSOs in reconstruction efforts on the continent thus far;
- Consider the question of coordination and coherence, particularly with regard to CSOs;

- Draw lessons from experiences at national, regional, and continental levels;
- Consider the issue of resource mobilisation, sources of resources and the challenges faced by countries emerging from conflict;
- Address some of the obstacles to civil society participation in PCRD processes, including determining the appropriate level of decentralisation and/or engagement;
- Capacity building and retention for CSOs;
- Mobilisation of resources; and
- Competition amongst CSOs.

IV. EXPECTED RESULTS

The workshop is expected to achieve the following results:

- A program for enhancing the role of the multiplicity of actors in the implementation of the PCRD policy and decision;
- The development of a framework and mechanism for cooperation which would enable the actors to contribute the PCRD policy and decision;
- The identification of core issues on which joint actions can be planned and implemented; and
- The establishment of a follow-up mechanism to monitor the implementation of the workshop results.

V. PARTICIPATION

There will be at least 100 participants comprising representatives of African CSOs representatives of selected international CSOs representatives of African private business representatives of RECs represen-

tatives of African countries emerging from conflict and selected members of the AU commission.

VI. CONFERENCE ORGANISATION

The workshop is organised by the Peace and Security Department of the AU Commission with the support of COMESA and the Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA).

The deliberation of the workshop will be on the basis of thematic areas, and background papers will be prepared in advance on specific topics within the themes identified.

The deliberations will be in plenary and working groups. Resource persons chosen for their expertise will be invited to lead the discussions as presenters of issue papers, or as discussants or commentators.

The workshop will be conducted in English, French, Arabic, Portuguese and Kiswahili.

Under the AU Commission through the Department of Peace and Security overall responsibility and coordination, the workshop secretariat will comprise of a team drawn from COMESA and OSSREA.

VII. CONFERENCE VENUE AND DATE

The workshop will be held at the COMESA conference centre in Lusaka, Zambia, from 16 to 18 July 2007.

VIII. CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

The workshop proceedings will be published by OSSREA as soon as possible after the Lusaka meetings and upon publication will be officially handed over to the AU peace and security department at an appropriate date.

OSSREA CHAPTERS ACTIVITIES

Report from the OSSREA Mozambique Chapter

1. Major Lecture Celebrating the Silver Anniversary of the Mozambican Teachers' Day

On the 12th October 2006, OSSREA Mozambique's Chapter together with the National Syndicate of Mozambican teachers, organized a major event to celebrate the Silver Jubilee of the teachers' organization. The main event was a lecture presented by Mozambican Liaison Officer, Professor Benigna Zimba, entitled "The Crises of Identity in Mozambique: The Search for Space and Resources" (*A crise de identidade em Moçambique: A procura de espaços e recursos*). The President of the Republic of Mozambique, His Excellency Armando Guebuza attended the event, together with over 700 participants among them a large number of government leaders, representatives of almost all ministries of the Mozambican government, NGOs, diplomats, representatives of political parties, and the general public. The event was also sponsored by the Ministries of Education, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Science and Technology.

2. The Niassa Girls Programme

This programme of the OSSREA Mozambique National Chapter aims to encourage the enrolment of girls in school in Niassa, one of the poorest provinces of the country. In February 2006, we contributed 500 USD to the board that locally runs this programme. At the moment it has become a multiparty programme that includes Idaho State University, the Save the Children Fund, and Eduardo Mondlane Uni-

versity as the main sponsor of the Niassa Girls Programme.

In April 2007, thanks to its partnership with the African Banking Corporation of Mozambique, OSSREA Mozambique donated 500 USD to Mavago to help with improvement of infrastructure in the schools involved in this programme. By all standards, this programme has been an important endeavour and one that has given OSSREA visibility and earned it national recognition that reaches into the remotest rural areas of northern Mozambique.

OSSREA Zimbabwe Chapter

The OSSREA Zimbabwe Chapter held two research methodology workshops in 2006, both of which were over subscribed. Despite the high demand for this service the current economic situation makes them very difficult to plan or implement profitably. Participation in the Zimbabwe International Book Fair was also affected by the current situation in the country as it turned out to be a low key affair in 2006. A 12-chapter book on development is in press. The Zimbabwe national chapter also made a suggestion that OSSREA grantees should agree to give seminars on their work when they complete their work so as to promote the culture of seminar presentations.

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OSSREA is an international organisation dedicated to the encouragement and promotion of study and research in the Social Sciences. Its sources of support are international donors and membership fees. Membership is open to individuals and institutions engaged in research in the Social Sciences and related fields in Eastern and Southern Africa. The current annual membership fees are as follows:

	Full Membership	Assoc. Membership
Individuals	US\$ 10.00	US\$ 5.00
Institutions	US\$100.00	US\$50.00

Payments can be made in local currency in the country of registration where OSSREA has Liaison Officers.

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FEATURE ARTICLES

50th Independence Anniversary, Celebrating Ghana 1957 and Forgetting the Sudan 1956. The Reasons Why

*Kwesi Kwaa Prah**

Ghana: Celebratory Offerings

Ghana's Golden jubilee year has provided a good chance for flag-waving and anthem-singing in celebration of the post-colonial or neo-colonial entity. For various reasons, it has also afforded the opportunity for some introspection by the broad citizenry who want to regard it as a convenient milestone in a journey forward from the end of colonialism. They want to assess the merits and demerits of the journey and what future prospects look like. For others, it is an occasion for chest-thumping and collective affirmation in the face of the realities of mass impoverishment and entrenched underdevelopment in the country. During most of these fifty years, Ghanaians have been ruled by soldiers and ex-soldiers who first came into power through "the barrel of a gun." In the words of the cineaste Nii Kwate Owoo, it has been largely a tradition of "soldier come, soldier go". The last of these military rulers, J. J. Rawlings, after a few years changed his military fatigues for civilian gear and ruled altogether for almost twenty years.

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The opening leadership of the independence era was the Nkrumah administration. In retrospect, it was the most dynamic and credible leadership the country has seen in the fifty years of its existence. The Nkrumah regime was particularly notable and significant for its Pan-Africanist stance and programme. It carried out very feverishly, firstly, an agenda for colonial independence in Africa and secondly a push for African unity. With respect to the first, "the decade of African independence" (1960 – 1970) was a partial testimony of the correctness and success of this vision and programme. With respect to the second, apart from some initial moves towards a Ghana-Guinea-Mali union, Nkrumah's regime achieved little in his lifetime. Needless to say, the agenda for African unity remains an outstanding cause for Africans.

The fact that Ghana was the first country in colonial Africa which came under the independent rule of non-Arab indigenous elites made it historically incumbent on Ghana to advance the project of African freedom and independence in Africa proper. It could hardly have been otherwise. Therefore, in a sense, even Nkrumah should be seen in this light. He was a product of historical forces, far beyond his single personality and it is not possible to explain the role of Nkrumah and the regime he headed without placing it in the wider historical context of Africa and the world. The role Nkrumah played in the African liberation movement was subsequently taken up by Nyerere, Kaunda, Machel and Mugabe as the liberation process steadily rolled southwards. At each historical turn, the next country took up the role. Today, that role is being played largely by Mbeki in South Africa. The question is whether there is to be unity including the Arab countries of the North or excluding them. The Arab countries of the North need and want unity of the Arab world which lies outside the African continent. In my view, so long as the unity of the Arab world is pursued democratically it must be supported by all democratic-thinking peoples, but so also is the African view for unity. Of course since the

Arab and African peoples are neighbours, this would have border implications.

After Nkrumah a revolving door of military rulers featured in Ghana. The two civilian regimes that emerged after the first round of military leadership, i.e. the Busia regime and the Limann regime, lasted together not more than four years. As I suggested during a recent address in Ghana, by the end of the Kuffour regime, between this regime and the previous Rawlings government, we would have seen almost three decades of inept, directionless, uninspired, stolid and kleptocratic government. True enough, the Rawlings administration was more cruel and blood-thirsty, but the debate about whether the Rawlings regime was more corrupt than the Kuffour administration is ultimately a profitless exercise. The impression I have is that there is widespread disillusionment with both the present government and the previous one. In the minds of many, in the coming election, if it is a contest between the two parties, then the offering is like a choice between the devil and the deep blue sea. The options are frustrating and many say they will not vote. Under these circumstances of voter apathy, disillusionment and suspicion of politicians, the slightest disturbance can rapidly escalate into a crisis, which would be difficult to roll back. Another soldier or soldiers could take advantage of the situation and stage a coup. The hordes of urban unemployed we see at the roadsides, selling dog-chains, loaves of bread and boxes of matches are ready-made social material for the chaos and violence that can be triggered. It is therefore, in my view, incumbent upon responsible minds to offer the wider populace another option, a third option outside the clutches of the devil and the deep blue sea.¹

Sudan, a Crisis of Identity

Over twenty years ago, in an article I wrote which appeared in the *Lesotho Law Journal*, I had argued that;

“It is often assumed that the Sudan, Africa’s largest country in geographical size, is an Arab country. When African independence is discussed it is usually said that Ghana was the first black African State to emerge out of colonialism. This is in fact wrong, for the Sudan gained its independence of January 1st, 1956 about a year before Ghana. The root of this misunderstanding lies in the fact that the Sudan is regarded as an Arab country.”²

It is therefore not counted with the African countries of this continent, but rather with the Arab countries of the north.

This is most unfortunate. Indeed, in my view, the present struggles in the Sudan are precisely about whether the Sudan will continue to be the country dominated by an Arab and Arabised minority, or the overwhelming majority of the people of the Sudan who are not Arab or Arabised will bring various types of pressures to bear on the centre to assert the African *bona fides* of the country.

As Gerard Prunier has pointed out in his book, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide* “The ‘Arabs’ in the Sudan are unsure about the purity of their Arab credentials, which tends to make them all the more touchy about these being respected.” This problem that Prunier refers to has a long history in the psychology of the ruling groups of the Sudan. During the colonial period, in August 1943, a senior British colonial administrator, Sir Douglas Newbold, made a revealing observation on this issue.³ In a letter to the Sudan Agent in Cairo, Newbold candidly observed,

“...I have been astonished that the Sudan (or at least the

¹ Kwesi Kwaa Prah. Fifty years of Ghanaian independence: Drawing up a balance-sheet and which way forward? Public address presented in Accra (23rd February, 2007)

² K. K. Prah. 1986. African nationalism and the origins of war in the Sudan. In: *Lesotho Law Journal*. Vol. 2. No. 2. P.180.

³ Ibid. P.181.

Northern Sudan) is continually omitted from books, articles, official memoranda, etc. on 'The Middle East' or 'The Arab Countries'. This has an unfortunate effect on the educated Sudanese, who resent the implication that they are not part of the Near or Middle East or of the Arab World."⁴

It is to this class of "educated Sudanese", a small group of Arab or Arabised Sudanese that the British handed over power at independence, and it is the same class which has ruled the Sudan since that time.

The history of the Sudan throughout most of the 19th century had provided scope for the entrenchment of Arabism in the country. However, under the Turco-Egyptian regime (1820 – 1881), large parts of the present day Sudan was free of Khedivial control. The Fur in the west were subjugated only in 1874. Sections of the Beja remained free until the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1898 – 1956). Under both the Turco-Egyptian regime and the Mahdist Administration (1881 – 1898) most of the South was unconquered. Garrisons and military posts were established

during and after the mid-century, but *de facto* control over the African nationalities in the South became a reality only after the Nuer Settlement in the early 1930s. Barricading themselves in stockades called *Zereebas*, marauding Arab traders and slave runners invaded the hostile African countryside. For much of the 19th century and before, Arabs had been raiding the southern and eastern borderlands for slaves and ivory. The volume and rapacity of this ruthless pursuit for blackskins was such that the population of the South at the turn of this century was only a fraction of what it had been a half-century before.⁵

It should be borne in mind that generally the Arabised nationalities enjoy superiority primarily in a class perspective which is emphasized on national lines. As a result socio-economic contradictions and class struggles are mirrored along national and regional dimensions. Banking trade, the civil bureaucracy, politics, and officer corps of the armed forces are all dominated by Arabised Sudanese.

Distribution of Main Ethnic Groups in Sudan (According to the 1956 Census)

Ethnic Group	No. in 1956	Total % Population	Characteristics	Location/Area
Arabs	3,989,537	39	Varying admixture of Semitic immigrants and indigenous negroids and Hamitic-speakers	East-west belt 10 degrees N and 16 degrees N.
Southerners	2,825,937	30	Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic and Sudanic negroids	Three southern provinces
West-Darfur	902,798	9	Indigenous negroids with some Hamitic and slight Semitic elements	Western Darfur
Beja	623,528	6	Indigenous Hamitic-speaking nomads	Hills and plains between Nile and Red Sea
West-Africans	592,450	6	Negroids immigrants from Chad, Nigeria, etc.	Scattered throughout Sudan
Nuba	572,935	6	Indigenous Negroes	Hills and plans of Southern Kordofan
Nubian	330,032	3	Negroid admixture with Hamitic and Semitic speaking peoples	Nile downstream from 4 th cataract
Funj	173,548	1.7	Indigenous Negroes	Abyssinian foothills and Southern Gezira

⁴. See K.D.D. Henderson. 1953. *The making of the modern Sudan*. P. 338. London.

⁵. British Foreign Office. 1898. *Handbook for the Sudan*.

In the first and only census conducted in the Sudan, 39% of the population claimed to be Arabs. In a country where being Arab represents privilege and exclusivity, many make claims to Arabness, whose validity is debatable. Arab identities, like all other social identities, are difficult to pin down and may mean different things in different contexts.

To the above were also included 156,009 West Africans with non-Sudanese status, 37,697 Sudanese of West African and Congolese origin, and 648 Belgian Congolese. Indeed the tragedy of the Sudan is that many of those who claim to be Arabs are actually mainly Nubians; African who have been culturally Arabised.⁶ Today, they lead the charge of Arabism in the Sudan.

While this orientation and Arabism has grown steadily in some of the Arabised areas of the Sudan, the picture in the culturally African southern areas has for long remained eminently different. In a letter, dated 30th August 1883 and addressed to Manfredo Camperio, the editor of *Esploratore* concerning the condition of Africans in the Egyptian provinces of the Sudan, with uninhibited frankness criticized the persistence of the slave trade in spite of the “pompous, declamatory circulars, written for the only objective of hiding the evil by denying its existence or diminishing its extent”.⁷ But more interestingly, the writer advanced an argument which has since then been often repeated by many who know the Sudan:

The Negro countries should be completely separated from those of the Arabs or those where they predominate, and the Bahr el Ghazal should be grouped to-

gether with Equatoria under a separate autonomous rule. Uniting these scattered members with a natural and logical boundary would awake the confidence in the blacks which they do not now feel in the Government, and convince them that it would have the same care for them that it has for the other provinces of the State.⁸

Most Northern Sudanese who claim Arab antecedents fall into two broad groupings. The first of these are the Arabised Nubians made up of the Barabra and Jaali. They are in the main sedentary cultivators huddled along the Nile. The second group are the Juhayna, who are nomadic and semi-nomadic nationalities. Among the Jaali in particular, Nubian dialects still persist here and there but this language is dying out in favour of Arabic. Modern linguistic studies show that Nubian or Nobiin, belongs to the Eastern Sudanic cluster of language which includes languages as apparently diverse as the Hill Nubian languages, Dair, Dilling, Midob, Birgid, Didinga-Murle, Barea, Ingessana, Nyimang, Temein, Tama, Daju and Liguri. By and large, the Arabised Sudanese under-rate their African roots. Most of the so-called Arabs of the Sudan are an admixture of local Africans, Arab settlers, and imported slaves. As MacMichael rightly indicates, “the importation of slave women from the South, which has proceeded uninterruptedly for centuries, has lent a further measure of spurious homogeneity to all these Nubian people.”⁹

It is among the Nubians that the denial of African nationality is more prevalent. The other more authentically African groups in the North of the country are principally the Funj in the East, the Fur, Messalit and Zagahwa in the West and the Beja in the North-East who, in spite of Arabisation, steadfastly hold on to

⁶ See, P.A. Ghabashi. 1973. The growth of black political consciousness in Northern Sudan, *Africa Today*, Vol. 20, No.3, P.30.

⁷ See G. Casati. 1891. *Ten years in Equatoria and the return with Emin Pasha*. London.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ See H.A. MacMichael. 1922. *A history of the Arabs in the Sudan*. Cambridge. P.13.

their non-Arabic cultural characteristics.

Closing Observations

The Darfur crisis and the bloodletting that we are seeing in the country is the latest instalment in the struggle for power in the Sudan. The South and, to a lesser extent, the Nuba area have been able to assert themselves sufficiently to obtain relative autonomy from Khartoum. The Beja in the north-east have also recently been given a new dispensation which creates local power in the area. The struggle in the east has not been resolved and Darfur has caught the imagination of the world. The Nubians are retrieving their collective African memory and asserting that they are not Arabs. The emancipation process of Africans in the Sudan and the struggles to remove power from the hands of the small elite of Arabised and Arab Sudanese will continue as it has in an unbroken fashion since the Torit mutiny of August 1955. In the end, without doubt, power will come to rest in the hands of the majority. Until that day, we may have possibly to contend with, unfortunately, more suffering. The sooner the suffering of the Sudanese people can be brought to an end, the better for us all.

The fact that questions are being asked now, “why is Ghana being celebrated and not the Sudan?”, is testimony of the fact that the crisis of identity in the Sudan persists. In the long run, whether people like it or not, the Sudan’s African identity will reassert itself.

Doing Research on Sexuality in Africa: Ethical Dilemmas and the Positioning of the Researcher

*Emidio Gune** and *Sandra Manuel***

The process of knowledge production involves a series of steps and is influenced by several factors which impact upon the end result of the research in various ways. When the topic of research is sexuality such conditions and influences become surrounded by a greater number of implications, some with far-reaching consequences. Not only is this due to the fact that sexuality is generally regarded as a sensitive topic, if not a taboo, that must not be mentioned in public, but it is also a topic that poses difficult questions that the researcher must resolve or the very success of the project may be in jeopardy. This article reflects on key epistemological conversations and debates on doing research on sexuality in Africa. The authors are both anthropologists who have conducted research in urban areas of Mozambique on young people’s sexuality.

One of the authors focused his interest on exploring the socio-cultural construction of sexual scripts for sexual acts in Maputo city. The other author worked first on the perceptions and routines of condom use among the youth and later explored the practices, meanings and narratives of sex amongst the youth in

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the same city. The fact that one of the researchers was a male and the other a female generated interesting nuances on the kinds of experiences and results they were able to produce.

An important note is that both researchers explored themes on sexuality in partial fulfilment of the requirements for their respective dissertations for a Master's degree at the University of Cape Town (UCT) in South Africa. The production of their theses, like the publication of any other academic piece required them to follow strict ethical procedures. And that is where their debate begins.

Whose Ethics Exactly?

After selection of the research theme, the next challenge for the postgraduate student was to convince the Department of Social Anthropology via a standard research proposal that included various points and the commitment of the researcher to comply with, *inter alia*, the UCT code of Ethics for research on human subjects, the Ethical guidelines and principles of conduct for anthropologists issued by Anthropology Southern Africa (ASA 2005, 142-143) and the statement on ethics by American Anthropological Association (AAA 1971).

Given that ethical considerations may decide whether or not one's project is approved, this is clearly a key element in the process of obtaining permission to conduct research. Thus the university's ethics committees, more than the department's academic review process, have the last word on whether one may proceed with the research and consequently with the MA programme. In that regard, there was awareness that researching sexuality and other sexual matters or issues would be a challenge, since "anything having to do with sex causes a great many people to feel embarrassed (Kelley and Byrne as cited in Frith 2000, 281) mostly because, as pointed out by David (1987: 4) "sexual practices always involve some degree of privacy, and the ethical implications of their scien-

tific study and of the publication of findings are myriad".

Therefore, following our commitment to the various ethical guidelines, it was made clear that the researchers would not overuse nor abuse the power inequity that could emerge as a result of the research encounters, such as during interviews (ASA 2005; Scheurich 1997). Also, one needed not to override social and cultural values of the participants, and be on guard against undue intrusion. From the start the participants who accepted to join in the study would be treated as subjects and not as objects, and, especially, if selected from amongst participants in the previous studies,¹ there would be need to give them due respect. The scholars would obtain informed consent from the participants that accepted to join the study. Also, only after they shared the research objectives and methodologies, volunteered to take part and were assured of their anonymity (to protect participants from exposure after obtaining their consent) would the study proceed.

Participants would be informed and reminded about the freedom to ask anything they find of their interest, to choose not to answer specific questions, to discontinue the interview or to withdraw, without any penalties. The researcher would also let them know that the study was being conducted for academic purposes at the Department of Social Anthropology at UCT and that the research results would be widely available once published in academic journals or presented in seminars and conferences.

In the case of the authors of this article there was the challenge of researching "at home" (Mkwanzu 2005, Spiegel 2005) that would require them to unpack and question their assumptions of "normality". Also, as happened to one of the authors, during the fieldwork

¹ Like Manuel (2004 & 2005) and Paulo (2004)

researchers could be confronted with similar questions to the one posed to Mkhwanazi (2005; 115) "... of people who thought that men menstruated" especially when conducting focus group discussions.² If a similar situation emerged, he had planned to share with the study participants his points of view regarding the raised issues in a reflexive way, without imposing his point of view, having been warned by Das (1989) about the need to share life threatening information.

They were also alert to the challenge that "... while a strict adherence to the code of ethics might protect one's research participants, who or what protects the anthropologist in the field?" (Becker *et al.* 2005, 126). For both researchers there was the feeling that since they were doing 'ethnography at home' the need for protection was not an issue as they were comfortable and knew the relevant support networks. Finally, and inspired by Spiegel (2005, 135), they were cautious that in the event of an unexpected occurrence raising serious ethical issues for the researchers they would guide themselves through an ethic of care that would include getting in touch with supervisors or other lecturers from the Department of Social Anthropology of UCT for guidance, advice and support.

After submission and approval of the proposals each of the researchers was confronted with a new reality: there was a clear realization that they would be using a code of ethics produced and informed by a cultural

order different from the one practiced in the social and cultural context where the study would be developed. By proceeding in such manner, would the researchers not be ignoring the fact that "Anthropologists don't study villages (tribes, towns, neighbourhoods...), but they study *in* villages" (Geertz 1973, 22)? Specifically, by using the approved code of ethics from the UCT they were bound to override the participants' own ethics when they were different from the approved professional research. What was the ethical thing to do?

This new dynamic presented in the field raised a number of questions. Since researchers are also socio culturally informed rather than a culturally free, where was the place of the researchers' own ethics in all this? How were they to manage the coexistence of diverse ethics without contradicting the principles of their discipline, while learning about and capturing by description or otherwise, the diversity of human life? Was the solution in giving less weight to the ethics of the study participants and more weight to the approved ethical considerations, or vice versa? If they chose to act in the approved manner would the researchers not be going back to Geertz's (1973) utopia, presenting only the *natives'* point of view in a context where they were also one of them, and lived in the cosmopolitan and heterogeneous *village* that is Maputo?

One of the possible escape routes for such dilemma was Spiegel's (2005) ethics of care. In his view, it is important to "protect participants, the researcher and protect anthropology".

How were the researchers to interact with participants, follow strictly the approved ethical consideration or learn and adopt the codes of ethics produced and reproduced in Maputo City, including the ones informing the researchers themselves? Which of the ethics should inform the setting up of questions in order to make sure that they were ethically appropri-

² *Editor's Note:* Mozambican-Sowetan playwright Richard Nwamba's radio play "Menstruating Men", a critique of South African xenophobia, was inspired by the reaction of South African mineworkers to some of their Mozambican counterparts who were seen in the communal ablution blocks to be urinating blood because they were suffering from bilharzia. Apparently the South Africans mocked the Mozambicans by calling them menstruating men.

ate? How were they to guide the research in order to know if one was being intrusive or overriding the socio-cultural values of the participants? As a consequence, the main challenge became how to reconcile the various ethical codes of the discipline, of the participants and the of researchers themselves without sacrificing any of them, since participants should not be treated as objects but as subjects. What kind of subjects are subordinate and conform to the approved ethical considerations? And since the aim of the research was to produce a thesis, how could this exercise not be exploitative and be seen as making use of participants to an end?

Confronted with such dilemmas, the male researcher noted that when he started observing in the field while conducting focus groups discussions, interviews as well as informal conversations, he realized how wrong he had been in minimizing the importance of Becker *et al.*'s (2005) warning regarding the need for ensuring that they were always protected, since for many times the interaction with participants in the fieldwork proved to be "violent" to him, albeit not in a physical way. His ears refused to 'accept' some words (even today he does not feel comfortable writing about it) that, when uttered he reacted strangely, his eyes refused to see the pictures or television when sex-related pictures were displayed, even if they were familiar to him.

In this regard he was heavily influenced by the conflict of dealing with what people were saying on the one hand and his expectation about what should be acceptable under the UCT codes of ethics that he subscribed to on the other. He was concerned that when it came to writing his dissertation (knowing that any further ethical adjustment by the supervisor would detract from the lessons and sexual scripts provided by his Maputo City context and which he shared with participants) he would not be able to adequately reflect what he experienced.

Should his data be considered pornographic or not? Was it appropriate to write about certain things and not others? If he accepted exactly what participants shared with him would this be regarded as overriding their socio cultural values? And what if he refused to use them in his thesis? Would this not, in reverse, be a way of reducing perceptions and cosmologies that informed their sexualities, just to fit into the approved ethical considerations that are not the same with local ethics?

Similarly the woman researcher was confronted with challenging dilemmas that were centred on the subtle distinction between writing sexuality and writing pornography.³ The discussions from the focus group and interviews provided graphically descriptive narrations of the sexual acts and practices that, unlike the male researcher, she enthusiastically transcribed and discussed in her paper in order to give a "thick description" of the target group. However, discussions with the supervisor and reading of the ASA (2005) and AAA (1971) ethics flagged her to the possibility of going against the academic writing standards. "Do not write in a way that creates sexual arousal" was one piece of advice. Here, she identified one of the greatest contradictions on studying sexuality. Sex and its dynamics are most of the time eroticized and sensualized in the dominant discourse. In the Mozambican and South African context, speaking publicly about the theme is rare. Discourse about it is now coming to the public arena with the debates and

³ There is, of course, an element of the pornographic in all ethnography. That is why it is easier to capture the 'sexual life of savages' *a la Malinowski* and not of the average fellow citizen. Even when one refrains from reporting on sexualities, prying into people's sacred rituals and studying their lives under a microscope is not just intrusive it is also very colonial. The best anthropologists are callous people when observed from an African perspective. [Editor]

awareness programmes of HIV/AIDS. However, much of the discussion remains very instrumental without any profound descriptions of its ways and means, almost as if sexuality without HIV is not relevant.

When she used ethnography to deeply explore youth sexuality, the details were profound and meticulous. Most definitely, those details were able to create sexual arousal in contexts where public reference to sex is a taboo. How should one proceed then? What can be said or not said regarding the vivid descriptions people provided of their own practices? Is not the aim of the discipline of Anthropology deeply exploring meanings and practices in order to understand/explain people's behaviour? How could the "thick description" of sexuality then be a problem?

For researchers working in Africa, the excuse for not writing the details in exactly the way they were narrated was associated with the need to discontinue the colonial tendency to construct Africans and African sexualities as something exotic. As Arnfred (2004, 7) points out, African sexuality is often constructed as different from European/Western and portrayed as deviant. Indeed many European politicians or common men on the street when commenting on the scourge of HIV in Africa, still automatically lame it mainly on 'the sexual life of savages'; therefore, this description from an African site that was creating sexual arousal could be understood within the pre-conceived ideas of Africans as promiscuous and sexually indisiplined.

Although such concern is valid for the African context, bearing in mind the historical construction of the Africans' sexualities, some questions regarding the aim of the discipline of Anthropology can be raised: How does one write the knowledge provided by informants when they can be read in various manners including ones that see only promiscuity in African sexuality? Should one filter the information given?

Shouldn't the emphasis be on critically accessing the perspectives that read African sexuality as promiscuous and not necessarily restrain local narrations fearing that they would be promoting such unconstructive perspective? With regard to the writing of sexuality that creates sexual arousal, would it not be crucial to engage cultural relativism and read sexuality in the context of where it was produced? How can one write a thick description of sexuality (sexual practices in this case), guaranteeing that such information will not create arousal? Is self-censorship ethical because it protects the people and the discipline? In any case does it? All indications are that old prejudices die hard and will not necessarily be put to rest by ethically sanitised ethnography.

Even Researchers are Sexual Beings

Kulick (1995) illuminated some of the dilemmas faced by researchers working on sexuality. Kulick's edited volume was a rare exploration of the sexual life of the people who used to study savages. He exposed the ambiguity of doing fieldwork and doing anthropology, since while on one hand anthropologists are recommended to and do write pages about close contacts with the *natives* regarding rituals, eating, sleeping, farming, hunting, fishing and gossiping habits. On the other hand, when it comes to writing about sex there is a big silence in anthropological narratives, the anthropologists' own sexualities are the most muted of all, perpetuating the dubious image of the asexualized scientist/ethnographer whose entire fieldwork experience follows the professional code of ethics to the letter. Kulick (1995) revealed the hitherto whispered about homosexual⁴ and heterosexual fieldwork experiences which now emerged as research results, that, according to the

⁴ In a context where this kind of approaches do not raise much noise regarding ethical issues, since male homosexuality and its exposition tend to be more tolerated at theoretical level, not only, perhaps as a non discriminatory strategy.

very restrictive codes of ethics, were about things that were not even supposed to have occurred. Kullick's critique also revealed the issue of heterogeneity in dealing with ethical principles, since he was proposing an anthropology that stresses the sexual experiences of the anthropologist while other codes recommend the muting of the researchers' sexuality, at least when in field. So what were the present two researchers to do - follow Kullick's (1995) approach or stick to the approved UCT ethical considerations?

As the data collection proceeded, the socio cultural proximity with the words, pictures and movies involved in the study allowed the male researcher to get closer to the local cosmologies of sex and related issues from the participants in the context of Maputo, allowing for the steady improvement of his data collection technique. However, sometimes what he considered appropriate differed from, and even clashed, with what some of the participants considered correct, or vice versa. The researchers, ultimately, were *nativized*⁵ in a very heterogonous village.

According to the AAA briefing paper, concerning consideration of the ethical implications of sexual relationships between Anthropologists and members of a study population and prepared in 2000,

The anthropological fieldworker must be aware of the actual or perceived difference in economic and social "power" between the researcher and the population studied. In many field situations, the anthropologist is an exotic "other" whose presence may be disruptive to the local cultural group and who is often perceived to be from a world of wealth and power

For the research participants, and Maputo City, rather

than a context where the ethnographer held power over powerless participants, the researchers found that they were taking part in encounters where power shifted from participants to the researcher and back again continuously. That fact led the researchers to incorporate new elements, perceptions and even practices related to sex issues, since the participants were not immune to the practices, narratives or to the *exotic* perceptions that they shared with or even taught their researchers.

As the AAA (2000) paper goes on it warns that "Humans are sexual animals, and the possibility exists that the researcher may be placed in an ethical dilemma should a sexual relationship develop in a field situation. It is equally important to the anthropologist to be aware of the health implications of such a relationship to the researcher as well as the population under study." While that concern is legitimate its relevance in the context of fieldwork could be questioned: Is not awareness to health implications a must in any context and any kind of relationship, be it at *home* or in the *field* (at home or abroad)? Does the advice and ethical code apply only to American anthropologists abroad and not, say, on campus as well?

Being a young heterosexual male, in fact the male researcher was not immune to the glances, the 'provocative' and sensual ladies' clothes, even of some of the women informants. Were they dressed in such way only to impress him or was that their usual dress code? Was he treating female participants only as participants or also as *women*? During the fieldwork was his sexuality suspended and just turned back on when he had left the field and was reviewing his field notes in his tent or *hut*?⁶ His sexual life was on, and it helped him to understand differences and

5. Since most of participants of the study were born out of Maputo City, the same with part of the City inhabitants.

6. Located in at the first floor of a three storey building in Malhangalene Barrio, in Maputo City *village*.

similarities in sexual scripts provided by other participants, as well as to make sense of the dynamics shaping them. However, it was not supposed to be part of the study and he had no informed consent of his partner.

The female researcher, as a young woman researching and studying sexuality, noticed that the topic itself came overloaded with all manners of prejudice. Within her networks of friends and acquaintances the perception of her choice of study was generally linked to the idea of sexual availability. In the context of Maputo, the public arena construct of (“decent”) women is of a heterosexual, subservient, docile, fragile and domesticated woman. Women are required not to show their sexual desires and needs, and to wait for the men to initiate and propose any romantic or sexual relationship.

Her choice to have a profession and her research orientation on sexuality created in most men (and women!) the perception that she was different from their view of the “decent” woman. Therefore, the idea that she was an easy sexual catch and that she was sexually available was held by many. That assumption was not even limited to the field. A number of her male respondents looked at her in such way even away from the research setting.

The experience of the female researcher shows an interesting example of the awakening of the sexuality of the researcher in fieldwork. During one of the many nights out with the group being studied in order to become *one of them*, the female researcher was confronted with a proposal to become a girlfriend of one of the participants. Such proposal was accompanied by sensual and seductive gestures and attitudes. Since she was not interested in the proposer the researcher declined the invitation. However, this participant was persistent and only gave up after a few more days of trying when other members of the group got wind of the situation and requested him to

stop as he was disturbing the course of the research. This kind of “incident” simply shows that not only that the researchers deactivate their sexual being (as per AAA code of ethics) but also that the participants/informants may end up putting science first. Though they may regard each other as objects of desire or interest it is not entirely clear how either party should manage such contexts, except, may be, to do the right thing as both an anthropologist and a socialised person.

While in most cases the female researcher felt disgusted by the sexual idea constructed of women studying sexuality in Maputo, during her fieldwork she also manipulated this stigmatising view to get more in-depth information, mostly from male informants. Her playing the role of the sexually liberated woman allowed both men and women to talk more openly about their views and practices of sex than they ever could with a ‘decent’ woman. Although this strategy was very useful, even necessary, she was aware that the ethical code emphasised the need to maintain the security and integrity of the researcher in the field. By entering into the seduction game the researcher was putting herself in danger. However, if all research (whether on sexuality or something else) were to strictly follow the safe guidelines and avoid the dangerous situations, much of the information gathering would be impossible. It is well known that most of the times people only opened after developing a more profound kind of rapport, well, that has its risks. The ethics codes seem to be implying that during fieldwork the researcher should not look at, desire the informants or get aroused, and be shocked or shy over what is being said. This only works if the researcher can block his/her emotions and only reactivate it after finishing fieldwork and returning to his/her house. Is this feasible?

When the male researcher was not responding to girls’ advances they mocked him, calling him *matre-*

co⁷, especially the ones he considered as *loose girls*, but including some of the other study participants. And the reverse was that the researcher and the other participants used to joke and tease each other about girls who did not respond to their greetings or even advances. Following local sexual scripts the one who advances is free to mock when they fail, but under whose ethics should it be availed to check if this constitutes sexual harassment, under the participants ethics, that sometimes coincided with the researcher's, or under the approved ethical considerations, itself a product from a particular and different socio cultural context?

Regarding dissemination strategies, we are committed to discussing with all participants on how to utilise the data once it has been analyzed, the best way to write results of the study, as well as to explain to them that dissemination strategies should include making the study available in public spaces such as the UCT Library, making presentations at conferences and scholarly publications. Finally, we agreed to distribute copies of the studies to the participants as a knowledge sharing strategy. However, during the male researcher's last group discussion, when he presented the raw findings and the very preliminary analysis, two contentious issues emerged: should he use participants' real names or pseudonyms in his writing? And should he even distribute copies of his reports to them?

The participants were quarrelling because four, out of twelve, participants demanded that their names should be displayed in the final dissertation because:

people should know that we are modern people, with no problems talking about sex and related matters, since sex is something that we do regularly in our

lives...(E)verything we shared with you, thorough the last month, all our up and down trips around the City, in bars, cars riding, at the beach barbecue sessions, meetings in Rua Araújo⁸, avenues and other forbidden⁹ spaces, it was all true, why then should I hide myself, I assume my attitudes and no one forced my participation in this study, nor to share what I share. That is why I see no problem in displaying my name.

Another one argued:

I want my full name displayed in the dissertation, and whenever you present papers at conferences you should use the examples that I provided, so that people all around the world know that I do exist and I have a say regarding sex and related issues.

Other participants, however, demanded anonymity arguing:

You should not forget that people used to see us together, and if their names are displayed they will find a link between us and the study. I promise you that if my wife reads the study results, as you suggest we each should hold one copy, she will catch me and I will be in trouble... divorce for sure. Since she is my wife she will easily spot me in the study.

My husband should not even dream about the details that I provided And you see I have been talking about sex related things that we do and worse- things that I have done with other guys but never with him ... tell me it's a joke and you will not display my name.

When I decided to participate in the study it was because I found it really interesting, I shared things that I never did before, even with my lady friends. You know it was therapeutic, and some of the things that we discussed I had never thought about them even doing it with regularity, but it doesn't give you the

⁷. Meaning someone considered backward, out of his context, and who does not know how to fit in the fashion.

⁸. Stands for Araújo Avenues which is the former name of an Avenue at the down town were most of the Maputo City night clubs and sex workers are located.

⁹. Places were sex and related issues are less restricted.

right to expose my name. Think about my parents, think about how they will react when they read explicit details about my sexual life (that they have never imagined) being available worldwide and followed by my name....

As for me, its not negotiable. I just don't want my name exposed and that is final.

I have nothing to prove to anyone, but since I am not a sex professional and I am not advertising sexual services or favours, why would you want to expose my name?

In a context where, according to Spiegel (2005), we should consider an ethic of care to protect participants, they were quarrelling among themselves about their right to be heard and recognised or to be protected by anonymity and it was not possible to satisfy both groups. The compromise solution was to impose the researchers' ethical order that excluded all the names. However, this was clearly prejudicial to the ethics of some participants. And by imposing his professional code on everyone the researcher was exercising his power privilege, but following his own ethics to 'protect' marriages, steady relationships and parents' sensibilities, was more important that giving a few of his research participants due recognition or even protecting his profession and himself (the only three dimensions mentioned by the ASA, AAA and UCT ethics).

Conclusion

The researchers survived both the discursive narratives on sex, after initial discomfort and 'shock' of diversity and the prospect of the dangers of deeply *becoming one of them*. They adjusted to the situation by learning about sex and related issues, at least as a spoken and shared thing with people not too close to the researchers. At the end of the experience the researchers learned about their own sexuality and not

only about participants in their research projects.

This discussion highlights a large number of questions and the need to negotiate ethics from the fieldwork in Maputo City rather than strictly follow professional ethics derived from different socio cultural contexts. This is because anthropology is about expanding the comprehension of diverse ways of being human beings, rather than forcing diversity to comply with a particular way of thinking about human beings.

The two researchers were caught in a complex combination of codes of ethics from UCT, ASA and AAA, on the one hand. Though rooted in the same professional scientific academy they are nevertheless diverse in themselves. In addition, the ethics of the participants of the study and of Maputo City generally which were also heterogeneous and complex. A third dimension was the researcher's own sense of ethics which contradicted completely or partially one or both of the other codes of ethics.

Evidently in all research situations ethics are shifting and changing. One learns about diverse dimensions of sexuality in a dialectical process in which sometimes one hides participants' voices, the research context, the codes of ethics or even one's own ethics. Some other times the researcher challenges the ethics in a kind of 'writing partial truths' following Clifford (1986).

Moreover, there are times when one wishes to share moments with the study participants and make them co-authors of the research findings only to end up quarrelling about whether anonymity was more important than recognition. This scenario exposed even more ambiguity about how to manage the conflicts emerging in the presence of participants' heterogeneous ethics, researcher ethics and professional codes of ethic. And one has to still learn how to do it without overriding socio-cultural values contained in each

of the different ethical perspectives.

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Evaluating the Millennium Development Goals: An African Perspective

*Thiyane Duda**

“The more things change the more they remain the same” claims an old French proverb; and as cliché as this phrase is, I believe it captures best the nature of development as it has been experienced by the so called “underdeveloped” world. In fact I believe this phrase also demystifies the nature of development as a social reality. Although “development” as a concept and a social reality is over a half a century old, on the ground I maintain that there is little that has changed for the intended beneficiaries, i.e. the “underdeveloped” world. I will present a critical evaluation of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and thereby demonstrate a number of points. The first of the eight goals, which is the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, will be given especial attention, with an outline of the historical and current experiences of South Africa with development to contextualize the process of social transformation. The term “Development” is put in inverted commas to indicate the illusive nature of the concept, which Ferguson (1990), Esteva (1992) and other authoritative voices have declared difficult to define.

The main argument this paper makes is that, the United Nations Millennium Development Goals sound good and necessary. But owing to the unjust means of administration and the dubious reputation of the “development” industry as well as the world’s experiences with social change, the MDGs suffer

from too many pitfalls, which could make them repeat the Development Decades and Health for All by the Year 2000 and other failed programmes.

The MDGs were formulated from the Millennium Declaration and put together in September 2000, by the international heads of state (<http://www.undp.org/mdg/abcs.html>). The Millennium Development Goals are seen as a strategy towards implementing the Millennium Declaration and most of these goals are set for 2015, with 1990 having been set as the benchmark. There are eight MDGs altogether which are listed below as they appear on the UNDP Website: <http://www.undp.org/mdg/abcs.html>.

1. Eradicating Extreme Poverty and Hunger

Target for 2015: Halve the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day and those who suffer from hunger.

More than a billion people still live on less than US\$1 a day: sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and parts of Europe and Central Asia are falling short of the poverty target.

2. Achieve Universal Primary Education

Target for 2015: Ensure that all boys and girls complete primary school.

As many as 113 million children do not attend school, but the target is within reach. India, for example, should have 95 per cent of its children in school by 2005.

3. Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women

Targets for 2005 and 2015: Eliminate gender disparities in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015.

Two-thirds of illiterates are women, and the rate of employment among women is two-thirds that of men. The proportion of seats in parliaments held by

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women is increasing, reaching about one third in Argentina, Mozambique and South Africa.

4. Reduce Child Mortality

Target for 2015: Reduce by two-thirds the mortality rate among children under five

Every year nearly 11 million young children die before their fifth birthday, mainly from preventable illnesses, but that number is down from 15 million in 1980.

5. Improve Maternal Health

Target for 2015: Reduce by three-quarters the ratio of women dying in childbirth.

In the developing world, the risk of dying in childbirth is one in 48, but virtually all countries now have safe motherhood programmes.

6. Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases

Target for 2015: Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and the incidence of malaria and other major diseases.

Forty million people are living with HIV, including five million newly infected in 2001. Countries like Brazil, Senegal, Thailand and Uganda have shown that the spread of HIV can be stemmed.

7. Ensure Environmental Sustainability

Targets:

- Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources.
- By 2015, reduce by half the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water.
- By 2020 achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.

More than one billion people lack access to safe

drinking water and more than two billion lack sanitation. During the 1990s, however, nearly one billion people gained access to safe water and the same number to sanitation.

8. Develop a Global Partnership for Development

Targets:

- Develop further an open trading and financial system that includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction – nationally and internationally
- Address the least developed countries' special needs, and the special needs of landlocked and Small Island developing States
- Deal comprehensively with developing countries' debt problems
- Develop decent and productive work for youth
- In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries
- In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies – especially information and communications technologies.

One of the strong points of the MDGs is the fact that they acknowledge the importance of the context within which “development” takes place and has been happening in the past. This is indicated by the recognition that if the MDGs are to be realised the global economic playing field first needs to be levelled. Thus trade barriers need to be reduced or removed; the free movement of goods and services should be promoted, and the debt problem burdening the “underdeveloped” world and preventing poor countries from investing in education, health and social services should be lifted if the MDGs are to be achieved (<http://www.undp.org/mdg/abcs.html>). These global exigencies have often been highlighted as some of the major reasons “development” pro-

grammes fail in the “underdeveloped” world. Esteva (1992; 22) argues along the same lines that, “...even those still convinced that development goals [here not referring to the MDGs] are pertinent ideals for the so-called underdeveloped should honestly recognize the present structural impossibilities for the universal materialization of such goals”. Elaborating on this Esteva (1992, 11) argues that underdevelopment is believed to be caused by internal and external factors, such as terms of trade, unequal exchange, dependency, protectionism, imperfections of the market, corruption, and lack of democracy or entrepreneurship.

Many studies by various scholars have shown how the powerful countries have utilised the “development” industry using such forces, for their benefit at the expense of the “underdeveloped” world, the Latin American *dependencia* theorists and African followers of Walter Rodney and Samir Amin being the main examples. It has even been suggested that the aid industry, which is one of the central forces in the field of “development” was set up for such purposes (Ferguson 1990, 11). Even today there are still those who suggest the sudden debt cancellation for certain African (Highly Indebted Poor) countries has not been decided without consideration of advantages to the EU and the United States (<http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/>). Sanjay Suri (ibid) puts this point more clearly saying that, “when you write off the debts of the poorest countries, you enable them to that extent to buy agricultural produce from the EU and the U.S”. So if the United Nations was aware of these facts, and did really wish to change them, then the MDGs stand a chance to benefit everyone, both the “developed” and the “underdeveloped” world, instead of just a few. Unless this is done, how can we possibly expect success?

Although the UN plans outlined in the previous paragraph; all sound good and promising, one can only

wonder whether it is not too good to be true. The road to hell, we are told, is paved with good intentions similar to the MDGs; that is where many poor countries debt burdens came from, previous attempts to achieve “development”.

The “developed” countries are well known for monopolising the decision-making in global institutions such as the UN, in such a way that such institutions work for the benefit of the “developed” countries to the detriment of the “underdeveloped” countries. Thus, some authorities have argued that even the good intentions of the powerful Western nations, committing themselves to developing Africa in order to make poverty history, should be treated with caution. To all intents and purposes it may well be a strategy for the “developed” world to expand the market for their goods, financial services and development expertise (<http://www.sarpn.org.za/newsflash.php#3166>).

Furthermore, when the “developed” countries fail to influence the decision making in these institutions, they tend to undermine the very authority of such institutions. A good example would be the United States’ unilateralism over the war on Iraq and Afghanistan, which not only showed great disrespect for the UN system and international law but may have unleashed political and economic repercussions which America could not control (hence the belated attempt to obtain Syrian and Iranian help in pacifying Iraq) and also affect many innocent countries. Therefore it would not hurt for the so called “underdeveloped” countries to be careful not to be used as mere stepping stones by the “developed” countries through the abuse of the international institutions they control. It is about time African countries in particular worked out their own ways of attaining a better life for all their citizens and not believe that the poor Africa will always be with us. After all, demographers suggest that the European donor will not al-

ways be there to help.

The UN system does not seem to realise that context is not the only significant aspect to be considered for the successful implementation of the MDGs. Implementation strategies of any “development” project in general are also significant, as they tend to determine the outcomes. This point is highlighted by Budlender (2000; 138) who noted that for South Africa’s local development strategy, the problem is not that the funds are not available (which is often the case for “development” funding in the “underdeveloped” world) but that the “implementation is patchy” in relation to the development of the health care, education, policy and welfare services. Similarly, though the UN might have all the plans on paper, if implementation is left to the proven dysfunctional development industry, then the plans are not likely to succeed.

The MDGs reek of “development discourse” even from the title. This could present a very serious challenge for the success of the goals, as “development” has managed to earn itself, or some people have managed to award it a very negative reputation in the world. This is more especially so with the so called “underdeveloped” world and a number of academics sympathizing with the “underdeveloped” world’s “development” predicament. One of the major challenges could be resistance to another invasion by “development.” The “redevelopment” strategies that were implemented in the “underdeveloped” nations in the early 1990s offer a good example as they were seen as launching of an assault against the resistance that development and economy were facing in the South (Esteva 1992; 16). Such resistance can also be seen from the general attitudes to “sustainable development”. Some authors view it as an attempt to maintain “development” after it has been uncovered as the main cause of “underdevelopment”, rather than a strategy to preserve the world’s diversity for the future generation, which is the mainstream interpreta-

tion of it (Esteva 1992; 16). Thus the MDGs can be seen as a strategy to push “development” into the corners of the “underdeveloped” world, which have been resisting it, or have uncovered its hidden agendas and now are trying to resist it. *[Editor’s Note: see the next article on fragile states for a discussion of the idea that if donors find them difficult to work with then states are by definition fragile]*

“Development” has a track record of a series of failed interventions and unexpected outcomes which should warn us not to take the MDGs at face value. The 1960s were the UN’s first Development Decade and they coincided with independence for many African countries, economic nationalism and advice from World Bank economists that nationalising the commanding heights of the economy was all right. Political scientists of the modernisation school argued that military dictatorships were fine as long as the officer corps constituted a modernising elite and it was okay to set up soda pop bottling factories as this was import substitution industrialisation and essential for modernisation. The 1970s were meant to be the second decade of development (Esteva 1992; 14) but they turned out to be dominated by oil prices and rising debt. African countries have still not recovered from the two development decades where the leaderships allowed others to do the strategising for them. The Lagos Plan of Action gathers dust on government shelves and a similar fate may befall the NEPAD strategy as Mr Tony Blair’s African initiative steals the thunder from local attempts to create a better life for all and reinforces the view that only Europe can transform Africa. Four hundred years and still waiting!

It should be obvious by now that “development” is not something you do with your eyes closed and African governments really ought to do more to take responsibility for charting the way ahead and mobilising the local resources to achieve the future.

The 1970s also saw the collapse of import substitution industries which had relied on imported technology, raw materials and even factory managers. The resulting mass unemployment of both labour and capital saw the ILO borrow Keith Hart's notion of the informal economy and turn it into a panacea for unemployment. The 1975 Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, which then led to the conference on Employment, Income Distribution and Social Progress in 1976, tried to provide answers to the new challenges (Esteva 1992; 16). These strategies were followed by a continuous stream of concept papers and new approaches as the economists bombarded the politicians with new ways of doing the usual work of making ends meet. Thus sustainable development in the 1990s, which came out at the same time as the publication of the UNDP's first Human Development Report in 1990 (ibid).

The MDGs are the latest "development" strategy to have been formulated. The work of Esteva (1992; 22) attests to the point, as he argues that the development metaphor opened up a new field of knowledge and for a while gave scientists something to believe in. After some decades, it is clear that this field of knowledge is mined. Esteva argues that neither in nature nor in society do we find evidence of evolution and transformation towards "ever more perfect forms" because real life is notorious for throwing surprises and laying booby-traps that have so far prevented modernising man from becoming God. Engineers, more than economists have always been aware and warned of the limits to growth and now with the threat of irreversible climate change looming large in everybody's nightmares, "development" does not sound so grand after all. So why are we still committed to implementing "development" in the form of the 2015 MDGs?

One reason could be that the MDGs appear like a change of strategy in approaching "development".

The MDGs entail for one thing focus on outcomes rather than inputs that go into the "development" programmes" (<http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/MDG/homePages.do>). The UN also plans to focus more on partnership based "development" interventions (<http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/MDG/homePages.do>). These new approaches serve as a sign that the UN experts have realized that "development" has so far failed to deliver and in this sense the new MDGs are thus an admission of previous failures.

"Development" has not only been defined by failure, it has also been struggling with progress, meaning solving the problems that it aims to solve and moving on to tackle new challenges. The issues that are listed in the MDGs indicate that "development" has not made any significant progress, as they reflect more or less the same issues that "development" has been grappling with in the past, that is, if it ever aimed to change or challenge such issues at all. All these approaches (listed in the paragraph focusing on the failure of development) had human-centred development and basic needs-approach as their main objectives, which is more or less the same for the MDGs.' This is more so for the 1976 approach, which (as with the MDGs) was planned to be universally applicable but also country specific (Esteva 1992; 15).

Ferguson (1990; 16) argues that "development" does not bring about any improvement in the lives of the poor, and I see "development", as a process that has been addressing poverty for many years, working on poverty with the same people, the "underdeveloped" countries and yet the problem of poverty getting worse. Admittedly there are World Bank reports that concede that this failure was only in Africa and only in fragile states resisting structural adjustment. But what cannot be doubted is that although the resources exist to make poverty history, this has so far not been achieved.

May (2000; 7) makes a similar point when stating that poverty has been the focus of “development” for so long that most people now believe that “development” is mainly about poverty (indeed “development” planning has now given way to poverty reduction strategising), which I believe spells lack of “progress” in “development”. This could pose a dangerous threat to the MDGs, as it would reflect on “development” as a failing and futile project, which would then lead to the MDGs, like the structural adjustment programmes, being doubted from the start and treated with suspicion as just so many more new bricks with which to pave the highway to hell.

According to the dependency school of thought, development and colonialism are the same, as they have led and perpetuated the “underdevelopment” of the “underdeveloped” world by the “developed” world for its “development” world Esteva (1992; 11). They base this on the idea that, on the one hand benefactors of slavery and colonialism are the same as those of development; whereas on the other hand the victims of slavery and colonialism are the same as those of “development”. (Escobar 1990; 248). This is supported by Esteva (1992; 7), who argues that development is a process of manipulation, subordination and disempowerment of the people of the “underdeveloped” world for the benefit of the “developed” world. Thus, although these forms of social reality came at different times, they were planned to do the same thing, produce the same results. Will the MDGs repeat the process of exploitation of the South by the North or will they break the cycle and allow Brazil, China and India to join the ranks of the powerful countries? And where will that leave Africa? We cannot expect the UN to answer this question, it is up to the African leaders to make NEPAD and the renaissance work for them and their people.

The UN system played a major role in the professionalisation of “development” after the Second World War (Escobar 1990; 431) and today the UN professionals have created the MDGs together with other professionals in World Bank, the IMF, the OECD, and other specialized “development” agencies (<http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/MDG/homePages.do>).

One major fault of development discourse is the tendency to try and de-politicise social transformation and reduce it to a mathematical formula. There are gross injustices in the world economy today, not just low incomes. Jeffery Sacks’s 2007 BBC Reith Lectures have revealed just how chaotic, unconvincing and partisan the business of development is and emphasised that one would have to be very naïve to expect the MDGs to be implemented by disinterested technocrats. Development has always been about power and politics and selfish group interests.

We can already see that the MDGs seem to perpetuate and strengthen the North-South unequal power relations, as the poor countries are expected to rely on additional support from the rich countries (<http://www.undp.org/mdg/abcs.html>). No attempt has been made to theorise a self-reliant Africa, not even by NEPAD for example, the crucial role is reserved for the northern donors and the horse-rider partnership. This is very problematic because we know that precisely such support, being conditional and non-negotiable, got many countries entangled in endless debt thereby actually perpetuating colonial domination. Is it not strange that Africa’s salvation should be dependent entirely upon foreign aid, foreign markets, foreign experts and foreign “development” concepts?

That is why it is often argued that “development” is a strategy of spreading Western capitalism through out the world. Such an argument is based on the idea that “development” is essentially Eurocentric in nature; anything that comes under the name of

“development” is an attempt to “Westernize” the world for the benefit of the “developed” world, thus it is a Western assumption (Esteva 1992; 11). As if the whole of humanity cannot offer an alternative, development persists in following only a capitalist logic (Ferguson 1990; 11) to the detriment of the majority. Escobar (1990; 146) quotes Sachs (1992, 2) who highlights the same point, that development is a strategy which offers the world a thinly veiled Westernization, which is misleading the “underdeveloped” world. The MDGs are thus good intentions but the method by which they will be achieved is one that has in the past delivered much misery. It is not too late to re-think, though judging by the enthusiasm the global market has for the Western way of life, only climate change and the threat of imminent global disaster may yet force the redefinition of “development”.

Escobar (1988; 439) is critical of “development” mainly rejecting it on the basis of its narrow economic focus, at the expense of ecological, peace-related, women and gender issues or the rights of indigenous peoples. We should do more to promote the use of local knowledge (Escobar 1988; 439) than the MDGs have shown, focused as they are on combating the economic problem of poverty which in the MDGs is defined in monetary terms (http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/mi/teachgroup/goals_2004/Goals):

Extreme poverty in this goal is measured in monetary terms against a threshold of about one dollar per day, standardized across countries for comparable purchasing power. This has been determined to be the monetary equivalent of the minimum a person needs to survive.

The economy-focused understanding of poverty in the MDGs could be one of their hazardous weaknesses. Such an understanding of poverty is obviously too shallow. Chambers, (1985; 185) suggests that such a definition is “reductionist in nature, as this

single-entity socio-economic indicator is often the most inaccurate, due to the fact that [it] simplifies what is complex and varied because what is measurable and measured then becomes what is real, standardizing the diverse and excluding the divergent.”

The Cape Metropolitan Council (1998) similarly states that *poverty is more than a lack of income. Poverty exists when individual's or households' access to income, jobs or infrastructure is inadequate or insufficiently unequal so as to prohibit full access to opportunities.*

Esteva (1992; 12) makes the same point when arguing that, understanding development as a simple increase of income per person in the economically underdeveloped areas is to hold a reductionist perception, as it ignores the social components. The author also elaborates on this, arguing that “after the failure of the First Decade of Development by the UN, it proved that economic growth does not lead to “development”, which then required a change in approach for the following decade”. Hulme and Slipsherd (2003) argue along the same lines that: *a clear understanding of poverty can be formulated from a more nuance understanding of poverty dynamics based on disaggregating the poor and recognizing a heterogeneous group of people experiencing different types and depths of poverty.*

According to Wilson and Ramphela (1989;14), poverty has different faces, which could have different root causes, thus requiring one to be sensitive in their treatment of poverty, as it is not always clear and easy to differentiate between the signs and the root causes of poverty, due to the complex relationship that exists between the causes and effects of poverty, which then makes it difficult to draw a clear picture of the state of poverty. Sen (1981; 20) clarifies this point by suggesting that:

... a small peasant and a landless labourer may both be poor, but their fortunes are not tied together. In understanding the proneness to starvation of either, we have to view them not as members of particular classes, belonging to particular occupational groups, having different endowments, being governed by rather different entitlements relations.

Wilson and Ramphela (1989;16) also refers to the work of Beckerman (3, 10), arguing that it is pointless to keep measuring poverty, when there are so many people that are living under the established standard. Esteva (1992; 18) also notes that “establishing economic values requires the disvaluing of all other forms of social existence, as skills turn to lacks, commons into resources, men and women into commodified labour, tradition into burden, wisdom into ignorance, autonomy into dependency”. With evidence like this, one is left with no choice but to believe that the UN professionals either did not do their homework very well, or they chose to ignore the real problem for the easy “development” options.

Tjonneland (1996; 2) shows just why it is important to avoid “one size fits all” approaches when he suggests that poverty is seen from different perspectives, because different measures of poverty highlight different ideas, thus using one measure and not the other would indicate a very specific way that one looks at poverty as well as the intentions of that particular person. To illustrate this point he suggests:

Income measures are used to convey information about the distribution of income and the extent of relative deprivation; the proportion falling below a poverty line; and the depth and severity of poverty. Basic needs measurements focus on output of social expenditures such as access to education, health or clean water, which are also useful in conditions where poverty oriented policies are addressing problems of improving social infrastructure.

Thus all this goes to show that a universal definition would not be appropriate to capture the complex picture of poverty. A single definition would only highlight some situations at the expense of others, and in relation to the MDGs, this would only result in misleading definitions of the problem and inappropriate solutions.

The carelessness that is demonstrated by the UN’s definition of poverty could have far reaching impact in relation to the image of poverty around the world, as it would produce false pictures. As has already been noted “For the poorest countries many of the goals seem far out of reach. Even in better-off countries there may be regions or groups that lag behind. Countries need to set their own strategies and work, together with the global partners, to ensure that poor people are included in the benefits of development” (<http://www.undp.org/mdg/abcs.html>).

Although statements like these sound good as they reflect the fact that the UN considers the importance of context, as the different countries of the world are expected to use their own strategies to achieve the goals, I still believe that the fact that a list of goals has been drawn up as the main target for all suggests universal scientific criteria for defining “development”. And of course, all alternatives will be considered irrelevant to the UN sanctioned global agenda of “development” as the implementation of the MDGs. Such a conclusion is also supported by the fact that all the goals that are listed are problems that are burdening the “underdeveloped” world, as most of them have been achieved by the “developed” world. Thus with the MDGs we are seeing yet another strategy to force the rest of the world to follow the steps that the “developed” world has gone through to achieve its “developed” status. The “underdeveloped” world is obliged to commit to the ideals of the “developed” world. This approach has been criticized with the argument that it has negative

implications, as for the underdeveloped, to escape the undesirable situation; they need to enslave themselves to the experiences, dreams (and nightmares) of others (Esteva 1992; 10).

MDGs and the South African Experience

Let me now outline the experiences of South Africa with “development” to demonstrate the points that this paper has made in relation to the MDGs’. It draws mainly on the historical and the current experiences of the country.

In this paper the pre 1994 period of South Africa’s history is treated as the period that constitutes the historical experiences of this country, and the post 1994 period is considered as the current history of the country. This break might be arbitrary, but it is based on the fact that a lot changed in South Africa in 1994, which affected all spheres of life in the country (Desai 2005:12). This then makes 1994 convenient to use as a break-off point. This break has been used with the acknowledgement of the fact that, all the changes that took place in South Africa in 1994 started to emerge a few years earlier, and the history of South Africa pre 1994 still has a strong effect on the post ’94 period (May 2000; 2) (Wilson and Ramphela 1989; 4, <http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000795/index.php>), as development in South Africa is still dictated by the effects of the policies of the past (Tjonneland 1996; 3).

The historical experiences of South Africa with “development” make a classic example of the way that “development” has been used by the “developed” nations to “develop” themselves at the expense of the “developing” nations, but on a micro scale. These include the creation of an “underdevelopment” of certain regions of the country and certain groups of people for the “development” of a select few. In the case of South Africa, the divide was along the lines of race, class and gender as the

White people were more privileged at the expense of Black people, and women less privileged than men (Wilson and 1989; 25). Such a situation was created and sustained with the formulation of policies that were put in place to ensure the exploitation and “underdevelopment” of the Black people for the “development” of the White people. Evidence for this can be drawn from the fact that the colonial and the union government created policies that resulted in the creation of Black cheap labour for White owned mining companies and agriculture (May 2000; 2). This then was the result of state driven “underdevelopment”, as this creation of cheap labour entailed dispossession and exclusion of the majority of Black South Africans of certain resources that are necessary for “development” (Ibid). This process of underdevelopment, May argues, entailed a loss of assets, such as land and livestock, systematic denial of access to markets, and education and infrastructure development, which would have allowed the development of the assets that the Black people were dispossessed of. Therefore development in South Africa’s past was racialised, and almost 80% of the Black people in South Africa lived in poverty (Wilson and Ramphela 1989; 17). A similar thing happened throughout the colonial world creating a system of apartheid writ large. And so when the MDGs seek to bring about development, should they not first like South Africa try to end apartheid?

The historical situation of South Africa reflects a point made by Escobar (1988; 430) that development has been used as a form of exercising power over certain groups of people, as it was set up from the start to benefit the global elite and oppress the global poor, which then led to the creation of the developed and the underdeveloped. This then demonstrates the point that this paper makes, which is that, the historical experiences of South Africa are not any different from those of the “underdeveloped” world generally.

Thus although South Africa has become a democratic country, and to a certain extent the country's experience of "development" is changing, it is still reflective of the country's past. In working to change the face of "development" in South Africa, a number of programmes were created that focus on "development" which are specifically, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme. This section reviews the two programmes to give a clear picture of development experiences of post-apartheid South Africa, as they took centre stage in this country's "development" endeavours.

RDP was a development plan that was constructed by the African National Congress, when it was still a national liberation movement, to combat the apartheid legacy of poverty for black citizens and bring about economy reconstruction and a better life for all as its main objectives (Tjonneland 1996; 5). As strategies for the promotion of this, five broad programmes were formed which included, the meeting of basic needs, upgrading human resources, strengthening the economy, democratizing the state and the society and making the state and the public sector more efficient" (Ibid).

Although this programme brought about the needed changes in the South African society in relation to education, health care, water and housing sector within its first 500 days, it fell short of its expected goals, as they were set by the ANC and noted by those observing (Tjonneland 1996; 5). The programme only managed to build about 11,000 houses, failed to curb unemployment, as the economic growth that the country showed was never accompanied by job creation (Ibid). Even the school feeding scheme that the programme had started never lasted, as corruption led to its suspension (Ibid). Looking at poverty in general, May (2000; 2) echoes the same

message that, despite the fact that South Africa is considered as an upper-middle income country, most households in South Africa are poor or vulnerable to poverty and many have a very limited access to education, water and sanitation, energy and health care services. This shows that the RDP failed to deliver on its promises. The failure of the RDP is believed to have been caused by the ineffective fund expenditure available to the programme, as only 55% of the funds was spent (Tjonneland 1996; 6). So miserably did the RDP fail to deliver what was expected of it that its office was closed down in June 1996 (May 2000; 2).

Tjonneland (1996; 6) remarks that the RDP failed because the ANC and the new leadership took for granted the complexities involved in planning, implementation and administration of development programmes. He recommends the consent and participation of the community, and partnership with efficient public services, the private sector and the non-governmental organizations as the key to the success of development programmes.

Following the collapse of the RDP, the GEAR policy was formulated, with the same objectives as RDP but with a more neo-liberal [approach] (i.e. anti-socialist methodology and ideology (www.polity.orh.za/html/govdocs/policy/growth.html). This strategy has also been criticised for not having created as much employment as it aimed and not increasing the labour markets to absorb the entrants (Desai). Hassen (2001) observes that "it is now widely acknowledged that the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) has, despite its name, failed in terms of economic growth, the creation of quality jobs and redistribution towards the poor".

In 2003 another strategy aimed at addressing HRD, employment equity, enterprise development, preferential procurement and investment, ownership and control of enterprises and economic assets, was formulated under the name of Black Economic Empow-

erment (South African Year Book 2004/05; 182). The success of this strategy was planned to be measured by considering objectives, such as increase in the number of Black people who have ownership and control of existing and new enterprises, numbers of Black-empowered and Black-engendered enterprises as well as the number of Black people in executive and senior management positions (South African Year Book 2004/05; 182). Although, this strategy is being criticized by some authorities, it is not yet easy to evaluate its success as it is fairly new and still continuing.

The post-1994 period of South Africa also saw the formulation of Affirmative Action Policy aimed at ending the legacy of the past, which promoted unfair discrimination and division on the basis of race and gender, and virtually excluded people with disabilities. Affirmative action makes sure that qualified designated groups (black people, women and people with disabilities) have equal opportunities to get employed and make their contribution to society (http://www.labour.gov.za/basic_guides/bgguide_display.jsp?id=5848), thus in this way rectifying the situation that was created by apartheid in the past.

Despite the fact that South Africa has recorded many impressive achievements since its transition to democracy in the past eleven years (National Human Development Report 2003), there are still major problems that this country is grappling with, such as poverty, inequality and unemployment, which are believed to have increased compared with the past (Desai <http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001234/index.php>). *“People are still poor, whatever the type of measurement that is used, as people in urban areas still live in shacks, with poor water access and sanitation, the last problem being the same in the rural areas”*. To support this point Desai (Ibid) presents good statistical evidence in relation to poverty that,

The poor remain as large a group as ever and that their experience of poverty is as suffused with suffering as in the past seems to be an intractable feature of post-liberation South Africa. The United Nations Development (UNDP) revealed in its 2004 report that the poverty rate in South Africa stood at 48%.¹⁰ The Taylor Commission reported a poverty rate of between 45 and 55%. Charles Meth holds that there were some 19.5 million people living below the poverty line in 2002, up from the 1997 figure of 17.2 million. Of these people somewhere between 7 and 15 million are living in utter destitution.¹¹ A government agency Statistics South Africa reports that households with less than R670 a month increased from 20% of the population in 1995 to 28% in 2000.¹²

Furthermore to really prove that poverty and unemployment are serious problems, there is evidence that shows the increased levels of inequality in South Africa. As the Gini coefficient indicates South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world, that is, those that have data available (Desai <http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001234/index.php>).

The fact that South Africa is experiencing these problems, despite the policies and the development strategies that have been put in place, goes to show that there is a disconnection between development and ground results. This then really proves that South Africa is engaging on an unfavourable development growth path (Ibid), being that growth; however measures is not accompanied by reduction in unemployment and poverty (Tjonneland 1996; 5)

This could pose a potential threat to the achievement of the MDGs in South Africa. This is based on the fact that, if the local strategies of development are not as functional, considering the fact that the MDGs are to be incorporated in the local development strategies, in South Africa the MDGs could suffer that same fate.

Additionally, the people of South Africa have seen so many “development” projects failing, which then could lower their trust in “development” in the future. This could be a problem for the MDGs’, especially so in relation to implementation. In fact I believe the signs of this problem in South Africa are starting to show. Only 30% of the potential voter pitched for this country’s first democratic local government elections in 1995 (Tjonneland 1996; 8). Furthermore, currently South Africa has seen the general public taking to the streets, protesting against what they consider as slow service delivery. This could go the other way as well, being an advantage for the implementation of the MDGs’, as it implies that people would welcome “development”, seeing that they are demanding it at the moment.

Furthermore, I am certain that the policies that have been formed by South Africa in order to rectify the past inequalities, could lay the ground for the achievement of the MDGs’, as the people that were disadvantaged in the past will get a chance to “develop”. Such programmes could be used as channels for implementation of the goals.

The South Africa Human Development Report 2003 (<http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001234/index.php>) highlighted the eradication of poverty and extreme income and wealth inequalities, the provision of access to quality and affordable basic services to all South Africans, the promotion of environmental sustainability, a sustained reduction in the unemployment rate, and the attainment of sustainable high growth rates as the major challenges facing development in South Africa at the moment. These challenges are more or less the same as the MDGs’, which then presents a good setting for the MDGs’ incorporation into the local development strategies.

The findings from South Africa Human Development Report 2003 (Ibid), advice that shifting decision-making closer to communities and their organisations

can improve the connection between sustainable development policies and outcomes, which I believe could be considered as an advantage, considering the fact that this is the approach that has been recommended for the implementation of the MDGs’. It is also based on the fact that one of South Africa’s problems is the disconnection between development policies and their outcomes.

To conclude, owing to the reputation of “development” around the world, especially in the “underdeveloped” world in general the MDGs may not be successful. The MDGs come under the burner of “development”, and “development” has been criticised too many times as a “Westernizing” and colonising crusade, the same as its predecessor, colonisation. It has been labelled as a continuation of colonialism; a process of domination fashioned to the benefit of the “developed” world at the expense of the “underdeveloped” world. Although, the MDGs aim to remove, or change the forces central in the “development” field, forces such as trade barriers, free trade of goods and services and the debt problem burdening the “underdeveloped” world, there is little confidence in these, as institutions such as the UN cannot be held accountable for their promises. This is based on the fact that such institutions are renown for being power channels for the “developed” world. That would also make MDGs suspicious as a strategy to subject the “underdeveloped world to the power of the “developed” world.

Furthermore, “development” tends to come as a set of goals to be achieved, which have been achieved by the “developed” nations, thus reinforcing an evolutionary, linear idea of “development, as the “underdeveloped” nations are expected to follow the path of the “developed” nations to “development”, in the process denying them a chance to “development” in their own terms. This could be reinforced by the fact that the “underdeveloped” nations are expected

to rely on the “developed” nations for help, which would then mean that the “developed” nations would benefit more from the MDGs compared to the “underdeveloped” nations, as they would open opportunities for their experts.

Moreover, the historical track record of “development” is not so convincing that “development” can or really intends to “develop” those it promises to. There are so many “development” strategies that have been put in place but delivered less than expected. And on top of this these strategies have been dealing with the same problems over and over again, which then means that there is no progress in “development”, that is if any.

Another problem that could present an obstacle to the achievement of the goals is the fact that they are based on an economic approach to “development”. This can be seen from the way that poverty is defined, which is in monetary terms. Such understanding has been criticised so many times, as it draws a misguided picture of poverty. It has been declared homogenizing and reductionist, as it does not consider the different ways of being poor. Such a definition is also believed to be used by those who opt for easy options, as it makes it easy to measure poverty, but fails to draw a clear picture of poverty.

In relation to South Africa, the goals could be a success, as this country is working hard to rectify the historical situation, which has led to the “underdevelopment” of the majority of the country’s population. There are programmes such as the Black Economic Empowerment and Affirmative Action, which have been set up by the new democratic government to change the historical situation of racialised “development”.

The MDGs match the problems that South Africa is focusing on at the moment, which means that it would be easy to incorporate them into the local strategy of “development” as they were originally

planned. The only problem, which could pose a threat in South Africa is the fact that, within the ten years of democracy, it has already had a series of “development” policies that have failed already, not delivering on their promises to the people at large. The criticised failure of strategies such as RDP and GEAR all took place in front of the people. In fact South Africa at the moment is faced with the problem of general public protesting against slow public service delivery. Although this could mean people losing faith in “development”, it could also mean that people would welcome the MDGs as they are calling for “development” at the moment. Mostly these strategies are criticised for having poor implementation strategies, as they have led to a positive economic growth, a milestone for a new democracy in the “underdeveloped”, but such growth was not accompanied by reduction in poverty and unemployment. That would mean then that, without change of such strategies the goals could suffer the same fate. Therefore, with good implementation plans, and maintenance of good “development” strategies, the Millennium Development Goals could be positively achieved.

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Globalisation and The Irresponsible State: Demystifying the Fragile State Agenda

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Introduction

The Fragile Concept

“Nation states fail because they can no longer deliver positive political goods to their people. Their governments lose legitimacy and, in the eyes and hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens, the nation-state itself becomes illegitimate.” (Rotberg 2002).

[The Fragile State is] ...an imaginary figure spawned by globalisation... [Some assert that] the rise in the number of civil wars is a sign of the end of the state. We should wonder if the wars are not bloody state-building processes. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, wars are a way to control the state, even to restore it" (Bayart 2005).

In the era of globalisation, nothing is “foreign”, nothing is “far” from us” (Marthoz 2005).

This paper is a critique of global apartheid and development initiatives that seek to contain poverty in Bantustan-like Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) so that the benefits of modern science and technology can be enjoyed relatively peacefully only in the privileged fortresses of Europe and America. We counter the development industry’s idea that poor people need aid with the very neoliberal suggestion that they need freedom of movement and fair trade and a level global playing field. Only by allowing labour and capital to find their true value on the world market without interference from political and economic mo-

nopolies can poverty ever become history. In any case, the development industry is finding it difficult to deal with the reality that certain African countries are currently enjoying economic growth, accompanied by improvements in quality of life, as a result of Chinese investments rather than Western aid. Sudan obviously comes to mind – but there are others. In countries like Ghana remittances from the Diaspora have also shown that if young Africans were allowed to work freely in Europe and America and to invest freely in their home countries, the G8 pledges of handouts and fund-raising concerts for Africa would indeed become superfluous. The idea of the fragile state is thus a dangerous (albeit redundant) concept because it seeks, like apartheid, to reinforce the use of foreign aid (ODA) to keep the natives in their Bantustans so that they do not bring poverty, ignorance, disease and terror to the white republic. It also seeks to lay the blame for human misery on the defunct nation-state when clearly the causes and solutions to the problems of countries ruled by criminals are global. The nation-state is too small to handle the massive problems that humanity faces today and therefore fragility must be seen as permeating through the global community and not the donors’ list of 46 demonised polities called *fragile states* (see DFID 2005, 7).

Conventional political science finds it impossible to envisage fragile states except as poverty-stricken African states led by kleptomaniacs, and Rotberg’s take on state failure and collapse seems to suggest that even if an illegitimate regime were to occur in Europe or North America, the nation-state itself would not lose its legitimacy, in short it is not possible for the old democracies of Europe and America to become fragile. Admittedly one donor does state that “All states are fragile in some respects and states move in and out of fragility” (DFID 2005; 7). I want to suggest that illegitimacy and fragility are inti-

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mately connected as Rotberg argues but it is precisely *Empire* that is inherently illegitimate and thus systematically fragile. History (and Ibn Khaldun) shows us that there is only one way for mighty empires to go and that is down. The Great Emperor who wept when he was told there were no more territories for him to subdue understood this very well. The quintessential fragile state is the world dominating empire because it has a built-in mechanism for obsolescence. So why is the fragile state agenda theorising Somalia and not America, or at least both?

Defining Fragility

According to the British Department for International Development (Colonial Office?), their working definition of fragile states in brief is "where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor...DFID does not limit its definition of fragile states to those affected by conflict" (<http://www.eldis.org/static/DOC17283.htm>). Do you want to know why the state is unable or unwilling to function normally?

The fragile state agenda, according to one report (Cammack *et al.* 2006, ix) dates back to the 1990s. Africans will remember this period as the second lost decade, one in which their governments were no longer attempting to implement development but were engaged in poverty alleviation. Fragile states are defined in many different ways, and so Iraq under Saddam Hussein accused of having Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) was a problem for the USA in a way that Liberia under Charles Taylor frustrating Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) was not. So how are we to make sense of the fragility of:

- Colombia that is unable or unwilling to stem the flow of cocaine into Europe and America? And what about America's own failure to reduce demand?

- Somalia that has no functioning state structures but working telecommunications and power companies?
- Oil rich Nigeria that still battles to generate electricity or conduct elections – something that even smaller and poorer countries have managed to with more success?
- Angola and Venezuela that can use their petrodollar windfall to tell the "International Community" *Bwana go home!* We do not need you anymore, the Chinese will help us!

The only thing that these countries have in common is that they are perceived as a problem for the "International Community" (of which most of Africa is not). And since 9/11 the fear that state failure in Afghanistan can translate into terror attacks on New York or London – the two most well-organized centres of capitalist civilization - has reached paranoid proportions. Whether it is global warming, HIV, Avian flu, cocaine or dirty bombs, the threat is no longer confined to the uncivilized side of the great wall, nobody is immune.

Donor driven development discourse today is peddling the "fragile state" as the latest manifestation of the LDC. "The state" sounds like something political scientists should be analyzing so it is quite surprising that the donors are the leading advocates of this concept. But why should we be surprised? Did they also not play the leading role in trying to define 'good governance' in their previous attempt to modernize the world via the World Bank's "state building agenda"? The people most concerned about fragile states are not university-based political scientists but professional donors and that is why state fragility is intimately tied to poor countries' relations with donors and not with their citizens.

Another definition of the concept states: "A fragile state is a state that cannot execute control over its

sovereign territory, which fails to perform the basic functions of statehood such as taxation or provision of public infrastructure, or fails to provide the population with basic services and needs, and protect its political rights” Fride, *Fragile states backgrounder* <<http://www.fride.org/File/ViewLinkFile.aspx?FileId=1294>>.

Should we not be asking why a state cannot provide public infrastructure? Some countries are too poor to build roads, others have leaders who just don’t care and yet another set have the deliberate policy of not building roads lest rebels use them to advance rapidly into the capital city. Indeed this definition of the ‘fragile state’ fits almost perfectly the description of a Bantustan. Those black satellites of the white racist republic of South Africa were totally illegitimate, completely dependent on handouts from Pretoria, and their main responsibility was protecting the white republic from revolution. One can see that, like other colonial states, the government of racist South Africa chose to leave education and health to charity and focus all resources on regime survival. The colonial state in South Africa was never legitimate from the point of view of the disenfranchised majority and it was able to deliver only to the white minority on the basis of systematic racial discrimination policies of segregation and apartheid. From the perspective of the colonized population the state was not only illegitimate but even irrelevant for their livelihoods. Today in much of the once colonized world we can still see many people living outside the formal/colonial sector. The reason for this is that the colonial state served foreign interests. This quality unfortunately has also been bequeathed to the postcolonial state, especially in Africa, which will do what it can to sell oil to America or copper to China instead of doing with the raw materials what the rest of the world does, namely to manufacture various goods for local consumption and export.

What we are talking about here are not fragile structures that exist in isolation and whose miserable condition is due to the madness of their leaders, but rather irresponsible ones that belong to a global system of power in which the role of some countries is to create an enabling environment for other countries to enjoy a high standard of living. Let us call that system what it is: global apartheid.

One can hardly call a Bantustan a failed state given that by its very nature, it is designed to lack the resources to succeed but state failure and fragility are intimately connected by this theory. Colonialism was always going to exclude the majority of the population from the ‘benefits of modernization’. In certain countries a combination of genocide and disease even turned the native population into an insignificant minority existing only on the margins in special nature reserve-like settlements. Indeed the recent emergence of native-American heads of state in hitherto Spanish-dominated Latin America proves the point that colonial rule is inherently illegitimate and therefore fragile according to the World Bank’s definition. So does the fragility lie in the Bantustan? Or in Pretoria or in the whole system of apartheid? Obviously nobody could have described the apartheid regime as weak, a failed state or even fragile and yet it was so illegitimate that its fall was always inevitable. So why do we assume a) that fragile states are low income countries under stress? or b) that foreign aid and World Bank loans can make an illegitimate Bantustan type colonial state acceptable and secure? Is fragility not intimately connected to the paramountcy of minority interests? How then can it be sanitized-with ODA? The solution has to be a political one.

Fragility is systemic and global, and Vice President Al Gore’s documentary on climate change has at last managed to show the “First Class Passengers” that even they will perish when the ship sinks, the same logic should apply to other aspects of human life in

our globalised world. In a sneaky way the concept of the fragile state does in fact admit that we are all in this together but in apartheid style only sees 'fragile states' as a threat to the good life in the West. This donor agencies view of the world is closer to apartheid South African theory than to Al Gore. Thus they say fragile states: a) will not reach the MDGs; b) will have adverse economic effects on neighbouring countries; and c) global spill-overs may follow. This is why apartheid South Africa took the war to Angola in order to keep Pretoria safe but all they had to do was implement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the war would not have been necessary. Another lesson we learn from apartheid South Africa is that you cannot keep the boys *on the border* forever even if your greatest fear is that 'the enemy will follow us home' as president G.W. Bush warns Americans when they demand an end to the war. The right thing to do is to level the playing field globally and not tinker with food parcels for the poor people in LDCs or LICUS entities. Fair trade rather than philanthropy, and freedom of movement for both labour and capital are the way forward.

Even after 30-years of meaningless war, Angola can always be rebuilt, the damage can be repaired and a fresh start is possible. But once the city walls have been breached and/or the provinces start to do their own thing, it is curtains for the world dominating empire and many great civilisations have come and gone for us to be able to say: *it is not accidental*. And thus it is easy to say quite confidently that the sun will never rise again on the British Empire. Collapsed Sierra Leone on the other hand can be put back on its feet again, and we suggest, that with greater freedom of movement for its young people, and fair trade for its exports rather than annual G8 pledges of aid, the post-conflict reconstruction can be speeded up.

The notion of fragile states like that of less developed countries does not mean what it suggests, it is simply

short for 'Countries that must cooperate with the donors'. World Bank Economists and securocrats in donor countries not political scientists are obsessed with this concept. In most university political science departments, it is the International Relations people that study international economic development/cooperation that are obliged to grapple with it. In real discussions of political power those that cannot think of the USA or EU as fragile states clearly are trapped in their preconceived agenda. Why should the fragility of small states be more serious than that of great powers? If big were better, American SUVs would outsell Asian sedans and the dinosaurs would still be masters of the earth. So, let all fragile state theorists throw all the possibilities into equation like reality does and consider the generic nation-state as potentially fragile. And don't mention donors.

Jean-Francois Bayart (2005) points us in the right direction (fragile state theorists are pointing us in the wrong direction, which is what the mystification of the title refers to) by highlighting the importance of a) globalisation; b) privatisation of the state; and c) wars that may restore the state (albeit only in black Africa!). Bayart too is unable to see prolonged riots in France or criminal violence in the USA in the same way that he considers violence in sub-Saharan Africa. But if privatisation of the state is bad for Liberia why should it be good for America? If the state loses its legitimacy because it cannot provide for the very basic human security of some of its citizens and we agree that this constitutes state failure, how can we then say but this applies to Angola and not France? Human rights are universal and for too long now we have been fooled into thinking Africans do not need potable water quite as much as Europeans do. But this will not do, the American state needs legitimacy as badly as the African village headman does. Let us try to think of the possibility that the USA is apartheid South Africa writ large. Let us not be blind to the facts because the violence that seeks

to rid society of the irresponsible state is not unique to black Africa; so we ask that the concept of fragility be opened up to apply to all political configurations including (I would argue especially to) Empire. If the fragile state is useful only to western donors then it is useless as a political science concept. After all, there are very few poor countries that receive all the aid that donors pledge to them, let alone all the donations that they need in order to overcome the poverty of their citizens. And in any case they would rather have fair trade than wait for the pledges to be honoured.

Privatisation and Irresponsibilisation

Tanzanian sociologist Chachage S.L. Chachage (2003) equates structural adjustment with privatisation and the making of the irresponsible state. Chachage's argument is that:

The popular democratic opposition to SAPs, as far as the IFIs were concerned were heralding the destruction of the fundamental basis of the liberal order and the institutions of privatisation and market forces. For them and the Western world, this was support for totalitarianism and against political and civil liberties, as it was against economic freedom for private capital. Thus, multiparty democracy, reduced to the number of parties, the right to govern after garnering more votes (regardless of the manner in which one got them), had become the anchorage of legality and legitimacy. The introduction of multiparty democracy became one of the aid conditionalities by the end of the 1980s. This was in a context of a world that was working hard to irresponsibilize the state by removing the notion of the public and public interests, submitting people to the belief of the values of the economy—the “return of individualism” (self-help, self employment, cost-sharing, etc) and the destruction of all philosophical foundations of welfareism and collective responsibility towards poverty, misery, sickness, misfortunes, education, etc. Within this context, the nature of these debates changed by the end of the 1980s.

The issues of the debate were recast to increasingly focus on the question of multiparty democracy, with the

fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. It was within this context that those democratic struggles, which sought new historical visions and modes of politics that aimed at defending women, youth, children, workers, poor peasants, the marginalized minorities, etc. were derailed. Politics were reduced to the number of parties and confining politics to the practices of the parties and the state by late 1980s. In fact, donor pressure was quite significant in pushing for the establishment of such a system, as conditionality of donor support over and above structural adjustments. This was being done under the banner of “good governance” (2003; 27).

The road to hell is paved with good intentions and Chachage suggests that the donors who are today trying to rebuild failed states may have inadvertently played a role in unmaking them in the first place. It is good governance and rolling back the state in the Soviet Union that gave the world the Russian Mafia, the skin-heads that go around attacking foreigners and the banks that stole old people's pensions, and of course the oligarchs who do their shopping in Western Europe and America. So if certain people are indignant it is not because they hate freedom or our way of life but because they have genuine grievances against privatisation and the irresponsible state.

Chachage's critique of privatisation resonates with the views of many who oppose the idea that the world should be judged by its usefulness to Western transnational firms rather than to humanity. And this is one thing the donors do not seem to understand. Thus 4 million Congolese (people who do not matter to the private sector) who have died since the insurgence from certain neighbouring countries can be used to refer to the process of structural adjustment in Africa as the 'irresponsibilisation of the state'. That millions have succumbed to HIV while the patent-owning private sector investors fight to protect their profit rights, falls in the same category of irresponsible statutory conduct because an enabling environment for big business may mean death for the poor.

And in any case, since they insist that they be paid for investing in research, do they compensate Asian or African countries when they take their scientists away – many of whom were educated at public expense and at no cost to the international companies or the western countries?

Structural Adjustment is essentially privatisation and only the rationalisations can be quibbled upon; but what it always boils down to is the belief that the Market/Private Sector delivers goods and services better than the state. The long queues for consumer goods in socialist states was proof enough of that, but there is more to life than Wal-Mart or Harrods and there are still millions of people who miss the Soviet Union not for its shoddy manufactured goods and shortages of shampoo and toothpaste but for the human security it was able to provide to the old, the sick and the weak.

Many structurally adjusted African countries have discovered that once the city council's water and sewerage department has been privatised, the government schools and hospitals turned into profit making ventures instead of providers of basic services and crucial investments in the future of the country, the right to life becomes a commodity on the global market. Unless one wins the lottery, Pop Idol, Who Wants to be a Millionaire, or some other game of chance, their place in the global market is not guaranteed. Only those who have access to dollars and Euros can afford to live in gated communities protected by Securicor or ADC patrol vehicles. In the rest of the world even a police checkpoint may deprive citizens of their rights and their property if not their lives. Why? Because the state has not collapsed or become fragile but because it has abdicated its social function in the name of privatization. There are of course criminal elements in countries like Sierra Leone and Liberia, but even there rise to power of criminals was facilitated by the in-action of the state across the globe. It was the state and not the market

that brought order back because the private sector was able to make money from the chaos. Social responsibility is a matter for the state, not the market.

South African political analyst Lushaba (2005) has said in similar vein:

It is now generally known that the concept of social responsibility is foreign to the logic of capital. Foremost in its agenda is insatiable desire to maximise profit. The much professed corporate responsibility is an after thought that has recently entered its vocabulary. If not what explanation exists for the consideration of costs emanating from socially responsible activities like environmental conservation, skills development as externalities? If capital is generally irresponsible, foreign capital can be said to be doubly irresponsible. African countries have been witness to the obstinacy of financial and other foreign institutions, which refuse to adapt their operational rules to the context within which they operate.

As Lushaba shows, even mainstream Western economists like Stiglitz (2002) also highlight the loss of economic sovereignty that follows privatisation and the domination of the financial sector by foreign banks. Through the instrumentalisation of central banks donor governments exert subtle pressure on domestic banks in "fragile states" to obey the rules of the market game so as to not shake prevailing economic conditions to the detriment of Western companies' interests. Thus when confronted with a possible economic slowdown Western governments can encourage banks to expand credit in order to trigger demand or withhold funds in cases of excess liquidity. Stiglitz (2002) calls this 'window guidance'. Foreign financial houses operating in fragile African states that do not owe their host government any obligation consciously ignore such signals, or as Stiglitz observes, "foreign banks are far less likely to be responsive to such signals" (2002, 70). It is the responsibility of African and other governments to apply checks and balances against the private sector because too much privatisation is tantamount to bad

governance, i.e. criminality.

It does not make sense for Ghana to be celebrating Fifty Years of Independence if in effect the country has again put its fate in the hands of foreign companies. Why then did our fathers fight for independence if not precisely to regain ownership of our history and destiny? A donor-driven existence is a kind of neo-colonialism and the determined effort on the part of donors to make fragile states toe the line is not based on any sort of charitable sense of duty (and if it were it would still be too paternalistic to stand) but quite simply on self-interest. A fragile state is one that the donors find difficult to work with. But what if the difficult state is not led by thieves but by nationalists defending their birthright? Conversely, what if the political leaders enthusiastically implementing structural adjustment policies and privatising everything in sight are defined by donors as easy to work with does that translate into a better society? Actually, the term normally used to describe African champions of structural adjustment is "brave" because they in essence are in confrontation with their own people and it is not for nothing that some of the aid that donors provide to them is riot control equipment.

The Rise of the Irresponsible State

Keith Hart (2001) has argued that:

Capitalism has become virtual (i.e. as good as) in two main senses: the shift from material production (agriculture and manufacturing) to information and services, and the corresponding detachment of the circulation of money from production and trade. This in turn is an aspect of the latest stage of mechanisation, the communications revolution of the late 20th century. The question is whether the same developments that have been responsible for the recent integration of the world society are also the cause of its increasing polarisation. The answer is yes (2001, 313).

One feature of apartheid both in South Africa and

globally is the gap between the rich and the poor and the non-economic causes of poverty, namely the use of fences, police and draconian laws to keep the poor people out of the wealthy areas except as guest workers. For economies that still rely on bananas, copper wire bars or even crude oil for their foreign exchange earnings, for farmers who still use hand tools or even animal draught power and for districts and provinces that missed out on the steam locomotive, all weather roads and water borne sanitation, will the Internet, satellite communications and hand-held computers reverse their marginalization or worsen it? The human development statistics speak for themselves. Hart (referring to the 1998 Human Development Report) showed that:

...225 of the richest men (and they are men) own more than US\$1 trillion, the equivalent of the annual income of the poorest 47 per cent of the world's people. Three of them have assets worth more than the gross domestic product of the 48 least developed countries. The West spends US\$37 billion a year on pet food, perfumes and cosmetics, almost the estimated additional cost of providing basic education, health, nutrition, water and sanitation for those deprived of them...World consumption has increased six fold in the last 20 years, but the richest fifth account for 86 per cent of it.

Money markets have made a few people very rich and have also ruined the lives of many. Corruption, mismanagement and even genuine errors in the banking industry have turned billions of paper assets into worthless investments and pauperised millions of people in the process. Free markets have failed before and it has taken state intervention to moderate the economics of greed. But the state has never been weaker and people in government are even more ignorant than those in the banks about how the new capitalism works. Unable to regulate e-commerce, the governments have turned their attention to putting up fences in order to prevent the poor from migrating

to the wealthy cities.

Given that, only one in fifty people are likely to leave the countries in which they were born and although increasing rapidly, and that only one in sixty people had access to the Internet by 1998, it is obvious that most people stand to benefit from old fashioned agriculture and manufacturing industry rather than money markets. Inequality threatens both economic well-being and political stability but it is only the irresponsible government that will allow genetically modified foods or bio-fuel plantations produced by big corporations to push peasant farmers growing bananas, sorghums and vegetables off the land. Equally irresponsible is the government that leaves welfare matters to charitable organisations at a time when education and health interventions are required to prevent the destruction of an entire generation of young Africans.

One lesson of the tragic Tuesday September 11, 2001 terror attack in America was that there is no Chinese wall separating the “barbarians” from the “civilised” world in our global village. So in a sense, despite the patriots’ suggestion to the contrary, one can even say that in a globalised world in our global village, it was not a foreign attack because those terrorists were citizens of the world and products of its madness. The War on Terror has failed to smoke the terrorists out of their caves because they are not cave-men anymore; and if in the past they used to ride in from the desert and ransack Sodom and Gomorrah, today they may fly in with the same goal in mind, regime change. Globalisation is not just about the Internet but about basic politics as well and it is not just a country’s registered voters who may decide whether a particular regime is legitimate or not. Indeed we are already accustomed to “the international community” condemning Third World Dictators so we should not be surprised that Third World citizens can also condemn ‘the international community’ for

failing to respond to their needs, for violating their basic rights; we are all in this together.

But that is not the only reason why no Great Wall can separate the civilised from the barbarians in a global village. We are all savages now because the irresponsible state cannot protect millions of victims of insecurity, provide clean water or prevent global warming whenever such action hurts the bottom line. And we are all savages now because of the way state officials torture Guantanamo Bay and Abhu Gharaib prisoners. The people who hanged Saddam Hussein were shown to be raving mad men of violence just like him and there was time when we could differentiate the common good from the selfish interests of the criminals, but it is not easy after the privatisation of the state.

Colonial Legacies

The collapse of the economy in Zimbabwe reminds us that social integration is not possible in a society that tends to exclude or marginalize people from participating in the central social arenas, the most important of which is the economy. Landlessness and joblessness are a death sentence and what is the crime that millions have committed to suffer this fate? The tendency towards increasing degrees of exclusion and marginalization in the final analysis must be blamed on political leaders’ failure to keep up with the changes in the economy. For African leaders, their inability to implement an alternative to neo-liberal economic ideologies has caused their countries a lot of harm. For both local and global marginalization problems, some of the solutions are well known; politicians have just lacked the courage to show faith in people over machines, the masses over educated elites, women farmers over biotech agro-business and local resources over foreign aid and investment.

The neo-liberal ideological project that pushed privatisation, informalisation and other anti-state policies

was easily criticised for excluding the majority of the population from development. Very few African leaders were however willing to challenge it. Other than Julius Nyerere, who chose retirement to the implementation of structural adjustment, others like Kenneth Kaunda tried to implement policies he disagreed with or, in the case of Yoweri Museveni and Jerry Rawlings, enforced it, more or less at gun point. They were the brave ones, the new breed of African leaders who believe in modernisation. As the food riots were put down, school kids recruited into the informal sector and peasant agriculture denied access to state supportive services, only those who could afford to live were allowed to.

Cost sharing measures were introduced in schools even though it was known that investing in the education of workers resulted in higher productivity, the education of girls was reflected in declining infant mortality levels and yet the leaders failed to defend their previous policies.

It is only after independence that access to health, education and welfare were democratised. This was the experience of all the countries in Africa. When was the last time that education was a luxury enjoyed by the wealthy few? During colonial rule. Go figure. The tremendous growth of education in Zambia or Zimbabwe in the first decade after independence was a great achievement. This (apart from the land) is what people expected from their government. The democratisation of the colonial economy, whatever its achievements in terms of welfare, wage equalisation and the promotion of an indigenous capitalist class, did not go far enough, and more seriously, was unsustainable beyond the first decade after independence. For a variety of local and international reasons, the growth - if not the very existence of a working class and black elite - was seriously challenged by the debt burden and the externally supervised attempts to stabilise economies.

What ESAP did therefore by introducing cost-sharing (fee paying) schemes in the social sector was to take us back to the colonial era. As public sector jobs disappeared and unemployment fuelled the worsening poverty, access to health and education became the exclusive privilege of the black and white elites. The role of government changed from development planning and implementation to poverty alleviation. What was the future meant to be for the children of retrenched civil servants and landless peasants? Now we are told that fragile states are an embarrassment because they "are most off-track in relation to MDGs" (DFID 2005; 9) But there was a time when they were told to stop building schools and focus on debt servicing.

While the flower and vegetable exporters enjoyed their foreign exchange retention facility, as ostrich farms and game ranches became more common, it was clear that larger farms were better placed to benefit than small ones and that state-owned lands were more likely to be turned into wildlife areas than to be redistributed to land-hungry peasants (see Moyo 2000). What then is to become of the landless under ESAP? The diversification of SADC economies away from agriculture and extractive industries has been pursued by many governments for a long time. The establishment of ISI manufacturing in the past was partly motivated by this need to diversify. Under ESAP however, the options open to most governments have declined as private sector investments in information, media, financial and leisure services have been concentrated in the most profitable areas. In most SADC countries, formal sector employment has been in decline throughout the 1990s and the incomplete statistics below are flattering.

Since Keith Hart's seminal work on the informal sector in Ghana World Bank economists have tried to use it as a means of providing for those who have been excluded from or denied access to formal em-

ployment. The informal sector however, is more about survival than prosperity, insecurity rather than

Formal sector wage employment in selected SADC member countries, 1994/97

Country	1994	1995	1996	1997	Annual % change
Botswana	230,614	233,457	234,116	226,001	-0.7
Mauritius	454,800	460,500	466,000	475,700	1.5
Namibia	350,280	--	--	356,849	0.6
South Africa	7,971 000	8 063 000	7,590 000	7,548 000	-1.8
Swazi-land	109 624	110 930	111 643	112 744	1.0
Zambia*	496 000	485 000	479 400	475 161	-1.4

Source: SADC Employment and Labour Co-coordinating Unit (SADC HDR 2000, 105)

* 1994/98

stability and of course, poverty rather than development. The failure of SAP is precisely in failing to reverse the trend of impoverishment.

The Impact of Structural Adjustment in Zambia: From Development to Poverty Alleviation

Zambia, as many writers have noted, was once a rapidly growing economy and in the top league of the world's copper producers. Like other African countries, it benefited from the post-war boom although it must be noted that one of the reasons for the high demand for copper was Cold War stockpiling of strategic reserves and the munitions industries. The decline of copper has always been anticipated and Zambia's problem is its failure to diversify the economy. Thus Zambia's decline from a middle-income to a highly-indebted poor country shows that some very

poor economic policies have been pursued and the price in human terms is very high.

What the qualification for HIPC status means is reversals in economic, social and development indicators in the last decade. In a country presentation for Zambia at the third United Nations Conference on the least developed countries it was observed that Zambia's economic performance in the last decade has been marked by "decline and decay". The report noted that the livelihood situation in the country has deteriorated in the period with a larger percentage of households resorting to undesirable forms of coping strategies such as reducing food intake, namely the 001 diet of one meal a day or, even worse, every other day.

Zambians have suffered a drastic decline in living standards with per capita Gross Domestic Product of US\$300 in 1999 compared to US\$720 in 1981 (Government of the Republic of Zambia/UNICEF 2000). There are many factors behind this decline but the standard explanation that most government officials have memorized to repeat without thinking includes the following:

- failure to successfully diversify into non-mining sectors like agriculture and tourism;
- unfavourable trading terms on the world market;
- declining earnings from metal mining; and
- occasional natural disasters like droughts, floods or bovine diseases.

What they will not acknowledge is that they have been following structural adjustment policies that they neither designed nor understood, which only compounded the problem. Many social indicators such as health, education and nutrition have declined in unison with declining economic indicators.

The UN further noted that Zambia was the only

country out of 101 for which data on trends in the Human Development Index (HDI) were available that had its HDI value in 1998 lower than 1975. The population living below the kwacha poverty datum line in fact grew from 70 per cent in 1996 to 73 per cent in 1998. On the basis of the international poverty datum line of US\$1 a day, well over 90 per cent of the population in Zambia was below it. In the education sector, net enrolment rates in primary schools have not shown any improvement while the quality of education has also declined as revealed by some surveys on learning achievements of grade five and six pupils. Infant and under-five mortality for Zambia has risen in the last decade, making it the highest rates in the world at 112 and 202 respectively per 1,000 live births. If this sounds like an emergency you will not find any indication of panic or crisis in the Zambian government. It is business as usual except that the business of government is no longer development but poverty alleviation and riot control.

The UN report also noted that while some of the economic reform programmes like the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility were designed to reverse economic downturn, they had failed to address the increased level of poverty in the country and placed too much emphasis on achieving financial stability like low inflation, sustainable balance of payment at the expense of domestic objectives like plain old investment in production and wealth creation.

Entitlement and Poverty

Amartya Sen (1981) showed that people starve if and when they have no command over food through the legal means available in society. These legal means include production possibilities, trade opportunities and entitlements vis-à-vis the state. People starve either because they are unable to produce food or fail to acquire it through exchange or a combination of both. Starvation is therefore not synonymous with

lack of food so much as lack of entitlement to adequate food. By the same token, lack of land, meaningful employment or antiretroviral medication is not due to the lack of resources but lack of access. In the final analysis, the right to life is a commodity freely available on the global market, and the lives of those that have no money, as per St Matthew's principle, will lose what little value they possess: *For unto every one that hath shall be given and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath. And cast ye the unprofitable servant into outer darkness: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth* (Matthew 25:29-30).

Being unable to command food, land, health, dignity or the right to life is nothing but one's entitlement to a commodity bundle. Whereas life is not yet a commodity in the strict sense of the term, the right to life as a legalistic cornerstone of global order is very much exchangeable. The apocalyptic Human Development statistics emanating from the poorest southern African countries are built on a colonial ownership structure and exchange entitlements regime that defines people's life chances depending on their race, gender and economic position. That is colonial capitalism and it is not quite the economy that textbooks make it out to be.

They may also be based on own labour, inheritance and remittances from relatives. These entitlements can be influenced by factors such as being gainfully employed, having assets to sell or ability to produce. Other factors that may influence entitlement relations include the cost of purchasing resources and the nature of the social security system.

The entitlement approach shows the link between starvation and poverty. Famines imply starvation while starvation accordingly implies poverty. However, there is no automatic link between poverty and starvation. Wealth and starvation co-exist globally and locally. People may starve not only due to food

shortages but also due to how it is distributed. States, markets, and even customs and traditions can cause starvation.

Starvation may also be caused or exacerbated by 'bad governance' especially in countries without a free press, as was the case in Ethiopia during the early and mid 1970s. One would have thought that the global news media makes this less important a factor than ever before and the Band Aid campaign certainly saved many lives using the new technologies but there are countries that the media ignore and others that are able to keep the press out and even censor internet communications. In the end globalization has not necessarily enhanced democracy or even freedom of the press. People continue to starve and to go without clean water and medicine without this fact necessarily making failed governments vulnerable during elections. If mass starvation tends to occur in colonial and totalitarian dictatorships rather than in democratic society, what are we to say about global governance in a world where communications networks are not limited by national boundaries other than that it is not yet democratic?

Entitlement theory suggests that elimination of poverty (and famines) is a complex process since it does not only involve changes in income and its distribution. Policymakers would do well to understand the complex link between famines or starvation, poverty and entitlements. Elimination of poverty and starvation requires changes not only in income but also in the ownership structure, production and exchange relations and entitlements.

Food is just one example, the most important one, of the services that people expect the state to provide for them. The state that fails to provide for the health, security and general well-being of the population should expect to be removed from office. But does this always occur? As already indicated, colonial and totalitarian dictatorships wield power without a popu-

lar mandate and without authority. They have no fear of losing elections and do their utmost to prevent losing power in a popular uprising, the only other alternative method of regime change that can be relied upon.

An unfortunate feature of the modern state in Africa is that the impotent king can rule and survive through drought, disease and famines without worrying about the threat of either elections or uprisings. Because he has access to foreign support he can ensure that he stays in power for as long as he has direct military aid including the presence of French troops in his country. Alternatively he may recruit Israeli-trained bodyguards, mercenaries working for companies set up by former SAS or South African troops and other mercenaries posing as legitimate international firms. In the 1990s when the so called second liberation of Africa took place and made 'democratization and good governance' fashionable, dictators switched from hiring security companies to computer firms that help with the rigging of the elections.

Given that thousands, if not millions, of Africans have died from war, cholera, malaria and HIV/AIDS, how is it that no government has been voted out of office on that account? How is it that the provision of safe drinking water which was achieved under the colonial regime in many African countries has proved too big a task for independent regimes and privatized water companies alike? Surely malaria, cholera and even HIV/AIDS kill people in the same way that hunger does i.e. not because they have an incurable disease but because their entitlement to life has been undermined by specific government policies. Today, as in the ancient past migration from resource deficit to surplus areas continues to be the response to poverty and war that many people adopt. Unlike before, however, they are rarely welcome as an asset and it is not just in the North that immigrants are made to feel unwelcome.

There is a tendency to treat countries, nations and societies as synonymous with states and though this may have been once true in Europe globalization has long put paid to that. In Africa, it has never been a true representation of people's political or social lives. State borders are colonial borders and national boundaries are slightly different. So although Zambia's founders, for example, aspired to create *one Zambia, one nation*, and many Africans value 'national unity', there is probably no good reason why we should continue to pay the heavy price of seeking national unity in English, French or Portuguese, too afraid to promote the mother tongue languages. Kiswahili, Hausa, Nyanja or Lingala, Wolof and Amharic, will probably deliver peace, democracy and development better than English if only because the majority of the African people will be able to take part in the conversations around these processes. And so if the colonial state is fragile, African society certainly is not; if it were it would already have perished. The point I want to make anyway is that we should not judge the capability of African societies by the fragility of their European language speaking states. It is because the World Bank and the International Community conducts business exclusively with our states that they are unable to see our nations and societies. Our societies, I want to argue, are more resilient than fragile and have withstood over four hundred years of statutory mayhem and more or less survived – against all odds.

So we are told that we are citizens of failing or failed states, LDCs, HIPC or LICUS – also known as fragile states. Why? Well, mainly because our states are deemed ineffective business partners of the 'International Community' of which we are thus not a part. When does an LDC become a LICUS? When a new generation of Harvard and Oxbridge economists is recruited by the World Bank and re-label all the existing programmes. Behind these Orwellian acronyms lies a powerful bureaucracy of phrasemon-

gers and concept paper production machines that are continually telling us new ways of saying "hungry people need food". But the trouble is that providing food to the hungry can be charitable or profitable or both. By now everyone knows that for every kind-hearted Irish pop-star trying to make poverty history in Africa there are a thousand transnational types, cosmopolitan profiteers who see opportunities where everyone else only sees human tragedy. "You will always have the poor with you" (Matthew 26:11) and it follows therefore that the donors will always be with us. Or does it?

Conclusion

So What is a Fragile State (donors aside)?

The answer to the above question is simple: it is a state that has lost legitimacy. How does a state lose its legitimacy? By failing to be socially responsible and in our era the common route to this shameful end is by privatisation. Needless to say (unless you are a donor economist) this can happen to the biggest and best, it is not an attribute solely of Sub-Saharan or socialist states.

And so which is the fragile state? The corrupt city or the impoverished desert camp? Stagnation, inhumanity and the irresponsible government may be found in the wealthy city rather than in the periphery. The fragile state agenda argues that when Sierra Leone's youth go crazy and start to chop off babies' limbs that it is the Sierra Leonean state that has failed. What about the rest of humanity – are you not your brothers' keeper? Is the only way to help countries like these limited to being their donors, adopting their orphans, distributing powdered eggs and high protein biscuits in their refugee camps or is there an alternative? Does state failure, like Ellis (2005) suggests, necessitate trusteeship – the strong re-colonising the weak? On the contrary it involves the sick getting their medicines, the thirsty having clean water and

the freedom of movement being enjoyed by all moving from Haiti to America, Senegal to Spain - just as the Irish and the Italians migrated to escape war, famine, unemployment and religious persecution not so long ago.

According to one Martoz (2005):

Two billion people currently live in “fragile states”, i.e. countries whose governments cannot even ensure minimal security and survival for large portions of their populations. Dozens of millions of people even live in “collapsed states”, under the arbitrary and brutal reigns of militia, criminal groups, and warlords. While the notion may be vague and contested, the experts quibble over the terms, and some governments may be scandalised at being so classified¹, the reality of an archipelago of vulnerable or failed states cannot be denied. Depending on the source and definitions, 20 to 60 countries are operating in this twilight of humanity.

Never mind the sixty countries, we can say of the UN that it too “cannot even ensure minimal security and survival for large portions of their populations”. Poor people are a minority in Western countries but even the UK and USA have failed to provide minimal security to some of their citizens, to most of the people in Iraq under their occupation and, in the final instance, to the two billion wretched of the earth who are not European American citizens but as fellow human beings who are very much everyone’s responsibility.

So if you look for it, you will see the fragility of the USA democratic republic; but if your *a priori* theory is that fragile states are ‘those that the donors label errant’ then you will not see it coming and whether we like it or not it is coming. The first golden rule is “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” and the second one states simply that, “This too shall pass away”. The fragile state agenda seeks to challenge both, first by creating irresponsible states that can abuse their power, confident that neither the bullet nor the ballot can bring them to ac-

count even when they start selling water to those who can afford it in plastic bottles instead of delivering it to all citizens via municipal water mains, and secondly by making reform, structural adjustment and transformation necessary for everyone but themselves. It is a very tall order.

Given that both state and market have failed the African people we have to look at what has kept African society alive and ask:

- How do women raise families on less than 1 US\$ a day?
- Why is the freedom of movement and free circulation of commodities good for the poor?
- How do Fair Trades challenge global apartheid and raise income levels more effectively than the ODA?
- Is the trouble with development aid connected to paternalism?
- What makes African societies resilient and how can we allow them to overcome state and market failure?

If there is just one point that this paper sought to underline, it is that Empire is inherently fragile and that therefore there is something very wrong with the theory of the fragile state that suggests that an African state becomes fragile when it annoys a donor whereas depriving citizens of their humanity is a brave thing to do as long as the donors approve. One can thus define a fragile state as, above all else, one that has lost its soul.

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BOOK REVIEW

- *Not white enough, not black enough: Racial identity in the South African coloured community*, by Mohamed Adhikari. Athens: Ohio University Press; and Cape Town: Double Storey Books, 2005. xvii + 252pp. paperback ISBN (13): 9-781770-130029
- *Why race matters in South Africa*, by Michael MacDonald. Scottsville: KwaZulu-Natal University Press, 2006. x + 245pp. paperback ISBN (13): 9-781869-140939

Reviewed by Owen Sichone

The two books were first published by US university presses and this would seem to indicate that race matters as much for American scholars as for South Africans. In both countries, even today, society remains racially segregated, and race continues to be the most commonly used device for population classifications and even individual identities.

Mohamed Adhikari is a Cape historian and the aim of his book, which is based on his UCT doctoral thesis, is to challenge the view that coloured identity has undergone a process of continuous transformation. His more nuanced representation of 'the nature of Coloured identity' is not necessarily true, especially as it relies on text more than on real people to show that 'Coloured identity' has remained stable. But which coloured identity is he referring to?

The author explores the long history of 'Coloured identity' from a constructivist perspective to provide a study that differs from the old 'essentialist' and 'instrumentalist' approaches he criticises. But it is not apparent that he achieves this because all three approaches are partially true and overlap, and also because working with the same stable Cape Town

population (that, though drawn from the rest of the world, is nevertheless disconnected enough to create this peculiar racial system of exclusion from rather than belonging to the rest of society) leads us to the same conclusion: confusion. The title borrows the oft repeated Cape lament that "under white rule we were not white enough" (some were and there are government records to that effect), and "under ANC rule we are not black enough" (some do gain from BEE and ANC largesse), an anti-historical prejudice if there ever was one.

His working definition of 'Coloured' is, he admits, the tautological 'people who regard themselves as Coloured' but he does not, like a sociologist or anthropologist would, show when, how and why people regard themselves or are regarded by others as such. We know that the same people may also be Italian, Indian or Sotho depending on the circumstances. And as for Coloured people not being African, well, only in Cape Town.

No one has one fixed identity. Despite the subtitle, the book in fact confirms that there are many ways of being Coloured and that there may even be more than one Coloured (racial) identity. This after all was what even the infamous Population Registration Act could not escape. Readers who are not from the Cape will probably see that everything he says about Coloured identity applies to others as well. All social identities are fluid and flexible and situational and confusing, as well as relatively unstable in form - except when fixed in print and archived.

Many people still tend to think of Coloured identity in apartheid terms either a) as a residual nonentity in which the National Party bureaucracy dumped all people they could not classify as black or white, or b) as the second class in the hierarchy of socio-economic class and pigment derived privilege. Thus instead of Colouredness representing /All/ (which, like all human categories, it does), the negative influ-

ence of apartheid has created a category of person that is seen as /None of the above/. As the Cape opens up to the rest of the world, all this is changing and Coloured visitors to Europe or America have discovered that there are numerous other ways of defining people.

MacDonald as a political scientist does not dwell so much on the history but analyses race in the post-apartheid transition. He also does not focus on one group but on the whole of South Africa; his book thus complements Adhikari's very well. We all expected that apartheid's 'racist republic' (as Radio Zambia used to call it) would be replaced by a united, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist (and yes socialist!) South Africa, didn't we? Well may be the democracy part has been adequately sorted out but the rest is proving very difficult to make. MacDonald shows how the ideology of non-racialism has failed to replace the colonial legacy of race identity and racial solidarities. He notes that this has only profited the black elites as the poor have been left out. We should remember, however, that the black elite's struggle in 1912 was not for BEE, many were doing very well and just wanted to hold onto the rights they already had as British subjects. Having lost that struggle, they were dispossessed and disenfranchised and declared non-citizens. It is not the ideology of non-racialism, or even the attainment of full citizenship that can correct the colonial crime of racism, therefore, and this is where both the Cape Town critique of BEE discussed in Adhikari's book and MacDonald's view that the economy has been /multiracialized/ but not /deracialized/ reveal the crux of the matter. Has the New South Africa, like the old regime, not left the black poor behind? What is the non-racial solution to that racist puzzle? Both books champion the right of people to define themselves but evidently that is not good enough if you are poor and powerless. <ends>

NB: This review was originally written for /New Agenda/ and is reprinted here with thanks.

PUBLICATIONS

Research Reports Submitted

Social Science Research Reports

- Hussen Eshetu. *The role of non-formal basic education in preventing the spread of HIV to the rural population: Limitations and prospects in Amhara, Ethiopia.*
- Kifle Zeleke. *Community response to HIV/AIDS related stigma and discrimination against PLWHA in some selected areas in Ethiopia.*
- Richard Wafula Kisaka. *Assessing the relevance of indigenous knowledge systems for sustainable agriculture: A case study of Njoro division, Kenya.*
- Sunungurai Dominica Chingarande. *An analysis of the impact of transe-boundary natural resources management on the livelihoods of border communities: The case of ZIMOZA Trans boundary natural resource management area.*
- Saif El Din Daoud Abd El Rhman. *The effectiveness of social spending in Sudan: Pro-poor policies or pro-poor spending? Case study of Kassala state.*
- Wangenge G. Ouma. *Income generation and the quality crisis in Kenya's public universities.*
- Joy Owen. *South Africa. Africa's America: An oasis for African educational migrants?*
- Claudious Chikozho. *Policy and institutional dimensions of innovations in Semi-Arid regions: The case of the Makanya-Chome catchments in the Pangani River Basin of Tanzania.*

Edward Mutandwa. *Can biotechnological innovations be considered as a vehicle for revitalizing African agriculture? Case of the Zimbabwean sweet potatoes.*

Carolyn M. Getao. *Flood management in the Kano plains, Kenya: Impacts, people's perception and coping mechanism.*

Euclides Goncalves. *Migrant labour and marriage strategies among youth in southern Mozambique: A study of Ukaba in the administrative post of Mocumbi.*

Jeminos Chipatiso. *The impact of HIV/AIDS stigma on corporate social responsibility: A case study of the mining sector in Zimbabwe.*

Mary Vienney Night & William Kasaija. *The nature and causes of conflict between politicians and public officers in decentralized districts in Uganda.*

Peter Kaumba Lolojih. *The role of civil society in building democracy: A critical assessment of Zambia's return to multiparty politics.*

Richard Wambua. *The making of an engineer: Background characteristics of female engineering students in Kenyan national Polytechnics .*

Satwinder Singh Rehal. *Mining-induced resettlement effects and impoverishment risks: as case study of titanium mineral sands project in Kwale, Kenya.*

Victor Kasulo & J. Luhanga. *Forest resource accounting for improved national income accounts of Malawi.*

Wilson Magaya. *Community based natural resources management: An analysis of community and private sector strategic partnerships as incentives for community participation.*

Gender Issues Research Reports

Chikalanga Mweemba Davies. *AIDS Orphans and the Aged/Elderly Women in Zambia.*

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Sheima Hssan Abdulla. *Knowledge of unmarried adolescent females about reproductive health risks related to Sexual behaviour in Muslim societies in Khartoum Sudan.*

Paul M. Nsimbila. *Violence in marriage in Tanzania: The Case of Shinyanga and Tabora regions.*

Flora O. Kasumba. *Child headed households in Tanzania: A case of Makete district.*

Mutasim Ahmed Abdelmawla Mohamed. *Gender gap in human development and its impact on economic growth: The case of Sudan (1990 - 2003).*

Andanje Mwisukha. *Towards gender equity in sports: Insights into the under-representation of women in sports leadership in Kenya.*

Basia Dennis Bless. *Gender analysis of urban living conditions of HIV/AIDS orphaned children in Lesotho.*

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Teferi Getahun. *Gender bias in education and its impacts on rural development in Ethiopia: The case of Awi.*

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Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review, XXIII, no. 1 (January 2007)

Articles

Edward Mutandwa, Christopher T. Gadzirayi and Farirai Zingwe. *Factors affecting adoption of long staple cotton variety among smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe.*

Josephat S. Itika and Adolf F. Makauki. *Smallholder cotton production in Tanzania: Emerging issues on accountability in Kilosa District Morogoro.*

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Latifat D. B. Ibisomi and Clifford O. Odimegwu. *Predictors of unintended pregnancy among South African Youth.*

Merera Gudina. *Ethnicity, democratisation and decentralization in Ethiopia: The case of Oromia.*

Samson Rwadzi Mhlahlo. *Assessment of urban governance in Zimbabwe: Case of the city of Gweru.*

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Alfred G. Nhema & Paul Tiyaambe Zeleza and (eds.) 2007. *The Resolution of African Conflicts: The causes and costs*, Oxford: James Currey, (September release date: ISBN: 978-1-84701-303-3)

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Alfred G. Nhema (ed.) *Assessment of Poverty Reduction Strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Zambia*, (ISBN: 978-99944-55-12-6).

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Assessment of Poverty Reduction Strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Kenya, (ISBN: 978-99944-55-14-0)

Assessment of Poverty Reduction Strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Malawi, (ISBN: 978-99944-55-15-7)

Assessment of Poverty Reduction Strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Rwanda, (ISBN: 978-99944-55-16-4)

Assessment of Poverty Reduction Strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Uganda, (ISBN: 978-99944-55-17-1)

Proceedings of International Conference on Assessment of Poverty Reduction Strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa, (ISBN: 978-99944-55-18-8)


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OVERSEAS NEWS

The European Conference on African Studies

African Alternatives: Initiative and Creativity beyond Current Constraints

The 2nd European Conference on African Studies (ECAS) will be held in Leiden from 11-14 July 2007.



Organized by the African Studies Centre for the Africa-Europe Group for Interdisciplinary Studies (AEGIS), a group of Africanist institutions in the European Union that aims at improving the understanding of contemporary African societies, it will bring together social scientists from Europe and Africa to discuss issues of

current importance and to promote cooperation between researchers from both continents. Topics ranging from religion, Islam, HIV/AIDS, state formation, education and literature to decentralization and politics will be discussed in 85 panel sessions.

- Keynote addresses will be given by Mr Moeletsi Mbeki from the South African Institute of International Affairs, and Professor Peter Geschiere, who will give the Lugard Lecture entitled 'Lord Lugard in the Present: From Indirect Rule to Present-Day Struggles over Belonging and Exclusion'.
- The International Criminal Court will be the focus of a roundtable discussion between Fatou Bensouda (Deputy Prosecutor at the ICC), Nick Grono (International Crisis Group), Evelyn Ankumah (Africa Legal Aid)

and Stephen Ellis (African Studies Centre) and editor of *African Affairs*..


- The meet-the-author sessions will include a debate about the much-discussed book *Reasonable Radicals* by Professor Richard Werbner of Manchester University. Invited researchers will give their opinion of the book and discuss how it has contributed to a new perspective on political elites in Africa.
- Esther Schroeder and Elmer Kolfin will give a presentation entitled 'Africans in Dutch and Flemish Art; from Supporting Role to Leading Part'.

For more information about the conference: <http://ecas2007.aegis-eu.org/>

SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT

'06 REFLECTIONS

Gender Training Institute
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
23-27 October 2006



'06 REFLECTIONS

'06 REFLECTIONS

Organisation for Social Science Research
in Eastern and Southern Africa
A Gender Training Institute Newsletter
Compiled by Trainees for Trainees

Editor: Dr Hilda F Israel
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University

The Delegates of '06

Reflections '06 is an outcome of time spent at the 2006 OSSREA Gender Training Institute, which brought together a select group of men and women who discussed pertinent issues surrounding gender and gender concepts. The more the concepts were clarified, the more we realised how ignorant we were – and how much work remains to be done in the field of gender sensitisation. With the focus being distinctively African in tradition and outlook, one left the workshop acknowledging the Biblical truth: that to whom much is given, more is expected. Much was given to us in that one week in Addis Ababa, more is expected of us in our separate institutions. Each delegate has now the insight on how gender awareness can be the start to future gender mainstreaming. Experiences can be shared. Policies need to be defined. Curriculum development has to take place. Expertise is available. We can make a difference.

We, the delegates of '06, have to be the agents of gender change right now, right where we are.

Dr Hilda F Israel



The OSSREA Executive Secretary with the Delegates

What is the future of Gender Mainstreaming?

Eunice Imasiku had some interesting conversations with her husband, Eric, after the Gender Workshop. She highlights some of the points they discussed. Of significance is that she is starting to apply GM strategies right now, right where she is - at home.

Conversations with my Husband

All of us have to work together in order to achieve gender equality. Academicians like us can help to make the difference. What is the future of GM if academicians fail to appreciate it? GM is everybody's job.

Sharing ideas with scholars from other countries in Eastern and Southern Africa was invigorating. Unfortunately, only one male delegate was present. It must have been a unique experience for Benjamin Kaneka, but he participated freely. It was easy to note that he has a heart for the girl-child.

Gender mainstreaming is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of men and women an integral dimension of the policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres. The ultimate goal of gender mainstreaming is to achieve equality. This calls for the involvement of everyone.

It is sad that many men feel uncomfortable when equality between men and women is advocated. This does not mean that women will occupy the driver's seat while men become passengers. For a long time females have not had equal opportunities, therefore, bringing them on board should not make men feel threatened. They just need to work together as equal partners in development.

Gender mainstreaming is not just the responsibility of a small number of specialists. It's a job for everyone. As a family we can make a difference. We need to continue ensuring that equality and equity are observed when dealing with our children and all others

who are part of our household.

What would your reaction be?



A man and his wife are going home. The man is driving. Suddenly, he stops and tells his wife that there's a problem with the car.

The wife quickly says, "Okay, sweetheart, I will check on it."

She goes out and picks up the car bonnet to identify the problem.

What would your reaction be if you saw this man sitting in the car while his wife was trying to sort out the problem?



Class of '06

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The OSSREA Gender Desk... *Training on Gender Mainstreaming*

Rahel Mesfin

The training on gender mainstreaming stemmed from the programme, *Integrating Gender in Multidisciplinary Research in Eastern and Southern Africa*, which was launched by OSSREA in 2004. The programme aims to:

- Sensitise the Eastern and Southern African research community on gender mainstreaming;
- Organise research programmes and promote multidisciplinary gender research;
- Encourage the development of gender frameworks that reflect on the realities in Africa;
- Promote curriculum development for universities and academic institutions in the region; and
- Build capacity of the teaching and research staff of universities and research institutions in the region.

One of the activities of this programme is capacity building through organising training programmes. OSSREA's Gender Training Institute was set up to undertake this responsibility. One of the key focus areas of the training is

mainstreaming gender. The need to mainstream gender has been acknowledged as a means of addressing the problems of gender power imbalance and gender-related concerns comprehensively.

The first training on gender mainstreaming was organised from Dec 12-17, 2005 in Addis Ababa. The training for the second time was conducted from October 23 to 27, 2006 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The training was attended by 13 participants who were selected out of 104 applicants. They were drawn from nine eastern and southern African countries, namely: Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The facilitators of the training were also identified from within the region. They were Dr. Regina Karega from Kenyatta University, Dr. Hirut Tereffe, from Addis Ababa University, and Dr. Magdalena K. Ngaiza from the University of Dar Es Salaam.



In South Africa, the slogan for celebrating Women's Day is *Wathint' abafazi Wathint' imbokodo*, which in Xhosa means: *You strike a woman, you strike a rock*. Women are the rocks of society. It is women, the daughters of Africa, who will change and shape society. This truth inspired Dr. Eunice Kamaara to remind her daughter that as women, they are both instruments of change, especially in attitudes towards gender and moral/ spiritual growth.

For My Daughter

I write this letter to you my daughter
To share with you like water
Some thoughts to quench your mind
Knowing my thoughts you do not mind

When I walk with you my daughter
To share with you like water
My time and space with love
Walking by you I feel your love

Such moments I do treasure
For they do me pleasure
For then I feel my share
Seeing what you and I share

You know how you and I treasure
Those songs for our pleasure
As you repeat for me again
I repeat to you again

When I walk with you my daughter
I want to share with you like water
The contradictions of real life
Bitter and sweet are men in real life

For our voices are sharp and sweet
And calm are our steps and feet
But can we make a choir without a
bass
As a vase would stand without a
base?


Can a bird fly with one heavy wing
Without feeling a heavy swing
So we must respect both wings
If we want safe swings

When I walk with you my daughter
And I share with you like water
And I see you do not falter
I am filled with laughter

For I know you are strong and set
To face all that will be set
Before you by culture and society
Because you are society

When I walk with you my daughter
And I see you do not falter
Under culture and society
For you can change society

So to heavens I look up
And to God I hook up



In gratitude for womanhood
And for shared sisterhood

When I walk with you my daughter
And see you do not falter
I can but thank God
All to the glory of God

Letter to Baba...

Tsige Gebremeskel's husband was not around when she attended the OSSREA Workshop.



However, she was inspired enough to write him a letter telling him of what HE missed! He is called Baba, named after their first born started calling him so. Also, congratulations to Tsige and Baba on the birth of their son. Thank you, Tsige, for sharing this personal note with us...

Dearest Baba,

23-27 Oct 2006

Day 1 started late! Because of transport problems, I reached Ghion, Safari Hall, later than expected. I just made it for the introduction. We had to introduce ourselves in different ways. Some of us used a text; system maps; drawings of home villages and some were more structural in their approach. A good exercise- it helped to improve individual presentations. What was more interesting was that everyone, including the only gentleman among the participants, was a parent. The afternoon session continued this idea. We were asked to write about the current situation regarding gender mainstreaming in our organizations. Later,

we were given a historical overview of gender mainstreaming. Reflection time brought some nice observations. Have you ever wondered how much fathers are deprived of their children's attention as they are negatively discriminated against by society? They are not closely involved in the child's upbringing. You see, when the children grow, they like to talk to and spend more time with their mothers than fathers. This is a clear case of 'gender inequality', a term that is always confused with women's inequality.

Day 2 introduced one of our tutors, Dr. Magdalena Ngaiza of Tanzania. She was marvelous because she brought things right under our feet. She wanted everyone to understand issues at grass roots level rather than just theoretically. Her gender analysis discussion was stimulating.

On Day 3 we focused on gender mainstreaming -strategies, modalities, problems and opportunities. As outspoken as I am, I faced some kind of harassment by a disabled man. He was also attending a conference, and tea for all of us was served in the garden. His wheelchair couldn't mount the paving to reach the tables. This made the man so annoyed that he complained loudly. Thinking that I was doing something good, I went to him to ask how we could help. Wow! He got so furious about the word HELP- What to help? Who to help? He didn't need any help from me or others! Well, the fact that I mentioned the word taught me that my understanding of the disabled is wrong. Drinking my morning soup of insults, I thanked him and went back to my business. I was really frustrated however, and I couldn't figure out why every service giver should say "May I help you?" if the word 'help' makes one as disappointed as he felt about it. Funny enough, it was eventually a helper who brought him his coffee, and it was always a helper who assisted him to choose his meals! So much for his frustrations!

Day 4 gave me special insight on how parents in some African countries address their children. Girls are 'daughters' but boys are 'children'. Isn't this interesting! More so because ultimately, the daughter never belongs to the family- she joins her husband's family. Some delegates spent the afternoon shopping and went on a city tour. The program was busy, so the organizers decided to give us Thursday afternoon off. Everyone wanted an Ethiopian outfit. My pregnancy ensured that I was HELPED to be free from accompanying our guests to Merkato. The other Ethiopian participants took them along.

Day 5 was fun! Our guests came to class with something Ethiopian on. They looked so nice! We developed Action Plans on Gender Mainstreaming. My group's framework helped us to identify activities for our Action Plan. We used the Gantt chart to show the time frame of all the activities- from setting objectives to the design, implementation and continuous evaluation of the gender mainstreaming policy. That afternoon we received our certificates from the Executive Secretary of OSS-REA. Our guests then went to Shiro Meda market to buy more local materials. It was only Atsede who could accompany them as Aster was busy. Me, as usual, I was let free to rest.

Well Baba, now you know how busy I was...

With love and affection

Tsige



At the OSSREA Gender Training Institute, **Dr Tabitha Kiriti-Nganga** saw clearly the dance games working women must daily perform in order to keep in step with husband-wife-family norms! It's a mind-dance; a role dance; a survival dance. Like it or not, gender discrimination forces the working woman to dance... but Tabitha is clearly defining who should be wearing the trousers in today's world. Enjoy her poem.



Who wears the trousers in this house?

It is early in the morning
I am rummaging in the wardrobe
Looking for something to wear to go to work.
I pull out a grey suit.
That is not good for you, he says.
It makes your buttocks stick out.
Why don't you wear a dress or a skirt suit, he asks?
They make you look like a lady and a well settled woman.
No, I don't want to wear that.
It is winter and wearing a dress or a skirt suit will make my legs freeze.
In any case, why do I want to show the varicose veins on my legs?
It is quite comfortable wearing trousers.
No I say. I will stick with the trouser suit.
But why, woman, why do you always have to question what I say? I am the husband.
We are now equal, eh?
Who wears the trousers in this house?
We both do. I smile sheepishly.
So we are both equal, aren't we?
That is what God wanted us to be.
Equal. Equal on earth and equal in heaven.






The Tanzanian Law of Marriage Act of 1971 is a vehicle for gender inequality, argues **Sarah Mwakyambi**. Indeed, Sarah is so incensed by the fact that it allows for girl child marriages that she wrote a comprehensive article on it.

In summary, Sarah points out that...

Laws are a Vehicle for Gender Inequality

Early marriage deprives girls of the opportunity to grow and develop physically, socially, Intellectually and economically. If a girl child gets married at an early age, she will not be able to develop to her fullest potential. This affects her development, leading also to poverty and underdevelopment in the community, hence lowering the status of women in Tanzania. Further, if the girls are married off to an older man, this exposes them to domestic violence and jeopardizes their reproductive rights.





Of all the stages in a girl's life cycle, the marriage stage is a myriad of gender disparities. Above all, she loses her identity as a human being, an individual with the right to express her opinion and decide her own destiny. The laws, aimed at protecting girls' rights, actually see them as persons who live in their private sphere performing domestic roles. Girls are a piece of property to be used. Since the girls are in their private sphere, they cannot be exposed to the public sphere and realize their other rights - like their right to own property, be educated and have health support. In the same vein, parents see the girl as a source of economic gain through payment of a dowry by the in-laws. The law recognizes this as a valid marriage practice. In this

way, a girl is reduced to a thing, an object rather than a subject.

Tanzanian Laws that deal with marriage are vehicles for gender inequality despite the fact that its Constitution recognizes that gender does not serve as ground for discrimination.

Are you a **GENDERATOR** of change?



Oh yes, you are! Look how you defined yourself at the '06 Workshop...



The world is US - U + ME.

Where are the men at this workshop? We need more men here!!



I am Sarah.
I counsel people.



Understand Self first, then others - inspire, counsel, guide, motivate, share, give, receive

I am interested
in seeing
women being
empowered.

Who am I ? ME Human Being
Christian Child of God Woman
Mother Black Daughter Sister Friend
Teacher Colleague Student ME!



I AM A SOCIAL EDUCATIONIST, RE-SEARCHER, MOM, WIFE.

I am a linguist involved in research. I am working in the Women's Affairs Dept.

I TEACH GENDER STUDIES TO UNDER-GRADUATES

I will rest when the issues of women have been addressed

I am a researcher on Gender, HIV-AIDS and Violence.



GENDERALLY IDLING



The Idler's Page *Xhosa* Iphepha loku libazisa

The Idler's Page *Kiswahili* Ukurasa wa watu wa kuregarega!

The Idler's Page *Luganda* okumala ebiseera ku kipapula

Genderally Speaking



And so we went shopping. In the matutu. First Aster negotiated the price, then shook her head-get another. Walk some more! Sardine ourselves

into a cranky old matatu and off we went. The blast-off was fun- Tsige warned us how safe it was by NOT coming into the taxi!

Hilda's face was white- it was her first matutu ride!

Nomsa caught the historic moment on camera. Suddenly the Lion of Judah

was upon us and the driver took a swing. Did he kill a

goat? Knock down a pedestrian? Run over a beggar?

He was simply taking a turn. To cheer him on and to show him our support, we all swung with him.

Money exchanged hands. 4Birr each. Never heard of

birr before. Must be a gender thing. Do you get male

birr? Female birr? Hot money?

Cool cash? Birrrrr... What-

ever. Negotiating the birr was far more entertaining. That's

the skirt I want- 250Birr?

100Birr? Okay, 60Birr... and so the Merkato grabbed our

birr. Eunice got baskets. Ben

bought shoes. Nomsa picked

up a belt. Laden with our goods, we clambered back

into our matutu-all short of birr, but with bargaining

skills better than an Ethiopian matutu driver!

Back to the Ghion, to great piano and cocktails, cricket ball bread rolls and traditional spirits. Eish! One double and you were seeing 2 Imeldas and 4 Hiruts the next day! And 5000 words on the slides! Genderally speaking, we had a really good time.

Genderally Ghion

Great staff. Good restaurants. Internet café. Hot water-sometimes. Not bad TV. Beautiful gardens. Lovely pool area— great mix of locals and guests. Curio

shops—not so nice \$.
Olde worlde rooms.
Older world furniture.
Keyholders heavy
enough to practise
weight lifting. Prompt
room service.

Genderally Dance

Of course we had to try traditional Ethiopian dance as well. It was easy to rotate our heads at 100 spins a second, especially after doing the traditional spirit thing! The dancers fascinated us with their head and neck movement. How do they stay on their feet? Don't they get dizzy?



Genderally Food

Nomsa and Hilda just had to taste njera. To their foreign eyes, it looked like a huge pancake served with a variety of meats and sauces. Unusual, yes. Tasty, yes. Try again, no! The chilli

sauce genderised them!

Anyway, there was always pawpaw galore to cool one down. Sliced pawpaw, mashed pawpaw, halved pawpaw, fresh juiced pawpaw. Soup was real good. There will be no comment on the toasted sandwiches.

Genderally Workshop

We waited, and waited. The women, that is. Not Benjamin. He was smug as the only rep of all males in East and Southern Africa. We silently sang *It's Rainin Men* as a plea to the gods. But no, no men came. Skewed the discussion a bit. Gender balance was needed. Sessions were soooo loooong, only after lunch. Farah came late. Dorothy got sick a bit. Sarah wrapped her shawl around her tighter. Tsige just had to put her feet up. Aster smiled through it all. Content was good - just ask the data projector. And the flip charts. And where on earth did the trainers come from? Kenya, Ethiopia and Tanzania, of course. They kept to African oral tradition - know your subject and talk to others about it. Thanks for convincing us to keep talking gender issues. Now and forever. Amen.

The Idler's Page Sheng Page ya madodo The Idler's Page Gikuyu Iratathi ria andu a mungetho The Idler's Page

Swahili Kona ya wavivu The Idler's Page Zulu iKhasi lamavila The Idler's Page Afrikaans Bogpraat-jies

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CALL FOR ARTICLES, REVIEWS AND COMMENTARIES

Since the February 2003 issue of its Newsletter, OSSREA has been publishing short articles on topical issues concerning the transformation process in Africa. The African Union and NEPAD have been among such topics dealt with from various angles. Our aim is to provide members of the academic and research institutes with a lively forum for debate and reflection on matters of critical concern for the people of the continent.






In the October 2007 issue of the OSSREA Bulletin, we plan to publish a few articles on issues of interest to the continent, e.g. the proposed United States of Africa. Accordingly, OSSREA members and other interested scholars are invited to contribute articles.

Articles should be 6-8 pages in length, including a brief abstract. Authors are advised to include their full address and send their contributions by e-mail before **10 September 2007** to:




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Readers wishing to respond to or comment on the articles in this Bulletin should also send their papers to [<pubunit@ossrea.net>](mailto:pubunit@ossrea.net)





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
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Calendar of Major OSSREA Forthcoming Events

16-19 June 2007	Participate in the Cape Town International Book Fair
July 2007	OSSREA Evaluation
16-18 July 2007	Second African Union/OSSREA Consultative Meeting on PCRD, Lusaka, Zambia
31 July 2007	Application deadline for Sabbatical Research Grant Programme
31 July 2007	Application deadline for the Senior Scholars Research Grant Programme
31 July 2007	Application deadline for the Post-Doctoral Fellowship Grant Programme
31 July 2007	Application deadline for Training in Social Science Research Methodology
30 August 2007	Application deadline for the Gender Training Institute
October 2007	Training in Social Science Research Methodology