

Transitional Processes and Citizen Inclusion in Kenya and South Sudan

Local Perspectives on Sustainable Peace



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Executive Summary

Post-conflict transition periods offer a brief, but critical opportunity to build the legitimacy of emerging democratic systems and to establish a foundation for inclusive political processes and institutions. Despite an emerging consensus that citizen inclusion in transition processes are necessary to foster legitimate and stable political systems, significant knowledge gaps exist on how to create opportunities more effectively for citizens to be included and develop trust in transitional processes, as well as enable them to be in a position to influence the design, implementation, or evaluation of the transitional process.

This report tests several current assumptions about citizens' inclusion during transitions in their country. One of the most significant of these is that citizens want to feel included during all stages of the complex negotiations and political maneuvering that often accompanies negotiated settlements that fundamentally transform societies. Recent evidence from Brexit suggests that despite the theory, most citizens aren't really interested in being included in the bureaucratic and political details of easing the United Kingdom out of the European Union. Rather, the prevailing sentiment has been that "they need to just get on with it!" This study wanted to test this assumption in African states that are in, or have been through a transitional period in the recent past.

From May 2017 to December 2018, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Oslo Center (Oslo Center) and the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) conducted research in South Sudan and Kenya to identify innovative bottom-up indicators of citizen inclusion and confidence (CIC) in transitional processes that can inform national and international policymakers' understanding of citizen priorities around inclusion and how inclusive processes can be designed. The research had three main goals:

1. Identify citizen priorities, needs, and expectations around transition processes in South Sudan and Kenya;
2. Identify innovative accountability mechanisms (citizen-derived indicators) that can be applied in various contexts and settings to increase accountability for citizen-centered design and evaluation of transitional processes; and
3. Increase knowledge of donors, development practitioners, national policymakers, civil society, and citizens about citizen priorities, needs, and expectations around transitional processes.

The study adopted a bottom-up method of data collection very loosely adapted from the approach used in the development of the Everyday Peace Indicators (EPIs) (Firchow & Mac Giny 2017). The indicator process developed for the purposes of this report was based on responses of participants (through focus groups) chosen from different cities around Kenya and South Sudan. These responses were consequently clustered and grouped with thematically related terms and indicators. This enabled our indicator generation process and understanding of inclusion to be informed, therefore empowering local responses in cities in Kenya and South Sudan to determine what inclusion is, how people feel about inclusion, and when they feel more/less included in processes that affect their lives. It also engaged these citizens in the measurement of their personal circumstance, and the types of processes they most want to be included in. These focus group discussions were held between August 2017 and September 2017.

Using this information, the research team defined four key thematic areas reflected by the focus group discussions separately for South Sudan and Kenya. The four key areas are:

1. Peace and security;
2. Development;
3. Governance; and
4. National Identity

Under these four themes, multiple categories and sub-categories were developed from the transcripts. This process allowed the voices of the citizen at the local level to inform the research, increasing the validity of the indicators used to measure inclusion. Using these country schema, the research team was able to develop a list of indicators for validation and testing through surveys, which were conducted in July 2018. On the basis of the responses to these, the researchers analyzed their data and presented the findings in this report.

Key Observations

Does a sense of inclusion by citizens during transitional processes matter to the citizens themselves? What type of engagement qualifies as inclusion for citizens in different countries? Are transitional processes enhanced materially when elite negotiations include the views and concerns of the citizens affected during transitional periods? According to the data collected during this project, citizens do care about the extent to which they feel included in transitional negotiations and processes, but the sense of what this constitutes and how important it is varies along a continuum—from cursory consideration, to fully immersed participation.

A key determinant of where a citizen falls on this continuum is strongly influenced by their expectations from a transitional process. When citizens have high hopes that a process will lead to tangible and substantial improvements in their personal circumstances, their expectations from the principal actors in a transitional process, most commonly political actors, are increased. With increased expectations comes a stronger sense of personal ownership in the process that influences citizen satisfaction about their levels of inclusion in this process.

The second major finding of this research is that the idea of what constitutes inclusion for citizens varies dramatically based on several key variables, including age, gender, ethnicity, and economic status. However, the clearest evidence for variance between citizens on how they view inclusion during this study was regional location. More than any other factor, where a respondent lived determined how they viewed inclusion, and how satisfied they were with the level of inclusion they experienced during transitional processes. This goes beyond a mere urban/rural divide, which was observable in the study, down to the communities in which respondents lived and interacted. In Kenya, where the government has pursued a process of devolution following the enactment of the country's 2010 Constitution, respondents' views on their trust in and engagement with local government varied considerably, but specific areas consistently demonstrated similar levels of trust in local government.

In South Sudan, regional differences were also important to the respondents. One area of dramatic variation is around that of the role of the military. While citizens tended to be joined in their belief that the military does not protect all citizens well, signaling some level of exclusion from army protection, there was little agreement on whether professionalization of the military is a viable solution. Indeed, South Sudanese respondent views differed dramatically on the merits of a professionalized army. South Sudanese were no less settled on disarmament as a solution to instability. While some communities felt that disarmament has merits, those in other communities disagreed. This may be attributed to the common practice of carrying arms in order to protect

land and cattle. Imposed disarmament may be perceived by some as leaving their community vulnerable to aggression from communities that may not effectively disarm.

Confidence in South Sudan's core governing institutions – the national government, the parliament, political parties, and police – also differed widely across regions. Most lack trust in these institutions to handle the problems facing South Sudan effectively, but in Yambio confidence was fairly high. Against this backdrop and with the South Sudan's National Dialogue stalled, there is also little consensus regarding the prospects for peace among South Sudanese surveyed. About as many in the regions believe that the National Dialogue will result in peaceful settlement as those that do not. Should the peace process move forward, however, respondents believe that non-military strategies, such as promoting dramas and sports could be fruitful avenues for settlement.

Understanding the extent to which a sense of inclusion by citizens in transitional processes strengthens or undermines the said process was perhaps the most challenging aspect of this study to assess. Citizens from both South Sudan and Kenya affirmed their view of the importance of their concerns in order to ensure that transitional agreements are trusted and robust. However, given the wide ranging and vastly different views of what inclusion meant to respondents, it is clear that a comprehensive process of engagement to solicit citizen views would be a complex and time-consuming process. For comparative purposes, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which undertakes such an exercise to solicit citizens' views on governance in their country, rarely completes the process in less than 18 months. Transitional societies rarely have this length of time or space to engage with their citizens comprehensively, and even were this to be possible, the variance of views would add to the complexity of transitional negotiations, which are, in most circumstances, already fraught with challenges.

To this end, the project sought to identify key country specific indicators that might serve as approximate measurements for citizens' sense of inclusion in transitional processes. These indicators were derived from engagements with citizens directly, where the respondents reflected in their own words on how they assess inclusion and when they feel more or less included in during and after transitional processes. While some indicators were common for both South Sudan and Kenya, other indicators were very specifically relevant for particularly communities, down to the local level. The section on "Common Indicators" later in this report goes into this in more detail.

One further finding is worth noting here: that the bottom-up approach to developing the CIC indicators was itself an experiment for this project. One of the questions the study examined was whether or not a bottom-up approach, loosely adapted from the work done by the Everyday Peace Indicators (EPIs), generates meaningfully distinctive findings from the more commonly used method of desk research into method design and then field testing. The approach used in this project, described in more detail in the "Methodology" and "Scope of Work" sections, went into the field with a relatively blank canvas, inviting the focus group respondents to fill in the details directly with minimal interpretation from the research team. The approach we developed was significantly more resource intensive, required greater allocation of resources (human, time and financial) after the focus groups, and arguably produced a less cohesive picture of elements of inclusion than might have been developed using a top-down approach. The schema produced from these focus group discussions are represented diagrammatically in the next section of this report, and while the positioning and grouping of some elements of citizen inclusion are surprising, the overall picture is much the same as the research team conceptualized it prior to going to the field. This may have been due to the fact that we collected indicators at a

local level, since these were necessarily general to reflect the broad understanding of a very diverse and multifaceted city context. So what value does this bottom-up approach add to the discussion then, given the limitations of such research?

Perhaps the biggest advantage of this type of research is the depth of responses facilitated through a free form research process with limited framing. The richness of the responses, and the collective affirming or disputing views expressed provided an incredibly detailed and informative template for the research team to use in forming a picture about how inclusion is viewed in South Sudan and Kenya. While the study was not designed with the intention of comparative analysis, a comparison of the same process in two countries yields common and distinctive understandings of certain issues. Given the ongoing conflict in South Sudan, it is not surprising that the two countries demonstrate distinctive differences in how they view peace and security, but perhaps less obviously, the same context impacted massively on how freedom of movement is viewed between the two countries. Whereas in Kenya, freedom of movement was viewed as an indicator of freedom related to economic activity, South Sudanese participants reflected that the ability to move about freely within and beyond their own village would be a useful sign that security was improving.

The other advantage of the bottom-up approach was the unanticipated local flavor introduced into the study through concepts and ideas the research team had not previously encountered. In Kenya, the researchers were informed of the value of sports and cultural activities as a means of building peace, as well as the “Peace Caravans” that are familiar to many Kenyans but were not previously on the radar of the research team. These types of anecdotes added distinctive tonal variance to the research that would have otherwise likely been missed using alternate approaches.

A final note on the use of quantitative data generated by surveys (as reflected in the country findings chapters of this report): the quantitative data was used to validate the findings and draft indicators developed first through the focus group discussions. There was never an intention to reflect this data as representative of the specific regions/demographics surveyed. The sample is small, and where possible, the same participants who engaged in the focus group discussions were surveyed in order to validate the schema and indicators. Although the general trends were endorsed during validations in Kenya and South Sudan, this research project did not carry out the validation survey with the intention of inferring to the general population. The results of all tables laid out here should therefore be viewed as such.

Organization of the Report

This report has five core sections. First, we consider in the introduction, different conceptualizations for “inclusion,” and, second, we provide an overview of the general approaches to inclusion found in the academic literature and used by policy makers and practitioners. The third section describes, in detail, the methodological approach of the research, and includes the rationale for selecting Kenya and South Sudan, the research design, as well as limitations of the research. In section four, we share the research findings for each country. The analysis entails background information on each country’s transition process, followed by an analysis of the results, which are based on mutually reinforcing focus group and survey findings. We also highlight similarities between country findings and the overall implications for the method itself. The report ends with general findings, conclusions, and recommendations. In this section, we outline the inclusion indicators developed based on the unique research approach and consider the extent to which the research is useful for other purposes.

Introduction

Citizen inclusion, with an emphasis on engaging citizens and civil society in political processes and decision-making, is a means of promoting responsive and accountable government. Over the longer term, inclusion facilitates democratic consolidation and stability. In South Sudan and Kenya, which are both countries in political transition amid substantial uncertainty and insecurity, the dividends of transition need to include stability and peace in order to enable democratic consolidation. Efforts of inclusion in these settings, however, have been uneven and pre-empted by a lack of government will and commitment, and by firmly entrenched power structures that are impediments to citizen voice and inclusion.

Post-conflict transition periods offer a brief, but critical opportunity to augment the legitimacy of emerging democratic countries and to establish a foundation for inclusive political processes and institutions. Transitions include a number of processes, such as constitution-making, transitional justice, security sector reform, elections, and the development of institutions such as political parties and civil society. The complexity and fragility of these processes is high, as are risks for conflict in the initial years following conflict.

Nascent democracies can backslide into authoritarianism or slip back into instability. The effectiveness of efforts to foster peaceful transitions is increasingly linked to the broad inclusion of citizens who can have a role in shaping the post-transition political order. Ownership and participation, aspects of inclusion, are crucial during and immediately following transitional political processes. At this juncture, societies are negotiating the very institutions and power-sharing agreements that will determine the legitimacy and stability of an emergent political order. Failure to include citizens undermines citizen confidence in government and ultimately, legitimacy.

The success of peace agreements and transitions is linked to two types of legitimacy: performance and procedural legitimacy. The former is associated with inclusive service-based delivery (education, health care, and security), while the latter is linked to participatory processes of decision-making and derives from the consent of those asked to comply with the rule of law.

Broad-based inclusion, therefore, seeks to ensure that citizens' basic needs are met and that their interests are represented. Each are essential for both types of state legitimacy. Broad inclusion in peace processes, for example, contributes to sustained peace. Inclusion bolsters the popular legitimacy needed to support viable governing institutions. Inclusion also enhances responsive social and economic policy by creating space for the expression of differing voices in policy debates and informing policy makers of interests. Finally, inclusive transitional processes also build the institutional and political foundations for peaceful democratic societies by strengthening accountable and responsive governance. When citizens can influence the design and content of transitional processes, mechanisms for accountable and responsive governance are created, paving the way for policies that reflect the interests of the mass citizenry.

Indicators of inclusion, therefore, are vital, as policy makers can identify more precisely how to create inclusionary processes and policies. Indicators themselves that are derived from local narratives, rather than external actors, more accurately reflect local interpretations and definitions, and thus contribute to more coherent – and inclusive – processes and policies. The bottom-up, grass roots approach provides a useful road map for developing indicators of inclusion based on local experiences and understandings.

Definitions of Inclusion

By definition, “inclusion” is a very broad and encompassing concept. Inclusion refers to efforts that ensure the needs of diverse people are met, and that positive actions are taken to create environments where people believe they are respected and can realize their full potential as citizens.¹ Ensuring that diverse groups of people have access to opportunity is often associated with inclusion.² Inclusion – and its counterpart, exclusion – can take many forms: political, economic, cultural, environmental, legal, physical, relational, and spatial.³ The United Nations (UN) defines inclusion as the process of improving the terms of participation in society, particularly for people that are disadvantaged, through enhancing opportunities, access to resources, voice, and respect for rights. A similar UN definition refers to inclusion as the involvement of citizens in social, economic, and political processes that allows full participation in the public life.⁴ In each of these conceptualizations, inclusion is both a process and a goal. It involves removing barriers, and efforts to enhance participation.⁵ Inclusion, however, should not be confused with its popular predecessor, “integration,” as one can have integration without inclusion and vice-versa.

Inclusion usually involves addressing the processes that lead to exclusion. For example, policies and institutions may exist that define the rules of the game, or drive the allocation and control of power and resources. Alternatively, inclusion can address norms, attitudes, and behavior that prevent disadvantaged groups from participation.

The term inclusion has been used abundantly in descriptions of key strategies that are necessary for state- and nation-building, as well as reconciliation processes. A closer look at how inclusion works in practice reveals a number of strategies. Mechanisms for citizen inclusion tend to emphasize several dynamics: 1) inclusion as voice via direct engagement and participation or a physical seat at the decision-making table; 2) indirect inclusion via engagement with constituencies, involvement in information-sharing and information gathering sessions, the creation of feedback loops, and regular communications with stakeholders on issues;⁶ 3) inclusion via the adoption of mechanisms and principles in state accountability structures (constitutions, legislatures, judiciary) that provide the legal framework for the inclusion of citizens; and 4) inclusion via the availability and broadening of the political space, where citizens can openly debate developments and issues, which can enable the expression of a host of freedoms for various societal sectors, such as the media, and allow opportunities for opposition voices to express their opinion, among other dynamics.

¹ Cardo in his interesting commentary on the concept of social inclusion, argues that social inclusion replaces its popular predecessors, “social capital” and “social cohesion.” He asserts that the two latter concepts are too vague, unmeasurable, and sometimes undesirable. For instance, a criminal gang has social capital and social cohesion. This author argues that these are terms common to social network approaches. While they are not easily measured, they can be quantified. Michael Cardo, “Social Inclusion and Policymaking in South Africa: A Conceptual Overview,” in *The Journal of the Helen Suzman Foundation*, No. 73: August 2014.

² The British Council, “Equality, Diversity and Inclusion” at <https://www.britishcouncil.org/>

³ Indeed, addressing inclusion must also take place through these dimensions. Thus, none are mutually exclusive. Discrimination, for instance, must be handled through legal, political, and economic dimensions.

⁴ United Nations, “Analyzing and Measuring Social Inclusion in Global Context and Leaving No One Behind” (New York: United Nations, 2010).

⁵ Cardo notes that the concept of “integration” was used prior to inclusion. Integration, is problematic, because it does not refer to the quality of engagement. Inclusion, by contrast, is more precise and useful, because it actually requires full participation in public life.

⁶ Ambassador Donald Booth, “South Sudan’s Peace Process: Reinvigorating the Transition, Transcript.” Chatam House, (London: The Royal Institute for International Affairs, February 2016).

Literature Review: Academic, Policy, and Practitioner Approaches to Inclusion

The issue of citizen inclusion has generated much debate in political science literature. As inclusion is considered integral to democracy, the dynamics of inclusion – and exclusion – figure prominently, particularly as it relates to democratic consolidation and stability. One perspective considers inclusion a norm of moral respect. Individuals are treated as means, if they are expected to abide by rules or adjust their actions according to decisions from whose determination their voice and interests have been excluded. When combined with the norms of political equality, inclusion allows for the maximum expression of interests, opinions, and perspective on issues that require public resolution.⁷

In political science approaches, political equality is also germane to inclusion. As a normative ideal, democracy means political equality. Not only should all be affected nominally, but they should be included on equal terms.⁸ In principle, everyone should have equal and effective opportunity to question one another and to respond to and criticize existing proposals and arguments. Models of democracy, therefore, promote free and equal opportunity to speak. This condition, however, must be met with freedom from domination. From the political science perspective, inclusion must be equal in that no one is in a position to coerce or intimidate others.⁹ Another condition of inclusion, “publicity,” also figures prominently in approaches. Here, the interaction of individuals participating in decision-making processes forms a public, consisting of many beliefs and practices, as well as interests, histories, and experiences. This public context forces the other to be answerable to others.¹⁰

Practitioner strategies to citizen inclusion, meanwhile, are more varied. Some international institutions, speaking to the political science perspectives above, tend to focus on inclusion in political processes with the aim of encouraging democratic governance. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) approach, for example, focuses on political inclusion. The UNDP’s work in South Sudan is illustrative of such UNDP strategies.¹¹ Other organizations tend to emphasize *social* inclusion and its impact on larger development goals, rather than specific repercussions for democracy and governance. The World Bank stresses social inclusion more broadly. Although World Bank interventions include civic engagement, the primary aim is not to only shape democracy, but to keep in line with the organization’s mandate to contribute to overall development goals.¹²

There are many international policies and conventions that address inclusion, either social or political. They include, but are not limited to the following:

- World Bank Strategic Framework for Mainstreaming for Civic Engagement in World Bank Operations
- The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990)

⁷ Charles Betz, *Political Equality* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

⁸ See also for example, Nick Stevenson, *Culture and Citizenship* (London: Sage, 2000), Andrea Cornwall and Vera Coelho, *Spaces for Change, The Politics of Participation in New Democratic Arenas* (London: Zed Books 2007), Russell J. Dalton, “Citizenship Norms and Political Participation,” in *Political Studies*, 56: 76-98, 2008.

⁹ See Charles Betz, 1990.

¹⁰ Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

¹¹ See, UNDP, Support to Democracy and Participation at

http://www.ss.undp.org/content/south_sudan/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/democracy_and_participation.html

¹² The World Bank, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/what-we-do/brief/citizen-engagement>

- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)
- Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1979)
- UN Security Council Resolution 1325 European Union Agenda for Change
- Copenhagen Declaration and Programme of Action
- Millennium Development Goals
- United Declaration on Right of Persons with Disabilities (2006)
- Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948)
- UNHRC Resolution on Freedom of Opinion and Expression (2009)
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)
- Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, or Ethnic, Linguistic and Religious Minorities (1966)
- UNHRC Resolution on Freedom of Opinion and Expression (2009)
- Endorsement by the UN General Assembly of High Level Principles of Fiscal Transparency, Participation, and Accountability (2012)
- Principles of Fiscal Transparency, Participation and Maintaining, in Law and in Practice, a Safe and Enabling Environment (2013)

The above approaches, however, do not consider the perspectives of citizens and their definitions of “inclusion.” Instead, their definitions and measures of inclusion are filtered through the lenses of external researchers. The narratives and experiences of local communities are thus obscured, which precludes accurate measures of inclusion.

Approaches that consider citizens rather than elite researcher perceptions offer more precise interpretations of what inclusion means to those to whom it matters the most—citizens. Understanding citizen perspectives and developing indicators based on local narratives, indeed, contribute to public policies that are better matched to the context and that contribute to substantive government responsiveness that meets the needs and demands of citizens. The findings from our research on inclusion in South Sudan and Kenya underscore the importance of a bottom-up, grassroots approach.

Utility of the Research

Given the importance of inclusion for successful and peaceful transitions, the topic merits exploration. The desire for inclusion centers around citizen demands for a say in political dispensation, and thus, the character of the transitional reforms themselves—e.g., What will be the relationship between state and society? How can fractured societies be reconciled? How are state resources allocated? The research, drawing on a grassroots methodology, truly reflects citizens’ own definitions of inclusion, as inclusion indicators flow from local conceptualizations, interpretations, and lived experiences. Finally, the findings produce real-time results and implications for policy makers in both Kenya and South Sudan, as peace processes unfold.

Methodology

The citizen inclusion project sought to develop a bottom-up framework for research and analysis, based on citizen input through focus groups, surveys, and key informant interviews to guide policy making on mechanisms that can increase public confidence through citizen inclusion in transitional processes in Kenya, South Sudan, and beyond. The entire project endeavor was implemented from December 2016 to November 2018.

The research questions listed below were developed as a guide for the creation of indicators of citizen-inclusion in countries in the midst of transitional processes:

- What fosters broad-based and sustained citizen confidence in new governance arrangements during and after post-conflict transitional processes?
- Compared with other factors (such as public service delivery), how important is inclusion to citizens in building their confidence in transitional processes?
- What does meaningful inclusion mean or look like to citizens, and how does this differ from expert opinions or conventional wisdom?
- What are the implications of research on citizen inclusion and trust for efforts to design and implement successful transitional processes that yield stable, peaceful democratic systems?

The Kenya and South Sudan research findings identified citizens' priorities, needs, and expectations during transitional processes, respectively. The accountability mechanisms (citizen-derived indicators) revealed in these countries can be applied in various contexts to increase accountability for the citizen-centered design and evaluation of transitional processes. These findings also contribute to an improved bank of knowledge for national policymakers, development practitioners, civil society, citizens, and donor partners regarding citizen priorities, needs, and expectations around transitional processes. The outputs of the project are listed below:

- Citizen-generated CIC indicators that measure inclusivity of transitional processes in Kenya and South Sudan from citizens' perspectives. These indicators can be used to hold governments accountable to citizen priorities (see Annex A);
- Policy brief with recommendations for designing, implementing, and evaluating transition processes that better meet citizen needs and expectations;
- Research report on CIC indicators in South Sudan and Kenya, with an analysis of implications for inclusive transition process design, implementation, and evaluation; and,
- Guidance methodology document on using bottom-up CIC indicators as a means of eliciting citizen input about transitional processes and designing related evaluation frameworks.

Research Design

The 'Transitional Processes and Citizen Inclusion' study employed mixed quantitative and qualitative methodologies to explore bottom-up perceptions of citizen inclusion in Kenyan and South Sudanese societies. The initial stages of the study included qualitative research in the form of a literature review of the concept of inclusion (and related concepts such as participation), from which a draft list of indicators of inclusion was developed. This was then followed by in-country key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and then the disaggregation and interpretation of this data. The qualitative approach was appropriate for this study

because the data collected focused on the participants' subjective experiences and perceptions of the level of inclusion of governance in Kenya and South Sudan. The second round of the research included quantitative methods in the form of a survey. This survey was comprised of questions based on the qualitative research outputs, and designed to test and validate the extent to which the points raised within the focus groups reflected the broader perceptions of citizens around issues of inclusion and peace in these contexts.

Step One: Background research

The first step of the study was to develop a 'foundational' background paper. The goal of the paper was to discuss mechanisms for citizen inclusion in the transition processes of South Sudan and Kenya, as well as associated policies and research approaches. There are several reasons the topic of inclusion merits exploration. The desire for inclusion centers around citizen demands for a say in political dispensation, and thus, the character of the transitional reforms themselves —e.g., What will be the relationship between state and society? How can fractured societies be reconciled? How are state resources allocated? The study also wanted to test the underlying assumption that citizens find inclusion in transitional processes desirable in the first place.

Step Two: Draft indicator development

Following the development of the background paper, the teams working on Kenya and South Sudan met to discuss the paper and develop a list of draft indicators of inclusion. The team drew on the methods and experiences used to develop the 'Everyday Peace Indicators (EPI).' The EPIs investigate alternative, bottom-up indicators of peace and how such bottom-up information can be meaningfully integrated into policy processes (Firchow & Mac Ginty 2017). The team used the EPI methodology to inspire the bottom-up data collection approach of the CIC indicators developed during this project. However, our methodology diverged from the approach developed by Firchow and Mac Ginty used to develop EPIs. In particular, we used a local level of analysis in cities in our indicator generation process.

Step Three: Key informant interviews

The draft indicator list developed by the research team was then taken to various civil society groups and other stakeholders in Kenya and South Sudan as an exploratory tool. The objective of these interviews was to test whether the local interpretation of the concepts and language was consistent with the intended meaning in this draft list of indicators. This testing phase allowed for the appropriate revision of the draft indicators and refining of concepts before they were put to wider discussion in focus groups.

Step Four: Focus groups

The objective of the focus groups was to test the draft indicators against a range of diverse groups that are representative the larger population of the two countries. Focus groups were divided according to the following demographic characteristics, and the selection of locations and regions was informed by achieving a diverse mix of respondents.

- Gender: Male/Female
- Age: 18 to 35 years old, and adults over the age of 35
- Ethnicity: Defined by Region
- Education
- Geographic Location: Urban/Rural
- Conflict Degree Geographically / Internally Displaced Persons (South Sudan)

In Kenya, focus groups were held in Mombasa, Nairobi, Garissa, Nakuru Kisumu, and Bungoma. In South Sudan, focus groups were implemented in Torit, Aweil, Yambio, Juba, Juba PoC, Bor, and Bor PoC.

The research teams conducted 15 focus group meetings in Kenya and 16 in South Sudan. The groups, comprised of 8-12 participants, were each approximately two to three hours in length. Each focus group was led by a trained moderator, with the assistance of a rapporteur/scribe taking detailed notes of the conversations.

Step Five: Coding of the data

The team used an inductive approach for the qualitative coding of the focus group data. The benefit of inductive analysis – particularly for the bottom-up nature of this study – is that it allows the categories to emerge organically from the focus group transcripts being analyzed, rather than imposing pre-conceived ideas on the data prior to analysis.

- Open Coding

The analytical team disaggregated the focus group transcripts, making detailed notes in the margins provided next to the transcript and flagging related concepts. Once each transcript had been annotated, the research team identified recurrent terms and labels and began populating the master file (coding sheets) on groupings. Because this process was fluid and organic, it required several iterations as previously identified labels were re-categorized as sub-categories or categories (concepts are not yet developed at this stage – see *Abstraction* below). For the sake of conciseness, the greatest number of linked sub-categories under categories are linked. Sub-categories do not appear under different categories simultaneously. The analysts inductively determined which groupings were best placed together.¹³



- Abstraction

During the abstraction step, the categories examined began to form a coherent reflection of the focus group discussions and the key concepts emerging from these. While most issues captured and organized into sub-categories and categories are cross cutting in nature - and could therefore fall under multiple key concepts - after careful examination of the conversations, categories were organized under the most appropriate of the four key concepts. This is again a subjective assessment and included discussion and debate between the analysts working on the coding.

The Kenya and South Sudan teams developed four key concepts: governance, development, national identity, and peace and security.

Governance: The issues covered under the governance concept are predominantly associated with the state-citizen relationship: beginning with how representatives are elected into office; the roles and responsibilities of

¹³ Coding teams were comprised of two to four people. The coding process for all the transcripts of Kenya and South Sudan required approximately 40 hours.

these representatives in public office; and whether or not and how leadership are held accountable. A considerable portion of the discussion centered on perception of deep rooted corruption within government and the level of impunity for 'powerful' individuals. Another component of the discussions under this governance concept dealt with the communication of governance issues – in the form of public meetings as well as the media – and the accessibility and freedom of information on governance and government concerns.

Development: At first glance, some of the categories under the development concept, particularly those related to service provision (e.g. education, infrastructure, and welfare), might also fit well under the governance concept. The emphasis in these conversations however relates to the perceived quality of life of the citizen. Similarly, the conversations related to the economy – business, industry, and employment – circled back to relative perceptions of status, position, and a sense of well-being in society. An interesting question to explore here would be whether citizens believe development can occur without government?

National identity: The conversations grouped under the concept of 'national identity' were predominantly centered on social interactions – perceptions of cooperation and unity (or the inverse) - in communities or neighborhoods. The conversations regarding tribalism were extensive and cross-cutting (related to issues of governance, development, and peace and security) but fall under this category as the power dynamics and resource distribution are ultimately linked to the individual's identity as a member of a tribe. Gender is also a cross-cutting issue, with many of the discussions under this category relating to violence and inequality, but again this is linked to the identity of an individual to a specific gender.

Peace and security: The conversations under this concept are two-fold, focusing on perceptions of peace and security (identifying perpetrators of violence and protectors of peace), but also aspirational, considering peace initiatives such as sport or inclusive events. Again, the role of government institutions such as the police and the army might have fallen under the concept of governance, but the primary focus in the conversations related to citizens' perceptions of peace and security rather than the organizational dynamics of the institutions.

Kenya Clusters		
Themes	Categories	Sub-categories
Governance	Democratic Process	Citizen consultation Representation Accountability Public meetings
	Rule of Law	Political impunity Corruption Legal process
	Elections	Electoral process Political parties
	Media	Government communication Media and incitement
Development	National Service Provision	Education Infrastructure Service delivery and welfare Persons with disabilities
	Economy	Business and industry Economic inequality and social standing/class Employment
National Identity	Community	Unity Social interaction/ neighbors Community cooperation and engagement Community environment
	Tribalism	Power and authority Identity Resource distribution
	Gender	Gender violence Gender inequality
Peace & Security	Security	Political threats and intimidation Police and Crime Protest and demonstration Freedom of movement
	Peace Initiatives	Promoting peace Peaceful coexistence

South Sudan Clusters		
Themes	Categories	Sub-categories
Governance	Democratic Political Space	Legitimacy of Institutions / Processes Elections Access to Information / Transparency Media Space
	Political Leadership	Accountable / Responsive Leadership Political Fragmentation
	Citizen Inclusion	Representation Community-Government Consultations Political Participation
	Rule of Law	Political impunity Corruption
	Civil Military Relations	Militarization Professional Army
	Peace & Security	Peace Initiatives
Security		Freedom of Movement Physical Security
Development	Service Provision	Equal Distribution Infrastructure
	Economic Vulnerability	Access to Markets and Goods
	Quality of Life	Psychological Well Being Livelihood Normalization of Routines and Customs
Identity	National Identity	Nationhood Tribalism Citizenship
	Gender	Gender Representation Violence Against Women
	Community	Cultural Tolerance and Coexistence Cooperation and Engagement

- Model

Based on the abstraction process that identified the key concepts inductively, the team developed a draft model of the contextual information provided in the focus groups for comparison (South Sudan vs Kenya).

Step Five – Validation surveys

The model constructed from the qualitative data collected in the steps outlined above provided a framework for the survey. A series of questions – approximately 70 for each country – based on the sub-categories and categories, were organized under the four key themes (see Annex A). The surveys were then administered in the same geographic locations and with the same demographic profiles as the focus groups. The survey, based on the reflections of citizens themselves, allowed the analysts the opportunity to quantify the extent to which perceptions of citizen inclusion raised in the various focus groups broadly reflect citizens' perceptions of inclusion in their societies.

Rationale for Country Selection

Post-conflict transition periods offer a brief but critical opportunity to build the legitimacy of emerging democratic systems and to establish a foundation for inclusive political processes and institutions. Despite an emerging consensus that citizen inclusion in transitional processes are necessary to foster legitimate and stable political systems, significant knowledge gaps exist on how to create opportunities more effectively for citizens to be included and develop trust in transitional processes, as well as enable them to be in a position to influence the design, implementation, or evaluation of the transition process.

The desire for inclusion centers around citizen demands for a say in political dispensation, and thus, the character of the transitional reforms themselves—e.g., What will be the relationship between state and society? How can fractured societies be reconciled? How are state resources allocated? South Sudan and Kenya each offer an interesting lens through which to assess this issue. These two East African case studies share several similarities that allow for useful comparisons of inclusive governance in transitional spaces.

Institutional legacy: Kenya and South Sudan were both once colonized by Britain, and South Sudan, later, by Khartoum. The dynamic of domination shaped relations between the countries' ethnic groups in ways that have been enduring and divisive. The societies in these states continue to be characterized by deep, persistent fragmentation as a consequence of entrenched inherited political and economic structures where politically dominant ethno-tribal groups enjoy hegemony over minority and other groups that remain outside of the echelons of power and decision-making.

Heterogeneous societies: The multi-ethnic composition of the Kenyan and South Sudanese societies adds to the complexity of instituting inclusive governance mechanisms and procedures. As a consequence of South Sudan's history of dysfunctional political institutions, citizens tend to turn to local authority rather than institutions for collective action and organization. A similar situation exists in Kenya where the strong ethno-tribal identities continue to shape the nature of the relationship between state and society, with enduring repercussions.

Transition: "In transitional societies, changes are significant and fundamental, and permeate almost every aspect of life; including the social, cultural, political, and economic dimensions. Thus, transitional societies create opportunities for re-imagining the intrapersonal and interpersonal dimensions of life" (Naude,

2017). Kenya and South Sudan were selected for this project because they have both experienced such fundamental changes. After profoundly divisive post-election violence in 2007/2008, Kenya's transition point came in 2010 with an overhaul of the country's constitution. South Sudan's transition point came in 2011 when it gained independence from the Sudan through a referendum. South Sudan's transition was preceded and succeeded by violent conflict (with Khartoum before, and civil war after).

Kenya and South Sudan are however not at the same point in their transition. Kenya was selected as a study to assess the sense of inclusion several years after a transition, and retrospectively engage with citizen perspectives on how inclusive governance processes have been since the transition point. South Sudan has been unable to successfully transition – largely because of political infighting that aggravate tensions between groups across the country.

While Kenya and South Sudan share various similarities, which allow for a comparison, it should be noted that South Sudan is an outlier. Africa's newest country has the three-fold challenge of having to embark upon a difficult project of nation- and state-building, as well as removing the trend of alienation from governance, as seen by the prolonged hegemony of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). This project has however allowed the team to juxtapose the two case studies as countries at different points in their transitional trajectory, and explore citizens' sense of inclusion at these points.

Limitations

Individual perceptions of inclusion: To develop indicators that speak to the quality of inclusion, this project relies on the perceptions of individuals' understanding of inclusion and asks the crucial question: "What does inclusion mean to you?" In the context of the project, perceptions of inclusion will therefore vary based on the experience of individuals in each focus group. Age and sex could be the most determining factors influencing what individuals think of inclusion; i.e., whether they describe inclusion as a goal or as a process.

Timing influence: The limited lifespan of the project impacts the type of indicators of inclusion that are mined. The period in which focus groups, IDIs, and surveys are held may lead to perceptions of inclusion that are focused on events or topics that are important to citizens at the time. In Kenya for example, focus group discussions were influenced by the 2017 general elections period (including campaigning, violence, and election outcomes and reactions). Ideally perceptions of inclusion need to be tracked over time as perceptions are susceptible to change over time.

As this has been a pilot project, it was not possible to track citizen perception of inclusion over time, but this methodology could be easily replicated in future studies.

The influence of available information on perceptions: The ability of individuals to fully engage with processes they see as inclusive depends on the level of access that they have to accurate information. The flow of information varies from country to country and therefore the quality of discussions in each focus group will ultimately impact the quality of the project outputs.

The project allows for variation in levels of informed participation, based on the assumption that these variances in informed knowledge are representative of their community. Inclusion as a concept is also not universally understood and allowing for differences to reflect in the focus groups enable the research team to better understand how inclusion is understood in different contexts.

Objective perceptions of quality inclusion: Inclusion also embodies societal norms and principles. Respect, for instance, may impact on the quality of individuals' standards of what inclusion means. As an example, individuals may believe that they are respected by being called to a community meeting, regardless of whether their opinions or needs are being adequately addressed.

Understanding that, perceptions of inclusion also depend on the level of expectations/confidence that the citizens have for their government. This is especially important in the context of ethnic tensions in Kenya and South Sudan.

Security of research team: The researcher's security and access to certain areas in both Kenya and South Sudan depends on the level of political stability and conduciveness of the environment to the holding of focus groups and the conduct of surveys. At the time of the project's conception, there was a conflict in Malakal in South Sudan, and in Kenya, there were concerns that the 2017 national elections could be affected by ethnic tensions and possibly post-electoral violence once more.

The project took all the necessary steps to ensure that its field workers and researchers were not unduly placed in potential danger, in line with the various partner institutions' codes of ethics. Where the likelihood of danger existed, no research was attempted.

Country Findings

In this section, we discuss the fieldwork results for Kenya and South Sudan. Each address the survey and focus groups findings according to the four broad categories abstracted above – governance, development, national identity, and peace and security – with discussion on noteworthy findings for the sub-categories, as relevant. We attempt to draw on the key highlights and findings from the data, and demonstrate how these findings illustrate consistent patterns in the attitudes among respondents.

Kenya

Background: A Contested Transition

For the purposes of this paper, the research team treated the introduction of the 2010 Constitution as the focal point of Kenya's transition. The 2010 Constitution was promulgated as a result of post-electoral violence between December 2007 and February 2008, which saw politically motivated killings to protest the swearing in of incumbent President Mwai Kibaki, and a violent response by the Kenyan armed forces, who shot and killed hundreds of protesters. In total, more than 1,300 people were killed because of the ethnically motivated violence, precipitating a power sharing agreement and far reaching political, judicial, and governance reforms. In this, Kenya offers a different view on transitional processes compared to South Sudan, as Kenya was not at the time of the violent outbreak a society undergoing transition. However, deep-seated ethnic resentment, a judicial and electoral system that did not enjoy universal trust, a disputed electoral result, and the hasty swearing in of the incumbent president led to the outburst of violence in the 2017 post-election period.

“In transitional societies, changes are significant and fundamental, and permeate almost every aspect of life, including the social, cultural, political, and economic dimensions. Thus, transitional societies create opportunities for re-imagining the intrapersonal and interpersonal dimensions of life.” (Naude, 2018)

Kenya's power-sharing agreement brought a cessation to the political crisis fermenting ethnic violence, created a Government of National Unity, re-established the post of the prime minister, and paved the way for the promulgation of a new constitution. Further, political stakeholders committed to a truth and reconciliation commission, land commission, changes to the electoral laws, a devolution process, and further reviews of the judiciary. The new Constitution was adopted in 2010. It introduced a bi-cameral parliament and reorganized Kenya's provinces into 47 counties, each with their own governor and local government structures. Local county assemblies were established, and national budgets were reorganized to empower these county assemblies to have more direct budgetary control over development in their respective counties.

The 2010 Constitution completely redrafted Kenya's political, economic, and social boundaries. The 2010 Constitution was an example of political adversaries recognizing the importance of inclusion in political governance, given that one of the causes of the violence was the winner-takes-all nature of Kenya's political system. The 2005 Constitutional draft split the political leadership in Kenya with a subsequent rejection through a national referendum. The outbreak of violence in 2007 galvanized a recognition that the 2010 Constitution needed to reflect a broader range of views and interests, and that it was important that this Constitution should be viewed as inclusive of multi-stakeholder views. The drafting of the 2010 Constitution was an exercise in consensus and compromise. As a result, the 2010 draft ballooned to over 700 pages as the document sought to include the multitude of views expressed by Kenyans which were not fully reflected in previous drafts. The 2010

Constitution represents both a process of inclusive participation (during the public consultations undertaken) and output (an inclusive, devolved governance structure).

Kenya's post-conflict transition spanned the breadth of its political, economic, and social organization, and in significant ways, it completely transformed Kenyan society. At the time of country selection for this project, the research team identified Kenya as an example of a country which, it assumed, represented a largely mature transition, enabling a retrospective analysis by citizens about their sense of inclusion prior to and after Kenya's political transition in 2010, as well as their satisfaction with the outcomes to date. The research team was interested in what similarities and distinctions could be drawn between the attitudes of citizens in Kenya with those of South Sudan, where transition is more of a current and evolving phenomenon.

Governance

With the intersection of this project's fieldwork and the 2017 national general elections in Kenya, it is not surprising that focus group discussions brought up governance issues in some detail. Considerable discussion focused on Kenya's democratic processes, specifically elections, as well as the personal costs of corruption and political impunity, and whether citizens felt well represented by their political leaders at both local and national level.

The question of who makes decisions and whose interests are served by those decisions was one of the underlying resentments held by ethnic groups that emerged from the transcripts. With a strong sense that some ethnic and tribal groups have benefited disproportionately to other tribes, and that elections represented a cyclical opportunity for tribes, the redivision of Kenya into 47 counties was supposed to create a more egalitarian governance system and enhance a sense of inclusion among local citizens in decision making processes. The results of the research suggest that this has been an uneven success. Tribalism was acknowledged by many focus groups as an ongoing issue across Kenyan society, and within the research study it often cuts across the categories in different ways. The main discussion on tribalism in this report is examined under the 'National Identity' section.

In Kisumu and Mombasa, the sense of inclusion was high at the local level, but low at the national level, while Garissa had little sense of inclusion at the local level but a high level at the national level. This appears to relate to divergent imperatives in these communities, with Garissa's peace and security concerns demonstrably different to those in Kisumu. Nairobi, the seat of national government, ironically demonstrated a consistently low sense of inclusion at both local and national levels. These imperatives are discussed under more the 'Peace and Security' section.

Sense of Inclusion in Decision Making

Kenya's devolution process, as well as the creation of county governors and county assemblies, has significantly increased the importance of local government in the lives of Kenyan citizens. During the focus groups, participants repeatedly stressed their belief in the importance of local political leaders who represent their local interests to national government. However, many participants voiced the belief that policy was done TO them, rather than with them, and that government was not making policy in ways that benefitted their local activity. One respondent stated that "They [government] just decided without our input, they banned sales in the *mitumba* (local market)."

Table 1 shows that local participation in community meetings and governance forums averaged 50 percent from the respondents, with Kisumu and Mombasa demonstrating strong participation in local meetings while Garissa and Nairobi demonstrated low levels of turnout for community meetings. The results of this question are supported by other data in the survey that indicates that trust in local government is higher than average in Kisumu and Mombasa, while Nairobi and Garissa demonstrated the lowest levels of trust in local government. That half of the respondents claimed to be active in community meetings suggests that citizens are active and participate in community meetings, but don't have much trust that their views ultimately inform government policy. In a later question, only 16 percent of the total respondents felt either 'confident' or 'very confident' that their opinions are considered when planning for development in their community.

Table 2 suggests one reason for the higher levels of trust in local government in Kisumu and Mombasa, where respondents reported much higher than average levels of consultation from political leaders than elsewhere. Similarly, Nairobi and Garissa demonstrated very low levels of political consultation. Although comments during the focus groups expressed a strong desire for more consultation with women in communities, there was no significant difference in the number of men and women who answered 'Yes' in Table 2.

It is further worth noting that while Kisumu respondents returned favorable responses when asked about local government consultations, they were consistently the least satisfied with national government engagement. Garissa demonstrated low levels of trust in local leaders, and higher levels of trust in national leadership.

Table 1 – Citizen Consultation

		I have attended a meeting/consultation which discussed a local community development in the last 6 months.					
		Yes		No		Total	
		Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
County	Mombasa	22	61.1%	14	38.9%	36	100.0%
	Kisumu	16	66.7%	8	33.3%	24	100.0%
	Garissa	12	33.3%	24	66.7%	36	100.0%
	Nakuru	20	55.6%	16	44.4%	36	100.0%
	Bungoma	13	54.2%	11	45.8%	24	100.0%
	Nairobi	7	29.2%	17	70.8%	24	100.0%
	Total	90	50.0%	90	50.0%	180	100.0%

Table 2 – Citizen Consultation

		I have been consulted by political leaders about my community's needs in the last 6 months.					
		Yes		No		Total	
		Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage
County	Mombasa	14	38.9%	22	61.1%	36	100.0%
	Kisumu	16	66.7%	8	33.3%	24	100.0%
	Garissa	1	2.8%	35	97.2%	36	100.0%
	Nakuru	9	25.0%	27	75.0%	36	100.0%
	Bungoma	5	20.8%	19	79.2%	24	100.0%
	Nairobi	3	12.5%	21	87.5%	24	100.0%
	Total	48	26.7%	132	73.3%	180	100.0%

Government Communication

The devolution of government in Kenya has enhanced the citizen’s sense of inclusion in the decisions that impact their lives on a day to day basis. However, communication – between levels of government as well as between the government and its citizens – requires additional efforts. Focus group discussions revealed a lack of clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of government officials at the various levels of government. An example of this misunderstanding has been the function of security, which forms part of the county commissioner’s mandate, but is often thought to be the responsibility of the governor. The lack of effective communication from government officials around, particularly new, roles and responsibilities will have implications for accountability, and ultimately undermine the devolution process. Table 3 shows the most fruitful avenues for communication: Kenyans surveyed get their information most often from television, followed by social media and radio more distantly.

Table 3 – Information about Government Decisions

Which of the following provide you with most of your information about government decisions and policies in your community?		
	Count	Percentage
Television	61	33.9%
Social media	54	30.0%
Radio	37	20.6%
Print media	17	9.4%
Political representatives	5	2.8%
Word of mouth	3	1.7%
Community leaders/Public Barazas	2	1.1%
None of the above	1	0.6%
Total	180	100.0%

Political Accountability

Corruption, the importance of identity in securing jobs, contracts, privileges, and other benefits, as well as the insulation of the ruling class against the type of legal processes that Kenyan citizens experience were common themes during the focus group discussions. Attitudes were largely consistent irrespective of gender, age, or county. This consensus was reflected in comments like “Politicians have always taken citizens for a ride,” and “Leaders at the top have no problem because they are safeguarded by the law.” These comments conveyed a sense in which the judiciary continues to work against the citizen when political leaders are called to account,

and the overarching sentiment from the transcripts was that this was just the way things are, and that there is little the citizenry can do to change this fact.

Table 4 indicates that only 7.8 percent of respondents felt “Very Confident” that political leaders in their community are held accountable for their actions. This compares to 58.3 percent who answered either “Not Confident at all” or “Not Confident.” Table 5 shows even lower levels of confidence that the justice system regularly identifies and prosecutes corrupt political leaders. Collectively 73.3 percent, of respondents were not confident about this statement.

Table 4 – Accountability

	I am confident that political leaders in my constituency are held accountable for their actions.											
	Not Confident at all		Not Confident		Neutral		Confident		Very Confident		Total	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Total	35	19.4%	70	38.9%	36	20.0%	25	13.9%	14	7.8%	180	100.0%

Table 5 - Accountability

	The justice system in my country regularly identifies and prosecutes corrupt political leaders.											
	Not Confident at all		Not Confident		Neutral		Confident		Very Confident		Total	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Total	76	42.2%	56	31.1%	17	9.4%	24	13.3%	7	3.9%	180	100.0%

Development

Kenya’s ethnic conflicts are strongly linked to competition for state development aid and support, with competition for political power translating into economic and developmental dividends. The numerical advantage of Kikuyus specifically, and the sense that Kikuyus have benefitted disproportionately for regularly being able to elect leaders from their tribe into the executive and other state entities has fueled resentment among other ethnic groups at what they perceive as favoritism. The solution to this resentment during the post 2008 transition was to accelerate the pace of devolution and introduce a county system to allow greater local ownership of the development agenda. Linked strongly to the previous section on governance, the key question the research team investigated under development was whether a respondent’s personal circumstance had improved after Kenya’s transition, and if not, whether they had any hope that it could still improve?

Development issues loomed large in the minds of almost all the focus groups, with affordable, quality education; community development fund projects; and fixed infrastructure such as roads and street lights recurrent themes in most of the focus groups. Less common, although still relevant were issues of social welfare, such as child grants and access to medical care. Understandably, focus groups in less urban areas viewed development quite differently to those in urban centers such as Nairobi and Mombasa. In urban areas, development was mostly seen as a process needed to help citizens with ease of business, whereas in focus groups from Garissa,

Bungoma, and Nakuru, livestock issues were more common. One cross cutting issue that all groups agreed on was the importance of street lights in promoting a sense of security and well-being.

The concepts of development and peace were strongly interwoven, making the abstraction process between Development and Peace and Security quite challenging. As one participant stated the connection: “When you are sleeping hungry with your family, [you have] no peace.” Inequality was also described as problematic for peaceful coexistence, with statements like: “Your neighbor will be having and you will not have and this brings disagreement,” and “the gap between rich and poor, you cannot say that those people are peaceful.”

Citizen Expectations of Development

Kenya’s economy is one of the largest in Africa, and the country has been a hub of innovation and early adoption of new technologies, most notably in the mobile phone space. Its youthful population and weak formal employment sector mean many Kenyans rely on entrepreneurial activities to earn a living. Respondent attitudes toward development in Kenya viewed the government as the central actor in driving economic growth, job creation, and better working conditions. Focus group participants expected the government to support their efforts with good policies, financial support (loans/development funding), and better infrastructure and services. Surprisingly, given the high number of young respondents to the validation survey, as well as the high number of unemployed young people in Kenya, Table 6 indicates little interest in prioritizing youth employment. The two issues most respondents prioritized were “Affordable food prices” and “Student bursaries.” Citizen expectations strongly tended toward access to education as a development, with another survey question identifying that the main cause of children missing days from school was due to inability to pay school fees.

Table 6 – Development Priorities

Which of these are the most important issues for your personal situation?		
	Total	
	Count	%
Affordable food prices	51	28.8%
More student bursaries/financial support for poor students	50	28.2%
Healthcare insurance	28	15.8%
Access to clean drinking water	16	9.0%
Support to children including OVCs	15	8.5%
Support to persons living with disabilities	13	7.3%
Social welfare for the elderly	4	2.3%
Youth Employment	0	0.0%
Total	94	100.0%

Table 7 illustrates an even spread of agreement and disagreement that citizens currently think the business environment in their community is good. Overall, responses to this question suggest that more respondents are positive about their current business environment than those that are pessimistic.

Table 7 – Business Environment

	In my opinion, the current environment is good for business in my community.											
	Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Neutral		Agree		Strongly Agree		Total	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Total	19	10.6%	40	22.2%	39	21.7%	63	35.0%	19	10.6%	180	100.0%

From the focus group discussions, infrastructure provisions were brought up repeatedly across many of the groups, with the provision of streetlights and roads identified as two of the major deliverables that contributed to participants’ sense of proper development, peace, and social cohesion. One participant complained that although roads were being built in his community, local youth were not employed on the project, stating: “No young person in that region has been employed, but roads are being built.” While others in his focus group argued that any projects were good for the community, for the respondent, employment of locals was an important consideration. Table 8 shows only 17.7 percent of the respondents agree that they felt consulted by decision makers during infrastructure development planning. This view is consistent with the views expressed earlier about governance processes. Nairobi reflected a very negative sentiment toward consultation, with more than 90 percent of respondents disagreeing to some degree with the statement.

Infrastructure, and street lights specifically, were often linked during the focus group discussions with peace and security. This was reinforced during the validation survey, where streetlights were a high priority infrastructure deliverable for both urban and rural respondents.

Table 8 – Infrastructure Development Consultations

I am consulted about infrastructure development processes in my county by the relevant political decision makers.												
County	Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Neutral		Agree		Strongly Agree		Total	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
	Mombasa	12	33.3%	14	38.9%	2	5.6%	6	16.7%	2	5.6%	36
Kisumu	8	33.3%	6	25.0%	5	20.8%	5	20.8%	0	0.0%	24	100.0%
Garissa	14	38.9%	10	27.8%	5	13.9%	4	11.1%	3	8.3%	36	100.0%
Nakuru	12	33.3%	15	41.7%	6	16.7%	1	2.8%	2	5.6%	36	100.0%
Bungoma	4	16.7%	11	45.8%	2	8.3%	6	25.0%	1	4.2%	24	100.0%
Nairobi	12	50.0%	10	41.7%	0	0.0%	2	8.3%	0	0.0%	24	100.0%
Total	62	34.4%	66	36.7%	20	11.1%	24	13.3%	8	4.4%	180	100.0%

During the focus group discussions, many participants stressed the importance they placed on opportunities for business and employment, focusing more on the government’s role as an enabler than as a social welfare provider. The validation survey confirmed this view and indicated a third of all respondents were quite positive about the opportunities to do business in their area in the previous six months (see Table 9).

From an inclusion perspective, the research team noted therefore that on development, respondents to the validation demonstrated a degree of satisfaction at the opportunities to be included in development and the economy, at the local level particularly. At the national level, the picture is more fractured, with people from Kisumu and Garissa having more negative views on their inclusion in national development than other focus groups.

Table 9 – Business Opportunities

	The opportunities to do business in my area have improved in the past 6 months											
	Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Neutral		Agree		Strongly Agree		Total	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Total	21	11.7%	55	30.6%	39	21.7%	48	26.7%	17	9.4%	180	100.0%

National Identity

Kenya is a multi-ethnic country with no single ethnic group significantly larger than other major ethnic groups. According to a 2009 estimate, the largest ethnic group, the Kikuyus made up less than 20 percent of Kenya’s total population, with 6,622, 578 people, followed by the Luhya with 5,388,666 and Kalenjin, Luo, and Kamba tribes all representing roughly 4 million citizens each (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2009). Politics in Kenya is significantly influenced by ethnic and tribal loyalties, with political parties often viewed as political wings of their respective tribes. This ethnicization of politics in Kenya is driven by strongly held perceptions that a Kenyan’s ethnicity is critical to the opportunities they can access from the state, and the types of privileges that some tribes enjoy more than others.

During the focus group discussions, ethnicity was linked strongly to all other aspects of the study, from peace and security concerns (“When people are envious of other tribes, [it] contributes to a lack of culture of embracing differences”) to elections (“People go back home [to their tribal village] during elections because of insecurity”) to the economy and jobs (“People are discriminated against when looking for jobs because of their language”). Ethnic conflict was one of the key factors behind the 2008 post-election violence, and the 2010 Constitution and governance reforms were designed specifically with a multi-ethnic governance model in mind.

However, the response from the validation survey painted a less cohesive picture than told during the focus group discussions on the role respondents believe ethnicity plays in their lives. Table 10 illustrates how respondents across the education spectrum were divided on whether ethnicity plays a role in job applications. The focus group field work took place at the height of election campaigning, while the validation was concluded six months later, which may have something to do with the neutral response to this question. However, the validation did not seem to reinforce the focus group view of the importance of ethnicity for Kenyans seeking opportunities and work.

Table 10 – Ethnicity and Job Opportunities

		My ethnicity does not prevent me from applying for any job or opportunity and having a fair chance of being selected.											
		Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Neutral		Agree		Strongly Agree		Total	
		Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Education	No formal education	0	0.0%	1	25.0%	1	25.0%	0	0.0%	2	50.0%	4	100.0%
	Primary	2	12.5%	3	18.8%	2	12.5%	7	43.8%	2	12.5%	16	100.0%
	Secondary	5	11.9%	4	9.5%	13	31.0%	13	31.0%	7	16.7%	42	100.0%
	College	13	18.6%	17	24.3%	11	15.7%	21	30.0%	8	11.4%	70	100.0%
	University	13	29.5%	14	31.8%	9	20.5%	5	11.4%	3	6.8%	44	100.0%
	Post graduate	1	25.0%	1	25.0%	0	0.0%	1	25.0%	1	25.0%	4	100.0%
	Total	34	18.9%	40	22.2%	36	20.0%	47	26.1%	23	12.8%	180	100.0%

A similar picture emerges in Table 11, where respondents to the validation survey were asked to agree/disagree with the statement that people mix freely in their community. More than half of the respondents replied that they agreed/strongly agreed with the statement, and only 4.4 percent of respondents strongly disagreed. The highest disagreement came from Kisumu and Garissa, consistent with the overall validation patterns, but once again, the validation survey disagrees with the stated views in the focus groups about the importance of ethnicity. Other validation questions indicated that 86.1 percent of respondents have been invited to ceremonies by Kenyans from different tribes, and nearly 60 percent of respondents approve of inter-tribal marriages. The validation therefore downplays what was described as a major issue during the focus groups.

One explanation offered during a key informant interview on the focus group transcripts was that politicians are largely responsible for dividing Kenyans along ethnic lines during electoral campaigns, as this suits their interests, but that for most Kenyans, everyday life is less defined by ethnicity than politicians would suggest. One validation question asked respondents whether political leaders are mostly elected due to their ethnicity, which was a statement that more than 72 percent of respondents agreed with. The extent to which election-related conflict can be understood as an elite, political issue therefore seems high. What is clear and encouraging from the validation is that despite Kenya’s ethnic violence in 2008, ethnic mixing occurs freely, and there is no consensus about ethnic favoritism and patronage either. For both statements, respondents from Kisumu and Garissa are outliers, and these statements apply less to those communities based on the validation responses.

Table 11 – Local Community Integration

		People in my community interact and mix freely with people from other ethnic/tribal groups.											
		Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Neutral		Agree		Strongly Agree		Total	
		Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
County	Mombasa	1	2.8%	3	8.3%	11	30.6%	16	44.4%	5	13.9%	36	100.0%
	Kisumu	2	8.3%	3	12.5%	3	12.5%	10	41.7%	6	25.0%	24	100.0%
	Garissa	4	11.1%	6	16.7%	1	2.8%	17	47.2%	8	22.2%	36	100.0%
	Nakuru	1	2.8%	5	13.9%	5	13.9%	14	38.9%	11	30.6%	36	100.0%
	Bungoma	0	0.0%	7	29.2%	5	20.8%	5	20.8%	7	29.2%	24	100.0%
	Nairobi	0	0.0%	7	29.2%	6	25.0%	9	37.5%	2	8.3%	24	100.0%
	Total	8	4.4%	31	17.2%	31	17.2%	71	39.4%	39	21.7%	180	100.0%

Peace and Security

Peace and security occupy the minds of almost every participant and respondent from every focus group and survey group respectively, proving to be a universal and constant concern for all Kenyans daily. The research identified several distinctions between the types of peace and security concerns that different regional focus groups reflected. During the focus group discussions, insecurity and transnational terrorism issues were far more pronounced in Garissa than any other grouping, while in Nairobi, crime and state violence were big concerns. In rural areas, the presence of wild animals and the safety of long walks to local schools were mentioned, and for some of the women participants, the ability to move around and do business at night were indicators of peace.

Most of the focus groups agreed that the presence of groups of young people in public spaces was viewed as a potential security risk in communities. Youth gatherings were associated with political protest (“Youths gathering, usually planning something evil”/ “Youths protesting, we have no peace”), criminality (“Idle youths attack people at night”) and lawlessness (“Youths fight with the police, throw stones”). Focus groups said that it is common to see groups of idle young people with nothing to do in their communities, and that with better employment prospects, these young people wouldn’t be such a nuisance.

Table 12 illustrates respondents’ sense of security for women moving about at night. This question was added to the validation survey after comments such as “Idle youths attack people at night”; “People fear to move due to wild animals”; and “hatred among the community (means there is no peace at night).” Yet the response indicates that more than 50 percent of the respondents feel that women can move freely at night and only 23.3 percent don’t agree with the statement. While fewer women agreed, and more women disagreed with the statement than men, there was not a significant difference between genders on this question. Respondents from Garissa were the most positive about women’s safety, while respondents from Nairobi and Kisumu were the least convinced about the statement.

Table 12 – Women Moving at Night

		The women in my community are able to move about freely without concern for their personal safety.											
		Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Neutral		Agree		Strongly Agree		Total	
		Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Gender	Male	4	4.1%	14	14.4%	19	19.6%	38	39.2%	22	22.7%	97	100.0%
	Female	9	10.8%	15	18.1%	17	20.5%	29	34.9%	13	15.7%	83	100.0%
County	Mombasa	1	2.8%	6	16.7%	9	25.0%	16	44.4%	4	11.1%	36	100.0%
	Kisumu	3	12.5%	4	16.7%	3	12.5%	10	41.7%	4	16.7%	24	100.0%
	Garissa	3	8.3%	2	5.6%	6	16.7%	15	41.7%	10	27.8%	36	100.0%
	Nakuru	3	8.3%	7	19.4%	4	11.1%	13	36.1%	9	25.0%	36	100.0%
	Bungoma	1	4.2%	4	16.7%	7	29.2%	6	25.0%	6	25.0%	24	100.0%
	Nairobi	2	8.3%	6	25.0%	7	29.2%	7	29.2%	2	8.3%	24	100.0%
	Total	13	7.2%	29	16.1%	36	20.0%	67	37.2%	35	19.4%	180	100.0%

Table 13 supports the generally positive view of women’s safety, with more than 50 percent of respondents agreeing with the view that women’s safety has improved in the past six months. However, here there is a stronger gender bias, with men more likely to agree than women. Women were also more likely to disagree, although the overall percentage in disagreement was still lower. Table 12 adds to the view of Table 13 that not only is everyday safety viewed favorably, but that there have been improvements in the past six months. Surprisingly, Table 14 suggests that citizen trust in the police is the lowest out of all state institutions, with the approval of only 11,7 percent, even worse than the 13 percent approval for political parties.

Perhaps a better explanation for these generally positive sentiments on community safety may be explained by the survey question examining which infrastructure projects respondents have observed in their communities recently. For this question, 76 percent of respondents had seen road building projects in their communities, and 60,6 percent had noted street light improvements. Given the importance the focus group discussions placed on streetlights as an indicator of peace, and with a high proportion of respondents reporting streetlight projects underway in their communities, this may be contributing to the sense of improvement. Without specific probing, it is impossible to say for sure. In both the focus groups and validation survey, the sense of peace conveyed by sound infrastructure and specifically streetlights are clear. This makes the presence or absence of streetlights an excellent indicator of a community’s sense of peace.

Table 13 – Improvements in Women’s Safety

		In the past 6 months, it has become safer for women in my community to go about their daily lives.											
		Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Neutral		Agree		Strongly Agree		Total	
		Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Gender	Male	3	3.1%	11	11.3%	17	17.5%	48	49.5%	18	18.6%	97	100.0%
	Female	2	2.4%	18	21.7%	21	25.3%	32	38.6%	10	12.0%	83	100.0%
County	Mombasa	0	0.0%	4	11.1%	8	22.2%	20	55.6%	4	11.1%	36	100.0%
	Kisumu	1	4.2%	1	4.2%	5	20.8%	14	58.3%	3	12.5%	24	100.0%
	Garissa	2	5.6%	2	5.6%	9	25.0%	21	58.3%	2	5.6%	36	100.0%
	Nakuru	2	5.6%	6	16.7%	5	13.9%	13	36.1%	10	27.8%	36	100.0%
	Bungoma	0	0.0%	9	37.5%	3	12.5%	5	20.8%	7	29.2%	24	100.0%
	Nairobi	0	0.0%	7	29.2%	8	33.3%	7	29.2%	2	8.3%	24	100.0%
	Total	5	2.8%	29	16.1%	38	21.1%	80	44.4%	28	15.6%	180	100.0%

Table 14 – Confidence in Institutions

	Rate your confidence in the following institutions to handle problems in our country effectively				
	Not Confident at all	Not Confident	Neutral	Confident	Very Confident
The Police	40.6%	27.2%	20.6%	9.4%	2.2%
The Army	14.4%	15.0%	23.9%	26.1%	20.6%
The Courts/Judiciary	11.1%	21.7%	30.0%	20.6%	16.7%
The National Leadership/Executive	19.4%	26.1%	31.1%	16.7%	6.7%
The Political Parties	33.3%	28.9%	24.4%	9.4%	3.9%
The Parliament (Senate and National Assembly)	20.0%	26.1%	28.3%	21.1%	4.4%
Tribal Council of Elders	7.8%	22.2%	30.0%	26.7%	13.3%
Religious Institutions	5.0%	9.4%	26.7%	31.7%	27.2%
Civil Society Organizations	9.6%	15.3%	26.6%	28.2%	20.3%

The validation survey does not actively set out to differentiate distinctions in peace and security priorities, but consistent patterns emerged in the validation that identify three regional differences between the peace and security patterns in Nairobi, Garissa, and Kisumu. These patterns reflect in part in the other regions, but less consistently. Nakuru and Bungoma reflect similar responses to Kisumu in some respects, but in others are completely different. Mombasa and Nairobi responses were identical in some areas, but Mombasa also mirrored Garissa views in other areas. In Kisumu, a Luo area where the opposition leader Raila Odinga is immensely popular, trust in national government structures was significantly lower than in other regions, while trust in

local institutions and leaders is higher than the average response rates, with state actors deeply distrusted and often held responsible for respondents' lack of security. In Garissa, this observation is directly flipped with low trust in local leadership, but higher than average trust in national leadership. In Garissa, respondents trusted national leaders to provide necessary security, but were hampered by distrust for local structures. In Nairobi, response rates to both national and local leadership were consistently low, with criminality the most common complaint with respect to peace and security.

Table 14 also highlights how religious institutions and tribal leaders enjoy the highest levels of trust – although even these levels of trust, at just over 50 percent, are not high. Comparing the poor trust respondents showed for police (11.6 percent) to the much higher trust placed in the army (46,7 percent), it is apparent that in Garissa, where border insecurity is a bigger issue than elsewhere, trust in national leadership may correlate to the trust in the armed forces deployed in the region.

South Sudan

Background: Transition Pre-Empted

Though many refer to South Sudan as a failed state, it could be argued that the country never really matured to the level of a formal state with functioning institutions. Controlled by Khartoum from 1955 to 2005, the country experienced two devastating bouts of civil war from 1955 to 1972 and, again, from 1972 to 1983 in its drive for independence from Sudan. The most recent conflagration occurred in 2013 rising to the level of civil war, which persists to present day.

Prior to being ruled by Sudan, the South Sudan was governed by the British. The British, applying their indirect style of colonial rule, separated northern Sudan (administered by Egypt) from southern Sudan. From the start, southern Sudan was neglected. Under the British system of indirect rule, autonomous arrangements proliferated in the south. Each was specific to the region's over 60 main autonomous ethno-tribal groups. South Sudanese turned to local authority rather than institutions for collective action and organization, as formal institutions were absent. A vibrant middle-class and educated class were non-existent. Social services were minimal, and the country's economic activity was largely agricultural. Against this backdrop, ethno-tribal identities were strong as attachments to local authority, rather than central authority, shaped the nature of the future relationship between state and society.

Thus, when efforts to build South Sudan's institutions began following the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the process had to start from scratch. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the organization that governed the south and led South Sudan's drive for freedom, inherited independent South Sudan and was faced with transitioning from a liberation movement to a national government where no previous formal state had existed, and experience with autonomous, formal, and effective government was limited. Crafting foundational governing institutions – a constitution, executive, legislature, judiciary, and police force – are formidable challenges.

South Sudan's experience with autonomous, formal, and effective government was limited, but the herculean task of crafting governing institutions that would be the foundation of the state, such as a constitution, executive, legislature, judiciary, and police force, began in earnest. Another imperative is the need to create a nation, amid long-standing tensions between the Dinka and Nuer. Citizen expectations were dashed when the country descended into civil war in 2013. Critically, as experts observe, the roots of the conflict in South Sudan is not ethnic strife. Instead, it is the politicization and militarization of ethnic tensions, stoked by a military that was loyal to and organized around ethnic units – an outcome that was the vestige of previous conflicts in which groups organized along ethnic lines, involving primarily, though not exclusively, the Dinka aligned with President Kiir, and the Nuer, aligned with challenger and former Vice-President Riek Machar, now leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO).

In August 2015, the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) sought to end hostilities. However, there has been minimal progress. South Sudan remains in a state of political, economic, and social insecurity, and the challenges that have vexed the formation of stable, effective governance remain. The SPLM largely continues to ignore the distinction between party politics and political processes. Moreover, SPLM leadership, as it has done historically, does not try to include civilians in the SPLM party structure or employ grass roots mechanisms of mobilization in a manner that transcends ethno-tribal affiliation and identities. The government, emphasizing security, relies on top-down, rather than bottom-up

decision-making. Elites struggle for power, and conflict over access to resources, territorial disputes, kidnappings, war crimes, and the interference of foreign states, including Uganda and Sudan, now characterize the ongoing conflict. South Sudan has been named the second most corrupt country in the world by Transparency International. Provisions for a transitional government currently hinge on the return of former Vice President Riek Machar (SPLM-IO) and his security forces to Juba. In Machar's absence, several militias and rebel factions have splintered from the SPLM-IO. Additionally, the lack of payment to government troops has resulted in SPLM soldiers defecting to form their own coalitions or join rebel movements. The spread of the civil war has resulted in routine violations against international law, including illegal detentions, recruitment of child soldiers, crimes against humanity, and sexual violence. The conflict continues to worsen, and despite repeated attempts of a ceasefire. At least four million people have been displaced from their homes, six million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, and South Sudan's economy is rapidly deteriorating. Meanwhile, the National Dialogue initiated by Salva Kiir in 2016, with the intention of ending the conflict and reconciling warring communities is stalled, dimming hope of moving forward with an enduring peace process.

Such conditions define South Sudanese attitudes regarding events in the country, as evidenced in findings from the focus groups and validation survey. The next section explores citizens attitudes in greater detail and is organized according to the four main categories that emerged from the word-clusters and sub-categories derived from the transcripts (see Methods section).¹⁴ As South Sudan's regional locales tend to be demographically defined by particular ethno-tribal groups, each with its own customs and interests, the analysis emphasizes attitudinal differences across locales. They include Torit, Aweil, Bor, Bor PoC, Juba, Juba PoC, and Yambio.

Governance

Most South Sudanese respondents say they have been traumatized by the five-year conflagration, which has claimed thousands of lives and has decimated the economy. When asked to share what they believed were the biggest problems, two-thirds identified "the conflict" as the most significant problem, though almost as many cited corruption (see Table 15). Corruption is endemic in South Sudan and has been exacerbated by the civil war. Indeed, South Sudan is among one of the most corrupt countries in the world, ranked 179 of 180 countries on the Transparency International Corruption Index in 2017 assessments.¹⁵ South Sudanese views may be reinforced by the belief that politicians accept bribes at least fairly often, and that nearly all respondents say they are aware of at least one person whose land has been confiscated. Respondents have differing views in their trust that leaders are ultimately held accountable for corruption, however, as most in Bor, Bor PoC, Juba, and Yambio think that leaders are held accountable. Those in other areas are less sure, by contrast.

In naming other problems challenging South Sudan, "tribalism" followed somewhat more distantly, but, significantly, it was mentioned by half of the respondents. Although the country's economic conditions continue to rapidly deteriorate amid the instability, few cited the economy as a major problem, while smaller percentages mentioned land grabbing, lack of opportunity for youth, cattle rustling, lack of elections, or the arbitrary or unlawful arrest of citizens as problems.

¹⁴ The presentation of findings is not an exhaustive analysis of the expansive focus group transcripts, neither a full analysis of the 71 survey questions developed for validation of our qualitative findings.

¹⁵ <https://www.transparency.org/country/SSD>.

Table 15 – Top Three Problems Facing South Sudan

What would you say are the top three problems facing your country (among those listed below)?		
	Total	
	Count	%
The conflict	86/128	67.2%
Corruption	85/128	66.4%
Tribalism	68/128	53.1%

With South Sudan’s democratic transition stalled, South Sudanese, nevertheless, see value in democratic processes for the country’s future, as roughly two-thirds or more of respondents, each, say that national- and state-level leaders being elected through free and fair elections is important, a sentiment that emerged as a CIC indicator. Most, moreover, say it is important that everyone accept the outcomes of elections and accept the governing institutions in the country, though views are more mixed in Torit, Juba, and Bor PoC. In focus group findings consistent with survey sentiments, participants envision institutionalization of the rule of law through a consultative process that would lead to the development and adoption of a new constitution. Large majorities also believe that credible elections contribute to peace.

Asked about their trust in their country’s institutions’ ability to handle problems in South Sudan effectively, few express confidence in the police, national leadership, political parties, or parliament as a whole, as Table 16 shows. Respondents, similarly, lack confidence in the courts, but in Yambio, a majority feels the opposite.

Table 16 – Confidence in Institutions

	Rate your confidence in the following institutions to handle problems in our country effectively					
	Not Confident at all	Not Confident	Neutral	Confident	Very Confident	Don’t know
The Police	50.8%	9.4%	8.6%	11.7%	19.5%	-
The Court	39.1%	6.2%	13.3%	12.5%	28.9%	-
The National Leadership	53.1%	6.2%	16.4%	4.7%	17.2%	2.3%
The Political Parties	57.0%	10.9%	19.5%	3.9%	7.8%	0.8%
The Parliament	53.9%	12.5%	10.9%	8.6%	14.1%	-

Political Accountability

South Sudanese respondents’ lack of confidence in the country’s governing institutions is reflected in their assessments of government accountability, which remains essentially elusive, in the view of respondents. Although respondents saw these features as important measures of inclusion, they offered largely negative evaluations of state responsiveness, a key pillar of good governance. Surveys indicate that South Sudanese tend to believe their national government is unresponsive to the needs of their communities. Views are more divided on this issue in Yambio and Aweil, however. Assessments are more complex on other accountability measures. For example, most doubt that leaders represent citizens well. As Table 17 shows, moreover, those

in Juba PoC, Aweil, and Torit are confident that their leaders are held accountable when they fail to deliver on their promises to the people, but respondents in Bor, Bor PoC, and Juba are decidedly more skeptical, while most residents in Yambio do not believe that their leaders are held accountable. Such divergent viewpoints may be attributed to the war's impact on states, which differ. Residents of POCs tend to feel abandoned by the state, but seem to be more inclined to trust national-level leaders as opposed to local-level. Notably, in their responses to the exit interview questionnaire, respondents from Juba PoC and Bor PoC expressed significant distrust in leaders at all levels.

Table 17 - Accountability of National Leaders

		National leaders are held accountable when they fail to deliver on their promises.									
		Strongly Disagree		Disagree		Agree		Strongly Agree		Total	
		Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Location	Aweil	4	25%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	12	75%	16	100.0%
	Bor	8	50%	3	18.8%	4	25%	1	6.2%	16	100.0%
	Bor PoC	1	6.2%	8	50%	2	12.5%	5	31.2%	16	100.0%
	Juba	7	43.8%	8	50%	0	0%	1	6.2%	16	100.0%
	Juba PoC	2	6.2%	1	3.1%	9	28.1%	20	62.5%	32	100.0%
	Torit	2	12.5%	3	18.8%	3	18.8%	1	6.2%	16	100.0%
	Yambio	14	87.5%	0	0%	1	6.2%	1	6.2%	16	100.0%
	Total	38	29.7%	23	18%	19	14.8%	48	37.5%	128	100.0%

Across all survey locales, most do not believe their interests are represented by members of parliament, though a sizeable portion in Aweil (44 percent) think the opposite. Majorities believe that it is important that leaders be present in their communities, but residents in Bor and Bor PoC offer rather divided assessments. South Sudanese interviewed are joined in their emphasis on the importance of leaders being honest to women and children, fostering good ties in their communities and protecting citizens' rights. Residents also largely believe that it is important for leaders to participate in politics. The quality of participation appears to matter, here, as significantly large majorities of at least 80 percent or more assert that disagreements among leaders merely exacerbates inter-communal strife.

Political Parties

Political parties, as an institution, are nascent in South Sudan. The SPLM never fully transitioned from an independence movement into a full-fledged political party that draws on mass bases of support. Thus, political party structures are weak and unable to effectively mobilize and articulate citizen interests. Instead, the civil war has seen a proliferation of militias, which have emerged as alternative forms of organization.

Against this backdrop, most South Sudanese respondents see a profound lack of cooperation between political parties in South Sudan. Leaders are, likewise, paralyzed in their ability to engage in dispute resolution. Not surprisingly, nearly all believe that political leaders would be able to solve their differences, if there were open dialogue in the country. Consistent with these more critical sentiments, South Sudanese interviewed are not

convinced that their local leaders articulate their concerns to the national government, with respondents in Yambio and Juba PoC most doubtful. Views are similarly mixed on the expression of tribal interests: while residents in Aweil and Bor are firm in their belief that their tribe is represented in the national government, residents in Juba PoC and Yambio say their tribe is not.

Other groups are also marginalized representationally at the local- and national-level, including women, youth, and persons living with disabilities, according to respondents. Despite the lack of representation among these key demographic segments, respondents are more favorable regarding opportunities for engagement of local tribal chiefs, as most say that the local government at least fairly often engages chiefs or community leaders to participate in political activities to speak on the behalf of communities. Assessments of national-level outreach are more diverse: though a large majority in Juba PoC and half in Aweil believes the national government does not engage tribal chiefs or community leaders, most in Bor, Juba, Torit, and Yambio say they do so fairly often or more frequently.

The National Dialogue and Peace Process

The National Dialogue in South Sudan is intended to bring peace and to reconcile divided ethno-tribal communities. The National Dialogue engenders criticism, however, due to the perceived limitations on the freedom of expression, the dearth of participation of opposition groups, as well as the composition and partiality of the steering committee, the government's failure to release political detainees, and the lack of confidence in the parties to the conflict. According to some observers, the government prefers to use the National Dialogue process as a substitute for a political settlement, thus eroding its legitimacy among various stakeholders. At present, South Sudanese opposition leaders have refused to engage in the process and members of the international community have avoided public endorsement of the National Dialogue and have not provided financial support.

Under such circumstances, there is little consensus on the question of whether the National Dialogue will bring peace to South Sudan, as most in Juba PoC, Bor PoC, and Yambio doubt that peace will emerge from the National Dialogue, while those in Bor, Juba, and Torit are more sanguine and opinion in Aweil and Torit is divided. Consistent with this sentiment, only in Aweil and Juba do respondents assert that the National Dialogue process represents all regions in South Sudan. Critically, church leaders and the United Nations are deemed the most credible actors in the peace process, according to 85 percent of respondents. However, evaluations are divided on tribal leaders and the government; and interestingly, youth are perceived as more credible than women, and most are wary of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Respondents perceive a process that is, essentially, exclusionary. Most say the government is included in the National Dialogue process, but tribes, civil society, youth, and persons living with disabilities are not, according to a majority of respondents. Residents in Bor PoC and Aweil are split on whether religious groups are included, as are views in Juba and Torit on whether opposition groups are engaged. Opinion is, likewise, divided over the issue of regional representation.

In the event of a future peace process in South Sudan, results indicate efforts might, first, focus on socializing the process amongst the public, in order to encourage support and engagement. Respondents mostly say their understanding of dynamics related to South Sudan's peace talks is limited. In Bor, Juba, and Torit, ratings are more nuanced. It should also be noted that this finding extends to peace processes led by external actors.

Although the international community has viewed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-led South Sudan High Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) as a decidedly more legitimate, inclusive, and credible peace process, such views are not necessarily shared by citizens who had little information about this process, if they had any information at all.

Nonetheless, respondents believe that it is vital for South Sudan to have a truth and reconciliation process. Activities such as sports, drama, and traditional dance can contribute to peace. Public views on the prospects for peace vary, though, with half or more in Aweil, Juba PoC, and Yambio decidedly pessimistic about a lasting ceasefire.

Political Participation

South Sudanese alienation from the peace process seems to extend to other areas of public life, and suggests that citizens might be hesitant to participate in key political processes even if there was an opportunity to do so. Reflecting their wariness to participate in elections, respondents do not even feel they can discuss politics in daily life (see Table 18), let alone participate in political activities: 81 percent feel unsafe whilst doing so, and also feel unsafe participating in key activities such as voting. This came out strongly in the focus groups and was again confirmed through feedback after the completion of surveys as well as in validation sessions on the research.

Table 18 - Possibility to Discuss Politics in Everyday Life

		If it is possible for people to discuss politics in everyday life					
		Yes		No		Total	
		Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage
Location	Aweil	2	12.5%	14	87.5%	16	100.0%
	Bor	1	6.2%	15	93.8%	16	100.0%
	Bor PoC	2	12.5%	14	87.5%	16	100.0%
	Juba	2	12.5%	14	87.5%	16	100.0%
	Juba PoC	5	15.6%	27	84.4%	32	100.0%
	Torit	-	-	16	100%	16	100.0%
	Yambio	-	-	16	100%	16	100.0%
	Total	12	9.4%	116		128	100.0%

Knowledge and Information

Information, as citizen linkages to information about government activities and various types of processes and policies, also facilitates inclusivity for South Sudanese respondents. Yet, South Sudanese knowledge about events in their country, on the whole, is varied, as respondents in Aweil, Bor PoC, Juba PoC, and Yambio believe they are aware of major events in South Sudan, while those in other areas are less aware. Access to information is also mixed: most in Bor, Juba PoC, and Torit believe they have access to information about current events, but those in Aweil and Yambio say they do not; residents in Bor and Juba are divided about evenly on the question.

Scarcely anyone believes they have access to information regarding political activities, plans, and processes, however. More specifically, most in Torit, Bor, and Aweil are satisfied with their access to information about the National Dialogue process, but those in Bor PoC and Yambio hold the opposite view, and those in Juba and Juba PoC are evenly divided. On the whole, the survey public appears rather cynical about their government's commitment to sharing information: except in Aweil, most South Sudanese respondents are convinced the information is kept from the public on purpose.

In views consistent with this assertion, a majority of respondents trust the media to provide each accurate and unbiased information, though in Juba, Juba PoC and Yambio, most feel the opposite. Yet opinion shifts dramatically on the question of whether residents feel comfortable using platforms such as social media: most in each locale do not feel safe. This may be related to the strongly held belief among two-thirds or more, that the media is not free in South Sudan.

Peace and Security

Throughout South Sudan's drive for independence from Sudan, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) attracted members from across the ethno-tribal spectrum. Under South Sudan President Salva Kiir, however, the army is comprised predominantly of members of the Dinka group, creating an ethnic imbalance. As the army, opposition forces, and their affiliated militias push for a military solution, engaging in vicious cycles of provocation and reprisal, large majorities are convinced that the increased presence of security personnel contributes to instability in South Sudan. At least half in Aweil and Bor believe, moreover, that a professionalized army is destabilizing, but residents in Juba, Torit, and Yambio widely disagree, and those in Bor are divided on the matter. In findings that further suggest distrust in the national security forces, most respondents, who tend to believe that all should have access to military protection, say that the national military does not do a good job of protecting citizens, with the exception of residents in Aweil.

South Sudanese believe that the conflict has affected citizens' ability to play sports, increased the number of orphans, and interfered with school attendance and residents' ability to practice their daily routines and customs. Indeed, the conflict has affected South Sudanese's access to safety, an essential indicator of inclusion. With the exception of Torit, most say they cannot travel safely outside of their communities, and it is difficult to see family and neighbors. Such sentiments were expressed strongly in focus groups. The safety of large majorities has been affected by murders, break-ins, gunfire, and banditry. Most females say their safety has been jeopardized by sexual and gender-based violence that is perpetrated not only by armed combatants, including national security forces, but also by family members and spouses. People tend to feel safer in daylight and are also comfortable in their homes during the day. At night, by contrast, people feel more insecure, whether it is outside or inside their homes.

Disarmament, as a solution to widespread insecurity in South Sudan, may be received differently across publics, however. Most South Sudanese interviewed believe that disarmament is essential for peace in South Sudan, except in Aweil, where most tend to disagree. At the same time, those surveyed also think that disarmament has exacerbated the conflict, though respondents in Juba, Juba PoC, and Torit feel the opposite. While residents in Bor and Aweil assert that the disarmament has exposed other tribes to conflict, residents in other locales disagree. Views in Aweil may be attributed to the influence of the region's pastoral culture norms, which accept the use of arms to protect crops.

Perspectives on the conditions associated with peace or lack thereof are complex among survey respondents. Unemployment is largely associated with lack of peace for the South Sudanese interviewed. Only in Juba, Juba PoC, and Yambio is the closure of major roads associated with lack of peace. Elsewhere views are divided, particularly on unemployment.

National Identity

There are well over 60 tribes in South Sudan, and the civil war and rivalry between political leaders seeking to exploit tribal fissures for political gain has only exacerbated already tense ethno-tribal conflicts. Despite deep and lingering cleavages, most respondents overwhelmingly say they would identify first as “South Sudanese,” while others would identify, second, according to their religious identity, and third, their tribal identity (see Table 19).

Table 19 - Rank of Attributes

		Rank the following affiliation							
		National (South Sudanese)		Tribal		Religious		Total	
		Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Location	Aweil	8	50.0%	3	18.8%	5	31.2	16	100.0%
	Bor	16	100.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	16	100.0%
	Bor PoC	10	62.5%	0	0.0%	6	37.5%	16	100.0%
	Juba	16	100.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	16	100.0%
	Juba PoC	32	100.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	32	100.0%
	Torit	15	93.8%	1	6.2%	0	0.0%	16	100.0%
	Yambio	12	75.0%	0	0.0%	4	25.0%	16	100.0%
	Total	109	85.2%	4	3.1%	15	11.7%	128	100.0%

Still, despite respondents’ affinity to a broader South Sudanese identity, ethno-tribal affiliation influences nearly all aspects of life for most South Sudanese, and influences inclusion to the extent that it shapes access to opportunity, particularly employment, findings show. Views differ more widely on whether ethnicity influences access to material resources, political opportunity, and scholarships across regions. Diverse opinions on the role of ethnicity possibly indicate that a South Sudanese identity is more aspirational than actual. Results indicate that the persistence of ethno-tribal affinities blunts the formation of a more encompassing sense of nation among South Sudanese respondents. Indeed, further research is necessary to explore the more complicated nuances of identity in South Sudan.

Communal Tolerance

Perceptions that ethnicity results in inequitable distribution benefits does not preclude the South Sudanese propensity toward tolerance of other tribes, as well as an appetite for greater ethno-tribal integration. Focus group respondents also view aspects of interaction with members from other tribes as a sign of a moving toward

a more peaceful South Sudan, with one participant stating, “...Coexistence is not functional, because leaders of this government have injected ethnicity and spread the tribalism almost everywhere in South Sudan.”

According to the survey, respondents believe that members of different tribes collaborate at least fairly often on issues of governance, to resolve shared challenges, and participate in joint community activities. South Sudanese are united in their view that mutual understandings contribute to peace. Though opinion is split on whether the national government, international community, and local institutions work together to solve problems, most say their community does so to resolve issues when they emerge. A majority of respondents expressed their willingness to make an effort to learn about another tribe’s culture, spend social time with another tribe, and share resources with someone from a different tribe. Few, however, actively cultivate farms with someone who is of another tribe, but many are open to pursuing a joint business with someone who is from a different tribe, and also would engage in economic transactions with someone from another tribe.

Integration appears to have limits. Despite their receptiveness to engaging with other who are ethnically different, at least 77 percent say that have never married anyone from another tribe. In Torit and Yambio only, views are more divided.

Development

In the focus group discussions, respondents mentioned core areas of development they find problematic, such as lack of basic commodities and infrastructure for water, drainage, systems, and electricity, in addition to health and educational institutions. Indeed, access to such infrastructure enables inclusion for respondents. Asked in the survey what infrastructure projects they have noticed in their communities in the past year, most mention street lights. Those in Bor, Bor PoC, Torit, and Yambio notice roads. Roughly a third in most areas saw hospitals, and just half of respondents in Aweil noticed schools. Electricity in residential areas is especially problematic, as also articulated in focus groups. Perhaps relatedly, focus groups respondents from Yambio, for instance, noted that lack of electricity hampers the creation of a fully functioning financial system. Most insisted on the need to have financial institutions, such as banks, that would enable the transfer of money locally and abroad. This would not only permit economic transactions, but also bring people together.

Except in Juba, South Sudanese interviewed offer poor ratings of their social services, including electricity, transportation, the provision of security, social services, and provision of development projects. Assessments are more varied around health care and education: in Bor, Bor PoC, and Yambio, services are at least fairly accessible.

Table 20 - Access to Electricity

		Rating the access to electricity									
		Not accessible at all		Not accessible		Accessible		Very accessible		Total	
		Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Location	Aweil	16	100%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	16	100.0%
	Bor	16	100%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	16	100.0%
	Bor PoC	10	62.5%	5	31.2%	1	6.2%	0	0.0%	16	100.0%
	Juba	15	93.8%	0	0.0%	0	0%	1	6.2%	16	100.0%
	Juba PoC	32	100%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	32	100.0%
	Torit	16	100%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	16	100.0%
	Yambio	15	93.8%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	6.2%	16	100.0%
	Total	120	93.8%	5	3.9%	1	0.8%	2	1.6%	128	100.0%

Gender

According to South Sudan 2008 census figures, women comprise 50 percent of the country’s population. Yet, respondents assert that men and women do not enjoy the same respect in their communities. Prevailing cultural norms that reinforce patriarchy marginalize women in public life. Perhaps for this reason, a majority of South Sudanese male and female respondents, alike, say men and women do not have access to the same political opportunities and are divided on whether they have access to the same economic opportunities, but believe that children are treated equally in school. Despite the apparent acknowledgement of women’s political and economic disenfranchisement, most men and women respondents, alike, are convinced that more women in positions of political influence would contribute to peace. Women consistently voiced the critical importance of including more women in political leadership roles during the focus group discussions. Although male respondents were just as likely to agree with these sentiments when prompted with questions about representation and inclusion of women in the survey, they were far less likely to raise it themselves in the focus groups. In vivid reflection of these opinions, focus group respondents similarly cited the importance of women as peacemakers, arguing that women are more sympathetic, yet resilient. "Women are always facing it harder, whether we're in peace or not in peace. When there is war, women are raped, violated, disgraced, their children abducted and killed and so on." Here, the study’s findings on gender-based violence are illustrative, as respondents linked freedom from being subject to rape and other forms of violence to being safe from harm, and ultimately, inclusion.

Summary Findings

Comparative Observations

Although this study was carried out simultaneously using an identical methodology, and with the same goals and objectives in mind, the research team was initially uncertain whether or not an approach that places so much of the project's development in the hands of respondents would enable the study to draw comparisons between two countries at all. However, the analysis of the discussion indicated that some concepts appear to be almost universally recognized as indicators of peace, inclusion, and participation. This finding was itself important, given the weight researchers often place on the distinctness of national contexts in international comparative studies. While key distinctions between South Sudan and Kenya clearly emerged during this study, there were in fact a number of cross-over issues that were broadly applicable according to respondents from both countries.

In both countries, the importance of local factors in influencing a respondent's sense of inclusion were the most significant variable. Gender was also an important factor, but not as significant as location, especially in Kenya.

In both countries, there was a heavy emphasis on the importance of clear communication from trusted sources. In both studies, citizens often felt increasingly isolated and excluded when information about negotiations and progress was not easily available and communicated through sources that respondents felt they not could trust. Respondents reflected their inability to trust media sources as highly exclusionary, and felt that if communications were improved, this would enhance their sense of inclusion in the process significantly. As this is a relatively straightforward matter compared to some of the more complex findings in this report, communications should be a priority during transitional processes where the actors want to increase citizens' sense of inclusion with relatively little effort.

In both studies, the research confirmed that respondents believe that ethnic differences are less meaningful to their daily lives than the political elites represent. However, there was evidence of double-speak on the part of participants here, as although most respondents stated publicly during the focus groups that they had no issues interacting with other tribes/ethnicities, levels of distrust during key periods such as elections, and in the contestation for scarce resources suggested that respondents do in fact treat ethnic differences as meaningful. This is a complex finding, requiring a nuanced approach to ethnic/tribal causes of conflict and insecurity. However, the possible double-speak occurred in both countries, in similar ways and at similar times.

Another common finding was the two forms of insecurity that concerned respondents when it comes to insecurity and violence. On the one hand, criminal insecurity was directly related to respondents' sense of inclusion, whilst a second category of violent exclusion could be categorized as politically motivated violence. In both studies, these two types of insecurity were often referred to interchangeably and sometimes even conflated. The study demonstrates that for citizens, there is little distinction between forms of violent conflict, although they often appreciate the motivations are different. The effect of violence on inclusion is the same irrespective of this motivation.

Finally, the importance of development to a citizen's sense of inclusion was the biggest single determinant of how included they feel during and post-transition. Streetlights, infrastructure maintenance, and development, when visible to respondents, dramatically increased their sense of inclusion in the development of their community.

Conclusions

To conclude, outcomes from the research in Kenya and South Sudan reveal several points of convergence on both results and indicators. First, findings from Kenya and South Sudan suggest that communications and information dissemination is critical for both populations. Be it communication around information related to transitions and / or peace processes, managing citizen expectations in a manner that contributes to empowerment and inclusivity is essential. In other words, government stakeholders should avoid framing outcomes in zero-sum terms. Gains for one ethno-tribal group does not have to translate into a loss for the other. Amid perceptions among both Kenyan and South Sudanese respondents that some ethno-tribal groups benefit more than others in terms of the distribution of state resources and opportunities, respondents' express willingness to become more familiar with ethno-tribal groups that are different from their own, and are open to engaging in economic transactions as well. Such attitudes suggest points of entry, and that tolerance can be leveraged to build confidence and cooperation, as transition and peace processes move forward in Kenya and South Sudan.

Fruitful contributions to peace, according to Kenyan and South Sudanese respondents, could include activities, such as sports, peace caravans, and dramatic plays. These activities build trust, familiarity and thus, a sense of citizen inclusion.

The study further finds that nuanced differences in Kenya and South Sudan exist regarding women's sense of exclusion and vulnerability. In Kenya, for example, there is not a great deal of evidence of perceived exclusion among women respondents. However, female respondents in Kenya were more likely to feel restricted in their ability to move around freely, in particular after dark, than male respondents. In South Sudan, by contrast, findings underscore a heightened sense of vulnerability. Though according to Kenya results, there is a sense that women are more vulnerable, this does not seem to preclude the belief that women can ultimately rise to positions of power. In both countries, the lack of personal safety is exclusionary for women. In Kenya, men are less vulnerable and able to conduct activities at any time, which creates more opportunities for men.

Finally, looking forward, for both Kenya and South Sudan, development indicators are powerful measures of safety and of inclusion. For Kenya streetlights, potholes, and roads are priorities among respondents. For South Sudan electricity looms particularly large. The level of emphasis of these indicators for either country was surprising. Kenya findings suggest more complex views on agency, however. When Kenyan respondents were asked to describe their priorities, they mentioned cheaper food prices, affordable education, and creating an enabling business environment. Considering views on infrastructure, Kenyan citizens appear to want the state to create favorable circumstances for citizens to have access to opportunity, and but then want to have a chance to take ownership. There appears to be a distinction between what people want to actually do versus what they want to be given, at least in the Kenyan context.

Applying the Model in Other Settings

Perhaps the greatest utility of this model lies with its application to other settings, especially conflict-affected countries. The current model demonstrates the possibilities for developing indices for various complex concepts, and for doing so in other different types of environments. The constant is the consistent and rigorous application of the methodology's participatory, bottom-up strategies. This research endeavor emphasized

inclusion. However, the model can be used in settings confronted by violent extremism, or in countries where women or vulnerable populations are subject to gender-based or other forms of violence. Countries such as Burundi, South Africa, and Liberia may be interesting settings for future research on such issues. In addition, the matter of corruption is fraught with complexity, as local conceptualizations do not always align with definitions of corruption used by the international development or academic community. As the international and national-level actors attempt to stem corruption, it would be worthwhile to understand how local communities see corruption in order to substantively address this issue.

Research Gaps

One of the key gaps in this study is the ability to conclude how important a sense of inclusion in transitional processes is for the ultimate success of that process, how robust it is during periods of adversity, and the degree to which the post-transitional dispensation enjoys legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry. Anecdotal and self-reported evidence from Kenya's study suggested that citizens in that country believe their sense of inclusion is important to confer legitimacy to a transitional arrangement. However, in South Sudan, levels of trust in the actors negotiating to end the conflict there was very low, suggesting they don't believe their views matter very much.

This is an opportunity for follow up research to explore a longer-term view of transitional processes factoring in both the views of the citizenry as well as the outcomes of negotiated agreements during transitional processes. Such a study would want to measure the sense of inclusion at the time of the transition, post-transition, and then assess the success of the transitional agreements entered into.

Another key research gap in this study is how the development of localized indicators translate to areas where the research team did not engage with citizenry. Given that one of the major findings of the study was the importance of localized indicators and issues, this study is presently unable to say anything useful about how locally developed indicators work when used in areas other than those used to develop them. Intuitively, there could be potential problems with such an approach, but this is an assumption that remains untested by this particular study.

Finally, the replicability of this type of study in contexts outside of Kenya and South Sudan remains untested for now. The intention of the study was to develop both a method and draft set of indicators to consider in other transitional contexts, but the usefulness of the outputs of this study remain untested. The study is therefore unable to assert the usefulness or value of this approach in other country and transitional contexts. This is however, an area where further research would provide immensely useful elaboration to the Citizen Inclusion and Confidence Indicators.

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ANNEXES

Annex A. Citizen Inclusion Indicators Lists

Indicators List for Kenya

To what extent/do you feel included in the transitional process in your country?

Governance

1. The level of confidence in local government representatives

- 1.1 Citizens regularly participate in public meetings in the area.
- 1.2 Confidence that the member of county assembly represents citizen concerns and issues at the county level.
- 1.3 Do political parties have working structures and visible officials and activities in the area?

2. The level of accountability of county government representatives

- 2.1 Do citizens know how public funds in the county are spent?
- 2.2 Can politicians in the area be prosecuted for corrupt activities?
- 2.3 Does citizen trust in the government system increase when corrupt government officials are prosecuted?

3. The confidence in accessing information on government activities

- 3.1 Are citizens aware of government projects or activities in the area?
- 3.2 Do citizens trust the information available on government projects and activities?

4. Level of trust in the electoral process

- 4.1 Trust in the IEBC locally
- 4.2 Trust in the IEBC nationally

Development

5. The level of access to education

- 5.1 Is quality education accessible in the area?
- 5.2 What are the impediments to accessing quality education in the area?

6. A business environment that enables economic participation in the area.

- 6.1 Is business activity increasing in the area?
- 6.2 There are high numbers of young unemployed people in the area
- 6.3 Do youth have access to the Youth Development Fund in the area?

7. The extent to which development is visible in the area

- 7.1 Have citizens observed Street lights being erected?
- 7.2 Have citizens observed roads being built or improved?
- 7.3 Have citizens observed potholes being repaired?

8. The cost of living

- 8.1 Does the change in basic living costs impact citizens' sense of trust in government?
- 8.2 Citizens' ability to participate in non-work activities has been impacted by the increase in the cost of living?

National identity

9. Ethnic representation enhances a sense of inclusion

- 9.1 Citizen sense of inclusion is based on affiliation with the identity of the representative in a position of authority?

10. The level of interaction between different Tribes in the community

- 10.1 Do children in the community play with children from different tribes?
- 10.2 Is there sharing of communal resources such as boreholes, grazing lands etc. in the community?
- 10.3 Do community members partake in the ceremonies of members from different tribes?

Peace and security

11. Sense of Freedom of movement within the community

- 11.1 Do community members feel safe to move around at night?
- 11.2 Do citizens change their movements during times of political tensions?
- 11.3. When groups gather spontaneously in public spaces do other people (not part of the groups) feel less safe?

12. The occurrence of Interethnic activities promote peace

- 12.1 Do interethnic sport events and activities take place in the community?
- 12.2 Do religious ceremonies bring different ethnic groups together in your community?

Indicators List for South Sudan

To what extent/do you feel included in the transitional process in your country?

Governance

1. Level of confidence in political institutions and processes

- 1.1 To what extent are citizens confident that governing institutions in their country can carry out their roles effectively?
- 1.2 Are leaders (national and local) elected via free and fair elections?
- 1.3 To what extent are national and local leaders held accountable when failing to deliver?

2. The extent of women's representation

- 2.1 How many women occupy leadership positions in key decision-making processes?
- 2.2 Do citizens feel these women have influence on key decisions?
- 2.3 Are women and men respected equally in leadership positions?

3. The extent of youth representation

- 3.1 How many youths occupy leadership positions in key decision-making processes?
- 3.2 Do citizens feel these youths have influence on key decisions?
- 3.3 Are youth respected in leadership positions?

4. The perception of access to information

- 4.1 Do citizens believe they have access to information?
- 4.2 Do citizens believe they have access to information on political activities/events?

5. The extent of media autonomy

- 5.1 To what extent do citizens believe that the media is independent (e.g. the media functions without government interference)?

6. The existence of political impunity

- 6.1 Do citizens feel that the government acquires land unfairly?
- 6.2 How likely is it that politicians accept bribes?

Development

7. The public's access to electricity

- 7.1 Do citizens have access to electricity in their household?
- 7.2 Is there electricity in public buildings in communities?

8. Access to roads

8.1 Do citizens think that they have access to traversable roads in their communities?

8.2 Have citizens seen any new roads being built within the last year?

9. The level of access to schools/education

9.1 Do citizens think that their access to schools/education in their communities has improved?

9.2 Have new schools opened in local communities?

10. Access to employment opportunities

10.1 What is the current level of employment within the country?

10.2 Do citizens notice an increase in access to employment opportunities in their communities?

10.3 Do citizens perceive that most of their family and friends have employment?

11. Access to markets and goods

11.1 How are citizens affected by price-fluctuations of basic commodities?

11.2 Does the government provide services, so that citizens can meet basic needs?

Identity

12. Impact of tribal affiliation

12.1 To what extent do citizens feel that tribal affiliation has an impact on their:

- employment opportunities
- political opportunities
- access to resources
- scholarship awards

13. The level of interaction between different Tribes in the community

13.1 To what extent are citizens willing to learn about another tribe's culture?

13.2 Do citizens believe that coming together for activities such as; traditional dance, sports, and drama, are effective means of promoting peace?

13.3 To what extent are citizens willing to do economic transactions with people outside of their tribe?

Peace and security

14. Feeling secure when participating in political activity

14.1 How safe do citizens feel participating in political activities in South Sudan?

14.2 Do citizens' friends or family participate in political activities in South Sudan?

14.3 Are there political activities taking place in areas where citizens feel they can participate?

15. Confidence in national military

15.1 To what extent do citizens believe that the national military can protect the people?

15.2 Do citizens fear the national military?

15.3 What are the reasons behind citizens' feelings towards the national military?

16. Sense of freedom of movement and safety

16.1 Are citizens able to move safely outside of their community?

16.2 Are citizens able to move safely within their community?

16.3 Can citizens perform daily routines safely (e.g. free from violent attacks)?

16.4 Can citizens farm safely (e.g. free from violent attacks) in their area?

16.5 Do citizens feel safe sleeping in their homes at night?

17. Level of sexual and gender-based violence

17.1 To what extent do women feel threatened by sexual and gender-based violence in the household?

17.2 To what extent do women feel threatened by sexual and gender-based violence in the community?

17.3 To what extent do women feel threatened by sexual and gender-based violence by armed combatants?

Annex B. Survey Instruments

Survey Statement sheet – Kenya

Overall Project Question				
To what extent / do you feel included in the post-conflict transitional process in your country?				
Themes	Categories	Sub-categories	Key Indicator Questions	Type of Measurement
Governance			Levels of inclusion in decision making?	5 point scale
	Democratic Process		*6 months is an appropriate time measurement due to the recently concluded elections during which heightened political consultations and meetings would have taken place. Therefore, the time period reflects the period AFTER the elections as its unit of measurement.	
		Citizen consultation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. I have attended a meeting/consultation which discussed a local community development in the last 6 months. 2. I have been consulted by political leaders about my community's needs in the last 6 months. 3. I am confident that I am able to speak with political leaders in my community. 	Yes/No (Quantify) Yes/No (Quantify) 5 point scale
		Representation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. I am confident that my local leaders represent my concerns and issues at the national government level. 5. I am confident that national government is aware of my community's concerns and issues. 	5 point scale 5 point scale
		Accountability	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Opposition parties are able to hold the government accountable for its programmes 7. I am confident that Constituency Development Funds benefit citizens in my community. 8. I am confident that political leaders in my county are held accountable for their actions (including corrupt/criminal actions). 	5 point scale 5 point scale 5 point scale
		Public meetings	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 9. I have attended a baraza (meeting) in my community in the last 6 months. 10. Barazas in my community are attended by rich people. 	Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No

			11. Local political leaders attend local barazas.	
	Rule of Law			
		Political impunity	12. The justice system in my country regularly identifies and prosecutes corrupt political leaders.	5 point scale
		Corruption	13. It is not necessary to bribe civil servants to receive public services in my community. 14. I feel confident that CDF budgets are properly audited.	5 point scale 5 point scale
		Legal process	15. I would accept peace at the cost of justice for victims of violent conflict. 16. The justice system in my country does not show favouritism for anyone.	Yes/No 5 point scale
	Elections			
		Electoral process	17. I trust the IEBC at the national level to perform its functions properly. 18. I trust the IEBC officials in my local community to carry out their tasks in a non-partisan manner. 19. During national elections, I feel less safe in my community than at other times.	5 point scale 5 point scale 5 point scale
		Political parties	20. I believe that political parties represent the best interests of the voters they are trying to attract. 21. I believe political parties contribute to promoting peaceful coexistence in my country.	5 point scale 5 point scale
	Media			
		Government communication	22. (Radio button) Which of the following provide you with most of/the majority of your information about government decisions and policies in your community? a. Print media b. Community radio c. National television d. Word of mouth e. Political representatives f. Community leaders g. None of the above h. Other:	Radio button

		Media & incitement	<p>23. I trust the media in my country to provide me with accurate and unbiased information.</p> <p>24. I believe the media in my country promotes tolerance and harmony.</p>	<p>5 point scale</p> <p>5 point scale</p>
Development			<p>Has your personal circumstance improved during/after the transitional process?</p> <p>How hopeful are you that it WILL improve?</p>	
	National Service Provision			
		Education	<p>25. How often is your child/children unable to attend school?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Several times per week b. Once per week c. Once or twice a month d. Every now and then <p>26. What are the main reasons your child does not attend school?</p> <p>27. (Star ranking) Please rate schools in your district on the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Financial aid for students b. Sufficient teachers for the students (How many students per teacher?) c. Buildings and infrastructure d. Transport to and from schools e. Availability of learning materials in the class 	<p>Radio button</p> <p>Open-ended question</p> <p>Star ranking</p>
		Infrastructure	<p>28. Have any of the following infrastructure developments been completed in your district/county in the past 6 months?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Roads b. Water & sanitation c. Healthcare projects d. Schools/libraries e. Streetlights f. None of the above <p>29. I am consulted about infrastructure development processes in my county by the relevant political decision makers.</p> <p>30. In my opinion, the roads in my county are better maintained than neighbouring counties.</p>	<p>Checkbox</p> <p>5-point scale</p> <p>5-point scale</p>

		Service delivery & welfare	31. Which of these are the most important issues for your personal situation? a. Better pension laws for citizens b. Basic child care grant c. More student bursaries/financial support d. Disability grant e. Healthcare insurance f. Basic foodstuff subsidies g. Other:	Radio button (choose 3)
		Persons with disabilities	32. I am confident that if I were to become disabled/am already disabled, I would be able to live a productive life.	5-point scale
	Economy			
		Business & industry	33. In my opinion, the current environment is good for business in my community. 34. The opportunities to do business in my area have improved in the past 6 months	5-point scale 5-point scale (Agree/Disagree)
	*there was a strong link between cost of living, hunger and peace in multiple FGs	Economic inequality & social standing/class	35. I believe that government cares for the poor in my community as much as the rich. 36. It has become easier to afford what I need to live in the past 6 months.	5-point scale 5-point scale
		Employment	37. My ethnicity does not prevent me from applying for any job or opportunity and having a fair chance of being selected. 38. Youth unemployment is undermining efforts to build a peaceful and inclusive society.	5-point scale 5-point scale
National Identity			How strongly do you identify with your national identity?	
	Community			
		Unity	39. People in my community interact and mix freely with people from other ethnic/tribal groups.	5-point scale
		Social interaction/ neighbours	40. In my community, people often greet others when walking in the street.	5-point scale 5-point scale Yes/No

			<p>41. I feel free to marry a partner from different ethnic or national background.</p> <p>42. Have you been invited to attend weddings/ceremonies from a community member from another ethnic/tribal group? (Yes/No)</p>	
		Community cooperation & engagement	<p>43. Does your community raise/contribute funds towards community projects?</p> <p>44. Do you belong to a community group or organisation?</p>	<p>Yes/No</p> <p>Yes/No</p>
		Community environment	<p>45. In my community, I often hear disturbances at night (e.g. dogs barking, donkeys braying or <i>matatus</i> speeding past)?</p> <p>46. People in my community mostly keep their doors and gates closed.</p>	<p>5-point scale</p> <p>5-point scale</p>
	Tribalism			
		Power and authority	<p>47. In my opinion, most political leaders are elected on the basis of their ethnicity/tribe.</p> <p>48. I trust political leaders who come from my tribe more than I trust political leaders from other tribes.</p>	<p>5-point scale</p> <p>5-point scale</p>
		Identity	<p>49. In my opinion, most Kenyans are more loyal to their ethnicity than their nationality.</p> <p>50. I was taught the importance of loyalty to my tribe/ethnic group at school.</p> <p>51. In my opinion, ethnicity determines access to opportunities less today than it did in the past.</p>	<p>5-point scale</p> <p>5-point scale</p> <p>5-point scale</p>
		Resource distribution	<p>52. In your opinion, how important is ethnicity for people trying to access:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Land Water Jobs Education Healthcare services 	Star scale (5 point)
	Gender			
		Gender violence	<p>53. The women in my community are able to move about freely without concern for their personal safety.</p> <p>54. In the past 6 months, it has become safer for women in my community to go about their daily lives.</p>	<p>5-point scale</p> <p>5-point scale</p>

		Gender inequality	55. The women in my community are able to dress how they prefer without fear of judgement by the community. 56. In my opinion, gender determines access to opportunities less today than it did in the past.	5-point scale 5-point scale
Peace & Security			Do you believe that Kenya is a more peaceful country today than it was previously?	
	Security			
		Political threats and intimidation	57. In my opinion, it is easy for external threats to cross our national borders and enter the country. 58. I feel safe when attending public meetings and rallies in my community.	5 point scale 5 point scale
		Police and Crime	59. The visible presence of police on the streets in my community makes me feel uneasy. 60. Streetlights in my community are regularly and well maintained. 61. In my opinion, criminal activity in my community has decreased in the past six months.	5-point scale 5-point scale 5-point scale
		Protest and demonstration	62. The visible presence of groups of young people gathering in public in my community makes me feel unsafe. 63. In the past 6 months, have there been any mass demonstrations in your community?	5-point scale Yes/No
		Freedom of movement	64. Are you aware of incidents in the past 6 months where public transport vehicles (matatus/trains/boda bodas) have been stoned or vandalised by community members? 65. I feel safe using public transport in the early morning and at night.	Yes/No 5-point scale
	Peace Initiatives			
		Promoting peace	66. Community leaders/Tribal elders/Chiefs promote peaceful coexistence in my community. 67. In my community, people from different ethnic groups regularly participate in sports in public areas together.	5-point scale 5-point scale
		Peaceful coexistence	68. Are you aware of conflict about utilities between members of your community?	Yes/No 5-point scale

* Discuss the terminology of “County” vs “Community” – how would Kenyan’s understand this? Which term will allow for better units of analysis? Inclusion is at the heart of this survey, so a person “identifying with their community” would be a useful starting point, but possibly from an administrative perspective, counties would make easier units of analysis. What would we do in such instances where minorities in a county don’t strongly identify with their county as “theirs”?

** The intended mode of the survey is to assess perceptions of recent changes over time (a specified or unspecified “transitional” period) which enables the instrument to assess the respondent’s perceptions of whether or not their personal circumstance has improved, and how included they feel in the process of transition.

Survey Statement Sheet – South Sudan

Overall Project Question				
To what extent do you feel included in the transitional processes in your country?				
Themes	Categories	Sub-categories	Key Indicator Questions	Type of Measurement
Governance				
	Democratic Political Space			
		Legitimacy of Institutions/ Processes	<p>1. How important are the following (for a democratic government) for South Sudan?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Leaders are elected via free and fair elections b) State-level leaders like governors are elected via free and fair elections c) Everyone accepts the outcome of elections d) Everyone accepts institutions governing our country <p>2. Rate your confidence in the following institutions to handle problems in our country effectively:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the police - the army - the court - the national leadership - the political parties - the parliament - tribes 	<p>Agree / Disagree; 5-point scale</p> <p>5-point scale (Very confident - No confidence)</p>
		Elections	<p>2. Credible elections contribute to peace.</p> <p>3. I am more confident in the government to represent me when the majority of</p>	Agree / Disagree; 5-point scale

			<p>leaders are elected, rather than appointed.</p> <p>4. During elections, I would trust security forces to ensure citizens' safety.</p>	
		<p>Access to Information / Transparency</p>	<p>5. I am well informed about what is going on around my country.</p> <p>6. I believe I have access to information about the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Current events throughout the country <input type="checkbox"/> the National dialogue process <input type="checkbox"/> Ongoing peace processes <input type="checkbox"/> Political processes <input type="checkbox"/> Political activities and plans <p>7. Do you believe that the government interferes with your access to information?</p>	<p>Agree / Disagree 5-point scale</p> <p>Check all that apply; 5-point scale</p> <p>Yes/No/I don't know</p>
		<p>Media Space</p>	<p>8. I trust the media to provide accurate information.</p> <p>9. I trust the media to provide unbiased information.</p> <p>10. I feel safe posting on social media.</p> <p>11. How free is the media in your country?</p>	<p>Circle the following statement that apply /you agree with</p> <p>5-point scale: free-not free</p>
	<p>Political Leadership</p>			

		Accountable and Responsive Leadership	<p>12. The government implements policies that are responsive to the needs of my community.</p> <p>13. Leaders are held accountable when they fail to deliver on their promises.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National government leaders - Local government leaders <p>14. My views are represented by members of parliament.</p> <p>15. Please rate how important you think the following qualities are for good leadership:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Leaders are present in the communities - Leaders are honest to women and children - Leaders are capable of fostering good relations in the community - Leaders protect of citizens' rights - Leaders make the effort to participate in politics 	<p>Agree / Disagree; 5-point scale</p> <p>5 point scale</p>
		Political Fragmentation	<p>16. Leadership wrangles have exacerbated conflicts in communities around the country.</p> <p>17. There is a lack of cooperation between political parties in my country</p> <p>18. Please choose the statement that reflects the viewpoint closest to your own:</p> <p>A. Political leaders would be able to solve their differences if they have open dialogue.</p> <p>B. I do not believe open dialogue can create lasting solutions between political leaders.</p>	<p>Agree / Disagree; 5-point scale</p> <p>2 Options: Select only 1</p>
	Citizen Inclusion			
		Representation	<p>19. I am confident that my local leaders communicate my community's concerns to the national government.</p> <p>20. My tribe is represented in the national government.</p>	Agree / Disagree; 5-point scale

			<p>21. To what extent are the following groups represented in government at the <i>local</i> level?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Women -Youth -PWDs <p>22: To what extent are the following groups represented in government at the <i>national</i> level?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Women -Youth -PWDs 	5-point scale (Well represented - Under-represented)
		Community - Government Consultation	<p>23. How often do you think the <i>local</i> government engage your community leaders or tribal chiefs to participate in political activities to speak on behalf of your community?</p> <p>24. How often do you think the <i>national</i> government engage your community leaders or tribal chiefs to participate in political activities to speak on behalf of your community?</p>	5-point scale (Very often - Never)
		Political Participation	<p>25. Are the following activities possible for you in your everyday life?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Joining a political party <input type="checkbox"/> Publicly discussing politics <input type="checkbox"/> Attending political activities <p>25.1: Do you feel safe when attending/doing activities listed above?</p>	<p>Check all that apply;</p> <p>Yes / No; 5-point scale</p>
	Rule of Law		<p>26. What would you say are the top three problems facing your country among those listed below?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. corruption b. the conflict c. the economy d. the status of women / gender-based violence (gbv) e. Lack of opportunities for youth f. Land grabbing g. Cattle rustling 	Rate top 3

			<p>h. Lack of elections</p> <p>i. arbitrary or unlawful arrest of civilians</p> <p>j. tribalism</p> <p>k. other: _____</p>	
		Political Impunity	<p>30. I am confident that political leaders are held accountable for their actions.</p> <p>31. Do you know any people whose plots have been taken or confiscated?</p>	<p>Agree / Disagree 5-point scale</p> <p>Yes / No</p>
		Corruption	<p>32. How serious of a problem is corruption in our country? (a. a very serious problem, b. fairly serious, c. not very serious, d. not serious at all, e. no opinion/unsure)</p> <p>33. How often do you think politicians accept bribes?</p>	<p>5 Options (select best fit)</p> <p>5-point scale</p>
	Civil-Military Relations			
		Militarization	<p>34. Which of the following, if any, contribute to the current instability in your country?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> increased presence of security personnel</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> increased deployment of UN troops</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> professionalized army</p>	Check all that apply
		Professional Army	35. How well do you think the army protects civilians?	5-point scale
Peace & Security				
	Peace Initiatives		<p>36. Do you believe that it is important for your country to undergo a formal truth and reconciliation process?</p> <p>37. Do you believe that coming together for activities, such as traditional dance, sports, and drama, is an effective means to promote peace?</p>	<p>Yes / No / maybe</p> <p>Yes / No / maybe</p>

		Cessation of Hostilities	<p>38. How optimistic are you that there can be a lasting ceasefire?</p> <p>39. Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements: A. Disarmament is an essential step for attaining peace in my country. B. Disarmament has exacerbated the conflict in my country. C. Disarmament prevents the government from protecting civilians. D. Disarmament has exposed other tribes to danger</p>	<p>5-point scale</p> <p>Agree / Disagree 5 point scale</p>
		National Dialogue	<p>40. Rate your level of understanding about the National Dialogue process.</p> <p>41. Which of these actors do you think are included in the National Dialogue process: - Government officials - Rebel leaders - Tribes / Tribal chiefs - Religious leaders - Civil society - Opposition groups - Women - Youth - PWDs</p> <p>42. How confident are you that the National dialogue processes will bring peace?</p> <p>43. Do you think that National Dialogue represent all the regions?</p>	<p>5-point scale</p> <p>Circle all that apply</p> <p>5-point scale</p> <p>Yes / No</p>
		Capable and Credible Peace Actors	<p>44. Who do you consider to be capable and credible peace actors? <input type="checkbox"/> church leaders <input type="checkbox"/> local chiefs <input type="checkbox"/> INGOs/NGOs <input type="checkbox"/> UN <input type="checkbox"/> CSOs <input type="checkbox"/> women</p>	<p>Check all that apply</p>

			<input type="checkbox"/> youth <input type="checkbox"/> government actors <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____	
	Security			
		Freedom of Movement	45. To what extent can you move freely within your community without fear for your safety? 46. To what extent can you move freely outside of your community without fear for your safety? 47. How easy is it for you to travel to see your family members and neighbors?	5-point scale (each)
		Physical Security	48. To what extent has your and your family's safety been affected by the following? - Murders - Break-ins - Gunfire - Bandits on the road - Sexual Violence 49. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements: A. I feel safe to travel / go home during daylight B. I feel safe to travel / go home late at night C. I feel safe in my own home during the daytime D. I feel safe in my own home during the night	5-point scale Agree / Disagree; 5-point scale
Development				
	Economic Vulnerability			
		Access to Markets & Goods	50. To what degree are the following conditions are associated with lack of peace: <input type="checkbox"/> limited availability of goods <input type="checkbox"/> goods brought from outside the country	Check all that apply

			<input type="checkbox"/> market is full of foreigners <input type="checkbox"/> high prices of commodities <input type="checkbox"/> limited business and commerce <input type="checkbox"/> closure of major roads <input type="checkbox"/> limited access to markets <input type="checkbox"/> limited availability of resources <input type="checkbox"/> Unemployment	
	Service Provision			
		Equal Distribution	51. Rate your access to the following public services: - healthcare facilities - schools/education - electricity - transportation - security/law enforcement 52. To what extent do you believe the government has equally distributed the following services across all regions fairly? - Provision of security - Social services - Development projects	5-point scale
		Infrastructure	53. Have any of the following infrastructure developments taken place in your community in the past year? <input type="checkbox"/> Roads <input type="checkbox"/> Hospitals <input type="checkbox"/> Schools <input type="checkbox"/> Streetlights <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____	Check all that apply
	Quality of Life			
		Psychological Well-being	54. Do you feel that you are traumatized as a result of the conflict?	Yes/no

			<p>54.1 If yes, on a scale from 1-5 (5 being highest) please rate to what extent the conflict has influenced feelings of trauma in your life?</p> <p>55. To what extent is your ability to sleep peacefully at night impacted by the conflict?</p>	5-point scale
		Livelihood	<p>55. I would feel my circumstances are improving when:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - People are able to cultivate their land and go to their farms freely without fear - People are no longer living in camps - People are able to produce for their livelihood - Women are able to send their kids to school 	5-point scale
		Normalization of Routines and Customs	<p>56. To what extent has the conflict impacted your daily life in the following areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ability to attend community events over the weekends - ability to start a family - resumption of daily routines - ability to practice customs freely - children are able to attend schools - animals roam freely - playing sports - increase in number of orphans in the community 	5-point scale
Identity				
	National Identity			
		Nationhood	<p>57. Which aspect of your identity do you relate to most strongly:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - national (South Sudanese) - tribal - religious - Other: _____ <p>58. Have you ever referred to someone in your community/country as your</p>	Rank

			'brother'/'sister' who was a member of a different tribe? (Never, Not in a long time, Sometimes, Often)	5-point scale
		Tribalism	<p>59. Which of the following are influenced by your tribal affiliation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> employment opportunities <input type="checkbox"/> political opportunities <input type="checkbox"/> access to resources <input type="checkbox"/> scholarship awards <p>60. How often do members of different tribes collaborate on issues of governance? (Never, Rarely, Sometimes, Often)</p>	<p>Check all that apply</p> <p>5-point scale</p>
		Citizenship	<p>61. The government provides national documents to all citizens.</p> <p>62. I have national citizenship documents in my possession.</p>	<p>Agree / Disagree</p> <p>Yes / No</p>
	Gender			
		Gender Represent-ation	<p>63. To what extent do you agree with the following statement:</p> <p>A. Men and women enjoy the same political opportunities.</p> <p>B. Men and women enjoy the same economic opportunities</p> <p>C. More women in positions of political influence will contribute to peace.</p> <p>D. Men and women enjoy the same level of respect in your community.</p> <p>E. Boys and girls treated equally in school</p>	<p>5-point scale</p> <p>Agree / Disagree</p>
		Violence Against Women	<p>64. Please pick the view that is closest to your own:</p> <p>A. Women are safe from sexual violence in their communities.</p> <p>B. Women are in danger of becoming victims of sexual violence.</p>	Pick one
	Community			
		Cultural Tolerance and Coexistence	<p>65. To what extent does mutual understanding amongst different tribes contribute to peace?</p> <p>65.1: Have you spoken with someone from a different tribe to learn about their culture? (Options: No, never; No, not recently; Yes, sometimes; Yes, often)</p>	5-point scale with follow-up

			<p>66. How often do you participate in each of the following activities with someone from a different tribe than you?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - share resources (for example: sharing food at a table) - spend time together/interact socially - cultivate farms together - joint business - engage in normal economic transactions - intermarriage <p>67. Do you think that people from different tribes can live together in one community?</p>	<p>5-point scale</p> <p>Yes / No</p>
		Cooperation & Engagement	<p>68. How often do members of your community join together in meetings to solve shared challenges?</p> <p>69. How often do you participate in joint community activities?</p> <p>70. When there is conflict or disagreement between communities, do people come together to discuss their problems?</p> <p>71. To what extent are Government, local and international organizations engaging youth in your community to find solutions?</p>	5-point scale

Annex C. Focus Group Protocol – Master Questions

<p>1. What does peace/peaceful co-existence mean to you?</p> <p>a. What is preventing resolution of the different types of conflict?</p> <p>b. Who is best positioned (most critical) to resolve/prevent conflict in the country?</p>
<p>2. What in your everyday life, what are the everyday things in order to determine whether you are more or less at peace in your community?</p>
<p>3. How would you like to be involved in the efforts to bring peace/peaceful co-existence to the country?</p> <p>a. [S Sudan] What do you think of the current peace process called the National Dialogue? Legitimate-Fair? Chance of Success?</p> <p>b. [Kenya] Constitution – has implementation addressed grievances & peaceful coexistence?</p>
<p>4. Who do you think is important to include in discussions about how to bring about peace?</p> <p>a. Do you expect your views to be included in discussions about how to shape peace/transition processes?</p>
<p>5. Who would you trust to represent your views on issues related to peace/transitions in this country? In this community? [Chiefs/CSOs/religious leaders/political leaders/military leaders/police etc.]</p> <p>a. Would your confidence in the peace/transition process increase if certain people or groups were included in the process?</p> <p>b. What is your part in bringing peace/peaceful coexistence to the country? Your community?</p>
<p>6. Do you feel that you as a citizen should be consulted and updated about peace/transition processes at various stages/times?</p> <p>a. When do you feel that you are included/represented in processes?</p>
<p>7. Do you feel political leaders understand your views and needs?</p> <p>a. Do your leaders value your opinions?</p> <p>b. What could political leaders do to make you feel they better understand your views and needs?</p>
<p>8. Do you feel that leaders of other ethnic groups value/respect your ethnic group? Why/why not?</p> <p>a. Do you feel your ethnic group is treated fairly?</p>
<p>9. Do you feel excluded in some way from politics/the economy/service delivery/[S Sudan] the peace process?</p>
<p>10. Do women/youth have a special role to place in peace/transition processes? If so what is that role?</p> <p>a. What would you need to see to feel that women/youth are playing an important role in peace/transitional processes?</p>
<p>11. Do you feel free to openly discuss and debate political issues? Does that change during times of conflict? If so, how?</p> <p>a. Let's imagine you are having a community meeting about how to spend development funds, would you feel comfortable disagreeing with others in the group/political leaders?</p>
<p>12. Do you have confidence in government/peace process/transitional decentralisation/devolution to deliver services to your community?</p> <p>a. What do you want to see happen to give you more confidence in government/peace process etc.?</p>
<p>13. What kind of information would you want to feel more included/more confident?</p> <p>a. Where would/could you get this information?</p> <p>b. Who is responsible for providing this information?</p>
<p>14. Who is local government listening to the most?</p> <p>a. Why do you think they listen to these people?</p>

Annex D. Schemas for Kenya and South Sudan





