HORN OF AFRICA BULLETIN
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The search for peace in the Horn: An optimistic note

The Horn of Africa has, for some time now, been regarded as one of the most fragile and conflicted regions of the world. Habitually referred to as 'the Horn", this loosely defined geopolitical region has seemed to remain in a perpetual state of crises characterised by multiple security threats ranging from protracted civil war in Somalia, deadly intra-state conflicts in the Sudan, social tensions in Kenya, and intermittent interstate animosity between the Sudan and South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda, and Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The recent past, however, has witnessed interesting developments. Starting with the power sharing arrangements in Kenya in 2008 and subsequent promulgation of a new constitution in 2010, to South Sudan's historic independence in 2011, Ethiopia's peaceful transition from the iconic but authoritarian Meles Zenawi to Hailemariam Desalegn in 2012, to the optimistic changes in Somalia that saw the election of newcomer Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as president in 2012. These events could possibly be regarded as defining moments. Equally significant is the increased international interest in the region's hydrocarbons that has raised hopes of an oil boom and the attendant benefits.

The question is, are these recent developments a game-changing scenario or merely a case of false hopes and exaggerated expectations? What are the geopolitical and geostrategic implications of these developments? This article will attempt to answer these questions by limiting itself to a few brief macro analyses of some of the recent developments in selected Horn of Africa countries.

The region in contest

The Horn of Africa is an important geostrategic region. Besides, being home to key international organisations and diplomatic missions such as United Nations (UN) Agencies in Nairobi, the African Union (AU) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in Addis Ababa, among others, the Horn of Africa is also endowed with an abundance of natural resources and is geographically close

to two crucial international maritime trade routes: the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. Unfortunately, however, it has remained one of the most conflict-prone and unstable regions in the world, plagued by a plethora of socio-economic and political tribulations whose net effect has been costly both in human and economic terms.

The region has not been helped by cyclical ecological challenges that have undermined food production and contributed to the displacement of large populations. As observed by Roy Love, the Horn of Africa "exemplifies a complex development-security nexus in which politics, inter-elite struggles, resource endowments, poverty and other seemingly distinct phenomena all interact"[1]. Indeed, in terms of governance, none of the region's states can be said to be an exemplar in democratic governance. Most of them lie somewhere in between authoritarianism and democracy (with Somalia having been a non-functioning state for the better part of the last two decades). The fact that most of the leadership in the region remains centralised with little checks and balances, means that most states remain weak and there are high levels of intolerance, politics of exclusion and skewed distribution of resources. Unresolved historical fault lines, regional geopolitics, proxy wars and the West's concern with terrorism compound the problem, often combining to occasion protraction of conflict and increase militarization. Indeed, regimes in the region spend large sums of the national budgets building and maintaining their armies to cushion themselves against self-inflicted security threats, rather than prioritising economic development.

Generally, therefore, the Horn of Africa has witnessed recurrent multiple and intertwined armed conflicts because of state weaknesses and the inability to deal with historical structural fault lines. The search for durable peace has not succeeded because states in the region have not succeeded in creating fair and inclusive socio-economic and political structures.

Is the wind of hope blowing across the Horn?

As observed earlier, there have been a number of interesting developments in the recent past that embody the possibility of a new path, albeit the embodiment being laced with misgivings. Aside from the evolving onshore and offshore oil and gas discoveries that promise to geo-strategically improve the fortunes of the region (of course, taking cognizance of the 'resource curse' syndrome), there have been events in Kenya, South Sudan, Somalia and to some extent Ethiopia and Eritrea that, to the optimists, suggest a possible turning point for the region. A more meaningful assessment of these developments requires a close and detailed appraisal that this article does not encompass.

Starting with the region's biggest economy, Kenya, the country's recent past has witnessed a renewed sense of optimism following the 2007-08 post-election related violence. This has more to do with the promulgation of the country's new and transformative constitution. Historically, Kenya has, since independence, generally avoided protracted armed conflict, compared to neighbouring countries like Somalia, Uganda and the two Sudans. This has, however, not precluded structural forms of violence and a deepening sense of economic and political decay for the better part of Kenya's post independent era. The country's first two presidents, Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Arap Moi, constructed the state in such a way that it encouraged personalization, patronage and centralization of power often precluding any form of accountability and democratic competition (at least until the advent of multiparty politics in 1991).

Indeed, the 2007-08 post-election violence was a reflection of these historical socio-economic and political fault lines, ingrained in the country's old constitution. It is for this reason that the promulgation of a new transformative constitution on 27 August 2010 is raising faith in national institutions, because other than heralding a Second Republic, it fundamentally restructures the country's governance architecture and political landscape. It provides for checks and balances, gives greater prominence to citizens' participation in government and affords decentralization

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of political power and national resources as a response to the country's historical problems of centralization of power and skewed distribution of national wealth. While some of the key provisions of the country's new constitution will only come into effect after the 2013 general elections, its transformative nature has so far been witnessed in the various institutional reforms that have, among others, led to a revamped judiciary and transparent public service recruitment processes. Kenya's new constitution has broadly injected a new sense of vitality and renewal in the country.

Obviously, the constitution will not solve all Kenya's problems. In fact there are challenges relating to implementation and follow up action. But, overall, it is forming a major source of inspiration to Kenyan citizens and other nations in the region and beyond. The sense is that the new constitution could form a key step towards achieving both internal peace and regional stability.

Another interesting development in the region is South Sudan's independence in July 2011. This was a critical and historic moment after a long history of political domination and suffering. Taking cognizance of the challenges of underdevelopment, poor governance, intrastate conflict and post-secession disputes with the Sudan, among others, South Sudan has, on the positive side, done relatively well in developing a semblance of functioning institutions from scratch. These include parliament, judiciary and executive with all the trappings of a legal regime. Indeed, regardless of the misgivings and constraints, South Sudan has, in less than a decade, managed to grow functions of government. In terms of regional implications, given its rich natural resources, an independent South Sudan offers the Horn of Africa an important bilateral partner.

On the whole, the South Sudanese leadership finds itself with the challenge of ensuring the integrity of the new state. Perceptions around corruption, centralisation of power, marginalisation of regions on the periphery and ethnic divisions – among others – threaten the promise of independence. Optimistically, it seems that South Sudan cannot do worse. There have been forecasts, including those by the World Bank,[2] that project speedy economic growth for South Sudan should the country manage to strengthen its institutions. Luckily, South Sudan has the advantage of learning from enormous experiences of other countries and finds itself in a changed international environment that demands transparency and accountability. This augurs well in terms of building governance institutions and overcoming the country's current multi-faceted problems, which in turn will reverberate across the region. South Sudan's independence may, therefore, be seen as a positive thing for the region, particularly when seen through the prism of managing the previous north-south conflicts, and the ensuing trade and infrastructural linkages with other Horn of Africa countries.

Within the Horn, the recent political changes in Africa's second most-populous country, Ethiopia, with the departure of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and the assumption of power by Hailemariam Desalegn, are also worth noting. Meles was seen as an important actor nationally, regionally and internationally. While some analysts feared that his demise would create a serious leadership vacuum in the country and region, others think it presented an important opportunity to open up the hitherto closed democratic space in Ethiopia and settle the unresolved animosity with Eritrea. Meles, who took over power promising freedom and democracy, ended up doing badly on human rights but quite well on the economic front, overseeing one of Africa's fastest-growing economy with annual GDP growth averaging nearly 10 per cent between 2006 and 2011. Critics, however, question some of the government's economic data and point to widespread poverty and lack of economic dividends for a majority of the population.

Indeed, Meles politically contrived a governance structure that gave a semblance of ethnic and regional autonomy but engendered a centralized one-party rule in the form of the ruling alliance, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). He ended up suppressing political and other freedoms and it is for

this reason that some thought his departure would help promote political reforms. Months after his death, uncertainty still remains over the political direction and regional role the new leader, Hailemariam Dessalegn, may take and whether or not he will encompass a rapprochement with Eritrea. The two countries fought a bloody border war between 1998 and 2000 and have in the recent past significantly raised stakes by fighting proxy wars and supporting groups aimed at destabilising each other.

It is unlikely that Hailemariam Dessalegn, seen more as a technocratic and more accommodating compared to his predecessor, will assume a similar prominent and aggressive role in Africa's and the region's realpolitik because of perceived differences with Meles in terms of personality. This may have it pros and cons for Ethiopia and for the region. Some observers think that an Ethiopia that loosens its grip on some of the region's geopolitics, especially relating to governance in Somalia, may be a positive development (albeit probably not so for Ethiopia itself). Interestingly, in early November 2012, Eritrea was seen lobbying Kenya with the aim of rejoining the previously Ethiopian-dominated regional body, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). It is not clear whether or not this effort was because of the departure of Meles, who some say had personal differences with Eritrean Leader, Issaias Afferworki. Broadly, the change in leadership in Ethiopia may at worst either sustain the status quo (in terms of relations with Eritrea and to an extent Somalia) and at best improve these relations and, by extension, help the region to gain stability.

The region has witnessed interesting developments with the transition in Somalia that saw Hassan Sheikh Mohammed, against all odds, become president. The international community is taking a renewed interest in Somalia because of this development. The president has appointed a new prime minister, Abdi Farah Shirdon, who in turn formed a lean cabinet that suggests an attempt to steer away from past bloated cabinets and clan intricacies. Expectations within and without Somalia are high that the country is on a new path. This has been augmented by the success of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), working alongside Somali forces, in achieving significant security gains in key towns and weakening the Islamic extremist group, al-Shabaab.

To consolidate these gains, the Somali leadership will have to extend its authority and deliver essential public services. The short and medium term future is going to be important for Somalia because this period carries the potential to promote or erode the new government's legitimacy. An erosion of the government's legitimacy will unfortunately improve the fortunes of insurgent groups such as al-Shabaab which, though weakened, is far from being a spent force. All in all, Somalia has certainly made a 'quantum leap' particularly with the security developments brought about by AMISOM and the election of a new government. There is no doubt that security and governance challenges remain ahead but compared to the two previous decades of anarchy, there is an important window of opportunity to move Somalia and, by extension, the region towards peace and stability.

Important, too, for the Horn of Africa region is the fact that almost all countries in the region have either found or embarked on explorations of oil and gas resources. In addition to Uganda's more than 2bn barrels of reserves, there is an indication of oil finds in Ethiopia's south Omo region, oil in Kenya's Turkana basin, prospects along Somalia's coastline and in Somalia's semi-autonomous region of Puntland, while South Sudan is already an established oil producer. Amidst a flurry of activities and increasing discoveries in the extractive energy resource, the dismal track record of Africa's oil producers, however, counsels against the paradox of plenty where hydrocarbons have turned into sources of instability and ecological catastrophes. Already, there are emerging concerns about territorial disputes relating to the discovery of natural resources in the region.

Overall, however, the oil and gas discoveries project potent possible improvement in the region's profile, economic growth and infrastructure development,

among other possibilities. The relevant governments, nonetheless, need to put in place sound policies and frameworks to ensure transparency, accountability and fairness in the distribution of natural resources' proceeds.

Conclusion

This article acknowledges that the Horn of Africa has had and still continues to have intractable problems. Compared to five years ago, however, there is certainly a sense of socio-economic and political progress in a number of countries in the region. This article takes an optimistic view that recognizes the region's inherent challenges but also acknowledges recent progresses that offer opportunities for promoting conditions for lasting peace and stability. In the immediate future, the region will be faced with a number of important geopolitical issues such as Kenya's 2013 elections (given the violence that followed the last elections), state building challenges for the nascent regimes of South Sudan and Somalia, the new regime in Ethiopia and its foreign policy towards Somalia and Eritrea, and the International Criminal Court's controversy over Sudan and Kenya. But, overall, there appears to be political and economic drivers that have the potential to change the course of some of the region's endemic conflicts.

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1   Roy Love, "Economic Drivers of Conflict and Cooperation in the Horn of Africa- A Regional Perspective and Overview", *Briefing Paper*, Chatham House, December 2009. http://www. chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/.../Africa/bp1209horn.pdf (accessed 10 November 2012)

2   See Otieno Ogeda, "South Sudan's bright economic prospects- World Bank", *The Pioneer*, March 19, 2011 - March 25, 2011, Issue 11 Vol 002, https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/files/africacan/the_pioneer_issue_11_juba.pdf. Accessed 15 November 2012

Security and foreign policy in post-transitional Somalia: A brief assessment

After more than two decades, Somalia has witnessed the inauguration of its fourth republic: the first non-transitional government.[1] There are, however, as many challenges facing the new leadership as there are also opportunities. Some of the key challenges facing the new government include the complete absence of a Somali-owned security sector without which there can be neither new Somalia nor lasting peace for the lawless country. One other major problem facing the new Somalia is its complex – but more historical – relations with its neighbours: mainly Ethiopia and Kenya.

Starting with a brief background, this article, therefore, aims to assess the current picture on the ground. It will also examine some of the key challenges, observations and strategies for the new Somali leadership. The article will also propose – in the form of proposed strategies – a number of policy options on reconciliation, governance and security issues including lessons from other countries; mainly from Uganda and Turkey which both seem to – or should – be Somalia's new-found darlings.

Background

In the months of August and September this year, Somalia witnessed the indirect 'elections' and the subsequent inauguration of a new speaker and a new president, both from the 13-year old Somali civic movement. While the speaker has been advising the country's constitution-making process, the president comes from the

more vibrant Somali civil society. Immediately after the elections, this was followed by the intricacies of statecraft: in other words, how to run a country. There is a lack of adequate expertise. The country is in shambles and key sectors like security and foreign policy – at least by international standards – do not even exist as is the case for all other state institutions.

Despite the non-transitional nature of Somalia, the 8-year transitional period and the related fatigue is still in the minds of many. The secessionist Somaliland and the more regionalist Puntland are also forces to reckon with as is the more socio-political Islamist Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ), which is also still unstructured and messy. Civil society has not been civil enough; equally, the Somali Diaspora (*Jaaliyadda* in Somali) is also confused; al-Shabaab is defeated with the possibility of it hitting back hard. On the more regional/international front, there is confusion over the southern enclave: the issue of Kismayo; piracy off the Somali coast slowed down a bit without having the root causes attended, the other pirates are alive and kicking as is the post-9/11 geopolitics and its effects on Somalia and in the east and Horn of Africa sub-region.

Also, positively speaking, the Somali people are there, enjoying their 'fierce republicanism' together with their 'pastoral democracy.' There is a new and more energetic Somali government and a parliament. In other words, the first post-transitional government in Somalia for over two decades: the 4th Republic. In addition, there is also *fatigue* among the general public with the growing perception that 'there is no life in opposition.' In other words, there is more and more popular support for the new government.

With possibly the imminent defeat of al-Shabaab, there have been some preliminary talks with Somaliland and the current government has the political will to continue. The Somali traditional leadership played a more proactive role than they ever did before. There also exists a new breed of Somali leaders in addition to the higher educational levels among the new parliamentarians. The sub-region's active engagement vis-a-vis the new government's constructive engagement with its neighbours is also something to applaud.

Challenges, observations and strategies

Challenges

Within the complex web of issues in today's Somalia, there are three major challenges even in the country's post-transitional nature all of which call for a tougher government engagement, both in terms of policy formulation and implementation:

• Security dilemma
• Structural instability
• Struggle for power and influence

There is a security dilemma in Somalia, mainly in Mogadishu and much of the south-central parts of the country. And, in addition to the al-Shabaab threat, piracy, the works of the other pirates, and the post-9/11 milieu and its effects on Somalia and the entire east and Horn of Africa sub-region are all contributing to this dilemma.

Structural instability also exists within the various Somali actors including the traditional elders as an institution: the traditional Somali leadership. Even in areas where there is some semblance of relative peace, stability and development, it is nothing to do with how solid their governance structures are but most of the credit goes to the level of 'civic responsibility' showed and enjoyed by the people in those regions: Somaliland and Puntland. The complete absence of a Somali-owned security sector is also largely to blame for much of the existing structural instability across the board in Somalia.

Also, there is a struggle for power and influence throughout Somalia not only by Somalis but also by non-Somali actors. Worst of all, the struggle is over petty politics rather than the bigger picture: national issues.

Observations

There are two major observations that can be made from the past engagements in Somalia: a faulty methodological approach to reconciliation and a definitional problem with various terms used.

In all the past peace processes for Somalia, there has been too much focus on post-conflict relations as opposed to the detailed mechanics of reconciliation. In other words, various mediators and the Somali actors focused – and worked hard – on the institutional and constitutional aspects of the Somali conflict with less attention given to the psychological and perceptual aspects of the conflict.

This puts the new government in a fix as it calls for a balance between the need to protect and build on the gains made and, at the same time, carefully craft a bottom-up approach in their formation of regional administrations.

Also, there is a definitional problem of the terms 'peace-building' and 'state formation.' The two terms are closely inter-related. While peace-building requires – and therefore must focus on – reconciliation, the mending of relations and the restoration of trust, state formation is, on the other hand, naturally characterized and dictated by competition, anxiety and tension between and among the warring groups. This means that a clearer distinction between the two – and how they are utilized – is and will remain a key determinant for any future engagement: the 'federal' government versus other political actors in Somalia.

Strategies

First and foremost, and despite the delays over the recent appointments, it is never too early or too late to act.

Internally, the new government and its allies can and should draw on the lessons learned and other best practices from past processes. The new government should also clean up the provisional 'constitution' and have it *Somalised*. It is the duty of the new Somali 'federal' institutions to attend to these concerns.

The government should also engage in reconciliation at three levels:

- Internal within the three branches of the 'federal' government by ensuring that there should be no more internal wrangles as was witnessed in the past;
- Political outreach between the government and other political actors, for example consultations with Puntland;
- Social reconciliation between and among Somali clans and sub-clans country-wide. Although there exist no clan conflicts, at least for now, there has also never been any social (clan-level) reconciliation that has taken place anywhere in Somalia mainly on past historical injustices, for example, and this may help heal clan and sub-clan conflicts. This level of engagement will also help the overall need for a national reconciliation and healing.

At a different level of reconciliation, the government also needs to continue with the preliminary talks which started early this year between Mogadishu and Hargeysa. This can be done through a multi-track approach: elders to elders, people-to-people, and at the official government lines and through the foreign ministry in Mogadishu.

So far, the new government's 6-pillars' policy has been very much applauded by both Somali and non-Somali observers. They are, however, not enough. In any case, the new government needs to build on the six priority areas:

- Securing progress in areas of stability
- Economic recovery
- Peace-building
- Service delivery
- International relations
- Unity in Somalia

In the interest of justice and lasting peace and reconciliation for Somalia, many people argue that, there should be a Somali-owned security sector for Somalia. There

are, however, debates over whether there should be reforms or a complete formation of the sector, especially in such a post-transitional Somalia.[2] These debates aside, consensus seems to be emerging that the new government should reform the security sector with some structural changes, for example training Somali forces in Somalia and by one friendly country, either Uganda or Turkey or both; training both file and rank and learning from Uganda's National Resistance Movement (NRM).

The NRM sent some 300 officers to Tanzania for military training and this core team formed the basis and the nucleus of what is now known as the Ugandan Peoples' Defence Forces (UPDF) which is now leading the current African Union-led peace support mission in Somalia, the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM). The NRM is widely seen as a success story in terms of the reformation of the security sector in Africa.[3]

Governance is another area of importance. The government needs to build local governance structures by facilitating inclusivity in, for example, ongoing processes in Kismayo, Hiran, Bay and Bakol, Galgudud and in Mogadishu and the two Shebelles. Ongoing efforts by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to stabilise south-central Somalia must respect Somalia's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence. IGAD's Peace and Stabilisation Plan should also respect and nurture the nascent Somali government and build on its legitimacy. This also means that the government should respect the will of the local populations in those areas as they form local (district) and regional administrations while the people in those regions are also expected to respect and, at the same time, align themselves with the provisional constitution.

As part of this, the new government will have to improve governance and demonstrate leadership at the national level by engaging in transparent and accountable public financial management systems; training and building its institutional capacity including the possible introduction of a secondment programme for members of the Somali civil service in other friendly countries; and leading by example in terms of ethical conduct and professionalism.

As a result, the government needs to continue its political dialogue with the peripheries, engage civil society, particularly women and the youth forces, and at the same time continue empowering the Somali traditional leadership, possibly in the form of an Upper House and with the formation of local (district) and regional elders' councils, possibly leading to the formation of a national *Guurti* like that of Somaliland.[4]

Finally, and equally important, Somalia's foreign policy is another major area of concern which needs a complete overhaul. With a capable foreign minister like Fowsiya Haji Adan, the government should also possibly develop – if not entirely borrow – Turkey's 'zero-problems with our neighbours' foreign policy.[5] Somalia is currently facing many post-transitional challenges and its demographic realities, like Turkey's, also affect its foreign policy vision. And from the Turkish side, there should also be a package of aid including support for Somalia's infrastructural development, the reformation of the security sector in addition to serving Somalia's big brother in this challenging post-conflict era. Turkey has already signaled that intent by responding to famine in Somalia in mid to late 2011 and by engaging Somalia politically since then.

Externally, the international community and the region should stop the culture of 'cynicism.' Instead, they should play the role of a 'facilitator,' engage the new government bilaterally and on equal footing and, at the same time, come up with not only the necessary but required political will, but also the long-term commitment which are both central to the nurturing of the nascent Somali institutions. The international community and the region should also realise and agree to the fact that 'it is not business as usual' anymore!

These strategies call for a number of tools to implement and these include: the use of government machinery; nationalist elements across the board; the traditional

and religious elders; and other prominent personalities from the civil society and the diaspora (*Jaaliyadda*). The new government and its allies can and should form a 'Friends of Somalia' group made up possibly of the United Nations' reformed UN Political Office for Somalia (a new UNPOS with a new mandate), the AU, IGAD, the League of Arab States and other individual friendly countries including Uganda, Turkey and possibly Qatar. The media also have a major role to play in this exercise of rebranding Somalia in its new image as it attempts to reclaim its position in the international community of nations. So are the use of diplomacy and public relations by the new government in terms of language and flexibility.

Conclusions

Somalia, even in its post-transitional nature, is not without challenges. The government lacks the necessary technocratic skills to run government business. Although the vision is there, there are also some problems with the sub-regions, for example the issue of Kismayo. The complete lack of a Somali-owned security sector and the absence of a 'big brother' are, however, the biggest problems facing the new government.

While Uganda's NRM provides a classical example of how to reform the security sector with structural changes, Turkey's 'zero-problems with neighbours' foreign policy' hints at a possible return of the new Somalia into the east and Horn of Africa fold once again after its absence from the regional theatre for over two decades. It is, therefore, up to the new Somali government to pursue constructive policies and to the Somali people – together with the international community and the region – to give peace a chance this time. This calls for respect for the sovereignty of the new Somalia, the legitimacy of its new 'federal' government and giving it the necessary support, including political will and long-term commitment to constructively engage the new leadership.

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1   Please note that the term the 'Somali Republic' has a far-reaching political connotation as it signifies the 1960 Somali unity; that it is the government which is 'federal' and NOT the Somali state: hence the 'federal' government of the Somali Republic; and that the new government is widely seen as the 4th republic due its non-transitional nature -- and -- as the first Somali government in office since the break-up of the civil war in 1991.

2   For a detailed discussion on the security sector reform vs. debate, see Herbert Wulf, 'Security sector reform in developing and transitional countries,' Berghof Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, July 2004.

3   For a detailed discussion on the NRM, see Museveni, Y., *Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda*, Macmillan Publishers, London, 1997; Museveni, Y. "Selected Articles on the Uganda Resistance War," *NRM Publication*, 1985, 1986. See also Mamdani, M. "The Politics of Democratic Reforms in Uganda," in P. Langseth et al. (eds.) *Uganda: Landmarks in Rebuilding a Nation*," Fountain Publishers, Kampala, 1995.

4   With a joint assessment mission by the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and Finn Church Aid (FCA) as the basis, FCA, together with its implementing partner: the Mogadishu-based Centre for Research & Dialogue (CRD) are currently working on a similar imitative.

5   On Turkey's zero-problems with its neighbours, see Ahmet Davutoglu 'Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy' *Foreign Policy*, May 20, 2010.

One year down the line in Kenya:
Al-Shabaab versus KDF and increased insecurity

It's been more than a year now since the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) crossed the border and entered Somalia to flush out al-Shabaab insurgents, following a spate of increased kidnappings of tourists along the Kenyan Coast and aid workers mainly working in the North Eastern part of the country. It can be argued that the KDF, Ras Kamboni Brigade and the Somali National Army have militarily defeated al-Shabaab and accomplished an unprecedented first in the hitherto lawless Somalia. But this 'victory' has also come at a cost that should ideally be sorted politically.

Weakening al-Shabaab may be the easier part; laying the political, social and economic foundations for a stable, peaceful and prosperous Somalia seems to be the battle ahead for the African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN). Without a politically stable Somalia, the recent gains made collectively by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) will melt away, much to the chagrin of those who are doing their best to liberate this Horn of Africa state from gangs of all sorts.

KDF's control over the port city of Kismayo has come at a cost, especially in terms of the worsening security situation in the North Eastern Province (NEP) in Kenya, which shares a large, porous and un-policed border with Somalia. Other areas within Kenya, hard hit by terrorism-like attacks attributed to al-Shabaab and its sympathizers, include Nairobi and the port city Mombasa. Of particular interest to this paper is the NEP region, a large swathe of land that was rocked with the *Shifta*[1] war in the early 1960s when this part of Kenya wanted to secede and join Somalia. The secessionist movement was met with full force of the law leading to a number of deaths, loss of property and general under-development of the region. It was only in the early 2000s that the region finally embraced peace following the brokering of a peace agreement at Modogashe, Sericho division of Isiolo County. The Modogashe declaration could be hailed as the watershed that changed the face of NEP for the better.

Since the signing of the Modogashe Peace Agreement in 2001, NEP continued to enjoy peace, save for a few isolated incidents of clan feuds here and there, despite the fact that the region borders lawless Somalia that guaranteed a constant source of refugees, small arms and light weapons. This peace could also be attributed to the concerted efforts of District Peace Committees, the Council of Elders, government organs, civil society, women peace forums and the politicians who engaged the NEP communities in peace building and conflict management initiatives and, more specifically, used the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.

But since the launch of *Operation Linda Nchi* in October 2011, the region has found itself grappling with increased incidents of 'terrorism-like attacks'. The operation was ordered by the Kenyan government as a result of alleged incursions by al-Shabaab extremists into Kenya where they committed heinous crimes bordering on terrorism. The kidnapping of two tourists of European descent and the killing of one in Lamu, as well as kidnapping of two Spanish women who were working for Médecins Sans Frontières at the Dadaab refugee camp, perhaps triggered the operation to flush out al-Shabaab elements in areas in Somalia that border Kenya. The abductions were allegedly carried out by al-Shabaab militants and were seen to have negative consequences on the economy of the country.

Faced with this deteriorating security situation, a Kenyan battalion, with air and armoured vehicle support, crossed the Somali border from Liboi on 16 October 2011, entering the town of Dhobley in Lower Jubba region. Residents reported that the troop columns were supported by four tanks, along with an estimated 40 armoured vehicles, some of which towed artillery[2]. Airstrikes targeted al-Shabaab positions in the jungle surrounding the town of Qoqani, along the main road from Dhobley. Airstrikes also hit an al-Shabaab base near the town of Afmadow.

And on 19 October 2011, the Kenyan cabinet unanimously voted for Kenyan troops to secure and remain in Kismayo until the TFG or AMISOM assumed control of the port city. On its part and in support of the operation to flush out al-Shabaab in southern Somalia, the Intergovernmental Authrotiy on Development (IGAD) issued a communiqué in support of *Operation Linda Nchi*[3] on 21 October 2011. On 24 October 2011 Kenya received international backing for the Somalia military incursions. The French military pledged limited support for the Kenyan operation. France pledged to assist in transporting supplies to Kenyan troops in northern Kenya. The U.S. denied any military operations outside of the Kenyan border and noted that it will continue its overt technical support to the Kenyan military[4].

On 7 December 2011, the Kenyan parliament voted unanimously to approve the deployment of Kenyan troops to AMISOM. With these developments, the operation was on full course, but with dire unintended consequences, especially on the Kenyan soil and more particularly in NEP.

Al-Shabaab reaction to the operation

In reaction to the government of Kenya's decision to send its troops into Somalia, al-Shabaab changed tactics, evidenced by increased attacks on Kenyan soil. In NEP, the attacks have been targeting government officers, security personnel, churches; eateries, entertainment joints frequented by non-Somalis and in some cases the residents. As a result, explosions have become the order of the day with fingers being pointed at al-Shabaab for trying to retaliate and sabotage *Operation Linda Nchi*. Wajir, Mandera, Dadaab and Garissa have been targeted continuously.

Since the launch of *Operation Linda Nchi*, the North Eastern Province and other parts of the country, especially Nairobi and Mombasa, have witnessed numerous grenade and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks. The following are some of the key incidents[5] linked with *Operation Linda Nchi* as reported by various sources.

- **18 October 2011**: A suicide car bomb exploded in Mogadishu near the Foreign Ministry during the visit of Kenya's Acting Defense Minister. The explosion occurred along the planned route to the airport, but the delegation's travel plans were changed at the last minute.[6]

- **6 November 2011**: The Mandera Peace Monitor reported that suspected al-Shabaab militants attacked a border post in Damasa village in Lafey district, killing a police reservist.

These attacks continued throughout much of the remainder of the year, with another attack on a restaurant and a shop in Garissa that killed three people and injured at least 27 being one of the worst incidents targeting civilians and more specifically non-Somalis residing in counties bordering Somalia. Such attacks did not only precipitate tensions between the Somalis and non- Somalis, and Muslims and non-Muslims in Kenya, but also increased ethnic/racial and religious profiling in which Somalis and Muslims in many parts of the country were wrongly perceived to be sympathisers of al- Shabaab.

This forced the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) as well as the minister in charge of internal security to warn against ethnic/racial/religious profiling that was slowly taking root in the country. On 6 November the NCIC issued a statement to the effect that hate is permeating social media networks, broadcasts and SMS text messages amounting to civilian 'ethnic and racial profiling' of Kenyan "Cushites", specifically Kenyan Somalis. The NCIC noted that it had received many complaints of victimization of Kenyan Somalis, warning that "increasingly Kenya is preparing the ground to make Somalis targets of xenophobia and violent attacks."[7]

Throughout 2012 attacks blamed on al- Shabaab continued targeting various sites in NEP. On 29 June 2012, a heavily armed group suspected to be members of al-Shabaab attacked Arabia town in Mandera County. One group of gunmen

engaged the security personnel in a firefight for almost seven hours while another group robbed shops. On 29 June 2012, gunmen kidnapped four foreign aid workers working with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), killing a Kenyan driver. The KDF and Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) troops successfully rescued the kidnapped NRC workers. On Sunday 1 July 2012, 17 people, including two police officers, were killed in two simultaneous attacks in Garissa when masked gunmen sprayed bullets and hurled grenades at the Catholic Central Cathedral and AIC churches. The dead included four men, nine women and two children. Masked gunmen wearing blue uniforms and disguising as security guards sprayed bullets at a congregation of the AIC church resulting in numerous deaths and a high number of casualties. Two grenades were hurled at the Catholic Cathedral but only one exploded. This was the most severe terrorist act to be reported in NEP and has been roundly condemned by Kenyans belonging to all walks of life and religions. Al-Shabaab has since claimed responsibility for this attack.

Road banditry incidents along the Dadaab-Liboi and Lafey-Mandera roads have also increased. This could be attributed to the high number of youth who have allegedly deserted TFG and al-Shabaab front-lines, returning to Kenya with their weapons.

Regarding the grisly 1 July 2012 incident in Garissa, where 17 worshippers were killed, the local residents of Garissa town have pointed to security lapses that have allowed extremists to gain easy access to public places.. They argue that security personnel posted to guard important installations appear relaxed, despite the obvious dangers after al-Shabaab's threats to avenge *Operation Linda Nchi*.

The local population has also been accused of not doing enough to help the security personnel prevent some of these incidents and apprehending the perpetrators. The perpetrators must have been known by some people but nothing was reported. Members of District Peace Committees (DPCs) have also been challenged to improve their intelligence collection and dissemination efforts to mitigate the backlash to *Operation Linda Nchi*.

1.3 Peace and security implications of the attacks

The incidents highlighted above definitely fit into the reactionary strategy used by terrorists/insurgents who normally mount guerrilla type attacks, targeting civilian population whenever cornered. The intention is also to sway the Kenyan public support for the operation and influence the citizens to demand the withdrawal of the forces from Somalia. So far, the impact of the operation is as follows:

- **Re-emergence of banditry activities** as result of many armed youths who had dropped out from either TFG or al-Shabaab militia. There has also been loss of innocent lives through landmines and other ambushes along the major roads in the North Eastern region. The operation has also discouraged public gatherings, meetings, workshops and seminars for fear of attacks by the militia.

- **Proliferation of illegal arms** resulting from the confrontations along the porous border, leading to cheap and readily available arms for Kenyan pastoralist to purchase. The mere availability of firearms can ignite inter-clan conflicts in the pastoral communities in the region.

- *Operation Linda Nchi* has **affected humanitarian efforts** since the NGOs and other development agencies are being targeted by the militia leading to security reviews and intermittent suspension of humanitarian interventions at critical times when they are most needed.

- **Police and military brutality against local people** that could be affecting the support of the operation by the local population. Attacks against the police or military by suspected al-Shabaab members or sympathizers is responded to with brutality where everyone near the area is beaten or rounded up with the objective of acquiring information on al-Shabaab.

- **Disruption of livelihoods** resulting from closure of businesses and income generating activities. In December 2011, many aid agencies reported that they have halted operations in Mandera due to the deteriorating security situation.[8]
- **Cross-border relations**: The operation as well as the fear instilled by al-Shabaab has also affected cross-border relations. Communities that used to trade freely, graze across the borders and share many more things are now being kept apart by the operation.
- **Elections**: The ability of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) to conduct a free, fair and peaceful election in the entire region bordering Somalia will likely be inhibited by real or imagined insecurity as a result of al-Shabaab threats to continue attacking Kenya.

This is just a synopsis of the side effects of the military operation by Kenyan government to contain al-Shabaab threats and possibly pacify Somalia in the long run. It is also important to build some possible scenarios now that al-Shabaab has been driven out of Kismayo, their main stronghold and source of revenue, and a new president has been elected in Somalia following the end of TFG's mandate.

The best case scenario is that Somalia will eventually be stable as AMISOM succeeds in restoring order, strengthening national institutions and particularly the security architecture. The new Somali government is also viewed as a legitimate authority and quickly consolidates its hold of the entire country. This is a scenario that all and sundry would like to see materialize with cumulative effects being peace in the Horn of Africa region as a whole.

On the other hand, the worst case scenario is that the new government will be perceived by a majority as illegitimate authority crafted by Western powers and neighbouring countries and is not reflective of the aspirations of the people of Somalia. Slowly, the government will find itself in the same quagmire that afflicted the previous Somali transitional governments. Al-Shabaab may regroup or mutate into armed groups. In such a scenario,, the KDF will find itself unable to exit Somalia. The continued presence of KDF in Somalia will not only eat into Kenya's meagre economy but may lead to a situation where the local Somali residents will grow disillusioned with it. This may perhaps lead to increased attacks on the Kenyan soil and also reversal for the military support in Somalia.

As AMISOM and KDF continue to celebrate their success in Somalia, a lot needs to be done. Political efforts to stabilize Somalia should now be prioritized and implemented with gusto especially now that the new government and AMISOM still enjoy positive ratings by the locals. This opportunity should not be lost for it may make or break Somalia for good.

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1   The shifta war (1963-67) was a secessionist conflict in which the Somali community in the North Eastern part of Kenya attempted to join Somalia to create the Greater Somalia. The government used the Somali word shifta that means bandit to describe the secessionists and their supporters largely as a propaganda campaign.

2   For a comprehensive collection of key events and incidents marking this operation, see Zimmerman, K. and Khatib, K., "Timelines: Operation Linda Nchi," in *CriticalThreats.org*, March 9, 2012 issue available at http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/timeline-operation-linda-nchi-october-24-2011

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4   Tom Odula, "France to Help Supply Kenyans Fighting in Somalia," AP, October 24, 2011. Available: http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article

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7   OCHA, Horn of Africa Crisis Situation Report No.22 of 11 November 2011 available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA%20HoA%20Situation%20Report%20No.%2022.pdf

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Is state building working in South Sudan?

The world's latest experiment of state building is currently underway in the youngest state of South Sudan. Ever since its independence in 2011, South Sudan has been carrying out massive efforts of state building. An international mission, the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), has also made its presence since July 2011 to assist with the state building process.

The increasing emphasis on building the capacity of non western states in the developing world is just a recent phenomenon. The dominant trend in world politics for the past generation has been the critique of "big government" and the attention to move the activities from the state sector to the private market or civil society.[1]

Despite a hopeful start in the post colonial and independence period, the state in the third world was largely seen as problem in the 20th century. It was seen as an obstacle to economic and political development, and limiting the state was the dominant paradigm. Nevertheless, the state was once again rediscovered at the dawn of the new millennium.[2] This rediscovery of the state in the new millennium was mainly due to security, development and peace building considerations.

First, weak states in the third world were increasingly perceived as international security threats, harbouring "terrorists, drug traffickers and international criminal networks and therefore exporting instability, refugees and terror."[3] Second, the role of the state in fighting against poverty and realizing development goals was also increasingly recognized.[4] Thirdly, Peace building specialists continuously argued that a successful peace building can only occur in the context of capable state institutions.[5] Consequently, the consensus in the new millennium seems that effective and capable states that can deliver on core functions of the state, realize development goals and consolidate peace are crucial in the third world.

issues, progresses and lingering challenges

Arguably, one year may not be enough to evaluate the state building process in South Sudan. The country just celebrated its first anniversary in July 2012, and one might argue that a single year is too short to be able make an effective analysis of the state building processes in the country. However, in-depth and comprehensive analyses pending, this paper aims at identifying some of the major issues, progresses and remaining challenges of state building in South Sudan. Doing such an appraisal of early efforts helps us to understand the track South Sudan has taken in realizing a stable, democratic and legitimate state.

State building versus nation building

One major issue of discourse in the state building process in South Sudan is the balance between nation building and state building. State building and nation building are related but different concepts. While state building aims at enhancing the capacity and legitimacy of state institutions, nation building focuses on the creation

of commonly shared citizenship identity.[6] Despite a clearly lacking shared sense of South Sudanese identity, most local and international efforts in South Sudan have been focused on state building.[7] The country contains more than 60 cultural and linguistic groups, each of which has a stronger sense of citizenship in their tribes than in the nation.[8] The main glue that hitherto bonded all the different tribes together was their resistance against a common enemy, the Khartoum government. Now, after independence, this sense of "common enemy" does not exist anymore; and hence the country should be able to build a common South Sudanese citizenship identity. "Whatever projects a new country conceives it has to view nation and state as inseparable components of the same project, not focusing too much on one without investing in the other."[9]

The "we liberated you" syndrome

Another important issue distorting the state building process in South Sudan is the domination of the state apparatus by former liberation fighters. According to Blackings, one of the most disturbing narratives among the former fighters of SPLM/A is the "we" liberated "you" doctrine.[10] This doctrine has put former fighters and other South Sudanese on different scale of privileges and rights. Former fighters were privileged and rewarded in the new government regardless of merit and other South Sudanese were treated as "second class" citizens. The consequence of this largely undermined the legitimacy of the state.

The issue of transformation of SPLM from a guerrilla movement to a ruling political party

Salih who studied former rebels that assumed state power in the Horn of Africa notes that "Guerrilla commanders and liberation movement leaders often find it difficult to transform their revolutionary leadership style and personal political ambitions to cope with the demands of democratic governance."[11] The SPLM/A, a former guerrilla movement currently in charge of the governance and the state building process, does not seem to be an exception to this trend. Blackings argue that the failure of the current ruling party, the SPLM, to successfully transform itself from a guerrilla movement to responsible political party lies at the heart of all the problems South Sudan continues to face a year after its euphoric independence.[12] Not bequeathing its decades old modes operandi, the SPLA largely continued to rely on the use of force in dealing with the opposition and the general public. According to a recent report by Reporters Without Borders, one of the major problems the people of South Sudan raised in the past year of independence is the brutality of the security forces and the SPLA.[13] Despite prohibition by the interim constitution, security forces tortured, beat and harassed political opponents, journalists and human rights workers.[14]

Dependence on the export of a single natural resource commodity

Paul Collier, who has written extensively on natural resources and conflict in Africa, argues that countries who are substantially dependent on the export of primary natural resource commodities are "radically more at risk of conflict" According to him, dependence of fragile states on the export of lucrative natural resources such as oil is likely to ignite civil wars due to greed and competition for the control of such resources.[15] South Sudan almost entirely depends on the export of oil. 98% of the yearly budget of the country comes from oil revenues.[16] This huge dependence on oil, without proper diversification of the basis of the economy, almost exposed the country to an economic collapse when the country decided to close down oil production in January 2012 as a result of disagreements over pipeline fees with Sudan. The loss of oil revenues soon caused huge inflation (up to 80%), chronic shortage of foreign currency and a series of crippling measures of austerity.

South Sudan needs to diversify the resource base of its economy not merely because uncertainties exist in the transportation of the oil, but also because the income from the oil supply is subject to market fluctuations and future declines in reserves.[17] While the diversification of the economy is critical in view of all these facts, not much has been done towards this end in the first year of independence.

North-South relations

Despite a recent breakthrough, a serious challenge to state building in the first year of independence for South Sudan was unresolved post independence issues and crisis with North Sudan. These unresolved issues and the ensuing crisis in the relation between the two countries has been hampering the state building process and holding back the progress of the new country.[18] The demarcation of the common boundary, the highly contested oil rich region of Abyie, the sharing of oil revenues and accusations of harbouring and supporting each other's rebel groups were the major unresolved issues that undermined the state building process. Many feared the resumption of another round of war when disagreements culminated in the flaring up of a war at Heglig in April 2012.

Progress, however, has been made just recently in resolving a significant number of these issues of disagreement. In September 2012, the two countries signed an agreement in Addis Ababa on nine major issues including oil transit fees, creation of Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ), humane treatment of nationals of the other and fostering trade relations. Yet, other thorny issues such as the status of the highly disputed region of Abiye and other territories in the border still hang on. These issues pending settlement are likely to pose tremendous challenges shadowing the implementation of agreements already reached. A more reliable peace between the two countries requires a comprehensive agreement that addresses all issues of concern affecting the relationship between the two countries. As repeatedly noted by the special representative of the UN Secretary General and the Head of UNMISS, Hilde Johnson, South Sudan's ability to resolve all the remaining issues of independence comprehensively is absolutely critical in laying down strong foundations and creating a viable state.

Internal conflict and insecurity/security

Tribal conflict has also been another evident challenge in the state building process. Inter-tribal conflict (due to cattle raiding and competition for water and pasture) is a widespread phenomenon in South Sudan. During the first year of independence, however, the violent attacks by Lou Nuer on Murle groups and the ensuing retaliatory attacks in the state of Jonglei was the biggest security challenge.[19] An investigation report released by the UNMISS in June 2012 reported 612 fatalities from the Murle communities and 276 deaths from the Lou Nuer and Dinka communities in the violence perpetrated between December 2011 and January 2012.[20] Such brutal and deadly tribal conflicts clearly show that the state is far from legitimately monopolizing violence and ensuring protection for its own citizens.

Another major security dimension that undermined the monopoly of violence was the presence of various local militias in different parts of the country. While a lot remains to be done, the government, however, has made considerable progress in disarming and integrating certain elements of the militia. Three prominent militia groups, namely, the forces of the late Colonel Gatluak Gai's, South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army led by Peter Kuol Chol, and South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) led by Major General Peter Gadet were effectively neutralized and joined the government.[21] Yet a number of other militia groups remain defiant and are still active in Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity state.

Many of the militia groups don't have a clear political agenda but a mere personal fall out with SPLM/A. And therefore, negotiations to bring these individuals on aboard but also offering educational and employment opportunities to the desperate

rural youth, who make up the rank and file of these militia groups, are key to demo-bilization. Furthermore, implementation of the security arrangements of the Addis Ababa peace agreement is extremely important since the majority of the militia groups are encouraged and supported by the Khartoum government.

Corruption

The other formidable challenge to the state building process in South Sudan is corruption by government officials. Added with the economic crisis, widespread ethnic favouritism, nepotism and embezzlement of public funds by the high ranking officials of the government have had a paralyzing effect on the state building process. According to the BBC, top South Sudanese government officials are reported to have embezzled at least 4 billon US dollars.[22] Aware of this challenge, the SPLM/A made a good move establishing an Anti-corruption Commission as early as 2009 but the commission seems too weak to prevent and prosecute such rampant cases of corruption. Hence, more efforts in the form of empowering the Anti-corruption Commission, institutionalizing accountability and transparency and prosecuting corrupt officials are needed to prevent corruption from further undermining the state building process.

Weak constitutionalism and rule of law

In its first year as an independent state, South Sudan has been laying down the legislative foundations and frameworks of the new state. A Transitional Constitution entered in to force on July 9, 2011, the day of independence. Part two of the consti-tution deals a Bill of Rights in detail recognizing several civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of citizens. The constitution also declares supremacy of the constitution and rule of law (Article 3.). In addition, the independence of the judici-ary from the executive and the legislative is provided (Article 124). The South Suda-nese Human Rights Commission has also been functional for a while to promote and protect human and fundamental freedoms of the people as enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the constitution.[23]

However, despite the presence of these legislative frameworks and institutions, the practice of constitutionalism and rule of law remained limited during the year. According to the US State Department Human Rights Report, arbitrary arrest, har-assment, torture and rape are grossly spread in South Sudan.[24] Despite the constitu-tion providing for an independent judiciary, courts remained subjected to political pressure.[25] In addition, widespread incidents of arbitrary detention and dire prison conditions were reported rife in the country.[26]

Concluding remarks

Not surprisingly, as the world's newest state, South Sudan has become a new arena for the world's latest state building project. One year on, the country has made considerable progress in laying down legislative frameworks and establishing major institutions of the state, and the foundations that are put in place will certainly aid in the building of a peaceful and legitimate state.

Despite the progresses made, however, the general impression is that South Sudan has failed to meet expectations. In the past first year, the state struggled a lot to be able to stand on its feet due to unresolved post independence issues with the Sudan, an economic crisis, conflict and insecurity, corruption and human rights violations, just to mention a few.

While the recent agreements with Sudan on the reflow of the oil, border secu-rity and a range of other bilateral issues are quite promising and need to be further strengthened, other lingering challenges still hang on calling for a much more ag-gressive, all inclusive and consolidated efforts of state building. Much work is still needed towards the monopolization of violence and dealing with the widespread insecurity in the country. Dependence of the economy on oil revenues shall be mini-

mized overtime and the basis of the economy must be diversified if South Sudan has to avoid any additional crisis like the one in the past year that challenged the very existence of the nation.

Widespread corruption has been a major predicament hampering the nascent efforts of state building, and hence, the country needs an aggressive national campaign against corruption and strong punitive measures against those officials who selfishly and irresponsibly embezzled public money. The agreement signed with the Sudan is a breakthrough but should be followed by a comprehensive one that deals with all issues of concern including the status of the oil rich Abyie region. An immediate intervention by government officials in the area of protection of human rights and improving the rule of law is also highly essential to improve the poor human rights record of the young nation.

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NEWS

KENYA

Towards elections
Media promotes conflict sensitive reporting

Preparations for elections in Kenya continue with a range of activities. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission launched the voter registration exercise on 19 November. It is expected to end on 18 December 2012. Kenyans who live in the five East African Community countries will have a chance to cast their votes for aspirants of their choice in the March 4, 2013 General Elections. Other voters in the diaspora outside East Africa were left out due to voter registration challenges. At the same time, new political alliances are being forged, marked by coalition of political parties' agreement that have to be submitted according to the Political Parties Act 2011.

The new political coalitions preparing for the election include one by individuals who have been indicted by the International Criminal Court over the 2007 post-election violence. The politicians who are part of this coalition have accused the international community of meddling in Kenya's internal affairs over the candidature of these individuals in the next general elections.

Similarly, as the political campaigns continue, initiatives are on-going to ensure that the March 2013 elections are peaceful, free and fair. Particularly, the media have been targeted and trained on how to report before, during and after the elections in a manner that does not exacerbate conflict. Following successful training sessions, a Kenya Media for Peace Network (KEMPEN) was launched aimed at conflict sensitive reporting. The training was a collaboration between the Life & Peace Institute, Saferworld and Uwiano Platform.
Source: Daily Nation, 8th December 2012 and Kenya Media for Peace Network

Rising insecurity and sectarian attacks

Over the past year, Kenya has seen a series of explosions, many from grenades and other small improvised explosive devices. The use of explosives targeting the public has been on the increase in Kenya and particularly in Nairobi. The attacks

have led to sectarian confrontation between different ethnic groups whose supporters are mobilizing to attack the other group perceived to belong to the community of the attackers. In November 2012, a grenade was hurled at a public vehicle, killing one person. The incident was followed by days of retaliatory attacks targeting the supposed attackers' community. In early December 2012, a grenade was hurled at a gathering in a mosque. Among those injured was a member of parliament who was having a meeting with constituents. The attack which occurred only a few weeks after the November attack took place in the same location. There is fear of again retaliatory attacks in response to the blast between members of the two dominant communities residing in the area.

Source: http://www.citizennews.co.ke/news/2012/local/item/5779-six-killed-in-eastleigh-grenade-attack and http://www.nation.co.ke/News/MP-injured-two-killed-in-Eastleigh-blast/-/1056/1639064/-/dd23b8/-/index.html.

AMISOM extension

The United Nations Security Council has extended the mandate of the international peacekeeping force providing support to the government of Somalia in its efforts to bring peace and stability to the Horn of Africa country. The Security Council reauthorized the African union mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to maintain its presence for four extra months, until 7 March 2013. The Security Council in a unanimously adopted resolution acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter determined that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security. Chapter VII of the Charter allows the Council to use force in the face of a threat to peace or aggression, taking "such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security," including blockades and other operations by the forces of Member States.

Created and operated by the African Union Peace and Security Council in January 2007, AMISOM received a UN mandate from the world body's Security Council the following month, and has been renewed ever since. With close to 10,000 peacekeepers, it is mandated to conduct peace support operations in Somalia, which has been affected by conflict for more than two decades. The AMISOM alongside Ethiopia forces and allied local forces have contributed to the improved security in Somalia. It is thus essential that AMISOM is supported to control more effectively the coastal waters around Mogadishu, Marka, Baraawe and Kismayo, in order to protect its own forces, supply lines, interrupt al-Shabaab re-supply lines and effectively secure the ports for commercial use.

Source: UN News Centre and RBC Radio http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp ?NewsID=43402&Cr=somalia&Cr1=#.UJTCacWTyyY & http://www.raxanreeb. com/2012/11/somalia-un-extends-amisoms-mandate-in-somalia-to-4-months/

10-member cabinet in balancing act

Somalia has appointed a 10-member cabinet in a delicate balancing act aimed at satisfying rival clans. The new government has also appointed two women in the cabinet, which is a historic precedent that is bound to change the political scene in Somalia. The major player in Somali politics are the elders and clan leaders who wield enormous influence. Several Somali clans were excluded from the new government, a potential source of discord in a country where clan balance is vital in political life. One of the women ministers appointed, Foreign Minister Fowsiya Yusuf Haji Adan, comes from the self-declared independent state of Somaliland and has lived in the UK for a long time. While in the UK, the newly appointed minister

was making an impact on the lives of ordinary Somalis in the diaspora through a welfare organisation focusing on advocacy.

The formation of the government is the culmination of a regionally brokered, UN-backed effort to restore central control and bring an end to more than two decades of fighting that has killed tens of thousands of people. The new administration, which has been approved by the Somali parliament, brings eight years of transitional rule by the corruption-riddled and Western-backed transitional government to an end.

Source: http://www.dw.de/woman-foreign-minister-in-somali-cabinet/a-16356475

RESOURCES

Gender and peacebuilding: Taking stock

The report explores the role of gender in peacebuilding and reflects the findings of the preparatory phase of a three-year research project exploring the role of gender in peacebuilding. Whilst addressing key research questions, the report identifies three approaches to gender that are evident in peacebuilding: gender-blind, those based on UN Security Council Resolution 1325, and gender-relational. The third – and hitherto unexplored – approach, is based on a strategy of benefit-sharing and solidarity-building between men and women, and uses a context-specific gendered power analysis as its starting point. The report calls for further exploration of the validity of this approach as an effective strategy for both analysing conflict and designing peacebuilding interventions, and it is this that will be the focus of the remaining two years of the project.

The full report can be accessed from International Alert: http://www.international-alert.org/resources/publications/gender-peacebuilding

The Somali diaspora: Options for post-conflict Reconstruction

The report presents an analysis of the role that Somali diaspora have in reconstruction of their country. This group is expected to play a crucial role in Somalia's reconstruction process is 14% of the country's population residing outside their homeland. Broadly, the diaspora is defined as a group or groups who are dispersed from their homeland, for example refugees, those who leave their homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions.

With the transition process having come to an end and semblance of normality returning to Somalia, the priority remains how to stabilise the country and promote national reconstruction. For a country that suffers from multifaceted security challenges and lacking basic functioning institutions, the effort to rebuild livelihoods is not going to be easy and will require support. Importantly this support will have to come from Somalis themselves both living in the country and those abroad with links with the country.

Source: Institute of Security Studies
http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/5Nov2012LewelaSomalia.pdf

Traditional roles peace-making in Darfur

The violence that has raged in Darfur for a decade is both a crisis of governance and a problem of law and order. As broader peace efforts have faltered, interest has increased in the capacity of local communities in Darfur to regulate conflict in their midst. All hope that traditional leaders, working within the framework

of traditional justice, can be more successful in restoring some semblance of normalcy and security to Darfur. This report outlines the background to the conflict and the challenges in resolving it.

To access the full report:
http://www.usip.org/publications/traditional-authorities-peacemaking-role-in-darfur

Fragile states 2013: Resource flows and trends in a shifting world

By 2015, half of the world's people living on less than USD 1.25 a day will be in fragile states. While poverty has decreased globally, progress on Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 1 is slower in fragile states than in other developing countries. Fragile states are also off-track to meet the rest of the MDGs by 2015.

Fragile situations became a central concern of the international development and security agenda in the 1990s. Since then, powerful forces have been influencing the causes and manifestations of fragility, including the combination of democratic aspirations, new technologies, demographic shifts and climate change. The last five years have been especially tumultuous, encompassing the 2008 food, fuel and financial crisis and the Arab Spring, which began in 2011.

These events have influenced the international debate on the nature, relevance and implications of fragility. While situations of fragility clearly have common elements – including poverty, inequality and vulnerability – how can we make sense of the great diversity in their national income, endowment in natural resources or historical trajectories? How do we move towards a more substantive concept of fragility that goes beyond a primary focus on the quality of government policies and institutions to include a broader picture of the economy and society?

This publication takes stock of 1) the evolution of fragility as a concept, 2) analyses financial flows to and within fragile states between 2000 and 2010, and 3) identifies trends and issues that are likely to shape fragility in the years to come.

Find the publication at:
http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflictandfragility/resourceflowstofragilestates.htm

Disarmament and demobilisation in comparative perspective: Patterns and policy recommendations

Disarmament and demobilisation (DD) programmes are vital components of strategic peacebuilding. DD provisions govern the collection and disposal of arms and ammunition, and oversee the discharge of active-duty combatants from the state's armed forces, rebel groups, or both. Using data from the Peace Accords Matrix database, this report compares the five most recent cases of DD implementation: Nepal (2006), Liberia (2003), Macedonia (2001), Indonesia-Aceh (2005) and South Sudan (2005). A comparative analysis reveals several common patterns in the kinds of provisional and operational choices associated with efficient DD implementation.

Having a definite timeline and largely completing the process prior to the first elections creates an incentivised environment for a timely DD process while diminishing the risks of election-related violence. Economic incentives associated with the process of cantonment can increase the duration of DD programmes. External actors with a strong mandate can solve problems faster and have been instrumental in achieving a swift DD progression. Disarmament programmes must be realistically matched to conflict settings. This can include the use of mobile collection units, which have proved to be successful in cases where a primary centralised site is not sufficient.

Find the report at:
http://www.peacebuilding.no/Themes/Peacebuilding-in-practice/publications/
Disarmament-and-demobilisation-in-comparative-perspective-patterns-and-policy-
recommendations

Hidden survivors: Sexual violence against children in conflict

Sexual violence is one of the most horrific crimes committed during conflict. It happens all over the world – in Afghanistan through Colombia to Somalia – with lasting consequences long after the fighting has stopped. Girls and boys make up a large number of the survivors of sexual violence in conflict – as well as a large number of those who do not survive – yet their experiences and specific needs are often overlooked and the perpetrators of these awful crimes are rarely brought to justice.

Save the Children welcomes the UK Government's commitment to use its G8 Presidency in 2013 to campaign for stronger international action to prevent sexual violence in conflict. This is a major opportunity to rally governments, the UN and civil society to re-double their efforts to end this scourge. But to be successful their efforts must address the particular needs of children.

To download the report, please visit: http://reliefweb.int/report/world/hidden-survivors-sexual-violence-against-children-conflict

Women Count: Security Council Resolution 1325: Civil Society Monitoring

In 2012, the Women Count report has sharpened the country specific analysis and recommendations with a focus on emerging trends in each of the participating countries. This is mainly to enable peace practitioners to use their findings as advocacy tools in pushing for the implementation of the recommendations within their respective countries.

To complement the report The Global Network Women Peace builders (GNWP) intends to come up with policy briefs for each country, highlighting the women, peace and security profile; main findings and specific recommendations in a reader-friendly format to be used as an advocacy tool both at the local and global levels. In addition to this, the report will have a directory of women, peace and security actors in each country which is one of the gaps often encountered in the women, peace and security environment.

Furthermore, the indicators have been refined in accordance with their thematic clusters to analyze the results and regressions thereof. The previous 16 indicators have been merged into 11 under the Participation, Prevention and Protection, and Promotion pillars. In addition to developing a guideline on the use of these indicators, GNWP also undertook a capacity building training for some of its members on developing monitoring tools as well as advocacy strategies in their reporting processes in Sierra Leone and South Sudan (June 2012).

A global snapshot of the findings as well as the individual country reports were published in the book Women Count 2012 – Security Council Resolution 1325: Civil Society Monitoring Report. The report was launched at the Canadian Mission to the United Nations in New York on November 6, 2012, during the 12th anniversary of UNSCR 1325.

Source: http://www.gnwp.org/what-we-do/policy-advocacy/in-country-and-global-monitoring-of-united-nations-security-council-resolution-1325

Addressing conflict and violence from 2015

Three new Issue Papers on the theme "Addressing conflict and violence from 2015" examine existing evidence and arguments - and pose key questions - to help inform a productive global conversation about the place of conflict prevention and peace-building in the post-2015 development framework.

The papers focus on three themes that will be crucial in the post-2015 debate include 1) The impact of conflict and violence on achieving development 2) What are the key challenges? What works in addressing them? 3) Rising powers and conflict.

The three papers look at the range of evidence that underpins the UN Task Team's assertion that 'violence and fragility have become the largest obstacle to the MDGs', explores the qualities of societies capable of moving beyond violence and achieving sustainable and accelerated long-term development, touching on key issues that underpin sustainable peace and examines the perspectives of five rising powers (China, Brazil, Turkey, India and South Africa) on peace, security and development. It brings to the fore some of the key political considerations for forging global consensus on the peace aspects of the post-2015 framework.

The full papers can be accessed from
http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/post-20152015-issue-papers-