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More than a chip off the block
Strengthening IGAD–AU peacebuilding linkages

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Key findings

1 Use the revision of IGAD's institutional treaty as an opportunity to realise IGAD's vision and comparative advantage as a peace and security actor, and ensure member states contribute to this vision.

2 Define IGAD's comparative advantages across the conflict spectrum.

3 Enhance linkages between IGAD's early warning, mediation and PCRD efforts.

4 Further systematise institutional responses to conflict.

5 Further enhance engagements with traditional authorities, women, the youth, and civil society to look at long-term responses to conflict.

6 Develop a database of IGAD countries' abilities to provide technical assistance to its PCRD framework.

7 Institutionalise capacity-building initiatives linked to IGAD's PCRD framework.

Summary

In principle, regional economic communities are an integral part of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), as demonstrated by the APSA Roadmap 2016–2020, and a vital element in larger global peacebuilding structures and processes. In practice, however, collaboration is not that easy, often due to capacity constraints. This policy brief argues that to become more effective, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) must consider its comparative advantages in relation to the African Union across the conflict spectrum, and focus its engagements more effectively. It looks at practical ways to do so by examining concrete best practices and lessons from IGAD's peace and security engagements.

IN PRINCIPLE, REGIONAL economic communities (RECs) are an essential part of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and a vital element in larger global peacebuilding structures and processes. The APSA Roadmap 2016–2020 demonstrates the important and growing role assigned to RECs by emphasising enhanced relationships between the African Union (AU) and RECs as one of its strategic priorities.[1]

In practice, collaboration is easier said than done. While there is an increasing emphasis on peacebuilding and a growing number of actors are involved, peacebuilding responses are not always effective and actors can also sometimes work at odds with one another.[2] In an effort to make peacebuilding more effective, the United Nations (UN) carried out a review in 2015[3] that noted that regional relationships, such as with the AU and RECs, are an essential part of sustaining peace. This was also emphasised in the 2016 UN High-Level Thematic Debate on UN, Peace and Security.[4] In order to

maximise the effectiveness of peacebuilding operations it is important that the diverse range of peacebuilding actors provide coherent and comprehensive support that draws on their respective comparative advantages.

However, there are a number of challenges in strengthening the role of RECs, including limited resources, a lack of understanding of the respective roles of the various actors, and the development of new frameworks and institutions that should complement but often compete with one another.

This policy brief examines practical ways for the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to enhance its implementation of the APSA. This is done by focussing on concrete best practices and lessons from IGAD's peace and security engagements, noting ways in which these linkages can be enhanced from a holistic perspective and/or extended to other RECs.

> A major focus for RECs in the past was regional and economic integration, but there is increasingly a drive to enhance their role in peace and security efforts

Firstly, this brief examines the rationale for increased linkages between the AU and RECs, and the developments IGAD has made in the peace and security arena. This is followed by a section focused on providing analyses of the demands made on IGAD in relation to the practical challenges it faces in implementing its activities. The policy brief then goes on to discuss IGAD's comparative advantages in different areas relating to peace and security and makes suggestions for the way forward.

Why enhance the role of RECs in relation to the AU?

In 2008 the AU signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with RECs that detailed the need for collaboration on peace and security matters. The MoU was broad and left questions over their respective roles. RECs have progressed at different levels of development and have different institutional capacities, meaning that collaboration between the AU and each REC has remained ad hoc and uneven.[5]

There is now a renewed impetus to enhance the role of RECs in relation to the peace and security efforts of both the AU and the UN. As noted by the APSA Roadmap 2016–2020, RECs are considered the 'building blocks' of the AU and are formally recognised, through the PSC Protocol, as being part of the AU security architecture.[6] The AU acknowledges eight RECs, including IGAD.[7]

A major focus for RECs in the past was regional and economic integration, but there is increasingly a drive, including by the AU, to enhance their role in peace and security efforts. Some have argued that RECs are better equipped to deal with the socio-cultural and political intricacies within their respective regions. In theory their proximity to the conflict also allows them to respond quicker and more cost effectively.[8]

REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES ARE CONSIDERED THE 'BUILDING BLOCKS' OF THE AU

RECs arguably possess a greater legitimacy than UN Security Council members such as the United States (US) or France, which may try to impose external solutions rather than home-grown ones relevant to the local context and region. RECs also have a greater stake in finding a peaceful resolution to conflict, since intractable conflicts usually spill over and adversely affect neighbouring countries in the concerned region.[9]

At the same time, RECs must overcome a number of challenges, including legal gaps, resource shortages, a lack of mandate or political will to intervene due to sovereignty concerns, overlapping memberships across different RECs, recurring instability and a lack of civil society participation.[10]

The role of RECs is particularly pertinent in the context of waning global resources and a multiplicity of actors that often work at odds with rather than complementing one another. Actors include the UN, AU and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as countries working bilaterally. Most notably, RECs are a priority for the APSA but it remains unclear how RECs can best realise the APSA's objectives.

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The APSA roadmap details the different APSA pillars and units that are expected to interact with RECs in various ways. The APSA is composed of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and supported by its pillars: the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund. In addition, the AU has a Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) unit, which is being injected with new life with calls from the PSC for 'stronger and more sustained support to countries emerging from conflict with regard to reconciliation and PCRD'.[11] The AU is also establishing a Mediation Support Unit and there are discussions over a mediation support fund. The APSA falls under the AU's Peace and Security Department.

A strategic priority in the APSA roadmap is coordination and partnerships, including with RECs.[12] This strategic priority notes a lack of clarity over the respective roles of RECS and the AU, and states that '[i]n order to fully

optimize the partnership between the AU and the RECs/RMs, the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage need to be applied'.[13] In this regard, the AU is aiming to enhance strategies and programming, as well as to examine lessons learned in the implementation of the subsidiarity principle.

How can the AU–REC linkages be strengthened? Some RECs already play major roles in mediation and early warning systems. Additional measures to enhance AU–REC linkages have recently been identified, including the AU Commission's 'scaling up its engagement with the RECs/RMs to develop their capacities to serve as the regional focal points or the first responders for PCRD'.[14] In this regard, the most progress has been made on security sector reform (SSR). The AU already has a well-developed framework and RECs have also taken various initiatives to enhance SSR.[15] IGAD is one such REC that already has a specialised security sector programme.

How far has IGAD advanced in peace and security measures?

IGAD was initially created as a response mechanism to address regional environmental issues such as desertification and drought. Its mandate has since grown to include peace and security matters, although it has been argued that this is more by default than design.[16] IGAD's engagement on peace and security matters has not always been straightforward, given a history of mistrust and competition among member states; a lack of clarity over the distinction between unwarranted interference and legitimate intervention; political sensitivity over governance; a hard security mind-set among member states; and capacity constraints that have an impact on donor perceptions.[17] Yet IGAD has begun to consolidate its vision as a peace and security actor, which is reflected in its revitalised organisational documents.

IGAD is in the process of adopting a new treaty as an institution, which includes a protocol on peace and security. The treaty has been validated by legal experts and adopted by IGAD's Committee of Ambassadors, but still needs to be adopted by the Council of Ministers and Heads of State.[18] Some have questioned whether there is political will to adopt this treaty.[19]

IGAD also adopted its Peace and Security Strategy 2016–2020 in 2014. The strategy builds on its 2010–2014 strategy and enlarges it. One notable addition is a PCRD framework.

IGAD's Peace and Security Division contains a Political Affairs Programme, which primarily deals with peace and security issues. There are also a number of other specialised institutions relating to peace and security, including the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), the IGAD Security Sector Programme (ISSP) and the Office for Special Envoys for South Sudan (OSESS). There is also an Office of the Facilitator for Somalia Peace and National Reconciliation.

Conflict prevention

IGAD's CEWARN[20] is highly developed in comparison with that of most other RECs. The system has received much praise but still suffers from constraints.[21] CEWARN's 2006–2011 strategy expanded its original and limited mandate of focusing on pastoral conflicts in specific areas to cover all IGAD states. The current 2012–2019 strategy has again broadened its reach of thematic and geographic areas, and could make the system more extensive and useful in warning about other types of conflict.[22] There are limitations, however. Saferworld has noted that capacity and resource constraints mean that solid data collection in all areas is not always possible and themes are seen as a 'menu of possibilities'. Moreover, it has been argued that there should be a CEWARN-defined list that forces countries to act in a similar manner.[23] Some countries still want to maintain their own national early warning systems and use CEWARN only as a means to collect additional information.

> CEWARN operates well technically, with state-of-the-art technology, but falls short in how its reports are translated into action

One particularly tricky area is governance, although CEWARN's involvement in assessing election-related threats in Kenya in 2008 was largely successful and led to calls for IGAD to engage more on governance issues.[24] Governance is included in CEWARN's new mandate, but this is a particularly contentious area given the historical differences and mistrust between member states.

In the past CEWARN field monitors reported to national research institutes (NRIs), which shared information with CEWARN. The information was then passed on to IGAD's peace and security division. Now CEWARN is moving from relying on field monitoring for information to bringing in civil society organisations (CSOs), partly to reduce costs (CSOs will voluntarily collect data for CEWARN) but also because grassroots movements are often best placed to both detect the causes of conflict and prevent them from erupting. Nevertheless, complications arise when laws in some countries restrict civil society freedoms, such as in Ethiopia. It also requires a re-think on defining civil society. There are also political obstacles, such as sovereignty issues resulting from rival member states' reluctance to share information.[25]

According to interviews with stakeholders,[26] CEWARN operates well technically, with state-of-the-art technology, but falls short in how its reports

CEWARN'S 2012–2019 STRATEGY HAS AGAIN BROADENED ITS REACH OF THEMATIC AND GEOGRAPHIC AREAS

are translated into action. Critics have expressed frustration at IGAD's inability to prevent conflict,[27] even though conflict prevention has been specified as one of the subregion's top priorities.[28]

CEWARN reports are sent to the AU Commission, but the urgency of the findings is open to interpretation. There is also no way for CEWARN to monitor what responses have been triggered by its reports, and early warnings from RECs are not always conveyed to AU member states to assist them in making decisions at the PSC.[29] It has also been noted that the AU's CEWS does not consult with CEWARN on matters related to its country desk offices in IGAD member states.[30]

Under the APSA there are now efforts to enhance collaboration through quarterly technical meetings and potential joint briefings, but more could be done to enhance analysis and scenario planning involving CEWARN in early response. The AU is developing country vulnerability assessments and mitigation strategies to enhance its structural conflict prevention measures, and has begun to discuss areas of collaboration with the World Bank, African Development Bank, the New Partnership for Africa's Development and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), all of which also carry out some form of country vulnerability assessment.[31] There is still a need for more effective institutional engagement and indicators.

Election observation

IGAD deployed small teams of short-term electoral observers to Sudan in 2015, Djibouti in 2016 and Uganda in 2016. However, in some cases it has been accused of not being critical enough.[32]

Mediation

IGAD has been involved in the management and resolution of various conflicts, more specifically the conflicts in Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan, to varying degrees of success. It oversaw direct negotiations between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army. The main achievement in this respect has been the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005.[33] As for Somalia, IGAD has undertaken various mediation efforts intended to somehow create unity among the different clans and warring factions. These efforts led to the establishment of the first Transitional Federal Government in 2004.[34]

Moreover, IGAD was relatively successful at mediating the conflict that broke out in South Sudan in December 2013. IGAD, supported by international partners, achieved a cessation of hostilities and pushed the warring parties towards a power-sharing agreement in August 2015. During the transitional period – even if conditions are not always favourable – IGAD has been involved in monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the peace agreement's components and reforms.[35]

> Under the APSA there are now efforts to enhance collaboration through quarterly meetings and potential joint briefings

Yet the financial burden of the mediation process has been enormous, with the bill being footed by the international community. As a result, IGAD has been pressured to find compromises that are unpalatable to some parties and do not take into account wider societal interests. According to an anonymous source, IGAD also needs to acknowledge that South Sudan is an intractable conflict and redefine its strategic priorities. This includes considering other armed groups outside of the two major warring parties, reforming the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and addressing corruption. It is important to note that further efforts to institutionalise such approaches have been seen as 'potentially limiting the actions of Heads of State, who may prefer the current ad-hoc approaches to conflict resolution and management'.[36] Financial and human resources to create such structures are also a concern.[37]

Peacekeeping

In 2005 IGAD agreed to establish a peacekeeping mission in Somalia, the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM), on behalf of the AU. In 2006 Kenya's foreign minister declared this to be a failure.[38] One of the reasons for its failure is said to be the fragmented approach taken by different key players.[39] For example, at the UN Security Council the US opposed the deployment of regional peacekeepers. Funding was also an issue, with member states unable to provide adequate finances and pledges from donors and the AU failing to materialise.[40] IGAD also cited the UN's failure to lift the arms embargo as another reason why it was unable to

deploy peacekeepers, as the embargo would prevent peacekeepers from arriving with weapons and being given ammunition.[41]

In terms of providing peacekeeping troops, since then IGAD has not engaged in peacekeeping activities, mainly because it is unable to mobilise the necessary political and financial support. Yet member states such as Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti and Ethiopia provide the bulk of the peacekeepers in the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Post-conflict reconstruction and development

On the other side of the conflict spectrum from early warning, IGAD is increasingly developing its PCRD engagements. Initially, IGAD contributed to PCRD through the ISSP, carrying out SSR/DDR training in South Sudan. It was engaged by the AU and the UN in a demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) strategy for South Sudan, aiming to empower the National DDR Commission.[42]

Separately to this, the IGAD Civilian Capacities Initiative was also set up to enable officials from neighbouring countries to work alongside officials from South Sudan.[43] IGAD oversaw the initiation of the project (although its role was limited), and civil service support officers (CSSOs) from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda were seconded on a bilateral basis. These countries paid the salaries of the secondees, and Norway contributed to programme management and operational costs. The UNDP provided technical assistance.

> The REC sees the AU as a coordinator and facilitator rather than an implementer, meaning that the AU should direct PCRD activities in the Horn of Africa to IGAD rather than carrying out these activities itself

The project has been praised for providing innovative approaches to capacity development, including providing a model for large-scale support for capacity deployment to governance functions, using regional capacity to mitigate reservations over external support, demonstrating impact in terms of developing plans and policies, and ensuring ownership of the programme.[44] A number of useful lessons were also learned from this experience, and recommendations were made for the future. These included complementing senior-level buy-in at ministries and institutions with efforts to communicate the objectives of the programme, aiming for a more even allocation of civil servants across ministries, and ensuring that the levels of expertise of the civil servants and their 'twins' were adequately matched.[45] However, there has been no follow-up since conflict erupted in December 2013.

In an effort to better systematise and expand its PCRD engagements, IGAD adopted a PCRD framework in 2014. The framework is based on a detailed country needs analysis.[46] The REC envisions dealing with softer issues rather

IGAD IS INCREASINGLY DEVELOPING ITS PCRD ENGAGEMENTS

than development per se, such as national reconciliation, SSR, leadership, capacity building, gender, youth and civil society. Rather than purely focussing on government, IGAD officials stressed the importance of engaging with traditional mechanisms used to resolve conflict. According to interviews conducted with stakeholders, IGAD's current interaction with civil society is mainly on drought resilience and a previous ad-hoc engagement relating to election observers, and the PCRD framework notes the importance of enhancing engagement with civil society across all areas. In terms of carrying out PCRD, IGAD already has the benefit of having offices in South Sudan and Somalia that focus on PCRD-related issues. It also already has a security sector programme. Unfortunately, the PCRD programme has not yet been launched, mainly due to a lack of resources.[47]

The PCRD framework clearly states how IGAD sees its engagement with the AU:

> Continental level actors include AU and various AU Systems. The continental organizations are required to provide strategic partnership and leadership support, framework for guidance and monitoring of progresses with international implication, support with data on financing, organizational learning and knowledge management, and support IGAD as a key REC in eastern and the Horn of Africa. The mechanisms include establishment of steering committees, creation of task forces for effective coordination and seek networking and collaboration opportunities among friendly countries.[48]

In other words, the REC sees the AU as a coordinator and facilitator rather than an implementer, meaning that the AU should direct PCRD activities in the Horn of Africa to IGAD rather than carrying out these activities itself. Currently the AU does implement PCRD activities on the continent, including quick-impact projects in countries recovering from conflict.

Interviews with stakeholders revealed differing views on the potential for PCRD within IGAD. Some believed that IGAD is best placed to do PCRD due to its understanding of context, its policy, and its offices in Somalia and South Sudan. Others argued that IGAD already has enough on its plate and should instead focus on what it has already established, in particular developing a vision for the REC, improving the functioning of the secretariat and

concentrating on its early warning system. Part of the reason for the differing views is different understandings of what PCRD actually is – if development is involved, it can be costly. However, as mentioned, IGAD's vision is one of dealing with softer issues. In addition, while the REC views itself as an implementer, the AU also continues to implement PCRD projects. Moving forward, the AU Commission should provide greater clarity on differing roles and responsibilities.

Expectations vs reality

While IGAD has lofty ambitions, it is often constrained by realities on the ground, including financing, membership and competition with other organisations. The greatest hindrance to IGAD's implementation of peace and security measures is its limited financial capacity.[49] Most of its budget comes from donor funding while member states' contributions are irregular, likely because they do not see tangible benefits and because multi-membership of RECs means their priorities are directed elsewhere.[50]

> To avoid a duplication of efforts, the AU will need to see where RECs are better positioned to implement responses

Another challenge for IGAD relates to differing understandings of 'comparative advantage', 'complementarity' and 'subsidiarity' between the AU and the RECs, as noted in the APSA roadmap. The AU continues to play the role of facilitator and implementer in responding to conflict, including with early warning, mediation and PCRD responses, whereas some have argued that RECs should implement while the AU coordinates. In order to avoid a duplication of efforts, the AU will need to see where RECs are better positioned to implement responses, based on their own unique strengths and interests. The PSC should give clear mandates based on the reality on the ground.

According to interviews with stakeholders,[51] donors are now trying to empower RECs, including IGAD, to develop their structural work in areas linked to AU PCRD policy. However, considering that resources are limited, where should IGAD be directing its attention?

IGAD's comparative advantage: challenges and opportunities across the conflict spectrum

IGAD has a real opportunity to define itself as it develops its treaty as an institution. Given resource limitations it needs to identify its comparative advantages and examine how to streamline, maximise and optimise its resource usage. According to some interviews,[52] the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which include most IGAD member states, are usurping IGAD in terms of regional integration and free trade agreements. Some stakeholders[53] claim that IGAD is becoming simply a 'regional community'. In this regard, IGAD seems best placed to focus on peace and security. This is still an extremely broad area and it will need to further define where it can be most effective, particularly in relation to the APSA. For example, IGAD may not be best placed to carry out the actual implementation of DDR in South Sudan given its resource constraints. Rather, it may be better suited to examining regional barriers and enabling factors to DDR, for example in joint strategies, especially on weapons control.

Table 1 looks at the challenges and opportunities for IGAD to operate in different areas of the conflict spectrum.

Table 1: Challenges and opportunities for IGAD

	Challenges	Opportunities
Conflict prevention	Traditionally 'hard' response reactions that do not consider the full range of appropriate response options	• Potential to engage with traditional authorities and civil society to enhance 'soft' reactions through the already developed CEWARN system • Potential to consider gender-sensitive mechanisms to utilise the role of women in cases of conflict • Utilise CEWARN to establish more elaborate structural indicators of conflict and use lessons learned from CEWARN's election-related experience • Feed CEWARN information on governance indicators to AU structures involved in governance issues
	Information fed to national government systems used in CEWARN can be used to crush rebellions against the state or undermine another state	• Consider ways of making CEWARN less subjective through systematic criteria • Revitalise IGAD's civil society platform to allow for the involvement of civil society and traditional authorities in CEWS briefings to accommodate differing views • Develop a framework that allows for IGAD–civil society engagement
	Limited resources and political obstacles to expansion of CEWARN across thematic and geographic areas	• Further define the specific added advantage of CEWARN in comparison to CEWS and avoid duplication of resources

	Challenges	Opportunities
	Early warning does not always lead to early response	• CEWARN can further develop its ability to produce scenarios of possible responses to conflicts • Early warning can be better capacitated to link to responses (including capacity building/PCRD) using CEWARN's well-established networks, particularly relating to the engagement of civil society and traditional authorities in local mediation and reconciliation efforts
Election observation	Missions regarded as not critical enough	• Develop protocols on elections, democracy and governance that allow IGAD to report more systematically on election issues
Mediation	Ad-hoc mediation structures can slow responses, as roles and responsibilities of respective actors are not clearly defined	• Consider whether systematised mediation structures within IGAD are necessary or whether these can be integrated into AU mediation structures • Consider ways of feeding IGAD early warning analyses (possibly through the development of a conflict-related database) and PCRD requirements into mediation engagements, to ensure the needs of the country are considered in peace agreements
	Political interference	• Ensure greater alignment with AU mediation to minimise unwanted interference
Peace-keeping	No peacekeeping resources, and previous attempts unsuccessful	• Consider whether peacekeeping is necessary within IGAD, or whether IGAD's comparative advantage lies in other areas
PCRD	PCRD framework is very broad	• Coordinate with other actors to determine respective areas of comparative advantage • Consider specific areas in which IGAD can be most useful in PCRD, based on an understanding of context, such as national reconciliation, capacity building, and the engagement of traditional authorities and civil society • Build a case to present to donors and the AU on this niche advantage: for example, CEWARN's extensive system could be utilised to develop PCRD initiatives making use of civil society and traditional authorities
	PCRD framework has not been implemented and lacks resources	• Develop a database of IGAD countries' abilities to provide technical assistance across different areas in order to refine areas of expertise, and engage with the AU PCRD unit on its African Solidarity Initiative, which also aims to provide technical assistance to countries • Use lessons learned from the Civilian Capacities Initiative in South Sudan to feed into the new PCRD framework in order to enhance effectiveness and institutionalise capacity-building initiatives. IGAD could consider standardising capacity-building support through regional standard operating procedures • Make use of offices in IGAD countries, and share analyses and strategies with the AU PCRD unit

Way forward

IGAD already has a number of initiatives that can be built on and used to scale up best practices. However, it first needs to become more streamlined and consider niche areas of advantage. The development of the IGAD treaty is an opportunity to decide how to develop the secretariat and realise a vision of the organisation that is best suited to its capabilities, and to enhance efficient decisions. Table 1 provides some initial reflections of IGAD's potential to engage across different areas of the conflict spectrum.

IGAD can also define specific areas of advantage in the peace and security field in relation to the AU and build on these advantages using the resources already at its disposal. In the short term there are already ways to enhance linkages that do not require additional resources. For example, the AU already has liaison offices in every IGAD country and collaboration between the AU liaison offices and IGAD can be strengthened by sharing early warning analyses, or by feeding back information to the AU PRCD unit on capacity-building initiatives carried out by IGAD. These offices first need to ensure better collaboration with the IGAD Secretariat. Additional ways of enhancing collaboration are mentioned in Table 1.

IGAD already has an understanding of peace and security in a holistic way that spans the conflict spectrum. However, more can be done to ensure better links between different programmes, including understanding how the ISSP unit should link to IGAD's PRCD framework and how this fits into the AU PCRD framework, or how CEWARN can be used to develop appropriate mediation strategies and PCRD responses. Moreover, it is important to enhance linkages between its Somalia and South Sudan offices and other programmes.

The development of a PCRD framework is praiseworthy. Arguably, IGAD is best placed to carry out such initiatives, especially in terms of capacity building, given that IGAD countries are closer in proximity and could be more cost efficient. Furthermore, engagement in areas such as national reconciliation and the engagement of traditional authorities are particularly relevant, as IGAD countries can be said to have a better understanding of context.

It is also worth noting the development of a relatively new institution at the AU. The African Governance Architecture (AGA), based on the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, came into force in 2012.[54] Its mandate is to provide a 'platform for dialogue between the various stakeholders' in order to promote good governance and democracy, and to strengthen the objectives of the legal and policy pronouncements in the AU Shared Values.[55] It falls under the Department of Political Affairs at the AU.

The APSA Roadmap also seeks to enhance collaboration with the AGA.[56] The AGA has many clear linkages to the APSA. For example, its clusters: democracy, governance, human rights and transitional justice; and constitutionalism and the rule of law, correspond strongly to the AU PCRD pillars: security, political governance and transition; human rights, justice and reconciliation; humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and socio-economic development; and gender. At present it is not yet clear how these clusters and pillars will collaborate.[57]

Given that the AGA–APSA linkages are already unclear, the AGA's relationship with RECs is even more vague. IGAD's PCRD framework also has many linkages to the AGA and there may be potential to engage on these matters. CEWARN could also share governance early warning information with the AGA. In addition, IGAD is drafting a protocol on democracy, governance and elections.[58] It may also want to engage with the AGA on its draft protocol on governance, democracy and elections to examine ways of maximising collaboration.

IGAD does have certain comparative advantages to the AU, but if it wishes to be 'more than just a chip off the old block' it needs to refine, re-evaluate and enhance its specific activities rather than try to be a 'one-size-fits-all' organisation. There are many opportunities ahead for it to do so.

Notes

1   This priority speaks to coordination and partnerships more generally, but specifies the role of RECs. Other priorities are conflict prevention, crisis/conflict management, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding and strategic security issues.

2   Gustavo de Carvalho and Amanda Lucey, Fractured peacebuilding in the Central African Republic, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Policy Brief 87, July 2016, https://www.issafrica.org/publications/policy-brief/fractured-peacebuilding-in-the-central-african-republic

3   United Nations (UN), The challenge of sustaining peace: report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, 29 June 2015, http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/150630%20Report%20of%20the%20AGE%20on%20the%202015%20Peacebuilding%20Review%20FINAL.pdf.

4   UN, In a world of risks: a new commitment for peace, UN General Assembly, New York, 10–11 May 2016, http://www.un.org/pga/70/events/hltd-peace-and-security/

5   South Africa, Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), The role of the regional economic communities (RECs) as the building blocks of the African Union, http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2003/au0815.htm

6   African Union (AU), APSA Roadmap 2016–2020.

7   The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA).

8   Kristina Powell, The African Union and the regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution, in Kristina Powell, *Opportunities and challenges for delivering on the responsibility to protect the African Union's emerging peace and security regime,* ISS, Monograph, 119, May 2005, https://www.issafrica.org/pubs/monographs/no119/contents.htm

9   Ibid.

10   South African History Online, The African Union and regional economic integration, http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/african-union-and-regional-economic-integration

11   AU, APSA Roadmap 2016–2020, 18.

12   The means of interaction with RECs are also specified under the other four thematic priority areas: conflict prevention, crisis/conflict management, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding, and strategic security issues.

13   AU, APSA Roadmap 2016–2020, 21.

14   AU Peace and Security, Remarks by Dr Alhaji Sarjoh Bah, Head Crisis Management and Post Conflict and Reconstruction Division, AU Commission roundtable on developing a roadmap and inter-departmental task force for the implementation of AU PCRD policy, 18 May 2016, http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/remarks-by-dr-alhaji-sarjoh-bah-head-crisis-management-and-post-conflict-and-reconstruction-division-au-commission-roundtable-on-developing-a-roadmap-and-inter-departmental-task-force-for-the-implementation-of-au-pcrd-policy?utm_source=Email_marketing&utm_campaign=Thursday_May_19_2016_-_1&cmp=1&utm_medium=HTMLEmail

15   AU, APSA Roadmap 2016–2020, 19.

16   Mehari Taddele Maru and Sagra El Fassi, Can the regional economic communities support implementation of the African Governance Architecture (AGA)? The case of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Discussion Paper, 181, 23 October 2015, http://ecdpm.org/publications/recs-igad-african-governance-architecture/

17   Ibid.

18   Ibid., 21.

19   Based on interviews with stakeholders, Addis Ababa, 20–22 July 2016.

20   IGAD, Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism, http://www.cewarn.org/

21   Based on interviews with stakeholders, Addis Ababa, 6–10 June 2016.

22   Bruce Byiers, The political economy of regional integration in Africa: Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), ECDPM, Report, January 2016, ttp://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/ECDPM-2016-Political-Economy-Regional-Integration-Africa-IGAD-Report.pdf

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58   Ibid.

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