



IN SEARCH OF SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE FOR AFRICA:

DOES DEMOCRACY WORK FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?



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– CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS REPORT –

EISA ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM
THE KOPANONG HOTEL, BENONI, SOUTH AFRICA
7-9 NOVEMBER 2007



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THIS REPORT DOCUMENTS THE PROCEEDINGS OF A THREE-DAY SYMPOSIUM
HELD AT THE KOPANONG HOTEL, BENONI, SOUTH AFRICA
7-9 NOVEMBER 2007

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EISA is a non-partisan organisation which seeks to promote democratic principles, free and fair elections, a strong civil society and good governance at all levels of Southern African society.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements	vi
List of abbreviations	vii
Introduction	1
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS	
1. Democracy: The African challenge	7
2. The developmental state and democracy in Africa	9
3. Democracy and governance in Africa	14
4. Gender dimensions of poverty and governance	28
5. The politics of poverty and poverty reduction strategies	32
6. The political conditionality of aid and its impact on democratic governance	37
7. The significance of leadership for sustainable democracy	41
8. Political culture and democratic governance	45
9. Global trends in democratisation and lessons for Africa	49
10. Poverty: A challenge for democratic governance – A round table discussion	55
Appendix 1: Opening speech by HE Sir Ketumile Masire	57
Appendix 2: Symposium programme	61
Appendix 3: Participants' list	66

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABC	All Basotho Convention
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ANC	African National Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AS	Alliance Sociale
AU	African Union
AVI	<i>Ny Asa Vita no Ifampitsanara</i>
BNF	Botswana National Front
BNP	Basotho National Party
CASAS	Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society
CCM	<i>Chama cha Mapinduzi</i>
CIDA	Canadian International Agency for Development
CIESP	Interministerial Committee Extended to the Private Sector
CMDEE	Conflict Management, Democracy and Electoral Education
CoD	Congress of Democrats
CPDM	Cameroon People's Democratic Movement
CPS	Centre for Policy Studies
CSO	Civil society organisation
CUF	Civic United Front
DA	Democratic Alliance
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DFID	Department for International Development
DFID- SA	Department for International Development – South Africa
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EC	Electoral commission
ECF	Electoral Commissions Forum
Ecosocc	Economic, Social and Cultural Council
Ecowas	Economic Community of West African States
ELECAM	Elections Cameroon
EMB	Electoral management body
FDC	Forum for Democratic Change
FDI	Foreign direct investment
FPTP	First-past-the-post
Frelimo	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
GM	Genetically modified
GMO	Genetically modified organism
G-8	Group of Eight
HDI	Human Development Index
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
Idasa	Institute for Democracy in South Africa
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IGD	Institute for Global Dialogue

IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPI	Institute for Policy Interaction
LCD	Lesotho Congress for Democracy
MCP	Malawi Congress Party
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MLC	Movement for the Liberation of Congo
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
MMM	<i>Mouvement Militant Mauricien</i>
MMP	Mixed member proportional
MP	Member of parliament
MSM	<i>Mouvement Socialiste Mauricien</i>
NDI	National Democratic Institute
Nepad	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NRM	National Resistance Movement
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
ODM-K	Orange Democratic Movement – Kenya
ONEL	National Elections Observatory
PEAP	Poverty Eradication Plan
PF	Patriotic Front
PPRD	<i>Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie</i>
PR	Proportional representation
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
Pudemo	People's United Democratic Movement
RCs	Resistance councils and committees
REC	Regional economic community
Renamo	<i>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana</i>
SABC	South African Broadcasting Cooperation
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SARPN	Southern African Regional Poverty Network
SAT	Southern Africa Trust
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
Swapo	South West Africa People's Organisation
TIM	<i>Tiako-i-Madagasikara</i>
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
Unicef	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITA	Union for the Total Independence of Angola
US	United States
ZESN	Zimbabwe Election Support Network
ZEC	Zimbabwe Electoral Commission

INTRODUCTION

This report is based on the deliberations of the 2nd EISA Annual Symposium held in Benoni on 7-9 November 2007, which was based on the theme 'In search of sustainable democratic governance for Africa: Does democracy work for developing countries?'. The 2007 symposium aimed to deepen the debate by teasing out relevant policy interventions for the eradication of poverty in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. The focus was on how democratic governance can best be sustained in Africa. The 2007 symposium was officially opened by Sir Ketumile Masire, former President of Botswana (see Appendix 1 for Masire's opening speech).

The deliberations of the 2006 inaugural EISA Annual Symposium confirmed the widely held truism that the majority of African states have witnessed political transitions away from authoritarian regimes of either civilian or military rule and have embraced multiparty democratic dispensations, especially since the late 1980s and early 1990s. It was established, however, that the sustainability of democratic governance remains a major challenge facing the continent. At the heart of this challenge, it was noted, is the fact that while procedural democracy (with emphasis on political rights and civil liberties) of a liberal type has become a norm, substantive democracy (with emphasis on economic rights and social justice) has not been achieved. The challenge of moving away from mere procedural to substantive democracy was considered even more onerous and daunting in those countries that have experienced spasms of violent conflict. The 2006 symposium therefore recognised the complex web of interconnections, as well as both contradictory and causal interfaces, between democracy, development and conflict.

The 2007 symposium built upon the fascinating policy debates that participants started during the inaugural symposium. The main purpose was to deepen the debate and to tease out relevant policy interventions. This time round, the spotlight focused on how best democratic governance can be sustained in Africa. Three broad conceptual and policy questions were posed namely:

- Can Africa achieve sustainable democratic governance?
- Does democracy work for developing countries in general and for Africa in particular?
- Does democracy necessarily facilitate the eradication of poverty in the SADC region?

These three questions ought to serve as a reminder that it is not only internal dynamics that determine the shade and shape of Africa's democracy project. Exogenous factors also have an important bearing, especially today within the context of accelerated globalisation. There is no doubt that powerful forces in the world economy and politics (such as donors, international financial institutions, international trade organisations, G-8 countries, etc.) have used their economic muscle to link aid to democratisation. Available evidence suggests that the economic adjustment programmes imposed upon many African states in the 1970s and 1980s have had

a devastating effect not only on socio-economic development in these countries, but also on democratic governance. Undoubtedly, economic adjustment programmes propelled iron-fisted authoritarian regimes.

The political conditionality of aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) has mounted external pressure on African regimes to re-orient their governance processes towards democracy, especially since the collapse of the Cold War and apartheid. It would be interesting to investigate what the emergence of China as a world power with massive interest in Africa would mean for the continent's democratisation agenda. Will China influence Africa to go for a developmental state devoid of democratic content?

PROBLEM STATEMENT

The main problem is that although many African states have embraced democratic governance, its sustainability is still at risk given that poverty and underdevelopment remain rife and embedded. This conundrum presents a catch-22 situation: should the ruling political elite in Africa prioritise poverty reduction and postpone democratisation as the East Asian countries and China have done? In sum, can poor countries democratise or is democratisation only assured in countries that are relatively socio-economically advanced? This sounds like the proverbial chicken and egg paradox: poverty reduction first and democracy later, or vice-versa. Are the two challenges mutually exclusive or mutually inclusive both in theory and policy practice?

Whatever the case, the institutionalisation of democratic governance is likely to rest or fall upon the extent to which democracies deliver tangible results in respect of poverty reduction and advancing societal development. Democracy ought to deliver bread for the poor, medicine for the sick, education for the illiterate, shelter for the homeless, jobs for the unemployed and clean water for all. This is the kind of democratic framework that is required if African states are to make progress towards the achievement of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

The link between democratic governance and poverty eradication is best pursued by examining the correlation between governance and the prospects for development. Most democrats would argue that democracy not only enhances freedom but also the prospects for development. In fact there is more development in democracies where civil and political liberties and choice are embedded than in regimes where these rights are absent. However, debate on the democracy–development nexus is not yet settled. Disagreements still rage on whether or not democracy leads to development, and by extension, to poverty eradication. Three perspectives are advanced in the extant literature: some analysts state that democracy fosters development; others argue that there is no conclusive evidence which shows that democracy ensures sustainable development; while other scholars argue that democracy does not foster development and cannot therefore be expected to eradicate poverty.

GOAL AND OBJECTIVES OF THE SYMPOSIUM

The primary goal of the 2007 symposium was to investigate how democracies lead to the development of social policies that redress the scourge of poverty. It aimed to establish the extent to which democratic governance in Africa is sustainable or reversible in the medium- to long-term.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

The specific objectives of the symposium were to:

- deliberate on current models of democratisation in Africa and the policy challenges facing the sustainability of democratic governance;
- investigate if poor countries can sustain democracy organically and at the same time reach their developmental goals;
- demonstrate how participatory democracy could enhance policy interventions aimed at poverty reduction through citizen participation, accountability, responsiveness and transparency; and
- make specific recommendations regarding possible institutional and policy reforms that African countries could embark upon in order to strive towards sustainable democratic governance.

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

1

DEMOCRACY: THE AFRICAN CHALLENGE

In his keynote address Professor **Kwesi Kwaa Prah** of the Cape Town-based Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society (CASAS) set the context of the conference by examining the Western tradition of democracy, its critics and its implications on the African post-colonial experience. He examined liberal democracy as a distinctive form of democracy pioneered by the West, which is representative and which emphasises individual and civil liberties.

While liberal democracy has survived competition from fascism and even socialism, enormous divergences still exist on the theory and practice of democracy. Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany scoffed at the democratic ideal, suggesting that it amounted to no more than psycho-social infantilism. Furthermore, African fascists such as Amin's Uganda, Nguema's Equatorial Guinea, Bokassa's Central African Republic, Mengistu's Ethiopia, Doe's Liberia and Mobutu's Zaire derided democracy. Intellectual arguments have been advanced to question some of the democratic ideals raised by such academics as Robert Michels and Gaetano Mosca. They argue that democracy is rule by the elite and democracy as majority rule is a myth. The benefits of democracy do seem, though, to be greater than weaknesses.

African countries, however, have accepted democracy without successfully adopting the relevant and viable institutional forms that will permit the fuller growth of a democratic culture.

Socialist claims on democratisation based on the dictatorship of the proletariat led to bureaucratised, centralised and authoritarian states that collapsed in the 1990s. Even in the United States (US), until the 1960s African Americans were disenfranchised and in the United Kingdom (UK) women only attained suffrage in 1928.

There have been varieties of democracies practised and with differing consequences. During the Cold War most of the socialist states claimed to be building proletariat democracies. In the 1960s and 1970s African countries claimed to be building one-party democracies and/or African Socialism. These one-party states feared dissent and oppositional voices and in the name of national unity prevented all opposition. However Cuba and Vietnam have managed to establish effective and far-reaching welfare societies, which have changed the living conditions of most of the population. China under the Chinese Communist Party is hardly described as a democracy, yet China has become the leading powerhouse of the world. In Africa, dictatorships have come into power through the barrel of the gun, some rigging elections and trampling upon the human rights of their citizens.

Prah outlined some key preconditions for democracy to thrive:

- The indigenisation of democracy.
- An acknowledgement of the cultural realities of the society in question.
- Freedom of expression and literacy as cornerstones of democracy.

- Democracy flourishes under conditions of economic well being.
- The growth of a middle class is crucial for democracy to flourish.
- Democracy should be understood as a historical process and as an institutionalised approach to decision making.

The African challenge is to adapt our cultural practices to decision-making settings and not simply to embrace uncritically Western principles, which may not be suitable to the African socio-economic and politico-historical setting.

Prah concluded by emphasising that citizenship is a requisite feature of a successful democratic system, as citizens should be free to engage and express their individual and group interests. Literacy and a vibrant media are crucial. Furthermore, if Africa is to develop politically it must build democratic institutions.

The challenge is to avoid indiscriminate borrowing from the West. Democracy is best when it is indigenised; it succeeds best when it wears and acknowledges the specific historical and cultural realities of the society in question.

2

THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA

Emmanuel Manyasa of the University of Kenya placed the state at the centre of development. He explored whether democracy will bolster the capabilities of the African state to formulate and implement coherent development policies. Economic development, or lack thereof, in Africa has been the subject of debate for a long time now. For many commentators – usually those not from the continent – Africa’s situation is hopeless. For them, the continent is trapped in a downward spiral. The list of problems includes poverty, disease, population explosion, bad governance and the inability to attract foreign investment. In short, Africa’s developmental prospects are bleak.

Manyasa pointed out, however, that there is an emerging consensus on the significance of the state in development. This leads to a number of important questions: first, what kind of state is needed to facilitate sustainable development in Africa; and, second, how can such a state be constructed? Manyasa made a strong case for a democratic state as authoritarianism breeds cronyism, corruption, inefficiency and inequality in resource distribution. These factors in turn hinder participation, access to resources and innovation by significant sectors of the population and stifle the potential of the economy.

While in some cases experience shows that benevolent authoritarianism can promote rapid economic growth in relatively poor countries, it is important to note that promoting economic growth at the expense of equity can damage the invisible bond between the people and the government. When the bond between the leadership and the people is diminished, political instability follows. An authoritarian regime can survive, though, if the geopolitical space it controls is attractive to powerful external interests and if the dictator respects those interests.

Social and economic inequalities tend to undermine individuals’ capacities to participate effectively in the public discourses that impact their lives. It is argued that there is an inverse causal relationship between political democracy and income inequality, which obtains in both directions. Vulnerable individuals have no capacity of citizenship, since coercion can be used to subvert their free will in exercising their democratic rights. Besides, political authority is increasingly legitimated through media-based acclamation, which the poor might not even have access to.

Democracy and individuals’ rights to property are intertwined. High levels of income inequality undermine democratic institutions and may lead to their collapse and the insurrection of authoritarianism.

Democracy, on the other hand, impacts on the levels of inequality through intervening mechanisms. Such mechanisms include the formation of trade unions and the development of socialist parties that push for egalitarian policies. Democracy gives people a choice and allows them an opportunity to engage their governors. Sustained democratic practice creates

opportunities for effective participation by the people in national policy formation and implementation. Such participation serves both as a tool of resource mobilisation and as a process of political legitimacy through consensus building. Both are important in realising any meaningful economic progress of a society.

Further, effective participation – which is realisable only under democracy – generates a feeling of inclusion in the populace, which increases their chances of cooperation with the government. And cooperation helps to improve governance. This improvement is at the heart of building an effective, developmental state because it strengthens consensus among different groups in society about how the country's affairs are managed. This helps to consolidate security and the rule of law. It enables the state to become more stable, with broad legitimacy and capability across all regions and parts of society.

Manyasa concluded by calling Africa to rethink its definition of democracy, to have a clear picture of the concept and to align it with the demographic, social, economic, cultural and other realities that impact on the lives of its people.

EISA senior advisor: research, **Khabele Matlosa**, explored the feasibility of a developmental state in Africa with special reference to Southern Africa. He advanced a strong argument that Southern Africa needs a developmental democratic state if the twin challenges of development and democracy are to be tackled successfully. Matlosa attempted to answer the following questions:

- What is the nature and role of the state in Southern Africa?
- Does the region need robust (strong) or soft (weak) states?
- Should the state intervene in the development process?
- Should the state withdraw from the development process and simply regulate markets?
- Should the state be the driver or a mere passenger of development?

Matlosa interrogated whether the state should be developmental (deliberately interventionist and driving the development process) or regulatory (simply facilitating market forces by providing the requisite regulatory framework). He also addressed the issue of whether or not it matters if the state is democratic (popularly elected, legitimate and accountable) or authoritarian (imposed, coercive and patrimonial).

Matlosa outlined the three weaknesses of the African state as follows:

- Lack of autonomy from society which undermines its authority.
- State authorities do not adhere to the rules of the game.
- Individuals appointed to public office rarely subordinate their personalities to the definitions of the role they are expected to perform.

It is important to note that the crisis of the state in post-colonial Africa has also been accompanied by the crisis of development. The Southern Africa region, like most other parts of the African continent, has witnessed a contestation over or confusion of development agendas

and development paradigms, namely: the nationalist agenda of an autonomous development path anchored upon a dirigiste economic nationalism on the one hand, and the Bretton Woods institutions, on the other hand, propounding a neo-liberal economic adjustment programme premised upon free market enterprise.

Various countries in Southern Africa including Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Lesotho, Tanzania, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe adopted Bretton Woods-sponsored economic adjustment programmes that came with harsh conditionalities. Some SADC member states (Botswana, South Africa and Namibia) adopted home-grown neo-liberal development models without recourse to the World Bank/International Monetary Fund (IMF)-imposed economic adjustment.

Evidence now abounds suggesting that World Bank/IMF-imposed economic adjustment has not delivered socio-economic development in Africa. Matlosa argued that socio-economic development in the region in a situation of a minimalist state remains a major challenge, and it may have been accentuated by structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) themselves.

A slight shift in policy was noticed in 1997 when the World Bank began to de-emphasise the market as the driving force for development. The 1997 World Bank report sees the state as being central to socio-economic development, not as a direct provider of growth but as a partner, catalyst and facilitator of development. This policy shift is explained, in part, by the failure of the SAPs to deliver socio-economic development. The same state should subscribe to the new political conditionality of good governance, the rule of law, transparency and democratisation. These are invariably the link between economic liberalisation and political liberalisation, both of which still aim to diminish the state and reify the supremacy of markets.

Matlosa made a strong case for a democratic developmental state – that is, a state which possesses the vision, leadership and capacity to bring about a positive transformation of society within a condensed period of time; a state which intervenes in the development process and facilitates economic growth.

The crucial features of a democratic developmental state are:

- a developmentalist ideology;
- a ruling elite that is autonomous from societal social cleavages and external forces, yet hegemonic in its pursuit of the development goal;
- an embedded ruling elite that is responsible for the development process, yet responsive to popular demands;
- efficient bureaucracy that, in a Weberian sense, discharges its mandate for the achievement of development;
- a democratic regime that is legitimate, accountable and popular; and
- a secure state at peace with itself and its external environment. The state must be effective in managing the nation's affairs if its authoritativeness is to be assured.

A democratic developmental state must be able to:

- provide key basic services that cannot be left to market forces alone to provide;
- play regulatory functions including the formulation, implementation and enforcement of laws and regulations; and
- perform certain redistributive functions for improving social justice, e.g., furthering gender equality and redressing regional and sectoral imbalances.

Throughout the world, social democracies tend to be more developmental compared to liberal democracies.

It is worth noting that none of the SADC countries can be classified as a social democracy, given that all the democratic experiments in the region thus far are confined to liberal notions of democracy. Social democracy is distinct from liberal democracy in that it promotes not just political rights and civil liberties, but goes further to propound a corporatist social welfare state that promotes and protects socio-economic rights. Such a state pursues development beyond just economic growth. This is crucial for Africa, which is confronted with the daunting challenge of achieving democracy and development in tandem.

Matlosa concluded by saying that Southern Africa needs a developmentalist and not just a regulatory state if socio-economic development, and not merely economic growth, is to be realised and the social welfare of the people is to be assured. But if the developmental state is to enjoy legitimacy and credibility, it has to be democratic. Southern Africa therefore needs to strive deliberately towards building and sustaining an institutionalised democratic developmental state. Southern African states need to pursue substantive democracy with social content and not just the formal/procedural democracy with its narrow focus on elections, competition, political rights and civil liberties.

However, judging by the state of democratisation, political rights and civil liberties combined with strides towards social development in each SADC country, it seems that only a few have the potential to build democratic developmental states. These include Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa and Namibia.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The discussion centred on the fact that democracy is achieved and won through struggle, protest and change. It is invariably the result of mass demand and action, and is hardly handed over to the people on a silver platter. Governance in Africa should mean that the governed must participate in all decision making and be consulted at all stages of policy making.

Elections as instruments of democracy remain trivialised, although elections remain necessary for democracy. In some countries the incumbents buy votes openly, and the electoral management bodies (EMBs) continue to serve the interests of the incumbents thereby failing to run free and fair elections. Consequently, Africa fails to move beyond mere procedural democracies and is trapped in electoralism. This leaves the electorate in Africa stripped of the ability to control their leaders. As such, the role of elections in these representative democracies remains a façade.

The question of why democracy has not delivered prosperity for the African people was tackled, as well as the question of whether the democratic project was worthy of the effort and resources being invested in it. The poverty of democracy in the African context lies in its failure to be properly domesticated. This does not mean that the African people want to discard democracy altogether. We need to reform our institutions, but not necessarily to Westernise them.

3

DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

There is consensus on the strong correlation between democracy and development. **David Maleleka** of the Central Bank of Lesotho used selected governance indicators for sub-Saharan Africa to map out the extent of the correlation between democracy and development. He argued that when people do not trust institutions that govern their country, they retreat into apathy, laxity and violence, hence undermining any democratic process under way.

Maleleka attempted to find the balance on the interaction between democracy and development. While highlighting the recent performance of selected African countries, he further introduced public trust in institutions as a factor that determines the harmonious outcome of democracy and development.

Trust can be divided into cognitive, effective and behavioural elements. In his arguments Maleleka used the Meerkat theory, which states that knowing someone for an extended time leads to mistrust, and he used this to interrogate the interaction of democracy, development and trust in a political climate.

Maleleka's main arguments were that:

- democracy and development are complementary;
- the benefits of democracy go as far as they relate to predictability rather than the democratic process itself; and
- lack of justice can directly compromise development through discouragement of investment and economic exchange.

Another important point to note is that people blame stagnation in livelihood on lack or no action from the political and state institutions to remedy the situation, thus deepening dependency on government provisions.

With the use of economic data Maleleka reflected on the interaction of democracy, development and trust in selected sub-Saharan African countries and gave an overview of how such an interaction blends with trust in institutions. He found in his study that there was no conclusive evidence that adherence to democracy had led to better and higher forms of development. It was, however, found that lack of trust in institutions may lead to apathy and laxity, which may slow economic activity in the medium and long term.

Maleleka also argued that democracy is only effective in relation to development when it is underlined by trust in political institutions. Trust is strong when institutions/government has a reputation of enforcing contracts and the law. The reputation itself can come from a well-established history of delivery in this regard. A track record also implies that future actions of an institution can be predicted. Thus a political party can be trusted just because it is not a stranger. Conversely, predictability of action leads to mistrust (Meerkat theory) if its delivery record on promises made in the past is poor. In a country where ruling political parties

favour their stronghold members in terms of development (service provision), the perceived inability to deliver by members of opposition parties leads to mistrust of the ruling party and its government, thus triggering people's disenchantment with democracy.

Maleleka concluded by calling on electoral institutions to conduct thorough and comprehensive awareness campaigns for the electorate so that they can clearly understand their role and how to complement the effectiveness of governance.

EISA senior researcher **Victor Shale** introduced the central role of parliament in the governance debate. According to him, it is no exaggeration to posit that one of the most critical pillars of representative democracy – namely, parliament – has been neglected in terms of capacity building of the requisite skills necessary for both the institution and the members of parliament (MPs) to deal with their day-to-day duties effectively.

Shale posed a number of questions relating to parliaments' ability and capacity to ensure democratic governance:

- Do MPs hold government to account?
- Do MPs contribute to improving the lives of ordinary citizens?
- Do MPs play an effective monitoring and oversight role in democratic governance?

Shale used the case of Lesotho in his critique of parliament's role in democratic governance. He argued that the purpose of parliament is to improve the quality of government by linking the people and the executive. Conventionally, the three major functions of parliament are representation, legislation and oversight. In order for this to be guaranteed, the presence of opposition parties in parliament is indispensable.

Lesotho is a parliamentary democracy with a dualistic governance system based on the Westminster model. The government is headed by a prime minister, while the state is headed by the king. Lesotho operates a fairly unique governance system that is a blend of modern democratic and traditional governance systems – a rare hybrid system in Southern Africa. It is therefore critical that a look at the parliament of Lesotho in terms of its ability to deepen democracy also recognises the fact that this parliament features a combination of party political interests, traditional interests as well as monarchical interests. In terms of the latter, by definition in the law, the traditional institution represented by the chiefs in the Senate does not include the king.

However, politics in Lesotho has always been a zero-sum game, often accompanied by aggressive and counter-aggressive measures which have at times led to the deaths of innocent people. There was effectively no representative democracy in Lesotho from 1970 to 1993, the period marked by authoritarian governance of both civilian and military varieties. Multiparty democracy was re-introduced in 1993 when the military, then under the more conciliatory Major General Phisoane Ramaema, stepped down.

Parliament can only contribute towards deepening democracy if it is seen as democratic and legitimate by all sectors of the population. In this case the role of political parties is crucial since

there is definitely a nexus between the political party culture as an external factor and the ability of parliament to contribute to the deepening of democracy. In other words, the culture of political parties has an impact on the performance of parliament.

A look at political parties in Lesotho shows a culture of leadership battles, predictable splits on the eve of every election and intolerance between the various splinter groups. At the centre of all these are individual self interests, while the interests of the Basotho people take a back seat. Under these conditions, political parties in Lesotho do not contribute much towards the deepening of democratic governance. The net effect of this is that these parties do little to change their behaviour when they get to parliament. The splits and floor crossings in parliaments affect the workings of parliament.

Lessons from the case study of Lesotho reveal the following:

- Election-related conflict situations which characterise many African states can be dealt with, and significant milestones in the workings of parliament can be achieved.
- Lack of intra-party democracy leads to fragmentation, which in turn ferments political intolerance.
- Intolerance has a ripple effect in parliament when parties use parliament as a platform to settle scores. This stifles its operation since parties are not holding each other accountable vis-à-vis the implementation of national goals.
- Parliaments can play an effective role if MPs are responsive to citizens' needs and are effective in overseeing government actions.

Shale concluded by calling upon parliaments in Africa to pay attention to the important issues of skills- and capacity-building and parliament–civil society relations, both of which would put parliaments at the forefront of entrenching democratic governance. Furthermore, parliaments can deepen democratic governance if they are reflective of the diversity of the population, if they comprise democratic political parties and if they have the necessary skills and resources to carry out their legislative, representative and oversight functions.

Sabiti Makara, a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda, highlighted the contribution of local democratic forces to the democratisation agenda, with specific reference to Uganda. There is a movement towards decentralisation and local government reforms with the aim of allowing sub-national units of government to enjoy some degree of autonomy, to act on local priorities and to elect representatives. Decentralisation is seen to promote social learning, decongest the centre, empower local communities, and introduce administrative efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness.

In the case of Uganda, by the time the current National Resistance Movement (NRM) government came to power in 1986 both the economy and society had collapsed: 7% of the population were displaced; per capita income had declined by 40% since 1971; the stock of capital investment had greatly reduced; contract enforcement had broken down; political and bureaucratic leadership had become opportunistic; and corruption was easily tolerated in the public service. Above all, the system of trust had totally collapsed.

Decentralisation was a response to the institutional collapse in Uganda following decades of military dictatorship that had adverse consequences on democratic governance and development. When the NRM captured power in 1986 after a bloody guerrilla war, it promised in its 'Ten-Point Programme' to re-introduce democracy. The NRM's form of democracy was, however, unique – it was a 'no-party' democracy or movement government. Its structure was built on local institutions known as resistance councils and committees (RCs).

The NRM had come to power through the barrel of the gun and needed the support of the people to establish and buttress its regime. The RC structures offered the NRM the opportunity to convince its opponents and the international community that although it had taken power by the gun, it had devised a system which embraced all Ugandans. The underlying motivation of the NRM government was to create a new structure that could achieve the twin objectives of securing legitimacy for its new government and uprooting the support of other political parties. The NRM claimed that through RCs every citizen was free to participate in the governance of his/her village and, if elected, at any higher level.

However, the RCs were a creature of the state and not the people themselves. The NRM has over the years used RCs to extend its ideological orientation of a no-party system, undermining all other political tendencies in society. The experiment with RCs helped the NRM government secure broad support of the masses especially in the rural areas. In reality, though, the RCs were unable to serve as autonomous vehicles for championing democratisation of society in Uganda, both at local and higher levels.

Local government reform was in line with the reforms that were taking place in other sections of the Ugandan public sector, which necessitated a devolved form of governance. The key reforms that took place in the first half of the 1990s included the privatisation programme, macroeconomic reform (SAPs) and public sector reforms. These neo-liberal reforms could only operate with a measure of success if the whole governmental structure was revisited and restructured.

Decentralisation was pursued in the context of an authoritarian centre in Uganda. The NRM kept itself in power under a *de facto* one-party system (until 2005), which its supporters branded 'no-party' or 'movement'. It is critical to note that this was a system in which no other political party had a role in the governance of the country. Authoritarian tendencies of the centre, however, cast doubt on whether local structures could be truly democratic. It appears paradoxical, therefore, to talk of democratic local governance when the centre is undemocratic.

The point here is that while most donors and some local observers have tended to praise the participatory nature of Uganda's local governance system, they have intentionally ignored the limitations imposed by the centre on local avenues of participation.

To what extent were the people involved in decision making? If anything, decentralisation has forged a place for the regime to gain undeserved 'democratisation' credentials. In reality, the local government system has provided excellent avenues for extending political patronage and patrimonial relations.

The misuse of tax money by local government officials has weakened the spirit of decentralisation, especially in terms of money that could have been used to pave roads, provide safe water and build schools. There is a strong belief among ordinary citizens that whatever one does, one must gain. This has given rise to a new term - *nfunilawa?* (where do I gain?). This attitude is individualistic in nature and opportunistic in orientation.

Citizens mistrust local government officials and believe they are motivated by self-interest and gain when it comes to the programmes they design for communities. Public officials are perceived as having ulterior motives. This belief is reinforced by rampant corruption and lack of accountability in the public arena, commonly known as 'eating'.

The implication of such perceptions is far reaching. It undermines people's zeal to demand accountability from public officials and may lead to lack of interest in public affairs (apathy) and lack of participation in and maintenance of public projects. There is very low citizen participation in local government projects, yet the exit options for ordinary citizens at the local level are also limited. The limitations arise from a number of factors: first, the state structure at all levels is intertwined with the 'party' structure of the NRM. This implies that an alternative political agenda may not be properly pursued by citizens wishing to do so. Second, the idea that decentralisation allows citizens at the local level to choose from available options in services is tenuous because of high levels of poverty in the country – 38% of Ugandans live on less than US\$1 a day. This increases the levels of manipulation of the ordinary citizen by the opportunistic political forces both at central and local levels.

Makara concluded that when the state fails, ordinary people retreat to their private lives and organise to solve problems that should have been solved by the government. At the same time the creation of a formal structure of local governance helps matters by creating opportunities for civil society to organise independently of the state or in partnership with the state.

The case of Uganda illustrates two extreme scenarios:

- When the state failed, civil society took over the management of schools, hospitals and informal trade.
- Decentralisation created opportunities for civic engagement with the state. This gave ordinary people the confidence to question the state's activities.

There have been opportunities for popular accountability, innovation at local level and cooperation among the ordinary people to deal with local problems. However, the state/ ruling party has used the same opportunity to entrench its interests and survival: it considers the local governance structures to be its mobilisation structures for entrenching its political agenda. This is just one example of the many contradictions when it comes to Uganda's democratisation project.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Participants were unanimous that public trust in institutions and systems of governance is a crucial measure of whether or not democratic governance is nurturing and becoming increasingly institutionalised. The central role of parliament in democratic governance was

acknowledged. The question of whether African parliaments change or perform better when there are more parties represented in parliament was interrogated.

The argument was that parliaments can deepen democratic governance if they are reflective of the diversity of the population, if they comprise democratic political parties, and if they have the necessary skills and resources to carry out their legislative, representative and oversight functions. While central government plays a key role in driving the democracy project, the Ugandan case study showed that democracy at local level is important. However, there is a tendency by the ruling elite to use decentralisation to extend their clientelistic and patrimonial relations. This trend may defeat the ends of democratic governance in Uganda.

Bill Lindeke of the Institute for Public Policy Research in Namibia assessed the democratisation and development experiences of one of Africa's newest independent states, Namibia. He took stock of how the country is performing in terms of consolidating democracy and developing the society and economy as a national unit. Five other countries – Botswana, Mauritius, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago – were chosen for comparison with Namibia to measure democratic and development experiences, shortcomings and prospects.

Namibia crafted a constitution that was meant to provide a stable future for some time to come. The original document has served well and is a source of justified pride for the country and its leaders. Namibia has had second, third and fourth elections, and has seen the retirement of its independence president, Sam Nujoma, in a controversial though successful succession process. The stepping down of the founding and only president of the South West Africa People's Organisation (Swapo) can be considered a remarkable achievement under the circumstances.

Lindeke outlined two features which are troubling for African democracies. First are the elite tensions and weak commitments to democratic procedures and necessities. Uganda, Ethiopia, Algeria, Nigeria and Zambia are all former 'poster cases' for African democracy, as seen by the West, which currently face criticism for abrupt violations of democratic procedural necessities. Second are the diverse wishes of Africans themselves about both democracy and development. Some think democracy is 'the best system of government' and others have shown a high level of 'satisfaction with democracy'. While public opinion surveys reveal that one-party and military regimes are thoroughly rejected by Africans, support for democracy as the 'only game in town' is only moderately strong and quite possibly not very deep.

Namibia is particularly well placed to learn from and avoid the mistakes of earlier experiences in Africa and beyond, as well as to become a model of leading and best practices for others to emulate. Namibia is in the middle of the pack when compared with its peers in terms of per capita income and national income level. With growth showing signs of recovery during a commodities price boom, Namibia should perform well on the economic front. In terms of the Human Development Index (HDI) ranking, the impact of HIV / Aids is felt.

The peer countries (Botswana, Mauritius, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago) against which Namibia is pitted, form a solid basis for measuring how Namibia is faring in its march toward development and prosperity. The countries possess a variety of governance and economic trajectories that can help illuminate potential paths or barriers in Namibia's journey.

Namibians express a relatively high degree of satisfaction for what democracy has done for them, but they do not demand or support it as strongly as respondents in other African democracies do. In fact Namibians score the lowest of any of the surveyed countries in demanding democracy. Namibia does not score so well on issues of literacy either when compared with the other countries, despite the country's high levels of spending on formal education. Human capital shortcomings remain the most constraining factor slowing Namibia's development.

Namibia's figures for life expectancy at birth are in sharp contrast to its peers. The continental African countries (Botswana and Namibia) show the dramatic impact that the high levels of HIV/Aids have on some conditions of life. This severe downward spiral of life expectancy among all Southern African countries also negatively impacts the HDI.

Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) is another measure that falls between poverty and HIV/Aids impacts. Namibia outperforms Botswana but is considerably behind the other peers. Perhaps it is the remote, rural and low population density factors that influence this health measure more than lack of government effort. A comparative trend in Namibia shows that progress toward the MDG for this indicator is in sight, with a drop from 60 in 1990 to 46 in 2005. Improvements are also noted in trained professionals attending births. Still, these are areas of human development where the peer countries are far ahead. Namibia, Botswana and Jamaica also trail in per capita health expenditures, despite Namibia's high expenditure on health in the national budget since independence.

Namibia often holds its own against the poorer performing peers in the critical area of governance. For example, in the rule of law, political stability and control of corruption dimensions, Namibia outperforms both Jamaica and Trinidad by a considerable margin, while trailing behind the other countries. In the other three dimensions of voice and accountability, government effectiveness and regulatory quality dimensions, Namibia trails marginally behind all the other peers in most cases. This relative weak performance in the governance area indicates that improvements in governance are important components of the democratic reforms that need to be pursued aggressively to meet established goals for the country.

Namibia has been at the forefront of gender empowerment and equality issues since early in the independence period. It has achieved a 50:50 gender school enrolment figure from kindergarten through to tertiary levels, and has outperformed many developed countries in terms of female management representation in both the public and private sectors. Compared to the selected peers, Namibia leads in all the categories on gender empowerment and has gained important ground in promoting more equitable access. On gender empowerment and equity (at least for the upper and middle class), Namibia excels.

Namibia scores in the middle of the pack in terms of other measures of freedom and good governance, such as the media freedom index supplied by Reporters Without Borders and Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index. This means that Namibia performs on a par with the peer countries when it comes to these freedom measurements. One can say that Namibia has benefited from democracy in terms of the freedoms usually defined as important dimensions of democracy, and from performance in terms of governance transparency and accountability.

In conclusion, Lindeke argued that Namibia performs relatively successfully compared to the other developing democracies in the study. It is, however, difficult to discern whether this is the result of 'democracy', Swapo leadership and ideas, or more generally Namibian conditions that prevail in this particular historical setting. At present, Namibia's democracy seems quite robust. However, it depends unduly on the good will of the ruling party's leadership and on the lack of a real challenge from a viable opposition. Namibia's social and governance performance has generally been a bright spot, with its attainment of most MDGs a reasonable possibility. Namibia seems very competitive with the middle income peers that it was pitted against and is far ahead of other African countries vis-à-vis the measures of good governance. The country has achieved democratic status and has much to be proud of in terms of policy performance and democratic achievement.

Thaddeus Menang of the Cameroon National Elections Observatory examined the challenges and prospects to the democratic process in Cameroon. Cameroon is a rare example of stability in the Central African sub-region: Cameroonians treasure the peace and tranquillity they have been enjoying and are prepared to put up with considerable physical and moral discomfort in order not to lose this peace.

Cameroonians experienced a severe economic recession beginning in the mid-1980s, which successive governments have been struggling to arrest by all means. Huge sacrifices were demanded from the people when the country agreed to submit itself to an IMF-imposed structural adjustment programme that lasted more than a decade but yielded little in terms of economic prosperity. The country finally came to be classified among the world's highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) and had to struggle hard to reach the completion point of the HIPC initiative in 2006.

One-party rule was the dominant mode of governance in Cameroon for several decades, a construct of the post-colonial era. However, President Biya went on to introduce what has been termed 'semi-competitive' elections in 1987 and 1988, in the course of which the race for seats in both municipal councils and the National Assembly was open to several candidates or lists of candidates within the same constituencies.

The 'winds of change' that blew across Eastern Europe towards the end of the 1980s and which brought about the fall of a number of totalitarian regimes, urged some Cameroonians to make demands for more liberalisation of politics in the country in 1990. A number of new parties were formed in the early 1990s, but the reaction of Biya's government was swift and brutal. The Biya administration was not keen on the return to multiparty politics. These were simply reactions to both internal and external pressures for multipartyism.

Nonetheless, Cameroonians were eager to exercise their newfound freedom. In 1991, 58 new political parties were approved and by the time the first multiparty elections were held in March 1992, more than 100 political parties had been approved. During the first year following liberalisation, the people wanted to see rapid change.

From this time onwards, the government has consistently used elections as a means of containing, and even controlling, the numerous political parties that are called upon to take

part in them. Elections are time consuming and pose serious challenges to those political parties with scarce material and human resources. They thus oblige the parties to suspend demands for fundamental reforms. Besides, the inability of most parties to obtain credible results at these elections further demobilises them and greatly reduces their capacity to continue to 'oppose' the incumbent.

Since Cameroon returned to multiparty politics, elections have been the single most visible indicator of the democratic transition. Between 1990 and 2007, the country has organised three presidential polls, four elections to choose MPs and three elections to choose local councillors.

The government introduced some institutional reforms in 2000 following repeated complaints from opposition political parties concerning the Ministry of Territorial Administration's management of elections, which most observers also thought was not impartial. Opposition political parties and some civil society organisations (CSOs) wanted the government to put in place an independent electoral commission, but the government instead set up the National Elections Observatory (ONEL) to supervise and monitor all electoral operations and ensure the respect of electoral laws by all election stakeholders.

However, ONEL's ability to stamp out certain malpractices remained limited as it had to face the powerful interior ministry, which remained responsible for the actual conduct of elections. Following more pressure not only from within but also from some of Cameroon's foreign partners, notably the Commonwealth, the government got an extraordinary session of parliament to adopt a bill setting up a new election management body to be known as Elections Cameroon (ELECAM). The bill was enacted into law on 29 December 2006. Once again, the government is taking its time to make ELECAM operational.

Some of the concrete measures taken so far to democratise the Cameroonian political system include the following:

- The gradual disengagement of the state from direct economic management through the on-going privatisation of state-owned enterprises.
- The revision of the tax code and the computerisation of tax collection and customs operations in a bid to improve state revenue collection.
- The intensification of the fight against corruption.
- The adoption of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank in July 2003. The PRSP provides guidelines in the formulation of government growth promotion and poverty reduction policies and ensures the necessary coordination between the actions taken by the government and assistance measures provided by Cameroon's foreign partners.
- The setting up of an Inter-ministerial Committee Extended to the Private Sector, a Competitiveness Committee and an Industrial Partnership Council for the purpose of creating an enabling environment for economic activity.

Some efforts have been made to enhance Cameroonians' participation in the democratic process. These have centred on the promotion of human rights and freedoms, the regular organisation of elections, the granting of press freedom, the strengthening of civil society and the civic education of the people. Citizen participation in elections has been ensured through the 1990 law on freedom of association and that authorising the formation of political parties. As stated earlier, the government has organised elections on a regular basis in the course of which Cameroonians have had the chance to choose their leaders at both national and local levels.

Press freedom was guaranteed by one of the series of laws enacted in late 1990. This law has been effectively followed up by the authorisation of numerous newspapers and the granting of licences for the opening of radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the country.

Civil society strengthening efforts have taken the form of a number of legislative and regulatory measures. Since the return to multiparty politics the government has introduced and enacted a law to govern the setting up and functioning of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The laws and regulations governing cooperatives, credit unions and development associations have also been amended and updated. In addition to these measures, the government recognises and consults a number of CSOs whenever the need arises.

Despite these positive indicators, the Biya government considers its most important achievement to be the political and social stability and peace that the people of Cameroon have enjoyed for several decades. This is in contrast to most of its neighbouring countries, which have experienced severe political turbulence at one time or another in their recent history.

Some government critics consider the transition to have stalled as it failed to progress from the initial phase of liberalisation to the nurturing and consolidation of democracy. Cameroon's democratic transition is believed presently to be stuck somewhere between a complete reversal to totalitarian rule and the difficult trajectory of democratic consolidation.

This state of political 'limbo' has prompted Cameroon's leaders to engage in a process of 'survival' that is characterised by 'incrementalism', which becomes obvious as the government muddles through reforms, struggling to achieve anything that would continue to sustain the impression that progress is being made.

The obstacles to effective democratisation in Cameroon, presented in various studies, are indeed numerous. Some may be said to result from historical factors or from the socio-cultural set up of the country, while others arise from the inability of the various political forces to act in tandem to bring about positive change. The main obstacles identified are many and varied. The first one relates to the absence of a democratisation action plan. This lack of planning does not provide the foresight that is indispensable for the successful consolidation of democratic rule. The second obstacle to effective democratisation in Cameroon relates to the existence of over 200 ethnic groups, coupled with two different colonial legacies. The politicisation of ethnicity, as some observers put it, is in itself a 'divide and rule' tactic by the ruling political elite. Other obstacles relate to weak democratic institutions and to the conflicting government agendas and the mix of liberalisation and neo-patrimonialism.

Neo-patrimonialism is incompatible with democratic governance as it indeed opens the way for the setting in of all the other obstacles to democratic rule. Thus, as long as the present government of Cameroon persists in implementing two incompatible governance models, the likelihood that democratic governance will take root in Cameroon remains distant.

In conclusion, Menang called on Cameroonians to strengthen state governance institutions. An important element of this would be to educate the masses, political party leaders and civil society leaders through formal and informal educational networks, to enable them to understand and effectively play the role that is theirs in a system of democratic governance.

Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni of Monash University, South Africa, and **Gwinyayi Dzinesa** of the University of the Witwatersrand examined the limits of neo-liberal democracy in Africa and argued that African leaders have to reconcile neo-liberal micro- and macro-economic policies that are often in tension with African dreams of economic empowerment. They argued that Africa needs a form of democracy that is not antagonistic to its cultures, historical realities and development challenges. They called for a democracy that is sufficiently indigenised and amenable to African agendas of economic development, social justice and African imaginations of liberation, while remaining consonant with global developments.

However, the celebration of modern democracy in Africa is premature in the context of its discontents. What is disturbing is that the majority of existing dominant intellectual interrogations of amenability and sustainability of democratic governance in Africa treat modern democracy as though it is a finished and perfect product that lacks only proper institutionalisation into a 'good governance' model. The dominant intellectual concerns revolve mainly around the identification of obstacles to the realisation of full democracy. What has happened is the bashing of the African state and its institutions as responsible for the crisis of governance.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Dzinesa engaged with the complex linkages between modernity, emancipation, liberation and democracy. Democracy is a highly contested concept, value, ideology and vision. Like all good things/values/visions, it is claimed by all people, with Europe claiming to be the originator, author and exporter of democracy to other parts of the world. Logically, some African scholars have contested the issue of modern democracy as a product of European Christian civilisation. They are not comfortable with the idea of Western civilisation as the only culture capable of producing notions of democracy and human rights. The Nigerian scholar Claude Ake was also dismissive of the notion of democracy as alien to African cultures.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Dzinesa argued that the best way to define and understand the ontology of democracy is as a vision of human freedom. Democracy is a human aspiration for a humane society. It is a human vision of a better world and better human relations.

The simplest way to understand the essence of democracy is to see it as being about ways in which people may creatively develop new ways of living together, choosing new and better institutional arrangements, and even founding new humane nations and states. Its ontology is informed by concrete historically and culturally specific circumstances.

However, the crisis of democracy in Africa is one of trying to implement a particular democracy in a different environment, culture and set of historical circumstances. The crisis is linked to the emergence of democracy as an imposition from outside. Colonialism denied African societies the chance to create and nurture their own context-specific democracy. A working and sustainable democracy for Africa must be amenable to the cultures and histories of Africa as well as linked to the present circumstances of the African peoples. A working and sustainable democracy for Africa must be a product of African imagination and visions as well as hopes.

What type of democracy would be suitable for Africa? Modern democracy in its liberal format with its trappings of political and civil liberties is reflective of its context of emergence and the imperatives of its visionaries. It emerged as a bourgeois class manifesto concurrently with modernity and coloniality. Modern democracy emerged in tandem with the exploitative capitalist system. Today, it has taken a triumphant neo-liberal orthodoxy, together with its tendency to worship at the altar of market forces and capitalist hegemonic globalisation. Is this the right democracy for Africa? Is this type of democracy sustainable in Africa?

The following components describe the type of democracy that Africa needs:

- Africans require a democracy that transcends the simple criteria of people having the right to vote and the power to install and remove leaders from office.
- Democracy for Africa needs to be biased towards consumer, material and social justice issues.
- Africans need a humane and functional democracy amenable to African desires for affordable food, health care, education, shelter and transport, employment opportunities and clean water.
- Africans require tolerant societies, responsive governments and the participatory space/environment in which to express themselves and project their visions and imaginations of the world. Africans require the release of their cultures, languages and knowledge from Western epistemological imprisonment.

Africa ended up with a non-functional and non-sustainable democracy because of the enduring realities of colonisation and coloniality. The most enduring and dangerous aspect of colonialism was the invasion and colonisation of African cultures and the African independent imagination and vision of the world.

Modern democracy is a creature of the modernity/coloniality project. Such a democracy is associated with the invasion and colonisation of Africa, and takes the form of a hegemonic wave and an imposition from outside. As such it cannot easily work in Africa where Western modernity and its coloniality are still being contested. The failure by modern democracy to contribute to material development, produce humane societies and establish social justice across the globe has resulted in contestations of the value of modernity, together with democracy, in some radical circles of the developing world.

Modern democracy is also a creature of emancipation not liberation. The problem in Africa is that what started as liberation movements eventually collapsed into emancipatory projects, and what started as revolutionary movements ended up as reform movements. Reform is a

tactic of self-preservation of an old system through concessions, but retaining its ontology. Reform gives an old system a new lease on life, disguised as change. This is the sad fate of African liberation projects.

The South African transition from apartheid to democracy in 1994 is showcased as a project of the crisis of neo-liberal democracy. While the black liberation struggle came to be viewed by all South Africans as a national achievement and a cornerstone of non-racial citizenship identity, for the immediate future, successive governments will have to cope with the sensibilities grounded in both non-racial and race politics.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Dzinesa outlined the limits of neo-liberalism in South Africa as follows:

- Liberation has not gone beyond simply taking racially based legislation off the statute books.
- While South Africa has the most progressive constitution on the planet, the actual realisation of these constitutional rights has not lived up to expectations.
- While gains have been made in terms of 'first generation' human rights such as political and civil rights (freedom from discrimination on the grounds of race, gender, sexual orientation, religion, etc.) the same cannot be said concerning the realisation of 'second generation' socio-cultural and economic rights.
- Post-apartheid South Africa is haunted by the gap between the rhetoric of rights and the economic and socio-cultural realities.
- The solution to the problems of poverty and disease in South Africa and broader social transformation does not lie in the abstract realm of constitutional law or political philosophy, but in everyday struggles, negotiations and pragmatic compromises. In South Africa, the state exists as a neo-liberal, right-sized and downsized phenomenon rather than as an interventionist developmental state. This is a sign of the African National Congress's (ANC's) capitulation to the neo-liberal agenda.
- Liberal democracy is very limited when implemented in an environment such as South Africa's, which is characterised by cultural differentiation, linguistic differences, cultural diversities, different customs and plural group claims to particular rights.
- Liberal democracy in South Africa is not easily amenable to the imperatives of the empowerment of historically disadvantaged and marginalised black groups.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Dzinesa concluded by arguing that modern democracy is a creature of bourgeois visions of society. Liberal democracy is proving hard to sustain and is not easily amenable to the realities in Africa and the developing world because it did not emerge within an African socio-economic and political environment. Democracy needs domestication and indigenisation for it to be amenable to different situations across the globe. A working and sustainable democracy for Africa is one that is inculcated from below; that is, a democracy that is amenable to the everyday demands of the ordinary people for food, clean water and shelter. Such a democracy cannot be imposed from above or from Washington. Such a democracy is a logical product of peoples' struggles for tolerant societies, accommodative and responsive governments, material welfare and poverty reduction.

At the ideological level, African leaders need to go back to the drawing board and reconnect all their development projects with the people; leaders need to put the people at the centre of democratisation processes. What is needed in Africa is African consensus not Washington consensus on democracy. And such an African consensus on democracy must be informed by the ideals of African liberation.

Vincent Tohbi, EISA executive director in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), exposed the democracy and governance challenges in the DRC. He defined the governance debate in the DRC as dealing with issues such as the values, practices, initiatives and experiences that enable a group of people in a community or a country to live in social or political balance. Governance is about how these people seek human development and freedom.

Democracy in the DRC is still fragile and in its infancy. The legacy of the past 40 years of authoritarian rule and protracted political violence is fully engrained and the security situation in the country is unstable. The country still needs to go through a number of stages before democracy becomes stable and sustainable. Whereas presidential and parliamentary elections have been held, local government elections are still outstanding. The laws governing local government elections are still being debated in parliament. Although democratic structures have been put in place in the DRC, what is lacking is the freedom and ability to use those structures. There are many unlawful arrests, murders of journalists and the harassment of opponents as the government is still fragile. Administrative structures need to be restructured and civil servants need training. The police are already being trained by local and international organisations as the DRC needs an efficient police force. The economy is a big challenge in the DRC where some 80% of the population live in poverty. Furthermore, building good governance in the DRC remains a challenge as there is on-going fighting in some provinces. The structures for governance – parliament, the judiciary, etc. – exist, but much assistance from the local and international community is still required to build a stable and democratic country in the DRC.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The discussion centred on issues of electoral democracies such as South Africa, and whether the people in an electoral democracy can or do influence economic policy. There is no evidence pointing to the fact that liberal democracy is easily amenable to the imperatives of the empowerment of the people, especially the historically marginalised majority. South Africa's new democracy, for example, does not empower the black people economically. Although we continue to argue that democracy and development should go together as democratisation powers development, democracy becomes meaningless if the blacks are not economically empowered to change their formally segregated lives.

Despite the difficult transition and lingering political instability, progress on the democratisation front in the DRC was noted. Efforts made by the government and the Congolese people to strengthen their new democracy were encouraging. In terms of press freedom, for instance, there are more than 68 television channels and over 60 newspapers, which is testimony to how far the DRC has come following decades of authoritarian rule and protracted war. It must be made clear that the DRC's nascent democracy is being built after almost 40 years of war and there are thus bound to be challenges.

4

GENDER DIMENSIONS OF POVERTY AND GOVERNANCE

Sheila Bunwaree of the University of Mauritius made a case for a gender inclusive, democratic developmental state. She acknowledged that while many good intentions and commitments have been made by leaders and different lobby groups to change women's lives on the continent, women remain worse off in their social and economic status. Gender-based violence both in the private and public spheres continues.

An effective transformation of women's lives remains a challenge in the context of globalisation, which also marginalises African countries and has led to the feminisation of poverty. What is sad is that while governments continue to commit themselves to international and regional instruments that seek to protect and promote women's rights, there has been little implementation at national level. Advocacy of a democratic developmental state has been articulated recently by African scholars; however, what has been lacking is the engendering of development objectives in order to get women out of feminised poverty. Women's unpaid labour continues to be invisible to the macroeconomic policy makers.

Gender inclusive developmental states must ensure that the financing of development is done with gendered lenses. There is also a need to challenge masculinist knowledge production, which defines development and the development objectives in strictly masculine terms. The first urgent step of a gender-inclusive developmental state needs to be to eliminate illiteracy among poor women. This state must also remove legal obstacles and cultural constraints to women's access to the control of productive resources. There is need for a gendered analysis of poverty eradication programmes and a much more gendered governance agenda.

Mamoeketsi Ntho of the National University of Lesotho's Development Studies Department began from the premise that women's political efficacy is critical for democratic governance. This could be enhanced, she said, by increased women's participation and representation in the major political processes of their country because women have been instrumental in certain aspects of the women's agenda. Ntho argued that a vibrant and consolidated women's movement is central in developing the political culture for democratic governance. The women's movement must clearly redefine its political agenda and try to play a significant role in promoting women's equal political participation. Activities suggested in Lesotho include political and democratic civic education, revisiting the allocation of the parliamentary proportional representation seats to include the women's constituency for the 2012 elections in Lesotho, and aggressive lobbying for legislated quotas to bind political parties to place women in winnable positions, in line with the principles of the Gender Policy. In this way women would be able to achieve both descriptive and substantive representation, which in turn would see women influencing major political events in Lesotho.

The women's movement in Lesotho is characterised by numerous women's organisations pursuing different aspects of the women's agenda. Because women's interests are not necessarily the same, Basotho women have employed different strategies and platforms to tackle societal

problems. Women's organisations have organised as community-based groups operating at local level. Some have also formed part of civil society by engaging in campaigns on human rights and legal issues, while others have organised around advocacy initiatives. Church/fairth-based women's groups have engaged women not only in prayer meetings but have seen women addressing poverty issues. Although there is an umbrella NGO body in Lesotho, there is no women's organisation that focuses solely on political or democratic education except for NGOs that combine civic education with other agendas.

Lesotho's unstable political history did not have a firm gendered governance agenda. Despite having acceded to United Nations (UN) agreements on equality, the Lesotho government policy structures remain highly male dominated. For example, the interim National Assembly that was created after the suspension of the constitution comprised nine women out of a 93-member assembly.

There has been a decline in the vibrancy of the women's movement since the late 1990s. It is remarkable that this decline has taken place almost unnoticed. Several factors that could have influenced this decline in the case of Lesotho include:

- the general regional vibrancy decline;
- donor fatigue;
- the sudden exodus of donors to Pretoria;
- the lack of a common agenda by women's organisations; and
- more importantly, the absence of a democratic culture within the political system.

When Lesotho changed its electoral system from first-past-the-post (FPTP) to mixed member proportional (MMP), it was hoped that this change in the electoral system would bring more women into the legislature. But this did not happen as the electoral system alone without any supportive measures from political parties could not achieve this goal. A combination of factors has functioned to marginalise the women's agenda of representation and has hence perpetuated the culture of political inequality. Some of these factors include the migrant labour system, regime types, the undemocratic nature of the political system and Lesotho's high dependence on donor agendas. High female literacy rates in Lesotho have been used by government and development partners as an indication of the political will to empower Basotho women.

Following a gradualist approach that is embedded in neo-liberal perspectives, once women get educational opportunities they get access to employment opportunities, which in turn alter gender disparities. As a result of this, different Lesotho regimes have pushed gender political equality to the margins of political debate. It is worth noting that even some women in Lesotho do not see the need for government to embrace an interventionist approach on gender inequalities. A number of complex tendencies have mitigated against equal political representation, especially as it relates to women. Women have been actively participating in social movements regarded as 'power from below', while the 'power from above' politics has been the domain of men.

The women's movement has been ostensibly operating at the margins of the political space and has thus failed to take part in institutionalising the political culture of democratic governance.

It is clear that in order for democratic development to be realised in Lesotho, there is a need for consolidation of the women's constituency by creating a united force that can initiate a platform for articulating the women's agenda as well as prioritising the political agenda of representation. There is clear need to lobby government aggressively to extend affirmative action to the national level so as to expand the political space that would see more women influencing the affairs of their countries.

Itumelang Kimane and **Matora Ntimo-Makara** of the National University of Lesotho are concerned that Basotho women are not emerging as builders of democracy. Their silence remains baffling. Lesotho is currently experiencing a political crisis following the February 2007 general elections, which has called for external intervention through mediation. However, even in this situation women's involvement is marginal at best and non-existent at worst. The on-going mediation process is male dominated, yet in these circumstances of political instability it is women and children who are the hardest hit.

Kimane and Ntimo-Makara argued that failure to include women in the critical democratic processes in Lesotho represents 'unfinished democracy', and is likely to result in gender-blind solutions to Lesotho's perennial political and socio-economic problems. They argued that the majority of Basotho have lost trust and hope that the modern form of democratic governance will ever become meaningful and of benefit to them. The widespread view is that modern democratic governance is benefiting a small coterie of the powerful political elite who use their control of the state as a licence to enrich themselves and those close to them. Substantive democracy would enable Lesotho to respond positively to the social, economic and developmental needs of its society.

Basotho women in traditional times not only participated in the production of food and the provision of services such as care to children and the aged, they also played a role in governance – although much of it was behind the scenes. No alternative traditional structures and processes existed among the Basotho to inculcate public leadership and governance-related attributes in girls in preparation for when they assumed adult roles. The orientation of women seems to have been predominantly geared towards being able to manage a household. It could be argued that the colonial officials exploited this situation to further marginalise women. This is a political problem that has served to maintain the existing unequal power relations between Basotho men and women up to the present day.

The absence of and silence of Basotho women's involvement in democratic processes remains the greatest challenge inhibiting Lesotho from attaining true and sustainable democracy that can deal with the social, economic and developmental concerns of the citizenry. The first step in the resolve for change should, however, come from women themselves.

The recommendations submitted by Kimane and Ntimo-Makara are as follows:

- A social contract is needed to pave the way towards getting an equal representation of women and men in the party executive structures, on criteria and procedures for selecting candidates to elections, the financing of electoral campaigns and involvement in all democratic processes.

- Special programmes for women's empowerment should be mounted to boost their competence to participate in the building of substantive democracy.
- A decisive effort should be made to mobilise the political commitment of the national leadership towards ensuring that the rule of law and human rights are institutionalised.
- Efforts must be intensified to fight corruption and nepotism in order to ensure the proper use of public funds and the enhancement of service delivery.
- Policy and legislation that promotes development and economic growth must be put in place and effort must be made to ensure implementation of such frameworks where they already exist.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

There was general agreement that the feminisation of poverty has been exacerbated by the implementation of numerous neo-liberal policies. Furthermore, women who participate in politics and who have sought to change their lives are negatively stereotyped and labelled. The first woman speaker of parliament in Lesotho was addressed as 'Madam speaker sir', showing that more needs to be done to change society's attitudes towards women leaders.

There is need to problematise the state and its failure to include gender issues and class in the development discourse. Furthermore, democracy is not an abstract idea: it begins in our homes. Family values are, however, often highly undemocratic. Despite this they are held as the ideal in society and those oppressive values are simply transferred to the public sphere.

An important issue that was tackled is how the development agenda and objectives are set out in masculinist terms, and yet what is needed is a gender inclusive developmental state that is capable of reversing the trend of the feminisation of poverty. The masculinist knowledge production which continues to marginalise women's needs in the development process needs to be challenged.

5

THE POLITICS OF POVERTY AND POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES

Lionel Cliffe of the University of Leeds, London examined the politics of hunger and vulnerability, and argued that the policy engineering of poverty reduction does not happen in a vacuum. In all pro-poor policies, there is the issue of who gets what, when and how. This process of distribution is usually politicised. This may be politicisation in a sense of one set of supporters of one political party or faction benefiting or being sidelined from that form of support. Patronage politics plays a big role in this regard. But where there is competition through elections, people may have to pay for such patronage by giving support to a candidate or party.

Cliffe argued that in pursuing the twin agendas of democratisation and tackling the plight of poverty, there is need to consider measures more basic than the 'political crafting of democracies'. The wave of democratisation experienced in recent years in the Southern African region, for example, can serve to highlight poverty through greater transparency and some empowerment of the poor themselves. There is growing recognition that 'poverty impinges on democracy's own prospects'. This insight in turn should force one to see complex interactions between the twin agendas of poverty eradication and democratic governance. It is not just a matter of further deepening democracy through strengthening and refining institutions so that once they are right, anti-poverty programmes and policies will automatically emerge and be implemented.

One basic feature of most contemporary approaches to poverty in post-independence Africa is that aid conditionality and the ideology underlying neo-liberal orthodoxy have pushed social policy away from earlier concerns. The choice that has been made in practice, almost without awareness, is to base strategy on providing 'safety nets' for the vulnerable and especially the 'deserving poor' – notwithstanding that there is a more active discussion about poverty reduction. From this perspective policy options become a technical matter of rationing limited resources by 'targeting' the needs of certain people designated as vulnerable or the poorest of the poor.

However, the principle behind the older strategies of 'universalism' has re-emerged in debates about social policy in Africa. Here again, some academics have provided valuable arguments questioning the emphasis on targeting. In practical terms, it has been shown to be expensive in terms of both money and personnel – especially in the poorest countries that need poverty programmes the most. But it can be challenged on the values it embodies: social protection is more of a privilege than an entitlement. The safety net approach, of necessity, involves targeting that isolates the 'most vulnerable', the 'poorest of the poor', those incapable of working for a livelihood, and thus a mechanism is needed for the identification of beneficiaries. This in turn inevitably vests a great deal of discretionary power in the hands of those in charge of setting criteria, of identification and of distribution of benefits. And those processes are susceptible to political manipulation within any system where patronage exists.

Moreover, the mere democratisation of electoral processes and a degree of formal accountability on the part of institutions do not seem to curb patronage, and may even provide more scope for it. On the other hand, the universalistic provision would reduce greatly the area for identification and discretion on the part of officials and thus reduce greatly, if not eliminate, patronage in crucial areas of social and economic policy and practice. In concrete terms, such shifts in Southern Africa might involve more initiatives like those to provide pensions for all old people in Lesotho and Malawi, or the subsidised provision of fertiliser and seeds to all farmers in Zambia and Malawi; something now advocated in the 2008 World Bank World Development Report after years of resistance.

Cliffe concluded that with a view to tackle poverty, development strategy choices may make a crucial contribution to a democratisation process that goes beyond formalised competitive election systems and notional answerability, and which begins to undermine the patronage networks that distort both anti-poverty development and democratic forms.

Marianne Ulriksen of the University of Aarhus, Denmark is concerned about the high prevalence of poverty still in existence in many countries in Southern Africa, even in the old democracies such as Botswana. Does democracy influence actors to choose more poverty-oriented policies? When do the elite care about poverty, and when do elites truly implement poverty-oriented policies?

Ulriksen used an actor-centered approach. She argued that unless pressurised or incentivised to care about poverty, the elite are likely to limit themselves to policies that do not substantially decrease poverty levels. The elite will normally choose policies that are not too costly to them. They will usually be reluctant to introduce or expand policies of redistribution which would substantially reduce poverty levels. Within the political process this is where elite competition and democracy matters. If there is a high competition for power and influence, the different members of the elite may be more interested in gaining the support of the poor by offering more pro-poor oriented policies. If the elite are not threatened, the poor become a less valuable support base.

It is important that in a politically competitive system the elite are made to be socially conscious of the reality that their own well being is inextricably intertwined with that of the poor. This calls for the mobilisation and empowerment of the poor to realise that their vote is important. In this case, then, democracy ensures that there is competition for poor people's votes. In consolidated democracies with one-party dominance such as Botswana and South Africa, there is no incentive to compete for the 'poor' vote and the elite are therefore not under pressure to put poverty on the agenda.

The poor are less politically active in most countries and their voices are not heard. As such, the participation and political mobilisation and organisation of the poor in the political and electoral processes is crucial if the elite are to be pressured to choose policies that deal with poverty eradication.

Democratisation matters when it comes to pro-poor policies. But the SADC region has seen only partial democratisation, which has not enhanced the voices of the poor. In addition, dominant party states crowd out competition and create a democratic deficit.

Blessings Chinsinga of the University of Malawi gave the local governance perspective to the politics of poverty reduction in Malawi. He argued that local governance reforms, with reference to Malawi's experience since the momentous return to democracy in May 1994, are not merely a technically neutral process but rather a deeply imbued political process. Local governments are touted as vital channels for improving citizens' ability to raise their voices and make demands on governing institutions, as well as for propping up the state's ability to promote democratic governance and respond to citizens' demands. However, local governance reforms in Malawi have not bolstered political participation or improved service delivery because these reforms have been greatly circumscribed by the strategic political considerations of various stakeholders in both the political arena and the wider society.

Chinsinga concluded with the following recommendations:

- In order to ensure that local governance reforms do not degenerate into a fight for political turf, donors must not only support the implementation of technical aspects of the reform initiatives but must also engage with the socio-political contexts of the reforms. In terms of the latter, the task of donors would be to provide a viable system of checks and balances. The argument is that left entirely to themselves, the political elite are bound to appropriate the reforms in a manner that serves their vested interest at the expense of the common good of the masses in whose name the policy reforms are often justified.
- The grassroots must be mobilised to gain political agency. This entails them understanding the democratic conception of citizenship, rights and obligations to enable them to have adequate knowledge about the functioning of institutions emerging as a result of the implementation of the reforms, as well as the ability to demand, claim and defend their rights and entitlements.
- There is need to define clearly the notion of poverty and embed it into the policy and legislative instruments championing the reforms.
- There is need to revisit the legislative framework with the view to defining and clarifying the roles of the key stakeholders in the decentralisation policy reforms, especially at the local level, in order to mitigate the adverse impact of local level politicking on the implementation of the reforms. Carving out the precise role of traditional leaders within the framework of rural governance and development is a politically sensitive issue. The government's relationship with traditional leaders is perhaps deliberately marked by ambiguity, with the intention of preserving its discretion in the determination of the status of chiefs for strategic political goals.

Ben Twinomugisha of Makerere University, Uganda, examined the extent to which Uganda's PRSP (the Poverty Eradication Plan – PEAP) promotes democratisation generally and socio-economic rights of the poor in particular. He argued that the PEAP largely promotes the interests of globalisation to the detriment of democratic governance and the socio-economic rights of the poor.

The PEAP is underpinned by the ideology of market forces. It does not challenge unequal exchange relations rooted in colonialism and exacerbated by the globalisation process. The PEAP has limited potential to protect the socio-economic rights of the poor. The so-called

participation in the design of the PEAP is mainly top-down and illusory and is aimed at legitimising the undemocratic neo-liberal policies of the World Bank, IMF and World Trade Organization. Twinomugisha recommended a genuine national poverty reduction strategy developed through a consensus-building process based on the active participation (not co-opting) of civil society, including grassroots organisations. Ways must be found of tackling the negative consequences of globalisation if the poverty reduction strategy is to be a meaningful development-oriented policy.

The PEAP contains certain aspects that may enhance democracy and protection of the socio-economic rights of the poor. However, any protection is undermined by the neo-liberal macroeconomic framework, which promotes the ideology of market forces. It is like giving with one hand and taking away with the other. Twinomugisha made the following recommendations as a way forward:

- A genuine national poverty reduction strategy (PRS) is needed, which has been developed through a consensus-building process based on the deep and broad participation of civil society.
- Good governance and democracy are largely about making choices. The state should be permitted to make choices on the socio-economic agenda it wishes to pursue, including a suitable PRS. Reforms of criminal and commercial justice as promoted by the PEAP under the pillar of good governance are insufficient. In short, the process in which the PRS is developed must be democratised.
- The PRS should provide for internal not external liberalisation of agriculture. Internal liberalisation promotes domestic markets as a priority and liberates agriculture for ecological sustainability and social justice. The PRS should protect and support domestic producers and, where necessary, provide them with subsidies. Since Uganda lacks sufficient foreign exchange, it is much cheaper to support local producers than to import food and other products. The country must aim at enhancing local food security.
- The informal sector must be strengthened. It is important though to strengthen those institutions and structures which have demonstrated that they are able to survive in a competitive environment exacerbated by globalisation.

In conclusion, Twinomugisha stated that the macroeconomic framework embedded in PRSPs is largely an extension of the colonial policy of exploitation. This policy went in search of raw materials, labour and markets, with little thought given to the local people and ecosystems. Nothing much has changed. PRSPs feature a slight modification of the SAPs only in so far as they attempt to focus on poverty reduction and stress the importance of consultation with civil society and the poor in the development process.

The PEAP has been sugar-coated with concepts like good governance and human rights to trick Ugandans into thinking that there is a fundamental change in policy direction of the World Bank and IMF. The democratic content of the poverty agenda is undermined by the macroeconomic framework, which exalts the ideology of market forces to the detriment of the socio-economic rights of the poor.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The discussions centred on a number of questions. For example, if there were no PRSPs would African economies have developed? Are African citizens worse off because of PRSPs? Furthermore, the nexus between local governance and poverty reduction needs to be highlighted. Local government elections need to be accorded the same priority as national elections.

Democracy must mean that people at local level are able to decide on all matters affecting their lives through decision-making structures that are close to them and to which they can relate.

Finally, a consolidated democracy does not necessarily guarantee less poverty; poverty remains on the agenda because the elite do not necessarily compete for poor people's votes. The poor must be organised so that they become a force to contend with. In order to find a balance between democracy and development there has to be an element of certainty at both the planning and execution levels.

6

THE POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY OF AID AND ITS IMPACT ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

EISA researchers **Bertha Chiroro** and **Catherine Musuva** examined the impact of democratic assistance or political aid on democratisation in Africa. They posed questions as to whether democratic assistance facilitated democratisation and whether democratic assistance made a difference to authoritarian states.

It would be wrong to claim that the success or failure of democratisation depends solely on democratic assistance. At the same time it is difficult to assess the impact of democratic assistance on democracy and the quality of governance. How much influence have donors wielded on processes of political change and how much democratisation would have taken place if there had been no donor assistance to the process of democratisation and transition?

Few cross country statistical studies have addressed the impact of aid on democracy and good governance. While there is a broader agenda to promote democratisation with international, regional and local efforts, democracy seems to be fading and even eroding in some of the countries. The third wave of democratisation has given rise to a wide array of political regimes, ranging from illiberal democracies to covert authoritarianism.

Foreign aid, whether in the form of development assistance or democratic assistance, has played a significant role in transforming societies and contributing to development policy through training and capacity building and the reform of political institutions. On the other hand, foreign aid in its different forms has not registered successful outcomes. For example, in Zaire (DRC) under Mobutu large-scale foreign assistance did not leave a trace of progress except for civil strife, war and unmitigated corruption.

The World Bank has been involved in assessing aid effectiveness especially after the Cold War in terms of its effectiveness on growth and poverty reduction. There was a re-conceptualisation of the role of aid in the light of a new development paradigm. The timing of assistance is crucial in helping countries improve their policies and institutions. When countries reform both their economic and political institutions, well timed assistance can increase the benefits of reform and maintain popular support for the reforms. Furthermore, although billions of dollars of foreign assistance were poured into Tanzania and Zambia, poverty remains a dire problem in the two countries with thousands living below the poverty datum line.

Africa's pressures for democratisation were not prompted by political aid. It was the implementation of IMF and World Bank SAPs in the 1980s and 1990s which were based on conditionalities, which prompted the pressures for democratisation. At the same time donors pressurised countries such as Kenya and Malawi by withholding aid in order to compel authoritarian regimes to democratise. Democratic assistance got refined, refocused and became highly conditional, and electoral democracies emerged.

CSOs have been identified as the key ingredients to promoting democratic development. It is believed that there is a virtuous circle in which rights to free association beget sound government policies, human development and an environment conducive for the protection of individual liberties.

Siphamandla Zondi of the Institute for Global Dialogue in South Africa argued that food has become a major element in the scramble for hegemony over Africa; food aid has become a key political tool in the subordination of Africa.

The United States (US) realised that food aid could become an effective political weapon and a tool for advancing its foreign policy interests. For example, food aid became a major activity on the international scene, with US food aid to Southeast Asia in the late 1960s in support of American military adventures. Then, it was subsequently tied to political conditions around democracy, good governance and economic liberalisation. These prescriptions sometimes undercut national priorities, policy reform and popular calls for change.

A new technology, biotechnology – which makes it much easier to produce more food even in unfavourable environments – is undercutting Africa's resistance to subordination to having food imposed upon it. Africa sees this challenge of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) as entitlement to innovate. If Africa adopts biotechnology it can solve its problems, as the continent will be able to produce food even in harsh conditions, because genetically modified food is able to resist diseases, pests and drought.

In the 1970s Africa moved from being a net exporter of food to a net importer of food, and the continent has for a long time been a picture of hunger and starvation. What happened? One reason put forward for this is Africa's inheritance of a colonial economy which was made to serve the metropolis rather than provide food sufficiency in the country.

GMOs are being consumed in Africa and even in a manner which undermines Africa's right to choose. Most of these foods are from the US. Africa's response has been to resist the food consignments because scientists are not sure of the health implications of genetically modified food. Some foods might have an effect on the environment and may annihilate organic foods if used as seeds. SADC has insisted on guidelines regarding GM foods, including the use of labelling, while Zambia developed biosafety policies to try and regulate GMO foods. The African Union (AU) has also developed GM food regulations and the AU/New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) Panel is trying to develop a common African position on these foods. Africa needs to defend its food sovereignty.

Zondi concluded by arguing that the GM lobby and sympathisers are asking Africa to open itself up to a technology about which very little is known, especially concerning the long-term ramifications. The AU/Nepad Panel crafts this as a pursuit for freedom to innovate and experiment. As the 2003 fracas over GM content in food demonstrated, the GM merchants and their backers are looking for freedom to inundate and create tastes for a lucrative trade. It is also disturbing that the Panel accepts as unproblematic the notion of 'freedom to experiment', notwithstanding indications that the world's powerful may be using Africans, yet again, as guinea pigs. Zondi called for a cautious and pragmatic approach to this matter. In this regard,

the decision by African governments to put in place regulatory and legislative frameworks to govern the importation and use of GM products, in the spirit of the Cartagena Protocol and the Convention of Biodiversity, is a wise one. Neither blind adoption of the technology in the name of innovation and in fear of being left behind, nor mere rejection and failure to prepare for an eventual entry of the technology and its products, are correct.

Julius Kiiza of Makerere University, Uganda interrogated the issue of financing illiberal democracies and posed the question as to how countries which are on the borderline between democracy and autocracy, finance their elections?

Kiiza examined party financing in the run-up to the 2006 Ugandan elections. Evidence shows that while the enabling electoral laws now exist regulating the mobilisation of party finances, and while impressive disclosure laws have been enacted, the level of compliance is still low. Parties seem to raise and spend their finances freely. Indeed, less than half of the registered parties have complied with the basic financial reporting regulations. Ironically, the ruling NRM is among the parties defying disclosure laws. The evidence also shows that the NRM obtained huge resource advantages long before the 2006 elections began. Furthermore, the party had unparalleled access to donor funds. It expanded its economic base by decentralising resources to state elites and business cronies who, because of their dependence on state favours, apparently saw the 2006 elections as payback time for their party. Even those that defected to the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) and other opposition parties seem to have translated their wealth into political finance.

Banking on its power of incumbency and its numerical strength in parliament, the NRM embarked on outmanoeuvring its rivals by controlling the electoral legislative process. The resultant party financing laws were not just NRM-friendly, they were late and vague, creating space for weak enforcement.

For Kiiza the 2006 elections signified no fundamental change in Uganda's political dispensation. All that is observable is a 'transition' from the Movement to the Movement. From the perspective of party financing, what continues is over-dependence of the party in power *and* the main opposition parties on one or a few dominant sources of party finances. This concentration of financing power signifies concentration of political power in the hands of a few actors. This is dangerous for internal party democracy. It is also dangerous for good democratic governance within the larger polity of Uganda. The solution seems to lie in increasing public financing and membership contributions.

Thus good governance in Uganda is the struggle for substantial poverty reduction, job creation and structural economic transformation. These are important if the vulnerability of Ugandan democracy to foreign powers (who finance 40% of the national budget) is to be reduced. This transformation is essential if citizens are to contribute substantially to party finances.

Voters should be educated on the need to vote for issues, not for parties or candidates who 'purchase' votes at the highest price. However, the demand for voters not to succumb to corruption cannot be effectively stopped so long as the corrupt activities of electoral candidates are not addressed. It is extremely important for Uganda to tame 'executive dominance', which

is the single most important obstacle to good governance in developing polities. In order to do this, a law should be passed to cause a sitting president who wishes to contest in subsequent elections to relinquish presidential office and become an ordinary citizen. Executive powers should temporarily be transferred to a Council of Elders led by a citizen of high repute (such as the principal of the Supreme Court). The aim here is to prevent the abuse of public resources by a sitting presidential candidate.

Financial limits beyond which neither parties nor candidates are allowed to spend must be factored into Uganda's electoral laws. Unfettered expenditure by candidates and parties is likely to entrench vote buying which, if unchecked, may postpone Uganda's chances of achieving good democratic governance to an uncertain future. A law should also be passed to restrict business contributions to electoral financing. Businesses are not charity houses.

A country can have good electoral laws without necessarily making headway in good electoral practice, as Uganda's impressive disclosure laws indicate. To make laws bite, the Electoral Commission must be depoliticised. Electoral Commission officials who fail to enforce disclosure laws should be forced to resign their offices in the public interest. Domestic financing of political parties needs to be stepped up if Uganda is to build a culture of durable democracy. This calls for civic education designed to boost members' contributions to electoral financing.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The discussion centred on the issue of democracy being a very expensive exercise, which would not be sustainable without external support and aid. Institutions of democracy need to be developed as well as the supportive institutions. Even elections in new democracies such as the DRC are an expensive exercise and require heavy funding. With regard to GMOs, Africa needs to regulate the manner in which this food is imposed on the continent.

Illiberal democracies remain prevalent in most African countries. Africa needs democracies that enable the people to have the right to vote and the power to elect their leaders, as well as the power to remove them from office. Elections remain a critical element of democracy; but on their own, they are not tantamount to sustainable democracy.

7

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LEADERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY

Matseliso Mapetla and **Moletsane Monyake** of the National University of Lesotho put forward leadership as central to good governance and sustainable democracy. They argued that Africa cannot sustain a democratic ethos if it is devoid of 'good' leadership that is competent to advance the process of democratisation. The primary requirement for the region to transcend its present conditions is thus the development of good leaders to sustain democracy. This development would incorporate consideration of gender representation, which has recently acquired much currency in the state leadership succession debates in, for example, South Africa and Zimbabwe. They argued further that good governance cannot be divorced from sound leadership.

Democratic consolidation – one of the greatest projects of our time – depends on good leadership. To attain and sustain consolidated democracy, Africa needs only the best and most uplifting leadership. Nothing succeeds by default. The success of a democracy that delivers on improving the livelihoods of the majority of Africans requires deliberate steps towards its attainment.

Despite the moves towards democratisation in the SADC region, many challenges continue unabated and democratisation has not delivered the desired results for the majority of African people. Even with the regular holding of elections and the establishment of democratic institutions, the credibility of many of Africa's elections remains a subject of contention.

For Mapetla and Monyake, leadership is both an ability and an activity. It is an ability to 'persuade others to comply voluntarily with one's wishes'. In order for leadership to have taken place the followers should have willingly submitted to the direction demonstrated by the person or people providing leadership. Leadership involves voluntary compliance by those over whom it is applied. Anybody who has *influence* or who commands an organised following, and whose decisions or actions affect the decisions or actions of a person or people, is exercising leadership. Leadership is also an activity of a person (leader) to draw other people (followers) to commit to and pursue goals that he/she is already committed to.

Most of the leaders in the SADC region do not seem to have a long-term vision of where they want to take their countries. A vision is reflected more in what one does than in what one says. Compared to other SADC countries, South Africa, Tanzania, Mauritius and Botswana's democracies are relatively consolidated, partly because of the steady and determined actions of the visionaries who made it a point that democracy takes root in their nations.

The pursuit of a sustainable democracy as a vision for Southern Africa will require a series of compromises from the political leadership. To compromise means momentarily to lose the battle in order to win the war. The war against poverty, HIV/Aids and bad governance can be won if leaders choose not to hold on to power, to eliminate dissidents or to accumulate wealth.

As a regional hegemony South Africa plays an enormous role in the SADC region's democracy project. A hegemony should enforce the values of good governance in the region through means ranging from influence to coercion. Furthermore, decentralisation, education and intra-party democracy policies need to be enhanced if effective leadership in Africa is to be attained. Fantu Cheru argues that 'a democratic project can only be sustained when there are political forces that not only accept it but also defend it, and where possible extend it; these forces are rulers, the civil servants and civil society'.

Ebrahim Fakir of the Centre for Policy Studies examined the leadership succession debate in South Africa as the country gears up for its 2009 elections. South Africa is a democracy and its succession issues are therefore not like a monarchical debate about succession. However, leadership succession still generates uncertainty, agony and even trauma within parties.

The succession debate in South Africa was caused by the term limit of the current president, which comes into effect in 2009. In the case of South Africa, Fakir contended that there is one leadership required for the party and another for the management and leadership of the state. The African National Congress (ANC) will in December elect its leadership for the next five years, but due to the nature of the electoral system used in South Africa (namely, proportional representation [PR]) the ANC is likely to be choosing also South Africa's next head of state. Some people in the private sector and international community had supported Mbeki's bid for a third term but the prospects of such a constitutional amendment in South Africa are remote.

Numerous questions have been asked lately: who will succeed Mbeki? Is an Mbeki third term desirable? Will other candidates emerge? Is the tripartite alliance headed for a split? Although the succession battle has been based a lot on personality issues, not everyone who supports Zuma is anti Mbeki. The succession debate is not only about personalities; it is also about the ideological identity struggle within the party itself.

There is currently ideological incoherence within the ANC. This ideological confusion hinges on the partnership between the state, civil society and the market as an ideal of progressivism. In this ideal of progressivism, however, there is recognition that the relationship between state, market and society is complex. It is hoped that the interaction of these three spheres will bring about social justice and that these spheres will become social partners: the state providing welfare, the market creating jobs and wealth and civil society being the site for engaging state and market. But the interaction of these three spheres is rarely this simple. The reality is that state, market and civil society have been in competition, leading to what have been termed the predatory state and rampant market. This hampers the idea of progressivism. In this case expert leadership is required.

Samuel Nyanchoga of the Catholic University of Kenya argued that leadership and democracy do not necessarily complement each other. Leadership may serve the parochial interests of a political process that is not always democratic. Since independence Kenya has been characterised by neo-patrimonial leadership laden with patron-client relations, whereby the act of ruling is arbitrary. Adherence to constitutionalism and democratisation is not prioritised. Even when there is political pluralism it has not produced greater accountability and the pace for legislative reforms is constrained by bureaucratic controls and authorisation. This is because

neo-patrimonial, ethnocentric, corrupt and absolute leadership upholds the status quo, projects ethnic interest and ineffective governance and is non-participatory.

In this context, multiparty democracy is confined to competition among political elites to the exclusion of the masses. Political pluralism has not encouraged a political culture of participation, accountability and public consultation. Leaders merely implement cosmetic reforms to placate internal unrest and to get foreign credit. Democracy should not be understood in the narrow sense of holding elections every five years or the proliferation of political parties. Kenya currently has 250 registered political parties, most of which lack ideological programmes and credible leadership. Democracy is more than that. It involves access to resources, institutional reforms, land redistribution, the democratisation of marketing institutions and the creation of political institutions that would give the masses the power to make leaders responsible.

Tribalised leadership in an ethnically segmented society embracing multiparty politics without internal democracy has not led to a democratisation process that has produced significant economic gains. Kenya has 42 ethnic groups and in the 1990s the ruling regime tried to stop a multiparty system by instigating ethnic riots. The opposition parties were divided along ethnic lines. In the 2005 constitutional referendum, voting was also along ethnic lines, and the political build-up to the December 2007 general elections has seen the manipulation of ethnicity by the leaders. Ethnic-based conflict has become endemic because leaders engage in cleansing undesirable ethnic elements from their political turf.

The expression of ethnicity and regionalism undermine the democratisation process. There is outright evidence that the leadership fails to manage ethnic pluralism and the problems associated with regional inequality. The current political split of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) into the ODM-Kenya led by Kalonzo Musyoka and the ODM led by Raila Odinga is symptomatic of a country where leadership is guided not by ideology or democratic values, but by ethnicity.

There is limited economic gain from this kind of leadership. Kenya's domestic debt stands at more than Kshs400 billion, much higher than its foreign debt. Though the economic growth rate rose from 0.6% in 2001 to the current 6.3%, job creation stands at less than 2% a year. Poverty levels are still high and infrastructure is poor. The skilled migration of Kenyans to Southern Africa, North America and Europe remains high.

Divergent views are criminalised in Kenya. Media houses, for instance, have been the target of state terrorism for being critical and censoring the excesses of government officers. In 2006 and 2007 the Standard Group of Newspapers, Kenya Television Network and the Hope FM radio station were petrol bombed by security forces. The government further tried to gag the press by introducing the infamous Kenya Communication Amendment Bill 2007, which was never signed into law.

CSOs are bankrolled by state coffers to silence them from criticising corrupt government deals. A number of CSO officials have been induced with lucrative positions and contracts and this leads to conflicts of interest. Others, such as John Githongo, have gone into exile for fear of their lives.

Nyanhoga concluded by saying that for democracy and development to take root in Kenya in particular and in Africa in general, there is need to transform neo-patrimonial, ethnocentric, corrupt and absolute leadership to a responsive, transformative and visionary model of leadership that is founded on the principles of participation, justice, human rights and the effective management of resources for the common good. This model of leadership transforms social structures and traditions. This may include engendering the leadership process by deconstructing the structures of patriarchy.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The discussion centred on the central role of leadership to democratic governance. Policies that need to be enhanced for effective leadership are decentralisation, education and intra-party democracy. Furthermore, when leadership fails there is bound to be conflict among different groups in society.

When the bond between the leadership and the people is diminished, political instability follows. A working and sustainable democracy for Africa must be a product of African imagination, vision and hope, which only good leadership can provide.

8

POLITICAL CULTURE AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Bhekinkosi Moyo of Trust Africa, Senegal, argued that national, regional and continental development initiatives can only be effective if embedded in their societies. This means that the participation of citizens in these structures is both a governance matter and a developmental requirement. The challenge confronting Africa is that of going beyond piecemeal interventions and beginning to move countries and regions towards becoming wealthy but also democratic. However, the debate on democratic governance and development has often been conducted in parallel. The question is always posed: which one first – democratic governance or development?

A number of large-scale studies have shown the causal link between good governance and development, and thus argued that for development to take place, good governance must be in place. And yet small-scale studies focusing on fewer countries or case studies have shown that there are some instances where the causal link does not exist, for example, in Vietnam and the Asian experience. Thus debate and research on the nexus between good governance and development has remained divided and has caused an intellectual conundrum not just for academics but for practitioners as well.

Moyo made a case for citizens to participate in the governance of their institutions, particularly at the national, regional and continental levels. Hence the focus is on the AU and its various structures, organs and programmes, which were created primarily to improve governance, promote sustainable development and uphold the rule of law and respect for human rights. The notion of citizen participation in their development is also central in the AU Charter on Popular Participation. This has been influential in the way the AU and its structures have crafted their treaties, protocols, rules of procedures and strategic plans, which have given primacy to the participation of civil society.

The launching of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (Ecosocc) as the official platform for civil society in the AU opened up space for CSOs to demand even more and effective inclusion. At the Nepad level, the introduction of a civil society desk and think tank has meant that civil society can contribute to Nepad programmes and their implementation. Various AU departments, and in particular the Gender Directorate, have been at the forefront in working closely with civil society.

The AU and its structures as well as CSOs suffer a number of challenges, especially around capacity needs. There is, for example, a serious shortage of skills and staff within regional economic communities (RECs) and CSOs. Tensions have been known to arise between intergovernmental institutions and CSOs as civil society normally has no patience for bureaucracy. The lack of knowledge on how RECs operate and how they are structured, impacts negatively on CSO intervention strategies. Very few organisations have extensive knowledge of how these groups operate.

Civil society in general wants increased participation in institutional programmes and processes. The difficulty has been partly due to capacity within civil society itself. Another could be the tensions that have often existed between civil society and public institutions.

Moyo advanced the following recommendations:

- The role of CSOs, especially in those regions confronted by conflicts, should be scaled up. Their advocacy role also needs support and strengthening.
- CSOs need to increase their networking activities as well as the learning and sharing of ideas, knowledge and resources.
- There is need for more human and financial resources for both intergovernmental institutions and CSOs. Financial support is required for capacity building in all institutions, especially in addressing human capacity needs.
- The private sector has been sidelined in many of these processes. The private sector needs to be included so that it can contribute towards the financing of regional processes.
- CSOs need to develop and strengthen their research skills and their capacity to engage in evidence-based advocacy.
- CSOs need to be trained in the art of diplomacy, monitoring, evaluation and financial management so that they can be involved effectively with intergovernmental institutions.

Peter Osimiri of the University of Lagos, Nigeria engaged with the problems of and prospects for promoting democratic values in Nigeria. He argued that the challenges posed to the diffusion of democratic values and practice by years of authoritarian rule, mass poverty and ethno-cultural heterogeneity do not necessarily condemn Nigeria to 'democratic reversal'. On a more positive note, the favourable international environment that is supportive of the emergence and subsequent development of democracy brightens the prospects of democratic consolidation in Nigeria.

The argument has been raised that the major international actors in the forefront of promoting democracy have tended to favour minimalist, procedural and liberal democracies. Even the transition from authoritarian rule to minimal democracy is a step in the right direction. The liberalisation of the political space that comes with transitions to democracy provides the appropriate platform upon which concrete economic rights could be won. Indeed, chances are that the longer a minimal democracy exists the greater the possibility that democratic forces will push it in the direction of consolidation.

This might be especially so for Nigeria, given its strategic position in black Africa. It has been estimated, for instance, that one-fifth of the African population is Nigerian. Certainly, all eyes are on Nigeria. If it does not slip back to authoritarianism, years of multiparty elections will bring about the diffusion of democratic values and the consequent strengthening of democracy.

The prospect for the cultivation of democratic values in Nigeria is not as bad as painted by pessimists. The challenges are real, but they are surmountable.

Osimiri examined the problems and prospects of developing a political culture for democratic governance in Nigeria. He argued that beyond the transition from military to civilian rule, the democratic experiment that the nation had embarked upon had so far yielded little or no dividends. The spread of democratic culture and ideals across the different strata of a nation's citizenry is a necessary condition for the successful introduction and consolidation of democracy anywhere in the world, including Nigeria.

While some progress was recorded with regard to press freedom and personal liberties, in many other respects, the fourth republic continues to fall short even on the minimum procedural requirements of a fledgling democracy. First, there is the phenomenon of 'godfatherism', which continues to be a major obstacle to the expression of the people's preferences in electoral competitions. Second is the executive lawlessness exhibited in the brazen disregard for the rule of law and the harassment of political opponents by the otherwise noble Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. Third, and more importantly, the economic reform programme in Nigeria today appears to be largely the imposition of the international financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank.

Such policies suffer from a democratic deficit because they do not reflect the preferences of the majority of Nigerians. Aside from the above problems, elections in the fourth republic, like in the ones before it, are hijacked and manipulated by moneybags and incumbents who deploy state resources to ensure their return to office. Elections in Nigeria, therefore, are nothing but a charade organised to perpetrate the reign of perfidious political elites in power. A case in point is the April 2007 polls which featured massive rigging, innumerable irregularities and violence. Nigerians and international observers have consequently roundly criticised that election.

Perhaps the greatest challenge to democracy in Nigeria remains the bogey of militarism and the militarisation of the nation's collective psyche. The political elite in particular reflect the militarist culture in their intolerance towards dialogue and dissent, their impatience for dialogue, and their penchant to employ executive fiat in decision making. On countless occasions, for example, the Obasanjo government imposed a hike in the price of petroleum products on Nigerians without any public consultation.

Osimiri concluded by making the following recommendations on how to promote democratic values in Nigeria:

- The international community should note that developing and nurturing democratic values would require the strengthening of civil society. NGOs and other democratic institutions should emphasise mobilising for democracy at grass roots level, and employing indigenous languages and modes of communication.
- The international community including the World Bank and IMF can only show their commitment to democracy in Nigeria by supporting efforts at revamping the Nigerian economy.
- The government's universal basic primary education programme would certainly help to reduce the level of illiteracy, and everything should be done to ensure that it succeeds.

- Citizenship education must be incorporated into the core of Nigeria's primary and post-primary school curricula in order to secure and increase the knowledge, skills, and values relevant to the nature and practice of participatory democracy.
- Democracy is a game whose rules must be clearly spelled out and codified. Thus strengthening democracy in Nigeria will require constitutional provisions that provide the necessary legal basis for the democratic practice. This constitution, however, must not be exclusively drafted by the elites; it must truly be a constitution of the people.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The role of traditional institutions and their fusion with modern institutions was tabled as an important institution that could be used to nurture and harness democratic values.

Civil society's role in the development process should be enhanced since a strong civil society is the backbone of a thriving democracy. Effective participation, which is realisable only under democracy, generates a feeling of inclusion of the populace and is central to democratic sustainability. Africa needs to strive for the inculcation of a democratic political culture that is the basis of a sustainable democracy, and not just to pursue the formal procedural democracy with its narrow focus on elections, competition, political rights and civil liberties.

9

GLOBAL TRENDS IN DEMOCRATISATION AND LESSONS FOR AFRICA

William Muhumuza of Makerere University, Uganda, examined the political implications of the resurgence in Sino-Africa relations, especially as far as democratic transitions are concerned. Since the 1990s, China has embarked on an aggressive foreign policy and diplomatic initiative aimed at improving its influence. While the recent surge of Chinese interest in Africa has been lauded because of its associated economic benefits, there is growing concern about its ramifications for the on-going democratic transitions in Africa.

These concerns are not unfounded given the fact that African leaders grudgingly accepted Western-induced political reforms, not because they believed in them but out of instinct for political survival. Despite Western pressure, many African leaders have tried to manipulate these reforms. China's entrance on to Africa's political scene therefore creates an exit option for those recalcitrant African leaders who wish to manipulate democratic transition. More particularly, China's policy instruments of 'no strings attached' assistance and 'non-interference in the internal affairs' of African states have serious political implications for Africa's democratic transition.

The recent enthusiasm with which China is strengthening diplomatic ties with Africa is attracting mixed reaction. China has tried to undercut Western influence by providing economic and political incentives to African states. Key among these incentives are generous grants and unconditional loans, debt relief, arms sales, diplomatic support and the promise of non-interference in the internal affairs of African states.

There are two schools of thought about the implications of China's surging interest in Africa. The radical view sees China's burgeoning relations with Africa as a positive and timely development. It advocates that China's interest will increase Africa's international bargaining power and improve its prospects for development. The liberal perspective views China's engagement with much suspicion. This suspicion is underpinned by China's own domestic political dispensation, which is characterised by non-democratic credentials and lack of respect for human rights. There is therefore general concern that the unfolding competition for influence between China and the West in Africa, which is reminiscent of the Cold War era, may do political harm to the continent.

China's relations with African states based on ideological interest started waning in the 1970s, especially with the exit of Mao Tsetung. The ascendancy to power of Deng Xiaoping marked a radical shift within the communist regime to concentrate on the economic modernisation of China. This period marked China's tactical retreat in its relations with African states. Put differently, China pursued an isolationist policy in the late 1970s and 1980s. It was not until the 1990s that China revived its diplomatic initiatives with African states.

The resurgence of Chinese interest in Africa in the past two decades needs to be understood within the context of an expanding Chinese economy and geo-political interests. China's

phenomenal domestic economic growth averaging over 9% of gross domestic product per annum for the last quarter a century, dictated China's shift from pursuing an isolationist policy in the 1980s to an engaging approach.

The non-political approach to business with African states is a radical shift from Western aid, which requires African countries to implement political reforms. These conditions were accepted due to lack of a better alternative. China's entry on to the scene therefore creates opportunities for an alternative source of aid and improves the bargaining power of African states. This is beginning to happen as the case of Chad exemplifies. Chad has been able to exploit the China link to renegotiate its contracts with the ExxonMobil consortium and to lighten pressure from the World Bank.

Muhumuza outlined the policies that should be learned from engagement with China. Africans leaders need to be farsighted and careful in their relations with China to avoid mortgaging their states. They should not preside over Africa's re-colonisation in the 21st century. They must be visionaries that put the long-term interests of their states ahead of their narrow economic gains and political preservation. Their goal should be to avoid seeing Africa as 'an egg on the breakfast table' of powerful states and instead strive to maximise the benefits from such relations.

There is need for continued international support for democratic reforms in Africa. More aid should be given to strengthen the building of institutions and processes that promote democracy and good governance. Besides, concerted international pressure should be put on undemocratic states by denying them aid and isolating them. This will discourage other African states from abandoning democratic reforms.

China also needs to desist from opportunism and the temptation of short term and narrow economic gains. It is in China's long-term economic interests to desist from supporting rogue and unpopular African regimes. This is because such actions are likely to create conditions for conflict and political instability. China should instead support existing mechanisms and efforts that enhance good governance, democratisation and peace in Africa. China needs to work in partnership with other interested parties both at the international and domestic level to ensure that Africa's political and economic gains are not reversed.

African states need to emphasise capacity building for institutions of good governance such as parliament, the judiciary, anti-corruption agencies and other oversight bodies. These play an important role in restraining national governments and making them accountable for their actions. African states must also uphold the rule of law. Their activities should be carried out within the precincts of the national law. Hence, there should be a provision to subject all national commitments such as bilateral agreements to parliamentary scrutiny. African opposition parties must also be vigilant to play their watchdog role of scrutinising policies and serving as checks and balances to the sitting government. If devoted and serious, opposition parties can restrain government from bad contracts.

It is also vital to support and strengthen civil society groups in Africa because they foster democracy and help to check government excesses by exposing and putting pressure on

government to be transparent and accountable. They also help to rally the public against the excesses of government. More especially, there is need for capacity building support for the mass media because it has a crucial role to play in terms of informing the public about government actions. Besides, its freedom must be guaranteed by African states.

Pan-African institutions also have a powerful role to play. The AU and regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), SADC and the East African Community need to develop mechanisms that will help to safeguard Africa's interests by giving technical and policy advice to African governments. Similarly, continental initiatives such as Nepad play an important role if invited by individual African governments to give advice. Nepad, which is a consensus framework, is already doing a good job by promoting democratic values and good governance in Africa. Such initiatives should be supported and maximally utilised.

African universities and think tanks also have a role to play by conducting research on topical issues such as the implications of Sino-African relations, informing the public thereof and giving policy advice to government. They should also organise public debates to which public officials and members of the public are invited.

Philip Oxhorn of McGill University, Canada addressed the implications of the trajectories of democratisation in Latin America and explored lessons for Africa's democratic regimes from the perspective of citizenship rights. He offered three models of citizenship, namely: citizenship as co-optation; citizenship as consumption; and citizenship as agency. He outlined the three threats to democratic governance, namely:

- growing economic inequality and insecurity;
- heightened citizen insecurity and the marketisation of the rule of law; and
- a general crisis of representation and the shrinking of the public sphere.

With notable exceptions, democracy in Latin America has been more stable, long lasting and robust than at any period in the region's history. Even in Argentina – a country infamous for political instability and its resultant violence – democracy was able to survive the worst economic crisis in the country's modern history. This new experience with democracy, in some countries now well into its third decade, reflects an unprecedented level of public support for the norm of liberal democratic governance. Yet this belief in democracy is often accompanied by widespread dissatisfaction with the governments that are actually being elected.

Citizenship as agency reflects the active role that multiple actors, particularly those representing disadvantaged groups, must play in the social construction of citizenship for democratic governance to realise its full potential for incorporation. It is synonymous with strong civil societies in Western Europe, where advanced social welfare states can be seen as one model of citizenship's principal achievements.

This new association between citizenship as agency and political democracy also reflects the rise of new actors, such as indigenous movements, and new institutions, such as Brazil's now famous participatory budgeting exercises. Today, the dichotomy of citizenship as agency and

citizenship as co-optation has lost its centrality as a new model of citizenship has become overwhelmingly dominant, namely: citizenship as consumption. Neither simply co-opted nor agents in the construction of their own citizenship rights, citizens are best understood as consumers, spending their votes and often limited economic resources to access what normally would be considered minimal rights of democratic citizenship.

Neo-pluralism is a market-centred pattern of political incorporation. It has replaced the state-centered pattern of incorporation associated with corporatism and the developmentalist state that dominated the region through the 1970s, and is closely associated with current neo-liberal economic policies emphasising free trade, open markets and a minimal role for the state in both the economy and society. Yet it is not reducible to neo-liberalism. More broadly, neo-pluralism reflects a combination of growing globalisation and the failure of the developmental state in the context of the debt crisis and lost decade of the 1980s – the same factors which largely influenced the adoption of neo-liberal reforms in the first place.

The logic of neo-pluralism permeates entire political systems in a variety of ways. In particular, market principles and market-based incentives come to play a defining role in collective action. An individual's personal economic resources largely determine the extent and nature of his/her political and social inclusion. They also directly affect the quality of education, health care and even the legal protection a person enjoys. Just as the state is assigned a minimal role in ensuring the smooth functioning of the market in the economic realm, the state largely abdicates its role in providing incentives (both positive and negative) for collective action.

The criminalisation of poverty and resort to repressive police methods also reflect the widespread marketisation of the rule of law. Basic civil rights are in effect allocated according to people's 'buying power'. Although equal protection under the law exists on paper, the poor cannot access it because of their limited economic resources.

There are a number of lessons that Africa can learn from Latin America and these include the fact that Latin America is at the moment enjoying many political rights which did not exist before. Even if civil and social rights of citizenship remain precarious (which is also not a new problem), one should not underestimate the importance of the unprecedented level of political rights enjoyed by most Latin Americans today. It opens up spaces for trying to resolve historical and contemporary problems.

There is also an unprecedented level of organisational activity among indigenous groups and other minorities in a number of Latin America countries. While the women's movement is not as active as it was during mobilisations demanding democracy, the movement has not disappeared and important gains have been made, even if much remains to be achieved. And even neo-pluralism has not been able to prevent the recent electoral victories of Lula in Brazil, Néstor Kirchner in Argentina and Chile's second socialist president in recent years, Michelle Bachelet.

All this underscores the importance of even limited political openings and political rights. This is one reason why elections are necessary for democracy, but it also underscores how they are not sufficient for sustainable, inclusionary democracies: they are an important means for

allowing people to take full advantage of their rights as citizens. Latin America's democratic challenge is to push those spaces out further and increase both what those rights entail and who is able to benefit fully from their exercise. Unfortunately, if this does not happen, the resultant void will not only discredit the political rights that were often won at great cost, but it is likely to be filled by opportunists whose populist and/or extremist rhetoric promises more responsive government.

This, in turn, will require that civil society be strengthened in order to demand more rights and that existing rights are enforced. And this is no easy task, especially given the historical and current weakness of civil society in Latin America. Here again, however, there are positive signs that point the way to a better, more promising democratic future.

For Africa, Latin America's experience underscores the importance of nurturing a civil society that can represent and help mediate differences and work with the state to confront the challenges faced by African societies today. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this nurturing process at length, it is important to emphasise that creating such a civil society does not mean that there is necessarily a high level of society consensus or social capital, defined in a narrow liberal sense. Instead, it requires a minimum consensus that there is no alternative to national unity, as well as a political leadership willing to work with all civil society actors in a process of negotiation and collaboration.

It also requires markets to be regulated by the state in a way that prevents its most serious consequences for democratic governance. While the excesses of the past where the economy was dominated by an often inefficient and corrupt state need to be avoided, this does not justify going to the other extreme – that associated with neo-pluralism. Instead, civil society and the state must work together to promote genuine economic development that will allow for a more equitable distribution of the rewards of growth so that citizenship rights are not limited to one's economic resources, but instead help people realise a quality of life that can sustain democracy, rather than threaten to undermine it from within.

Nandini Patel of the Institute for Policy Interaction (IPI) examined the essential aspects of Indian democracy that may be of relevance to Africa. The economic strides made by India in the last two decades are significant, especially considering its huge population. More interesting though is the fact that India made those strides within the confines of a democratic order. Sixty years after independence, India is called the largest functional democracy in the world. Some of its institutions are, however, not yet democratic. For example, political parties in India are riven with factionalism, opportunism, dynastic succession to leadership and narrow ethnic loyalties. There are enormous challenges facing this large democracy, but what is sustaining it is equally challenging.

After a decade of political instability India has come to grips with stable party coalition formation, which may be of particular relevance to many African countries. India stands as a remarkable exception to theories holding that low levels of economic development and high levels of social diversity are conditions inimical for democratic governance. Although poverty and social diversity have been endemic, democracy in India has survived turbulent times. Some have observed that in recent decades, India has proven itself capable not of preserving

democracy, but of deepening and broadening it by moving to a more inclusive brand of politics. Political participation has widened, electoral alternation has intensified, and civil society has pressed more vigorously for institutional reforms and greater government accountability.

India falls squarely under a parliamentary system of government following the Westminster model. The head of state is the president in whom all the executive power vests and in whose name it is to be exercised. The president is also the supreme commander of the armed forces. The president of India, however, is only a nominal or constitutional head of the executive. The real political executive is the Council of Ministers which is collectively responsible to the popularly elected House of Parliament called the Lok Sabha.

India is indeed a very poor country with about 70% of the population living below the poverty datum line. Although poverty and social diversity have been endemic, India has not only proved itself capable of preserving democracy but has been capable of deepening and broadening it. Political party participation has widened, electoral alternation has intensified and civil society has pressed more for institutional reforms and greater government accountability.

India's democracy has over the years been plagued by unstable coalitions. However, India's political parties came to learn in the 1990s that coalition governments were to be the order of the day and parties began to form strong coalitions.

African countries can learn from Indian democracy the importance of protecting and preserving the basic structure of the constitution, and the importance of judicial independence. Space for social movements which allow people to speak freely is also critical for democratic sustainability.

India does, however, still suffer from human rights violations, police atrocities and even riots between Hindus and Moslems. There are therefore still challenges with the Indian democracy in as much as there are strengths in the institutions thereof.

10

POVERTY: A CHALLENGE FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE – A ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION

The round table discussion tackled issues such as: elites caring about poverty (**Marianne Ulriksen**); democracy, social policy and poverty reduction (**Lionel Cliffe**); democratic local governance and poverty reduction (**Bill Lindeke**); and the gender dimensions of poverty (**Itumelang Kimane**).

The discussion centred on structural and institutional explanations, such as economic growth and the functioning of state institutions, as variables for understanding the interface between poverty and governance. While institutional and structural factors are important in poverty reduction there is need to focus on the elite's choices of policies. What would cause actors to implement and enact poverty-oriented policies? While the elite might care about poverty they will limit themselves to policies that do not substantially decrease poverty levels.

What will influence the elite to implement more pro-poor policies? If there is a high level of competition for power and influence, the different members of the elite may be more interested in gaining the support of the poor by offering more pro-poor oriented policies. If the political elite are not threatened, the poor become a less valuable support base and the plight of the poor a less pressing problem.

Competition is thus important for democracy, and democracy in turn ensures competition that favours poverty eradication or redistribution. It is perfectly conceivable that a consolidated democracy can prevail while poverty remains a major social problem. Put differently, a consolidated democracy is not necessarily a guarantee for reduced levels of poverty; poverty still prevails even in established democracies. Does the level of competition among the elite ensure that there is need for poor people's votes?

Two types of states are proposed to deal with poverty. First is the liberal welfare state which will be concerned with economic growth more than full employment and equity. The role of the state is limited to maintaining micro-economic stability and political stability. Second is the social democratic welfare state. Here, the state plays a crucial role in ensuring full employment and redistribution towards greater equality, even if this means interfering with the market. Due to heavy taxes and comprehensive social services provided by a social democratic welfare state, all groups in society should rely on and benefit from the state. The social democratic welfare state has much higher levels of equality and also lower poverty levels. The elite need to be pressured to choose policies that benefit the poor.

There has been partial democratisation in Africa, and as such the state has developed social welfare policies capable of tackling poverty on a longer-term perspective. But this amounts to a democratic deficit. A number of policies can be implemented to deal with poverty and they involve targeting, old-age pensions, farmers' subsidies, etc.

We should also be wary of introducing poverty reduction strategies that make people dependent on government. Policies have to be implemented that remove people from the poverty trap. It is important to acknowledge that women's and men's lived experiences of poverty are different. We cannot therefore assume that the same strategies that work for men will automatically help women get out of poverty. We ought to have strategies that focus on entitlements on the rights of men and women and on their capabilities. These could be in the form of gender, land redistribution, inheritance and marriage policies, poverty reduction, education strategies, banking policies and business promotion policies.

While local governance could be at the centre of poverty reduction, there are few checks and balances at the local governance level. Disgruntled citizens therefore confront poor local governance by withholding their payments for services, electricity, water and power.

The biggest problem in the SADC region is the dominance of the market logic under conditions of the global neo-liberal agenda. The markets are incapable of eradicating poverty; poverty reduction requires an interventionist state that is both inclusive and democratic. The institutional capacity of the state therefore needs to be enhanced. There is also need for social policies that are comprehensive rather than just focusing on poverty. The role of civil society is also crucial in poverty eradication; however, civil society cannot replace the state.

APPENDIX 1

OPENING SPEECH BY HIS EXCELLENCY SIR KETUMILE MASIRE,
FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA AND EISA PATRON

Director of ceremonies, chairperson of the EISA board, members of the EISA board, the EISA executive director, your management team and EISA staff, members of the diplomatic corps, the donor community and EISA's development partners, honourable ministers, honourable members of parliament, leaders of political parties, representatives of the election management bodies, representatives of the non-governmental organisations, excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen ...

It gives me great pleasure and honour to have been invited to be part of this august gathering organised by EISA. First and foremost, let me take this opportunity, on my behalf and on behalf of the participants at this conference, to thank EISA for its pioneering work aimed at promoting credible elections and democratic governance in Africa. I am encouraged to notice that the momentum of multi-stakeholder dialogue on democratic governance in Africa, which EISA started last year, continues to attract enormous interest. This is an important policy dialogue forum for it brings together various key democracy stakeholders from various parts of Africa to reflect on challenges facing the continent, share lessons of experience and make policy recommendations on the best way forward. I was privileged to be part of the first EISA Annual Symposium in 2006, delivering a keynote address during the gala dinner marking the tenth anniversary of EISA. I am further honoured to have been invited to deliver an official opening speech for this second symposium under the theme 'In search of sustainable democratic governance for Africa: Does democracy work for developing countries?'

This continental conference is both timely and relevant given that since the wave of democratisation across the African continent in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the major challenge still remains that of sustaining the democratic momentum and deepening the roots of democracy. The sustainability and deepening of democracy will be tested by the extent to which democratic governance advances the social livelihoods of the ordinary people, in particular reducing poverty. This is why this second EISA annual symposium is so crucial.

I have been advised by the organisers that the principal goal of this second EISA annual symposium is to investigate how democracies lead to the development of social policies that redress the scourge of poverty. The specific objectives of the symposium are to:

- deliberate on current models of democratisation in Africa and pose policy challenges facing the sustainability of democratic governance;
- investigate if poor countries can sustain democracy organically and, at the same time, attain their developmental goals;
- demonstrate how participatory democracy could enhance policy interventions aimed at poverty reduction through citizen participation, accountability, responsiveness and transparency; and
- make specific recommendations regarding possible institutional and policy reforms

that African countries could embark upon in order to strive towards sustainable democratic governance.

Judging by the goal and objectives of this conference, surely you have a mammoth task ahead of you over the next three days. Allow me to thank EISA for organising this conference and focusing our attention on such a pertinent and germane subject as the link between democracy and poverty reduction. This is extremely important given the reality that since Africa began the positive transition to multiparty democracy some two decades ago, the scourge of poverty has intensified. Poverty, therefore, remains one of the major threats to the sustainability of democratic governance in Africa.

It remains a major hindrance to sustainable human development. The extent to which African states are able to meet the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) collectively through the African Union (AU) and regional economic communities (such as SADC, Ecowas, IGAD, etc.) and individually will be judged by, among other things, the extent to which they eradicate poverty through prudent social policies.

However, social policy engineering for poverty reduction does not happen in a political vacuum. It is heavily influenced by the nature of the political system in place in a given country. Today, it has become a cliché that democracies are supposed to deliver better social policies that enable our countries to wage a successful war against poverty and its multivariate social ills. Thus, ideally, democratic systems are rated better in regard to poverty reduction than autocracies. Africa is therefore called upon to nurture, deepen and institutionalise democratic governance, and in the process expanding social frontiers – sustainable human development broadly and specifically eradicating the social malaise of poverty.

Let us accept that there have been encouraging developments on the political front in our continent in the recent past. The adoption of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) during the inaugural AU Summit of Heads of State and Government in Durban, South Africa in 2002 is surely a positive development. Furthermore, during the Nepad Heads of State meeting in Abuja in 2003, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was adopted as an instrument for assessment and strengthening democratic governance. During the Eighth Summit of the AU Heads of State and Government held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 30 January 2007, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance was adopted.

The essence of Nepad, as a new development path of the continent, revolves around its six main pillars, namely the:

- Peace and Security Initiative;
- Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative;
- Sub-Regional and Regional Cooperation Initiative;
- Human Resource Development Initiative;
- Environment Initiative; and
- Democracy and Political Governance Initiative.

Through the Nepad Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance,

which was officially adopted by the Assembly of the AU Heads of State and Government held in Durban, South Africa in July 2002, African states have committed themselves to promoting democratic governance and its core values, in particular:

- the rule of law;
- the equality of all citizens before the law and the liberty of the individual;
- individual and collective freedoms, including the right to form and join political parties and trade unions, in conformity with the constitution;
- equality of opportunity for all;
- the inalienable right of the individual to participate by means of free, credible and democratic political processes in periodically electing their leaders for a fixed term of office; and
- adherence to the separation of powers, including the protection of the independence of the judiciary and of an effective parliament.

The APRM is a voluntary self-assessment mechanism for African states aimed at institutionalising and consolidating democratic governance. It is a self-monitoring mechanism intended to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that will lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated regional and economic integration through the sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful best practices, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the need for capacity building of participating countries. To date 26 member states of the AU have voluntarily acceded to the APRM. Participation in the APRM is open to all members of the AU through notification of the chairperson of the Nepad Head of State and Government Implementation Committee. A country that accedes to the APRM commits itself to be periodically reviewed in terms of its practice around four clusters of governance, namely:

- Democracy and Good Political Governance;
- Economic Governance and Management;
- Corporate Governance; and
- Socio-economic Development.

The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance commits member states of the AU to the following principles of democratic governance, namely:

- respect for human rights;
- access to and exercise of state power in accordance with the constitution and the principle of rule of law;
- promotion of a system of government that is representative;
- holding of regular, transparent, free and fair elections;
- separation of powers;
- promotion of gender equality in public and private institutions;
- effective participation of citizens in democratic and development processes and in governance of public affairs;
- transparency and fairness in the management of public affairs;
- condemnation and rejection of acts of corruption, related offences and impunity;

- condemnation and total rejection of unconstitutional changes of government; and
- strengthening political pluralism and recognising the role, rights and responsibilities of legally constituted political parties, including opposition parties which should be given a status under national law.

It is my humble submission that these three initiatives (Nepad, APRM and the Democracy Charter) provide the African continent with a comprehensive framework for sustainable democratic governance and social policy engineering towards poverty eradication. I am sure that over the next three days, you will deliberate on these and various other pertinent issues as you search for sustainable democratic governance for Africa and in the process answering the question whether democracy works for Africa. I hope and trust that through your efforts, such as this EISA annual symposium, we will make democracy work for Africa, and we will contribute to the institutionalisation of a democracy that eradicates poverty and its associated social ills.

Director of ceremonies, it therefore gives me great pleasure to declare this EISA second symposium 'In search of sustainable democratic governance for Africa: Does democracy work for developing countries?' officially open. I wish you fruitful deliberations that will encourage prudent policy reforms in our countries.

I thank you all for your attention.

APPENDIX 2**SYMPOSIUM PROGRAMME****EISA's 2nd ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM****IN SEARCH OF SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE FOR AFRICA:
DOES DEMOCRACY WORK FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?**

Kopanong Hotel, Benoni, South Africa
7-9 November 2008

DAY ONE

7 November 2007

- SESSION 1: Chairperson: Leshele Thoahlane, chairperson of IEC, Lesotho and EISA board chairperson**
- 09:00-09:30 **WELCOME AND OFFICIAL OPENING**
Denis Kadima, executive director, EISA
His Excellency Sir Ketumile Masire, former president of the Republic of Botswana
- 09:30-09:45 Tea
- SESSION 2: Chairperson: Justice Anastasia Msosa, EISA board member**
- 09:45-10:15 **KEYNOTE ADDRESS**
Democracy: The African challenge
Professor Kwesi Kwaa Prah, executive director, Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society (CASAS)
- 10:15-11:00 **THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA**
Democratising to develop or developing to democratise: Which way for the African state?
Emmanuel Manyasa, University of Kenya
- The feasibility of a democratic developmental state in Southern Africa**
Dr Khabele Matlosa, senior advisor: research, EISA, South Africa
- 11:00-11:45 **Discussion**
- SESSION 3: Chairperson: Dr Kwaku Asante Darko, South Africa Institute of Foreign Affairs**
- 11:45-12:30 **DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA**
Trust in political institutions and the challenges of democracy in Africa
David Maleleka, Central Bank of Lesotho

Can parliaments deepen democratic governance in Africa?

Lessons from Lesotho

Victor Shale, EISA

The promise of democratic rule at the grass roots level in Africa: A case of democratic decentralisation in Uganda

Sabiti Makara, University of Makerere, Uganda

12:30-13:00 **Discussion**

13:00-14:00 Lunch break

BOOK LAUNCH

Matlosa K, Elklit J & Chiroro B (eds). 2007. *Challenges of Conflict, Democracy and Development in Africa*, Johannesburg, EISA.

Facilitator: Iona Tip, EISA Senior Advisor-CMDEE

Overview of Challenges of Conflict, Democracy and Development in Africa

Professor J Elklit, University of Aarhus, Denmark and EISA board member

Book Launch

Leshele Thoahlane, Chairperson of the IEC Lesotho and chairperson of the EISA board

SESSION 4: Chairperson: Rindai Chipfunde-Vava, director, Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN)

14:00-15:00 **DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA (cont.)
How are we doing? Comparative democratisation and development in Namibia**

Professor Bill Lindeke, Institute for Public Policy Research, Namibia

Cameroon's democratic process: Landmarks, challenges and prospects

Dr Thaddeus Menang, National Elections Observatory, Cameroon

The limits of neo-liberal democracy in South Africa

*Dr Sabelo J Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Monash University, South Africa and
Dr Gwinyayi Dzinesa, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa*

The challenges of democracy and governance in the post-election DRC

Vincent Tohbi, EISA country director, DRC

15:00-15:30 **Discussion**

15:30-15:45 Tea break

SESSION 5: Chairperson: Moses Mkandawire, Church and Society, Malawi

15:45-16:45 **GENDER DIMENSIONS OF POVERTY AND GOVERNANCE**
Addressing the feminisation of poverty in SADC through democratic
gender inclusive developmental states

Professor Sheila Bunwaree, University of Mauritius

Developing a political culture for democratic governance: The role of the women's
movement

Mamoeketsi Ntho, National University of Lesotho

The deafening silence of women: Unfinished democracy in Lesotho

Dr Itumeleng Kimane and Dr Matora Ntimo-Makara, National University of Lesotho

16:45-17:30 **Discussion**

6:00-21:00 Cocktail party

DAY TWO
8 November 2007

SESSION 6: Chairperson: Professor Jørgen Elklit, EISA board member

09:00-10:15 **THE POLITICS OF POVERTY AND POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES**
Politics and the feasibility of initiatives of hunger and vulnerability in
Southern Africa

Professor Lionel Cliffe, University of Leeds, London

When do elites care about poverty?

Marianne S Ulriksen, University of Aarhus, Denmark

Politics of poverty reduction in Malawi: A local governance perspective

Dr Blessings Chinsinga, University of Malawi

A critique of Uganda's Poverty Eradication Plan (PEAP)

Ben K Twinomugisha, Makerere University, Uganda

10:15-11:00 **Discussion**

11:00-11:15 Tea break

SESSION 7: Chairperson: Wonder Jekemu, SIDA, Harare

11:15-12:15 **THE POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY OF AID AND ITS IMPACT ON**
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

The consequences of aiding democracy in Africa

Bertha Chiroro and Catherine Musuva, EISA

The politics of food aid in Africa*Dr Siphamandla Zondi, Institute for Global Dialogue, South Africa***Financing illiberal democracy in Uganda***Dr Julius Kiiza, Makerere University, Uganda*12:15-13:00 **Discussion**13:00-14:00 **LUNCH BREAK****SESSION 8** **Chairperson: Ilona Tip, EISA senior advisor – CMDEE**14:00-15:00 **THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LEADERSHIP FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY****Significance of leadership for sustainable democracy in Southern Africa***Matseliso Mapetla and Moletsane Momyake, National University of Lesotho***The leadership succession debate in South Africa***Ebrahim Fakir and Aubrey Mashiqi, Centre for Policy Studies***Leadership and the democratic process: Lessons from Kenya***Samuel Nyanchoga, Catholic University, Kenya*15:00-15:30 **Discussion**

15:30-15:45 Tea break

SESSION 9: **Chairperson: Miguel de Brito, EISA Mozambique country director**15:45- 16:30 **POLITICAL CULTURES AND DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE****Developing a political culture for democratic governance:****Opening spaces for civil society participation***Dr Bhekinkosi Moyo, Trust Africa, Senegal***Promoting democratic values in Nigeria: Prospects and problems***Peter Osimiri, University of Lagos, Nigeria***Developing a political culture for democratic governance: Evidence from Malawi***Moses Mkandawire, Malawi*16:30-17:00 **Discussion**

DAY THREE
9 November 2007

- SESSION 10: Chairperson: Dr Khabele Matlosa, EISA senior advisor research**
- 10:30-11:00 **GLOBAL TRENDS IN DEMOCRATISATION AND LESSONS FOR AFRICA**
Sino-Africa relations and democratic transitions in Africa
Dr William Muhumuza, Makerere University, Uganda
- The challenges for democratisation in Latin America: Lessons for Africa**
Professor Philip Oxhorn, McGill University, Canada
- An institutional analysis of Indian democracy**
Dr Nandini Patel, Institute for Policy Interaction
- 11:00-11:30 **Discussion**
- 11:30-12:30 **ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION**
POVERTY: A CHALLENGE FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
- Facilitator: Professor Sheila Bunwaree, University of Mauritius**
- PANELISTS**
- Democracy, social policy and poverty reduction**
Prof Lionel Cliffe
- State capacity for poverty reduction**
Dr Khabele Matlosa
- Democratic local governance and poverty reduction**
Professor Bill Lindeke
- Gender dimensions of poverty**
Dr Itumelang Kimane
- 12:30 -13:00 **VOTE OF THANKS AND OFFICIAL CLOSING**
Ilona Tip, EISA senior advisor – CMDEE

**APPENDIX 3
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ABOUT EISA



EISA is a not-for-profit and non-partisan non-governmental organisation which was established in 1996. Its core business is to provide technical assistance for capacity building of relevant government departments, electoral management bodies, political parties and civil society organisations operating in the democracy and governance field throughout the SADC region and beyond. Inspired by the various positive developments towards democratic governance in Africa as a whole and the SADC region in particular since the early 1990s, EISA aims to advance democratic values and practices and to enhance the credibility of electoral processes. The ultimate goal is to assist countries in Africa and the SADC region to nurture and consolidate democratic governance. SADC countries have received enormous technical assistance and advice from EISA in building solid institutional foundations for democracy. This includes: electoral system reforms; election monitoring and observation; constructive conflict management; strengthening of parliament and other democratic institutions; strengthening of political parties; capacity building for civil society organisations; deepening democratic local governance; and enhancing the institutional capacity of the election management bodies. EISA was formerly the secretariat of the Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF) composed of electoral commissions in the SADC region and established in 1998. EISA is currently the secretariat of the SADC Election Support Network (ESN) comprising election-related civil society organisations established in 1997.

VISION

An African continent where democratic governance, human rights and citizen participation are upheld in a peaceful environment

MISSION

EISA strives for excellence in the promotion of credible elections, participatory democracy, human rights culture, and the strengthening of governance institutions for the consolidation of democracy in Africa

VALUES AND PRINCIPLES

Key values and principles of governance that EISA believes in include:

- Regular free and fair elections
- Promoting democratic values
- Respect for fundamental human rights
- Due process of law / rule of law
- Constructive management of conflict
- Political tolerance
- Inclusive multiparty democracy
- Popular participation

- Transparency
- Gender equality
- Accountability
- Promoting electoral norms and standards

OBJECTIVES

- To enhance electoral processes to ensure their inclusiveness and legitimacy
- To promote effective citizen participation in democratic processes to strengthen institutional accountability and responsiveness
- To strengthen governance institutions to ensure effective, accessible and sustainable democratic processes
- To promote principles, values and practices that lead to a culture of democracy and human rights
- To create a culture of excellence that leads to consistently high quality products and services
- To position EISA as a leader that consistently influences policy and practice in the sector

CORE ACTIVITIES

- Research
- Policy Dialogue
- Publications and Documentation
- Capacity Building
- Election Observation
- Technical Assistance
- Balloting

