



THE EAGLE AND THE SPRINGBOK: **STRENGTHENING THE NIGERIA/SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONSHIP**



POLICY ADVISORY GROUP SEMINAR REPORT
9-10 JUNE 2012, THE MOORHOUSE, LAGOS, NIGERIA

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CAPE TOWN • SOUTH AFRICA

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RAPORTEURS

DAWN NAGAR AND MARK PATERSON

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PHOTOGRAPHER: EMMANUEL BALOGUN

Acknowledgments

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About the Organiser: Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR)

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa, was established in 1968. The organisation has wide-ranging experience in conflict interventions in the Western Cape and Southern Africa and is working on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations. Its policy research focuses on post-conflict peacebuilding involving the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), and African civil society; Southern Africa’s peacebuilding challenges; the European Union’s (EU) engagement with Africa; and HIV/AIDS in relation to post-conflict societies.

The Rapporteurs

Dawn Nagar is a Researcher, and Mark Paterson a Senior Project Officer, at the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa.

Note on the Report

The contents of this report do not indicate consensus reached during discussions, but reflect key points raised and include additional research conducted before and after the seminar.

Executive Summary

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a policy advisory group meeting in Lagos, Nigeria, from 9 to 10 June 2012, on “The Eagle and the Springbok: Strengthening the Nigeria/South Africa Relationship”.

Nigeria and South Africa have led economic integration and development, as well as peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, in their respective sub-regions, and in other parts of Africa. Their partnership represents the continent’s most strategic bilateral relationship. Yet, tensions have emerged between the two countries, particularly between 2005 and 2012, as they both sought a permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council (South Africa publicly announced its intention to seek this seat in 2010). The relationship also became strained after xenophobic attacks against Africans, including Nigerians, in South Africa in 2008; following increasingly divergent foreign policy positions in 2011; and in 2012, when Nigeria and South Africa turned away each other’s citizens in a dispute over entry requirements. Partly in an attempt to resolve mounting tensions, the Nigeria-South Africa Bi-National Commission (BNC) met in full session in Cape Town in May 2012. CCR’s policy advisory group seminar in Lagos in June 2012 sought to build on the outcomes of the BNC meeting and help to “reset” the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa by addressing key themes, and crafting concrete recommendations on the history and diplomacy of bilateral relations; the multilateral roles adopted by the two countries; their economic and trade links; civil society perspectives; and the future of the relationship.

1. The History of Nigeria/South Africa Bilateral Relations

During the 1960s and 1970s, Nigeria took a leading role in opposing apartheid, participating in meetings of the Frontline States (FLS) of Southern Africa; chairing the UN Special Committee against Apartheid; and championing the anti-apartheid cause at the Commonwealth. However, after South Africa’s first democratic election in 1994, the country’s new president and Nobel peace laureate, Nelson Mandela, appeared to don the garments of African leader that Nigeria had historically sought to wear. Relations reached a nadir after Nigeria’s autocratic leader, General Sani Abacha, ignored Mandela’s pleas and ordered the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni human rights activists in November 1995. South Africa called for a boycott of Nigerian oil exports and the country’s suspension from the Commonwealth. However, Mandela’s stand failed to win broad support among African countries. Following General Abacha’s death in 1998, relations between Nigeria and South Africa improved dramatically. Mandela’s successor as president in 1999, Thabo Mbeki, worked closely with Nigeria’s new civilian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, to manage African conflicts and to promote norms of democratic governance through new continental institutions. In addition, a Bi-National Commission was established between Nigeria and South Africa in 1999. Under the presidency of Jacob Zuma, after 2009, South Africa decided to court Angola as a strategic partner in Africa, leading to suggestions that the relationship with Nigeria had been deprioritised, though the South Africans noted that this was a move to strengthen alliances in Southern Africa. In May 2008, the Nigerian press criticised Tshwane (Pretoria) over a perceived failure to crack down on xenophobic violence in South Africa, which included attacks on Nigerian immigrants. In 2011, Nigeria and South Africa adopted divergent positions on the UN Security Council and at the African Union (AU) over the military intervention conducted by French/UN troops in Côte d’Ivoire, and the recognition of the National Transitional Council (NTC) as Libya’s new government. In March 2012, South African customs officials turned away 125 Nigerian travellers. Seventy-eight South African travellers were subsequently barred entry to Nigeria in retaliation.

2. The Diplomacy of Nigeria/South Africa Bilateral Relations

Although diplomatic relations between Nigeria and South Africa were established in 1994, high commissions in Abuja and Tshwane were only founded in 1995 and 1996 respectively. Relations soured when Nelson Mandela sought international sanctions against General Abacha's regime. However, after 1999, presidents Mbeki and Obasanjo initiated a "golden age" of bilateral relations between Abuja and Tshwane, building new African institutions and making continuous efforts to address difficult issues as they arose. High commissioners on both sides had relatively open access to their host leaders. Nigeria and South Africa closely coordinated their efforts before key AU and UN meetings. The Bi-National Commission, which was headed by the two countries' deputy presidents, was established, and held seven meetings between 1999 and 2008. In addition, 20 key bilateral agreements had been signed by 2003. However, tensions emerged in the relationship from 2005 over African permanent representation on the UN Security Council, the Chair of the AU Assembly of heads of state and government, and Mbeki's mediation role in Côte d'Ivoire. After 2008, no full sessions of the BNC were held for four years. An eighth BNC meeting took place in Cape Town only in May 2012 as part of efforts to strengthen bilateral relations.

3. Nigeria/South Africa Multilateral Relations

After 2005, both Nigeria and South Africa promoted themselves as candidates for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, though Tshwane was more discreet and only publicly declared its interest in 2010. The two countries subsequently agreed that the contest could undermine unity of purpose in advancing peace, security, and development on the continent, and that efforts to win Africa's right to proper representation on the Security Council should take priority. Abuja and Tshwane have acknowledged the primacy of the AU in mandating African non-permanent representatives to the Council, with South Africa consistently insisting on the 2005 "Ezulwini Consensus" which called for at least two permanent African seats and five rotating ones (instead of the existing three non-permanent seats allocated to the continent). Nigeria and South Africa have adopted common responses to African security challenges, including as key troop- and police-contributing countries to UN peacekeeping missions on the continent. Both countries have also worked together in multilateral institutions including the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the World Bank; the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); and the Commonwealth. However, South Africa has also joined key multilateral bodies as the sole African country, including the Group of 20 major economies (G20), and the BRICS economic bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), which has created further tensions with Abuja. In 2011, Nigeria and South Africa served as non-permanent members on the UN Security Council and occupied seats on the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC). The two countries adopted divergent positions on the crises in Côte d'Ivoire and Libya. In Côte d'Ivoire, South Africa opposed Nigeria's belligerent stance towards Laurent Gbagbo, who had refused to cede power after losing elections. Abuja interpreted Tshwane's actions as a challenge to the principle of "subsidiarity" under which each African sub-regional bloc takes the lead in decisions about external interventions within its sphere of influence. In relation to Libya, Nigeria was quick to recognise the National Transitional Council as the country's new government, while South Africa delayed recognising the NTC. At the AU, Nigeria opposed South Africa's nomination of its home affairs minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, for the Chair of the AU Commission. In July 2012, Dlamini-Zuma won the post in the fourth round with 37 votes after a protracted and fiercely contested election. Although South Africa accurately argued that its action did not break any legal AU rules, Nigeria and several other countries questioned whether it was politically wise.

4. Nigeria/South Africa Economic Relations

South Africa with an estimated Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of \$368 billion represents Africa's largest economy, despite slowing growth that is forecast to drop to under three percent in 2012. Meanwhile, Nigeria became Africa's second biggest economy by GDP, recording \$232 billion in 2011, representing a long-term market for South African investment. After South Africa's Mobile Telephone Networks (MTN) successfully entered the Nigerian market (three times the size of South Africa's) in 2001, other major South African companies followed, including banks, investment funds, hotels, breweries, media houses, and food and clothing retailers. Nigerian engagement in South Africa has been limited by structural restrictions: the South African market is an established, competitive one with relatively thin profit margins and low growth prospects. South African business people often approach Nigeria as a destination for products rather than as an opportunity for industrial investment. However, the direct employment benefits of South Africa's economic engagement in Nigeria continue to outweigh those brought by Nigeria's export of oil to South Africa, which represents its main contribution to bilateral trade. South African businesses in Nigeria can find themselves targeted by popular resentments; boycotts of South African goods can be threatened; and business people suffer directly when retaliatory travel restrictions are imposed.

5. Nigeria/South Africa Trade Relations

Nigeria has been South Africa's largest trading partner in Africa since 2006, with the value of bilateral trade reaching \$3.6 billion by 2011. Oil represents over 95 percent of Nigeria's exports to South Africa, which, in turn, account for about 80 percent of the balance of trade between the two countries. By contrast, South Africa exports a wide range of goods to Nigeria: machinery, electrical equipment, wood, paper, plastics, rubber, foodstuffs, beverages, spirits, and tobacco. Bilateral chambers of commerce were established in Nigeria and South Africa in 2000 and 2005 respectively. South Africa can provide technical competence and finance to develop Nigeria's transport, power, iron, steel, agriculture, and information and communication technologies (ICT) sectors. Joining one of Nigeria's 20 free trade zones, or establishing a new one, might enable South African businesses to service the country's major infrastructural deficit on favourable terms. Intra-African trade is estimated at less than ten percent, and a political commitment to the impulse to create a free trade area between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) could help to replace the vertical patterns of trade imposed on Africa under colonialism with a more horizontal dynamic.

6. Civil Society Perspectives

In Nigeria, civil society was historically enlisted in support of the government's principled opposition to apartheid in South Africa. After democratic rule emerged in 1994, South African human rights activists opposed General Abacha's increasingly repressive regime. A South Africa-Nigeria Democracy Support Group was formed in South Africa in 1996 to rally a mass democratic movement against the regime, and was reconstituted following Abacha's death in 1998. Following this activism, it was hoped that the creation of the Bi-National Commission in 1999 would signal a new engagement with civil society. However, this did not happen. Subsequently, immigrant Nigerian and South African communities have encountered mounting prejudice in

both countries. The need for efforts to promote mutual understanding in people-to-people relations is critical. Young Nigerians and South Africans can potentially find common cause in addressing the huge employment and education challenges facing the continent. In addition, think-tanks in South Africa and Nigeria may usefully host “track-two” meetings outside the glare of public scrutiny to explore and resolve tensions between Abuja and Tshwane. Other actions to improve bilateral relations could include: programmes to educate media in both countries; strengthened links between trade unions, business associations, militaries, sports clubs, and cultural groups; and the establishment of Nigeria/South Africa friendship associations.

7. The Future of Nigeria/South Africa Relations

Divergences of national and regional interests between Nigeria and South Africa need to be clearly communicated and managed within appropriate institutions such as the Bi-National Commission. Thus the BNC meeting in Cape Town in May 2012 provided an opportunity for the two countries to “reset” their relationship. Economic and technical agreements were signed at the meeting, including on migration issues; customs procedures; economic cooperation; the protection of investments; extradition and mutual legal aid; and terrorism and cyber crime. New deals were also proposed in the areas of aviation, defence, agriculture, minerals and energy, as well as science and technology. It was further agreed that focal points for the BNC should be established at the two countries’ high commissions in Abuja and Tshwane, and that an implementation committee should meet within six months to review the progress made on the BNC’s decisions. Future meetings have been planned for working groups on foreign affairs; trade, industry, and finance; defence and security; agriculture and the environment; minerals and energy; public enterprise and infrastructure; social and technical matters; as well as communications and constitutional issues. A consular and immigration forum will also meet monthly. Finally, the BNC recommended that the bilateral Joint Presidential Advisory Council on Investment should be revived.

Policy Recommendations

The following 10 key policy recommendations emerged from the Lagos policy advisory group seminar:

- 1) Strong mechanisms to institutionalise the strategic partnership between Nigeria and South Africa, such as an active Bi-National Commission with an effective implementation and monitoring mechanism, need to be fostered. The establishment of focal points at the countries’ missions in Abuja and Tshwane, and regular consultation at the level of permanent secretary and director-general could aid the BNC’s efforts. High commissioners from both countries should have access to host leaders to help maintain the bilateral relationship. In addition, the BNC’s decisions need to be communicated at all levels, including provincial and local government, to ensure effective implementation;
- 2) Nigeria and South Africa should prioritise their bilateral relationship to promote democracy, security, and development in Africa. Divergent national and regional interests need to be carefully managed to ensure that the continent is protected from external attempts at “divide and rule”. Steps should be taken to ensure that the two countries’ efforts to keep and build peace in Africa are not misinterpreted as attempts to further parochial agendas. Nigeria and South Africa should also coordinate carefully on any interventions in each other’s sub-regional spheres of influence;

- 3) Nigeria and South Africa need to resolve their differences over representation on international bodies. Consideration should be given to agreeing a mechanism to formalise how the AU should select African non-permanent representatives to the UN Security Council. For example, one of the three non-permanent seats could be rotated between Africa's major powers; another between the continent's middle powers; and the third between the smaller African states. Abuja and Tshwane should also coordinate more effectively on nominations of senior officials to the AU Commission;
- 4) Nigeria and South Africa should work together more closely to represent Africa's interests at international fora, including at multilateral bodies such as the G20 in which South Africa is the sole African country. The foreign affairs committee of the BNC could aid this process. As already suggested by the BNC in 2012, Nigerian and South African diplomats in Addis Ababa, New York, Geneva, and Vienna should prioritise the coordination of both countries' positions on international bodies in order to promote African interests more effectively;
- 5) Also suggested by the BNC of 2012, a tripartite group consisting of Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola could be created to consult on African issues, and this body could later be expanded to include Ethiopia and Algeria. It was further suggested that a second North African representative could be Egypt, and an East African representative such as Kenya could also be included in the group;
- 6) Greater South African investment in Nigeria should be encouraged to develop infrastructure and create mutually beneficial business models. Economic relations could also be improved through greater inclusion of the private sector in the BNC's work, and by relaxing entry restrictions for business people;
- 7) The Nigeria/South Africa free trade area proposed by the BNC in March 2002 could be revived to remove high tariff and non-tariff barriers that inhibit intra-African trade. A political commitment should be made to create a free trade area between ECOWAS and SADC in the long term, and a trade corridor between the two sub-regions in the medium term, in order to promote regional integration and socio-economic development across Africa;
- 8) Nigeria and South Africa should be in the forefront of efforts to redress capital flight from Africa – estimated at between \$735 billion and \$1.8 trillion between 2008 and 2010 – which would boost intra-regional trade, strengthen region-building efforts, and help to alleviate poverty;
- 9) The BNC should seek greater engagement from civil society in its work, particularly to counter common prejudices and communicate more effectively the benefits of close cooperation between the two countries. Abuja and Tshwane should seek greater public visibility for bilateral visits and events. Media on both sides should also be educated on the extent and nature of current and historical socio-economic and political relations. Business schools in both countries should provide diversity training for South African businesses operating on the continent. Links between trade unions, business fora, militaries, sports clubs, and cultural groups should be strengthened; and the establishment of friendship associations encouraged; and finally,
- 10) "Track-two" mechanisms deploying current and former senior foreign policy officials and experts could be established to forestall potential diplomatic incidents, to act as back-channels in times of crisis, and to help both sides to "reset" bilateral relations.

Introduction


The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) in Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a two-day policy advisory group seminar in Lagos, Nigeria, from 9 to 10 June 2012, on the theme, “The Eagle and the Springbok: Strengthening the Nigeria/South Africa Relationship”.

The meeting brought together about 30 key Nigerian and South African diplomats, high-level government officials, policymakers, and private sector and civil society actors, to focus on how Nigeria and South Africa can “reset” their bilateral relationship and work more closely together to promote Africa’s interests bilaterally; and multilaterally, especially at the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN); as well as to consider how they can collaborate more effectively to promote peace and security and economic cooperation and development in Africa.

Nigeria and South Africa are the two leading political and economic powers in Africa. They have sought to act as engines of economic integration and development both in their respective sub-regions and on the continent as a whole. The bilateral relationship is vital to peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, regional integration, and development in Africa. While South Africa remains the wealthiest and most industrialised country on the continent, accounting for about a fifth of Africa’s economic strength, Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country (140 million people), with the second largest economy on the continent. Nigeria and South Africa are the dominant players in their sub-regions, each accounting for about 75 percent of the economies of their respective regional blocs: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In 2011, both countries were non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, and sat on the 15-member AU Peace and Security Council (PSC). Yet, tensions began to emerge in bilateral relations between the two countries in recent years, particularly between 2005 and 2012, when, in the process of relaunching negotiations for reform of the UN Security Council, Abuja and Tshwane (Pretoria) sought a permanent seat on the Council (South Africa publicly announced its intention to seek this seat in 2010). The relationship also became strained after xenophobic attacks against Africans, including Nigerians, in South Africa in 2008; following increasingly divergent foreign policy positions in 2011; and most recently, in 2012, when 125 Nigerian travellers were barred from entering South Africa, and Nigeria barred 78 South African travellers in retaliation, creating a diplomatic incident.

Partly in an attempt to resolve mounting tensions, the Nigeria-South Africa Bi-National Commission (BNC), which had been founded in 1999, met in full session for the first time in four years in Cape Town in May 2012. CCR’s policy advisory group seminar in Lagos in June 2012 sought to build on the outcomes of the BNC to foster the bilateral relationship between the two regional giants, which represents Africa’s potentially most strategic relationship as evidenced between 1999 and 2007 under Nigeria’s president, Olusegun Obasanjo, and South Africa’s president, Thabo Mbeki. The Lagos policy advisory group seminar addressed seven key themes: the History of Nigeria/South Africa Bilateral Relations; the Diplomacy of Nigeria/South Africa Bilateral Relations; Nigeria/South Africa Multilateral Relations; Nigeria/South Africa Economic Relations; Nigeria/South

Africa Trade Relations; Civil Society Perspectives; and the Future of Nigeria/South Africa Relations. The meeting also crafted concrete recommendations for the improvement of the bilateral relationship and for strengthening the partnership between Nigeria and South Africa to promote Africa's socio-economic, political, peace and security, and development agendas. The seminar further built on a decade of policy research expertise developed by CCR, including two influential edited volumes on Nigeria's and South Africa's foreign policies published by the Centre,¹ and CCR policy seminars held on related topics such as: Nigeria's leadership role in ECOWAS's evolving security architecture; South Africa's role in Africa; South Africa's role in SADC; and South Africa's role on the UN Security Council.²



ABOVE: Ambassador Welile Nhlapo, National Security Advisor to the South African President; and Special Representative of South Africa to the Great Lakes Region
MIDDLE: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa
RIGHT: Ambassador Sonni Yusuf, High Commissioner of Nigeria to South Africa

- 1 Adekeye Adebajo and Abdul Raufu Mustapha (eds.), *Culliver's Troubles: Nigeria's Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, June 2008); and Adekeye Adebajo, Adebayo Adedeji, and Chris Landsberg (eds.), *South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007).
- 2 Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), *South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Decade*, policy report, 29 July-1 August 2004, Stellenbosch, South Africa; *West Africa's Evolving Security Architecture: Looking Back to the Future*, policy report, 30-31 October 2006, Accra, Ghana; *Building Peace in Southern Africa*, policy report and brief, 25-26 February 2010, Cape Town, South Africa; and *South Africa, Africa, and the United Nations Security Council*, policy report and brief, 13-14 December 2011, Somerset West, South Africa (available at www.ccr.org.za).

1. The History of Nigeria/South Africa Bilateral Relations

Although Nigeria and South Africa only formally established diplomatic relations in February 1994 – two months before South Africa’s first democratic election ushered in the presidency of Nelson Mandela – the ties between the two countries date back to the period immediately after Nigeria achieved independence from British colonial rule in 1960.

In March 1960, 69 anti-apartheid protestors, including many women and children, were shot dead by South African police in Sharpeville, leading to international outrage and setting the regime in Pretoria (now Tshwane) on the road to international isolation and increasingly brutal and repressive rule. In March 1961, South Africa left the Commonwealth before it was forced out. During the 1960s and 1970s, Nigeria took a leading role in supporting black liberation movements in Southern Africa, including the African National Congress (ANC). The country’s leaders also played a pivotal role in the establishment of the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid in 1963, and, for decades, chaired the committee which oversaw the implementation of international sanctions against the apartheid regime, including sports and cultural boycotts; the provision of assistance to the victims of apartheid; and the campaign to publicise apartheid’s inhumanity and seek the release of political prisoners. Nigeria further championed the anti-apartheid cause at the Commonwealth, taking a leading role on economic sanctions and sports boycotts. After the 1976 Soweto uprising in South Africa, Nigerian students contributed financially towards the education of black South Africans; the Nigerian High Commission in Botswana issued hundreds of Nigerian passports to South Africans who had fled the country; and Nigerian civil servants contributed portions of their salaries to the South African Relief Fund, which supported the anti-apartheid movement and was popularly known as the “Mandela Tax”.³ In addition, hundreds of South Africans studied in Nigeria – many of whom went on to occupy key positions in government, the private sector, and academia in post-apartheid South Africa.

In 1977, Lagos hosted the Second World African Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC), which brought together artistes from across the continent and united them in the international struggle against apartheid. Nigeria adopted the role of the leader of the black world and was seen by some as “the new global hub of the anti-apartheid movement”.⁴ A founding member of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Lagos also participated in the meetings and decision-making of the Frontline States (FLS) of Southern Africa⁵ – which included Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Angola, and Zambia – from 1976, and played an important role in securing the independence of Namibia by 1990, supporting the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) financially in its efforts to rid the country of apartheid South African rule in 1989 under the UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG). By the time apartheid had come to an end, Nigeria had spent an estimated \$17 billion in support of liberation struggles in Southern Africa.⁶ Nelson Mandela also received a reported \$10

3 Olayiwola Abegunrin, “Nigeria and the Struggle for the Liberation of South Africa”, in *Africa in Global Politics in the Twenty-First Century: A Pan-African Perspective* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

4 Mark Gevisser, *Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2007), pp. 371 and 375, citing in particular the South Africa Relief Fund set up by the Nigerian government at a major UN conference against apartheid held in Lagos in 1977.

5 Ufot Bassey Inamete, *Foreign Policy Decision Making in Nigeria* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 2001), p. 73.

6 Nomfundo Ngwenya, “Giants of Africa Limp Along – South Africa and Nigeria”, *The Sunday Independent*, 10 October 2010 (accessed at <http://www.saiia.org.za/sa-foreign-policy-african-drivers-opinion/giants-of-africa-limp-along-south-africa-and-nigeria.html>).

million campaign contribution for the ANC on a visit to Nigeria in 1990.⁷ In 1994, Abuja sponsored the UN Security Council resolution welcoming South Africa back into the international community.⁸ Nigeria's Permanent Representative at the UN, Ibrahim Gambari, was the last Chair of the world body's Special Committee Against Apartheid and oversaw the restoration of South Africa's full membership of the UN. With the establishment of diplomatic relations between Nigeria and South Africa in 1994, high commissions were established in Abuja and Tshwane in 1995 and 1996 respectively.

However, the relationship established by the government and people of Nigeria with the people of South Africa during the apartheid era did not immediately translate into closer inter-governmental ties after 1994. Having achieved a negotiated settlement which was hailed around the world, South Africa, led by the revered Nobel peace laureate, Nelson Mandela, quickly emerged as a leading player on the African and international stages. Nigeria was, however, now in political crisis, falling under the sway of successive military juntas led by generals Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) and Sani Abacha (1993-1998). Although these governments undertook noteworthy peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, they also became increasingly repressive at home. Tshwane sought to explore how it could help to promote democracy and protect human rights in Nigeria. However, successive Nigerian governments resented the way in which the new South Africa saw itself as an African and global leader, occupying a role that Nigeria had historically sought to play. Relations reached a nadir in 1995/1996 when Mandela sought to punish Nigeria's autocratic leader, General Abacha, for hanging the environmental and human rights activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa, and eight fellow Ogoni campaigners in November 1995 while a Commonwealth summit was being held in Auckland, New Zealand. Having made great efforts to prevent the executions, and believing he had been promised that the death sentences would not be carried out, Mandela led international calls for oil sanctions to be imposed on the Abacha regime and for Nigeria's suspension from the Commonwealth. Nigeria's membership of the Commonwealth was suspended from 1995 to 1999, and it increasingly became diplomatically isolated. The South African president also called for Abuja to commute the death sentences of, and release, prominent political prisoners including General Olusegun Obasanjo and General Shehu Musa Yar'Adua. Although Mandela's stand against Abacha received some popular sympathy in Nigeria, it failed to win broad support among other African countries.⁹ Egyptian UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, made a point of reminding Mandela of Nigeria's peacekeeping sacrifices in Liberia and Sierra Leone.¹⁰ Mandela asked Salim Ahmed Salim, the Tanzanian Secretary-General of the OAU, to explain to Nigerians that the South African government was not being manipulated into its position by American and British "imperialists". Nigeria's pugnacious information minister, Walter Ofonogoro, had described Mandela as the "black head of a white country".¹¹ Thabo Mbeki, who was South Africa's deputy president at the time, noted that Mandela had been left to take the blame for his principled opposition to Abacha's actions by Western countries, which paid lip service to his stance while prioritising the protection of their oil businesses in Nigeria.¹² The opposition to Mandela's position within Africa led the ANC – under Mbeki's guidance – to reaffirm the position that its leadership should not be taking such major foreign policy decisions without first consulting closely with other African countries.¹³

7 James Barber, *Mandela's World: The International Dimension of South Africa's Political Revolution, 1990-99* (Cape Town: David Philip, 2004), p. 110.

8 Martin I. Uhomobhi, "A Triple Web of Interdependence", in Adebajo and Mustapha (eds.), *Culliver's Troubles*, p. 229.

9 Maxi Van Aardt, "A Foreign Policy Worth Dying For: South Africa's Response to the Nigerian Crisis", *Africa Insight*, No. 26, 1996.

10 Adewale Segun Banjo, "South Africa's Policy Towards Nigeria: 1994-2004", unpublished paper, p. 15.

11 "Mandela, Abacha to Solve Row Personally", *Mail and Guardian*, 28 July 1997 (accessed at <http://mg.co.za/article/1997-07-28-mandela-abacha-to-solve-row-personally>).

12 Barber, *Mandela's World*, p. 110.

13 Adekeye Adebajo, "Nigeria and South Africa: A Drama In Four Acts", presentation made at the CCR seminar, *The Eagle and the Springbok: Strengthening the Nigeria/South Africa Relationship*, Lagos, Nigeria, 9-10 June 2012.

Following General Abacha's death in 1998, relations between the two countries improved dramatically. Mandela's successor as president in 1999, Thabo Mbeki, had a deep understanding of Nigeria, having lived there as the ANC head of mission between 1977 and 1978, when he befriended Obasanjo, who was then the military head of state.¹⁴ Obasanjo, who became Nigeria's civilian president in 1999, only weeks before Mbeki's ascent to power in South Africa, had previously championed his country's support of the ANC's struggle against apartheid. In a deeply symbolic meeting, Obasanjo had, as co-leader of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group on South Africa, visited Mandela in jail in 1986 – becoming the first black non-South African to be granted this privilege. The coincidence of Obasanjo and Mbeki coming into office at the same time provided an opportunity for a strategic partnership between the two African powers.¹⁵ As South Africa's president until 2008, Mbeki worked to promote a transition to democracy in Nigeria, supporting civil society efforts in this area. Mbeki made the first ever state visit to Nigeria by a South African head of state, and attended Nigeria's fortieth independence anniversary celebrations in 2000. Obasanjo had also visited South Africa as president in 1999.

Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki shouldered and shared responsibilities as leaders in Africa. Obasanjo continued Nigeria's peacemaking efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and extended these to Sudan's volatile Darfur region, while Mbeki lent his country's weight and resources to African Union peace efforts in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Côte d'Ivoire. Obasanjo spoke of the two countries having "the burden of turning around the fortunes of our continent",¹⁶ and, for a time, both leaders worked together to end conflicts on the continent and to reconstruct Africa's institutional architecture, with a view to promoting economic development and democratic governance. Led by Mbeki, the two leaders elaborated a new socio-economic blueprint for the continent by 2001: the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). With the support of other African leaders, they together led the way in transforming the OAU into the AU, rejecting Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi's more radical vision of a "United States of Africa" for a more gradualist approach to regional integration, based on five sub-regional pillars. They also championed the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)¹⁷ by 2003 as an instrument to advance socio-economic development and democratic governance in Africa (31 African countries are now members of the APRM). Both presidents argued forcefully at annual G8 (Group of Eight industrialised countries) summits for the forgiveness of Africa's \$290 billion external debt. They closely coordinated their efforts before key AU, UN, and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summits. Obasanjo later described the high level of cooperation between the two leaders: "There was a perfect understanding between Nigeria and South Africa when I was president of Nigeria and president Mbeki was in charge [in South Africa]. South Africa will not show interest in any position Nigeria wants and Nigeria will not show interest in any position South Africa wants. Both of us have [our] way[s] of lobbying other African countries to support us for any position."¹⁸

14 Gevisser, "The Real Africa: Nigeria", in *Thabo Mbeki*; and Adekeye Adebajo, *The Curse of Berlin: Africa After the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press; London: Hurst and Co; Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2010), p. 151.

15 Adebajo, *The Curse of Berlin*, pp. 143-162.

16 Olusegun Obasanjo, "Nigeria-South Africa: Bond Across the Continent", in Ad'Obe Obe (ed.), *A New Dawn: A Collection of Speeches of President Olusegun Obasanjo 2* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2001), p. 137.

17 On 14 July 2012, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) counted 31 member states: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia. See "Communiqué Issued at the End of the Seventeenth Summit of the Committee of Heads of State and Government Participating in the African Peer Review Mechanism", Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 14 July 2012 (accessed at <http://aprm-au.org/sites/default/files/17th%20Apr%20forum%20-%20final%20communiqu%200.pdf>).

18 "Nigerians Donated to South African Liberation Struggles – Obasanjo", *Ascology News* website, 27 May 2012 (accessed at <http://www.ascology.com/news/local-news/24789-Nigerians-donated-South-African-libertion-struggles--Obasanjo.html>). The story quotes President Obasanjo addressing a banquet held in his honour on 25 May 2012 at the South African chapter of Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation (NIDO) in Johannesburg.

In 1999, a Bi-National Commission was established between Nigeria and South Africa, headed by their respective deputy presidents. The commission met seven times between 1999 and 2008. However, after Thabo Mbeki was “recalled” by the ruling ANC as president of South Africa in 2008 and Jacob Zuma ascended to the office in 2009, the BNC did not meet again for four years until May 2012. South Africa decided, after 2009, to court Angola as a strategic partner in Africa – Luanda was the first state visit that Zuma embarked on as president – leading to suggestions that the relationship with Nigeria had been deprioritised, though Tshwane noted that this was a move to strengthen alliances in Southern Africa and that, anyway, Luanda already represented one of its strategic partners as a former active member of the Frontline States. The perceived shift in focus exacerbated tensions that had emerged between the two countries after 2005 over the activist roles adopted by Obasanjo and Mbeki on the continent. After Obasanjo, in his capacity as Chair of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, had initially invited Mbeki to mediate in the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria eventually made clear it did not support his intervention, accusing Mbeki of failing to report promptly to Obasanjo on his mediation efforts. Having overseen a peace deal between Ivorian warring parties – the Pretoria Agreement of April 2005 – Mbeki stepped down as AU mediator in October 2006. Earlier in the year, Mbeki had opposed Obasanjo continuing for a third consecutive term as chair of the AU Assembly. Then in May 2008, violence erupted in South Africa’s townships. The Nigerian press was very critical of South Africa over a perceived failure to act more decisively against this violence, in which 62 African, including Nigerian, immigrants were killed and over 100,000 displaced.¹⁹ The violence was characterised as “xenophobic” by the Nigerian and South African media, although South African political figures argued that the attacks were caused by competition over scarce resources rather than prejudice against immigrants from other African countries. More recently, in March 2012, 125 Nigerian travellers were turned back at O.R. Tambo airport in Johannesburg for allegedly carrying fake yellow fever vaccination cards.²⁰ The Nigerian government deplored the incident and demanded an explanation from the South African government, while 78 South African travellers to Nigeria were turned away in retaliation. Abuja further accused Tshwane of acting in a xenophobic manner, and members of the public in both countries fired off heated responses on the issue.²¹ South Africa subsequently apologised for the incident, while denying the charges of xenophobia. In 2011, Nigeria and South Africa adopted divergent positions on the UN Security Council and at the AU over the military intervention conducted by French/UN troops in Côte d’Ivoire, and the recognition of the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the new government in Libya.

After democratic rule was established in South Africa in 1994, it was anticipated that the new South African government would be conscious of a debt of gratitude to Nigeria, and that this would lay the foundation for the development of a close relationship between the two countries. However, the burden of such a debt can, by definition, exceed the capacity of the indebted – in this case, South Africa – to repay it. Nevertheless, successive

19 Ben Okolo, “The Love/Hate Relationship between Nigeria and South Africa”, *Nigeriaworld* website, 26 May 2008 (accessed at <http://nigeriaworld.com/articles/2008/may/261.html>); and blog on the topic at *Nairaland Forum* from November 2009 to January 2010 (accessed at <http://www.nairaland.com/nigeria/topic-359259.0.html>).

20 Yusuf Alli, “Fed Govt to South Africa: Stop Cruelty to Nigerians”, *The Nation*, 5 March 2012.

21 See comments on “Nigeria Lashes Out at SA Xenophobia”, *News24*, 3 March 2012; and “South Africa-Nigeria: Nigeria Deports 56 More South Africans”, *Afrique en Ligne*, 7 March 2012.

presidents of the ANC and senior South African political figures have voiced their gratitude to all who supported the struggle against apartheid, especially the Frontline States and Nigeria. In addition, the release by General Abdulsalam Abubakar in 1998 of prominent figures imprisoned by Abacha's regime, which had been sought by South Africa, secured the gratitude of sections of Nigeria's political elite. Abuja's historical sense of itself as Africa's champion – which resulted in a principled foreign policy that actively supported African liberation movements and the struggle against apartheid, as well as its engagement in regional peacekeeping efforts – can, at times, lead it to overlook the point that such a leadership role needs to be continuously earned. By contrast, when Nigeria and South Africa have cooperated closely, significant progress has been made in addressing African challenges, and external efforts to “divide and rule” Africa politically and prevent strong African participation in international politics have been successfully resisted. Both sides have stressed that the relationship between them is critical to Africa's welfare, and that they share a common responsibility to defend and protect the continent's interests, which have been threatened by the global financial crisis of 2007/2008, a new “Scramble” for African resources, and a UN Security Council that has been increasingly used by Western powers as an instrument for “regime change” in countries such as Libya. Furthermore, relations between Nigeria and South Africa since 1994 have often been shaped by the nature of the individual relationships between the countries' leaders – such as the partnership forged by Obasanjo and Mbeki between 1999 and 2007. To offset the instability that an over-reliance on personal relationships can bring to bilateral relations, strong mechanisms to institutionalise and sustain the partnership need to be put in place and fostered, and the relationship should be directed by principles rather than the exigencies of *Realpolitik*. In the international sphere, Nigeria and South Africa further need to resolve differences caused by competition for seats on powerful African and international multilateral bodies – it is pointless, for example, for both countries to fight over a permanent seat or seats on the UN Security Council which are not actually on offer, at least not in the near future.



ABOVE: Mr Aziz Pahad, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa
RIGHT: From left, Chief Dubem Onyia, former Nigerian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari, former Foreign Minister of Nigeria, and Joint Special Representative for the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur

2. The Diplomacy of Nigeria/South Africa Bilateral Relations

Although diplomatic relations between Nigeria and South Africa were established after democratic rule was introduced to South Africa in 1994, high commissions in Abuja and Tshwane were only established in 1995 and 1996 respectively. South Africa's first post-apartheid president, Nelson Mandela, played a key role in shaping the first official bilateral relations between the two countries.

Historically, Nigeria had supported the African National Congress's anti-apartheid struggle. More than thirty years before Mandela was elected president, news of an apartheid government plot to kill him in prison reached Nigeria's prime minister at the time, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (1960-1966), who pleaded with the then British prime minister, Harold Macmillan (1957-1963), to confront the apartheid government to prevent the murder.²²

Shehu Malami, who served as Nigeria's first High Commissioner to South Africa from 1996 until 1999, sought to foster close relations with Mandela. However, South Africa's pan-African solidarity with Nigeria had been tempered by its criticism of human rights abuses under General Abacha's regime. Mandela was angered after his pleas for clemency for Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight Ogoni activists were ignored by Abacha, and the nine were executed in November 1995. The dispute between the two leaders prevented Malami from officially presenting his diplomatic credentials as the Nigerian High Commissioner to South Africa until 1996. On the occasion of this presentation, Mandela is reported to have said to Malami: "You Nigerians are the leaders of Africa, but we, your brothers and sisters, reserve the right to criticise you."²³ During the 1990s, Nigerians faced constraints when seeking visas to South Africa, such as Tshwane's insistence on the need for applicants to present tax clearance documents, bank statements, and inoculation certificates. In turn, South Africans applying for visas to Nigeria faced similar constraints. South Africa's requirement that all Nigerians present cards proving vaccination for yellow fever also caused a serious diplomatic incident in May 2012.

After 1999, when Obasanjo became Nigeria's civilian president and Mbeki succeeded Mandela as South African president, relations between the two countries began to improve. The two leaders had forged a close relationship during Mbeki's time as head of the ANC office in Lagos between 1977 and 1978, when Obasanjo was the military head of state.²⁴ As presidents, they visited each others' countries. Together they helped to build new African institutions. Obasanjo told Mbeki in Abuja in October 2000: "Our location, our destiny and the contemporary forces of globalisation have thrust upon us the burden of turning around the fortunes of our continent. We must not and cannot shy away from this responsibility."²⁵ Nigeria and South Africa closely coordinated their efforts before key AU and UN meetings, and, based on the principle of reciprocity, continuous efforts were made by both leaders to address difficult issues as they arose. The five years between 1999 and 2004 were subsequently viewed as the "golden age" of bilateral relations between Abuja and Tshwane.

22 Alhaji Shehu Malami, former Nigerian High Commissioner to South Africa, presentation made at the CCR seminar, *The Eagle and the Springbok: Strengthening the Nigeria/South Africa Relationship*, Lagos, Nigeria, 9-10 June 2012.

23 Ibid.

24 Adekeye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg, "Obasanjo, Mbeki as Thick as Thieves", *Mail and Guardian*, 13 February 2004, p. 35.

25 Obasanjo, "Nigeria-South Africa: Bond Across the Continent", p. 137.

A key bilateral initiative that quickly emerged from the new relationship after it was suggested at a meeting of the World Economic Forum was the establishment in 1999 of a Bi-National Commission between the two countries, which was headed by their deputy presidents.²⁶ A close relationship was soon forged between the two countries' representatives on the BNC: then deputy president Jacob Zuma went to Nigeria where he was granted an honorary chieftaincy title; Nigerian delegates were also received as honoured guests in South Africa. An implementation committee was established to deal with sensitive issues and to make recommendations to the leaders of both countries. High commissioners on both sides had relatively open access to their host leaders. Seven meetings of the BNC were held between 1999 and 2008. In March 2002, a Nigeria/South Africa business summit was held on the sidelines of the fourth BNC meeting to foster stronger economic relations between both countries. By February 2003, about 20 key bilateral agreements covering areas such as science and technology, agriculture, information-sharing, heritage issues, defence, and immigration, had been negotiated and signed between Abuja and Tshwane.²⁷ Among the ideas promoted in the BNC was that of a Nigeria/South Africa free trade area, and a free trade area between Nigeria and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU): South Africa, Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, and Namibia.²⁸

Tensions emerged in the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa from 2005 over foreign policy issues. In June 2008, Mbeki spoke of the partnership between the two countries as being "part of a historically important process of leading the entire continent in terms of reconstruction and renewal".²⁹ A meeting in Abuja in February 2009 discussed the state of bilateral relations and sought ways to strengthen BNC structures, as well as mutual collaboration on African and global issues. However, after 2008, no full sessions of the BNC were held for four years. Following South Africa's deportation of 125 Nigerians in March 2012 over suspicions that their yellow fever certificates were fake (for which Tshwane later apologised), and Nigeria's retaliatory refusal to permit 78 South Africans entry into its country, the eighth BNC meeting which took place in Cape Town only in May 2012 sought to strengthen bilateral relations. An agreement was reached at the meeting that both countries could offer visiting government officials, business people, and scholars a five-year entry visa, with a view to a ten-year visa being made available in future. The BNC meeting, which was jointly led by Nigerian vice-president, Mohammed Namadi Sambo, and South Africa deputy president, Kgalema Motlanthe, also reviewed the progress of bilateral cooperation since the previous session of the commission, which had been held in 2008. The BNC agreed to set strict time-frames for implementing the decisions and action plans of the commission's seven working groups on: foreign affairs and cooperation; trade, industry and finance; defence and security; agriculture, water resources and environment; minerals and energy; public enterprises and infrastructure; and social and technical matters. Agreements on mutual legal assistance and customs administration, and economic and technical cooperation, were also signed. In addition, Sambo and Motlanthe expressed the need for strengthening the AU and Africa's sub-regional organisations – with the support of the international community – to promote, peace, security, democracy, and development on the continent. They called for reform of the UN Security Council and the establishment of a "new world economic order" to narrow the ever-widening gap between the poor and the rich.³⁰

26 "Closing Remarks by the Vice-President His Excellency Atiku Abubakar on the Inauguration of the Nigeria/South Africa Joint Commission, presented to the Deputy President of the Republic of South Africa, Mr. Jacob Zuma", Abuja, 4-5 October 1999.

27 "Overview of Nigeria-South Africa Relations", *Nigeriafirst.org*, 18 February 2003.


28 "Agreed Minutes of the 6th Session of the Bi-National Commission Between the Republic of South Africa and the Federal Republic of Nigeria", Durban, South Africa, 6-10 September 2004.

29 *Agence de Presse Africaine* (APA), "Nigeria, South Africa Move Closer in Relations", 8 June 2008 (accessed at <http://emergingminds.org/Nigeria-South-Africa-move-closer-in-relations.html>).

30 "Joint Communiqué Issued at the End of the 8th Session of the South Africa-Nigeria Bi-National Commission Held in Cape Town, South Africa", 23 May 2012 (available at <http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=27659&tid=69292>).

The BNC's efforts to foster bilateral ties should be supported by regular meetings at deputy director-general level to service the relationship. In addition, it is important for high commissioners from both countries to have access to host leaders to ensure that differences of approach and principle between the two countries are managed effectively and prevented from escalating. The re-establishment of friendship associations between Nigeria and South Africa, and improved coordination with other bi-national institutions such as their chambers of commerce could strengthen the work of the BNC and help to make it more effective. The Commission also needs to meet regularly and to communicate its decisions down to provincial and municipal level to ensure their proper implementation.

Programmes to educate the media in both countries about their joint history and shared challenges could further help to counter negative stereotypes about Nigerian drug-traffickers and predatory South African mercantilists. The behaviour of law enforcement agencies and their targeting of citizens from other African countries, particularly in South Africa, has sometimes exacerbated diplomatic tensions and popular prejudices and this situation must be more carefully managed. The BNC should also promote greater "people-to-people" links, involving civil society actors from both countries more widely in its work. To this end, common challenges such as strengthening Africa's vote in multilateral fora, and developmental issues of reducing poverty in Africa, should be pursued, rather than the defence of parochial interests. However, attempts to foster improved bilateral relations by seeking closer politically mandated party-to-party ties between South Africa's ruling ANC and Nigeria's dominant Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) might prove counterproductive. The 100-year ANC is well established and organically linked to its constituency, while the PDP is less well-established as a stable political party, instead representing a diverse agglomeration of interests. Any party-to-party dialogue should thus be broadened beyond both ruling parties so as not to damage bilateral relations if the ruling party were to lose power in either or both countries. The BNC should also continue to be used as the main mechanism to consolidate the bilateral relationship.



From left, Alhaji Shehu Malami, former High Commissioner of Nigeria to South Africa; Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse, Member of the AU Panel of the Wise; and Ambassador Bangumzi Sifingo, former High Commissioner of South Africa to Nigeria, and Ambassador-in-Residence, Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Tshwane, South Africa

3. Nigeria/South Africa Multilateral Relations

In an effort to secure fairer global representation on the UN Security Council, a meeting of African Union foreign ministers in Swaziland in March 2005 – in what became known as the “Ezulwini Consensus” – called for an expansion of the Council from 15 to 26 members, with two permanent seats with veto power and five rotating non-permanent seats for Africa (instead of the existing three non-permanent seats allocated to the continent).³¹

Both Nigeria and South Africa put themselves forward as candidates for a permanent seat on the Council, though Tshwane was more discreet and only publicly declared its interest in 2010. Nigeria stressed that it was “the largest democratic black nation” in the world and had a solid history of international peacekeeping for over four decades. South African officials noted that their country had the largest and most advanced economy on the continent – as measured by industrialisation and diversification – and highlighted the global repute won by the country’s relatively peaceful transition from racist apartheid rule to democracy. Both countries touted themselves as gateways for investment and trade to other parts of the continent, and sought to capitalise on this image. Opposition from the five veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council (P-5)³² – most notably the United States (US) and China – effectively ended any chances of Security Council reform or enlargement in 2005. However, although neither Nigeria nor South Africa could win a permanent seat, the competition between the two countries led to tensions in their bilateral relationship. Subsequently, both countries have agreed that the debate over which country would have the best claim to represent Africa permanently on the Council undermines unity of purpose in defending the continent’s interests, and should take second place to efforts to win permanent representation for Africa as a whole. Nigeria and South Africa, however, have sometimes differed on how best to secure effective African representation on the UN Security Council and continue to grapple with their divergent views in pursuit of bilateral consensus on this issue. Although both sides acknowledge the primacy of the African Union in mandating African representatives to the UN Security Council, South Africa has been less willing to countenance any new proposal that would formalise how the AU should go about selecting these representatives. Tshwane continues to stress the need to stick to the letter of the 2005 “Ezulwini Consensus” and insists on seeking the implementation thereof. It was, however, noted that UN Security Council reform is unlikely to occur in the near future, and that Abuja and Tshwane should not waste their time squabbling about permanent seats that are currently not on offer. One interim suggestion is that one of Africa’s three non-permanent seats could be rotated between Africa’s major powers (including Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Kenya); another between the continent’s middle powers; and the third between the smaller African states.

Even though South Africa has continued to reiterate that Nigeria remains “one of South Africa’s most important partners on the African continent in pursuing the vision of an Africa renewal”, the relationship has weakened in recent times.³³ The strategic partnership and close diplomatic coordination that reached its peak between the

31 African Union, “The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus”, March 2005 (accessed at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/AU_Ezulwini%20Consensus.pdf).

32 See, for example, James Jonah, “The Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Secretariat”, in Adekeye Adebajo (ed.), *From Global Apartheid to Global Village: Africa and the United Nations* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009), pp. 65-86.

33 South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), “South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, H E Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, on an Official Visit to the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 17 May 2010”, press release (accessed at <http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2010/nige0517.html>).

two countries after 1999, while Obasanjo and Mbeki were presidents, has recently not been as strong.³⁴ After the advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994, the two countries worked together amicably in multilateral institutions including the UN, the AU, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. The two also belonged to, and worked together in, groupings such as the Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of 77 (G77) developing countries at the UN, and the Commonwealth. In addition, the Nigeria/South Africa partnership spearheaded the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the AU in 2002, as well as the establishment of the African Peer Review Mechanism of 2003. However, differences also emerged. Mandela pushed for the suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth between 1995 and 1999. South Africa was also invited to join key multilateral bodies in which Nigeria was not represented: it is the only African country in the Group of 20 major economies (G20). In 2003, South Africa was a founding member of the IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) forum, and, seven years later, became the newest member of the BRICS economic bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). South Africa's membership of these bodies as the sole African country has created tensions with Abuja. In the area of sport, while South Africa successfully hosted the football world cup in 2010, Nigeria lost its bid to become the first African country to host the Commonwealth Games in 2014, and some Nigerians felt that Tshwane had not provided enough support to this bid.³⁵

In 2011, both countries served as non-permanent members on the UN Security Council and occupied seats on the AU's Peace and Security Council. However, Abuja and Tshwane sometimes took divergent positions on key issues on these bodies. After fighting broke out in Côte d'Ivoire's 2011 post-election contest between presidential candidates Alassane Ouattara and Laurent Gbagbo, the two countries failed to agree on how to deal with the crisis. Nigeria – like most members of the international community – recognised Ouattara's victory in the election, while South Africa sought a negotiated settlement between Gbagbo and Ouattara, and raised questions about the accuracy of the poll and the legality of the electoral process. However, Tshwane's impartiality in reserving judgment over the constitutional validity of Ouattara's electoral victory was thrown into doubt as Angola, South Africa's new strategic ally in Southern Africa since Zuma's election as president in 2009, seemed to adopt a similar position by throwing its weight behind Gbagbo's refusal to cede power. Luanda provided funds and 300 soldiers to Gbagbo.³⁶ In January 2011, South Africa sent a naval vessel, the *SAS Drakensberg*, to the Gulf of Guinea, to be on standby in the event that the South African embassy in Abidjan needed to be evacuated. This action in Nigeria's traditional West African "sphere of influence" was regarded in Abuja as provocative and officially criticised.³⁷ South Africa was perceived to have challenged the principle of "subsidiarity" under which each African sub-regional bloc – ECOWAS in West Africa – usually takes the lead in decisions about external interventions in crises within its own sub-region. However, Tshwane subsequently argued that its refusal to adopt the belligerent stance that Nigeria took towards the losing incumbent, Gbagbo, was based on its historical principled opposition to external military interventions that support "regime change", and that it had taken guidance from ECOWAS and adhered to the positions adopted by the AU towards the Ivorian crisis. Furthermore, having obtained negotiated agreements, Tshwane considered that it had an obligation to seek to implement these. The Libyan case also revived historical diplomatic rivalry between South Africa and Nigeria. Although, both countries voted on the UN Security Council to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) intervention in Libya in

34 Funke Atohengbe, "Nigeria to Deepen Relations with South Africa", *Voice of Nigeria*, 12 July 2011 (accessed at <http://www.voiceofnigeria.org/Nigeria/Nigeria-to-deepen-relations-with-SA.html>).

35 Alex Last, "Nigeria Keen to Host Games", BBC, 9 November 2007 (accessed at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7086584.stm>).

36 "Will the Bad Loser Be Squeezed Out?" *The Economist*, 12 March 2011, Vol. 398, No. 8724, pp. 43-44.

37 Leon Engelbrecht, "Drakensberg off West Africa", *Defenceweb*, 3 February 2011 (accessed at http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13414:drakensberg-off-west-africa&catid=55:SANDF&Itemid=108).

March 2011, Nigeria became one of the first African countries to recognise the National Transitional Council as the legitimate government of that country in August 2011, even when South Africa was leading efforts to prevent what it regarded as premature recognition of the NTC. Abuja and Tshwane also disagreed on the UN Security Council on proposed action against Syria in October 2011.³⁸

Nigeria made clear that it did not approve of South Africa's nomination of its former foreign minister and then home affairs minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, as the SADC candidate to succeed Gabon's Jean Ping as Chair of the AU Commission.³⁹ South Africa argued that Dlamini-Zuma would help to reform the AU, but Nigeria (and several other African countries) feared that her presence in the post would give South Africa undue leverage in the organisation, particularly since Africa's large states had reportedly informally agreed not to contest this post. In December 2011, president Zuma made an official visit to Nigeria, and discussed the Dlamini-Zuma nomination, among other matters, with Nigerian president, Goodluck Jonathan, calling on Nigerians to work with him "to save Africa from Western domination".⁴⁰ It has been argued that one of the unwritten rules of the OAU and the AU has been restraint on the part of Africa's big powers in not applying to become the chair of the AU Commission – just as the P-5 members of the UN Security Council would not seek to nominate one of their own to the post of UN Secretary-General. Previous holders of the Chair of the AU Commission had all come from smaller countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, and Gabon. Although South Africa accurately argued that its nomination of Dlamini-Zuma did not break any legal AU rules, Nigeria and several other countries questioned whether it was politically wise. In July 2012, Dlamini-Zuma won the Chair in the fourth round with 37 votes after a protracted and fiercely contested election, enabling the confirmation of the other nine posts on the commission,⁴¹ but taking over an organisation divided by her campaign. Following her election, it was hoped that Dlamini-Zuma would be able to heal these wounds and unite the organisation.

Notwithstanding their diplomatic differences, Nigeria and South Africa have adopted common responses to African security challenges. In 2012, both were key troop- and/or police-contributing countries to important UN peacekeeping missions, including in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the first and only hybrid AU/UN Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The two countries have adopted similar diplomatic positions on key African issues such as the situations in Somalia, Sudan, and the DRC, as well as the need to include a human rights monitoring mechanism in the mandate of the UN Mission for the Organisation of the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). Both also have acknowledged the importance of deferring to AU positions as African members of the UN Security Council and to continue to explore measures for strengthening the relationship between the UN and the AU in pursuit of more effective maintenance of peace and security in Africa. In January 2012, South Africa led a high-level debate on the UN Security Council (which it chaired that month) on strengthening relations between the world body and regional organisations. South Africa has further supported Nigeria in its efforts to wield greater influence in other international fora – Tshwane, for example, supported the failed bid by Nigerian finance minister, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, to become the first non-American

38 South Africa abstained in a Security Council vote on potential action against the government in Damascus, tabled by France, Britain, Germany, and Portugal, and supported by Nigeria and Gabon in October 2011. *Journal of the United Nations*, Wednesday 5 October 2011, No. 2011/192, p. 19.


39 Press statement issued by the High Commission of Nigeria in Tshwane, 25 May 2012.

40 "Nigeria-South Africa Bi-National Commission to Discuss Visas, Other Issues", *Nigeria First*, 24 August 2011 (accessed at <http://allafrica.com/stories/201108250098.html>); "South Africa: President Jacob Zuma to Visit West Africa", *BuaNews* 7 December 2011 (accessed at <http://allafrica.com/stories/20112070444.html>); and Ahamefula Ogbu, "Zuma: We must Save Africa from Western Domination", *This Day Live*, 11 December 2011 (accessed at <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/zuma-we-must-save-africa-from-western-domination/104777/>).

41 The other nine posts are the Deputy Chairperson and the commissioners heading the eight departments of political affairs; social affairs; trade and industry; economic affairs; peace and security; infrastructure and energy; human resources, science and technology; and rural economy and agriculture. Representatives from leading African countries often occupy some of these posts.

president of the World Bank in June 2012. South Africa has argued that the perception that it has sought a higher profile at international fora is misconceived – for example, Tshwane did not actively lobby for the appointment of its national, Navi Pillay, as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in September 2008. South Africa has stressed that as the sole African country on bodies such as the G20, IBSA, and BRICS, it has never sought to claim the status of Africa’s representative in these institutions and, in addition, ensures that what has been agreed as the African agenda at the AU is not undermined at these fora. Furthermore, these groupings do not tell South Africa how to vote on issues of international security. In March 2011, for example, unlike the other members of BRICS, South Africa supported UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorising the imposition of a “no fly” zone in Libya. Tshwane has continually pushed for more African representation in the G20, and has argued that the continent’s interests should properly be represented on the group by African invitees such as the head of the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Chair of the AU’s Assembly of Heads of State and Government, and the Chair of NEPAD. However, South Africa’s pledge to offer support for Africa’s agenda at such multilateral fora may be usefully reinforced by increased coordination with Abuja on matters of multilateral and continental concern. The foreign affairs committee of the BNC could aid this process and should help to coordinate bilateral efforts in order to present a united African voice. Nigerian and South African diplomats in Addis Ababa, New York, Geneva, and Vienna⁴² should further prioritise the coordination of both countries’ positions in key multilateral fora in order to promote African interests more effectively.

In relation to African peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, Somalia and Sudan represent two complex cases that require urgent attention and well-crafted African positions on the UN Security Council. The establishment of focal points at the two countries’ missions in Tshwane and Abuja, and regular consultation at least every six months at the level of permanent secretary and director-general, could further aid such coordination. In addition, consideration should be given to exploring the institutionalisation of mechanisms whereby the expertise of experienced senior former and current foreign policy officials from both countries can be rapidly deployed to forestall potential diplomatic crises.



ABOVE: Ambassador George Nene, former High Commissioner of South Africa to Nigeria, and Deputy Director General: Multilateral, Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Tshwane, South Africa
MIDDLE: Ambassador Welile Nhlapo, National Security Advisor to the South African President; and Special Representative of South Africa to the Great Lakes Region
RIGHT: Ambassador Martin Uhomoibhi, Permanent Secretary, Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

⁴² Addis Ababa, New York, Geneva, and Vienna are the host cities respectively of the AU; the UN General Assembly and Security Council; the UN Human Rights Council and the International Labour Organisation (ILO); and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

4. Nigeria/South Africa Economic Relations

In 2011, Africa contributed about three percent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP). South Africa with an estimated GDP of \$368 billion remained the largest contributor to the continent's total, despite showing relatively low real growth year-on-year, which is forecast to drop even further to under three percent in 2012.

Meanwhile, Nigeria overtook Egypt as Africa's second biggest economy by GDP, recording \$232 billion in 2011, and with a growth rate of more than seven percent: one of the strongest among Africa's ten leading economies.⁴³ It has been envisaged that Nigeria could overtake South Africa's economy by 2015.⁴⁴ Together the two economies currently account for about 30 percent of Africa's GDP.

Nigeria represents a long-term market for South African investments. After South Africa's Mobile Telephone Networks (MTN) successfully entered the Nigerian market in 2001,⁴⁵ other South African "blue chip" companies followed, including Standard Bank (which trades as Stanbic in Nigeria); Rand Merchant Bank, which is involved in equity funding deals; and retirement fund administrator Alexander Forbes. MTN spent \$340 million launching its mobile telephone network in Nigeria in August 2001 and planned to invest a further \$1.4 billion over ten years. Within three years of entering the Nigerian market – which is three times larger than South Africa's – MTN was making more profit in Nigeria than in South Africa. Between 2003 and 2004, MTN Nigeria's post-tax profit stood at 2.36 billion Rand, which surpassed MTN South Africa's profit of 2.24 billion Rand.⁴⁶ MTN's phenomenal success encouraged other South African companies to enter the Nigerian market. Within a year of starting its operations, Stanbic's Nigerian affiliate was contributing 13 percent of its parent company's Africa-wide revenues (1.26 billion rand).⁴⁷ In 2008, Alexander Forbes bought a 40 percent stake in Nigeria's pension sector, comprising a potential eight million state employees. South Africa's Protea group was running four hotels in Lagos by the end of the same year, with another eight under construction.⁴⁸ Fast-food chains Chicken Licken and Debonairs Pizza established franchises in Nigeria.⁴⁹ SABMiller is operating a brewery and building another. South African media house Johncom opened Nu Metro cinemas and multimedia stores in Abuja and Lagos, as well as DVD and CD manufacturing plants. Satellite television provider, Multichoice, boasted 700,000 Nigerian customers in 2012, and has spent \$100 million on developing local content. Retailer, Shoprite Checkers, opened an outlet in Lagos in 2005 that became profitable within a year.⁵⁰

However, Nigerian engagement in the relatively more sophisticated South African market has been more limited. While many South African companies were granted licences to operate in Nigeria from 1999 and prospered thereafter, few Nigerian companies entered South Africa, and some that tried to do so failed (such as the newspaper *This Day*).⁵¹ At a meeting to celebrate ten years of the BNC which was held in Abuja in November

43 International Monetary Fund (IMF), "World Economic Outlook April 2012" (accessed at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/pdf/text.pdf>).

44 "Nigeria's New Government: Groping Forward", *The Economist*, 12 November 2011 (accessed at <http://www.economist.com/node/21538207>).

45 Other South African investors in the information and communications technology sector include: Altech, Didata, Terac, and CQS.

46 Adebajo, *The Curse of Berlin*, p. 204.

47 Other South African investors in the finance and property sectors include: Aurecon, ABSA Capital, Novare, Metropolitan, Sanlam, and Group 5.

48 In the hospitality sector, Sun International has made a \$160 million investment, and Southern Sun, Legacy, and Mantis have also entered the Nigerian market.

49 Adebajo, *The Curse of Berlin*, pp. 143-161.

50 Shoprite was building a further three stores in 2012, and planned to open 50 stores in Nigeria by 2015.

51 "Bankole Seeks Equity in Nigeria, South Africa Relations", *Vanguard* website, 29 October 2009 (accessed at <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/10/bankole-seeks-equity-in-nigeria-south-africa-relations/>). The only Nigerian airline flying to South Africa at the beginning of 2012 was Arik Air.

2009, South Africa's deputy president, Kgalema Motlanthe, noted that his country wished to see more Nigerian businesses investing in South Africa.⁵² Some recent investments – such as the three billion Rand purchase by Dangote Group, Nigeria's largest industrial conglomerate, of 45 percent of South Africa's Sephaka Cement – have helped to convince some Nigerians, who have often accused South Africans of predatory, mercantilist behaviour, that the South African market may be opening up to their own firms in reciprocation. In addition, many of the restrictions on Nigerian engagement in South Africa are structural: its market is an established, competitive one with thinner profit margins and lower growth prospects. The commonly held misconception that South Africa bars Nigerian banks from operating in South Africa is thus inaccurate: the market is saturated and monopolised, and therefore difficult to enter successfully even for Western and Asian banks.

The strengthening of economic relations between Nigeria and South Africa has led to two airlines flying seven times a week between the two countries. Many South Africans now live in Nigeria; while an increasing number of Nigerians live in South Africa. In addition, further large-scale South African entries into the Nigerian market are planned: Massmart and Woolworths retailers, Old Mutual insurance company, and Distell beverages, are looking to invest in the country. However, South African engagement with Nigeria's economy is still widely regarded as unequal. Although the partnerships that are sought by South African businesses with their Nigerian counterparts are regarded as less tokenistic and more genuine than in the past, they often take the form of joint-venture acquisitions or controlling equity ownership rather than investment for growth. Of the \$7 billion earmarked by the South African Public Investment Corporation pension fund for investment in sub-Saharan Africa, \$250 million was allocated to purchase a holding in Nigeria's Ecobank as it took over its compatriot Oceanic Bank in 2011. South Africa's Nedbank paid \$285 million for another stake in Ecobank. In addition, critics have charged that South African investors often approach Nigeria as a destination for products rather than as an opportunity to invest to add value along the manufacturing chain. However, the direct employment benefits of South African investment continue to outweigh those brought by Nigeria's main contribution to the South African economy: oil, which accounts for over 95 percent of Nigeria's exports to South Africa. In addition, the bilateral economic relationship has been criticised for only bringing benefits to international capital: a charge that resonates strongly in South Africa, which has failed to converge its "two economies" – formal and informal – since the end of apartheid, and where the gap between rich and poor has widened, making it the world's most unequal society.

South African companies have experienced some success in creating businesses that address all consumers – such as through its introduction of pre-paid telephone airtime in the 1990s, and, more recently, through innovative and highly successful online- and cellphone-based services that have brought banking to the previously unbanked. Nigerian companies could learn important lessons from such South African business models that can often straddle formal and informal economies. Mutual benefits could also accrue from a relationship that combines South African know-how in adapting business models to African marketplaces, and working within African institutional contexts, with the benefits of access to Nigeria's burgeoning economy of 140 million consumers, which represents the single largest market on the continent. Notwithstanding the larger benefits, South African business people have continued to be criticised as "arrogant" by some of their Nigerian counterparts. The perception is that many South African businesses operate according to the belief that all of Africa beyond their borders is one homogenous entity amenable to the same business models. Although such

52 *BuaNews*, "SA, Nigeria to Push Trade, Investment", *SouthAfrica.info*, 17 November 2009 (accessed at <http://www.southafrica.info/news/international/nigeriabnc-171109.htm>).

approaches have recently been modified, a disconnect between the business cultures of Nigeria and South Africa persists. Business schools in both countries can help to address this gap. The two-highest ranked African institutes offering open executive education programmes⁵³ – the Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) at the University of Pretoria, and the Lagos Business School – recently announced a joint programme promoting the development of a peer support network for African business faculties.

South African businesses in Nigeria can find themselves targeted by popular resentments, such as after the xenophobic attacks in South Africa in 2008, and following controversies over visas and entry requirements. On the consumer interface, boycotts of South African goods can be threatened. In addition, business people are among the first to suffer when retaliatory travel restrictions are imposed. However, politicians have often failed to acknowledge the importance of business to the bilateral relationship between Abuja and Tshwane. The BNC should offer business representatives more feedback on their deliberations and consult more closely with them. In addition, Nigeria and South Africa need to reach a lasting agreement on visa and immigration issues to prevent these from unnecessarily impeding the bilateral economic relationship. Speedy ratification of other BNC agreements on economic and trade relations would also be beneficial.

Business relationships between the two countries have also been damaged by the promotion in the South African media of negative stereotypes of Nigerians and vice versa. Furthermore, the positive changes in the bilateral relationship are often not properly publicised. Both governments need to seek greater public visibility for official bilateral visits and events. Editors and journalists in both countries should also be educated more fully on the depth and strength of the historical ties between the two peoples, as well as the true extent and nature of current socio-economic and political relations.



ABOVE: Ms Dianna Games, Honorary Chief Executive of the South Africa/Nigeria Chamber of Commerce, Johannesburg, South Africa
MIDDLE: Mr Adetilewa Adebajo, Senior Technical Advisor to the Nigerian Minister of Trade and Investment
RIGHT: Mr Dele Babade, former Chief Executive Officer, Ecobank Capital, Lagos, Nigeria

53 The 2012 Executive Education rankings produced by the British newspaper, the *Financial Times*, ranked GIBS and the Lagos Business School at 42nd and 54th respectively in its global league table of business schools. See "Africa Excels in Financial Times Executive Education Ranking", mba.co.za, 3 June 2012 (accessed at <http://www.mba.co.za/article.aspx?s=51&a=3688>).

5. Nigeria/South Africa Trade Relations

Trade between Nigeria and South Africa has grown ten-fold since 1999. After the end of apartheid and the introduction of democratic rule in South Africa in 1994, South African companies sought business opportunities in Nigeria as the largest market in Africa.

However, in 1999, there were only four major South African companies engaged in business in Nigeria. By 2003, this number had reached 55, and, within a decade, had increased to over 100, as the successful profitable entry of South African firms like Mobile Telephone Networks and Standard Bank contributed towards employment, revenue generation, and improved quality of goods and services in Nigeria, and encouraged other South African companies to follow. By 2006, Nigeria had become South Africa's largest trading partner on the continent. The value of bilateral trade, which totalled only \$16.5 million in 1999, increased to \$1.5 billion in 2007, and to almost \$3 billion by 2008.⁵⁴ This figure had reached over \$3.6 billion by 2011. The Nigerian-South African Chamber of Commerce, which was established in 2000 in Lagos, identified investment opportunities for South African companies and provided them with relevant information, while South Africa's Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) launched a South Africa-Nigeria Business Investment Forum to assist South African companies wishing to invest in Nigeria. This forum met in South Africa three times between 2004 and 2008.⁵⁵ The South Africa-Nigeria chamber of commerce was established in 2005 in Johannesburg. Business people from both countries now frequently cross each other's borders.

The balance of trade between the two countries has favoured the Nigerian side, with Nigerian exports valued at more than 16 billion Rand in 2010, compared with South African exports of only about 4.4 billion Rand in the same year. Oil constitutes the bulk of Nigeria's exports. In 2003, petroleum accounted for 98.3 percent of exports, although other bilateral business included the establishment by Nigeria's Union Bank and First Bank of representative offices in South Africa. In 2005, Nigerian oil company, Oando, set up shop in Johannesburg. When Obasanjo's successor as president of Nigeria, Umaru Yar'Adua, visited South Africa in June 2008, with a delegation of 300 Nigerian business people, he and Mbeki enthused about the further potential for business cooperation between the two countries. Yar'Adua noted that Nigeria hoped soon to reach double-digit growth and needed investment from South African companies in power, railways, roads, oil, and gas.⁵⁶ South Africa's Sasol, the world's largest producer of petrol from coal, made a \$1.2 billion investment in Nigeria to export natural gas. South Africa's government-funded Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) has also invested in Nigerian oil and gas, as well as infrastructure, tourism, and telecommunications. South African parastatal, Spoornet, has worked with the Nigerian Railway Corporation to revive its freight network. Other Nigerian exports to South Africa largely come in the form of human resources: many Nigerian professionals work in South Africa in fields like academia, medicine, accounting, human resources, and property. South Africa exports a wide range of goods to Nigeria. It sells machinery, electrical equipment, wood, paper, plastics, rubber, foodstuffs, beverages, spirits, and tobacco.⁵⁷

54 Dianna Games, "Decade of Success and Missed Chances Between SA and Nigeria", *Business Day*, 23 November 2009; and Ayodamola Owoseye, "Nigeria, South Africa to Enhance Trade Relations", *Online Nigeria News*, 22 April 2010 (accessed at <http://news2.onlinenigeria.com/feed/headlines/13339-Nigeria-South-Africa-enhance-trade-relations.txt>).

55 See the South Africa-Nigeria Chamber of Commerce website at www.sa-ncc.co.za.

56 *Agence de Presse Africaine*, "Nigeria, South Africa Move Closer in Relations".

57 The first three paragraphs in this section are drawn from Adebajo, *The Curse of Berlin*, pp. 143-161.

Since the early bilateral trade deals that were struck between 1995 and 1997 – generally on a cash basis – the failure to extend proper lines of credit has continued to inhibit the selling of South African products in the import-driven Nigerian market. Furthermore, Nigeria’s infrastructure problems – particularly in electricity and water supply – have continued to increase the costs to South African companies of doing business in Nigeria.⁵⁸ Some Nigerian companies have competed unsuccessfully for South African government contracts due to stringent conditions on such bids relating to the government’s policy of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). The private sectors in both countries have also reported that they have not been properly consulted by the BNC to improve bilateral trade policies.

The cooperation of the Nigerian and South African governments has proved vital to the success of larger scale business ventures, such as in the case of MTN Nigeria, which made great efforts after it entered the Nigerian market in 2001 to adapt to new employment and cultural demands by recruiting talented Nigerians; training South Africans and Nigerians together; empowering black South African managers; providing cultural sensitivity training to staff; and ending apartheid-style practices in the workplace.

South Africa can provide technical competence and finance that are needed to develop Nigeria’s transport, power, iron, steel, and agriculture sectors. These offer investment opportunities although they are limited by relatively poor institutional governance ratings. Broad-band and other information and communication technologies (ICT) could also offer future investment opportunities. South African businesses could usefully explore the opportunities that can flow from joining one of Nigeria’s 20 free trade zones or establishing a new one, in order to ease access to Nigeria’s large high-growth economy, and service its major infrastructural deficit on favourable terms. The Nigeria/South Africa free trade area proposed by a previous BNC in March 2002 could also be revived. High tariff and non-tariff barriers can inhibit intra-African trade which is estimated to constitute less than ten percent of continental imports and exports. For example, when South Africa lifted its ban on importing finished clothing, it boosted investment in Liberia’s nascent garment manufacturing industry. However, a free trade area between Nigeria and South Africa could also damage infant industries in Nigeria and negatively affect bilateral trade if not carefully designed to protect such industries.

Since Jacob Zuma succeeded Thabo Mbeki as president in 2009, South Africa has increasingly looked to African countries other than Nigeria for new business opportunities, including oil imports. South Africa’s increasingly close relationship with Angola has added to the tensions that have developed between Tshwane and Abuja in the past three years. Angola is South Africa’s second largest trading partner in Africa after Nigeria, and over 90 percent of Luanda’s exports are based on oil. At the same time, as South Africa reduces oil imports from Iran in the face of American sanctions over Tehran’s nuclear programme, its oil imports from Nigeria, as well as Angola, are likely to rise.⁵⁹ In June 2012, the South African High Commissioner in Nigeria, Kingsley Mamabolo, noted that substantially increased oil imports from Nigeria had been discussed at the BNC a month

58 Dianna Games, ‘An Oil Giant Reforms: The Experience of South African Firms Doing Business in Nigeria’, *Business in Africa Report* no.3 (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004); and John Daniel, Jessica Lutchman, and Sanusha Naidu, ‘South Africa and Nigeria: Two Unequal Centres in a Periphery’, in John Daniel, Roger Southall, and Jessica Lutchman (eds.), *State of the Nation: South Africa 2004-2005* (Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council, 2005), pp. 544-568.

59 Reuters, ‘South Africa Looks to Nigeria, Angola to Replace Iran Oil’, 16 June 2012 (accessed at: <http://www.brecorder.com/fuel-a-energy/193/1201245/>).

earlier, which, if agreed, would boost the volume of bilateral trade.⁶⁰ To address Africa’s “resource curse” – the corrupt flight of capital gained through sales of resources to bank accounts outside Africa – former South African president Thabo Mbeki has taken the helm of a high-level panel on illicit financial flows from Africa that was set up in 2012 by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). In May 2012, the African Development Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the UN ECA, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), estimated that about \$700 billion had disappeared from Africa in capital flight between 1970 and 2006.⁶¹ Effective steps to redress such capital flight would boost inter-regional trade and region building efforts and development, and help to alleviate poverty on the continent. Nigeria and South Africa should therefore be in the forefront of such efforts.



ABOVE: Ms Felling Sekha, former Executive Director, Mobile Telephone Networks (MTN) Nigeria
MIDDLE: Ambassador Kari Bjørnsgaard, Ambassador of Norway to South Africa
RIGHT: Mr Foluso Phillips, Chairman, Nigeria/South Africa Chamber of Commerce, Lagos, Nigeria

60 Adesanya Alao, “South Africa Considers Oil Imports from Nigeria as Bilateral Trade Hits \$3 billion”, *World Stage* website, 21 June 2012 (accessed at: <http://www.worldstagegroup.com/worldstagenew/index.php?active=news&newscid=5152&catid=3>).

61 African Development Bank (AfDB), *African Economic Outlook 2012: Promoting Youth Employment* (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] Publishing, May 2012), p. 69.

6. Civil Society Perspectives

As part of the Economic Community of West African States, Nigeria adopted the “Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security” in 1999, which clearly defined a role for civil society actors in conflict prevention and management efforts.

After the bloody conflicts which took place in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire during the 1990s and the decade of 2000-2010, the protocol sought the active participation of civil society to build strong partnerships with national governments, the ECOWAS Commission, and other key actors to manage conflict and promote democratisation.⁶² The Southern African Development Community's Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) of 2004 pursues a similar goal. This plan, which defines SADC's security and political mandate, has sought to achieve regional peace through the institutionalisation of democratic governance, and called for civil society's participation in SADC's security efforts. In practice, ECOWAS has been more open to civil society participation in its work than SADC.⁶³

Both within and outside these regional frameworks, civil society activists in Nigeria and South Africa have important roles to play in bilateral relations, alongside the efforts of governments and the private sectors in both countries. In Nigeria, civil society was historically enlisted in support of the government's principled opposition to apartheid South Africa. After the establishment of democratic rule in South Africa in 1994, the country's human rights activism started to focus on the actions of General Sani Abacha's regime, as Nigeria's military became more repressive. Mandela condemned the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight Ogoni activists in November 1995 and sought to isolate Nigeria's military government in Africa and internationally. South Africa was the only country to withdraw its high commissioner – George Nene – from Nigeria in protest. Abuja reacted by withdrawing the Nigerian football team from the Africa Cup of Nations that was held in South Africa in 1996.

During the 1990s, human rights organisations played a key role in Nigeria, as did civil society activists such as the Nobel literature laureate, Wole Soyinka, who criticised human rights violations in Nigeria and sought to use South Africa as a base to mobilise efforts against Nigeria's military junta.⁶⁴ In January 1996, the South Africa-Nigeria Democracy Support Group was formed in South Africa with the support of the Foundation for Global Dialogue (FGD) – now the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) – to rally a mass democratic movement against the regime of General Abacha. The campaign was backed by senior figures in the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP), and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), as well as leading civil society representatives, including from South Africa's Lawyers for Human Rights. However, many of the Nigerian groups and representatives who joined this group lacked focus and/or proved to be opportunistic. Following the death of Abacha in June 1998, and the launching of an electoral process in Nigeria to help to restore a civilian government, the campaign was reconstituted by the Foundation for Global Dialogue. In 1998, the organisation produced a paper on “Transition to Democracy in Nigeria: How Can South Africa Assist?” A year later, the FGD held two meetings on the “Nigeria-South Africa Dialogue”, under the theme “Civil Society

62 Dawn Nagar, “Conceptualising Civil Society's Role in Southern Africa”, paper presented at the African Studies Association Conference, New Orleans, November 2009.

63 Ibid.

64 Foundation for Global Dialogue (FGD), “Transition to Democracy in Nigeria: How can South Africa Assist?”. report, Braamfontein, South Africa, September 1998.

and Africa's Democratic Recovery", in Lagos and Johannesburg.⁶⁵ The meetings reported that external actors such as the US and the European Union (EU) had played ambivalent roles in Nigeria's pursuit of democracy. They noted that Washington had often failed to take significant action against human rights violations in Nigeria, only implementing token sanctions to restrict civil aviation and to combat international crime. Meanwhile, despite an EU ban on sporting links with Nigeria and restrictions on the granting of visas to members of the government in Abuja, France had allowed the Nigerian football team to participate in the World Cup that it hosted in 1998; and Paris had granted visas to senior Nigerian officials on humanitarian grounds. In gratitude, General Abacha announced that French would become Nigeria's official second language, and moved the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation's (NNPC) European office from London to Paris.⁶⁶

The FGD's efforts, which were strongly supported by president Thabo Mbeki and his deputy foreign minister, Aziz Pahad, had assumed that the Bi-National Commission would actively engage civil society once it was established in 1999. This, however, did not occur. Mbeki's "African Renaissance" project represented an attempt to build African solidarity, particularly in society and the arts. The Nigerian community in South Africa and the number of South Africans visiting Nigeria every year has steadily increased. Divisive stereotypes and negative perceptions and prejudices need to be countered among Nigerians and South Africans so that the potential benefits of the two countries working together more closely can be properly recognised. In particular, both countries must address youth issues on a continent in which most people are under 30 years old. The employment outlook for young Africans represents a huge challenge and a source of discontent that has given rise to popular protest across the continent. Population growth greatly exceeds the number of new jobs created. In the public sector alone, Africa would need to create an additional 1.9 million jobs annually until 2025 to keep pace with present employment levels in this sector. Skills shortages among young people as well as rigid labour markets further restrict job opportunities and exacerbate youth unemployment. Young Nigerians and South Africans can potentially find common cause in collaboratively addressing these employment and education challenges.⁶⁷ Such efforts would also help to communicate the direct benefits of pan-Africanism and promote these ideals more widely.

It is critical that civil society perspectives shape the bilateral relationship between Nigeria and South Africa. The BNC was urged to incorporate civil society representation into its working groups, in particular to build bridges between Nigeria and South Africa on the commission's technical, trade, industry, and finance working committees. In addition, civil society, and not only the private sector, should be included in parallel sessions at BNC meetings. Beyond the BNC, Abuja and Tshwane should boost civil society cooperation in the areas of sports, culture, human rights, and trade unions.

After 2009, the South African administration of president Jacob Zuma established closer ties with Angola, although he had chaired the Bi-National Commission between 1999 and 2005 as deputy president, establishing close ties with his Nigerian counterpart, Atiku Abubakar. Nigerian and South African suspicions of the other's intentions seemed to deepen after the BNC stopped meeting in full session after 2008.⁶⁸ Following

65 Adekeye Adebajo, "South Africa and Nigeria in Africa: An Axis of Virtue?", in Adebajo, Adedeji, and Landsberg (eds.), *South Africa in Africa*, p. 229.

66 Foundation for Global Dialogue, "Nigeria-South Africa Dialogue", conference report, Braamfontein, 26-27 August 1999.

67 *African Economic Outlook 2012: Promoting Youth Employment*.

68 A Review Council Meeting of the BNC was held in Abuja in February 2009, and celebrations of the Commission's tenth anniversary were held in Tshwane and Abuja in October 2009 and November 2009 respectively. However, the BNC did not meet again in full session until May 2012.

the arrest of Henry Okah, one of the leaders of Nigeria's Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in Johannesburg in October 2010, Nigerian bloggers alleged that South Africa had deliberately failed to inform Nigeria that bombings would take place in Abuja during the celebrations to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of independence which had been held on 1 October 2010.⁶⁹ Bilateral structures do not always work as intended, and tensions are an inevitable consequence of relatively new bilateral relationships. In this respect, think-tanks in South Africa and Nigeria can host informal "track-two" meetings among policymakers in both countries that can play a crucial role outside the glare of public scrutiny in exploring differences of position and in creating consensus to resolve tensions between Abuja and Tshwane. As well as providing valuable policy advice and conferring the approval of civil society, such fora could also act as back-channels in times of crisis, and help both sides to "reset" bilateral relations as required.

In addition, civil society ties between the two countries should be encouraged at all levels. For example, large groups of South Africans regularly travel to Nigeria for church and religious meetings. In South Africa, Nigerian businessmen regularly come together at "patriots" clubs. The re-establishment of friendship associations between both countries could further foster greater cooperation and understanding, which could in turn help to counter negative stereotypes that ordinary South Africans may have about Nigerians and vice versa.



From left, Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa; Ambassador Segun Apata, former Deputy Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the UN; and Dr Garth le Pere, Visiting Professor at the University of Pretoria, South Africa

69 Ngwenya. "Giants of Africa Limp Along". See also SAPA (South African Press Association), "SA Investments Threatened by MEND", *Business Report*, 14 April 2012 (accessed at <http://www.iol.co.za/business/business-news/sa-investments-threatened-by-mend-1.1276010#UBINy6MhCig>).

7. The Future of Nigeria/South Africa Relations

Notwithstanding the recent tensions between Nigeria and South Africa which began to emerge particularly from 2005 when both countries sought a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, the bilateral relationship between the two regional giants, Nigeria and South Africa, remains potentially the most important strategic partnership on the continent.

Were Nigeria and South Africa to work more closely together, especially on African issues, they could achieve much, given their strong political, economic, and military positions both nationally and regionally. Continental institutions, such as the AU, NEPAD, and the African Peer Review Mechanism, still remain relatively weak. The creation of a robust partnership between Nigeria and South Africa to provide political leadership for Africa is therefore crucial for these institutions to become more effective.

Were the two countries to coordinate their efforts more effectively at the AU and the UN,⁷⁰ Africa would be more likely to be seen in global fora as a continent capable of defining and defending its interests effectively. In order to achieve these goals and to create an “axis of virtue” to promote democracy and development on the continent, divergent Nigerian and South African interests – both national and regional (in ECOWAS and SADC respectively) – need to be clearly communicated and managed within appropriate institutions such as the Bi-National Commission. Where such bodies do not exist, they should be created. In addition to mitigating the effects of divergent national interests, vibrant bilateral institutions and networks can also enable both countries to ensure that their principled actions to keep and build peace in Africa are not viewed as attempts to dominate the continent in pursuit of their own parochial interests.⁷¹

In August 2011, South African president, Jacob Zuma, sent his special adviser on international relations, Charles Nqakula, to meet with Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan, in Abuja to explore reviving the BNC and facilitating the issuing of visas to citizens of both countries.⁷² Since then, the commission met in full session for the first time in four years in May 2012 in Cape Town.⁷³ This meeting provided an opportunity for the two countries to “reset” their relationship. During three sessions of the BNC, a raft of economic and technical agreements were signed including on migration issues; customs procedures; economic cooperation; and the promotion and protection of investments. In addition, agreements were reached on issues of extradition, mutual legal assistance, terrorism, and cyber crime. New cooperation was proposed in the areas of piracy, agriculture, minerals and energy, as well as science and technology.⁷⁴ In the field of aviation, it was proposed that the number of commercial and cargo flights operated by South African Airways (SAA) and Nigeria’s Arik Air be substantially increased.

70 Charles Molele, “Lindiwe Zulu: Talking Tough for Zuma”, *Mail and Guardian*, 25 November 2011. As adviser to President Zuma, Zulu said: “We are newcomers as far as Nigeria is concerned, and we’ve quickly occupied space internationally. But we believe these contradictions should not destroy relations. President Zuma’s approach is that we should engage, engage and engage.”

71 Adebajo, *The Curse of Berlin*, p. 161.

72 “Nigeria-South Africa Bi-National Commission to Discuss Visas, Other Issues”, *African Examiner*, 25 August 2011 (accessed at <http://africanexaminer.com/NGRSA0825>).

73 “Joint Communiqué Issued at the End of the 8th Session of the South Africa-Nigeria Bi-National Commission”.

74 *Ibid.*

Nigeria and South Africa also agreed in May 2012 that an implementation committee should meet within six months to review the progress made on the BNC's decisions, and that focal points for the commission should be established at the two countries' high commissions in Abuja and Tshwane. In relation to fostering business opportunities, the South African and Nigerian Chambers of Commerce should be engaged in the future implementation plans of the BNC's economic decisions. Further meetings have been planned for the commission's seven working groups on foreign affairs and cooperation; trade, industry and finance; defence and security; agriculture, water resources, and the environment; minerals and energy; public enterprise and infrastructure; and social and technical matters. Working groups will also be convened to consider communications and constitutional developmental issues. The importance of maintaining momentum in the bilateral relationship was stressed, and senior foreign policy officials will meet every six months to consider the partnership and its progress. A consular and immigration forum will meet monthly, which will include police and home affairs officials as appropriate, and will address issues such as the reported maltreatment of Nigerians by the South African police.

A range of recommendations emerged from the May 2012 BNC meeting and at CCR's policy advisory group seminar in Lagos a month later to improve bilateral relations between Nigeria and South Africa. The importance of strengthening the relationship to remove misconceptions was emphasised. The bilateral partnership needs to be strengthened and continuously cultivated, emphasising business and cultural success stories, and the close historical ties between the two countries and peoples. This could include programmes to educate opinion-formers in the media and young people in general. In addition, civil society links should be encouraged in a range of areas: between trade unions, business associations, militaries, sports clubs, and cultural groups. Civil society, think-tanks, and the private sector from both countries should also assume more visible and participatory roles to promote bilateral relations, perhaps coming together to create Nigeria/South African friendship associations. The relaxing of visa restrictions would also ease tensions and greatly assist the development of friendly ties. The present extension of visa limits to three years for diplomats could be made available to business people; in addition, it has been suggested that both countries could offer visiting government officials, business people, and scholars a five-year entry visa, which may be extended to a ten-year permit in future. In general, steps to remove practical irritants and build mutual trust would enhance business relationships between both sides. Expanding the scope of economic ambition beyond the bilateral relationship by establishing an ECOWAS/SADC free trade area to lower and/or remove tariff and non-tariff barriers could have the potential of boosting intra-Africa trade significantly, which at present constitutes less than ten percent of continental trade. Although the creation of a free trade area between ECOWAS and SADC remains a distant prospect at present, a political commitment to the impulse, and steps such as the creation of a trade corridor between the two sub-regions, could help to replace the horizontal patterns of trade imposed on Africa under colonialism with a more horizontal dynamic which could vastly increase trade between the two sub-regions. In addition, Nigeria and South Africa should work closely together to continue to reactivate NEPAD as an engine of economic growth and development in Africa. The bilateral Joint Presidential Advisory Council on Investment should also be revived.

In the diplomatic sphere, the BNC of May 2012 recommended that a tripartite group consisting of Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola should be created to consult on African issues; and this body could later be expanded to include Ethiopia and Algeria. It was further suggested during the Lagos policy seminar that a second North African representative could be Egypt, and an East African representative such as Kenya could also be included in the group. Mutual recognition by Nigeria and South Africa of each other's pre-eminence in their respective sub-regions could also ease diplomatic differences over national leadership and governance crises in Africa. The creation of a caucus of reputable foreign policy stakeholders from both sides could usefully complement, and provide a back-channel for, state actors and efforts to promote bilateral cooperation. The diplomats and experts who met at the June 2012 policy advisory group seminar in Lagos could usefully be brought together again in South Africa. Consideration should also be given to working together to elevate the strategic partnership between Nigeria and South Africa in order to promote the development and Renaissance of Africa, and to safeguard the continent from external attempts at "divide and rule".



ABOVE: Ambassador Sonni Yusuf, High Commissioner of Nigeria to South Africa
MIDDLE: Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari, former Foreign Minister of Nigeria, and Joint Special Representative for the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
RIGHT: Ambassador Kingsley Mamabolo, High Commissioner of South Africa to Nigeria

Policy Recommendations

The following 10 key policy recommendations emerged from the Lagos policy advisory group seminar:

- 1) Strong mechanisms to institutionalise the strategic partnership between Nigeria and South Africa, such as an active Bi-National Commission with an effective implementation and monitoring mechanism, need to be fostered. The establishment of focal points at the countries' missions in Abuja and Tshwane, and regular consultation at the level of permanent secretary and director-general could aid the BNC's efforts. High commissioners from both countries should have access to host leaders to help maintain the bilateral relationship. In addition, the BNC's decisions need to be communicated at all levels, including provincial and local government, to ensure effective implementation;
- 2) Nigeria and South Africa should prioritise their bilateral relationship to promote democracy, security, and development in Africa. Divergent national and regional interests need to be carefully managed to ensure that the continent is protected from external attempts at "divide and rule". Steps should be taken to ensure that the two countries' efforts to keep and build peace in Africa are not misinterpreted as attempts to further parochial agendas. Nigeria and South Africa should also coordinate carefully on any interventions in each other's sub-regional spheres of influence;
- 3) Nigeria and South Africa need to resolve their differences over representation on international bodies. Consideration should be given to agreeing a mechanism to formalise how the AU should select African non-permanent representatives to the UN Security Council. For example, one of the three non-permanent seats could be rotated between Africa's major powers; another between the continent's middle powers; and the third between the smaller African states. Abuja and Tshwane should also coordinate more effectively on nominations of senior officials to the AU Commission;
- 4) Nigeria and South Africa should work together more closely to represent Africa's interests at international fora, including at multilateral bodies such as the G20 in which South Africa is the sole African country. The foreign affairs committee of the BNC could aid this process. As already suggested by the BNC in 2012, Nigerian and South African diplomats in Addis Ababa, New York, Geneva, and Vienna should prioritise the coordination of both countries' positions on international bodies in order to promote African interests more effectively;
- 5) Also suggested by the BNC of 2012, a tripartite group consisting of Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola could be created to consult on African issues, and this body could later be expanded to include Ethiopia and Algeria. It was further suggested that a second North African representative could be Egypt, and an East African representative such as Kenya could also be included in the group;
- 6) Greater South African investment in Nigeria should be encouraged to develop infrastructure and create mutually beneficial business models. Economic relations could also be improved through greater inclusion of the private sector in the BNC's work, and by relaxing entry restrictions for business people;

- 7) The Nigeria/South Africa free trade area proposed by the BNC in March 2002 could be revived to remove high tariff and non-tariff barriers that inhibit intra-African trade. A political commitment should be made to create a free trade area between ECOWAS and SADC in the long term, and a trade corridor between the two sub-regions in the medium term, in order to promote regional integration and socio-economic development across Africa;
- 8) Nigeria and South Africa should be in the forefront of efforts to redress capital flight from Africa – estimated at between \$735 billion and \$1.8 trillion between 2008 and 2010 – which would boost intra-regional trade, strengthen region-building efforts, and help to alleviate poverty;
- 9) The BNC should seek greater engagement from civil society in its work, particularly to counter common prejudices and communicate more effectively the benefits of close cooperation between the two countries. Abuja and Tshwane should seek greater public visibility for bilateral visits and events. Media on both sides should also be educated on the extent and nature of current and historical socio-economic and political relations. Business schools in both countries should provide diversity training for South African businesses operating on the continent. Links between trade unions, business fora, militaries, sports clubs, and cultural groups should be strengthened; and the establishment of friendship associations encouraged; and finally,
- 10) “Track-two” mechanisms deploying current and former senior foreign policy officials and experts could be established to forestall potential diplomatic incidents, to act as back-channels in times of crisis, and to help both sides to “reset” bilateral relations.



Participants of the policy advisory group seminar “The Eagle and the Springbok: Strengthening the Nigeria/South Africa Relationship”, The Moorhouse, Lagos, Nigeria

Annex I

Agenda

Day One Saturday 9 June 2012

09.00 – 09.30 Welcome and Opening Remarks

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Speakers: Ambassador Sonni Yusuf, High Commissioner of Nigeria to South Africa

Ambassador Welile Nhlapo, National Security Advisor to the South African President; and Special Representative of South Africa to the Great Lakes Region

09.30 – 11.00 Session I: The History of Nigeria/South Africa Bilateral Relations

Chair: Chief Dubem Onyia, former Nigerian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

Speakers: Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari, former Foreign Minister of Nigeria; and Joint Special Representative for the African Union (AU)/United Nations (UN) Hybrid Operation in Darfur

Mr Aziz Pahad, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa

11.00 – 11.15 Coffee Break

11.15 – 12.45 Session II: The Diplomacy of Nigeria/South Africa Bilateral Relations

Chair: Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse, Member of the AU Panel of the Wise

Speakers: Alhaji Shehu Malami, former High Commissioner of Nigeria to South Africa

Ambassador Bangumzi Sifingo, former High Commissioner of South Africa to Nigeria

12.45 - 13.45 Lunch

13.45 – 15.15

Session III: Nigeria/South Africa Economic Relations

Chair: Mr Adetilewa Adebajo, Senior Technical Advisor to the Nigerian Minister of Trade and Investment

Speakers: Mr Dele Babade, former Chief Executive Officer, Ecobank Capital, Lagos, Nigeria

Ms Dianna Games, Honorary Chief Executive of the South Africa/Nigeria Chamber of Commerce, Johannesburg, South Africa

15.15 - 15.30

Coffee Break

15.30 – 17.00

Session IV: Civil Society Perspectives

Chair: Ambassador Segun Apata, former Deputy Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the UN

Speakers: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Dr Garth le Pere, Visiting Professor at the University of Pretoria, South Africa

19.30

Dinner

Day Two Sunday 10 June 2012

09.15 – 10.45 Session V: Nigeria/South Africa Trade Relations

Chair: Ambassador Kari Bjørnsgaard, Ambassador of Norway to South Africa

Speakers: Mr Foluso Phillips, Chairman, Nigeria/South Africa Chamber of
Commerce, Lagos

Ms Felleng Sekha, former Executive Director, Mobile Telephone Networks
(MTN) Nigeria

10.45 – 11.00 Coffee Break

11.00 – 12.30 Session VI: Nigeria/South Africa Multilateral Relations

Chair: Ambassador Welile Nhlapo, National Security Advisor to the South African
President; and Special Representative of South Africa to the
Great Lakes Region

Speakers: Ambassador Martin Uhomoibhi, Permanent Secretary, Nigerian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

Ambassador George Nene, former High Commissioner of South Africa to
Nigeria, and Deputy Director General: Multilateral, South African
Department of International Relations and Cooperation

12.30 – 13.30 Lunch

13.30 – 15.00 Session VII: The Future Of Nigeria/South Africa Relations

Chair: Professor Ibrahim Gambari, former Foreign Minister of Nigeria; and Joint
Special Representative for the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur

Speaker: Ambassador Sonni Yusuf, High Commissioner of Nigeria to South Africa

Ambassador Kingsley Mamabolo, High Commissioner of South Africa
to Nigeria

15.00 – 15.30 Coffee Break and Completing Evaluation Forms

15.30 – 16.30 Session VIII: Rapporteurs' Report And Way Forward

Chair: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution,
Cape Town

Rapporteurs: Ms Dawn Nagar, Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Mr Mark Paterson, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution,
Cape Town

Annex II

List of Participants

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4. Professor Bola A. Akinterinwa
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Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
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6. Mr Dele Babade
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7. Ambassador Kari Bjørnsgaard
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9. Mr Niyi Fatogun
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10. Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari
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11. Ms Dianna Games
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13. Ms Adaora Ikenze
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14. Dr Apiribo Iyalla
Scanwater Limited
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15. Dr Garth le Pere
Visiting Professor, University of Pretoria
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16. Alhaji Shehu Malami
Former Nigerian High Commissioner to South Africa
17. Ambassador Kingsley Mamabolo
High Commissioner of South Africa to Nigeria
Abuja, Nigeria

18. Ms Thandi Mgxwati
Counsellor: Political
South African High Commission
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 19. Ambassador M. S. Monaisa
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 20. Dr Abdul Raufu Mustapha
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 21. Ms Dawn Nagar
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 22. Ambassador George Nene
Former South African High Commissioner
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 23. Ambassador Welile Nhlapo
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 24. Chief Dubem Onyia
Former Nigerian Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs
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 25. Mr Aziz Pahad
Former South African Deputy Minister of
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 26. Mr Mark Paterson
Senior Project Officer
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Cape Town, South Africa
 27. Mr Foluso Phillips
Chairman
Nigeria/South Africa Chamber of Commerce
Lagos, Nigeria
 28. Ms Felleng Sekha
Former Executive Director of MTN Nigeria
 29. Ambassador Bangumzi Sifingo
Former South African High Commissioner
to Nigeria; and Ambassador-in-Residence,
Training, Research and Development, DIRCO
Tshwane, South Africa
 30. Dr Martin Uhomoibhi
Permanent Secretary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Abuja, Nigeria
 31. Ambassador Sonni Yusuf
High Commissioner of Nigeria to South Africa
Tshwane, South Africa
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Personal/Research Assistant
to the Executive Director
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Cape Town, South Africa
 33. Ms Liliane Limenyande
Administrative Assistant
Centre for Conflict Resolution
Cape Town, South Africa

Annex III


List of Acronyms

AfDB	African Development Bank
ANC	African National Congress (South Africa)
APA	Agence de Presse Africaine
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
BNC	South Africa-Nigeria Bi-National Commission
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CCR	Centre for Conflict Resolution
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa)
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FESTAC	Second World African Festival of Arts and Culture
FGD	Foundation for Global Dialogue
FLS	Frontline States
G8	Group of eight leading industrialised nations
G20	Group of 20 major economies
G77	Group of 77 developing countries at the UN
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIBS	Gordon Institute of Business Science
IBSA	India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum
ICT	Information and Communications Technologies
IDC	Industrial Development Corporation (South Africa)
IGD	Institute for Global Dialogue
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Organisation of the Referendum in Western Sahara
MTN	Mobile Telephone Networks
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NIDO	Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation
NNPC	Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
NTC	National Transitional Council (Libya)

OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPDSC	Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SADC)
P-5	Five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the US, China, Russia, France, and Britain)
PDP	Peoples Democratic Party (Nigeria)
PSC	Peace and Security Council (AU)
SAA	South African Airways
SACP	South African Communist Party
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAPA	South African Press Association
SWAPO	South West African People's Organisation
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNTAG	UN Transitional Assistance Group (Namibia)
US	United States

Other publications in this series


(Available at www.ccr.org.za)



VOLUME 1 THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S SECURITY

THE UNITED NATIONS, REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND FUTURE SECURITY THREATS IN AFRICA


The inter-related and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security within the framework of United Nations (UN) reform were the focus of this policy seminar, held from 21 to 23 May 2004 in Claremont, Cape Town.



VOLUME 5 WHITHER SADC?

SOUTHERN AFRICA'S POST-APARTHEID SECURITY AGENDA


The role and capacity of the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) were focused on at this meeting in Oudekraal, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005.



VOLUME 2 SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRICA

THE POST-APARTHEID DECADE


The role that South Africa has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa's domestic transformation 10 years into democracy were assessed at this meeting in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 29 July to 1 August 2004.



VOLUME 6 HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY


AN AGENDA FOR AFRICA

The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and the potential role of African leadership and the African Union (AU) in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.



VOLUME 3 THE AU/NEPAD AND AFRICA'S EVOLVING GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The state of governance and security in Africa under the African Union (AU) and The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) were analysed and assessed at this policy advisory group meeting in Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004.



VOLUME 7 BUILDING AN AFRICAN UNION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES (RECS), NEPAD AND CIVIL SOCIETY


This seminar in Cape Town, held from 20 to 22 August 2005, made policy recommendations on how African Union (AU) institutions, including The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), could achieve their aims and objectives.



VOLUME 4 A MORE SECURE CONTINENT


AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN HIGH-LEVEL PANEL REPORT, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

African perspectives on the United Nations' (UN) High-Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change were considered at this policy advisory group meeting in Somerset West, Cape Town, on 23 and 24 April 2005.




VOLUME 8 THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

This meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 October 2005, explores civil society's role in relation to southern Africa, democratic governance, its nexus with government, and draws on comparative experiences in peacebuilding.



**VOLUME 9
WOMEN AND
PEACEBUILDING IN
AFRICA**

This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations (UN) in 2000.




**VOLUME 13
SOUTH SUDAN WITHIN
A NEW SUDAN**

This policy advisory group seminar on 20 and 21 April 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A).




**VOLUME 10
HIV/AIDS AND
MILITARIES IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

This two-day policy advisory group seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.



**VOLUME 14
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES
ON THE UN
PEACEBUILDING
COMMISSION**


This meeting, in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3 and 4 August 2006, analysed the relevance for Africa of the creation, in December 2005, of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission, and examined how countries emerging from conflict could benefit from its establishment.



**VOLUME 11
AIDS AND SOCIETY
IN SOUTH AFRICA**


BUILDING A COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE

This policy and research seminar, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 March 2006, developed and disseminated new knowledge on the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in the three key areas of: democratic practice; sustainable development; and peace and security.




**VOLUME 15
THE PEACEBUILDING
ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
IN CENTRAL AFRICA**

This sub-regional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.




**VOLUME 12
HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN
SECURITY IN SOUTH
AFRICA**

This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS in South Africa and southern Africa from a human security perspective.



**VOLUME 16
UNITED NATIONS
MEDIATION EXPERIENCE
IN AFRICA**

This seminar, held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006, sought to draw out key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa, and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations (UN) newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).



VOLUME 17
WEST AFRICA'S
EVOLVING SECURITY
ARCHITECTURE


LOOKING BACK TO THE FUTURE

The conflict management challenges facing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the areas of governance, development, and security reform and post-conflict peacebuilding formed the basis of this policy seminar in Accra, Ghana, on 30 and 31 October 2006.



VOLUME 21
AFRICA'S EVOLVING
HUMAN RIGHTS
ARCHITECTURE


The experiences and lessons from a number of human rights actors and institutions on the African continent were reviewed and analysed at this policy advisory group meeting held on 28 and 29 June 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa.



VOLUME 18
THE UNITED NATIONS
AND AFRICA

PEACE, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SECURITY


This policy advisory group meeting, held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 14 to 16 December 2006, set out to assess the role of the principal organs and the specialised agencies of the United Nations (UN) in Africa.



VOLUME 22
PEACE VERSUS JUSTICE?


TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS AND WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS IN AFRICA

The primary goal of this policy meeting, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 May 2007, was to address the relative strengths and weaknesses of "prosecution versus amnesty" for past human rights abuses in countries transitioning from conflict to peace.




VOLUME 19
AFRICA'S
RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT

This policy seminar, held in Somerset West, South Africa, on 23 and 24 April 2007, interrogated issues around humanitarian intervention in Africa and the responsibility of regional governments and the international community in the face of humanitarian crises.




VOLUME 23
CHILDREN AND ARMED
CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

This report, based on a policy advisory group seminar held on 12 and 13 April 2007 in Johannesburg, South Africa, examines the role of various African Union (AU) organs in monitoring the rights of children in conflict and post-conflict situations.



VOLUME 20
WOMEN IN POST-
CONFLICT SOCIETIES IN
AFRICA


The objective of the seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 and 7 November 2006, was to discuss and identify concrete ways of engendering reconstruction and peace processes in African societies emerging from conflict.



VOLUME 24
SOUTHERN AFRICA

BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY


This report is based on a seminar, held in Tanzania on 29 and 30 May 2007, that sought to enhance the efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to advance security, governance and development initiatives in the sub-region.



**VOLUME 25
PREVENTING GENOCIDE
AND THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT**


CHALLENGES FOR THE UN, AFRICA, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

This policy advisory group meeting was held from 13 to 15 December 2007 in Stellenbosch, South Africa, and focused on six African, Asian and European case studies. These highlighted inter-related issues of concern regarding populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, 'ethnic cleansing' or crimes against humanity.



**VOLUME 28
HIV/AIDS AND
MILITARIES IN AFRICA**

This policy research report addresses prospects for an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic within the context of African peacekeeping and regional peace and security. It is based on three regional advisory group seminars that took place in Windhoek, Namibia (February 2006); Cairo, Egypt (September 2007); and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (November 2007).



**VOLUME 26
EURAFRIQUE?**

AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY

This seminar, held from 31 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt); peacekeeping and military co-operation; and migration.



**VOLUME 29
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
AND PEACEBUILDING IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**


CIVIL SOCIETY, GOVERNMENTS, AND TRADITIONAL LEADERS

This meeting, held on 19 and 20 May 2008 in Johannesburg, South Africa, provided a platform for participants from Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe to share insights on sustained intervention initiatives implemented by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in the three countries since 2002.



**VOLUME 27
SECURITY AND
DEVELOPMENT IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

This seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 8 to 10 June 2008, brought together a group of experts – policymakers, academics and civil society actors – to identify ways of strengthening the capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to formulate security and development initiatives for southern Africa.



**VOLUME 30
CROUCHING TIGER,
HIDDEN DRAGON?
CHINA AND AFRICA**

ENGAGING THE WORLD'S NEXT SUPERPOWER

This seminar, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 September 2007, assessed Africa's engagement with China in the last 50 years, in light of the dramatic changes in a relationship that was historically based largely on ideological and political solidarity.



**VOLUME 31
FROM EURAFRIQUE TO
AFRO-EUROPA**

AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY


This policy seminar, held from 11 to 13 September 2008 in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, South Africa, explored critically the nature of the relationship between Africa and Europe in the political, economic, security and social spheres.



**VOLUME 32
TAMING THE DRAGON?**

DEFINING AFRICA'S INTERESTS AT THE FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA CO-OPERATION


This policy seminar held in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa on 13 and 14 July 2009 – four months before the fourth meeting of the Forum on China-Africa co-operation (FOCAC) – examined systematically how Africa's 53 states define and articulate their geo-strategic interests and policies for engaging China within FOCAC.



**VOLUME 33
PEACEBUILDING IN
POST-COLD WAR
AFRICA**


PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS

This policy research seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana from 25 to 28 August 2009 took a fresh look at the peacebuilding challenges confronting Africa and the responses of the main regional and global institutions mandated to build peace on the continent.




**VOLUME 36
POST-CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION IN THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
THE CONGO (DRC)**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 19 to 20 April 2010 considered how to enhance the effectiveness of the Congolese government, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), civil society, the United Nations (UN), and the international community, in consolidating peace and security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).




**VOLUME 34
STABILISING SUDAN:
DOMESTIC, SUB-REGIONAL, AND
EXTRA-REGIONAL CHALLENGES**

This policy advisory group seminar held in the Western Cape, South Africa from 23 to 24 August 2010 analysed and made concrete recommendations on the challenges facing Sudan as it approached an historic transition – the vote on self-determination for South Sudan scheduled for January 2011.




**VOLUME 37
STATE RECONSTRUCTION
IN ZIMBABWE**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Siavonga, Zambia, from 9 to 10 June 2011, assessed the complex interlocking challenges facing the rebuilding of Zimbabwe in relation to the economy, employment, health, education, land, security, and the role of external actors.



**VOLUME 35
BUILDING PEACE IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

This policy seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 25 to 26 February 2010, assessed Southern Africa's peacebuilding prospects by focusing largely on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its institutional, security, and governance challenges.



**VOLUME 38
SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA,
AND THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 13 to 14 December 2011, focused on South Africa's role on the UN Security Council; the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the Council; the politics of the Council; and its interventions in Africa.

Notes

Nigeria and South Africa have led economic integration and development, as well as peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, in their respective sub-regions and in other parts of Africa. Their partnership represents the continent's potentially most strategic bilateral relationship. The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, brought together about 30 high-level practitioners and scholars to strengthen relations between the two countries. CCR's policy seminar sought to build on the outcomes of a Nigeria-South Africa Bi-National Commission meeting held in May 2012 in order to help to "reset" the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa by addressing key themes, and crafting concrete recommendations, on the history and diplomacy of bilateral relations; the multilateral roles adopted by the two countries; their economic and trade links; civil society perspectives; and the future of the relationship.



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