



SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION



CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

POLICY ADVISORY GROUP SEMINAR REPORT

FRANSCHHOEK, SOUTH AFRICA

DATE OF PUBLICATION: AUGUST 2015

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RAPPORTEURS

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About the Organiser

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa, was established in 1968. The organisation has wide-ranging experience in conflict interventions in Southern Africa and is working on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations. Its policy research focuses on peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa; region-building and regional integration on the continent; relations between Africa and the European Union (EU); the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa; and South Africa’s bilateral and multilateral foreign policy.

The Rapporteurs

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Executive Summary

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a policy advisory group seminar at Le Franschhoek Hotel, Western Cape, from 9 to 10 May 2015 on “Security and Governance in the Great Lakes Region”.

The Great Lakes region – focusing largely around Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Uganda – is central not only to Africa’s geography but also to continental security and governance. The seminar brought together about 30 mostly African policymakers, academics, and civil society actors to assess the major obstacles to peace, security, and governance in the Great Lakes region. The meeting, which focused in particular on the ongoing political crises in Burundi and the DRC, also sought to craft effective and credible strategies to overcome these obstacles.

1. The Great Lakes Region: Progress, Problems, and Prospects

Poverty, weak state and regional institutions, and the failure to undertake effective security sector reform have made post-conflict peace precarious, and governance uneven, in the Great Lakes region. The region has become a “militarised space”, and needs to remove militarist and autocratic influences from its politics. Citizens of the region are threatened both by armed groups, sometimes including the security forces of their own governments, and by breakdowns in the ability of states to provide public services and protection from common crime. Despite these daunting challenges, in the past decade there has been some progress towards the goal of achieving durable peace in the region. Notably, in February 2013 the Peace, Security, and Cooperation (PSC) Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region was signed by the DRC, Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda, as well as the Central African Republic (CAR), Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan, and Zambia, under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).

The ultimate aim in the Great Lakes region is the achievement of a durable peace in which its 127 million citizens can live their daily lives without fear. While security must be addressed as the foundation for the consolidation of peace and socio-economic development, military approaches like the SADC-led intervention brigade within the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) provide only partial solutions. Achieving durable peace will also require addressing the root causes of conflicts, which include weak and autocratic governance; illicit exploitation of natural resources; land disputes; unresolved questions of refugee resettlement and citizenship; inadequate trust among regional leaders; lack of reconciliation at the community level; and inequitable economic growth.

2. The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Two intertwined factors drive conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: weak state legitimacy, and interference by its neighbours. President Joseph Kabila is constitutionally prohibited from running for a third term, but may seek to do so by changing the constitution, or to prolong his stay in power by delaying the November 2016 presidential elections. A proposed census that would have required delaying of elections was blocked by the Congolese parliament in January 2015 after violent protests in Kinshasa. However, predictable problems with the complex local elections planned for October 2015 could be used as a rationale for delaying the presidential polls.

The persistent insecurity in the DRC that began with the 1996 to 2003 conflict, and is now localised in the country's eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, is deeply regionalised. Many of the largest and most dangerous militias in the Kivus are tied to conflicts in neighbouring states, including the Rwandan-backed March 23 Movement (M23), which was part of Rwanda's efforts to pursue its security and economic interests in the DRC. The international response to the violence in the eastern Congo has tended to be dominated by three assumptions: first, that the insecurity is primarily about national and regional conflicts over the illegal exploitation of resources; second, that the worst result of the war is violence against women (especially sexual violence); and third, that the solution is to expand state capacity. In reality, much of the violence is driven by local conflicts over land and political power (which regional actors such as Rwanda and Uganda have exploited). A disproportionate focus on violence against women can perversely allow armed groups to gain attention and leverage by perpetrating such violence. Finally, extending state capacity without first establishing state legitimacy may expose citizens to abuse and alienate them from the government in Kinshasa.

3. Burundi

President Pierre Nkurunziza is seeking to take advantage of an apparent loophole in the constitution to run for a third term, in violation of the 2000 Arusha agreement, which formally ended the phase of the country's civil war that started in 1993 and killed an estimated 300,000 people.

The current crisis indicates deeper problems in the political and social arrangements that have prevailed in Burundi since the end of its civil war by 2005. The ruling National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) has never seemed to hold the Arusha agreement in high regard. It refused to sign the accord in 2000, and only ended its armed opposition in 2003. In 2010, the CNDD-FDD gained unrestrained power over the government, as a result of an opposition boycott of the elections, and has since sought to consolidate its power and shrink the space for dissent and democratic participation. Any long-term resolution of Burundi's challenges must not only enforce democratic norms but also support the development of more mature democratic institutions, a task that should be led by African powers such as South Africa.

4. Regional Actors: Rwanda and Uganda

The aggressive foreign policies of Rwanda and Uganda towards the region, particularly their support for armed groups in the DRC, has already contributed to instability in the Great Lakes. While it is easier to criticise Kigali and Kampala when they violate the sovereignty of other countries, respect for sovereignty should not continue to deflect attention from domestic repression in both countries. Uganda and Rwanda are formally multi-party democracies with elections approaching in 2016 and 2017, respectively. However, they are both effectively dominated by a single party, with long-serving leaders who have taken steps to restrict effective internal dissent.

In only 21 years since the 1994 genocide that killed an estimated 800,000 people, Rwanda has become touted as an example of successful development and an "island of stability" in a troubled region. However, its gains in areas such as the provision of public services mask the fact that its stability is based largely on fear. The government engages in violent suppression of dissent at home, and also supports armed groups in the DRC. Uganda has played the role of both "arsonist" and "fire-fighter" in the region. It has supported several peace initiatives, including the Kampala peace talks that led to the surrender of the M23 in December 2013, but it has also backed armed groups that have fuelled conflicts in the DRC.

5. Regional Actors: South Africa, the Southern African Development Community, and the African Union

South Africa has long played a critical role in peacebuilding efforts in the Great Lakes region. In Burundi, former South African president Nelson Mandela took over facilitation of the Arusha peace process in 1999 after the death of the former president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere. South Africa's deputy president (now president), Jacob Zuma, succeeded Mandela in this role in 2002. Under President Thabo Mbeki, Tshwane (Pretoria) began hosting the inter-Congolese dialogue in Sun City in 2002, which led to the adoption of a transitional constitution for the DRC in 2003. South Africa explains its involvement in the Great Lakes region as acting within the framework of its membership of SADC. The organisation's involvement in the Great Lakes dates back to 1997, when the DRC became a member with strong support from South Africa. MONUSCO's current 3,000-strong intervention brigade, authorised in March 2013, is composed of troops from SADC members South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi.

The African Union has also been an active player in the Great Lakes region, for more than a decade. In 2003, it deployed the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB). The 3,335-strong mission was led by South Africa and included troops from Mozambique and Ethiopia. AMIB was the first peacekeeping mission wholly planned and executed by members of the African Union. Since May 2013, the African Union and the United Nations have also jointly convened a regional oversight mechanism for the Great Lakes Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework.

6. External Actors: The United Nations and the European Union

The United Nations faces a pressing challenge in the DRC. In February 2015, UN military operations in the DRC were effectively halted. The immediate cause was the Kabila government's decision to put two commanders who had been "red-listed" by the UN over allegations of human rights abuses in charge of the Congolese army's operations against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). While the UN ban technically only applies to joint operations with the sanctioned commanders, military cooperation in general was affected by the dispute. The world body is also under pressure from Kinshasa to reduce its 20,000-strong peacekeeping force by more than a third. The most promising way forward is the creation of a concrete roadmap, one clearly and unequivocally endorsed by all major stakeholders and communicated not only to the government of the DRC, but also to the governments of its neighbours.

The Great Lakes region faces two core problems: animosity between national leaders, and the DRC's inability to control its eastern provinces effectively. In the European Union's (EU) analysis, neither problem is likely to be resolved without a focus on building the diplomatic and security sector reform capacity of regional organisations, such as the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community. Regional intelligence capacity also needs to be developed in order to address illicit economic exploitation. In the short to medium term, Brussels is prepared to continue funding the security efforts of Africa's security architecture, as seems necessary given its currently limited capacities. In the long term, however, the level of donor dependency in African institutions will remain a problem that leaves African regional bodies vulnerable to external agendas.

Policy Recommendations

The following ten recommendations emerged from the Franschhoek policy advisory group seminar of May 2015.

1. Autocratic governance structures throughout the Great Lakes region hinder national socio-economic progress, and have spread instability. Regional states themselves should adopt measures to ensure public debate and accountability for their foreign policies. Regional organisations such as SADC, the EAC, the ICGLR, and the AU can contribute to these changes by strengthening their diplomatic engagement in support of norms of democracy and human rights, as well as promoting civic engagement and civic education.
2. Central to any peacemaking strategy in Burundi must be efforts to address the divisions in the country's ruling CNDD-FDD and opposition parties, as well as the violence of the CNDD-FDD's *Imbonerakure* youth wing. Urgent diplomatic efforts are required to resolve the ongoing political impasse, but longer-term efforts to develop the capacity and democratic commitments of political parties in Burundi, as well as to reform politicised government agencies such as the National Commission on Land and Other Assets (CNTB) and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), are also essential.
3. Security sector reform throughout the region is a critical need. The Great Lakes region is a militarised space, in which political and military institutions have often become fused in ways that have hindered the development of democracy. A concerted diplomatic and reform effort is therefore urgently needed not only to prevent abuses among organised armed actors, but also to move states away from the use of fear and repression in their governance practices more generally.
4. Grassroots, bottom-up initiatives to promote peace and reconciliation, such as the work of local non-governmental organisations (including women's organisations) and traditional conflict resolution processes, should be supported with financial, logistical, and technical resources. Examples of existing projects that could be built upon, or learned from, include the East African Court of Justice's (EACJ) cooperation with civil society organisations in Uganda to promote human rights, the Swiss Tujenge Amani! programme in the DRC's Kivu provinces, and Dutch support for decentralised land registration in Burundi.
5. Governments in the region and their external supporters should strengthen the conflict resolution capacity of existing regional structures, such as the Southern African Development Community, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, and the East African Community. One immediate way to strengthen the capabilities of regional organisations in the Great Lakes could be for SADC to complete its efforts to establish a liaison office in the DRC.
6. The African Union and the United Nations should take the lead in efforts to address the challenges of the Great Lakes region, assisted by African powers such as South Africa. The European Union, the United States, and China should play a supporting role. A coordinated, consistent, and coherent strategy will allow different actors to leverage their particular strengths, avoid partiality, and prevent regional actors from engaging in "forum shopping" that plays different mediators off against each other.

7. There must be a process of consultation and coordination among SADC, the AU, and other regional organisations, backed by the UN (including its technical bodies, such as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)), and the EU, to create a concrete roadmap and a unified strategy to resolve the impasse between the UN peacekeeping mission and the government of the DRC in order to forestall similar difficulties in the future. This strategy must be clearly conveyed not only to the government in Kinshasa, but also to governments in Kigali and Kampala.
8. The UN peacekeeping force in the DRC should develop an effective end-game to its 15-year mission in the country. One element of this strategy could be a redeployment of existing UN troops to strengthen the SADC-led intervention brigade. However, any exit strategy must be carefully considered and developed in cooperation with the AU, regional organisations, and the Congolese government in order to ensure that responsible national and regional structures are in place and adequately resourced before the UN withdraws from the country.
9. An international regime should be established that monitors and punishes illicit exploitation of the DRC's mineral resources; such a system should be backed by the creation of a regional intelligence facility under the auspices of SADC or the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. Without a more effective regime than the one currently in place, there will be insufficient incentive for regional actors to stop plundering the Congo's resources.
10. Donor governments, the AU, and others with influence over Rwanda and Uganda must prevent these two countries from destabilising the region. Neither the legacy of the Rwandan genocide nor parochial national interests should stand in the way of holding all countries accountable to the same human rights standards. The AU, African governments, and the broader international community should ensure that norms relating to human rights and democratic governance are enforced in an even-handed manner including, where appropriate, through the use of targeted sanctions and judicial prosecutions.

Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a policy advisory group seminar at Le Franschhoek Hotel, Western Cape, South Africa, from 9 to 10 May 2015, on “Security and Governance in the Great Lakes Region”. This report is based on discussions at this meeting and also includes material from a public dialogue on the “Challenges of Peacemaking in the Great Lakes Region”, held in Cape Town on 8 May 2015, as well as further research.

The Great Lakes region – focused largely around Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Uganda – is central not only to Africa’s geography but also to continental security and governance. In addition, the region has long been a site of global intervention in Africa, beginning with colonialism, which influenced both the region’s borders and its ethnic divides. More recently, it has been a theatre for peacekeeping operations (such as the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC [MONUSCO], as well as the African Union Mission in Burundi [AMIB]), peace enforcement missions (such as the European Union’s [EU] 2003 Operation Artemis in the DRC’s Orientale province), and electoral observation initiatives (such as the EU’s Election Observation Mission [EOM] to observe the DRC’s 2006 elections). The Great Lakes region is a major recipient of global aid and investment: the EU provided about €2.2 billion in aid to the region over the period 2008–2013, from its 10th European Development Fund (EDF) and related assistance programmes;¹ China has invested heavily in minerals in the Great Lakes, including a \$6 billion deal – originally negotiated in 2007 – that traded mining concessions in the DRC for infrastructure investment;² and the United States (US) appropriated a total of \$991.6 million in aid for countries in the region, largely for health but also including military assistance, in 2014.³ Reflecting continental and international attention to the region, a number of key actors have established special envoys to coordinate efforts, including the Special Envoy of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, Algerian diplomat Said Djinnit; the African Union (AU) Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region and former UN Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region, Senegal’s Ibrahima Fall; the South African Special Envoy to the Great Lakes, Eddy Maloka; and the EU Senior Coordinator for the Great Lakes Region, Belgian national, Koen Vervaeke.

The Centre for Conflict Resolution has established itself as a leading policy development, research, capacity-building, and training institution on peacebuilding issues in Africa, as well as on the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the UN, and the EU.⁴ CCR has more than 15 years of experience on the

1 Figures from EuropeAid, “Countries, Territories, and Regions Where We Are Active”, <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/countries-territories-and-regions-where-we-are-active_en> (accessed 6 July 2015).

2 The precise value of the deal is a matter of ongoing negotiation between the DRC and China, and after a period of suspension from 2012 through 2014 seems to be being implemented. See Johanna Jansson, “The Sicomines Agreement: Change and Continuity in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s International Relations”, South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA) Occasional Paper no. 97, October 2011, <<http://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/the-sicomines-agreement-change-and-continuity-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congos-international-relations>> (accessed 1 April 2015), pp. 10–11; and Johanna Jansson, “China – DRC Sicomines Deal Back on Track”, *The Africa Report*, 4 August 2014, <<http://www.theafricareport.com/Central-Africa/chinadrc-sicomines-deal-back-on-track.html>> (accessed 27 March 2015).

3 Data on United States assistance from the US Department of State and US Agency for International Development’s website www.foreignassistance.gov (accessed 11 March 2015).

4 SADC comprises Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Great Lakes region. Between 1999 and 2011, the Centre organised conflict management capacity-building workshops for national human rights institutions involving representatives of Great Lakes countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. CCR's capacity-building work in the DRC has demonstrated the value of training civil society and women's groups in conflict resolution skills in collaboration with government institutions. These workshops have been complemented by policy research on the Great Lakes. In April 2010, for example, at the request of the SADC secretariat's security organ, the Centre held a policy advisory group seminar in Cape Town that examined strategic mechanisms for enhancing the effectiveness of the Congolese government, civil society, SADC, the UN, and the broader international community in consolidating peace and security in the DRC. The Centre has also published 12 seminar reports, 11 book chapters, and 26 media articles related to the Great Lakes region over the past decade.⁵

The Franschoek seminar took place as the Great Lakes region entered a two-year period of potentially significant political change, in which all four regional countries were scheduled to hold national and local elections. Unfortunately, while Burundi was set to begin the 2015–2017 election period in the region with legislative and communal elections in May 2015, at the time of the seminar this country was suffering a violent political crisis centred on Pierre Nkurunziza's bid for a third presidential term, in defiance of the 2000 Arusha accord, which formally ended the phase of the civil war that began in 1993 and killed an estimated 300,000 people.⁶ The leaders of the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda were similarly signalling their unwillingness to cede power, regardless of their countries' laws or the desires of their citizens. Meanwhile, the Congo continued to struggle with persistent insecurity in its eastern provinces, a legacy of the regionalised 1996–2003 war and a consequence of the continued involvement of Rwanda and Uganda (two of the main belligerents in that conflict) with armed groups and economic exploitation in the DRC.


To address these issues, the Cape Town seminar brought together 30 mostly African policymakers, academics, and civil society actors to assess the major obstacles to peace, security, and governance in the Great Lakes region and to craft effective and credible policies and strategies to overcome these obstacles. The seminar focused, in particular, on the challenges faced by the DRC; the problems of, and prospects for, stability in Burundi; the roles of Rwanda and Uganda in the region; the influence of regional actors such as South Africa, SADC, and the AU; and the role of external actors such as the United Nations and the European Union.

5 See, for example, CCR, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, seminar report, Cape Town, 19–20 April 2010, <http://www.ccr.org.za/images/pdfs/Vol36_post_conflict_reconstruction_mar2011.pdf> (accessed 1 April 2015); Devon Curtis, "South Africa: 'Exporting Peace' to the Great Lakes Region", in Adekeye Adebajo, Adebayo Adedeji, and Chris Landsberg (eds.), *South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal [UKZN] Press, 2007), pp. 253–273; Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "UN Peacekeeping in the Great Lakes Region: The DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi", in Adekeye Adebajo (ed.), *From Global Apartheid to Global Village: Africa and the United Nations* (Scottsville: UKZN Press, 2009), pp. 305–322; René Lemarchand, "Peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region of Africa", in Devon Curtis and Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa (eds.), *Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa* (Athens: University of Ohio Press, 2012), pp. 212–231; and Paul Mulindwa, "Pan-African Bodies Wash Their Hands of Uganda's Anti-Gay Law", *Mail and Guardian*, 15 August 2014, <<http://www.ccr.org.za/index.php/media-release/in-the-media/newspaper-articles/item/1197-ugandas-anti-gay-law>> (accessed 1 April 2015).

6 René Lemarchand, "Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo", *African Affairs* 106, no. 442 (2006), p. 11.

In discussing these issues, seminar participants were invited to address five key questions:

1. How can the DRC and Burundi and the broader Great Lakes region be restored to functional, post-conflict democratic stability?
2. How can democratic governance be promoted effectively in Rwanda and Uganda, and how can both countries be encouraged to play a stabilising rather than destabilising role in the region?
3. How can the conflict management roles of South Africa, SADC, the AU, the UN, and the EU – and their special envoys – be more effectively harnessed to national and regional efforts?
4. What positive and locally sensitive models for addressing conflicts over ethnicity, land, and political or economic exclusion can be derived from the experiences of the countries in the Great Lakes?
5. How are violence against, and marginalisation of, women, youth, and sexual minorities related to regional conflict and poverty?



From left, Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa; and Ambassador Welile Nhlapo, Former Special Representative of South Africa to the Great Lakes Region, and Former National Security Adviser to the South African President, Tshwane, South Africa

1. The Great Lakes Region: Progress, Problems, and Prospects

Achieving durable peace in the Great Lakes region requires concerted action at all levels. Problems of order and security must be addressed first, but the long-term focus needs to be on democratic governance and economic opportunity. It is critical to recognise the centrality of the Democratic Republic of the Congo not only to the geography of the region, but also to its politics, security, and economy.

The ultimate aim in the Great Lakes region is the achievement of a durable peace in which its 127 million citizens can live their daily lives without fear. Conflicts over power, ethnic identity, citizenship, land, and mineral and other economic resources have fuelled violence in the Great Lakes,⁷ including the 1972 Burundian genocide, in which between 200,000 and 300,000 people were killed;⁸ and the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in which an estimated 800,000 people were killed.⁹ Persistent insecurity in the DRC has resulted in over three million deaths. Seven other African states (Angola, Burundi, Chad, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe) fought in the Congo's wars, and several more were involved less directly (such as Congo-Brazzaville, Libya, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania), which had a destabilising impact on the security complexes of Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa. Poverty, weak state and regional institutions, and the failure to undertake effective security sector reform (SSR) have made post-conflict peace precarious, and governance uneven, in the region. All the states in the Great Lakes are formally multi-party democracies, but also engage in autocratic practices to various degrees, such as clamping down on opposition and restricting media freedom. Women and sexual minorities in the region have faced socio-economic marginalisation and violence.

Despite these daunting challenges, in the past decade there has been some progress towards the goal of achieving durable peace in the region. In the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa in February 2013, the Peace, Security, and Cooperation (PSC) Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region was signed by the DRC, Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda, as well as the Central African Republic (CAR), Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan, and Zambia. The accord was witnessed by representatives of the UN, SADC, the AU, and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).¹⁰

However, fully achieving durable peace, with dividends for ordinary people, will be challenging. It will require addressing the root causes of conflicts, which include weak and autocratic governance; illicit exploitation of natural resources; land disputes; unresolved questions of refugee resettlement and citizenship; inadequate trust among regional leaders; lack of reconciliation at the community level; and inequitable economic growth. These issues were explored throughout the Cape Town seminar, but it is helpful to consider them broadly in the context of the “five Cs”:- consolidation, citizenship, constitutionalism, capitalism, and contiguity.

7 See, for example, Gilbert M. Khadiagala (ed.), *Security Dynamics in Africa's Great Lakes Region* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2006). These types of conflicts are often entangled with each other – for example, ethnic notions of citizenship are often created or deployed in contests over resources or political power.

See, for example, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, “Citizenship, Political Violence, and Democratization in Africa”, *Global Governance* 10 (2004), pp. 403–409.

8 René Lemarchand, “The Burundi Genocide”, in Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons (eds.), *Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts*, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 268.

9 United Nations, *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, S/1999/1257*, 15 December 1999, p. 3. See also Henry Kwami Anyidoho, *Guns Over Kigali: The Rwandese Civil War – 1994 (A Personal Account)* (Kampala: Fountain, 1998).

10 *Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region*, adopted 24 February 2013, <<https://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/PSC%20Framework%20-%20Signed.pdf>> (accessed 6 July 2015).

Consolidation

All regional states, particularly the DRC, should be supported in extending effective control over their territories. Some progress has been made in the eastern Congo, especially since the creation in March 2013 of the 3,000-strong SADC-led intervention brigade within the 20,000-strong UN mission in the Congo, involving South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi. The brigade's mandate represented a necessary shift to full-fledged peace enforcement, as the United Nations was being asked to conduct peacekeeping operations where there was no peace to keep.

However, MONUSCO's new, more aggressive stance alone will not provide a long-term solution to this two-decade civil and regional war. The armed groups operating in the eastern Congo – such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Mai-Mai “self-defence” groups, and the Raia Mutomboki – have a variety of origins and agendas, and no one solution will be appropriate to address all of them. Many local people still do not see the relevance of MONUSCO to their daily lives. The ability for the UN-backed government to deliver basic social services, such as education and protection from common crime, is as important for state consolidation as the defeat of rebel movements. MONUSCO should coordinate more effectively with regional actors such as SADC, the East African Community (EAC), and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region; as well as respect the sovereignty of the DRC in order not to undermine state consolidation efforts.¹¹

Part of any effective consolidation of state authority involves effective security sector reform. Such reform has had limited impact in the DRC, in part because it has been massively under-resourced, has been driven too much by outside donors, and has been insufficiently “owned” by the Congolese themselves. Another controversial aspect of security sector reform has been the strategy of integrating former armed groups into the national army or into Congolese politics. The March 23 Movement (M23), for example, was defeated as an armed group in December 2013, but many Congolese are unhappy that the former rebel group has been allowed to survive as a political entity.¹² Some see the government and the international community as being too willing to sacrifice accountability for stability.

Two other aspects of effective security sector reform need to be recognised, and not just in the DRC. First, such reform requires long-term engagement by both local actors and international supporters. For example, the government of Joseph Kabila would like to create a rapid reaction force as the nucleus of a reformed national army, but such a force cannot be created quickly or cheaply. Second, SSR is not just a military issue: the security sector also includes police and judicial systems.

Citizenship

The citizens of the Great Lakes region need inclusive political systems in which they are all treated as equal stakeholders by their governments, and institutions of citizenship developed in a context in which all citizens of each country can see themselves as belonging to a common political community. Contested citizenship has weakened regional states; given rise to rebel movements among groups who feel marginalised from political systems; and, at worst, been expressed in ethnic violence, including the genocides in Burundi (1972) and Rwanda (1994).

¹¹ The EAC comprises Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda.

¹² See *Declaration of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo at the End of the Kampala Talks*, adopted 12 December 2013, para. 4; and *Declaration of Commitments by the Movement of March 23 at the Conclusion of the Kampala Dialogue*, adopted 12 December 2013, paras. 2, 5.

Constitutionalism

Constitutional order is characterised by equitable sharing of power, as well as institutions of participation and accountability. In the Great Lakes region, such order is threatened, particularly by militarisation. While a strong military is needed for state consolidation, the region has become a “militarised space”, and must eliminate militarist and autocratic influences from its politics. This problem is exemplified by Rwanda under Paul Kagame, who became president in April 2000 and was widely viewed as the true power behind the Rwandan throne during his tenure as vice-president and minister of defence under Rwanda’s first post-genocide president, Pasteur Bizimungu, between 1994 and 2000. Under Kagame, Rwanda has built a fairly strong state and there has been some socio-economic progress, but not on a basis of democratic governance.

Nor do other states in the region fare much better. Uganda has been ruled by Yoweri Museveni since he came to power as a guerrilla leader in January 1986. Uganda, Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda all have leaders who are signalling their unwillingness to cede power, disregarding the will of the people and their constitutions. In Burundi and the DRC, this has already led to violent protest. While indefinite leadership by a single individual would not necessarily violate the rule of law if the constitution did not make provisions for term limits – as the constitutions of Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda currently do – such limits are often an important means of ensuring that long-serving leaders do not come to be identified with the state itself and do not lose touch with the concerns of their citizens. Democratic constitutional governance also has an affinity with inclusion and human rights, and could help address problems of citizenship in the region.

Capitalism

Resolving the paradoxical situation in which the Great Lakes region finds itself – with people living in great poverty amid plentiful natural resources – will require an economic system with clear, enforceable, and equally applied rules, in which people can provide for themselves and their families. Much of the violence in the Great Lakes region is financed by the exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources, facilitated by the fact that neighbouring countries such as Rwanda and Uganda, as well as non-state actors (including both armed groups and international corporations), have taken advantage of the weak Congolese state. In addition, corruption within the state itself leads to unfair distribution of mineral and land rights. Pervasive lack of economic opportunity forces individuals into precarious or heavily exploited lines of work, such as small-scale farming and mining, or encourages them to join armed groups.

International systems, similar to the Kimberly Process for diamonds created in 2002, that monitor the conditions under which coltan, gold, charcoal, and other valuable resources from the DRC are produced, could help stem the tide of illegal exploitation and foster a market in which the Congo could benefit from its natural resources in order to promote socio-economic development. Such regimes would, however, be both technically and politically difficult to implement.

The Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, Said Djinnit, has worked to spur private investment in the region.¹³ However, this needs to be done in partnership with public institutions.

¹³ See, for example, Government of Angola, Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, and International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, “Communiqué of the Regional Consultation Conference on the Private Sector Investment Opportunities in the Great Lakes Region”, 17-18 December 2014, <<http://ungreatlakes.unmissions.org/Portals/ungreatlakes/Recent%20Documents/ENGLISH%20Outcome%20Final%20Version%20-%20Regional%20Consultation%20Angola%2018%20DEC%2014.pdf>> (accessed 1 April 2015).

One of the strongest supports for regional peace would be if the DRC could be transformed into a capable “developmental state” – a state that can harness the power of markets for the benefit of its people by intervening to foster the development of internationally competitive industries.¹⁴ This would require ensuring that the government is accountable to all its citizens, and does not intervene in markets simply for the benefit of patronage networks centred on the Congolese capital of Kinshasa.

Contiguity

Problems in one Great Lakes country are rarely challenges for that state alone, as the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework acknowledges. The fact that state borders run through areas with transnational ethnic groups and difficult geography means that there is often “contagion” of problems between states in the Great Lakes.

One of the most dangerous cases of contagion is the continued involvement of Rwanda and Uganda with armed groups in the eastern Congo. Contiguity also facilitates the movement of refugees throughout the region. About 144,000 refugees had fled Burundi to Tanzania, Rwanda, the DRC, Uganda, and Zambia by June 2015 due to the unrest over the upcoming elections in the country.¹⁵ If the crisis in the DRC deepens, it could unleash catastrophic refugee flows across the entire Great Lakes region.


Addressing these regional problems will require regional institutions to be properly resourced and strengthened. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, for example, was important in a number of constructive initiatives, including helping to create the PSC Framework; hosting the initial discussions that gave rise to the MONUSCO intervention brigade; and sponsoring the Kampala talks from December 2012 to December 2013 between the M23 and the Congolese government, which ultimately led to the rebel group’s surrender. It may be better, however, to shift attention and support away from the relatively narrowly focused ICGLR and towards the better-established and broader regional economic communities: SADC and the EAC. SADC could strengthen its presence in the region by, for example, completing its work to establish a liaison office in Kinshasa (and also, possibly, establishing a similar office in Goma, the capital of Congo’s fragile North Kivu province). A regional joint verification mission for the PSC Framework and a regional joint intelligence facility, one that could track non-state groups and illicit economic activity, could also help to promote peace across the Great Lakes.

International intervention in the region has met with some successes, especially through the coordinated work of the group of special envoys from South Africa, the AU, the UN, and the EU. However, over-reliance on external actors can be dangerous. Their involvement is often shaped by their own parochial interests. They may also be part of the problem – the Great Lakes region’s autocratic leaders rely on support from international backers to remain in power, and external actors have been accused of (directly or indirectly) supporting or condoning the use of force in the region. External interventions can also, intentionally or not, usurp or block local and regional projects. Links between local, national, regional, and external initiatives need to be built in which local, national, and regional actors take the lead in peacemaking efforts.

14 See, for example, Thandika Mkandawire, “Thinking About Developmental States in Africa”, *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 25, no. 3 (2001), pp. 289-314.

15 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Thousands of Refugees Continue to Flee Burundi”, 30 June 2015, <<http://www.unhcr.org/55929f206.html>> (accessed 2 July 2015). The UN estimated 66,612 refugees from Burundi in Tanzania; 56,508 in Rwanda; 11,500 in the DRC; 9,038 in Uganda; and 400 in Zambia.

Over-reliance on external actors is fostered by the fact that regional institutions have not yet developed effective approaches to funding their programmes from their own members, or to enforcing norms of democratic governance. A commitment by the international community to reduce the footprint of some of its interventions (such as MONUSCO) might not only ease some of the tensions between national leaders and international actors, but also force a more serious conversation about how to make regional institutions better promoters of peace and prosperity in the region.



From left, Professor Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, Professor of African Studies, Department of African, African American, and Diaspora Studies, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, United States; Dr Miria Matembe, Founder Member, Centre for Women in Governance (CEWIGO), Kampala, Uganda; and Professor Gilbert Khadiagala, Professor of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), Johannesburg, South Africa.

2. The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Two intertwined factors drive conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: weak state legitimacy, and interference by its neighbours. International responses to these problems have often been limited by an unsophisticated understanding of their dynamics.

The Congolese state does not enjoy widespread legitimacy among its 68 million citizens. This is particularly problematic as planned local and presidential elections approach in October 2015 and November 2016, respectively.¹⁶ President Joseph Kabila is constitutionally prohibited from running for a third term, but may seek to do so, or to prolong his stay in power by delaying elections. Many observers believe that the DRC does not have the procedures and infrastructure in place to hold effective local government elections. The problems include the fact that anyone not registered in the 2011 elections will not be eligible to vote in 2015–2016, thus disenfranchising between five and eight million young people.¹⁷ Also, in January 2015, parliament passed a law expanding the number of provinces in the DRC from 11 to 26, at President Kabila's urging. While this expansion was mandated by the constitution, doing it quickly – the expansion was scheduled to be completed by 30 June 2015 – is unrealistic, and could negatively affect the smooth conduct of elections. Problems in holding local government elections could also be used as a pretext to delay national elections. Heightening the concern, Kinshasa has been hardening its position. In particular, the September 2014 reorganisation of the military is interpreted by some analysts as a way of solidifying military control in advance of possible election-related unrest, and has resulted in individuals accused of abuses being placed in charge of the country's three new “defence zones”: General Gabriel Amisi, accused of selling arms to militias (including to the Hutu-dominated Nyatura) and involvement in illicit tin-mining, was placed in charge of the western zone; General Jean-Claude Kifwa, accused of trading arms to the Mai-Mai Morgan militia in exchange for ivory, was made commander of the southern zone; and one of Kifwa's former subordinates, General Leon Mushale Tshipamba, was given command of the eastern zone.¹⁸

President Kabila's actions have sparked opposition both from within his own party, and from Congolese civil society. For example, he proposed a national census before local government elections – an undertaking that could not have been completed in time to hold elections on schedule. Parliament, though controlled by a pro-Kabila coalition, refused to approve the census, following protests in Kinshasa in January 2015 in which at least 36 people were killed and many more arrested.¹⁹ The DRC could be heading for further unrest, a deepening of Kabila's autocratic rule, or a possible military coup.

16 For all DRC election dates, see Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante, *Décision no. 001/CENI/BUR/15 du 12 Fév. 2015 Portant Publication du Calendrier des Elections Provinciales, Urbaines, Municipales et Locales 2015 et des Elections Présidentielle et Legislatives 2016*, 12 February 2015, <http://www.ceni.gouv.cd/lois/decision_calendrier_contraintes_2015_2016.pdf> (accessed 11 June 2015).

17 On disenfranchisement (giving an estimate of eight million), see Alain-Joseph Lomandja, “Difficile Réforme du Processus Électoral 2015–2016”, *Défense et Sécurité du Congo*, 23 March 2015, <<http://desc-wondo.org/rdc-difficile-reforme-du-processus-electoral-2015-2016-alain-joseph-lomandja>> (accessed 11 June 2015).

18 See, for example, Alex Ntung, “Congo: Kabila Reshuffles His Military Pack”, *African Arguments*, 9 October 2014, <<http://africanarguments.org/2014/10/09/congo-kabila-reshuffles-his-military-pack-by-alex-ntung>> (accessed 2 July 2015); and Malcolm Beith, “Congo's New Cabinet Favors President Kabila As Opposition Splits”, *Bloomberg Business*, 9 December 2014, <<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-09/congo-s-new-cabinet-favors-president-kabila-as-opposition-splits>> (accessed 2 July 2015). On reported abuses by the new commanders, see United Nations, *Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/2012/843, 15 November 2012, pp. 33, 36 (Amisi), 34–35 (Kifwa).

19 Human Rights Watch, “DR Congo: Deadly Crackdown on Protests”, 24 January 2015, <<http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/24/dr-congo-deadly-crackdown-protests>> (accessed 2 July 2015).

The appropriate regional and international response to this situation has many dimensions. On the one hand, any international support of the elections risks at least partly legitimising them. Deficits in President Kabila's legitimacy go back to the first post-conflict elections in 2006, which were broadly supported by the international community, despite their imperfections. SADC, for example, acknowledged problems in the 2006 polls, but pragmatically decided that the primary goal of securing peace was best served by allowing the government to be constituted. Since then, President Kabila has consolidated a highly centralised clientelistic system that often undermines his accountability to the public, weakens security sector reform, and fosters corruption. The flawed 2011 elections, which were widely condemned but sparked little other international reaction, accelerated Kabila's ability to build a power base that lacks broad legitimacy. If major African and international institutions refuse to send observers or other support to forthcoming elections in October 2015 and November 2016, as the European Union has signalled that it will do, this could send a clear message that Joseph Kabila's actions in the lead-up to the polls were unacceptable and had irredeemably tainted them.

On the other hand, local government elections have already been delayed at least three times, having been previously announced for 2005, 2009, and 2013. If appropriate structures are not in place to hold them in a timely, transparent, and accurate manner, perhaps the AU, the UN, and SADC should provide "good offices", as well as financial and technical support, to the Congolese government. This approach would have the advantage of honouring the desire for local government elections that Congolese citizens have expressed, and of actively supporting the strengthening of democracy in the DRC.

The Congo has also suffered destabilising interventions by its neighbours, particularly in the country's eastern provinces (North and South Kivu). While violence in the eastern Congo has garnered much of the international attention, the country faces other challenges as well. For example, an estimated 583,000 people have been displaced by fighting in the southern Katanga province since 2012.²⁰

The persistent insecurity in the DRC that began with the 1996–2003 conflict has always been regionalised. Some of the largest and most dangerous militias in the Kivus, including Burundi's National Forces of Liberation (FNL) and Uganda's Allied Democratic Forces – National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU), are tied to conflicts in neighbouring states. Many indigenous militias, such as the Mai-Mai "self-defence" forces, have also arisen in the eastern DRC, often originally in response to abuses by foreign-backed armed groups.²¹

The primary external player in the Congo, however, is Rwanda. One of the precipitating factors of the 1996 war was the fact that Rwandan *génocidaires* sought refuge in the eastern Congo after they had been defeated by

20 United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 39 of Security Council Resolution 2147 (2014)*, S/2014/957, 30 December 2014, p. 6.

21 See, for example, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History* (London: Zed, 2002), esp. chap. 7.

the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1994. Kigali has been credibly accused of supporting several of the strongest militias, including the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) and the M23. Rwanda has been able to continue its support for armed groups in the DRC in significant part because its international donors – particularly the US and the EU – have been unwilling to exert pressure on Kigali to end its destabilisation of the region. This only began to change in 2013, when strong evidence of Rwandan involvement with the M23 led the United States and several European donors to freeze military aid to the country.

Insecurity in the eastern Congo has also spurred national, regional, and global activity aimed at conflict management and resolution. The DRC and Rwanda mounted joint military operations in 2009, called *Umoja Wetu*, against the FDLR. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region hosted peace talks in Kampala from December 2012 to December 2013 between the Congolese government and the M23. Since 1999, the DRC has been the theatre of one of the largest UN peacekeeping operations in the world, MONUSCO, with 20,091 uniformed personnel as of May 2015.²² In July 2013, MONUSCO added a SADC-led intervention brigade, the first UN force with an explicit mandate of “neutralizing armed groups”,²³ and which has been credited, along with the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC), with the defeat of the M23 in November 2013.²⁴

Persistent insecurity in the Congo’s eastern provinces has also been exacerbated by limitations in international initiatives there. The international response has tended to be dominated by three assumptions: first, that the violence is primarily about national and regional conflict over the illegal exploitation of resources; second, that the worst result of the conflict is violence against women (especially sexual violence); and third, that the solution is to expand state capacity.

Locating the cause of the conflict (as opposed to a significant source of conflict financing) in mineral exploitation conceals the fact that violence in the Kivus is often driven by intensely local disputes, which are more often over land or about who will hold local and traditional offices, than about mineral exploitation. Even the ability of regional actors to attract combatants to their proxies is often tied to the resources that such actors can provide locals with in order to gain the upper hand in internal conflicts with rivals. For example, the Congolese Tutsi (such as the Banyamulenge of the South Kivu highlands), who are the main recruits to pro-Rwandan armed groups, have been involved in land and citizenship disputes with their neighbours since the 1930s.²⁵ International approaches that focus solely on curtailing illegal mineral exploitation cannot therefore deal effectively with these drivers of conflict. Similarly, efforts at security sector reform and improving civil-military relations need to be addressed not only at the national level, but also in terms of local relationships between citizens and security forces. Addressing local drivers of conflict requires understanding local disputes and providing alternative economic opportunities for individuals who might otherwise join armed groups. State illegitimacy exacerbates these problems, as the patronage networks maintained by the government in Kinshasa give it little incentive to engage with local stakeholders outside these networks.

22 Personnel figures from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *UN Missions Summary of Military and Police*, 31 May 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2015/may15_6.pdf> (accessed 2 July 2015). Until July 2010, the mission was known as the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC).

23 United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/2098, (2013) on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, adopted at the Council’s 6943rd meeting, 28 March 2013, op. para. 9. While authorised in March 2013, the Brigade was only fully deployed by October 2013.

24 See, for example, Christoph Vogel, “Big Victory As M23 Surrenders, but Not an End to Congo’s Travails”, International Peace Institute (IPI), New York, Global Observatory, 7 November 2013, <<http://theglobalobservatory.org/2013/11/in-drc-one-militia-m23-down-49-more-to-go>> (accessed 12 March 2015).

25 See Séverine Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 129–141; and Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo*, pp. 225–227.

Unfortunately, deeply ingrained perspectives and procedures in international institutions make it difficult to convince international donors to invest sufficient resources in local efforts. International approaches to the Congolese conflict have, however, been slowly realising the need to focus more on local, “bottom-up” conflicts and to support local conflict resolution efforts with financial, logistical, and technical assistance. For example, the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) has cooperated with civil society organisations in Uganda to promote human rights.²⁶ In addition, the Swiss government’s programme Tujenge Amani! (Swahili for “build peace”) in South Kivu’s Kalehe territory – aimed at reducing violence by the Raia Mutomboki militia – has succeeded in demobilising about 600 fighters and promoting cooperation between the FARDC, traditional leaders, religious leaders, and civil society.²⁷ The Life and Peace Institute, a Swedish non-governmental organisation (NGO), has also worked with Congolese partners – Action for Endogenous Development and Peace (ADEPAE), and the Organisational Innovation Network (RIO) – to hold intercommunity fora that reduce friction over seasonal cattle migration in South Kivu, among other locally focused projects.²⁸ The Dutch government (among other donors) has also supported the creation of decentralised land registration systems in Burundi.²⁹

The single-minded international focus on sex- and gender-based violence in the Congo, though clearly a genuine problem – a 2014 survey conducted in the North Kivu province found that 47 per cent of men surveyed had used violence against an intimate partner³⁰ – can sometimes be counter-productive. Armed actors have learned that violence against women is an effective tactic for gaining international attention, which can be parlayed into more lucrative incentives to lay down their arms. Emphasis on the victimisation of women can also divert attention and resources from other kinds of abuses, such as violence (including sexual violence) against men, and can inadvertently play into problematic international views of Congolese society as inherently violent.

Finally, bolstering state capabilities in eastern Congo without resolving issues of legitimacy may only increase resentment and local support for non-state actors. For example, since the Congolese military is one of the armed actors implicated in human rights abuses, increasing its capacity risks facilitating these abuses.³¹ Critics of the internationally backed approach to stabilisation in the eastern Congo have also raised concerns about whether the UN’s counterinsurgency-derived “islands of stability” strategy will lead to consolidation of the protection of areas that are already relatively safe and favoured by the government in Kinshasa and external actors, at the expense of sacrificing the most vulnerable populations.³²

26 See, for example, James Gathii, “Mission Creep or a Search for Relevance? The East African Court of Justice’s Human Rights Strategy”, *Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law* 24, no. 249, 2013, esp. pp. 254–256, 271–273, 277–283.

27 Samira Usman, “Great Lakes: The Human Security Division’s Commitment to Dialogue”, in Centre for Peacebuilding (KOFF), *KOFF Newsletter* 137, May 2015, p. 10.

28 Life and Peace Institute, “Our Work in the Democratic Republic of Congo”, <<http://life-peace.org/programmes/democratic-republic-of-congo>> (accessed 2 July 2015).

29 Embassies of the Netherlands in Kigali, Kampala, Bujumbura, and Kinshasa, *Great Lakes Region Multi-Annual Strategic Plan, 2014–2017*, October 2013, pp. 14, 17–18.

30 Promundo and Sonke Gender Justice, *Gender Relations, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence, and the Effects of Conflict on Women and Men in North Kivu, Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo*, 2014, <<http://promundoglobal.org/resources/gender-relations-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-and-the-effects-of-conflict-on-women-and-men-in-north-kivu-eastern-drc-results-from-images>> (accessed 1 April 2015), p. 50 (fig. 17).

31 See, for example, Séverine Autesserre, “Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and Their Unintended Consequences”, *African Affairs* III, no. 443 (2012), pp. 219–221.

32 See, for example, Christoph Vogel, “Islands of Stability or Swamps of Insecurity? MONUSCO’s Intervention Brigade and the Danger of Emerging Security Voids in Eastern Congo”, Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, Africa Policy Brief no. 9, February 2014, <<http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/APB9.pdf>> (accessed 1 April 2015).

Ending insecurity and improving governance in the DRC will require a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches to the conflict, with SADC a key actor in these efforts. International supporters of regional governments must therefore be willing to use their leverage to end support for armed groups in the Congo, and should also explore better ways to address human rights abuses, such as targeted sanctions, “naming and shaming” particular perpetrators of abuses, or pursuing a more comprehensive and even-handed strategy of prosecutions by the Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC). At the same time, while it would be a mistake to focus entirely on local conflicts, more effective ways must be found for external actors to facilitate the resolution of micro-scale conflicts by acting in advisory and support (financial, logistical, or technical) roles to local NGOs.



From left, Professor Séverine Autesserre, Associate Professor of Political Science, Barnard College, Columbia University, New York, United States; Mr Giorgio Dhima, Head of the Peace Policy Section for Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, Directorate of Political Affairs and Human Security, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Bern, Switzerland; and Professor Stephen Weissman, Former Staff Director of the United States House of Representatives, Sub-Committee on Africa.

3. Burundi

The crisis in Burundi has centred on Pierre Nkurunziza's bid for a third presidential term. But the situation has roots in deeper problems of the country's political system.

In May 2015, Burundi was scheduled to hold legislative and communal elections, followed by a first-round of presidential polls a month later.³³ These would be the third elections since the 2000 Arusha agreement that formally ended the phase of the country's civil war that started in 1993 and killed an estimated 300,000 people.³⁴ (The last armed faction in Burundi, the National Forces of Liberation, did not lay down its arms until 2006.) In large part due to an opposition boycott in the 2010 elections, President Pierre Nkurunziza's National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) has dominated the government, and has since sought to consolidate its power and shrink the space for dissent and democratic participation.

Nkurunziza formally announced on 25 April 2015 that he planned to take advantage of an ambiguity in the constitution to run for a third presidential term, in violation of the Arusha agreement.³⁵ Article 96 of Burundi's 2005 constitution specifies that the president is to be elected by direct universal suffrage for a five-year term, renewable once. Article 302, however, provides for the election of the first post-transition president by a vote of the National Assembly and Senate. President Nkurunziza's supporters have argued before the Constitutional Court that, because he was not directly elected to his first term, these five years did not count against the Article 96 limit. Others, however, have noted that it is not plausible that this could have been the intention of the constitution's drafters. They argue that Article 302's indirect election was included to smooth the transition from Burundi's long experience with military rule and civil war. The 2000 Arusha agreement also states unambiguously that no president may serve more than two terms.

Reaction to the constitutional claim has been mixed. For example, in March 2015, Burundi's Catholic Church announced its opposition to a third term, regardless of the Constitutional Court's decision.³⁶ In April 2015, the African Union Peace and Security Council called for the Court's decision to be respected.³⁷ A month later, the Court ruled in favour of Nkurunziza. Its vice-president, Sylvere Nimpagaritse, however, fled to Rwanda, claiming that the decision had been made under duress. International observers – such as the chair of the AU Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma,³⁸ and the United States Permanent Representative to the UN, Samantha Power³⁹ – have since criticised the Court's decision.

33 The full 2015 electoral calendar is available on the website of Burundi's Independent National Electoral Commission, www.ceniburundi.bi (accessed 27 March 2015).

34 On the civil war in general, see, for example, Floribert Ngaruko and Janvier D. Nkurunziza, "Civil War and Its Duration in Burundi", in Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (eds.), *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, vol. I, Africa (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005), pp. 35–62.

35 "Burundi President to Run for Third Term Despite Protest", *Al Jazeera*, 25 April 2015; and Devon Curtis and Willy Nindorera, "A Vulnerable Peace: What's at Stake in the Upcoming Burundian Elections?", IPI Global Observatory, 20 February 2015, <<http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/02/vulnerable-peace-burundi-elections-nkurunziza/>> (accessed 5 March 2015).

36 Patrick Nduwimana, "Burundi Catholic Church Says Incumbent President Not Allowed a Third Term", *Reuters*, 7 March 2015. In May 2015, the church announced that it would not observe or support the elections. Clement Manirabarusha, "EU, Burundi's Catholic Church Pull Out from Observing Elections", *Reuters*, 28 May 2015.

37 African Union, "Communiqué: The Peace and Security Council of the African Union Decision on the Developments in Burundi", 28 April 2015.

38 "Burundi: AU Says Environment Not Conducive for Elections", *CCTV Africa*, 7 May 2015.

39 Samantha Power, "Remarks at a Stakeout Following Security Council Consultations on Burundi", US Department of State, 8 May 2015.

The current crisis indicates deeper problems in the political and social arrangements that have prevailed in Burundi since the end of the country's civil war by 2005. The Arusha agreement of 2000 is widely regarded to have been a success. Even with the recent unrest, Burundi is safer for its 10 million inhabitants today than it was two decades ago: more people have access to resources to live decent lives; ethnicity is no longer the main cleavage in society (for example, both the ruling CNDD-FDD and the largest opposition party, the FNL, were associated with Hutu elements during the civil war); the military and police have been ethnically integrated and significantly reformed; and presidential and parliamentary elections were successfully held in 2005 and 2010. Women have also been mobilising for peace in Burundi since at least the July 2000 All-Party Burundi Women's Peace Conference.

But the CNDD-FDD has never appeared to hold the Arusha agreement in high regard. It refused to sign in 2000, and only ended its armed opposition to the accord three years later. Arusha formed the basis for the agreement between the transitional government and the CNDD-FDD, but this was apparently only because the rebel group had no alternative. Nkurunziza's bid for a third presidential term, as well as other laws restricting political and media freedom passed during the CNDD-FDD's ten years in power – such as a 2011 law that gave Burundi's government the power to interfere with the operations of political parties,⁴⁰ and laws passed in 2013 that heavily restricted public demonstrations and media freedoms⁴¹ – could be seen as part of a sustained attack on the basic power-sharing system established by Arusha, and an attempt to create a de facto one-party state. The ruling party's political manoeuvres have also exacerbated tensions over land issues, affecting livelihoods, food security, and the resettlement of the 72,499 refugees from Burundi and 52,946 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country as of December 2014, originating from the civil war and previous unrest.⁴² A 2013 law expanded the scope of the National Commission on Land and Other Assets (CNTB) in a way that critics charged favoured the CNDD-FDD's political allies and members of the Hutu ethnic group, leading to violent opposition in south-eastern Burundi and the suspension of CNTB decisions in March 2015.⁴³ The much-delayed Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has also been politicised. Part of the Arusha agreement, the TRC was finally established in April 2014, and its members were elected in December 2014 amid an opposition boycott.⁴⁴

However, it is not just the CNDD-FDD that has expressed opposition to Arusha. The FNL, led by Agathon Rwasa, also continued fighting until 2006, after rejecting the Arusha accord. Rwasa then fled to the DRC after the 2010 elections, and his FNL restarted paramilitary operations in both the DRC and Burundi, drawing the Burundian military back into the Congolese conflict.⁴⁵ Rwasa has since returned to Burundi to run for political office, but a faction of the FNL remains active in the DRC, and was targeted by MONUSCO in January 2015.⁴⁶ Any analysis of the situation in Burundi must avoid construing Nkurunziza as one-dimensionally bad, or those who oppose him as one-dimensionally good. One issue that is often lost in discussions of punitive measures is that both the democratic structures in Burundi, and its main parties, are young institutions that could benefit as much from support as from being held responsible to strong regional and international democratic norms.

40 United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi, S/2011/751*, 30 November 2011, p. 3.

41 Yolande Bouka, "Status and Dynamics of the Political Situation in Burundi", Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Central Africa Report no. 1, July 2014, <<http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Central-Africa-Report-Issue1-Burundi.pdf>> (accessed 1 April 2015), p. 9.

42 UNHCR, "Burundi", <<http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45c056.html>> (accessed 6 July 2015). See also "Burundi's Land Conundrum", *IRIN News*, 14 November 2013.

43 "Conflicts Fonciers au Burundi: Les Décisions de la CNTB Suspendues", *Radio France Internationale*, 22 March 2015, <<http://www.rfi.fr/africque/20150322-conflits-fonciers-burundi-decisions-cntb-suspendues-pierre-nkurunziza-presidentielle-3e-mandat>> (accessed 1 April 2015).

44 Bouka, "Status and Dynamics", pp. 5-6.

45 "Burundi: Officials Downplay Rebel Activity in Eastern Congo", *IRIN News*, 8 December 2010, <<http://www.irinnews.org/report/91322/burundi-officials-downplay-fnl-rebel-activity-in-eastern-congo>> (accessed 1 April 2015).

46 Judith Verweijen, "Guest Blog: Understanding the Recent Operations Against the FNL/Nzabampema", *Congo Siasa*, 13 January 2015, <<http://congosiassa.blogspot.com/2015/01/guest-blog-understanding-recent.html>> (accessed 3 March 2015).

President Nkurunziza's third-term bid also appears to be a response to divisions within his ruling CNDD-FDD party. Burundi provides an interesting case for the region's ethnic divides. Friction between members of the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups has been a factor in violence and gross human rights abuses in Burundi, Rwanda, and the DRC. Arusha, in an attempt to defuse ethnic tensions, established ethnic power-sharing in the post-conflict government through, for example, a requirement to institute ethnically mixed party lists.⁴⁷ However, while ethnicity was a major factor in the war, and continues to be one in current Burundian social divisions, it was far from the only one, and current conflicts often cut across ethnic divides.⁴⁸ The dominant position of the CNDD-FDD, combined with a need for parties to broaden their ethnic membership, led to opportunists with no deep loyalty to the party or its leadership joining after 2004, thus exacerbating existing divisions. Nkurunziza has maintained a tight inner circle within the party, made up primarily of ex-fighters and "securocrats", and has turned to coercive tactics to maintain his position. For example, former CNDD-FDD party chair Hussein Radjabu was arrested in April 2007 after a political rift with Nkurunziza, though he escaped from prison in March 2015. Radjabu's current whereabouts are unclear, though shortly after his release he claimed to be "living among the Burundian people".⁴⁹ These dynamics make the stakes over a third presidential term extremely high for Nkurunziza and his circle personally, and make it more difficult for him gracefully and safely to step down from office.

Some in the party have come to view Nkurunziza as a political liability. A leaked February 2015 memo by the intelligence service and a March 2015 letter from 17 party leaders both urged him to step down.⁵⁰ While Nkurunziza has never been popular in the capital of Bujumbura, there have been recent reports that his popularity is slipping in the countryside as well, with 62 per cent of people nationwide reportedly opposing a third presidential term.⁵¹ In rural areas, Nkurunziza had been praised for popular projects such as building schools and football stadiums, and promoting maternal health programmes. However, the Catholic Church's criticism of Nkurunziza carries great weight with its members, who constitute about 70 per cent of Burundi's population of 10 million.⁵² Politicisation of the country's land court has also been a major issue in rural areas, and the countryside has seen a rise in "ethnic discourse" (noticeable, for example, to observers of social media).

The political opposition is also divided, thus limiting its effectiveness. It was severely weakened by the decision of most opposition parties to boycott the 2010 presidential and parliamentary elections. This led to exile for some opposition leaders (such as Agathon Rwaso), arrest for others (such as François Nyamoa of the Movement for Solidarity and Democracy [MSD]), and little meaningful opposition representation in the government. The CNDD-FDD has used its dominant political position to intimidate and fragment the opposition. One tactic, for example, has been to employ Burundi's electoral laws to allow the government to recognise dissident factions within opposition parties as the official leadership of these parties, as was the case with the Union for National Progress (UPRONA) in January 2014.⁵³ The opposition has been further weakened by gerrymandered electoral districts, alleged irregularities in the party registration process, and reported threats against citizens who register

47 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, signed 28 August 2000, prot. II, chap. II, art. 12 (13); and *Constitution Interimraire Post-Transition de la République du Burundi*, promulgated 18 March 2005, art. 129. See also Devon Curtis, "The International Peacebuilding Paradox: Power-Sharing and Post-Conflict Governance in Burundi", *African Affairs* 112, no. 446 (2013), p. 84.

48 Stef Vandeginste, "Chronique Politique du Burundi 2013-2014", in Filip Reyntjens, Stef Vandeginste, and Marijke Verpoorten (eds.), *L'Afrique des Grands Lacs: Annuaire 2013-2014* (Antwerp: University of Antwerp, 2014), pp. 19, 23 (n. 17); and Curtis, "International Peacebuilding Paradox", p. 74.

49 Miguel Salmeron, "Burundi: Après sa Spectaculaire Évasion, Radjabu Sort de Son Silence", *RFI*, 10 March 2015 (CCR's translation).

50 Olivier Caslin, "Burundi: Nkurunziza Vers un Troisième Mandat?", *Jeune Afrique*, 11 March 2015; and Edouard Madirisha, "De Grosses Pointures du Cndd-Fdd Disent Non à un 3ème Mandat de Pierre Nkurunziza", *Iwacu*, 23 March 2015.

51 Boniface Dulani, "African Publics Strongly Support Term Limits, Resist Leaders' Efforts to Extend Their Tenure", *Afrobarometer Dispatch* no. 30, 25 May 2015, p. 4.

52 Nduwimana, "Burundi Catholic Church".

53 See, for example, Vandeginste, "Chronique Politique", pp. 17-18.

for opposition parties. Burundi's electoral commission also issued a ruling in August 2014 prohibiting anyone with a pending lawsuit against them from standing for election, which would bar at least two important opposition candidates – Agathon Rwasa (no longer head of the FNL, but running as an independent) and Frédéric Bamvuginyivira (Sahwanya – Front for Democracy in Burundi [FRODEBU]) – from running.⁵⁴

The CNDD-FDD has shown itself willing to use coercive tactics against the population, even before the crackdown on protests. Its *Imbonerakure* youth wing has long been accused of violence, especially in rural areas. The CNDD-FDD has been accused by both civil society and the UN of arming the *Imbonerakure*,⁵⁵ and executing captured rebels.⁵⁶ As earlier noted, insecurity in Burundi has generated large refugee flows, numbering about 144,000 people by June 2015, into neighbouring countries. A complete collapse of the 2000 Arusha accord would exacerbate inter-communal conflict, particularly over access to economic resources (importantly, but not limited to, land).

The African and broader international community has been engaged in Burundi, but has tended to focus on stabilisation and crisis response, to the detriment of human rights and long-term democratic governance – in part from a desire not to upset a fragile peacebuilding process. The Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, Said Djinnit, had been engaged in talks with members of the government, opposition parties, and civil society. However, President Nkurunziza was accused of offering as “concessions” issues that should not have been open to discussion, such as the release of people imprisoned for non-violent protest, restoration of the ability of radio stations to operate as long as they agreed not to report live from protests, and a promise not to run for a *fourth* presidential term. The East African Community's representatives on the ground (such as a May 2015 fact-finding mission led by Tanzania's foreign minister, Bernard Membe) have been focused on removing obstacles to the polls going forward, so they may be conducted in a free and fair manner. At a July 2015 summit, while the EAC criticised the June 2015 parliamentary and local elections, it called for Nkurunziza to remain in power while recommending that the planned July 2015 presidential elections be delayed to ensure that these polls could be “free, fair, peaceful, and credible”.⁵⁷

Africa has institutions that could be used to address the situation in Burundi diplomatically, such as the African Union and its Panel of the Wise. However, so far, these bodies have been unable to take effective action. The AU in particular has been criticised for not taking a stronger stance towards Nkurunziza's actions through its special envoys (until April 2015, Malian diplomat Boubacar Diarra, and thereafter Ibrahima Fall). AU Commission chair Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma has appealed to the regional leadership of the EAC in deference to the principle of subsidiarity, according to which regional organisations should be the first to act, where possible. In March 2015, she travelled to Burundi to meet with President Nkurunziza, as well as with women and other civil society leaders. Dlamini-Zuma reiterated that the CNDD-FDD had the primary responsibility for maintaining peace in

54 On various electoral issues, see United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi*, S/2015/36, 19 January 2015, pp. 3–5.

55 United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Burundi*, S/2014/550, 31 July 2014, p. 3.

56 Human Rights Watch, “Burundi: Summary Executions by Army, Police”, 12 February 2015, <<http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/12/burundi-summary-executions-army-police>> (accessed 12 March 2015).

57 Isaac Ongiri, “EAC Wants Burundi Election Postponed”, *Daily Nation* (Kenya), 6 July 2015.

the country, and called for a postponement of the elections, then scheduled for May 2015. She also asked the country's Constitutional Court to consider the political, as well as the legal, implications of a third presidential term, and arranged for an independent advisory opinion from the AU Office of the Legal Counsel, headed by Vincent Nmeihelle. However, at the time of the AU chair's visit, Nkurunziza had not declared his intention to seek a third presidential term, nor had elections taken place. Invoking AU provisions on unconstitutional changes of government and suspending Burundi from membership, or seeking other sanctions through the AU Peace and Security Council, would therefore have been premature.



From left, Dr Devon Curtis, Lecturer, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, England; Dr Marie-Louise Baricako, Member, United Nations Secretary-General's High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations; and Ambassador Welile Nhlapo, Former Special Representative of South Africa to the Great Lakes Region; and Former National Security Advisor to the South African President, Tshwane.

4. Regional Actors: Rwanda and Uganda

The aggressive foreign policies of Rwanda and Uganda towards the region, particularly their support for armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have contributed to instability in the Great Lakes.

While it is easier to criticise them when they violate the sovereignty of other countries, respect for sovereignty should not continue to deflect attention from domestic repression in both countries. Uganda and Rwanda are formally multi-party democracies with elections approaching in 2016 and 2017, respectively. However, they are both effectively dominated by a single party, with long-serving leaders, Yoweri Museveni and Paul Kagame, who have taken steps to restrict effective internal dissent in their respective countries.⁵⁸

Rwanda

In only 21 years since the 1994 genocide, Rwanda has become touted as an example of successful development and an “island of stability” in a troubled region. However, its gains in areas such as the provision of public services for its 12 million citizens mask the fact that its stability is based largely on fear. While some Rwandan officials pay lip service to democracy, others argue that suppressing freedom of expression prevents the resurgence of ethnic violence.⁵⁹ But the government restricts much expression and political activity that is unrelated to the genocide or to ethnic hatred. Fear of genocide thus often appears to be a pretext for maintaining control.

The Rwandan government has shown itself willing to use violence to stifle dissent. For example, in May 1998, the first post-war interior minister, Seth Sendashonga, was killed in Nairobi, Kenya, after he tried to found a new opposition group. More recently, in January 2014, Patrick Karegeya, a former head of intelligence, was murdered in Johannesburg, South Africa. In both assassinations, involvement of the Rwandan government was suspected.⁶⁰ The Rwandan state has also allegedly been involved with many “disappearances”, a reported 30 in 2014 alone. Some victims reappear after weeks or months, many allege torture, and some are tried for collaboration with the FDLR.⁶¹

These acts of apparent political violence take place in a broader context of repression. Paul Kagame reportedly won his last two presidential elections with more than 90 per cent of the vote, and the Rwandan Patriotic Front routinely commands more than 70 per cent of the parliamentary vote. Officially recognised political parties tend to be part of the RPF coalition (such as the Party for Progress and Concord), or at least often support the government politically (such as the Social Democratic Party). Parties that have mounted genuine opposition are targeted for repression. In 2010, three new parties attempted to contest the presidential election: the Social

58 David Smith, “Paul Kagame Hints at Seeking Third Term as Rwandan President”, *The Guardian* (London), 23 April 2014; and Elias Biryabarema, “Uganda’s Ruling Party Urges Museveni to Run Again in 2016”, *Reuters*, 12 February 2014.

59 International Crisis Group, *Rwanda at the End of the Transition: A Necessary Political Liberalisation*, Africa Report no. 53, 4 December 2002, <<http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/africa/central-africa/rwanda/Rwanda%20at%20the%20End%20of%20the%20Transition%20A%20Necessary%20Political%20Liberalisation.pdf>> (accessed 1 April 2015), pp. 1-2.

60 Human Rights Watch, *Repression Across Borders: Attacks and Threats Against Rwandan Opponents and Critics Abroad*, 28 January 2014.

61 By May 2014, Human Rights Watch was already reporting 14 confirmed cases. “Rwanda: Spate of Enforced Disappearances”, 16 May 2014. <<http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/16/rwanda-spate-enforced-disappearances>> (accessed 19 June 2015). The higher number was provided at the Cape Town seminar.

Party (PS)-Imberakuri, the United Democratic Forces (FDU)-Inkingi, and the Democratic Green Party. André Kagwa Rwisereka of the Democratic Green Party was killed in July 2010, but no one was held to account for his murder. Critics of the government believe it was a political assassination. Victoire Ingabire and Joseph Ntagwandi of the Democratic Green Party, and Bernard Ntaganda of the PS-Imberakuri, faced beatings and periods of imprisonment.⁶² None of the parties ultimately ran candidates. Ingabire was sentenced to eight years in prison for “terrorism” and “genocide denial” in October 2012, a sentence that was increased to 15 years after her appeal was dismissed in December 2013.⁶³

Civil society in Rwanda has also been stifled through a combination of government intimidation and infiltration. Nearly all the leading human rights activists have left the country – the only significant human rights group still active in Rwanda is the regional group Human Rights League in the Great Lakes Region (LDGL).⁶⁴ Remaining civil society groups mostly engage in uncontroversial service delivery tasks, such as childhood education.

Most independent journalists have also been forced into silence or exile. In April 2010, two of the most popular independent newspapers, *Umuseso* and *Umuwugizi*, were suspended for inciting public disorder, and their leadership sued and exiled.⁶⁵ Jean-Léonard Rugabage of *Umuwugizi* was killed in June 2010.⁶⁶ In October 2014, the government suspended the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) Kinyarwanda service, one of the most popular radio services in the country, in response to a BBC documentary, *Rwanda’s Untold Story*, that the Kagame administration claims amounted to “genocide denial”.⁶⁷ The remaining media are pro-government, and have been publishing sycophantic articles about Kagame that seem to be laying the groundwork for him to run for a third presidential term in 2017. However, private radio stations have begun hosting call-in programmes on which more sensitive issues are discussed.

The possibility of Kagame running for a third term in 2017 (which would require forcing through a change of Rwanda’s constitution) is being presented as the “will of the people”. But in a context in which the basic building blocks of democracy – such as freedom of speech and the spirit of independent thought – are not in place, it is not clear how this could genuinely be the case. Despite these abuses, international criticism of Kagame has been muted compared to the reaction to Burundian leader Pierre Nkurunziza’s third-term bid.

Donor governments have been, until recently, unwilling to criticise Rwanda, partly due to guilt over international failures during the genocide of 1994, in which about 800,000 people were killed. This has been changing with respect to Rwanda’s involvement in the DRC. But international donors are still largely reluctant to criticise

62 Human Rights Watch, *Rwanda: Attacks on Freedom of Expression, Association, and Assembly in the Run-Up to Presidential Elections*, 2 August 2010.

63 Kris Berwouts, “Injustice and Indifference: Victoire Ingabire Is Sentenced to 15 Years on Appeal in Rwanda”, *African Arguments*, 19 December 2013, <<http://africanarguments.org/2013/12/19/injustice-and-indifference-victoire-ingabire-is-sentenced-to-15-years-on-appeal-in-rwanda-by-kris-berwouts>> (accessed 2 July 2015).

64 Human Rights Watch described the League for the Promotion and Defence of Human Rights (LIPRODHOR) as the “last effective human rights group” in Rwanda at the time of LIPRODHOR’s controversial takeover by a government-backed board in August 2013 that was widely viewed as neutralising the organisation; “Rwanda: Takeover of Rights Group”, 14 August 2013, <<http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/14/rwanda-takeover-rights-group>> (accessed 6 July 2015). See also United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association at the Conclusion of His Visit to the Republic of Rwanda”, 27 January 2014, <<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14201&LangID=E>> (accessed 6 July 2015). The LDGL’s continued independence was referred to positively at the seminar.

65 Tom Rhodes, “Censored in Rwanda, Editors Work from Exile”, Committee to Protect Journalists, 18 October 2010, <<https://cpj.org/blog/2010/10/censored-in-rwanda-editors-work-from-exile.php>> (accessed 2 July 2015).

66 Human Rights Watch, *Rwanda: Attacks on Freedom of Expression*, p. 5.

67 “Rwanda Suspends BBC Broadcasts over Genocide Film”, *BBC News*, 24 October 2014.

Kagame's internal repression. Criticism of Kigali will have a limited impact so long as African leaders do not speak out as well – foreign voices are not as effective as grassroots, national, and regional ones. This may make it more sensible to look to the leadership of an African power like South Africa to speak out rather than relying solely on the broader international community, if the aim is to achieve internal democratic reform in Rwanda.

Uganda

In 1996, Uganda was part of the coalition that supported rebel forces against the Western-backed dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko in the DRC. Many allies in that coalition intended to open regional space for democracy, but Rwanda and Uganda sought to pursue their narrow economic and strategic interests. The alliance between Rwanda and Uganda fell apart early in the 1998–2003 phase of the war, and their rift led to three military clashes in Kisangani in 1999 and 2000 in which hundreds of Congolese were killed.⁶⁸ It also resulted in violence between their proxies in the DRC, starting with the split between the pro-Kigali Congolese Rally for Democracy–Goma (RCD-G) and the pro-Kampala RCD-Kisangani (RCD-K) in May 1999, though the rift between Rwanda and Uganda has recently shown signs of healing. Yoweri Museveni's ostensible reasons for the war were to deny rear bases to Ugandan rebels and to protect his country from invasion by the DRC. But the main reason for Kampala's continued interventions in the Congo may be economic exploitation. This, at least, was the explanation of a 2005 International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling requiring Uganda to pay reparations to the DRC, and the implication of the 2002 final report of the United Nations panel of experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Congo.⁶⁹

Uganda has played the role of both “arsonist” and “fire-fighter” in the region. For example, in December 1999, Kampala brought together several rebel factions in the DRC in a bid to resolve their differences. These were the RCD-G, the RCD-K, and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), the latter two of which were Ugandan allies.⁷⁰ Similarly, while Museveni was chair of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region between January 2012 and January 2014, he hosted the Kampala talks under the auspices of which M23 fighters eventually laid down their arms in December 2013. Along with Rwanda, however, Uganda had earlier been implicated in supporting the M23. Kampala's problematic role in the region is facilitated by the fact that most regional and international initiatives are ad hoc, and the capacity of regional mechanisms to promote effective conflict management needs urgently to be strengthened. Uganda's involvement fills the vacuum left by regional institutions.

Formally, Uganda's 38 million citizens have many political freedoms, but most of the country's political mechanisms are dysfunctional, and the government has sometimes acted in repressive ways towards the political opposition, and in restricting press freedom.⁷¹ Uganda has a strong civil society and outspoken political

68 See OHCHR, *Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed Within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Between March 1993 and June 2003*, August 2010, pp. 189–190. The report estimates 30 civilian deaths during clashes in August 1999, 24 in May 2000, and between 244 and 760 in June 2000.

69 International Court of Justice, *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)*, 2005/26, decided 19 December 2005; and United Nations, *Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/2002/1146, 15 October 2002, pp. 19–23.

70 See Gérard Prunier, *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 229.

71 See, for example, Amnesty International, *Rule by Law: Discriminatory Legislation and Legitimized Abuses in Uganda*, 2014, <<http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/rule-by-law-discriminatory-legislation-and-legitimized-abuses-in-uganda>> (accessed 6 July 2015).

parties, but they are at a disadvantage relative to the government’s organisational capacity and resources to co-opt and intimidate its opponents.⁷² As with Rwanda, while Uganda’s regional role has been increasingly criticised, powerful Western actors have been largely silent about internal repression as protesters have been intimidated, beaten, and tear-gassed. However, both Rwanda and Uganda rely on international donors for between 19 and 40 per cent of their national budgets, thus providing these external actors with leverage.⁷³

Uganda’s foreign policy is often driven by Museveni’s decisions, without a clear and coherent strategy. For example, in an August 1999 address to the Ugandan parliament, he made clear that intervening in the DRC was not a matter of national consensus, but a decision he had made in consultation with only a few military commanders. As he noted in that address, the “decision ... was taken by the Army High Command” and later approved by the Army Council.⁷⁴



From left, Ms Carina Tertsakian, Senior Researcher, Human Rights Watch, London, England; Professor John Stremmler, Visiting Professor of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, and Former Vice-President for Peace Programmes, Carter Centre, Atlanta, United States; and Mr Paul Mulindwa, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town.

72 Max Delaney, “Why Uganda’s Besigye Failed to Deliver Egypt-Style Protests After Election Defeat”, *Christian Science Monitor*, 22 February 2011.

73 Rwanda depends on donor funding for about 30–40 per cent of its budget, and Uganda for about 19 per cent. See World Bank, “Rwanda Overview”, <<http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview>> (accessed 15 June 2015); and Sophie Nampewo Kakembo, “Aid Accounts for a Falling Share of Uganda’s Budget”, *Development Initiatives*, 22 July 2014, <<http://devinit.org/#/post/aid-accounts-falling-share-ugandas-budget>> (accessed 15 June 2015).

74 Speech reproduced in “Why I Sent UPDF to DR Congo – Museveni”, *The Observer* (Uganda), 14 July 2014.

5. Regional Actors: South Africa, the Southern African Development Community, and the African Union

Continental actors from outside the region – or whose membership extends beyond the region – notably South Africa, SADC, and the AU, have long played an active role in the Great Lakes.

For example, the African Union began deploying the first wholly African peacekeeping operation, AMIB, in Burundi in February 2003; South Africa was instrumental to the dialogue that created a new Congolese government in July 2003; and the MONUSCO intervention brigade deployed from August 2013, was credited with progress against rebel groups in the eastern Congo, and remains led and staffed by SADC personnel.

South Africa and the Southern African Development Community

South Africa has long played a role in peacebuilding efforts in the Great Lakes region. In Burundi, President Nelson Mandela took over the facilitation of the Arusha peace process in 1999 after the death of the former president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere. South Africa's deputy president (now president), Jacob Zuma, succeeded him in 2002. The country sent 700 troops to protect returning politicians from exile assuming their posts in the transitional government after the peace deal,⁷⁵ and was instrumental in the creation of the African Union Mission in Burundi in 2003.⁷⁶

Under president Thabo Mbeki, Tshwane (Pretoria) hosted the inter-Congolese dialogue at Sun City from 2002, which led to the adoption of a transitional constitution for the DRC in 2003. President Mandela had also unsuccessfully sought to mediate an end to the Congolese war in a direct meeting between Mobutu Sese Seko and Laurent Kabila in May 1997. South Africa has had a Special Envoy to the Great Lakes since 1996, when Welile Nhlapo was appointed Special Envoy to Burundi, a position that was expanded to cover the entire region, and in which he served until 2000. Later, Kingsley Mamabolo served in the position from 2006 to 2009. He was succeeded by Dumisani Khumalo, before Nhlapo's second tenure, from 2011 to 2013. Eddy Maloka has filled the role since 2013. Tshwane maintains observer status at the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region as well as having two military officers on the ICGLR joint verification mechanism. Under the auspices of the South Africa-DRC binational commission, established by the February 2004 general cooperation agreement between the two countries, South Africa has signed over 36 bilateral agreements with the DRC covering various fields, including capacity-building in defence, police, justice, elections, and public service reform. Tshwane has also signed the Trilateral Mechanism on Dialogue and Cooperation between Angola, the DRC, and South Africa, towards the achievement of security, stability, democratic governance, and development in the region. In February 2013, South Africa was one of the

⁷⁵ Curtis, "International Peacebuilding Paradox", p. 83.

⁷⁶ See, for example, Kristina A. Bentley and Roger Southall, *An African Peace Process: Mandela, South Africa, and Burundi* (Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council [HSRC], 2005), esp. chap. 10.

signatories to the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework. It was also one of the key architects of the 3,000-strong SADC-led MONUSCO intervention brigade, in which its troops serve alongside personnel from Tanzania and Malawi, and which was instrumental in the defeat of the M23 in November 2013.⁷⁷

South Africa's approaches to Burundi and the DRC reflect a model of peacebuilding derived from its largely successful transition to majority rule. In both countries, Tshwane promoted inter-communal dialogue and a transitional government characterised by power-sharing between belligerent factions.⁷⁸ The successes (or failures) of post-conflict regimes in the Great Lakes therefore have implications for South Africa's image as a continental leader.⁷⁹

South Africa's role as an "honest broker" in the Great Lakes region has sometimes been questioned, given its economic interests there. A government with direct national interests could be tempted to act in pursuit of these interests, rather than to pursue peace impartially. However, a government with direct interests in a region is also likely to have greater commitment than an actor whose interests are not directly threatened by instability. In addition, Tshwane's influence over Kinshasa is sometimes overstated. For example, while South Africa consulted with the DRC over the latter's upcoming revisions of its provincial structures, these conversations were limited to discussing South Africa's own experiences with decentralisation after the end of apartheid in 1994 and suggesting that the economic dominance of mineral-rich Katanga could be reduced by creating several provinces from it.

Perhaps most significant, South Africa maintains that it understands its involvement in the Great Lakes region as a member of SADC. The organisation's involvement in the Great Lakes dates back to 1997, when the DRC became a member with strong support from South Africa. SADC's collective security provisions were invoked to send Zimbabwean, Angolan, and Namibian troops to the Congo to defend the government of President Laurent Kabila in 1998. Starting with about 600 Zimbabwean and 1,500 Angolan troops in August 1998,⁸⁰ by December 2000 there were an estimated 11,000 Zimbabwean military personnel, about 2,500 Angolans, and about 2,000 Namibians in the DRC.⁸¹ South Africa and Botswana, however, challenged the depiction of the force as a SADC one.⁸² Joyce Banda, who was then SADC chair and president of Malawi, along with Yoweri Museveni, then chair of the ICGLR and president of Uganda, signed the final joint communiqué of the Kampala talks that formally ended the M23 rebellion in December 2013. A month earlier, SADC and the ICGLR had held a joint summit in Tshwane to discuss the disarmament of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda. This summit was followed by a joint ministerial meeting in the Angolan capital of Luanda in July 2014, at which a six-month deadline for FDLR disarmament was agreed. As of February 2015, the United Nations reported that 339 FDLR combatants had voluntarily disarmed alongside 1,119 of their dependents.⁸³

77 Andre Roux, "South Africa and the UN Intervention Brigade in the DRC", *ISS Today*, 24 April 2013, <<http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/south-africa-and-the-un-intervention-brigade-in-the-drc>> (accessed 9 March 2015).

78 Curtis, "Exporting Peace", pp. 255-258.

79 CCR, *Post-Apartheid South Africa's Foreign Policy After Two Decades*, seminar report, Cape Town, June 2014.

80 Filip Reyntjens, *The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2000* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 197; and Martin R. Rupiya, "A Political and Military Review of Zimbabwe's Involvement in the Second Congo War", in John F. Clark (ed.), *The African Stakes of the Congo War* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 94. Reyntjens cites "several Angolan battalions"; the numeric estimate is based on a battalion size of about 500 troops.

81 International Crisis Group, *Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War*, Africa Report no. 26, 20 December 2000, p. 4 and app. C.

82 Gilbert M. Khadiagala, "Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in Southern Africa's Fading Frontline", in Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons (eds.), *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2001), pp. 143-145.

83 United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/2015/172, 10 March 2015, p. 11.

Concern over South Africa's role in the sub-region centred on the Inga III Dam, planned as the first phase of the Grand Inga Dam project on the Congo River. In November 2011, the governments of South Africa and the DRC signed a memorandum of understanding that ultimately led to an October 2013 treaty under which South Africa agreed to buy 2,500 megawatts of Inga III's expected 4,800 megawatts of hydroelectric output. Critics charge that this deal disproportionately benefits South Africa, and that the timing of the memorandum was suspiciously close to the November 2011 Congolese elections – polls that South Africa was one of few countries to have certified as having been “successful”.

However, South African president Jacob Zuma made his statement on the 2011 elections only after receiving a positive report from the SADC observer mission.⁸⁴ In addition, the joint statement by the African Union, SADC, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the ICGLR, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) observer missions also declared the elections to have been successful, and called for the results to be respected.⁸⁵ While South Africa is set to consume more than half of the planned output of the Inga III Dam, it views the project as beneficial for Southern Africa as a whole. Tshwane argues that it signed the memorandum with Kinshasa not because it plans to dominate the project – it could not finance the project alone even if it so desired – but because such a project needs a lead nation to spearhead it, and South Africa is well positioned to play this role.

The African Union

There has been significant concern over respect for the sovereignty of states in the Great Lakes region, though sovereignty has sometimes been invoked by some African governments to protect incumbent autocratic regimes. This is why the AU's Constitutive Act of 2000 has sought to limit the applicability of sovereignty by permitting the organisation to intervene in cases of gross human rights abuses and incidents likely to result in regional instability.

The African Union has also been an active player in the Great Lakes region for more than a decade. In 2003, it deployed the African Union Mission in Burundi, the first peacekeeping mission wholly planned and executed by members of the continental body. The 3,335-strong mission was led by South Africa and also involved troops from Mozambique and Ethiopia, as well as military observers from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo, and Tunisia.⁸⁶ More recently, in November 2012, the AU appointed Malian diplomat Boubacar Diarra as Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region. In October 2013, AU Commission chair Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma made an official visit to the DRC in support of the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework. In June 2015, Diarra was succeeded by Ibrahima Fall, the former UN Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region.

84 Republic of South Africa, “Statement on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Presidential and Parliamentary Elections”, 5 December 2011.

85 African Union, Southern African Development Community, Economic Community of Central African States, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, “Joint Declaration on the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, 30 November 2011.

86 Festus Aboagye, “The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons Learned from the First African Union Peacekeeping Operation”, *Conflict Trends* 2004/2 (2004), p. 11.

Since May 2013, the AU and the UN have jointly convened a regional oversight mechanism for the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework. The 15-member AU Peace and Security Council has prioritised the situation as well, issuing a decision in February 2015 expressing concern about the rift between MONUSCO and the Congolese army in operations against the FDLR.⁸⁷ While much external attention to the situation in the Great Lakes has been security-focused, the AU Peace and Security Council also noted the importance of economic growth and poverty reduction to the long-term future of the region, welcoming the private investment conference held by the UN, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, and the government of Angola, in December 2014. Beyond the DRC, as earlier noted above, the AU Mission in Burundi was deployed in 2003, and the continental body maintains an office in Burundi. During his tenure as AU special envoy, Diarra had expressed concerns about the political deadlock between the ruling CNDD-FDD and the opposition UPRONA, while the AU has repeatedly reiterated its support for the Arusha agreement.⁸⁸

Constructive dialogue among international actors in the region is important for establishing a common approach, but all actors in the Great Lakes need to recognise four “inconvenient truths” about international involvement in the region.


First, the international community often acts as if more money automatically buys a better solution to conflicts. Second, external actors tend to focus disproportionately on military analyses of the region’s problems and hence often search for military solutions. This mistakes a symptom – armed non-state actors – for the root causes of the problem, such as lack of socio-economic development, poor governance, and manipulation of ethnicity. Third, a major cause of the region’s problems is that it has often been the victim of *realpolitik* – powerful national and international actors have pursued their own parochial interests with little concern for the interests or perspectives of the region’s citizens. This includes organisations involved in the “industry of conflict”. Businesses that profit from the economic access that conflict provides, as well as some governments and aid agencies, sometimes have little incentive in seeing the conflicts actually resolved. Finally, while international actors often look for ready-made solutions to conflicts, resolving the issues in the Great Lakes region will require close attention to the needs of its citizens, which are varied and complicated. The international community’s limited tool-kit of sticks and carrots is often inadequate. For example, incentives applied at the state level may not address the fact that corruption and limited economic opportunities have left many youth in the region (more than 30 per cent of the regional population were aged between 10 and 24 as of 2013)⁸⁹ feeling as if they do not have a stake in its future. There is a particular need for new, more effective approaches to resource management in the region. It should not be assumed that “more effective” necessarily means stronger enforcement. An inventory should be undertaken of other resource regimes so that their strengths and weaknesses can be assessed. It may turn out that a more effective conflict management system in the Great Lakes region will have more to do with the coordination and/or consolidation of existing tools.

87 African Union, “Communiqué of the 488th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council”, PSC/PR/COMM.(CDLXXXVIII), 23 February 2015.

88 Institute for Security Studies, “Country Analysis: Burundi”, Peace and Security Council Report no. 57, April 2014, <<http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/PSC57April14Eng.pdf>> (accessed 9 March 2015).

89 Population Reference Bureau, “Population of Youth Ages 10–24”, <<http://www.prb.org/DataFinder/Topic/Rankings.aspx?ind=19>> (accessed 2 July 2015).

Despite some critics calling for the dissolution of the ICGLR, the AU regards the body as still having an important role to play in the region. The conference was key to the resolution of the stalemate that continued after the signing of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement in 1999. The states that neighbour the DRC – including Rwanda and Uganda – had security concerns over withdrawing their troops and proxy forces from the country. Only the promise of both an interposition force to maintain security and a long-term platform (the ICGLR) for the discussion of governance and socio-economic issues in the region convinced them to withdraw by 2002, though they continued to intervene sporadically and to loot the Congo's resources.



From left, Ambassador Nshakivane Mashimbye, Ambassador of South Africa to the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Dr Kaire Mbuende, Former Executive Secretary, Southern African Development Community; and Ambassador Lazarous Kapambwe, Advisor for Economic Affairs, Office of the Chair, African Union Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

6. External Actors: The United Nations and the European Union

Both the United Nations and the European Union have had a significant presence in the Great Lakes region for decades, but both are now facing limits to their ability to influence the situation there, due to a combination of organisational constraints on action, resistance from regional governments, and the need for external actors to play a supporting role while allowing regional and continental actors to lead.

While the discussion here focuses on the UN and the EU, other external actors such as China, the New Development Bank of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) bloc, and the US should also be kept in mind.

The United Nations

In July 2014, the UN appointed Said Djinnit as its Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region, replacing Ireland's Mary Robinson, the first UN Great Lakes envoy, who had served in the position since March 2013. As with the AU, a key focus of the UN envoy's work is to support the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework.

The United Nations is institutionally complex and cannot be regarded as a unitary actor. Peacekeeping operations may have mandatory obligations that they are not well-resourced or well-designed to fulfil. The 20,000-strong United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, is mandated to support local elections in the DRC, despite the fact that the required resources – from both the UN and Kinshasa – would be at least comparable to the investment in the Congo's first elections in 2006, which cost about \$500 million.⁹⁰ MONUSCO is also mandated to monitor the arms embargo, which it does not have the capacity to do.⁹¹

Nor is the UN Security Council the only place where political interests are at play in peacekeeping mandates. Because troop and police contributions to UN peacekeeping operations are voluntary, the world body must be sensitive to the interests of large contributors whose withdrawal could threaten ongoing and future operations. For example, an August 2010 UN report accused the Rwandan military and Kigali-backed rebel groups of human rights violations in the eastern Congo during the 1996–2003 conflict.⁹² At the time the report was released in October 2010, Rwanda was the eighth largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, and had threatened to withdraw all of its personnel from these missions if the report was made public without revision. The document (including the accusations against Rwanda and its proxies) was only released after being leaked to the press, and after the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, had personally travelled to Kigali to discuss it with Paul Kagame, and allowed Rwanda to include a reply in the final release.⁹³ As of May 2015, Rwanda was the

90 United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/2053, adopted by the Council at its 6792nd meeting, 27 June 2012, op. para. 16. On the cost, see, for example, UN, *United Nations Peace Operations Year in Review 2006*, <<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/2006/YIR2006.pdf>> (accessed 2 July 2015).

91 United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/2147, (2014), adopted by the Council at its 7150th meeting, 28 March 2014, op. para. 4(c).

92 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Report of the Mapping Exercise*, esp. pp. 279–282.

93 “Ban’s Discussions with Rwandan Leader on UN Rights Report to Continue”, *UN News Centre*, 9 September 2010.

fifth largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, and Kigali seems to have pursued greater contributions to UN missions in part to achieve this kind of influence. Rwanda also served on the UN Security Council between 2013 and 2014, at a time when it was accused of destabilising the Great Lakes region.

The UN's presence in any individual country is also multifaceted, which may limit the ways in which resources can be deployed. Its member states are required to pay their share of the peacekeeping budget, while contributions to UN agencies that operate projects alongside peacekeeping missions (such as humanitarian assistance) are typically voluntary. This means that peacekeepers are often much better-resourced than other elements of the UN presence. While everyone recognises in principle that an active civilian component is necessary to complement military efforts in order to address insecurity, peacekeepers are heavily military-focused and tend to use their resources on the mission itself rather than for post-conflict reconstruction efforts. In the 2014–2015 fiscal year, for example, MONUSCO was only budgeted for \$7 million in “quick-impact projects” – small humanitarian and infrastructure projects intended to build good will for the mission – while the rest of its \$1.4 billion 2014–2015 budget was designated for operational costs.⁹⁴

The UN, however, faces more pressing challenges in the Great Lakes region. As of February 2015, its military operations in the DRC were effectively halted. The immediate cause was Kinshasa's decision to put two commanders – Fall Sikabwe and Bruno Mandevu – who had been “red-listed” by the UN over allegations of human rights abuses, in charge of the Congolese army's anti-FDLR operations. These operations were intended to be the next campaign for the SADC-led intervention brigade. While the UN ban technically only applied to joint operations with the red-listed commanders, military cooperation in general was affected by the dispute.

Some observers believe that the Congolese government chose the commanders of its anti-FDLR operations so as to provoke a confrontation with the world body. In January 2010, president Joseph Kabila had signalled that he would formally ask the UN operation to leave the country. A joint working group established by the government and the UN to assess security conditions was originally intended by Kinshasa to develop an “exit strategy” for the UN Organisation Mission in the DRC, as the mission was then named. However, the UN was able to negotiate for a reorganisation from MONUC to MONUSCO instead, which involved a draw-down of 2,000 troops, redeployment of the 19,000 remaining UN personnel to concentrate them in the eastern Kivu provinces, and revisions to the mandate that emphasised the primary role of the Congolese government.⁹⁵ The UN is again facing a government in Kinshasa that is ambivalent about its presence and has called for a reduction of 7,000 personnel out of 20,000 peacekeepers. In addition, pressure from major UN funders – led by the US, which is currently assessed at 28 per cent of the UN's peacekeeping budget – to reduce peacekeeping spending, led to the insertion of language devoted to an “exit strategy” in the MONUSCO mandate in March 2013.⁹⁶ Reports of renewed activity in the eastern Congo by Rwanda, Uganda, and their allied militias indicate that neighbouring states were aware that the rift between the UN and Kinshasa had hampered MONUSCO's smooth operation, and that Kigali and Kampala could have been looking to take advantage of this situation.

It will be difficult to resolve these tensions as long as the debate over President Joseph Kabila's third term, and hence the legitimacy of his government, remains unresolved. Any final decisions on MONUSCO's future may

94 United Nations, *Approved Resources for Peacekeeping Operations for the Period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015*, A/C.5/69/17, 14 January 2015, p. 2.

95 See, for example, UN, *Thirty-first Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/RES/2010/164, 30 March 2010, pp. 22–25. In reality, MONUC ended its mandate with 20,586 uniformed personnel in June 2010, and MONUSCO had 19,685 in its first month of operations (July 2010). MONUSCO continued to draw down, reaching a low of 19,008 uniformed personnel in October 2010.

96 United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/2098, op. paras. 10–11.

thus need to be deferred, but consultations are urgent. The only way forward is likely to be a unified front from all international stakeholders in the DRC. This would involve not just the UN, but also the AU, regional institutions such as SADC and the ICGLR, and major international donors. A concrete roadmap will need to be clearly and unequivocally endorsed by all major stakeholders and communicated not only to the government of the DRC, but also to the governments of its neighbours.

The UN has faced challenges in Burundi as well, even before the onset of the current crisis. The world body has had a presence in Burundi since 1993, most recently as the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB, 2011–2014).⁹⁷ The country was one of the first recipients of support from the UN Peacebuilding Fund, and is the largest single recipient of such funds – nearly \$62 million as of February 2015.⁹⁸ These funds were used, among other things, to establish the Independent National Commission on Human Rights (CNIDH) and to support dialogues between the country's political parties in 2013.⁹⁹ The UN Peacebuilding Commission also has a country-specific configuration for Burundi, which held its first meeting in October 2006. However, following tensions with the Burundian government, the UN closed BNUB in December 2014, at the request of the government in Bujumbura. UN operations in Burundi are now coordinated by the country team, including the UN Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi (MENUB), the mandate of which will expire after the 2015 elections, currently scheduled to extend through delayed presidential polls in July 2015.¹⁰⁰ Whether the UN Peacebuilding Commission will remain engaged with Burundi past the elections is also in question.¹⁰¹

In both Burundi and the DRC, UN officials have been expelled for criticising alleged government abuses: in April 2014, Bujumbura expelled the UN's security chief, Paul Debbie, after a UN report was leaked that claimed that the CNDD-FDD was arming its *Imbonerakure* youth militia;¹⁰² while, six months later, Kinshasa expelled Scott Campbell, director of the UN Joint Human Rights Office, over the office's report on alleged police abuses in the country.¹⁰³

The European Union

The European Union funds a variety of development, governance, humanitarian, and security projects in the Great Lakes. Koen Vervaeke, the EU Senior Coordinator for the Great Lakes Region, was appointed in October 2011. Although the organisation deployed two small, short-term military missions to the DRC in 2003 and 2006, EU success in the region has been mixed.¹⁰⁴ A 2013 report by the European Court of Auditors found that, while the EU's projects in the DRC were generally targeting relevant issues of electoral processes, security sector reform, and rule of law, fewer than half could be counted as successes, and even fewer were likely to be

97 United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General, S/RES/2015/36*, pp. 1–2.

98 United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, “Burundi”, February 2015, <<http://www.unpbf.org/countries/burundi>> (accessed 2 July 2015).

99 Susanna Campbell, Tracy Dexter, Michael Findley, Stephanie Hofmann, Josiah Marineau, and Daniel Walker, *Independent External Evaluation: UN Peacebuilding Fund Project Portfolio in Burundi, 2007–2013* (Geneva: Centre on Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 1 February 2014), p. 5.

100 United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General, S/RES/2015/36*, pp. 12–13.

101 Paul Seger, “La Situation au Burundi”, Statement of the Chair of the Country Configuration, 21 January 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/cscs/bur/statements/120910_sc_pbc_burundi_chair.pdf> (accessed 1 April 2015), pp. 4–5.

102 “Burundi Expels UN Official Over Arms Report”, *Al Jazeera*, 17 April 2014, <<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/04/burundi-expels-un-official-over-arms-report-2014417144546195161.html>> (accessed 1 April 2015).

103 “DR Congo: UN Rights Chief Condemns Government's Decision to Expel Envoy”, *UN News Centre*, 19 October 2014, <<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49116#VP8jkuHxFmM>> (accessed 10 March 2015).

104 Aldo Ajello, “The EU Security Role in the Great Lakes Region”, in Adekeye Adebajo and Kaye Whiteman (eds.), *The EU and Africa: From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa* (London: Hurst; New York: Columbia University Press; Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2012; and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 277–293.

sustainable in the long term, rendering the EU's overall impact "limited".¹⁰⁵ Sustainability is a key issue because Brussels, like the UN, is drawing down some of its significant involvement in the region, particularly related to security sector reform in the DRC. Its police mission in the Congo ended in October 2014,¹⁰⁶ while its military reform mission was scheduled to begin phasing out operations in June 2015.¹⁰⁷ Despite these concerns, the EU plans to increase aid through the European Development Fund throughout the region in 2014–2020, compared to the 2008–2013 cycle. Assistance to the DRC is planned to rise from €569 million to €620 million; to Rwanda from €379 million to €460 million; to Burundi from €188 million to €432 million; and to Uganda from €465 million to €587 million.¹⁰⁸ Brussels's assistance to the region is important politically, apart from its direct effects. For example, restrictions on EU aid to Rwanda were seen as having helped to accelerate the defeat of the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels in 2013.¹⁰⁹

The Great Lakes region faces two core problems: animosity between national leaders, and the DRC's inability to control its eastern provinces effectively. Brussels endorses work at all levels – local, national, and regional – to address these issues.

The leaders of the four states in the region have a long history of animosity towards each other. This hostility does not seem to be broadly shared among the citizens of the Great Lakes region, which holds out hope for an eventual resolution of these conflicts. Unfortunately, the governments in all four Great Lakes countries are autocratic and personalistic, meaning that it may be difficult to translate a desire for reconciliation and cooperation on the part of citizens into effective state action. Strong regional norms against autocracy and in favour of democratic accountability could help rectify this situation, but other states in the regional organisations to which the Great Lakes countries belong, such as Sudan (in the ICGLR) and Zimbabwe (in SADC), are themselves examples of poor governance.

The EU believes that the Congolese government's inability to control its eastern provinces is a major source of regional instability. The DRC is in need of serious and prolonged security sector reform, even though the climate in 2015 is even less conducive to reform than it has been in the past. Many individual officers in the Congolese army are well trained but, on the whole, there is little unity of command. The army bears the scars of having integrated numerous armed groups and of having been trained by uncoordinated international programmes. This has often continued the culture of indiscipline and abuses. In Brussels's view, more emphasis needs to be placed on effectively addressing the illegal exploitation of Congolese minerals, primarily from the eastern Kivu provinces.

In general, international action in the region should be led by the AU and regional organisations, with the UN and other players (including continental powers such as South Africa and Nigeria) in support roles. Special

105 European Court of Auditors, *EU Support for Governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, Special Report no. 9, 2013, <http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SRI3_09/SRI3_09_EN.pdf> (accessed 1 April 2015), p. 34.

106 European Union, "Completion of EUPOL DRC: Advancing Police Reform in Congo", 3 October 2014, <http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2014/20141003_eupoldrc_en.htm> (accessed 10 March 2015).

107 European Union Delegation to the United Nations, "Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo) Extended", 25 September 2014, <http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_15507_en.htm> (accessed 10 March 2015).

108 For 2008–2013 figures, see EuropeAid, "Countries, Territories, and Regions". For 2014–2020, see European Commission and Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, *Programme Indicatif National 11ème Fonds Européen de Développement 2014–2020*, 26 June 2014; European Commission and Government of the Republic of Rwanda, *National Indicative Programme for the Period 2014–2020*, 18 September 2014; European Commission and Government of the Republic of Burundi, *Programme Indicatif National pour la Période 2014–2020*, 26 June 2014; and European Commission and Government of Uganda, *11th European Development Fund (EDF) National Indicative Programme*, 17 December 2014.

109 David Smith, "EU Partially Freezes Aid to Rwanda", *The Guardian* (London), 27 September 2012.

envoys can be especially valuable for their ability to react quickly and influence individual leaders. For example, the meeting between President Joseph Kabila, Angola's José Eduardo Dos Santos, and South Africa's Jacob Zuma in the Angolan capital of Luanda in March 2014, at which Dos Santos and Zuma pledged support for the Congo in its efforts to ensure stability in its East, was facilitated by the group of special envoys.

International action should also focus on building regional diplomatic capacity, particularly of the ICGLR and other regional institutions, and promoting the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework, signed in Addis Ababa in February 2013. EU representatives have, for example, consulted the Rwandan government about Burundi, particularly concerning refugee flows into Rwanda in response to the current unrest (more than 56,000 refugees as of June 2015).¹¹⁰ Only concerted diplomacy by the EAC and SADC is likely to be able to avert further violent confrontation in Burundi, and perhaps in the region more generally, over the political crisis in Burundi. Similarly, one attractive way to address illicit mineral exploitation in the Congo would be to create an African intelligence facility to investigate and track abuses. A fully functional African Standby Force (ASF), or the interim African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC), the latter created in May 2013, if willing and able to impose peace, could intercede in situations similar to those in Burundi and the eastern Congo in the future. The East African Brigade has undertaken contingency planning for a military force in this regard.

In the short to medium term, the EU is prepared to continue funding Africa's peace and security architecture of regional and continental bodies, as seems necessary given their currently limited capacities. In addition to €750 million in support to the African Peace Facility (APF) for 2014 through 2016,¹¹¹ Brussels has pledged €29 million, through its African Union Support Programme II, for 2014 through 2017.¹¹² In the long term, however, the level of donor dependency in African institutions – for example, 80 per cent of the AU's programme budget is funded by the EU – will remain a problem that leaves African regional bodies vulnerable to external agendas.¹¹³



From left, Ambassador Roger Meece, Former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the DRC, and Former Head of the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC; Mr Siphosweze Masango, Chair, Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation, Parliament of South Africa, Cape Town; and Ambassador Roeland van de Geer, Head of the European Union Delegation to South Africa, and Former EU Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region.

110 UNHCR, "Thousands of Refugees".

111 Council of the European Union, *Action Document for the 2014–2016 Action Programme of the African Peace Facility*, 28 March 2014.

112 European Union and African Union, "European Union and African Union Renew the African Union Support Programme II with 31.8 Million Euro", 24 March 2014, <<http://dcpauc.au.int/en/content/european-union-and-african-union-renew-african-union-support-programme-ii-318-million-euro>> (accessed 2 July 2015).

113 European Commission, "African Union Commission and European Commission Meet to Bring New Impetus to the EU-Africa Partnership", 21 April 2015, <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP15-4810_en.htm> (accessed 12 June 2015).

Policy Recommendations

The following ten recommendations emerged from the Franschhoek policy advisory group seminar of May 2015.

1. Autocratic governance structures throughout the Great Lakes region hinder national socio-economic progress, and have spread instability. Regional states themselves should adopt measures to ensure public debate and accountability for their foreign policies. Regional organisations such as SADC, the EAC, the ICGLR, and the AU can contribute to these changes by strengthening their diplomatic engagement in support of norms of democracy and human rights, as well as promoting civic engagement and civic education.
2. Central to any peacemaking strategy in Burundi must be efforts to address the divisions in the country's ruling CNDD-FDD and opposition parties, as well as the violence of the CNDD-FDD's *Imbonerakure* youth wing. Urgent diplomatic efforts are required to resolve the ongoing political impasse, but longer-term efforts to develop the capacity and democratic commitments of political parties in Burundi, as well as to reform politicised government agencies such as the National Commission on Land and Other Assets and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, are also essential.
3. Security sector reform throughout the region is a critical need. The Great Lakes region is a militarised space, in which political and military institutions have often become fused in ways that have hindered the development of democracy. A concerted diplomatic and reform effort is therefore urgently needed not only to prevent abuses among organised armed actors, but also to move states away from the use of fear and repression in their governance practices more generally.
4. Grassroots, bottom-up initiatives to promote peace and reconciliation, such as the work of local non-governmental organisations (including women's organisations) and traditional conflict resolution processes, should be supported with financial, logistical, and technical resources. Examples of existing projects that could be built upon, or learned from, include the East African Court of Justice's cooperation with civil society organisations in Uganda to promote human rights, the Swiss Tujenge Amani! programme in the DRC's Kivu provinces, and Dutch support for decentralised land registration in Burundi.
5. Governments in the region and their external supporters should strengthen the conflict resolution capacity of existing regional structures, such as the Southern African Development Community, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, and the East African Community. One immediate way to strengthen the capabilities of regional organisations in the Great Lakes could be for SADC to complete its efforts to establish a liaison office in the DRC.
6. The African Union and the United Nations should take the lead in efforts to address the challenges of the Great Lakes region, assisted by African powers such as South Africa. The European Union, the United States, and China should play a supporting role. A coordinated, consistent, and coherent strategy will allow different actors to leverage their particular strengths, avoid partiality, and prevent regional actors from engaging in "forum shopping" that plays different mediators off against each other.

7. There must be a process of consultation and coordination among SADC, the AU, and other regional organisations, backed by the UN (including its technical bodies, such as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO]), and the EU, to create a concrete roadmap and a unified strategy to resolve the impasse between the UN peacekeeping mission and the government of the DRC in order to forestall similar difficulties in the future. This strategy must be clearly conveyed not only to the government in Kinshasa, but also to governments in Kigali and Kampala.
8. The UN peacekeeping force in the DRC should develop an effective end-game to its 15-year mission in the country. One element of this strategy could be a redeployment of existing UN troops to strengthen the SADC-led intervention brigade. However, any exit strategy must be carefully considered and developed in cooperation with the AU, regional organisations, and the Congolese government in order to ensure that responsible national and regional structures are in place and adequately resourced before the UN withdraws from the country.
9. An international regime should be established that monitors and punishes illicit exploitation of the DRC's mineral resources; such a system should be backed by the creation of a regional intelligence facility under the auspices of SADC or the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. Without a more effective regime than the one currently in place, there will be insufficient incentive for regional actors to stop plundering the Congo's resources.
10. Donor governments, the AU, and others with influence over Rwanda and Uganda must prevent these two countries from destabilising the region. Neither the legacy of the Rwandan genocide nor parochial national interests should stand in the way of holding all countries accountable to the same human rights standards. The AU, African governments, and the broader international community should ensure that norms relating to human rights and democratic governance are enforced in an even-handed manner including, where appropriate, through the use of targeted sanctions and judicial prosecutions.



Participants of the CCR policy advisory group seminar "Security and Governance in the Great Lakes Region" Le Franschoek Hotel, Western Cape, South Africa

Postscript

The policy advisory group seminar held by CCR in the Western Cape in May 2015 on “Security and Governance in the Great Lakes Region” was held at a time of significant upheaval in the region. Burundi’s President Pierre Nkurunziza had just formally declared that he would seek a third presidential term, thus deepening the unrest in Burundi; the Democratic Republic of the Congo was moving forward with plans to hold local elections and re-draw its provincial borders; and the future of MONUSCO was uncertain. This context contributed to the timeliness of discussions at the seminar, but it was inevitable that some events would unfold in the time between the seminar and the finalisation of this report.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

The June 2015 target for redrawing the DRC’s provincial borders, and increasing the number of provinces from 11 to 26, was not met. While commissions to plan the breakup (*découpage*) of provinces were established in April 2015, they had not completed their work in all areas.¹¹⁴ At the time of writing, it was not clear when the process might move forward.

In June 2015, MONUSCO began joint military operations with the FARDC against the Ituri Patriotic Resistance Front (FRPI), making some territorial gains against the rebel group.¹¹⁵ In a March 2015 report, the UN had identified the FRPI as “renewed threat to civilian life and property” in the wake of a failed surrender deal with the Congolese government.¹¹⁶ However, the FRPI is a small group that has been the target of repeated UN and FARDC operations since 2005.¹¹⁷ Full-fledged military cooperation between MONUSCO and Kinshasa was resumed in July 2015, with the UN blinking first by dropping its insistence that the government replace its red-listed military commanders.

Burundi

Following the seminar, in May 2015, a faction within the Burundian military, led by former intelligence chief Godefroid Niyombare, attempted a coup d’état. President Nkurunziza was out of the country at the time, attending an EAC summit on the pre-election unrest in Burundi in the Tanzanian capital of Dar es Salaam. The putschists, however, were not able to gain the backing of the entire military, and Nkurunziza returned to the country after only a day to foil the coup.¹¹⁸ In the wake of this crisis, elections were delayed. Parliamentary and local elections planned for May 2015 were held in June 2015, while presidential polls were held in July 2015. AU Commission chair Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, bluntly noting that Nkurunziza’s third-term presidential bid

114 Cited in “Burundi: High-Risk Campaigns”, *The Africa Report* no. 72 (July 2015), p.19.

115 “RDC: L’Opération Conjointe FARDC-Monusco Contre la FRPI est un Succès, Affirme Kobler”, *Radio Okapi*, 10 June 2015.

116 United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/RES/2015/172, 10 March 2015, p. 5.

117 See, for example, Jason Stearns, “The Latest Installment of Military Offensives Against the FRPI”, *Congo Siasa*, 12 June 2015, <<http://congosiassa.blogspot.com/2015/06/the-latest-installment-of-military.html>> (accessed 6 July 2015).

118 See, for example, “Burundi Revenge Begins: Coup Plotters ‘Severely Beaten’”, *Radio Chief Flees Amidst Crackdown - Polls Delay Likely*, *Mail and Guardian* (South Africa), 17 May 2015.

violated both Burundi's constitution and the Arusha peace accord, had called for a delay in the polls. A preliminary statement from the UN electoral observation mission stated that the June 2015 polls had not been "free, credible and inclusive". The AU, the UN, and the EU all refused to recognise the outcome of the July 2015 presidential election which Nkurunziza won amid a low turn-out and opposition boycott.

The security and governance situation in this volatile region remained precarious in August 2015, and it was uncertain how soon the stormy waters of the Great Lakes could be calmed.

Annex I

Agenda

Friday, 8 May 2015

14:30 Welcome Cocktail

17:30 – 19:00 Public Dialogue: “Challenges of Peacemaking in the Great Lakes Region”

Chair: Professor Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, Professor of African Studies, Department of African, African American, and Diaspora Studies, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, United States (US)

Ambassador Ntshikiwane Mashimbye, Ambassador of South Africa to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

Ambassador Roger Meece, Former Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General to the DRC; and Former Head of the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO)

19:00 Dinner

Day One: Saturday, 9 May 2015

09:15 – 10:00 Welcome and Opening Remarks

Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa

Ambassador Welile Nhlapo, Former Special Representative of South Africa to the Great Lakes Region; and Former National Security Advisor to the South African President, Tshwane, South Africa

10:00 – 11:30 Session I: The Great Lakes Region: Progress, Problems, and Prospects

Chair: Dr Miria Matembe, Founder Member, Centre for Women in Governance (CEWIGO), Kampala, Uganda

Professor Gilbert Khadiagala, Professor of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), Johannesburg, South Africa

Professor Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, Professor of African Studies, Department of African, African American, and Diaspora Studies, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, United States

11:30 – 11:45 Coffee Break

11:45 – 13:15 Session II: The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Chair: **Mr Giorgio Dhima**, Head of the Peace Policy Section for Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, Directorate of Political Affairs and Human Security, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Bern, Switzerland

Professor Stephen Weissman, Former Staff Director of the United States House of Representatives, Sub-Committee on Africa

Professor Séverine Autesserre, Associate Professor of Political Science, Barnard College, Columbia University, New York, United States

13:15 – 14:30 Group Photo followed by Lunch

14:30 – 16:00 Session III: Burundi

Chair: **Dr Marie-Louise Baricako**, Member, United Nations Secretary-General's High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations

Ambassador Welile Nhlapo, Former Special Representative of South Africa to the Great Lakes Region; and Former National Security Advisor to the South African President, Tshwane

Dr Devon Curtis, Lecturer, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, England

18:00 Wine-Tasting followed by Dinner

Day Two: Sunday, 10 May 2015

09:30 – 11:00 Session IV: Regional Actors: Rwanda and Uganda

Chair: Professor John Stremlau, Visiting Professor of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg; and Former Vice-President for Peace Programmes, Carter Centre, Atlanta, United States

Ms Carina Tertsakian, Senior Researcher, Human Rights Watch, London, England

Mr Paul Mulindwa, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

11:00 – 11:15 Coffee Break

11:15 – 12:45 Session V: Regional Actors: South Africa, the Southern African Development Community, and the African Union

Chair: Dr Kaire Mbuende, Former Executive Secretary, Southern African Development Community

Ambassador Ntshikiwane Mashimbye, Ambassador of South Africa to the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Ambassador Lazarous Kapambwe, Advisor for Economic Affairs, Office of the Chair, African Union Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

12:45 – 13:45 Lunch

13:45 – 15:15 Session VI: External Actors: The United Nations and the European Union

Chair: Mr Siphosizwe Masango, Chair, Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation, Parliament of South Africa, Cape Town

Ambassador Roger Meece, Former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the DRC; and Former Head of the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC

Ambassador Roeland van de Geer, Head of the European Union Delegation to South Africa; and Former EU Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region

15:15 – 15:45

Coffee Break and Completion of Evaluation Forms

15:45 – 16:30 Session VII: The Way Forward

Chair: Professor Chris Landsberg, South African Research Chair (SARChI) of African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy; and Senior Associate, School of Leadership, University of Johannesburg


Ambassador Roger Meece, Former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the DRC; and Former Head of the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC

Ambassador Roeland van de Geer, Head of the European Union Delegation to South Africa; and Former EU Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region

Ambassador Ntshikiwane Mashimbye, Ambassador of South Africa to the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Rapporteurs: Dr Daniel Levine, Consultant, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Ms Dawn Nagar, Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town



From left, Ambassador Roger Meece, Former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the DRC, and Former Head of the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC; Ambassador Ntshikiwane Mashimbye, Ambassador of South Africa to the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Professor Chris Landsberg, South African Research Chair (SARChI) of African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy; and Senior Associate, School of Leadership, University of Johannesburg; and Ambassador Roeland van de Geer, Head of the European Union Delegation to South Africa, and Former EU Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region.

Annex II

List of Participants

1. Dr Adekeye Adebajo
Executive Director
Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR)
Cape Town, South Africa
2. Professor Séverine Autesserre
Associate Professor, Department of
Political Science
Barnard College, Columbia University
New York, United States
3. Dr Marie-Louise Baricako
Member of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-
General's High-Level Independent Panel on
Peace Operations
Bujumbura, Burundi
4. Mr Fritz Brand
Senior Manager, Human Resources
and Administration
Centre for Conflict Resolution
Cape Town
5. Dr Devon Curtis
Lecturer, Department of Politics and
International Studies (POLIS)
University of Cambridge
Cambridge, England
6. Ambassador Frédérique de Man
Ambassador-Designate of the Netherlands
to Rwanda
Maputo, Mozambique
7. Mr Giorgio Dhima
Head of Section: Peace Policy II
Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America
Directorate of Political Affairs
Human Security Division
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
Bern, Switzerland
8. Mr Robert Hovde
Counsellor
Regional Affairs
Embassy of Norway to Uganda
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9. Ambassador James Jonah
Former UN Under-Secretary-General for
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New York, United States
10. Ambassador Lazarous Kapambwe
Advisor, Economic Affairs
Office of the Chair
African Union (AU) Commission
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
11. Professor Gilbert Khadiagala
Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations
University of the Witwatersrand
Johannesburg, South Africa
12. Professor Chris Landsberg
South African Research Chair (SARChI) of
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University of Johannesburg
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13. Dr Daniel Levine
Consultant, Centre for Conflict Resolution; and
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14. Mr Bernard Likalimba
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15. Ms Betty Maharaj
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Department of International Relations and
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16. Mr Siphosezwe Masango
Chair
Portfolio Committee on International Relations
and Cooperation
Parliament of South Africa
Cape Town
17. Ambassador Ntshikiwane Mashimbye
Ambassador of South Africa to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo
Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo
18. Dr Miria R.K. Matembe
Founder Member
Centre for Women in Governance (CEWIGO)
Kampala, Uganda
19. Ambassador Kaire Mbuende
Former Executive Secretary
Southern African Development Community
(SADC)
Windhoek, Namibia
20. Ambassador Roger Meece
Former Special Representative of the UN
Secretary-General to the DRC
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21. Dr David Monyae
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Cape Town
22. Mr Paul Mulindwa
Senior Project Officer
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23. Ms Dawn Nagar
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24. Ambassador Welile Nhlapo
Former Special Representative of South Africa
to the Great Lakes Region
Tshwane
25. Mr Eric Niyitunga
PhD Candidate, South African Research Chair
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University of Johannesburg
26. Mr McBride Nkhalamba
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27. Professor Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja
Professor of African Studies, Department of
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Diaspora Studies
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
United States

28. Mr Godfrey Ramuhala
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South Africa Department of Defence
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29. Ms Lena Schildt
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Deputy Head, Regional Cooperation
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Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

30. Dr Westen Shilaho
Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, South African
Research Chair in African Diplomacy and
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31. Mr Robert-Jan Siegert
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Embassy of the Netherlands to South Africa
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32. Professor John Stremmlau
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Johannesburg

33. Ms Carina Tertsakian
Senior Researcher
Human Rights Watch (HRW)
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34. Ambassador Roeland van de Geer
Head of the European Union Delegation to
South Africa
Tshwane

35. Ms Cornelia van der Laan
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Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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36. Dr Kudrat Virk
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37. Professor Stephen Weissman
Former Staff Director
United States House of Representatives
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Conference Team

1. Ms Jill Kronenberg
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3. Ms Sinazo Nomsenge
Intern
Centre for Conflict Resolution
Cape Town

Annex III


List of Acronyms

ACIRC	African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis
ADEPAE	Action for Endogenous Development and Peace (<i>Action pour le Développement et la Paix Endogènes</i>) (DRC)
ADF-NALU	Allied Democratic Forces – National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
APF	African Peace Facility
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BNUB	United Nations Office in Burundi (<i>Bureau des Nations Unies au Burundi</i>)
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CAR	Central African Republic
CCR	Centre for Conflict Resolution
CNDD-FDD	National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy (<i>Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie</i>) (Burundi)
CNDP	National Congress for the Defence of the People (<i>Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple</i>) (DRC)
CNIDH	Independent National Commission on Human Rights (<i>Commission Nationale Indépendante des Droits de l'Homme</i>) (Burundi)
CNTB	National Commission on Land and Other Assets (<i>Commission Nationale des Terres et Autres Biens</i>) (Burundi)
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
EACJ	East African Court of Justice
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EOM	Election Observer Mission (EU)
EU	European Union
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (<i>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</i>)
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (<i>Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda</i>)
FDU-Inkingi	United Democratic Forces (<i>Forces Démocratiques Unifiées</i>) – Inkingi (Rwanda)
FNL	National Forces of Liberation (<i>Forces Nationales de Liberation</i>) (Burundi)
FRODEBU	Front for Democracy in Burundi
FRPI	Ituri Patriotic Resistance Front (<i>Forces de Résistance Patriotique d'Ituri</i>) (DRC)

ICC	International Criminal Court
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDP	internally displaced person
LDGL	Human Rights League in the Great Lakes Region (<i>Ligue des Droits de la Personne dans la Région des Grands Lacs</i>)
LIPRODHOR	League for the Promotion and Defence of Human Rights (<i>Ligue Rwandaise pour la Promotion et la Défense des Droits de l'Homme</i>)
M23	March 23 Movement (Mouvement du 23-Mars)
MENUB	United Nations Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi (<i>Mission d'Observation Électorale des Nations Unies au Burundi</i>)
MLC	Movement for the Liberation of the Congo
MONUC	United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (<i>Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo</i>)
MONUSCO	United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (<i>Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo</i>)
MSD	Movement for Solidarity and Democracy (Burundi)
NGO	non-governmental organisation
PS-Imberakuri	Social Party (<i>Parti Social</i>) – Imberakuri (Rwanda)
PSC Framework	Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region
RCD-G	Congolese Rally for Democracy (<i>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie</i>) – Goma (pro-Kigali)
RCD-K	Congolese Rally for Democracy (<i>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie</i>) – Kisangani (pro-Kampala)
RIO	Organisational Innovation Network (<i>Réseau d'Innovation Organisationnelle</i>) (DRC)
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SSR	security sector reform
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Burundi)
UN	United Nations
UPRONA	Union for National Progress (<i>Union pour le Progrès National</i>) (Burundi)
US	United States

Other Publications in this series


(Available at www.ccr.org.za)



VOLUME 1 THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S SECURITY

THE UNITED NATIONS, REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND FUTURE SECURITY THREATS IN AFRICA


The inter-related and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security within the framework of United Nations (UN) reform were the focus of this policy seminar, held from 21 to 23 May 2004 in Claremont, Cape Town.



VOLUME 5 WHITHER SADC?

SOUTHERN AFRICA'S POST-APARTHEID SECURITY AGENDA


The role and capacity of the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) were focused on at this meeting in Oudekraal, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005.



VOLUME 2 SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRICA

THE POST-APARTHEID DECADE


The role that South Africa has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa's domestic transformation 10 years into democracy were assessed at this meeting in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 29 July to 1 August 2004.



VOLUME 6 HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY


AN AGENDA FOR AFRICA

The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and the potential role of African leadership and the African Union (AU) in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.



VOLUME 3 THE AU/NEPAD AND AFRICA'S EVOLVING GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The state of governance and security in Africa under the African Union (AU) and The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) were analysed and assessed at this policy advisory group meeting in Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004.



VOLUME 7 BUILDING AN AFRICAN UNION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES (RECS), NEPAD AND CIVIL SOCIETY


This seminar in Cape Town, held from 20 to 22 August 2005, made policy recommendations on how African Union (AU) institutions, including The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), could achieve their aims and objectives.



VOLUME 4 A MORE SECURE CONTINENT


AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN HIGH-LEVEL PANEL REPORT, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

African perspectives on the United Nations' (UN) High-Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change were considered at this policy advisory group meeting in Somerset West, Cape Town, on 23 and 24 April 2005.




VOLUME 8 THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

This meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 October 2005, explores civil society's role in relation to southern Africa, democratic governance, its nexus with government, and draws on comparative experiences in peacebuilding.




**VOLUME 9
WOMEN AND
PEACEBUILDING IN
AFRICA**

This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations (UN) in 2000.




**VOLUME 13
SOUTH SUDAN WITHIN
A NEW SUDAN**

This policy advisory group seminar on 20 and 21 April 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A).




**VOLUME 10
HIV/AIDS AND
MILITARIES IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

This two-day policy advisory group seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.



**VOLUME 14
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES
ON THE UN
PEACEBUILDING
COMMISSION**

This meeting, in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3 and 4 August 2006, analysed the relevance for Africa of the creation, in December 2005, of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission, and examined how countries emerging from conflict could benefit from its establishment.



**VOLUME 11
AIDS AND SOCIETY IN
SOUTH AFRICA**


BUILDING A COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE

This policy and research seminar, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 March 2006, developed and disseminated new knowledge on the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in the three key areas of: democratic practice; sustainable development; and peace and security.




**VOLUME 15
THE PEACEBUILDING
ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
IN CENTRAL AFRICA**

This sub-regional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.




**VOLUME 12
HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN
SECURITY IN SOUTH
AFRICA**

This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS in South Africa and southern Africa from a human security perspective.



**VOLUME 16
UNITED NATIONS
MEDIATION EXPERIENCE
IN AFRICA**


This seminar, held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006, sought to draw out key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa, and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations' (UN) newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).



**VOLUME 17
WEST AFRICA'S
EVOLVING SECURITY
ARCHITECTURE**


LOOKING BACK TO THE FUTURE

The conflict management challenges facing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the areas of governance, development, and security reform and post-conflict peacebuilding formed the basis of this policy seminar in Accra, Ghana, on 30 and 31 October 2006.



**VOLUME 21
AFRICA'S EVOLVING
HUMAN RIGHTS
ARCHITECTURE**

The experiences and lessons from a number of human rights actors and institutions on the African continent were reviewed and analysed at this policy advisory group meeting held on 28 and 29 June 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa.



**VOLUME 18
THE UNITED NATIONS
AND AFRICA**

**PEACE, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN
SECURITY**


This policy advisory group meeting, held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 14 to 16 December 2006, set out to assess the role of the principal organs and the specialised agencies of the United Nations (UN) in Africa.



**VOLUME 22
PEACE VERSUS JUSTICE?**


**TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSIONS AND WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS IN AFRICA**

The primary goal of this policy meeting, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 May 2007, was to address the relative strengths and weaknesses of "prosecution versus amnesty" for past human rights abuses in countries transitioning from conflict to peace.




**VOLUME 19
AFRICA'S
RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT**

This policy seminar, held in Somerset West, South Africa, on 23 and 24 April 2007, interrogated issues around humanitarian intervention in Africa and the responsibility of regional governments and the international community in the face of humanitarian crises.




**VOLUME 23
CHILDREN AND ARMED
CONFLICTS IN AFRICA**

This report, based on a policy advisory group seminar held on 12 and 13 April 2007 in Johannesburg, South Africa, examines the role of various African Union (AU) organs in monitoring the rights of children in conflict and post-conflict situations.



**VOLUME 20
WOMEN IN POST-
CONFLICT SOCIETIES IN
AFRICA**


The objective of the seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 and 7 November 2006, was to discuss and identify concrete ways of engendering reconstruction and peace processes in African societies emerging from conflict.



**VOLUME 24
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

**BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY AND
GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE FOR THE
21ST CENTURY**

This report is based on a seminar, held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 29 and 30 May 2007, that sought to enhance the efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to advance security, governance and development initiatives in the sub-region.



**VOLUME 25
PREVENTING GENOCIDE
AND THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT**

**CHALLENGES FOR THE UN, AFRICA, AND THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY**

This policy advisory group meeting was held from 13 to 15 December 2007 in Stellenbosch, South Africa, and focused on six African, Asian and European case studies. These highlighted inter-related issues of concern regarding populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, "ethnic cleansing", or crimes against humanity.



**VOLUME 29
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
AND PEACEBUILDING IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

**CIVIL SOCIETY, GOVERNMENTS, AND
TRADITIONAL LEADERS**


This meeting, held on 19 and 20 May 2008 in Johannesburg, South Africa, provided a platform for participants from Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe to share insights on sustained intervention initiatives implemented by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in the three countries since 2002.



**VOLUME 26
EURAFRIQUE?**

AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY

This seminar, held from 31 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt); peacekeeping and military cooperation; and migration.



**VOLUME 30
CROUCHING TIGER,
HIDDEN DRAGON?
CHINA AND AFRICA**

**ENGAGING THE WORLD'S NEXT
SUPERPOWER**

This seminar, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 September 2007, assessed Africa's engagement with China in the last 50 years, in light of the dramatic changes in a relationship that was historically based largely on ideological and political solidarity.



**VOLUME 27
SECURITY AND
DEVELOPMENT IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**


This seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 8 to 10 June 2008, brought together a group of experts – policymakers, academics and civil society actors – to identify ways of strengthening the capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to formulate security and development initiatives for southern Africa.



**VOLUME 31
FROM EURAFRIQUE TO
AFRO-EUROPA**

AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY

This policy seminar, held from 11 to 13 September 2008 in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, South Africa, explored critically the nature of the relationship between Africa and Europe in the political, economic, security and social spheres.



**VOLUME 28
HIV/AIDS AND
MILITARIES IN AFRICA**


This policy research report addresses prospects for an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic within the context of African peacekeeping and regional peace and security. It is based on three regional advisory group seminars that took place in Windhoek, Namibia (February 2006); Cairo, Egypt (September 2007); and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (November 2007).



**VOLUME 32
TAMING THE DRAGON?**

**DEFINING AFRICA'S INTERESTS AT THE FORUM
ON CHINA-AFRICA CO-OPERATION (FOCAC)**


This policy seminar held in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa on 13 and 14 July 2009 – four months before the fourth meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) – examined systematically how Africa's 53 states define and articulate their geo-strategic interests and policies for engaging China within FOCAC.



**VOLUME 33
PEACEBUILDING IN
POST-COLD WAR
AFRICA**


PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS

This policy research seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana from 25 to 28 August 2009 took a fresh look at the peacebuilding challenges confronting Africa and the responses of the main regional and global institutions mandated to build peace on the continent.



**VOLUME 37
STATE RECONSTRUCTION
IN ZIMBABWE**


This policy advisory group seminar held in Siavonga, Zambia, from 9 to 10 June 2011, assessed the complex interlocking challenges facing the rebuilding of Zimbabwe in relation to the economy, employment, health, education, land, security, and the role of external actors.



**VOLUME 34
STABILISING SUDAN**

**DOMESTIC, SUB-REGIONAL, AND
EXTRA-REGIONAL CHALLENGES**

This policy advisory group seminar held in the Western Cape, South Africa from 23 to 24 August 2010 analysed and made concrete recommendations on the challenges facing Sudan as it approached an historic transition – the vote on self-determination for South Sudan scheduled for January 2011.



**VOLUME 38
SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA,
AND THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 13 to 14 December 2011, focused on South Africa's role on the UN Security Council; the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the Council; the politics of the Council; and its interventions in Africa.



**VOLUME 35
BUILDING PEACE IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**


This policy seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 25 to 26 February 2010, assessed Southern Africa's peacebuilding prospects by focusing largely on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its institutional, security, and governance challenges.



**VOLUME 39
THE EAGLE AND
THE SPRINGBOK**

**STRENGTHENING THE NIGERIA/SOUTH
AFRICA RELATIONSHIP**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Lagos, Nigeria, from 9 to 10 June 2012, sought to help to "reset" the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa by addressing their bilateral relations, multilateral roles, and economic and trade links.




**VOLUME 36
POST-CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION IN THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO (DRC)**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 19 to 20 April 2010 sought to enhance the effectiveness of the Congolese government, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), civil society, the United Nations (UN), and the international community, in building peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).



**VOLUME 40
SOUTH AFRICA IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 19 to 20 November 2012, considered South Africa's region-building efforts in Southern Africa, paying particular attention to issues of peace and security, development, democratic governance, migration, food security, and the roles played by the European Union (EU) and China.



**VOLUME 41
THE AFRICAN UNION
AT TEN**


PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS

This international colloquium held in Berlin, Germany, from 30 to 31 August 2012, reviewed the first ten years of the African Union (AU); assessed its peace and security efforts; compared it with the European Union (EU); examined the AU's strategies to achieve socioeconomic development; and analysed its global role.



**VOLUME 45
THE AFRICAN,
CARIBBEAN, AND PACIFIC
(ACP) GROUP AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION (EU)**

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 29 to 30 October 2012, considered the nature of the relationship between the ACP Group and the EU, and the potential for their further strategic engagement, as the final five-year review of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 between the two sides approached in 2015.



**VOLUME 42
AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICA,
AND THE UNITED NATIONS'
SECURITY ARCHITECTURE**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 12 to 13 December 2012, considered Africa and South Africa's performance on the United Nations (UN) Security Council; the politics and reform of the Security Council; the impact of the African Group at the UN; and the performance of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.



**VOLUME 46
TOWARDS A NEW
PAX AFRICANA**


**MAKING, KEEPING, AND BUILDING PEACE
IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA**

This policy research seminar held in Stellenbosch, South Africa, from 28 to 30 August 2013, considered the progress being made by the African Union (AU) and Africa's regional economic communities (RECs) in managing conflicts and operationalising the continent's peace and security architecture; and the roles of key external actors in these efforts.




**VOLUME 43
GOVERNANCE AND
SECURITY CHALLENGES
IN POST-APARTHEID
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

This report considers the key governance and security challenges facing Southern Africa, with a focus on the 15-member Southern African Development Community (SADC) sub-region's progress towards democracy; and its peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding efforts.




**VOLUME 47
POST-APARTHEID SOUTH
AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY
AFTER TWO DECADES**

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 28 to 30 July 2013, reviewed post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy after two decades, and explored the potential leadership role that the country can play in promoting peace and security, as well as regional integration and development in Africa.




**VOLUME 44
ACHIEVING THE
MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT GOALS
(MDGs) IN AFRICA**

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 13 and 14 May 2013, considered the progress that Africa has made towards achieving the UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and sought to support African actors and institutions in shaping the post-2015 development agenda.



**VOLUME 48
SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA,
AND INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS (IIAs)**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 17 to 18 February 2014 assessed the principles underpinning international investment agreements, including bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and the implications of these instruments for socio-economic development efforts in South Africa and the rest of the continent.



VOLUME 49
REGION-BUILDING AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 28 to 30 April 2014, considered the challenges and potential of Africa's regional economic communities (RECs) in promoting region-building and regional integration on the continent, including through a comparative assessment of experiences in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.



VOLUME 50
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE BRICS:

PROGRESS, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS

This policy advisory group seminar held in Tshwane, South Africa, from 30 to 31 August 2014, assessed the potential for increasing the impact of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) Grouping on global politics, and to develop concrete recommendations in support of South Africa's continuing engagement with the bloc.

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In May 2015, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, brought together 30 mostly African policymakers, academics, and civil society actors to assess the major obstacles to peace, security, and governance in the Great Lakes region and to craft effective and credible policies and strategies to overcome these obstacles. The meeting focused, in particular, on the challenges faced by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); the problems of, and prospects for, stability in Burundi; the roles of Rwanda and Uganda in the region; the influence of regional actors such as South Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), and the African Union (AU); as well as the role of external actors such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU).



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