



AFRICA AND EXTERNAL ACTORS



CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

POLICY RESEARCH SEMINAR REPORT

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RAPORTEURS
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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements, About the Organiser, and Rapporteurs	v
Executive Summary	1
Introduction	6
1. Africa's Key Traditional Bilateral Relations: The United States and Russia	9
2. Africa's Key Traditional Bilateral Relations: France and Britain	12
3. Africa's Key Bilateral Relations in Asia: China, India, and Japan	14
4. Africa's Key Bilateral Relations: The Nordics, Europe, and the Islamic World	19
5. Africa's Key Multilateral Relations: The United Nations and the European Union	22
6. The Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa Bloc	26
7. Africa, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organisation	29
Policy Recommendations	32

Annexes

I. Agenda	34
II. List of Participants	39
III. List of Acronyms	42

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About the Organiser

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa, was established in 1968. The organisation has wide-ranging experience in conflict interventions in Southern Africa and is working on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations. Its policy research focuses on peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa; region-building and regional integration on the continent; relations between Africa and the European Union (EU); achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa; and South Africa’s bilateral and multilateral foreign policy.

Rapporteurs

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Executive Summary

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a two-day policy research seminar at the Townhouse Hotel in Cape Town from 24 to 25 August 2016 on “Africa and External Actors”.

The seminar brought together about 30 key scholars, policymakers, and civil society activists, and examined Africa’s relations with eight key bilateral actors or blocs and six major multilateral actors, assessing progress made in the continent’s efforts to increase its leverage in global politics through engagement with external actors.

1. Africa’s Key Traditional Bilateral Relations: The United States and Russia

During the Cold War, the policy of the United States (US) towards Africa often ignored basic democratic principles and socio-economic development, and focused instead on resisting the spread of communism in Africa by supporting autocratic client regimes. The post-Cold War era saw the securitisation of policy under three presidents: Bill Clinton (1993–2000), George W. Bush (2001–2008), and Barack Obama (2009–2016). On the economic front, the 2000 African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) had, within seven months, generated \$100 million in annual apparel exports from Africa. In 2015, at \$4.8 billion, AGOA’s oil and gas exports represented 52 percent of total exports of \$9.3 billion. In the same year, Africa’s trade with the US was \$37 billion. In the area of health, the Bush administration’s \$18.8 billion President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) provided treatment to 1.7 million people, mainly in Africa, between 2003 and 2008.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union provided support to national liberation struggles in African countries including South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Russia was economically weak and initially disengaged from Africa. Recognition of the potential geo-political and economic importance of Africa, however, led to Moscow pursuing closer relations with the continent after March 2000 when Vladimir Putin was elected president. Russian business interests in South Africa, its largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa, are concentrated primarily in the mining, oil, gas, and petro-chemical sectors. Bilateral trade between Russia and Africa, however, remains unbalanced. In 2015, Russian exports to Africa were \$7.3 billion, compared to \$2.3 billion of African exports to Russia.

2. Africa’s Key Traditional Bilateral Relations: France and Britain

Since 1960, France has pursued a neo-colonial relationship with Africa known as *Françafrique*. With the discrediting of Callic interventions following the dubious French role during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the fall of Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997, and the reduction of military spending, Paris sought to multilateralise its previous unilateral interventions using the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) to secure legitimacy for them. In 2016, France still had about 10,000 troops deployed across Africa. The country’s image was, however, badly damaged, when its troops were alleged to have sexually abused children in the Central African Republic (CAR) in exchange for food and/or money between December 2013 and June 2014. Meanwhile, French trade with the continent totalled \$66 billion in 2015, and nearly half of Africa’s exports to France were in the distillation products, mineral fuels, and oil sectors.

Britain, unlike France, has not maintained the same extensive political, security, and economic ties in its former African colonies. The end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 was an important milestone, but Africa continued to be viewed as a marginal British foreign policy interest, even under the Labour prime minister, Tony Blair. Blair sometimes demonstrated a paternalistic approach to Africa and his own announced pursuit of an “ethical” foreign policy was contradicted by arms deals in Africa. British interest in the continent’s natural resources and energy sector is evident in the oil-producing countries of Nigeria, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea. Britain is also a major source of remittances to Africa, with Nigeria being the second largest recipient of such remittances in the world (\$21 billion in 2015).

3. Africa’s Key Bilateral Relations in Asia: China, India, and Japan

China is an increasingly influential actor in world politics, with geo-political interests that have expanded into Africa since the 1960s. The “Africa Rising” narrative has been contributing to Beijing’s involvement on the continent, particularly through mechanisms such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), established in 2000. While China is Africa’s largest trade partner, valued at \$179 billion in 2015, African exports to China were \$70 billion, and Chinese exports to Africa were \$109 billion. Furthermore, a major challenge facing the Sino-Africa partnership is Africa’s seeming lack of a long-term strategy for engaging China.

Africa’s relations with India historically saw the latter’s founding premier, Jawaharlal Nehru, leading efforts for the liberation of the continent and promoting a policy of non-alignment in the 1960s. More recently, relations have focused on trade with the continent. India’s presence in Africa is, in part, a reaction to competition with China. In 2014, India overtook the US to become Africa’s largest trade partner after the EU and China. New Delhi’s total commerce with Africa grew rapidly from \$25 billion in 2007 to \$70 billion in 2015. In July 2016, India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, visited Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa in a bid to strengthen Afro-Indian partnerships and agreements. Recent attacks on African students and migrants in India, however, expose the underlying racism and intolerance of parts of Indian society.

Most of Japan’s trade with Africa during the Cold War was largely with apartheid South Africa, which estranged Tokyo from the rest of the continent. In the post-apartheid era, and as a sign of its intentions to build relations with South Africa’s new democratic leadership, Japan offered two aid packages to South Africa: in 1994 (\$1.3 billion), and in 1999 (\$1.5 billion). In 2015, bilateral trade between Japan and Africa totalled \$20 billion. Created in 1993, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) has been a model for newer fora such as FOCAC of 2000 and the India-Africa Forum summit of 2008.

4. Africa’s Key Bilateral Relations: The Nordics, Europe, and the Islamic World

The “Afro-Arab Spring” of 2011, has had major consequences for Europe’s relations with Africa, and European policy has increased attention on the mainly Muslim-dominated North Africa. Insecurity issues that are linked to African migration now dominate Brussels’ agenda, centred on terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida, Al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram as major drivers of instability for Africa and the Arab world, as well as for Europe. The migration movement across the Mediterranean into Europe peaked in 2015 with 1.6 million arrivals. This was triggered by factors including socio-economic insecurity, political violence, terrorism, and climate change. For many in Europe, however, migration has become synonymous with terrorism.

The former Nordic development approach to Africa has changed fundamentally: Nordic support has moved from a discourse on global justice to a more interest-based approach. Like the EU, the Nordics are determined to address the political instability in North Africa to help reduce the influx of refugees and migrants across their borders. Sweden received the most migrants in the EU per capita with 163,000 people entering the country in 2015. On the economic front, in 2015, trade relations between Denmark and Africa totalled \$1.9 billion; Norway-Africa trade amounted to \$3 billion; while Finland's Africa trade was \$1.9 billion. Sweden had the largest trade with the continent, reaching \$4.9 billion in 2015.

5. Africa's Key Multilateral Relations: The United Nations and the European Union

Founded in 1945, the United Nations had only four African states at the time: Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa. Today, 54 African countries represent over a quarter of the world body's 193 member states. Much of the UN's socio-economic and humanitarian work occurs in Africa, and Nairobi remains one of only four UN headquarters around the world – together with New York, Geneva, and Vienna. About half (29 out of 56) of the UN's peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War era have taken place in Africa. The continent remains one of only two major regions of the world – along with Latin America – without a permanent seat and veto power on the 15-member Security Council. To some extent, the issue of UN Security Council reform has been held up by African states, as they are constrained by the African Union's (AU) 2005 Ezulwini Consensus, which favours at least two additional African permanent seats with veto power, in addition to its existing three rotating seats, on the Council.

For many Africans, the relationship with the EU has been unequal and represents more a situation of uneasy co-existence than a mutually beneficial relationship. Brussels has awarded about 80 grants for infrastructure projects in Africa worth over €6.5 billion. The EU has further provided peacekeepers to African conflicts, having deployed troops to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Chad, and CAR. However, Brussels' perceived imposition of economic partnership agreements (EPAs) on African countries has posed a major challenge to EU-Africa relations since the 2000 Cotonou Agreement. Key concerns for many African countries have included threats by the EU to withdraw duty-free access for those countries that do not sign economic partnership agreements; disruption in the process of African integration due to the various EPA configurations; and intrusion upon existing trade configurations such as AGOA.

6. The Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa Bloc

The Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) bloc may seek to contribute to reshaping the Western-dominated global order, but where international financial institutions are concerned, it can be said to form part of the prevailing order. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) of the BRICS' New Development Bank stipulates that a member country can borrow only 30 percent of its quota, after which it must approach the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a structural adjustment loan. In this regard, the grouping remains, to a large extent, dependent on the IMF. The BRICS bank is, however, a potentially timely response to continental initiatives such as the AU Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) of 2011-2040 (adopted in July 2012). Africa's interests at the IMF were dealt a severe blow when the voting power of four of the five BRICS countries at the IMF was increased in December 2015 (China by 37 percent, Brazil by 23 percent, India by 11 percent, and Russia by 8 percent). Seven African countries, including economies that were not able to provide support for IMF recapitalisation, lost more than a fifth of their voting share. South Africa, for example, lost 21 percent, while Nigeria lost 41 percent.

7. Africa, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organisation

The controversial structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s, created by the World Bank and the IMF for African countries, advocated the lifting of market restrictions; free access to markets, with relaxed tariffs and taxes; encouragement of inward investment and external trade; and liberalised labour markets. This resulted in major underdevelopment in Africa, with massive cuts in health and education. Between 1980 and 1989, 241 SAPs projects were implemented in Africa, resulting in economic growth of merely 2.5 percent by 1990. The 164-member World Trade Organisation (WTO) was established in 1995 as a more institutionalised version of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947. African governments were central to the renegotiations for changing the rules-based multilateral trading system established during the WTO's Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, between 1986 and 1994, which culminated in the Marrakesh Agreement, signed by 123 countries in April 1994. Given the decrease in Africa's share of world trade from 5.9 percent in 1980 to about 3 percent by 2013, the continent must prioritise issues of food security and opening up export markets for agriculture in global trade negotiations.

Policy Recommendations

The following 10 policy recommendations emerged from the August 2016 Cape Town policy seminar:

1. Pro-Africa lobbyists in the US need to collaborate closely with legislators in the US Congress as well as Washington-based interest groups as they did during South Africa's anti-apartheid struggles in the 1980s. The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) should also be mobilised to support these battles. The tens of thousands of highly-educated Africans in America should further help to build a viable constituency for Africa.
2. People-to-people relations are important in Africa's relations with Russia. Russian cultural centres could therefore contribute to building Russo-African cultural relations to improve language barriers and to strengthen business partnerships with a view to changing stereotypes on both sides.
3. African countries should seize the potential opportunities presented by a weakened, less confident, and less cohesive post-“Brexit” Europe to redefine their relations with the European Union. This includes Africa calling for a moratorium on the economic partnership agreements while the EU completes its “divorce settlement” with Britain, and formulating substantive policy responses to issues such as Brexit.
4. African countries should leverage China's and India's interest in the continent to reduce their dependence on traditional Western powers such as the US, Britain, and France, while Beijing and New Delhi should assist Africa in broadening its export base through technology transfer and knowledge-sharing. Francophone countries on the continent should reduce their political, economic, and cultural dependence on France. Furthermore, Africa must explore how it can borrow from India's attitude towards aid and development, which is to accept aid as and when needed, and in specific ways to further its own socio-economic development based on a clear definition of its specific interests.

5. African governments should develop clear, coordinated positions on their goals and the strategies for achieving them in fora such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation; the Tokyo International Conference on African Development; and in respect of other rapidly emerging economies in the “global South” such as Brazil and India.
6. Africa remains a supplier of primary products to external actors, and should change its trade structures so that technical capacity transfer and capacity-building become more of a focus for partnerships with external actors, with local procurement and beneficiation given more prominence. Furthermore, African countries should claim their own individual and collective agency, and strengthen efforts to add value to their primary commodities; diversify their economies; and increase the competitiveness of the export of manufactured products.
7. Building on the experiences of the Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the African Union missions in Burundi, Darfur, and Somalia, Africa needs to create an effective peacekeeping force; it must fund its own institutions to a greater extent in order to prevent external actors such as France and the US intervening in Africa in pursuit of their own parochial interests.
8. African countries need to regain their influence in the UN General Assembly and Secretariat, and find a unifying issue such as UN Security Council reform, that is of benefit to the entire continent and its Southern allies.
9. Besides providing the capital to carry out infrastructure projects in Africa, the BRICS New Development Bank should be used as a knowledge development bank to help to differentiate sources of capital and to create more opportunities for investment, trade, and development.
10. African countries and their Southern allies must continue to push for genuine transformation of the World Bank and IMF to make decision-making more equitable; African governments at the World Trade Organisation should also continue to work together and develop strategies to achieve trade deals, as well as to build coalitions and develop regional consensus on important issues such as climate change and de-industrialisation.

Introduction¹

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a two-day policy research seminar at the Townhouse Hotel in Cape Town from 24 to 25 August 2016 on “Africa and External Actors”. The meeting built on previous policy development and research on this subject involving 17 seminars and eight books published by the Centre between 2006 and 2016.²

The Cape Town seminar in August 2016 brought together about 30 key scholars, policymakers, and civil society activists to assess bilateral and multilateral relations between Africa’s traditional and non-traditional actors in the post-Cold War era. Key issues pertaining to Africa’s relations with global actors were discussed under the following three broad themes: bilateral relations with traditional powers: the United States (US), Russia, China, France, and Britain; bilateral relations with non-traditional powers: India; Japan; the Nordics; and Europe and the Arab world; and multilateral relations: the United Nations (UN), the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), the European Union (EU), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This meeting examined Africa’s relations with eight key bilateral actors or blocs and six major multilateral actors, assessing progress made in the continent’s efforts to increase its leverage in global politics through engagement with external actors.

Objectives

The five key objectives of the August 2016 Cape Town policy research seminar were:

1. To explore how relations between external actors and Africa have changed since the Cold War era;
2. To assess critically the key political dynamics of these relationships in the post-Cold War era;
3. To discuss the key economic dynamics of these ties in the post-Cold War era;
4. To examine the social and cultural dynamics of these relations in the post-Cold War era; and
5. To assess whether these ties have been mutually beneficial, exploitative, a mixture, or whether there is another characterisation that is more appropriate.

1 Dawn Nagar, CCR Senior Researcher, and Nomathamsanqa Masiko, former CCR Research Consultant compiled this concept note on which this report is based.

2 See Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) reports: “South Africa and the BRICS: Progress, Problems, and Prospects”, Tshwane (Pretoria), 30-31 August 2014; “Towards a New *Pax-Africana*: Making, Keeping, and Building Peace in Post-Cold War Africa”, Stellenbosch, 28-30 August 2013; “Africa, South Africa, and the United Nations Security Architecture”, Somerset West, 12-13 December 2012; “The African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Group and the European Union (EU)”, Cape Town, 29-30 October 2012; “South Africa, Africa, and the UN Security Council”, Cape Town, 13-14 December 2011; “Peacebuilding in Post-Cold War Africa”, Gaborone, 25-28 August 2009; “Taming the Dragon? Defining Africa’s Interests at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)”, Tshwane, 13-14 July 2009; “From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa: Africa and Europe In A New Century”, Stellenbosch 11-13 September 2008; “Preventing Genocide and the Responsibility To Protect”, Stellenbosch 13-15 December 2007; “Eurafrique? Africa and Europe In A New Century”, Cape Town 31 October - 1 November 2007; “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? China and Africa: Engaging the World’s Next Superpower”, Cape Town, 17-18 September 2007; “Africa’s Responsibility To Protect”, Cape Town, 23-24 April 2007; “The United Nations and Africa”, Maputo 14-16 December 2006; “United Nations Mediation Experience in Africa”, Cape Town, 16-17 October 2006; “African Perspectives on the UN Peacebuilding Commission”, Maputo, 3-4 August 2006; “A More Secure Continent”, 23-24 April 2005; and “The New Partnership for Africa’s Security”, Cape Town, 21-23 May 2004 (policy seminar reports are available at www.ccr.org.za). Books: See Daniel H. Levine and Dawn Nagar (eds.), *Region-Building in Africa: Political and Economic Challenges* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Devon Curtis and Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa (eds.), *Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press; and Athens: Ohio University Press, 2013); Adekeye Adebajo and Kaye Whiteman (eds.), *The EU and Africa: From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa* (London: Hurst; and Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2012); Adekeye Adebajo, *UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2011); Adekeye Adebajo, *The Curse of Berlin: Africa After the Cold War* (London: Hurst, 2010); Adekeye Adebajo (ed.), *From Global Apartheid to Global Village: Africa and the United Nations* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009); Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu (eds.), *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Africa and China* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008); and Adekeye Adebajo and Helen Scanlon (eds.), *A Dialogue of the Deaf: Essays on Africa and the United Nations* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2006).

Background

The Cold War affected the African state system by prolonging destabilising liberation wars and by creating military instability in countries such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Liberia, Angola, and Mozambique. As the Cold War ended by 1990, the two superpower blocs – led by the United States and the Soviet Union – along with France, abandoned autocrats like Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko, Somalia’s Siad Barre, and Liberia’s Samuel Doe who had served as reliable Cold War clients. After the Cold War, African actors sought to achieve greater autonomy within the international system through alliances with external actors in order to promote security and development more effectively and to achieve a stronger African voice within international institutions such as the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO.³ These efforts have proved largely unsuccessful.

Africa’s quest for security was also evident in post-Cold War efforts to improve the effectiveness of the African Union (AU) and sub-regional organisations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). But these institutions have often proved to be weak, and in the security field, the UN has frequently had to play a leading role. A lack of capacity and unity has also frustrated Africa’s quest for autonomy within the international system. The Afro-Asian coalition that was born at the Bandung conference of 1955 has also been largely frustrated in its efforts to shape global institutions such as the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO in ways that could increase the autonomy of the Third World against powerful Western actors. The contemporary role of China on the continent – Africa’s largest bilateral trading partner – could, however, potentially reduce Africa’s dependence on Western powers like the US, France, and Britain, while increasing the continent’s diplomatic and economic leverage. But it is far from certain that African governments will be able to craft a common approach to engaging China and developing new ties with other emerging powers like Brazil and India.

Moving to the post-Cold War era, it is perhaps unfair to expect a single African voice to emerge from African governments and the African Union given the multiplicity of African views expressed by its 54 member states, and given the context of Europe, which, despite the EU’s successful integration efforts, continues to lack a single voice in many areas. For example, although the EU has made advances in the promotion of a single trade diplomacy for Europe, its 28 member states generally continue to speak for themselves in bilateral and multilateral political fora, while the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Italy’s Federica Mogherini, and the President of the European Council, Poland’s Donald Tusk, can speak only on foreign policy matters that have been agreed by all the Union’s members. Africa also lacks adequate representation on, and influence over, the strategic direction and actions of the 15-member UN Security Council, the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and the IMF), and the World Trade Organisation, all of which continue to be dominated by powerful, largely Western countries. In the context of an increasingly globalised world, the exclusion of a significant African voice at such fora must be reversed as a matter of urgency through increased leverage and professionalism representing Africa’s interests.

Africa could consider appointing a foreign policy tsar and ask the chair of the AU Assembly to be appointed on a bi-annual basis to ensure policy continuity. Acceptance of the principle of subsidiarity, under which Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) are mandated to act as the AU’s implementing organs, could improve the coherence of African responses to crises. Despite its strong call for an immediate end to the violence in Libya, in February 2011, the continental body was effectively sidelined in multilateral decision-making during the crisis. Africa’s lack of an international voice is partly due to the continent’s financial dependence on external actors, with

3 This paragraph and the next are drawn from Adebajo, *The Curse of Berlin*.

over 90 percent of the AU's funding in the security area provided by external donors. African diplomats in multilateral fora in Addis Ababa, New York, Geneva, and Vienna must also coordinate their positions more effectively. The African Group of Ambassadors in key capitals already seeks to harmonise disparate views before these are presented to the rest of the world, and these diplomats, with the help of improved coordination with national capitals, could more effectively voice African positions on areas of common interest. African governments should perhaps in the short term not be diverted from their responsibility to promote the continent's interests by squabbles about permanent seats on the UN Security Council that are currently not on offer. Consideration should be given to creating a temporary mechanism to formalise how the AU selects African non-permanent representatives to the UN Security Council. For example, one of Africa's three non-permanent seats could be rotated between the continent's major powers (Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, and Ethiopia); another between its middle powers; and the third between smaller African states.⁴ This could ensure the consistent presence of stronger African powers on the Council until genuine reform of the body occurs.

Strong leadership is forged by effective responses to important contemporary issues. The drive of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) to promote Africa's socio-economic development and to eradicate poverty from 2001, and the continent's continued marginalisation, represent major causes around which continental leaders can forge strategic bilateral and multilateral relations and frame global debates. However, the preponderance of the voices of the more powerful African states such as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Algeria at different multilateral fora on these and related issues can sometimes fragment African voices rather than provide continental leadership. The invitation of African leaders to summits of the Group of Eight (G8) industrialised countries has often represented, for many Africans, a form of participation without voice. The Group of Twenty (G20) countries, according to critics, also does not substantively reflect African priorities, even though South Africa is part of this body. African states must therefore develop clear, coordinated positions on their goals and the strategies for achieving them. This should be done – for example in relation to China at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC); in relation to Japan at the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD); and in respect of other rapidly emerging economies in the global South such as Brazil and India. In particular, African governments could adopt a clear, common position on engaging the BRICS economic bloc to promote economic development and to strengthen the South's geo-strategic role in world politics.



Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa.

⁴ This paragraph and the next are based on CCR, "The African Union at Ten: Problems, Progress, and Prospects", international colloquium report, Berlin, 30-31 August 2016 (available at www.ccr.org.za).

1. Africa's Key Traditional Bilateral Relations: The United States and Russia

Africa and the United States⁵

During the Cold War, the policy of the United States towards Africa often ignored basic democratic principles and socio-economic development, and focused instead on resisting the spread of communism in Africa by supporting autocratic client regimes in countries like Zaire – now the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – and Liberia. After 1945, the United States portrayed itself as an anti-colonial power while furthering its parochial interests against the presence of a communist Soviet Union on the continent. The two superpowers conducted ideological games that resulted in the deaths of millions of Africans, while simultaneously providing financial support in fighting proxy wars in Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, and Somalia. The United States also provided continuous support to autocratic regimes such as Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, Uganda's Yoweri Museveni, Ethiopia's Meles Zenawi, and Eritrea's Isaias Afwerki, while geo-political interests triumphed over meaningful engagement in Africa.

The post-Cold War era saw the securitisation of policy under three presidents: Bill Clinton (1993–2000), George W. Bush (2001–2008), and Barack Obama (2009–2016). Under all three administrations, US policies in Africa ignored principles as basic as democracy and development on the continent. The policy of the Clinton administration towards Africa was termed “enlargement” – increasing democratic governments – but this was often contradicted in support of autocratic regimes in Rwanda, Uganda, and Ethiopia. While African civil society strongly pushed against autocratic leaders, Clinton's diplomatic visit to the continent in March/April 1998, supported such regimes, even naming them as new “leaders” of Africa: Museveni, Zenawi, and Afwerki, as well as Rwanda's Paul Kagame, all of whom soon became embroiled in conflicts against each other.

Under George W. Bush (2001–2008), US policy towards Africa was widely seen as arrogant, unilateral, and focused on America's “war on terror”. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in the US heightened Washington's anti-terror drive, which put in place a number of African initiatives, including the creation of a 2002 US military base and a joint Horn of Africa command established in Djibouti, and the Germany-based United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) which was founded in 2007. In 2003, Washington launched its \$100 million East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI), with Kenya and Ethiopia. The US also strengthened its security engagement with Eritrea, and, in 2005, launched its \$500 million five-year Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) to guard borders and build the capacities of national armies in Algeria, Chad, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Mauritania, and Tunisia.⁶ The Obama administration also established a military presence in Africa, embarking on one of the largest military expansions on the continent, including in countries such as Burkina Faso, Kenya, and Uganda. Washington further established drone and other bases in Niger, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and the Seychelles.

President Barack Obama's 2008 election as the first black president of the US had generated great expectations in Africa of a positive change in Washington's policy towards the continent. But by the time he visited South

5 This section is partly based on a presentation made by Adekeye Adebajo at the CCR policy research seminar “Africa and External Actors”, Cape Town, 24–25 August 2016.

6 See Adebajo, “An Axis of Evil? China, the United States, and France in Africa,” in Adebajo, *The Curse of Berlin*, pp. 163–191.

Africa, Senegal, and Tanzania in June/July 2013 (having briefly visited Egypt and Ghana in June/July 2009), the unrealistic expectations that the first black US president would radically transform US-Africa policy had not even come close to being fulfilled. Despite Obama's Kenyan ancestry, as president, he has had other pressing policy priorities (the economy, health care, Afghanistan, the Middle East, China, Iran, Cuba, and North Korea) that have taken precedence over Africa.

On the economic front, the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2000 had, within seven months, generated \$100 million in annual apparel exports from Africa. In 2015, at \$4.8 billion, AGOA's oil and gas exports represented 52 percent of total exports of \$9.3 billion. In the area of health, the Bush administration deserves some credit for its \$18.8 billion President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which provided treatment to 1.7 million people, mainly in Africa, between 2003 and 2008. The Obama administration further increased the number of Africans receiving treatment for AIDS from 1.7 million in 2008 to 6.7 million by 2013, and in 2014, Obama deployed 3,000 troops to Liberia to build hospitals to treat victims of Ebola. The US provided important support to HIV/AIDS and Ebola challenges in Africa totalling \$750 million in 2014.⁷ The Obama administration also contributed to peacemaking and UN and AU peacekeeping efforts between 2009 and 2014 in Sudan (\$3.8 billion), South Sudan (\$635 million), Mali (\$288 million), and Somalia (\$976 million).⁸ In 2015, Africa's total trade with the US was \$37 billion.⁹ But hard questions must be posed about the Obama administration's commitment to democratic governance in countries like Egypt and Rwanda, and the "war on terror" largely dominated US policy towards Africa after 2001.

Africa and Russia¹⁰

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union provided support to national liberation struggles in African countries such as South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. In large measure, Russia's engagement in Africa included arms deals and the supply of military equipment. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Russia was economically weak and initially disengaged from Africa. Moscow had thus to shift its focus to transforming its domestic political and economic system and building external relations with strategic partners such as the United States. Vladimir Putin was elected president in March 2000, and has overseen a more assertive and autonomous foreign policy that has sought to reassert Russia's global role.

Recognition of the potential geo-political and economic importance of Africa in furthering Russia's national interests led to Moscow pursuing closer relations with Africa after 2000. Russia backed South Africa's accession to the BRIC bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) in 2010, and participates, together with South Africa, in the BRICS group. Sub-Saharan Africa, however, is mentioned in only one paragraph (out of 104) in Russia's foreign policy concept of 2013, which outlines Moscow's diplomatic priorities and objectives.¹¹ Russia regards South

7 Susan Blumenthal, "AIDS to Ebola: Moving from Peril to Progress", *Huffington Post*, 15 December 2014 (available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-blumenthal/ebola_b_5989488.html).

8 White House, "Fact Sheet: US Support for Peacekeeping in Africa", Washington, D.C., 6 August 2014 (available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/fact-sheet-us-support-peacekeeping-africa>).


9 Office of the US Trade Representative, "Statement by US Trade Representative, Michael Froman on the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)", April 2015 (available at <https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa> and <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2015/april/statement-us-trade-representative-0>).

10 This section is partly based on a presentation made by Rosaline Daniel and Vladimir Shubin at the CCR policy research seminar "Africa and External Actors", Cape Town, 24-25 August 2016.

11 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation", 18 February 2013 (available at http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D).

Africa as a key partner in Africa. Its economic interests in the country include a \$50 billion nuclear framework agreement between the two countries in 2014 that has the potential to increase the nuclear power-generating capacity of Tshwane (Pretoria). Russian business interests in South Africa, its largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa, are concentrated primarily in the mining, oil, gas, and petro-chemical sectors. Total bilateral trade between Russia and Africa, however, remains unbalanced. In 2015, for example, Russia's total exports to Africa stood at \$7.3 billion, compared to \$2.3 billion of total African exports to Russia.¹² Moscow's focus in Africa is disproportionately on arms deals. Currently, global exports of Russian-made weapons and military equipment are worth \$4.6 billion.¹³ The importance of mineral trade should, however, not be underestimated, with 20 major Russian companies participating in mining across Africa.

It is therefore imperative that Africa set its own agenda in geo-strategic engagements with external partners like Russia and the US. People-to-people relations are important in Africa's relations with Moscow. Russian cultural centres could contribute to building mutually beneficial cultural relations to improve language barriers and to strengthen business partnerships with a view to changing stereotypes in both countries. It is also important that pro-Africa lobbyists in the US collaborate closely with legislators in the US Congress as well as Washington-based interest groups, as they did during South Africa's anti-apartheid struggles in the 1980s. The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) must further be mobilised to support such struggles. The tens of thousands of highly educated Africans in America could further help to build a viable constituency for Africa.



From left: Ms Rosaline Daniel, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town; Professor Vladimir Shubin, Principal Research Fellow, Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), Moscow; Ambassador John Hirsch, Senior Adviser, International Peace Institute (IPI), New York, United States, and Former United States Ambassador to Sierra Leone; and Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town.

¹² International trade statistics based on UN Comtrade, "Bilateral Trade Between Russia and Africa", 2016 (available at http://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx).

¹³ Vladimir Putin, "Meeting of the Commission for Military Technology Cooperation with Foreign States", <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/councils/by-council/1/52493>.

2. Africa's Key Traditional Bilateral Relations: France and Britain

Africa and France¹⁴

Since 1960, France has pursued a 50-year neo-colonial relationship with Africa known as *Francafrique*.¹⁵ Africa has historically represented a stage on which Paris has sought to maintain the illusion of being a global power. There are three pillars to the hegemonic French policy in Africa: military, financial, and politico-cultural. These have allowed Paris to create an intricate network of dependence. Though all francophone African countries were eventually granted nominal independence by 1963, most signed military and economic pacts that gave France continued influence over their sovereign affairs. Between 1963 and 1966, there were 13 coup attempts in francophone Africa, a trend that continued throughout the entire colonial period. Paris maintained military bases across Africa: in Djibouti, the Central African Republic (CAR), Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, and Senegal. The Gallic power intervened over 50 times to prop up or depose assorted tyrants in countries such as Gabon, Togo, Zaire (now the DRC), and CAR. An important aspect of French policy was to keep trespassers out of its *pré carré* (backyard) or *chasse gardée* (private hunting-ground), often frustrating efforts at regional integration across Africa.

France encouraged francophone states in West Africa to create their own economic community and circumvent Nigeria's integration efforts towards creating ECOWAS in 1975. With the end of the Cold War, the idea of an exclusive French "sphere of influence" in Africa was increasingly challenged. With the discrediting of Gallic interventions following the dubious French role during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the fall of Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko three years later, and the reduction of military spending, Paris sought to multilateralise its previous unilateral interventions using the United Nations and the European Union to secure legitimacy for its interventions and to share its military burden. Paris further demonstrated its continuing neo-colonial influence in Africa by outmanoeuvring South Africa and Nigeria in CAR and Mali respectively in military interventions in 2013. France's image was, however, badly damaged, when its troops were alleged to have sexually abused children in CAR in exchange for food and/or money between December 2013 and June 2014, amid allegations of a cover-up by senior French and UN officials.¹⁶ In 2016, Paris still had about 10,000 troops deployed across Africa. The continent must depend to a greater extent on its own institutions and resources, to prevent external actors like France having to intervene in Africa in pursuit of their own parochial interests. With regard to commerce, French trade with Africa totalled \$66 billion in 2015, and nearly half of Africa's exports to France were in the distillation products, mineral fuels, and oil sectors.¹⁷ While it makes economic sense for Africa to engage with France in commerce, this must be done on Africa's terms and for the continent's own economic benefit. Africa should therefore diversify its dependence on Paris economically, politically, and culturally.

Africa and Britain

Britain, unlike France, has not maintained the same extensive political, security, and economic ties in its former African colonies. British entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 was seen as a means of disengaging from a number of Commonwealth obligations that were absorbed into Europe's budding development

14 This section is based on Adebajo, "An Axis of Evil?", pp. 163–191.

15 See John Chipman, *French Power in Africa* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989); Victor T. Le Vine, *Politics in Francophone Africa* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2007); Guy Martin, *Africa in World Politics: A Pan-African Perspective* (Asmara: Africa World, 2002); and Douglas A. Yates, *The French Oil Industry and the Corps Des Mines in Africa* (Asmara: Africa World, 2009).

16 See "Taking Action on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers", Report of An Independent Review of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse By International Peacekeeping Forces in the Central African Republic, 17 December 2015 (available at http://www.refworld.org/publisher/UN/_568dl6eb4.0.html).

17 See Trade Map website, <http://www.trademap.org>.

policy, especially the Lomé Convention of 1975. The end of the apartheid regime in South Africa in 1994 was an important milestone, but Africa continued to be thought of as a marginal British foreign policy interest, even with the coming to power in 1997 of the Labour Party's Tony Blair. Between 1997 and 2007, British policymakers, under the Blair administration, sought to champion an “ethical” foreign policy. Blair sometimes demonstrated a paternalistic approach to Africa (describing it insensitively as a “scar on the conscience of the world”) and his own announced pursuit of an “ethical” foreign policy was contradicted by arms deals in Africa. Furthermore, the promises at the July 2005 G8 Gleneagles Summit on African aid and debt went largely unfulfilled.

The success of British efforts at providing leadership on development, aid, and trade was also viewed as having been mixed. Though the four-month (May – September 2000) British military intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 stabilised a crumbling UN mission, the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) had already contributed to stabilising the country for a decade. Africa needs to create an effective peacekeeping force, building on the experiences of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, and the AU missions in Burundi and Somalia after 2004. African governments must consider implementing Kenyan scholar, Ali Mazrui's, notion of a *Pax Africana* instead of settling for a middle ground such as the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) model – which is a temporary force. African governments must also strongly consider funding their own institutions.

British interest in Africa's natural resources and energy sector has not diminished since the end of the Cold War. Such interests are evident in the oil-producing countries of Nigeria, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea. According to the World Bank, Britain is a major source of remittances to Africa, with Nigeria being the second largest recipient of remittances in the world (\$21 billion in 2015).¹⁸ Moreover, in 2014, Britain's foreign direct investment (outward FDI) in Africa totalled £42.5 billion.¹⁹ When Britons voted to leave the European Union in June 2016, a wave of instability swept across global markets, including African markets. It is crucial that post-“Brexit” developments are monitored as far as Anglo-African relations are concerned, particularly in strategic countries for London such as South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya.



From left: Dr Julia Gallagher, Senior Lecturer, Department of Politics and International Relations, Royal Holloway College, University of London, England; Ms Felleng Sekha, Managing Partner, IQS Strategic Public Affairs Consulting, Cape Town; and Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town.

18 See World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Factbook*, 2016 (available at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-I199807908806/4549025-1450455807487/Factbookpart1.pdf>).

19 See “The UK's Trade and Investment Relationship with Africa”, 2016 (available at <https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/articles/theukstradeandinvestmentrelationshipwithafrica/2016/pdf>).

3. Africa's Key Bilateral Relations in Asia: China, India, and Japan

Africa and China²⁰

China is an increasingly influential actor in world politics, with geo-political interests that have expanded into Africa since the 1960s. African countries will continue to be important to Beijing which has become the world's second largest economy after the US, and continues to show great interest in Africa's strategic resources. Beijing is also adopting a more assertive foreign policy befitting its rapid socio-economic development and rising power status. The "Africa Rising" narrative has been contributing to China's involvement on the continent, particularly through mechanisms such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, which has become a popular approach for multilateral cooperation with African countries. Established in 2000 as a platform for collective consultation and dialogue, and with meetings held every three years, FOCAC represents an important mechanism for Sino-African cooperation. For the most part, China, however, prefers bilateral relationships over multilateral ones.

In 2004, the Export-Import Bank of China (EximBank) – one of Beijing's most important policy instruments since its establishment in 1994 – provided Angola with a \$2 billion loan to improve its transportation infrastructure. At the time, this was a considerable sum when compared with funds coming from other donors across the continent. The importance that China attaches to engagement with African countries is evidenced by the fact that two out of the four overseas branches of China's EximBank are in Africa, representing Southern and Eastern Africa, as well as West and North Africa. Furthermore, industrialisation projects on the continent are a current priority for Beijing which has selected Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda as pilot countries.

China's predisposition for bilateral cooperation with Africa could, however, negatively impact the continent's long-term development efforts. Furthermore, Beijing's economic engagement with Africa disproportionately focuses on extractive industries compared to secondary and tertiary sectors. China has been criticised for destroying textile industries and for using over 70,000 Chinese workers on its projects rather than employing African labour.²¹ Beijing's partnership with Africa has also been affected by issues such as environmental degradation caused by Chinese companies and the fact that African governments – with a few exceptions such as Sudan, Ethiopia, and Egypt – lack the capacity to negotiate with Beijing from a position of strength.

While China is Africa's largest trade partner, valued at \$179 billion in 2015, African exports to China were \$70 billion, and Chinese exports to Africa were \$109 billion.²² Moreover, Africa remains a supplier of raw materials to China, and should change its trade structures so that technical capacity transfer and capacity-building become more of a focus for partnerships with external actors such as Beijing. Local procurement and beneficiation should therefore be given more prominence. China has sought to enhance its global status while

20 This section is partly based on a presentation made by Liu Haifang at the CCR policy research seminar "Africa and External Actors", Cape Town, 24–25 August 2016.

21 Garth le Pere, "China", in Chris Saunders, Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa, and Dawn Nagar (eds.), *Region-Building in Southern Africa: Progress, Problems, and Prospects* (London: Zed, 2012), pp. 281–296. See also Ian Taylor, "China's Environmental Footprint in Africa", *China Dialogue*, 2 February 2007.

22 See Trade Map, "China's Total Trade with Africa", 2015 (available http://www.trademap.org/Country_SelProductCountry.aspx).

contributing to Africa's infrastructural development. More coordination is, however, needed between Asian donors such as China and Japan in their approaches to Africa. Beijing, for its part, should move beyond "showcase projects" that provide limited contributions to Sino-African relations.

Additionally, "people-to-people" relations between Beijing and Africa should be strengthened, and general understanding of China in Africa enhanced. For example, there is a perception that many of the about one million Chinese migrants in Africa²³ are on the continent as part of a Chinese government strategy to solve domestic pressures such as employment and natural resources. While some "new overseas Chinese in Africa" migrants have come to the continent with the help of state aid and do not tend to apply for citizenship even after many years on the continent, those migrants who went to countries such as Botswana, Lesotho, Uganda, and Zimbabwe in the late 1980s and early 1990s chose to do so in order to settle permanently in these countries.

One of the major challenges facing the Sino-Africa partnership is that Africa does not seem to have a long-term strategy for engaging China. At the sixth FOCAC summit, held in Johannesburg in December 2015, the Chinese government pledged \$60 billion to assist the development of African countries in 10 priority areas including: infrastructure development; upgrading of health-care facilities; supporting drought-stricken countries; and providing scholarships for African students. The summit further adopted the Johannesburg Action Plan, which is expected to be implemented between 2016 and 2018, and seeks to deepen political, economic, social, security, and diplomatic relations between China and Africa. About 2,600 Chinese peacekeepers are also deployed in UN missions in Africa. Beijing's evolving partnership with Africa should also be seen in the wider context of the BRICS grouping. In February 2016, African Mining Indaba – the world's largest mining investment conference – expressed concerns regarding the negative impact on the African mining industry of declining Chinese investments.²⁴ It is thus critically important that African governments develop a common long-term strategic plan to engage Beijing. African countries can leverage China's (and India's) interest in the continent to reduce their dependence on traditional Western powers, while Beijing and New Delhi can assist Africa in broadening its export base through technology transfer and knowledge-sharing.

Africa and India²⁵

Africa's relations with India historically saw the latter's founding premier, Jawaharlal Nehru, leading efforts for the liberation of the continent and promoting a policy of non-alignment in the 1960s. More recently, relations have focused on trade with the continent and, particularly, on New Delhi's role in UN and African peacekeeping. India has long been among the top five UN troop-contributors to Africa. Yet peace and security cooperation is an under-exploited area of cooperation among the BRICS countries and in their relations with the continent. Much of these activities have been undertaken on an individual country basis and under the UN umbrella, with key differences in approach to issues such as the "responsibility to protect" (R2P).²⁶ Ownership has become a key feature of Africa's discourse on, and approach to, peace and security cooperation, as has the promotion of democracy and human rights.

23 Howard W. French, *China's Second Continent: How A Million Migrants Are Building a New Empire in Africa* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014).

24 See African Mining Indaba website, <https://www.miningindaba.com>.

25 This section is partly based on a presentation made by Kudrat Virk at the CCR policy research seminar "Africa and External Actors", Cape Town, 24–25 August 2016.

26 Adebajo, "The Revolt Against the West: Intervention and Sovereignty", *Third World Quarterly*, vol 37, issue 7, April 2016.

South Africa is home to the largest Indian diaspora in Africa, followed by Mauritius, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Africans have gone to India for education or employment. In 2015, at the third India-Africa Forum summit in New Delhi, the Indian government committed to providing 50,000 scholarships for Africans to study in the country. Recent attacks on African students and migrants in India, however, expose the underlying racism and intolerance of parts of Indian society. Incidents include an attack in February 2016 by a mob in Bangalore on a female Tanzanian student who was beaten and stripped after a student from Sudan had caused a fatal accident. There was also a fatal attack on a Congolese teacher in New Delhi in May 2016. The widespread discrimination against Africans in India must be urgently addressed by the government in New Delhi.

India's presence in Africa is, in part, a reaction to competition with China. In 2014, India overtook the United States to become Africa's largest trade partner after the European Union and China. New Delhi's trade relations with Africa have been increasing exponentially: total commerce with Africa grew rapidly from \$25 billion in 2007 to \$70 billion in 2015.²⁷ In July 2016, India's prime minister, Narendra Modi, visited Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa in a bid to strengthen Afro-Indian partnerships and agreements. The Modi government, however, is focused on conducting more development finance projects with Tanzania, Kenya, and Mozambique, with a view to increasing maritime security and strengthening India-African partnerships to become more focused around the Indian Ocean.²⁸

Importantly, there is a marked trade imbalance with individual African countries that is unsustainable in the long term. New Delhi, for example, is Nigeria's third largest trade partner, with oil accounting for 98 percent of Abuja's exports to India. African countries have also attracted increasing interest from Indian mining companies that have been involved in mineral extraction. This has led to widespread over-production in steel, coal, and diamond mining in Zimbabwe in 2015, mainly to India's benefit. African countries should therefore claim their own individual and collective agency, and strengthen efforts to add value to their primary commodities, diversify their economies, and increase the competitiveness of the export of their manufactured products.

India's economic engagement in Africa has been mostly led by the private sector, facilitated by the government's Focus Africa Programme since 2002. This includes the information and communications, manufacturing, and pharmaceutical sectors. Tata and Ranbaxy have been operating in Africa since the 1970s, while Bharti Airtel – Africa's second largest telecommunications operator – began operations in 2010. India is also an emerging provider of development assistance to Africa, although the exact amounts are difficult to ascertain. Africa should perhaps explore how it can borrow from India's attitude towards aid and development: to accept aid as and when needed, and in specific ways to further its own socio-economic development based on its particular interests.

27 Mohan Guruswamy, "India-Africa Summit: Why India Is Rolling Out the Red Carpet for All 54 African countries", *Quartz India*, 25 October 2015 (available at <http://qz.com/532657/why-india-is-rolling-out-the-red-carpet-for-all-54-african-countries>).

28 See Michelle DeFreese, "The Modi Doctrine and India-Africa Ties", *The Diplomat*, 7 July 2016 (available at <http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/the-modi-doctrine-and-india-africa-ties>); and Kudrat Virk, "Modi's Four-State Tour a Sign of Resurgent Interest in Continent," *Business Day* (South Africa), 27 July 2016 (available at <http://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2016-07-27-modis-four-state-tour-a-sign-of-resurgent-interest-in-continent/>).

Africa and Japan²⁹

Most of Japan's total trade with Africa during the Cold War was largely with the apartheid South African regime, which estranged Tokyo from the rest of the continent. In 1974, for example, apartheid South Africa was Japan's main supplier of platinum metals for its vibrant motor industry, and Tokyo was also Pretoria's leading African trade partner in 1987. In the post-apartheid era, and as a sign of its intentions to build relations with South Africa's new democratic leadership, Japan offered two aid packages to South Africa: the first, in 1994, amounted to \$1.3 billion; while the second, in 1999, was valued at \$1.5 billion. These aid disbursements were the largest ever provided by Japan to any African country, and were mostly composed of loans and overseas trade and investment insurance aimed at encouraging investment in South Africa, particularly by Japanese enterprises. In 2015, bilateral trade between Japan and Africa totalled \$20 billion.³⁰

The creation of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development in 1993 was significant, and has been a model for newer development fora such as FOCAC of 2000 and the India-Africa Forum summit of 2008. Since its inception in 1993, TICAD has evolved into a multi-stakeholder process, including state parties, international agencies, and civil society organisations, to promote the continent's development based on the principles of African ownership and international partnership. Although Tokyo initiated the process and all the summits were held in Japan between 1993 and 2013, TICAD meetings are co-organised with the United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (UN-OSAA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the World Bank. Even so, the process remains principally a Japanese effort to harness lessons from East Asia's development successes for Africa; and to implement Tokyo's development approach – guided by the philosophy that economic growth must be led by the private sector, with official development assistance acting as a catalyst.

TICAD seeks further to serve as a facilitating link between the corporate sector in Japan and African governments. Japan's development cooperation with Africa is based on an aid philosophy that seeks to promote “self-help” and African ownership, which is a key feature of the country's bilateral and multilateral official development assistance (ODA). In 2000, the Japanese government invited Presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal to attend the G8 summit in Okinawa, Japan, to highlight their emerging visions for the continent's recovery. The African Union's New Partnership for Africa's Development was a key outcome of the overlapping programmes of these three leaders.

The fourth TICAD conference, in May 2008, differed from those that came before, as it established a secretariat within Japan's foreign ministry to ensure follow-ups between African ministers and their Japanese counterparts

29 This section is partly based on a presentation made by Scarlett Cornelissen and Yoichi Mine at the CCR policy research seminar “Africa and External Actors”, Cape Town, 24–25 August 2016.

30 See Trade Map website, <http://www.trademap.org>.

in monitoring implementation of TICAD targets. The Yokohama Plan of Action under the fifth TICAD conference in June 2013 sought to align with the AU's *Agenda 2063* in support of infrastructure development, including transportation corridor development, provision of low-carbon energy, optimisation of energy use, and information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure. For Japan, the “Africa Rising” narrative has stimulated new economic and business interests. Some of the domestic imperatives faced by Japan after the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake, northeast of Tokyo, for example, resulted in Japan increasing its search for more secure sources of raw materials and energy. The sixth TICAD conference took place, for the first time, in Africa, in Nairobi, Kenya, on 27–28 August 2016. The change in venue could be seen as a credible sign that Tokyo is trying to emphasise and develop African agency and ownership. The meeting agreed that for the period of three years from 2016, Japan will invest \$30 billion under a private partnership programme in Africa through the implementation of quality infrastructure; building resilient health systems; and laying the foundation for peace and stability on the continent.³¹ Africa policy in recent years has been devised increasingly as a counterbalance to the rise of China and Chinese economic competition across the continent.



From left: Professor Yoichi Mine, Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan; Professor Scarlett Cornelissen, Department of Political Science, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa; Dr Seifudein Adem, Associate Research Professor of Political Science, and Associate Director, Institute of Global Cultural Studies, Binghamton University, United States; Professor Liu Haifang, Associate Professor, School of International Studies, and Deputy Director, Centre for African Studies, Peking University, China; and Dr Kudrat Virk, Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town.

31 The TICAD Sixth Summit, 27-28 August 2016, Nairobi, Kenya (available at <https://ticad6.net/>).

4. Africa's Key Bilateral Relations: The Nordics, Europe, and the Islamic World

Europe and the Islamic World³²

Since the inception of the European Economic Community in 1957, there have been efforts to develop relations with the southern and eastern Mediterranean. By the beginning of the 1980s, there were a series of bilateral association accords with the Maghreb and Mashrek countries, which consolidated the important and diverse trade relations between countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, as well as northern European countries. Between 1995 and 2005, exports to the European Union from what are called the Euro-Med countries to the south and east (Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Lebanon, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Israel, and Palestine) doubled, halving the region's total deficit with the EU to 10 percent of total trade.³³

Africa's relations with Europe and the Islamic world have changed since the end of the Cold War. Previously, Europe dominated relations in Africa, and did not concentrate much on the Arab world. Europe is no longer an exporter of instability, but has instead become an importer of instability, and is increasingly more concerned with security issues related to the Muslim-dominated countries of North Africa in order to curb mass migration from those countries into Europe across the Mediterranean. The "Afro-Arab Spring" of 2011 will have potentially radical consequences for the mental map of Africa and for relations between Africa, the Arab world, and the European Union. In terms of policy, the "2011 North African Uprisings" have had major consequences for Europe's relations with Africa, gradually leading to a division of the African continent into a northern half and a southern half, cut off by the Sahara desert.

The northern part of Africa is mainly Muslim-dominated and inward-looking, with every country focused mainly on its own survival. European policy has increased attention on this northern part, with a special focus on political stability and the reduction in the number of refugees and migrants flowing across the Mediterranean into Europe. The influx of young male refugees and migrants into Europe from North Africa has further given rise to a perception of instability among European citizens, forcing the EU to draft a new migration policy. Thus, through security and migration issues, Europe is becoming more closely involved with the northern part of Africa, while the reverse may be the case for the EU's relationship with sub-Saharan Africa which is increasingly developing ties with countries such as China, Brazil, and India, as discussed above.

In the coming decades, the number of young men from both the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa trying to migrate to Europe will remain significant and might increase further, forcing the EU to develop a more sensible and practical migration regime towards the continent.³⁴ Insecurity issues that are linked to African migration now dominate Brussels' agenda, centred on terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida, Al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram as

32 This section is partly based on presentations made by Anne Hammerstad and Roel van der Veen at the CCR policy research seminar "Africa and External Actors", Cape Town, 24-25 August 2016.

33 European Union Commission, "EU Adopts Negotiating Proposal For Services and Investment Talks with Mediterranean Countries", Brussels, 23 June 2005 (available at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=192>).

34 Andrew Geddes, "Migration and 'Fortress Europe'", in Adebajo and Whiteman (eds.), *The EU and Africa*, pp. 405-418.

major drivers of instability for Africa and the Arab world, as well as for Europe. Migration across the Mediterranean into Europe reached its peak in 2015 with 1.6 million arrivals. This was triggered by a combination of factors such as socio-economic insecurity, political violence, terrorism, and climate change, as well as the lack of socio-economic development in these countries.

Migration has therefore come to be seen as an opportunity for many desperate people fleeing these countries. For many in Europe, however, migration has become synonymous with terrorism. Europe's response has been to put in place a policing mechanism to protect "Fortress Europe", but Frontex – the European Border and Coastguard Agency – has not been able to prevent refugees from entering the EU. As migrants from countries such as Libya, Eritrea, Morocco, and Somalia continue to flee into Europe, Africa and the EU should seek to work together to develop an effective migration policy and find more creative and developmental ways to address migration that move beyond a securitisation of the issue.

The Nordic Countries³⁵

Moving to the Nordic countries, before the Cold War, shared values were central to the foreign policies of Nordic countries: mainly Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. Due to similarities in the socio-economic models and foreign policy approaches of the Nordics, outsiders often mistakenly view these countries as a united group. The common model has been termed the "Nordic model", while the foreign policy relations of the countries comprise an array of "middle-power" attributes and ambitions. The foreign policy of the Nordic countries can be said to represent activism and consensus-seeking multilateralism; normative values such as equality, redistribution, and peaceful conflict resolution; support for the United Nations and its agencies; and aid to developing countries. Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, in particular, have a long history of engagement on the continent, and played an active role in the liberation of Southern Africa.

The former Nordic development approach to Africa, however, has fundamentally changed, and Nordic engagement with Africa is now much more centred on the interests of Nordic countries themselves. Notably, Nordic support has moved from a discourse on global justice to a more interest-based approach. A significant policy shift is evident in Sweden's increasing focus on its national interests compared to earlier discourses on development assistance in Africa. A similar rhetoric is also noticeable in Denmark and Norway's Africa policies.³⁶ Like the EU, the Nordic countries are determined to address the political instability in North Africa to help reduce the large numbers of refugees and migrants flowing across their borders. For example, Sweden received the most migrants in the EU per capita, with 163,000 people entering the country in 2015. Norway saw an influx of 30,000 migrants, into a country of 5 million people, at the end of 2015.

Between 2010 and 2015, Stockholm prioritised trans-border issues such as climate change, migration, peace and security, as well as cooperative research and combating corruption. In addition, Copenhagen and Oslo's Africa policies have sought to adopt an integrated approach on trade, aid, climate change, and development. Focus has increasingly centred on Nordic trade and investment in Africa. Attention to terrorism, migration,

35 This section is partly based on a presentation made by Anne Hammerstad at the CCR policy research seminar "Africa and External Actors", Cape Town, South Africa, 24-25 August 2016.

36 Anne Hammerstad, "The Nordics, the EU, and Africa," in Adebajo and Whiteman (eds.), *The EU and Africa*, pp. 385-402.

climate change, and conflict resolution has also increased. Nordic countries have focused on investment in technology for Africa and building a number of industries in African countries. In 2015, trade relations between Denmark and Africa totalled \$1.9 billion; Norway-Africa trade amounted to \$3 billion; while Finland's Africa trade was \$1.9 billion. Sweden had the largest trade with the continent, reaching \$4.9 billion in 2015.³⁷ There is an urgent need to investigate what the Nordic countries' social-democratic, middle-power approach consists of, and how it has affected their policies towards, and relationships with, the African continent. It is equally important to investigate whether the many strong ties and affinities between the Nordic countries have resulted in a common and coordinated Nordic approach towards Africa.



From left: Professor Roel van der Veen, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and Senior Academic Advisor, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague; Professor Brian Williams, Visiting Professor in Peace, Mediation, and Conflict Transformation, University of Lusaka, Zambia; and Dr Anne Hammerstad, Honorary Senior Research Fellow, University of Kent, Canterbury, England.

37 See Trade Map website.

5. Africa's Key Multilateral Relations: The United Nations and the European Union

Africa and the United Nations³⁸

When the United Nations was conceived by the US, Russia, China, and Britain at the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks conference in Washington, D.C., the organisation was established to act as a guarantor of world peace with the assistance of regional bodies. Founded in 1945, the United Nations had only four African states at the time: Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa. The Indian government was the first to bring to the attention of the UN General Assembly in 1946 the issue of racism – in particular the treatment of people of Indian origin – by the apartheid government in South Africa. India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, worked with African countries at the UN to wage the anti-apartheid struggle, and began the campaign to isolate the South African government.

Against strong opposition from Western powers, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was established in 1964 in response to the concerns of developing countries about the disparity between rich and developing nations. This was followed in 1966 by the establishment of the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) to promote the industrialisation of developing countries. The decline of the dominant African position at the United Nations during the 1970s and early 1980s began after the continent had dropped from a third to a quarter of its membership with the end of the Cold War by 1990. Today, 54 African countries represent over a quarter of the world body's total of 193 member states.

Much of the UN's socio-economic and humanitarian work occurs in Africa, and Nairobi (the site of the United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP]) remains one of only four UN headquarters around the world – together with New York, Geneva, and Vienna. About half (29 out of 56) of the UN's peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War era have taken place in Africa. In the 2015/2016 financial year, the nine UN-deployed missions in Africa (out of 16 globally) cost \$6 billion (about 86 percent of the total cost of all missions). There were 82,772 UN peacekeepers deployed in these nine missions in Africa in August 2016 (about 82 percent of all UN peacekeepers deployed globally).³⁹ In May 2016, the UN Development Programme had 1,067 projects in Africa, including in Zimbabwe, South Sudan, and the DRC.⁴⁰

The world body has also established sub-regional offices in West Africa, the Great Lakes region, and Central Africa, as well as peacebuilding offices in Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, CAR, Sierra Leone, and Burundi. Two Africans – Egypt's Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Ghana's Kofi Annan – were Secretaries-General of the UN during the critical post-Cold war years of 1992 to 2006, while Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, and South Sudanese scholar-diplomat Francis Deng, were respectively involved in leading some of the most important conceptual debates and initiatives on UN

38 This section is partly based on a presentation made by James Jonah at the CCR policy research seminar "Africa and External Actors", Cape Town, South Africa, 24–25 August 2016; as well as on a presentation "A Life in Peacekeeping" at the CCR policy research seminar "Towards a New Pax Africana: Making, Keeping, and Building Peace in Africa", Stellenbosch, 28–30 August 2013.

39 UN Missions Summary of Military and Police, August 2016 (available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2016/aug16_6.pdf).

40 See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "Our Projects", 2016 (available at <http://open.undp.org/#2016/filter/region-RBA>).

peacekeeping, and issues involving the emerging norm of R2P. While 60 percent of the 15-member UN Security Council's deliberations focus on Africa, the continent remains one of only two major regions of the world – along with Latin America – without a permanent seat and veto power on the UN's most powerful body.⁴¹

To some extent, the issue of UN Security Council reform has been held up by African states, as they are constrained by the African Union's 2005 Ezulwini Consensus, which favours at least two additional African permanent seats with veto power, in addition to its existing three rotating seats, on the 15-member UN Security Council. Italy's proposal that, given the importance of regional configurations, the African continent and the European Union each have one seat on the Security Council, has gained little support with countries such as Nigeria and South Africa, which oppose the idea. The role of the Security Council as the guardian of international law – an issue around which much of the debates on Council reform is centred – is essential for smaller, less powerful countries, which need the international legal system to protect them. This guardianship will be threatened if the Council is unable to provide such protection. African countries thus need to regain their influence in the UN General Assembly and Secretariat, and find a unifying issue such as UN Security Council reform, that is of benefit to the entire continent and its Southern allies.

The five permanent members (P-5) of the UN Security Council – the US, China, Russia, France, and Britain – now largely control decision-making on peacekeeping, and UN support for peacekeeping interventions in Africa is mostly shaped by the parochial interests of the P-3 – the US, France, and Britain. They write all the resolutions on 11 out of 15 African cases on the Council. The concept of the “responsibility to protect”, which urges action by the international community to protect populations at risk from egregious human rights abuses, was misused by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members in 2011 – led by the P-3 – to pursue a “regime change” agenda against Libya's Muammar Qaddafi. This has complicated the response of P-5 countries such as China and Russia to the Syrian conflict that began in March 2011. Beijing and Moscow – supported by Tshwane on the Council in 2011/2012 – oppose any resolution that authorises the use of “all necessary means” to be used for the protection of civilians.

Africa and the European Union⁴²

Relations between Africa and the Europe Union have for some time been considered as a laboratory for North-South relations. This was certainly the case in the 1970s when the Lomé Convention of 1975 was signed. The term “partnership” has often been used to characterise this relationship. However, for many Africans, the relationship has been unequal and is more a situation of uneasy co-existence than a mutually beneficial relationship. For example, the EU's 2005 Africa strategy sought to provide a framework for a comprehensive, integrated, long-term relationship, but was almost completely prepared by the European Commission in Brussels, without much input from African states. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), launched in Lisbon in

41 Adebajo, *UN Peacekeeping in Africa*.

42 This section is partly based on a presentation made by Gilbert Khadiagala at the CCR policy research seminar “Africa and External Actors”, Cape Town, South Africa, 24–25 August 2016.

December 2007, however, involved African input and contained valid ideas on creating an environment for sustainable and inclusive development in Africa. The JAES sought not only to streamline Brussels' engagement with the continent, but also to move this engagement beyond development aid and Africa-focused issues to include political dialogue and cooperation in areas of mutual interest and concern, as well as on global challenges. Beside other political, economic, and geo-strategic interests, the EU needs a strong continental organisation to deal with African issues.

The evolving relationship between Africa and the EU has often lent itself to two dominant interpretations. On the one hand is the optimistic view that recognises obstacles to mutually beneficial Africa-EU relations, but views the relationship as a work in progress and a pioneering experience in inter-regional cooperation. This perspective is largely informed by the EU's financial and technical support to Africa through programmes such as the African Peace Facility (APF), the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF), and the African Union Support Programme (AUSP). The European Union has also awarded about 80 grants for infrastructure projects in Africa worth over €6.5 billion. By 2016, Brussels had contributed more than €1.3 billion to support the AU's peace and security agenda through the APF. The EU has further provided peacekeepers to African conflicts, having deployed troops to the DRC (2003 and 2006), Chad (2008–2009), and the Central African Republic (2014–2015). However, as veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council, France and Britain have considerable influence, and the impact that European self-interest may have on UN peacekeeping on the continent needs to be closely monitored. France has been involved in UN missions in Côte d'Ivoire and Mali, the latter before and after the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) took over the authority of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) in April 2013.

A fairly pessimistic view, however, argues that the rhetorical commitments emanating from political dialogue between African and EU leaders are rarely matched by effective implementation, and that Brussels is little more than the AU's most prominent paymaster. Currently, about 90 percent of funding for the AU's African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) framework comes from external partners, largely the EU. Africans should therefore increase funding for their own institutions through their resources. This includes implementing the January 2015 decision that the AU should finance 25 percent of its peace and security budget and 75 percent of its programmes. Often when AU members do not pay their dues to the continental body, it is because they may attach little importance to the work that is being conducted at the continental level. Furthermore, very few heads of state return home from AU summits and report to their citizens on what transpired at the meeting. African countries should therefore strengthen the continental integration project and include a bottom-up approach that involves actors such as youth, think tanks, and civil society who can provide much-needed assistance in authoring Africa's own destiny.

The EU's perceived imposition of economic partnership agreements (EPAs) on African countries has also recently poisoned Africa-EU relations. Negotiating the EPAs has posed a major challenge to EU–Africa relations since the signing of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 (revised in 2010 and 2015, the agreement is scheduled to end in 2020). Key concerns for many African countries have included threats by the EU to withdraw duty-free access for those countries that do not sign economic partnership agreements; disruption in the process of African integration due to the many different EPA configurations; and intrusion upon existing trade configurations such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act, or with countries like China.⁴³ African

43 See Mareike Meyn, "An Anatomy of the Economic Partnership Agreements"; and Gilbert Khadiagala, "Africa and Europe: Ending a Dialogue of the Deaf", both in, Adebajo and Whiteman (eds.), *The EU and Africa*, pp. 197-216; and pp. 217-235.

countries should seize the potential opportunities presented by a weakened, less confident, and less cohesive post-Brexit Europe to redefine their relations with the European Union. This should include Africa calling for a moratorium on the economic partnership agreements while the EU completes its “divorce settlement” with Britain, and formulating substantive policy responses to issues such as Brexit. For example, Tanzania withdrew from the East African Community’s (EAC) economic partnership agreement on the eve of the signing process in July 2016, calling for the EAC to re-evaluate the agreement – a move that has galvanised long-time critics of the economic accords.



From left: Professor Gilbert Khadiagala, Head of the Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), Johannesburg; Ms Karin Henmarck-Ahlino, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Sweden to South Africa, Tshwane (Pretoria); and Ambassador James Jonah, Former United Nations Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs.

6. The Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa Bloc⁴⁴

The Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa bloc has a combined population of an estimated three billion people, representing 46 percent of the global population.

The five countries have 46 percent of the global workforce, but are responsible for only 14 percent of global trade and 19 percent of world gross domestic product (GDP), rising to 27 percent in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). Washington's "quantitative easing" policy has resulted in a fall in the values of currencies of all the BRICS countries except for China since 2013. Brazil and Russia have suffered from economic depression since 2014, in part because of the fall in commodity prices, and South Africa has been close to recession in 2016. India has been experiencing uneven development, while China's growth rates have been slowing since 2014. Notwithstanding its regular summitry, the BRICS bloc is still a relatively new grouping with an expanding, but still evolving, agenda for cooperation. Doubts persist about the bloc's ability to coalesce into an agenda-setting actor with a harmonised approach to addressing global challenges. At the same time, the lack of cohesion among the BRICS countries makes it difficult to categorise them as being "for" or "against" the existing Western-dominated world order.

The BRICS countries may seek to contribute to reshaping the Western-dominated global order, but where international financial institutions are concerned, they can be said to form part of the prevailing order. At the Fortaleza/Brasilia summit in July 2014, the BRICS bloc agreed to establish the New Development Bank (NDB), "with the purpose of mobilising resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging and developing economies".⁴⁵ The Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) of the BRICS' New Development Bank stipulates that a member country can borrow only 30 percent of its quota, after which it must approach the International Monetary Fund for a structural adjustment loan. Only then can it access more from the Contingent Reserve Arrangement. In this regard, the grouping remains, to a large extent, dependent on the IMF.

The BRICS bank is a potentially timely response to continental initiatives such as the AU Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) of 2011-2040 (adopted in July 2012), whose aggregate price tag will amount to about \$368 billion, with 51 priority programmes and projects envisioned. However, it remains to be seen how the BRICS bank will fare as a provider of development finance, given that the NDB's entire initial subscribed capital is only \$50 billion. Still, the usefulness of the BRICS bank for African countries extends beyond the provision of capital and includes knowledge-sharing about innovative ways to meet the demands of development in the global South. In this respect, the New Development Bank could create space for the BRICS countries and other developing and emerging economies to contribute more meaningfully to their own sustainable development.

In order for the BRICS to move away from the notion that they are replicating a "Scramble for Africa", they need to address issues such as exploitation of cheap labour in countries such as South Africa and China. For

44 This section is partly based on presentations made by Patrick Bond and David Monyae at the CCR policy research seminar "Africa and External Actors", Cape Town, 24-25 August 2016.

45 See CCR, "South Africa and the BRICS"; and Sixth BRICS Summit, Fortaleza Declaration, 15 July 2014, para. II (available at <http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/media2/press-releases/214-sixth-brics-summit-fortaleza-declaration>).

example, the diamond mines in South Africa's city of Kimberley still make use of rural-urban African migrant labour, while China's rural-urban migration controls cheapen labour supplies. African countries need over \$480 billion for infrastructure development over the next decade. Besides providing the capital to carry out infrastructure projects in Africa, the BRICS' New Development Bank should be used as a knowledge development bank to help differentiate sources of capital and create more opportunities for investment, trade, and development.

The IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) Dialogue Forum – created in June 2003 – could also provide an alternative focus for its three member countries. The evolution of the BRICS agenda beyond trade and investment has raised questions about IBSA's ability to retain a unique niche on the global stage. If managed well, both BRICS and IBSA could play a potentially critical and complementary role in advancing the interests of the “global South”. In addition, Tshwane is the only African member of the BRICS bloc, and South Africa has – according to critics – sought rhetorically to use this platform to promote Africa's voice while pursuing its own more parochial interests. However, the extent to which the interests of the BRICS countries in Africa converge with the continent's own interests remains uncertain.

Africa's interests at the IMF were dealt a severe blow when \$75 billion from the BRICS countries – \$43 billion from China; \$10 billion each from Brazil, Russia, and India; and \$2 billion from South Africa – was used to recapitalise the IMF through a credit mechanism in 2012. While the voting power of four of the five BRICS countries at the IMF was subsequently increased in December 2015 (China by 37 percent, Brazil by 23 percent, India by 11 percent, and Russia by 8 percent), seven African countries, including economies that were not able to provide support for IMF recapitalisation, lost more than a fifth of their voting share. South Africa, for example, lost 21 percent, while Nigeria lost 41 percent. The other countries were: Algeria, Gabon, Libya, Morocco, and Namibia. Beyond the acronym, therefore, questions remain as to whether there are any real synergies within the BRICS grouping. In order for the bloc to contribute to the reform of the global system rather than being perceived as a group of status quo powers, the five countries need to be better coordinated with regard to discussions on leadership of international institutions such as the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO.

The widespread racism and xenophobia that are often produced and perpetuated by politicians as well as the media within the BRICS countries must also be urgently addressed. In China, for example, in a racist advertisement, a black man is forced to drink a cleaning detergent and then bundled into a washing machine, after which he emerges as a Chinese man, with the detergent credited for having brought about the change.⁴⁶ The legacy of “xenophobia denialism” in the case of South Africa – which experienced major xenophobic violence in 2008, 2010, and 2015 that resulted in an estimated 350 deaths in those seven years – has contributed to the inability of some African countries to view the country as a credible representative of African interests in the BRICS, at the WTO, and at the G20. Although eventually opposing further intervention in Libya following the NATO intervention in 2011, South Africa had initially supported the UN Security Council resolution 1973 in March 2011 that allowed for military intervention.⁴⁷ Invited by China to join the BRICS in December 2010 and having been a member since April 2011, South Africa is undoubtedly in the bloc to advance its own interests. It has, however, also sought to include other African voices through hosting a BRICS

46 See Russian Television News, “Chinese Laundry Detergent Ad Awash With Racism [video]”, 27 May 2016 (available at <https://www.rt.com/viral/344582-chinese-ad-racist-outcry/>).

47 United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ Over Libya, Authorising ‘All Necessary Measures’ To Protect Civilians, By Vote of 10 In Favour With 5 Abstentions” 17 March 2011 (available at <http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm>).

Leaders–Africa Dialogue Forum retreat on the sidelines of the March 2013 Durban summit, which was attended by 15 African leaders. As a collective, the BRICS bloc was able to come together to lobby successfully against the proposal to expel Russia from the G20 summit in Brisbane, Australia, in November 2014 following Moscow’s annexation of Crimea eight months earlier.

Three counter-summits that seek to include more voices in critical analysis of the BRICS have taken place alongside the summits in Durban, South Africa (March 2013); Fortaleza, Brazil (July 2014); and Goa, India (October 2016). Protest marches have also occurred. According to a 2015 Pew Research Centre survey, 47 percent of South Africans were aware that climate change is the greatest long-term threat of local concern, followed by international economic instability. For the December 2015 Paris Agreement within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the BRICS countries allied with the United States and the European Union, major emitters of green-house gases. Though the deal was cited as an international compromise, it is not legally binding with regard to emissions-cutting commitments, and provides no recourse for legal liabilities against the world’s wealthy countries for their role in contributing to droughts, extreme weather, and increased temperatures.

There needs to be more awareness about the benefits of the BRICS for ordinary people within the bloc. For example, civil society initiatives such as “BRICS from below”⁴⁸ exert pressure on governments to address urgent issues such as the roll-out of anti-retroviral (ARV) drugs for AIDS sufferers in the case of South Africa. In the early 2000s, Brazil and India abused the patents of major Western pharmaceutical companies by developing generic ARVs to replace expensive branded medicines, and worked with South African activists to protest against the WTO, and the South African and US governments. These ARVs have since saved the lives of millions of HIV-positive Africans.



From left: Dr David Monyae, Co-Director, University of Johannesburg Confucius Institute (UJCI); Dr Folarin Cbadebo-Smith, Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the Centre for Public Policy Alternatives (CPPA), Lagos, Nigeria; and Professor Patrick Bond, School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

48 “BRICS from below” is an evolving project that represents accountability from below led by civil society.

7. Africa, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organisation

Africa, the World Bank, and the IMF⁴⁹

The two Bretton Woods institutions – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – were established in 1944 to support major economic and political developments in the world. However, underlying ideological and governance assumptions about politics and development have largely shaped the policy interventions of these two institutions in Africa. For example, in 1963, the World Bank approved an investment of 80 million British pounds to develop the railway system of the racist state of Rhodesia, while refusing to complete the Tazara railway for socialist Tanzania. This latter project was eventually completed in the 1960s with the backing of Chinese funds of \$450 million.⁵⁰ The World Bank and the IMF continued to dominate Africa’s political, social, and economic development agendas.⁵¹ The controversial structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s, created by the IMF and the World Bank for African countries, advocated the lifting of market restrictions; free access to markets, with relaxed tariffs and taxes; encouragement of inward investment and external trade; and liberalised labour markets. The SAPs were anchored in a neo-liberal framework that failed to take into account the realities of Africa’s socio-economic inequalities. This resulted in major underdevelopment in Africa, with massive cuts in health and education. Between 1980 and 1989, 241 SAPs projects were implemented in Africa, resulting in a total economic growth of merely 2.5 percent by 1990. After the Cold War, the World Bank became involved in post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Eritrea, Mozambique, and Rwanda.⁵² The results of these peacebuilding initiatives have been mixed, however, amid a continued lack of effective international coordination and inadequate funding.

The African Development Bank, as part of the World Bank Group, faces similar constraints as African governments from powerful Western shareholders. Africa responded to the SAPs by crafting policies such as the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos, both of 1980; the African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery of 1985; the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) of 1989; and the African Charter for Popular Participation for Development of 1990. Adebayo Adedeji, at the time, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), was at the forefront in designing these constructive frameworks with a view to assisting African governments to reverse the damage caused by the SAPs.

49 This section is partly based on a presentation made by Adele Jinadu at the CCR policy research seminar “Africa and External Actors”, Cape Town, 24–25 August 2016.

50 Joseph Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa* (London: James Currey, 1986), p. 246.

51 Graham Harrison, “Financing Peace: The World Bank, Reconstruction, and Liberal Peacebuilding”, in Curtis and Dzinesa (eds.), *Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa*, pp. 158–170. See also Adebayo Adedeji, “The Travails of Regional Integration in Africa”, in Adebajo and Whiteman (eds.), *The EU and Africa*, pp. 83–104.

52 World Bank, “The World Bank’s Rwanda Economic Update: Seizing the Opportunities for Growth with a Special focus on Harnessing the Demographic Dividend”, 29 January 2014 (available at <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/01/29/the-world-banks-rwanda-economic-update-seizingthe-opportunities-for-growth-with-a-special-focus-on-harnessing-the-demographic-dividend>).

In order to address the unequal status quo of the international economic order, African countries must establish the political conditions for democracy and development, and develop a more Africa-centred response to democracy and socio-economic development. Africa's relations with the World Bank and IMF have historically involved considerable loans being offered to African governments. The World Bank approved a total of \$11.6 billion in loans in 2015 – in support of an enhanced role for the private sector and a minimalist role for African governments. The harsh consequences of market imperfections have subsequently seriously undermined growth and development in African economies. One of the many weaknesses of the SAPs was their inability to relate the core problem of designing efficient “democratic institutions” in Africa to the structural problem of underdevelopment. Moreover, the absence of a clear structural framework for equitable global trade has exacerbated Africa's weak economies. It is therefore imperative that African governments strengthen the collective capacity of their continental and regional institutions to address contemporary challenges of democracy, development, and globalisation as envisioned in the AU's *Agenda 2063* of 2013. African leaders must engage in negotiation processes that promote economic growth and development. African countries at the WTO should thus continue to work together to develop strategies to negotiate beneficial trade deals, as well as to build coalitions and develop regional consensus on pertinent issues such as climate change and de-industrialisation.

Africa and the World Trade Organisation⁵³

The World Trade Organisation was established in January 1995 as a more institutionalised version of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), created in November 1947. The WTO has 164 member states,⁵⁴ and deals with global trade rules to ensure fair trade among its members. It has been just over two decades ago since the organisation adopted its rules on the functioning of the multilateral trading system. African governments were central to the renegotiations for changing the rules-based multilateral trading system established during the WTO's Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, between 1986 and 1994, which culminated in the Marrakesh Agreement, signed by 123 countries in April 1994. Given the decrease in Africa's share of world trade from 5.9 percent of world trade in 1980 to about 3 percent by 2013, the continent must prioritise issues of food security and opening up export markets for agriculture in global trade negotiations.


The Doha Declaration of November 2001 provided a further mandate to the organisation for negotiations with a view to the abolition of food and agricultural subsidies in industrialised countries, and in support of developing countries being able to protect their infant industries. The WTO has had major difficulty in finalising trade talks between developing and industrialised countries since December 1999, with the latter failing to open their markets to clothing and food – the most important exports from poor countries. At the November 2001 WTO Doha round of multilateral talks held in Qatar, discussions on development and opening of markets in agriculture, manufacturing, and services failed to achieve concrete results. Six subsequent meetings were held between 2003 and 2008 to address this impasse.

53 This section is partly based on a presentation made by Mariama Williams at the CCR policy research seminar “Africa and External Actors”, Cape Town, 24–25 August 2016.

54 World Trade Organisation (WTO), “Membership of the WTO as of 31 December 2015”, Annual Report, 2016 (available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Research/Files/Reports/2016/01/foresight-africa/foresightafrica2016_fullreport.pdf?la=en).

The WTO marked its 20-year anniversary by holding its tenth ministerial conference in the Kenyan capital of Nairobi in December 2015.⁵⁵ The conference discussed a number of historical agreements on commodities such as agriculture and cotton; issues of specific interest to the least-developed countries; as well as measures to assist low-income cotton producers to gain access to new markets. It also focused on abolishing tariffs on 201 information technology (IT) products with a total annual trade value of \$1.3 trillion. Moreover, two important WTO agreements remain partially unsigned by its member states, and will enter into force once two-thirds of the organisation's member states commit to the agreements. The outstanding agreements are the trade facilitation agreement approved at a WTO ministerial conference held in Bali, Indonesia, in December 2013; and another on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS).⁵⁶ The WTO's rules regarding the making of trade policy are thus important to Africa's efforts to achieve a more balanced, rule-based multilateral trading system. The organisation must also address important issues such as investment, competition policy, e-commerce, and climate and trade.

African countries have further failed to diversify their economies through a lack of focus on industrialisation and agricultural and export-led growth. They have been unable to develop their social sectors to promote equity and income redistribution. African governments must thus be more active in the World Trade Organisation's dispute settlement mechanisms. It is also imperative that the WTO's trade rules be reformed to enhance Africa's voice in global commerce.



From left: Dr Mariama Williams, Senior Fellow, South Centre, Geneva, Switzerland; Professor Adele Jinadu, Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Babcock University, Ogun State, Nigeria; and Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse, Former Deputy Director-General of the International Labour Organisation, and former Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme.

55 WTO, "Message from Director-General Roberto Azevêdo", *Annual Report*, 2016 (available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Research/Files/Reports/2016/01/foresight-africa/foresightafrica2016_fullreport.pdf?la=en).

56 "Global Trade After the Failure of the Doha Round", *The New York Times*, 1 January 2016 (available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/01/opinion/global-trade-after-the-failure-of-the-doha-round.html?_r=0).

Policy Recommendations

The following 10 policy recommendations emerged from the August 2016 Cape Town policy seminar:

1. Pro-Africa lobbyists in the US need to collaborate closely with legislators in the US Congress as well as Washington-based interest groups as they did during South Africa's anti-apartheid struggles in the 1980s. The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) should also be mobilised to support these battles. The tens of thousands of highly-educated Africans in America should further help to build a viable constituency for Africa.
2. People-to-people relations are important in Africa's relations with Russia. Russian cultural centres could therefore contribute to building Russo-African cultural relations to improve language barriers and to strengthen business partnerships with a view to changing stereotypes on both sides.
3. African countries should seize the potential opportunities presented by a weakened, less confident, and less cohesive post-"Brexit" Europe to redefine their relations with the European Union. This includes Africa calling for a moratorium on the economic partnership agreements while the EU completes its "divorce settlement" with Britain, and formulating substantive policy responses to issues such as Brexit.
4. African countries should leverage China's and India's interest in the continent to reduce their dependence on traditional Western powers such as the US, Britain, and France, while Beijing and New Delhi should assist Africa in broadening its export base through technology transfer and knowledge-sharing. Francophone countries on the continent should reduce their political, economic, and cultural dependence on France. Furthermore, Africa must explore how it can borrow from India's attitude towards aid and development, which is to accept aid as and when needed, and in specific ways to further its own socio-economic development based on a clear definition of its specific interests.
5. African governments should develop clear, coordinated positions on their goals and the strategies for achieving them in fora such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation; the Tokyo International Conference on African Development; and in respect of other rapidly emerging economies in the "global South" such as Brazil and India.
6. Africa remains a supplier of primary products to external actors, and should change its trade structures so that technical capacity transfer and capacity-building become more of a focus for partnerships with external actors, with local procurement and beneficiation given more prominence. Furthermore, African countries should claim their own individual and collective agency, and strengthen efforts to add value to their primary commodities; diversify their economies; and increase the competitiveness of the export of manufactured products.
7. Building on the experiences of the Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the African Union missions in Burundi, Darfur, and Somalia, Africa needs to create an effective peacekeeping force; it must fund its own institutions to a greater extent in order to prevent external actors such as France and the US intervening in Africa in pursuit of their own parochial interests.

8. African countries need to regain their influence in the UN General Assembly and Secretariat, and find a unifying issue such as UN Security Council reform, that is of benefit to the entire continent and its Southern allies.
9. Besides providing the capital to carry out infrastructure projects in Africa, the BRICS New Development Bank should be used as a knowledge development bank to help to differentiate sources of capital and to create more opportunities for investment, trade, and development.
10. African countries and their Southern allies must continue to push for genuine transformation of the World Bank and IMF to make decision-making more equitable; African governments at the World Trade Organisation should also continue to work together and develop strategies to achieve trade deals, as well as to build coalitions and develop regional consensus on important issues such as climate change and de-industrialisation.



Participants at the CCR policy research seminar on "Africa and External Actors", 24-25 August 2016, Cape Town, South Africa.

Annex I

Agenda

Tuesday, 23 August 2016

16:00 **Welcome Cocktail and Registration**

17:30 – 19:00 **Public Dialogue launching the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) book, Region-Building in Africa: Political and Economic Challenges**

Venue: 6 Spin Street, Cape Town

Chair: **Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse**, Former Deputy Director General of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and former Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Speakers: **Ms Dawn Nagar**, Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Discussant: **Professor John Akokpari**, Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town (UCT)

Day One: **Wednesday, 24 August 2016**

09:00 – 09:30 **Welcome and Opening Remarks**

Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

09:30 – 11:00 **Session I: Africa's Key Traditional Bilateral Relations: The United States (US) and Russia**

Chair: **Ambassador John Hirsch**, Senior Adviser, International Peace Institute (IPI), New York, United States; and Former United States Ambassador to Sierra Leone

Speakers: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Professor Vladimir Shubin, Principal Research Fellow, Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), Moscow

Ms Rosaline Daniel, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

11:00 - 11:15 Coffee Break

11:15 – 13:00 Session II: Africa’s Key Traditional Bilateral Relations: China, India, and Japan

Chair: Dr Seifudein Adem, Associate Research Professor of Political Science, and Associate Director, Institute of Global Cultural Studies, Binghamton University, United States

Speakers: Professor Liu Haifang, Associate Professor, School of International Studies, and Deputy Director, Centre for African Studies, Peking University, China

Dr Kudrat Virk, Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Professor Scarlett Cornelissen, Department of Political Science, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa

Professor Yoichi Mine, Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan

13:00 - 14:15 Group Photo followed by Lunch

14:15 – 15:45 Session III: Africa’s Bilateral Relations With Non-Traditional Powers: The Nordics, Europe, and The Islamic World

Chair: Professor Brian Williams, Visiting Professor in Peace, Mediation, and Conflict Transformation, University of Lusaka, Zambia

Speakers: Dr Anne Hammerstad, Honorary Senior Research Fellow, University of Kent, Canterbury, England

Professor Roel van der Veen, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and Senior Academic Advisor, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague

15:45 - 16:00 Coffee Break

16:00 – 17:30 Session IV: Africa’s Key Multilateral Relations: The United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU)

Chair: Ms Karin Hernmarck-Ahliny, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Sweden to South Africa, Tshwane (Pretoria)

Ambassador James Jonah, Former United Nations Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs

Professor Gilbert Khadiagala, Head of the Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

19:00 Dinner

Day Two: Thursday, 25 August 2016

09:00 – 10:30 Session V: Africa’s Key Traditional Bilateral Relations: France and Britain

Chair: Ms Felleng Sekha, Managing Partner, IQS Strategic Public Affairs Consulting, Cape Town

Speakers: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Dr Julia Gallagher, Senior Lecturer, Department of Politics and International Relations, Royal Holloway College, University of London, England

10:30 – 10:45 Coffee Break

10:45 – 12:15 Session VI: The Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) Bloc

Chair: Dr Folarin Gbadebo-Smith, Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the Centre for Public Policy Alternatives (CPPA), Lagos, Nigeria

Speaker: Professor Patrick Bond, School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand (Wits), Johannesburg

Discussant: Dr David Monyae, Co-Director, University of Johannesburg Confucius Institute (UJCI)

12:15 – 13:15 Lunch

13:15 – 14:45 Session VII: Africa, The World Bank, The International Monetary Fund (IMF), and The World Trade Organisation (WTO)

Chair: Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse, Former Deputy Director-General of the International Labour Organisation, and former Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme

Speakers: Professor Adele Jinadu, Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Babcock University, Ogun State, Nigeria

Dr Mariama Williams, Senior Fellow, South Centre, Geneva, Switzerland

14:45 – 15:15 Coffee Break and Completing Evaluation Forms

15:15 – 16:15 Session VIII: Rapporteurs’ Report And The Way Forward

Chair: Professor Chris Landsberg, South African Research (SARChI) Chair of African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy; and Senior Associate, School of Leadership, University of Johannesburg (UJ)

Speakers: Ms Dawn Nagar, Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Ms Rosaline Daniel, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town



From left: Ms Dawn Nagar, Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town; and Ms Rosaline Daniel, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Annex II

List of Participants

1. Dr Adekeye Adebajo
Executive Director
Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR)
Cape Town
South Africa
2. Dr Seifudein Adem
Associate Research Professor of Political
Science; and Associate Director
Institute of Global Cultural Studies
Binghamton University
United States
3. Professor John Akokpari
Associate Professor
Department of Political Studies
University of Cape Town (UCT)
Cape Town
4. Professor Patrick Bond
School of Governance
University of the Witwatersrand (Wits)
Johannesburg
South Africa
5. Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse
Former Deputy Director-General of the
International Labour Organisation (ILO)
Accra
Ghana
6. Professor Scarlett Cornelissen
Department of Political Science
University of Stellenbosch
South Africa
7. Ms Rosaline Daniel
Senior Project Officer
Centre for Conflict Resolution
Cape Town
8. Ms Claudia Furriel
Director: New Partnership for African
Development (NEPAD)/African Union
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
Tshwane
South Africa
9. Dr Julia Gallagher
Senior Lecturer
Department of Politics and International
Relations
Royal Holloway College
University of London
England
10. Dr Folarin Gbadebo-Smith
Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer
The Centre for Public Policy Alternatives
(CPPA)
Lagos
Nigeria
11. Dr Anne Hammerstad
Honorary Senior Research Fellow, University of
Kent, Canterbury, England; and Senior
Research Associate, South African Institute of
International Affairs (SAIIA)
Johannesburg
12. Ms Karin Hernmarck-Ahliny
Deputy Head of Mission
Embassy of Sweden
Tshwane

13. Ambassador John Hirsch
Senior Adviser
International Peace Institute (IPI)
New York
14. Mr Jan Huesken
Deputy Head of Mission
Embassy of the Netherlands to South Africa
Tshwane
15. Professor Adele Jinadu
Professor of Political Science
Department of Political Science and Public
Administration
Babcock University
Ogun State
Nigeria
16. Ambassador James Jonah
Former United Nations (UN) Undersecretary-
General for Political Affairs
New York
17. Professor Gilbert Khadiagala
Head
Department of International Relations
University of the Witwatersrand
Johannesburg
18. Mr Vahyala Kwaga
Research Associate
The Centre for Public Policy Alternatives
Lagos
Nigeria
19. Professor Chris Landsberg
South African Research (SARChI) Chair of
African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy; and
Senior Associate School of Leadership
University of Johannesburg (UJ)
Johannesburg
20. Professor Liu Haifang
Associate Professor, School of International
Studies, and Deputy Director and Secretary-
General, Centre for African Studies
Peking University
Beijing
China
21. Mr Sambulo Mathebula
Senior Policy Officer
Embassy of the Netherlands to South Africa
Tshwane
22. Professor Yoichi Mine
Graduate School of Global Studies
Doshisha University
Kyoto
Japan
23. Dr David Monyae
Co-Director
University of Johannesburg Confucius Institute
(UJCI)
Johannesburg
24. Mr Lucas Mutheiwana
Assistant Director
Defence Policy Formulation
Department of Defence
Tshwane
25. Ms Dawn Nagar
Researcher
Centre for Conflict Resolution
Cape Town
26. Mr Sagaren Naidoo
Director
Defence Policy Formulation
Department of Defence
Tshwane

27. Ms Felleng Sekha
Managing Partner
IQS Strategic Public Affairs Consulting
Cape Town
28. Professor Vladimir Shubin
Principal Research Fellow
Institute for African Studies
Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS)
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Russia
29. Professor Roel van der Veen
Senior Academic Advisor
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Hague
Netherlands
30. Dr Kudrat Virk
Senior Researcher
Centre for Conflict Resolution
Cape Town
31. Professor Brian Williams
Visiting Professor
University of Lusaka
Zambia
32. Dr Mariama Williams
Senior Researcher
South Centre
Geneva
Switzerland

Conference Team

1. Mr Stanley Enga Awaseh
Senior Administrative Officer
Centre for Conflict Resolution
Cape Town
2. Ms Jill Kronenberg
Personal and Research Assistant
Centre for Conflict Resolution
Cape Town
3. Ms Nombulelo Mthimkhulu
Intern
Centre for Conflict Resolution
Cape Town
4. Ms Nabila Noor Mahomed
Administrator
SARCHI Chair on African Diplomacy and
Foreign Policy
University of Johannesburg
5. Ms Nomathamsanqa Masiko
Research Consultant
Centre for Conflict Resolution
Cape Town

Annex III


List of Acronyms

AAF-SAP	African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation
ACIRC	African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (AU)
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
AFRICOM	Africa Command (United States)
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
AITF	EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund
APF	African Peace Facility (EU)
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture (AU)
ARVs	anti-retroviral drugs
AU	African Union
AUSP	African Union Support Programme
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India, and China
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CAR	Central African Republic
CBC	Congressional Black Caucus (US)
CCR	Centre for Conflict Resolution (Cape Town, South Africa)
CRA	Contingent Reserve Arrangement (BRICS)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
EACTI	East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (US)
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEC	European Economic Community
EPAs	Economic Partnership Agreements
EU	European Union
EximBank	Export-Import Bank of China
FDI	Foreign direct investment
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
G8	Group of Eight
G20	Group of Twenty
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	gross domestic product
IBSA	India, Brazil, and South Africa
ICT	information and communications technology
IT	information technology
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy

MDGs	Millennium Development Goals (UN)
MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDB	New Development Bank (BRICS)
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
ODA	official development assistance
P-3	US, France, and Britain
P-5	five permanent members of the UN Security Council
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (US)
PIDA	Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (AU)
PPP	purchasing power parity
R2P	responsibility to protect
REC	regional economic community
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAP	structural adjustment programme
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
TRIPS	trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
TSCTI	Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (US)
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNIDO	UN Industrial Development Organisation
UN-OSAA	United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa
US	United States
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Other Publications in this Series


(Available at www.ccr.org.za)



VOLUME 1 THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S SECURITY

THE UNITED NATIONS, REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND FUTURE SECURITY THREATS IN AFRICA


The inter-related and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security within the framework of United Nations (UN) reform were the focus of this policy seminar, held from 21 to 23 May 2004 in Claremont, Cape Town.



VOLUME 5 WHITHER SADC?

SOUTHERN AFRICA'S POST-APARTHEID SECURITY AGENDA

The role and capacity of the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) were focused on at this meeting in Oudekraal, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005.



VOLUME 2 SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRICA

THE POST-APARTHEID DECADE


The role that South Africa has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa's domestic transformation 10 years into democracy were assessed at this meeting in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 29 July to 1 August 2004.



VOLUME 6 HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY


AN AGENDA FOR AFRICA

The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and the potential role of African leadership and the African Union (AU) in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.



VOLUME 3 THE AU/NEPAD AND AFRICA'S EVOLVING GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The state of governance and security in Africa under the African Union (AU) and The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) were analysed and assessed at this policy advisory group meeting in Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004.



VOLUME 7 BUILDING AN AFRICAN UNION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES (RECS), NEPAD AND CIVIL SOCIETY


This seminar in Cape Town, held from 20 to 22 August 2005, made policy recommendations on how African Union (AU) institutions, including The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), could achieve their aims and objectives.



VOLUME 4 A MORE SECURE CONTINENT


AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN HIGH-LEVEL PANEL REPORT, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

African perspectives on the United Nations' (UN) High-Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change were considered at this policy advisory group meeting in Somerset West, Cape Town, on 23 and 24 April 2005.




VOLUME 8 THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

This meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 October 2005, explores civil society's role in relation to southern Africa, democratic governance, its nexus with government, and draws on comparative experiences in peacebuilding.




**VOLUME 9
WOMEN AND
PEACEBUILDING IN
AFRICA**

This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations (UN) in 2000.




**VOLUME 13
SOUTH SUDAN WITHIN
A NEW SUDAN**

This policy advisory group seminar on 20 and 21 April 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A).




**VOLUME 10
HIV/AIDS AND
MILITARIES IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

This two-day policy advisory group seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.



**VOLUME 14
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES
ON THE UN
PEACEBUILDING
COMMISSION**

This meeting, in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3 and 4 August 2006, analysed the relevance for Africa of the creation, in December 2005, of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission, and examined how countries emerging from conflict could benefit from its establishment.



**VOLUME 11
AIDS AND SOCIETY IN
SOUTH AFRICA**


BUILDING A COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE

This policy and research seminar, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 March 2006, developed and disseminated new knowledge on the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in the three key areas of: democratic practice; sustainable development; and peace and security.




**VOLUME 15
THE PEACEBUILDING
ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
IN CENTRAL AFRICA**

This sub-regional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.




**VOLUME 12
HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN
SECURITY IN SOUTH
AFRICA**

This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS in South Africa and southern Africa from a human security perspective.



**VOLUME 16
UNITED NATIONS
MEDIATION EXPERIENCE
IN AFRICA**


This seminar, held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006, sought to draw out key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa, and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations' (UN) newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).



**VOLUME 17
WEST AFRICA'S
EVOLVING SECURITY
ARCHITECTURE**


LOOKING BACK TO THE FUTURE

The conflict management challenges facing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the areas of governance, development, and security reform and post-conflict peacebuilding formed the basis of this policy seminar in Accra, Ghana, on 30 and 31 October 2006.



**VOLUME 21
AFRICA'S EVOLVING
HUMAN RIGHTS
ARCHITECTURE**


The experiences and lessons from a number of human rights actors and institutions on the African continent were reviewed and analysed at this policy advisory group meeting held on 28 and 29 June 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa.



**VOLUME 18
THE UNITED NATIONS
AND AFRICA**

PEACE, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SECURITY


This policy advisory group meeting, held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 14 to 16 December 2006, set out to assess the role of the principal organs and the specialised agencies of the United Nations (UN) in Africa.



**VOLUME 22
PEACE VERSUS JUSTICE?**


TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS AND WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS IN AFRICA

The primary goal of this policy meeting, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 May 2007, was to address the relative strengths and weaknesses of "prosecution versus amnesty" for past human rights abuses in countries transitioning from conflict to peace.




**VOLUME 19
AFRICA'S
RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT**

This policy seminar, held in Somerset West, South Africa, on 23 and 24 April 2007, interrogated issues around humanitarian intervention in Africa and the responsibility of regional governments and the international community in the face of humanitarian crises.




**VOLUME 23
CHILDREN AND ARMED
CONFLICTS IN AFRICA**

This report, based on a policy advisory group seminar held on 12 and 13 April 2007 in Johannesburg, South Africa, examines the role of various African Union (AU) organs in monitoring the rights of children in conflict and post-conflict situations.



**VOLUME 20
WOMEN IN POST-
CONFLICT SOCIETIES IN
AFRICA**


The objective of the seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 and 7 November 2006, was to discuss and identify concrete ways of engendering reconstruction and peace processes in African societies emerging from conflict.



**VOLUME 24
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

This report is based on a seminar, held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 29 and 30 May 2007, that sought to enhance the efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to advance security, governance and development initiatives in the sub-region.



**VOLUME 25
PREVENTING GENOCIDE
AND THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT**

**CHALLENGES FOR THE UN, AFRICA, AND THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY**


This policy advisory group meeting was held from 13 to 15 December 2007 in Stellenbosch, South Africa, and focused on six African, Asian and European case studies. These highlighted inter-related issues of concern regarding populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, 'ethnic cleansing', or crimes against humanity.



**VOLUME 29
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
AND PEACEBUILDING IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

**CIVIL SOCIETY, GOVERNMENTS, AND
TRADITIONAL LEADERS**

This meeting, held on 19 and 20 May 2008 in Johannesburg, South Africa, provided a platform for participants from Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe to share insights on sustained intervention initiatives implemented by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in the three countries since 2002.



**VOLUME 26
EURAFRIQUE?**

AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY

This seminar, held from 31 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt); peacekeeping and military cooperation; and migration.



**VOLUME 30
CROUCHING TIGER,
HIDDEN DRAGON?
CHINA AND AFRICA**

**ENGAGING THE WORLD'S NEXT
SUPERPOWER**

This seminar, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 September 2007, assessed Africa's engagement with China in the last 50 years, in light of the dramatic changes in a relationship that was historically based largely on ideological and political solidarity.



**VOLUME 27
SECURITY AND
DEVELOPMENT IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**


This seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 8 to 10 June 2008, brought together a group of experts – policymakers, academics and civil society actors – to identify ways of strengthening the capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to formulate security and development initiatives for southern Africa.



**VOLUME 31
FROM EURAFRIQUE TO
AFRO-EUROPA**

AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY

This policy seminar, held from 11 to 13 September 2008 in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, South Africa, explored critically the nature of the relationship between Africa and Europe in the political, economic, security and social spheres.



**VOLUME 28
HIV/AIDS AND
MILITARIES IN AFRICA**


This policy research report addresses prospects for an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic within the context of African peacekeeping and regional peace and security. It is based on three regional advisory group seminars that took place in Windhoek, Namibia (February 2006); Cairo, Egypt (September 2007); and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (November 2007).



**VOLUME 32
TAMING THE DRAGON?**

**DEFINING AFRICA'S INTERESTS AT THE FORUM
ON CHINA-AFRICA CO-OPERATION (FOCAC)**


This policy seminar held in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa on 13 and 14 July 2009 – four months before the fourth meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) – examined systematically how Africa's 53 states define and articulate their geo-strategic interests and policies for engaging China within FOCAC.



**VOLUME 33
PEACEBUILDING IN
POST-COLD WAR
AFRICA**


PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS

This policy research seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana from 25 to 28 August 2009 took a fresh look at the peacebuilding challenges confronting Africa and the responses of the main regional and global institutions mandated to build peace on the continent.



**VOLUME 37
STATE RECONSTRUCTION
IN ZIMBABWE**


This policy advisory group seminar held in Siavonga, Zambia, from 9 to 10 June 2011, assessed the complex interlocking challenges facing the rebuilding of Zimbabwe in relation to the economy, employment, health, education, land, security, and the role of external actors.



**VOLUME 34
STABILISING SUDAN**


**DOMESTIC, SUB-REGIONAL, AND
EXTRA-REGIONAL CHALLENGES**

This policy advisory group seminar held in the Western Cape, South Africa from 23 to 24 August 2010 analysed and made concrete recommendations on the challenges facing Sudan as it approached an historic transition – the vote on self-determination for South Sudan scheduled for January 2011.



**VOLUME 38
SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA,
AND THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 13 to 14 December 2011, focused on South Africa's role on the UN Security Council; the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the Council; the politics of the Council; and its interventions in Africa.



**VOLUME 35
BUILDING PEACE IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**


This policy seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 25 to 26 February 2010, assessed Southern Africa's peacebuilding prospects by focusing largely on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its institutional, security, and governance challenges.



**VOLUME 39
THE EAGLE AND
THE SPRINGBOK**

**STRENGTHENING THE NIGERIA/SOUTH
AFRICA RELATIONSHIP**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Lagos, Nigeria, from 9 to 10 June 2012, sought to help to "reset" the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa by addressing their bilateral relations, multilateral roles, and economic and trade links.




**VOLUME 36
POST-CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION IN THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO (DRC)**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 19 to 20 April 2010 sought to enhance the effectiveness of the Congolese government, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), civil society, the United Nations (UN), and the international community, in building peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).



**VOLUME 40
SOUTH AFRICA IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 19 to 20 November 2012, considered South Africa's region-building efforts in Southern Africa, paying particular attention to issues of peace and security, development, democratic governance, migration, food security, and the roles played by the European Union (EU) and China.



**VOLUME 41
THE AFRICAN UNION
AT TEN**


PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS

This international colloquium held in Berlin, Germany, from 30 to 31 August 2012, reviewed the first ten years of the African Union (AU); assessed its peace and security efforts; compared it with the European Union (EU); examined the AU's strategies to achieve socioeconomic development; and analysed its global role.



**VOLUME 45
THE AFRICAN,
CARIBBEAN, AND PACIFIC
(ACP) GROUP AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION (EU)**

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 29 to 30 October 2012, considered the nature of the relationship between the ACP Group and the EU, and the potential for their further strategic engagement, as the final five-year review of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 between the two sides approached in 2015.



**VOLUME 42
AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICA,
AND THE UNITED NATIONS'
SECURITY ARCHITECTURE**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 12 to 13 December 2012, considered Africa and South Africa's performance on the United Nations (UN) Security Council; the politics and reform of the Security Council; the impact of the African Group at the UN; and the performance of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.



**VOLUME 46
TOWARDS A NEW
PAX AFRICANA**


**MAKING, KEEPING, AND BUILDING PEACE
IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA**

This policy research seminar held in Stellenbosch, South Africa, from 28 to 30 August 2013, considered the progress being made by the African Union (AU) and Africa's regional economic communities (RECs) in managing conflicts and operationalising the continent's peace and security architecture; and the roles of key external actors in these efforts.



**VOLUME 43
GOVERNANCE AND
SECURITY CHALLENGES
IN POST-APARTHEID
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

This report considers the key governance and security challenges facing Southern Africa, with a focus on the 15-member Southern African Development Community (SADC) sub-region's progress towards democracy; and its peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding efforts.




**VOLUME 47
POST-APARTHEID SOUTH
AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY
AFTER TWO DECADES**

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 28 to 30 July 2013, reviewed post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy after two decades, and explored the potential leadership role that the country can play in promoting peace and security, as well as regional integration and development in Africa.




**VOLUME 44
ACHIEVING THE
MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT GOALS
(MDGS) IN AFRICA**

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 13 and 14 May 2013, considered the progress that Africa has made towards achieving the UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and sought to support African actors and institutions in shaping the post-2015 development agenda.




**VOLUME 48
SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA,
AND INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS (IIAs)**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 17 to 18 February 2014 assessed the principles underpinning international investment agreements, including bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and the implications of these instruments for socio-economic development efforts in South Africa and the rest of the continent.



**VOLUME 49
REGION-BUILDING AND
REGIONAL INTEGRATION
IN AFRICA**

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 28 to 30 April 2014, considered the challenges and potential of Africa's regional economic communities (RECs) in promoting region-building and regional integration on the continent, including through a comparative assessment of experiences in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.




**VOLUME 53
THE AFRICAN UNION:
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL
CHALLENGES**

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 27 to 29 April 2016, revisited the performance and prospects of the African Union (AU) in the areas of governance, security, socio-economic challenges, as well as assessing the AU Commission and its relations with African sub-regional organisations and external actors.




**VOLUME 50
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE
BRICS:
PROGRESS, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Tshwane, South Africa, from 30 to 31 August 2014, assessed the potential for increasing the impact of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) Grouping on global politics, and to develop concrete recommendations in support of South Africa's continuing engagement with the bloc.




**VOLUME 54
WAR AND PEACE IN THE
GREAT LAKES REGION**

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 19 to 20 March 2016, assessed the major obstacles to peace and security in the Great Lakes, and considered seven broad issues: security and governance; the cases of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda; as well as the roles of the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) in the region.




**VOLUME 51
SECURITY AND
GOVERNANCE IN THE
GREAT LAKES REGION**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Franschoek, Western Cape, from 9 to 10 May 2015, assessed the obstacles to peace, security, and governance in the Great Lakes region. The report assessed the political situation in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); the roles of Rwanda and Uganda in the region; as well as those of regional and external actors.



**VOLUME 55
THE PEACEBUILDING
ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
IN SOUTH SUDAN**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Tshwane, South Africa, from 11 to 12 December 2015, reflected on the role of, and prospects for, civil society in South Sudan in the areas of peacemaking and peacebuilding. The report also provides policy recommendations for strengthening the capacity of South Sudanese civil society to play a more effective peacebuilding role in the country.



**VOLUME 52
REGION-BUILDING AND
PEACEBUILDING IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana, from 19 to 20 September 2015, assessed key issues relating to region-building and peacebuilding in Southern Africa, while analysing South Africa's leadership role in the sub-region.

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In August 2016, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, brought together about 30 key scholars, policymakers, and civil society activists to assess bilateral and multilateral relations between Africa's traditional and non-traditional actors in the post–Cold War era. Key issues pertaining to Africa's relations with global actors were discussed under the following three broad themes: bilateral relations with traditional powers: the United States (US), Russia, China, France, and Britain; bilateral relations with non-traditional powers: India; Japan; the Nordics; and Europe and the Arab world; and multilateral relations: the United Nations (UN), the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), the European Union (EU), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This meeting examined Africa's relations with eight key bilateral actors or blocs and six major multilateral actors, assessing progress made in the continent's efforts to increase its leverage in global politics through engagement with key external actors.



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