



BUILDING PEACE IN SOUTH SUDAN: PROGRESS, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS



CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

PPOLICY ADVISORY GROUP SEMINAR REPORT

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RAPORTEURS

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About the Organiser

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa, was established in 1968. The organisation has wide-ranging experience in conflict interventions in Southern Africa and is working on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations. Its policy research focuses on peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa; region-building and regional integration on the continent; relations between Africa and the European Union (EU); achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa; and South Africa’s bilateral and multilateral foreign policy.

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Executive Summary

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a two-day policy advisory group seminar at the Vineyard Hotel in Cape Town, from 14 to 15 December 2016, on the theme “Building Peace in South Sudan: Progress, Problems, and Prospects”.

The meeting brought together about 30 key policymakers, academics, and civil society actors to reflect critically upon the challenges of, and prospects for, peacebuilding in South Sudan; and to examine the role of major actors – such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), the Troika (comprising the United States [US], Britain, and Norway), and China – in supporting local and national peace processes.

1. The Challenges of Building Peace in South Sudan

The violent conflict that began in December 2013 and, after a brief hiatus, resumed in July 2016, is the gravest challenge facing South Sudan’s fragile peacebuilding and state-building processes. The humanitarian costs of the crisis continue to be extremely high, with one in four people displaced, four in ten severely food-insecure, and thousands of homes destroyed.¹ An emphasis on humanitarian and emergency relief has, furthermore, shifted the focus away from development assistance. Low state absorption capacity and donor concerns about the diversion of funds amidst widespread corruption have also contributed to the limited availability of resources for state capacity-building.

“The humanitarian costs of the crisis continue to be extremely high, with one in four people displaced, four in ten severely food-insecure, and thousands of homes destroyed.”

An acute, unresolved crisis of national identity lies at the heart of the conflicts within both Sudan and South Sudan, as well as between them, that reflects their failure to manage internal diversity constructively. The current civil war in South Sudan began as a power struggle within the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), but rapidly descended into a violent, inter-ethnic conflict. The renewed violence, since July 2016, reflects, in part, the weakness of the August 2015 Addis Ababa agreement in addressing fully the role of ethnic-based grievances as a driver of conflict. It also reflects an overemphasis on elite-level conflict resolution and concomitant lack of attention to peacebuilding at the grassroots level in a context of widespread poverty, inequality, and a weak economy.

South Sudanese leaders need to recognise the country’s ethnic and cultural diversity as an asset that can contribute towards the building of a strong state and resilient society. Successful diversity management must also include bottom-up processes that provide space for participation by an engaged citizenry. This requires greater awareness of South Sudan’s pluralistic heritage; and, just as important, visionary leadership to build a modern state that draws its strength from grassroots experiences and indigenous institutions.

¹ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), “South Sudan: Humanitarian Response Plan 2017”, December 2016, p. 6.

2. Challenges Facing South Sudan's Transitional Government of National Unity

South Sudan's Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) – created under the terms of the Addis Ababa agreement, but without key SPLM-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) members after July 2016 – faces severe, inter-locking political, economic, and security challenges. In early 2017, the UN declared famine in parts of the country, with an estimated 100,000 people facing starvation. Persistent violence, increasing insecurity, and limited access to basic services are continuing to cause displacement and distress, even as humanitarian agencies struggle to provide assistance in difficult conditions. Both government and rebel forces have been implicated in human rights violations; and the SPLA remains a deeply fractured force, controlled by warlords and divided along ethnic lines.

South Sudan's \$9 billion economy, meanwhile, is heavily reliant on oil, which comprises 90 percent of government revenues. These have been badly affected by reduced oil production, as well as lower international oil prices and Juba's fixed oil transit fee agreement with Khartoum. At the same time, subsistence agriculture – the mainstay of local livelihoods – has collapsed in the face of renewed violence and drought. These problems have been compounded by increasing levels of militarisation, and youth unemployment and marginalisation. Two-thirds of the South Sudanese population is below the age of 30.

The violence since July 2016 has, at best, severely set back the Addis Ababa agreement and, at worst, fatally undermined it. Influential figures within South Sudan remain opposed to the peace accord, with the ruling elite continuing to prioritise self-enrichment and ethnic-based interests over nation-building. Politics beyond Juba and below the national level, combined with a proliferation of informal conflicts, has only added further depth to the challenges facing the transitional government.

3. Implementing the 2015 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement

The Addis Ababa peace agreement was the result of an intense IGAD-led mediation process, with critical support provided by key external actors such as the AU, the UN, and the Troika. The negotiations featured sharp differences between the South Sudanese government and the SPLM-IO; and President Salva Kiir eventually signed the accord, under immense international pressure, nine days after opposition leader Riek Machar had done so. In these circumstances, implementation was, from the outset, characterised by a lack of confidence, trust, and ownership of the agreement.

Initial progress included the establishment and partial operationalisation of mechanisms such as the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission, and the Strategic Defence and Security Review Board. However, differences quickly emerged between Kiir and Machar, including on the creation of 28 states, before the outbreak of violence in July 2016 amidst rising tensions, mistrust, and frustration. Machar's subsequent flight from Juba, his replacement by Taban Deng Gai as first vice-president, and the fracturing of the SPLM-IO have since imperilled the peace agreement, and the transitional government remains bitterly contested.

Amidst a worsening humanitarian crisis, the imposition of an arms embargo and individual sanctions has been raised at the UN Security Council. However, IGAD remains strongly in favour of continuing dialogue; and has continued to assert its support for the Addis Ababa agreement and the deployment of the UN-authorized Regional Protection Force (RPF). In early May 2017, though, this force was still to be deployed.

4. Human Rights

In March 2017, there were an estimated 1.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in South Sudan, with about 1.6 million South Sudanese refugees having fled to neighbouring countries, including Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Violations of international humanitarian law, including attacks against UN personnel and humanitarian workers, and restrictions on movement and access, also continued to impede efforts to protect and provide assistance to civilians. Rural populations, as well as vulnerable groups such as women and children, have been particularly badly affected by the conflict, including the concomitant decline in spending on social services.

With both warring sides accused of committing human rights violations, there has been very little discussion of accountability at the national level. Strong doubts also remain about whether an inclusive national dialogue can be held and transitional justice dispensed, as envisaged under the Addis Ababa agreement, in an environment characterised by fear, intimidation, and violence. The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has, meanwhile, faced criticism over its failure to protect civilians during the July 2016 violence in Juba, and the mission, as well as other UN agencies, continue to face significant challenges in carrying out their mandates.

5. Gender and Peacebuilding

Even before the outbreak of the current conflict, translating constitutional principles on gender equality into practice was a formidable challenge in South Sudan, which has since been exacerbated by the ongoing violence. Patriarchal gender norms and traditional practices, such as the payment of bride prices and cattle-raiding among pastoral communities, are deeply implicated as drivers of conflict and insecurity in South Sudan. Similarly, sexual and gender-based violence was widespread in South Sudan prior to December 2013, but has since increased. Women and children compose a majority of those displaced by the ongoing conflict, including the over 214,000 people sheltering in UN protection-of-civilian (PoC) sites across the country.

“Patriarchal gender norms and traditional practices, such as the payment of bride prices and cattle-raiding among pastoral communities, are deeply implicated as drivers of conflict and insecurity in South Sudan.”

Meanwhile, the role of women as actual and potential agents of peacebuilding in South Sudan has been neglected. South Sudanese women, though, campaigned actively to strengthen their representation in the Addis Ababa peace negotiations and the incorporation of gender-based perspectives in the resultant agreement; and have since continued advocacy efforts to strengthen their voices in peacebuilding processes. However, greater efforts are needed to ensure that their participation in decision-making structures is both adequate and meaningful. More sustained efforts – such as the creation of UN Women-supported rural empowerment centres – are also needed to bridge the gap between the country’s female elite and women at the grassroots level.

6. The Role of Civil Society in Peacebuilding

Civil society in South Sudan has for a long time played a critical role in resolving and managing conflicts, building peace, and delivering services. Despite myriad challenges, South Sudanese civil society groups have continued to support peacebuilding in several ways, including through the dissemination of the Addis Ababa agreement to local communities. Local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), furthermore,

remain a key conduit for sharing information on the human rights situation in South Sudan with external actors. There are doubts, though, about the extent to which South Sudanese civil society can influence elite-level politics and achieve impact beyond local-level improvements in human security.

Intrusive government interference, economic volatility, and weak rule of law have altogether led several South Sudanese NGOs to re-locate to neighbouring countries such as Uganda, Kenya, and Sudan. The working environment for media groups and journalists, in particular, has become hugely restricted, even dangerous, in South Sudan. The lack of democratic political institutions and an independent and functioning judiciary have added to the vulnerability of NGOs. Furthermore, relations between civil society organisations have tended to be characterised by competition, in a context of resource scarcity and dependence on external funding. Local NGOs also have significant capacity deficits, and several lack clear and achievable objectives, while others are struggling to maintain non-partisanship in an increasingly polarised context. Church leaders and groups remain active and influential peacebuilding actors, but face growing challenges, including a perceived loss of relevance.

7. The Role of External Actors in South Sudan

Despite an increasingly difficult relationship and a decline in its influence with Juba (since December 2013), the US remains one of the most important extra-regional actors engaged with South Sudan. External pressure, led by Washington, was key to getting the Addis Ababa agreement signed, and in 2017 the US remains the largest single donor of humanitarian aid to South Sudan. Domestic pressure for an aid drawdown has, however, increased in the face of growing attacks on aid workers and humanitarian convoys. Since December 2013, at least 79 aid workers have been killed in South Sudan. Though Washington has continued to reiterate its support for the Addis Ababa accord, unlike IGAD it favours the imposition of an arms embargo and individual sanctions to resolve the crisis.

China – the largest investor in the South Sudanese economy – has also continued to offer diplomatic support for the IGAD-mediated peace process. However, Beijing’s approach has been cautious and reactive, while seeking to balance the country’s relations with Khartoum and Juba, with Chinese diplomats seeing their engagement primarily in terms of a learning process. There is also limited understanding in Chinese society at large about how the crisis in South Sudan affects China, or about the position of Africa in Beijing’s foreign policy. Meanwhile, the role of neighbouring countries – including Uganda, Sudan, and Kenya – has varied and evolved since December 2013, as part of a changing constellation of regional circumstances and interests. Outside the region, South Africa’s engagement has continued to be notable, mainly for its diplomatic support for AU and IGAD efforts to address the South Sudanese conflict. South Africa’s ruling African National Congress (ANC) is also co-guarantor – alongside Tanzania’s ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party – of an intra-party dialogue process aimed at promoting SPLM unity.

Policy Recommendations

The following ten key policy recommendations emerged from the Cape Town seminar:

1. Visionary and transformative leadership by the South Sudanese ruling elite that prioritises inclusive state-building and peacebuilding is an imperative. Traditional authorities can play a critical role in this endeavour, but need to move away from ethnic exclusivism. Efforts should be made to encourage the creation of a National Council that brings together ethnic-based institutions, such as the Dinka and Nuer Councils of Elders, and aims to promote inclusivity and unity, while exerting a positive influence on the conduct of SPLA and SPLA-IO soldiers, as well as militia fighters.

2. African leaders and organisations, including, in particular, IGAD and the AU, need to engage South Sudan's political leadership in constructive dialogue for greater accountability for the protection and promotion of human rights, as well as respect for international humanitarian law.
3. The AU Commission needs, as a matter of urgency, to establish the Hybrid Court of South Sudan, as envisaged in the Addis Ababa peace agreement, to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of atrocities, and end impunity for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious crimes under international and South Sudanese law including sexual and gender-based violence.
4. Conflict analysis and peacebuilding interventions need to address both notions of masculinities and women's issues, for a holistic approach to achieving gender equality in South Sudan. Civil society organisations need also to be innovative in designing and implementing programmes that address patriarchy and gender inequities in South Sudan, while key external actors – including the UN as well as major donors such as the US and the EU – must seek to continually assess that their interventions do not inadvertently promote gender inequality.
5. It is vital for South Sudanese civil society organisations to focus on becoming more professional and to avoid being seen as partisan actors, in order to (re-)gain their legitimacy in the eyes of the communities that they engage with and to have an impactful role at the grassroots level. Civil society and faith-based groups also need to make more effective use of coordinating bodies, such as the South Sudan NGO Forum and the South Sudan Council of Churches, to avoid conflict and competition; and to be able to have greater influence at the national level.
6. There is a need for closer coordination between IGAD, the AU, the UN Security Council, and the Troika, as well as other relevant actors including China, on the situation in South Sudan and on strategies to restore order and stability in the conflict-affected country.
7. The deployment of a Regional Protection Force has to be treated as a matter of priority for the restoration of law and order in Juba, with more careful consideration given to the timing and potential impact of an arms embargo and sanctions.
8. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan must take greater responsibility for the provision of security to internally displaced persons under its protection and in its protection of civilian camps. In this regard, UNMISS should further consider initiating dialogue and educational programmes to promote human rights among, and provide conflict management skills to, IDPs to limit violent clashes.
9. Once the situation in South Sudan stabilises, peacebuilding efforts should focus on improving economic conditions, particularly in the agricultural sector, to strengthen community resilience; improve food security; and reduce the vulnerability of ordinary South Sudanese to conflict. Just as important, civil society must be supported in its efforts to combat corruption and address the nexus between conflict and oil-based patronage more effectively.
10. It is vital that security arrangements – including, in particular, issues related to the integration of armed militias – are properly addressed in the peace process in South Sudan, with a view to transforming the SPLA into a professional conventional national army, with a shared institutional culture, that is less likely to fragment along ethnic lines during political crises.

Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a two-day policy advisory group seminar at the Vineyard Hotel in Cape Town, from 14 to 15 December 2016, on the theme “Building Peace in South Sudan: Progress, Problems, and Prospects”.

The Centre has, for nearly five decades, worked to promote a just and sustainable peace in Africa, with an emphasis on strengthening the capacity of African institutions and civil society actors to resolve conflicts and to build peace in their own communities. This report builds on CCR’s policy development and research work on issues pertaining to South Sudan since 2006, as well as its sustained capacity-building work in the country since 2012. The report expands, in particular, on the Centre’s December 2015 policy seminar “The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in South Sudan”, which reflected critically on the record of, and prospects for, civil society in peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan.² CCR previously organised a seminar, in April 2006, on the theme “South Sudan Within a New Sudan”, which devised concrete recommendations on how the country could use the opportunity of the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to establish strong governance institutions.³ The Centre held a further policy meeting in August 2010 that focused on the domestic, sub-regional, and external challenges facing Sudan, as then Southern Sudan prepared for its landmark referendum in January 2011.⁴ Based on this experience, since 2012, CCR has worked on a sustained basis in South Sudan to build the capacity of diverse local actors in the areas of human rights, security sector reform, conflict resolution, and HIV/AIDS. Currently, the Centre, in a consortium with the Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD) and DanChurchAid (DCA), is implementing a five-year project (2016–2021) in South Sudan – funded by the government of the Netherlands – aimed at generating sustainable livelihoods and leadership for peace in Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, and Jonglei.⁵

CCR’s December 2016 Cape Town seminar took place at a particularly uncertain and critical juncture in South Sudan’s young history as an independent state: three years after the outbreak of civil war in December 2013, and about six months after renewed fighting in the capital of Juba in July 2016, brought the status of the newly independent country’s precarious formal peace into further doubt. The violence has shattered the high expectations that accompanied South Sudan’s independence in July 2011. Though there were other conflicts after independence, and relations with the government of Sudan continued to be strained, the fighting that broke out in Juba in December 2013 – as in the case of the subsequent violence in July 2016 – rapidly spread to other parts of the country, taking its civil conflict to a new, deeper, and more destructive level.

The December 2013 conflict was precipitated by a leadership crisis, but was rooted in deeper political tensions, within the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).⁶ These had been simmering over the course

2 Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), *The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in South Sudan*, seminar report, Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa, November 2016 (available at <http://www.ccr.org.za>).

3 CCR, *South Sudan Within a New Sudan*, seminar report, Franschhoek, South Africa, 20–21 April 2006 (available at <http://www.ccr.org.za>).

4 CCR, *Stabilising Sudan: Domestic, Sub-Regional, and Extra-Regional Challenges*, seminar report, Somerset West, South Africa, 23–24 August 2010 (available at <http://www.ccr.org.za>).

5 In October 2015, South Sudanese president Salva Kiir issued an executive order establishing 28 states out of the country’s existing ten. This number has since increased to 32, with Kiir announcing the creation of four new states in January 2017. In view of the domestic political debate and uncertainty surrounding this re-drafting of borders, the references in this report are to the original ten states.

6 Peter Adwok Nyaba, *South Sudan: The State We Aspire To*, Casas Book Series no. 85, reprint (Cape Town: Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society, 2013), p. 167.

of the year, particularly after the South Sudanese president, Salva Kiir, stripped his vice-president, Riek Machar, of key powers in April 2013, and then dismissed the cabinet – including Machar – in July 2013. At the same time, there was a breakdown of clientelistic politics, fuelled by reduced oil money in the context of weak state structures and historic legacies of violence from previous conflicts. Amidst these internal political tensions, failure to resolve the political differences between the SPLM’s top leaders led, in December 2013, to the outbreak of fighting targeting people from the Nuer ethnic group in Juba, when Kiir (a Dinka) claimed and denounced an attempted coup led by Machar (a Nuer). The subsequent African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan (AUCISS) – chaired by former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo – found no evidence, in its report, of such a coup attempt, but concluded that “widespread and systematic” killings had occurred in Juba in December 2013, later spreading to other parts of South Sudan.⁷ The Juba fighting sparked a rapid descent into violent, inter-ethnic conflict and led to the formation of the SPLM/A-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), led by Machar.⁸ The conflict also drew in key regional actors, including the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU), as well as individual countries such as Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and South Africa. Notably, in December 2013, Uganda intervened militarily to support Kiir, while peace negotiations have been held since the start of the crisis under the auspices of IGAD.

The IGAD-led peace talks eventually resulted in the August 2015 Addis Ababa agreement, signed first by Machar, on behalf of the SPLM-IO, and then by a more reluctant Kiir, on behalf of the South Sudanese government.⁹ From the outset, implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement proved very challenging, with both parties seeking delays and with regular ceasefire violations documented by the international Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) for the agreement. In October 2015, a controversial presidential decree re-divided South Sudan’s ten states into 28.¹⁰ Following advance deployment by the SPLM-IO, Machar finally returned to Juba to be sworn in as first vice-president, as part of a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), in April 2016. There was cautious optimism, but then, in July 2016, on the eve of the fifth anniversary of South Sudan’s independence, heavy fighting between SPLA and SPLA-IO forces broke out in Juba, rocking the Addis Ababa agreement, with the violence rippling out to other parts of South Sudan and the humanitarian situation deteriorating precipitously.

Following Machar’s flight to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), he was formally replaced by Taban Deng Gai – a former ally, and leader of a Juba-centred faction of the SPLM/A-IO – as first vice-president in the transitional government. Machar declared that Taban had “defected”, and announced his dismissal from the SPLM/A-IO Political Bureau.¹¹

“From the outset, implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement proved very challenging, with both parties seeking delays and with regular ceasefire violations documented by the international Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission for the agreement.”

7 “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan”, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 15 October 2015.

8 Øystein H. Rolandsen, “Another Civil War in South Sudan: The Failure of Guerrilla Government?”, *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 9, no. 1 (2015), pp. 163-174.

9 The August 2015 Addis Ababa agreement was also signed by a third party, Pagan Amum Okiech, on behalf of the Former Detainees group, which was marginalised in South Sudan’s militarised political landscape.

10 As mentioned earlier, this number has since increased to 32, with Kiir announcing the creation of four new states in January 2017.

11 Riek Machar, “To All Members SPLM/A (IO), Field Commanders SPLA (IO)”, letter, 22 July 2016.

Building on IGAD and AU communiqués,¹² in August 2016 the United Nations (UN) Security Council condemned the July 2016 fighting in Juba; and authorised an increase in the strength of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) – deployed since 2011 – from 13,000 to 17,000 troops, including a 4,000-strong Regional Protection Force (RPF).¹³ In September 2016, a UN Security Council delegation also visited South Sudan on a fact-finding mission to show the world body’s “firm commitment to bring ... the much-needed peace”.¹⁴ It initially appeared that the RPF was accepted, and support for the Addis Ababa agreement reaffirmed, by the South Sudanese government, but this was subsequently cast into doubt amidst political contestation about the role of the regional force and international intervention in South Sudan.¹⁵ Meanwhile, the SPLM/A-IO Political Bureau stated, from Khartoum – to where Machar had since been moved from the DRC – that South Sudan “had slid [sic] into another round of civil war”; and “that the people of South Sudan should brace for long term popular armed resistance led by the SPLM/SPLA (IO)” against the Kiir government.¹⁶ Since July 2016, conflict has spread in Central and Western Equatoria, and Northern and Western Bahr El Ghazal, against the backdrop of economic crisis, deteriorating humanitarian conditions, and worsening relations between the transitional government and key external actors including UNMISS and the United States (US).

Building on CCR’s well-established academic and policy networks, and ground engagement in South Sudan, the December 2016 Cape Town seminar brought together about 30 key policymakers, academics, and civil society actors to reflect critically upon the challenges of, and prospects for, peacebuilding in South Sudan; and to examine the role of major external actors in supporting local and national peace processes. The seminar sought to craft concrete and actionable recommendations for addressing the challenges of achieving national reconciliation and building sustainable peace in South Sudan. It also sought to provide a platform for developing recommendations aimed at promoting a sense of local ownership over peace processes, the identification of problems, and the search for solutions in the conflict-affected country. This report is based on presentations and discussions at the meeting, as well as on the concept note¹⁷ and further research.

The Cape Town policy seminar sought to achieve six key objectives:

1. To identify the main challenges facing the Transitional Government of National Unity, in particular, and South Sudan more generally, in the context of the ongoing civil conflict;
2. To examine critically the challenges of, and prospects for, implementing the August 2015 Addis Ababa peace agreement;
3. To assess systematically the human rights situation in South Sudan, with a view to identifying more effective ways to protect and promote such rights meaningfully, while addressing their gross violations;

12 See Communiqué of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Plus Heads of State, 18 July 2016, which called for the deployment of a regional protection force. See also Communiqué of the African Union (AU) Assembly, 18 July 2016; and Communiqué of the Second IGAD Plus Extra-Ordinary Summit, 5 August 2016.

13 United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2304, UN doc. S/RES/2304, 12 August 2016.


14 Interview with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for South Sudan, Ellen Margrethe Løj, UN News Centre, 1 September 2016 (available at <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54824#WBNIcXESX7Y>).

15 Joint Communiqué of the Transitional Government of National Unity [TGoNU] of South Sudan and the Members of the United Nations Security Council, 4 September 2016.

16 Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), “The Political-Military Situation Following the Eruption of Violence in July 2016 and the Future of the Agreement”, 23 September 2016.

17 The concept note drew mainly on research undertaken by Daniel Large, Assistant Professor at the School of Public Policy at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary.

4. To explore ways of strengthening local, national, as well as international engagement, with issues related to gender and women's empowerment as important aspects of conflict management and peacebuilding in South Sudan;
5. To understand the challenges facing South Sudanese civil society and to assist the sector in identifying opportunities in support of peacebuilding, in the context of the current conflict; and
6. To provide an informed assessment of the role of key external actors in South Sudan, such as IGAD, the AU, the UN, the US, and China, as a way of identifying concrete ways in which international engagement can support conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts in the country more effectively.



From left: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, then Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa; and Mr Paul Mulindwa, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town.

1. The Challenges of Building Peace in South Sudan

The renewal of conflict and violence in July 2016, only a year after the signing of the August 2015 Addis Ababa peace agreement, is the greatest challenge facing South Sudan’s fragile peace process.

The costs of the crisis continue to be extremely high, with one in four people displaced, four in ten severely food-insecure, and thousands of homes destroyed.¹⁸ Under the 2017 South Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan – coordinated by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) – humanitarian partners need \$1.6 billion to provide life-saving aid and protection to people across the country this year.¹⁹ Since December 2013, the greater emphasis on humanitarian and emergency relief has, furthermore, shifted the focus away from development assistance, which has implications for the country’s long-term prospects. Low state absorption capacity and concern about the diversion of resources, amidst widespread corruption, have also contributed to the limited availability of resources for state capacity-building.

An acute, unresolved crisis of national identity lies at the heart of South Sudan’s conflict. The crisis is, to a significant extent, a legacy of the country’s five-decade struggle for independence, culminating in the landmark referendum in January 2011 in which the South Sudanese voted overwhelmingly to secede from the North. Looking back, this crisis manifested in two different ways: first, a view, held by the dominant group in Sudan, of themselves as being homogenously Arab, with this Arab identity infused with an emphasis on Islam and Islamic culture; and second, an effort to impose this Arab identity representing a minority onto the national framework, in disregard of the diversity and complexity of Sudanese society. The resultant inequality, discrimination, and marginalisation – with power and resources concentrated in Khartoum – contributed directly to Sudan’s civil wars. The first Sudanese civil war, from 1956 to 1972, was characterised by the North as a desire for secession by a Dinka-dominated Southern Sudan. Yet this overlooked the ethnic diversity of the region. Though the Dinka are a majority, there are 64 ethnic groups in the South. The second Sudanese civil war (1983–2005), with the rebellion led by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, was justified by SPLM/A leader John Garang on the basis of a vision that sought to create a “new Sudan” based on equality for all, without discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, culture, or gender. This vision served as well to inspire non-Arab regions and liberal elements in the North, while leading others to believe that it could be a basis for unity between the North and the South. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A provided for a Southern referendum to assess efforts to make unity attractive during a six-year interim period, but not enough was done, and in January 2011, Southerners voted overwhelmingly in favour of independence.²⁰ Yet, about six years on, despite the partition, Sudan and

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18 UN OCHA, “South Sudan: Humanitarian Response Plan 2017”, December 2016, p. 6.

19 UN OCHA, “South Sudan”, p. 3.

20 CCR, *Stabilising Sudan*, pp. 12–18.

South Sudan remain “bound by conflict”,²¹ with ethnic-based grievances as a significant cause of their internal conflicts. Furthermore, the internal conflicts in the two Sudans have tended to spill over their borders, forcing them into conflict with each other, with the situation compounded by their support of the other’s rebel groups.

Though the current conflict in South Sudan began – as mentioned earlier – as a power struggle within the SPLM/A, between President Salva Kiir and then Vice-President Riek Machar, it exposed ethnic divisions that transformed the dispute into widespread ethnic violence involving, but not confined to, the country’s two largest ethnic groups: the Dinka and the Nuer. The conflict, which erupted in December 2013 and resumed in

“ Though the current conflict in South Sudan began as a power struggle within the SPLM/A, it exposed ethnic divisions that transformed the dispute into widespread ethnic violence involving, but not confined to, the country’s two largest ethnic groups: the Dinka and the Nuer. ”

July 2016 after a brief pause, has witnessed the increasing militarisation of communities, alongside a rise in arbitrary arrests, killings, incidents of rape, and internal displacement. This situation reflects the failure of the South Sudanese leadership to manage diversity constructively following independence, which further saw economic disparities emerge between the centre and the peripheries of the newly independent country that were reminiscent of the “old Sudan”. The conflict has become ethnically driven to the extent that it has begun to be viewed, in several quarters, as a struggle against Dinka attempts to dominate, similar to the independence-era struggle against the dominance of one particular identity (Arab). The renewal of violence since July 2016 also reflects the failure of the Addis Ababa peace agreement to address fully the role of ethnicity in conflicts in South Sudan, as it does an overemphasis on elite-level conflict, and a lack of attention to grassroots initiatives and community-based programmes aimed at strengthening peace from the ground up, against a background of poverty, inequality, and under-development. In this respect, South Sudanese independence has been but a partial liberation. The struggle for national unity, through the building of a South Sudanese identity that transcends ethnic, religious, gender, and cultural boundaries, remains an ongoing one.

The diversity of South Sudan should not be viewed as a liability, but recognised as an asset that can contribute towards the building of a strong state and vibrant society. There is a need, thus, to ensure that effective mechanisms for the constructive management of this diversity are created, based on the principle of equality, so as to create a sense of belonging for all South Sudanese. This cannot rely solely on top-down approaches, but must also include bottom-up processes that provide space for civil society participation and recognise the importance of an engaged citizenry in the creation of resilient societies. This, in turn, requires greater awareness and education about the country’s rich history and pluralistic heritage; and, just as important, visionary leadership to build a modern state that draws its strength from grassroots and community experiences, as well as indigenous institutions and culture. South Sudan’s constitutional and governance structures must be based on ground realities, on the nature of South Sudanese society itself, rather than on Western models. The international community has a vital role to play in this endeavour, as it had in the achievement of South Sudanese independence – its support having been critical for the CPA, particularly in the run-up to the Southern

21 Francis M. Deng, in collaboration with Daniel J. Deng, *Bound by Conflict: Dilemmas of the Two Sudans* (New York: Center for International Humanitarian Cooperation and Institute of International Humanitarian Affairs, Fordham University, 2015).

referendum. For many, this role needs to focus more on constructive forms of engagement, to help encourage a less defensive posture on the part of the South Sudanese government, as well as a greater willingness to discuss difficult issues such as ethnicity and human rights violations. This approach has been divisive, with some favouring the use of threats and sanctions. Meanwhile, with allegations and counter-allegations currently threatening to tear South Sudan apart, African leaders – in particular those trusted by both warring sides – may have a vital part to play in engaging the South Sudanese political elite in much-needed dialogue that avoids the pitfalls of threats and labels, and helps the peace process move forward, while ensuring that injustice and impunity are not tolerated.



From left: Dr Mary Chinery-Hesse, Former Deputy Director-General of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and Former Member of the African Union (AU) Panel of the Wise; and Ambassador Francis Deng, Former Permanent Representative of South Sudan to the United Nations (UN), and Former Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide.

2. Challenges Facing South Sudan’s Transitional Government of National Unity

Over a year and a half after the signing of the Addis Ababa peace agreement in August 2015, South Sudan’s Transitional Government of National Unity, created under its terms, but without key SPLM-IO members after the Juba violence of July 2016 – as well as in South Sudan more generally – faces severe, inter-locking political and security challenges, compounded by dire economic straits.

In February 2017, the UN formally declared famine in the northern-central part of the country, with an estimated 100,000 people in the affected areas facing starvation and more than 40 percent of the total population deemed to be severely food-insecure.²² Persistent violence and increasing insecurity, along with limited access to food and basic services, continue to cause severe displacement and distress, even as humanitarian agencies struggle to provide adequate and much-needed assistance in extremely difficult and volatile conditions. Yet the transitional government – more generally, the South Sudanese ruling elite – has been unable to fulfil an urgent need for visionary and transformative leadership that prioritises the goals of nation-building over self-enrichment or the pursuit of ethnic-based interests. This failure of political leadership cuts across the board, and as such constitutes a paramount challenge facing South Sudan.

More troubling is the implication of the state in the perpetration of violence, with gross human rights violations coming to be a part of the counter-insurgency response of the Salva Kiir-led government and armed groups affiliated with it, as much as that of rebel groups.²³ The transformation of the SPLA from a coalition of disparate militias, steeped in corruption and clientelism, into a professional national army was a major outstanding challenge even before the outbreak of the December 2013 conflict.²⁴ In the absence of genuine security sector reform, the SPLA is a deeply fractured force, controlled by warlords and riven along ethnic lines, and has become a key contributor to insecurity. Such structural weaknesses in the foundation of the South Sudanese state have been compounded by the absence of a positive vision of nation-building. For ordinary South Sudanese suffering from extreme violence in various forms (political, criminal, institutional, and gender-based), the transitional government represents but another episode in a long series of broken promises. Contestation over state power and control of resources, together with issues of ethnic identity, are driving an appalling humanitarian crisis, while engendering systemic corruption, looting, violence, and economic disparities between a warring elite and the vast majority of South Sudanese.

“The transformation of the SPLA from a coalition of disparate militias, steeped in corruption and clientelism, into a professional national army was a major outstanding challenge even before the outbreak of the December 2013 conflict.”

22 “Famine Declared in Region of South Sudan – UN”, UN News Centre, 20 February 2017 (available at <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56205#.WOujfiN94mp>).

23 Interim Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2206 (2015), UN doc. S/2016/963, 15 November 2016.

24 Alex de Waal, “When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of the Civil War in South Sudan”, *African Affairs* 113, no. 452 (2014), pp. 347–369.

South Sudan's economic crisis has, in part, been a product of, and in part a further symptom of, and contributing factor to, its ongoing political and humanitarian crises, and the mounting conflict. With a gross domestic product (GDP) of \$9 billion in 2015 and growth forecast to continue to decline in 2016–2017, South Sudan is one of the most under-developed economies in the world, heavily reliant on oil production, which composes more than half of GDP, 95 percent of exports, and 90 percent of government revenue.²⁵ The current conflict has had a significant impact on the oil sector. Government finances have been badly affected by reduced oil production, which fell to about 130,000 barrels a day in 2016 (having earlier been at around 245,000 barrels a day in 2013), amidst efforts to boost output.²⁶ Oil income has further fallen due to lower international oil prices (since June 2014) and Juba's fixed oil transit fee agreement with Khartoum.

Beyond the oil sector, subsistence agriculture (including farming, fishing, and herding) is the mainstay of local livelihoods in South Sudan. This has collapsed in the face of renewed conflict and drought, as have the few efforts that had begun after independence to move beyond subsistence farming, including a joint programme – launched in 2012 – by Nestlé Nespresso and TechnoServe to revive commercial coffee production in Central Equatoria. In October 2016, Nespresso suspended its operations in, and imports from, South Sudan in the context of increasing instability and violence in the region.²⁷ The local production and market failures are reflected in the rising numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and South Sudanese refugees, and deteriorating food security situation; as well as the arrival of famine, which is still localised in central and southern Unity, but has the potential to spread if not addressed urgently and adequately. In addition, people have been forced to use defensive violence to protect meagre modes of food production, and militarisation has become a survival strategy for communities, further perpetuating the crisis. Other economic problems include: deficit financing caused by the devaluation of the South Sudanese pound (SSP) in December 2015 and the printing of money; annual inflation of about 550 percent in September 2016;²⁸ and growing fuel shortages due, in part, to the insecurity of supply routes from Uganda. According to the South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics, the consumer price index (CPI) rose by 426 percent from February 2016 to February 2017.²⁹ With two-thirds of the population under the age of 30,³⁰ youth unemployment and marginalisation are of particular concern. Amidst high levels of pre-existing poverty and illiteracy, the current conflict has further diminished limited opportunities and weakened future prospects for young men, in particular, leaving them vulnerable to recruitment into militias and criminal networks.

“ Amidst high levels of pre-existing poverty and illiteracy, the current conflict has further diminished limited opportunities and weakened future prospects for young men, in particular, leaving them vulnerable to recruitment into militias and criminal networks. ”

25 World Bank, “Gross Domestic Product 2015”, 1 February 2017 (available at <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf>); International Monetary Fund (IMF), *South Sudan: 2016 Article IV Consultation – Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for South Sudan*, IMF Country Report no. 17/73 (Washington, D.C., March 2017), staff report, p. 6.

26 Moyiga Nduru and Richard Rubin, “South Sudan’s Fragile Oil Industry Faces Uphill Struggle”, *S&P Global Platts*, 19 January 2017 (available at <http://www.platts.com/latest-news/oil/juba/feature-south-sudans-fragile-oil-industry-faces-26643336>).

27 Nicholas Bariyo, “Nestlé’s Nespresso to Suspend Coffee Imports from South Sudan”, *Wall Street Journal*, 4 October 2016 (available at <https://www.wsj.com/articles/nestles-nespresso-to-suspend-coffee-imports-from-south-sudan-1475576056>).

28 IMF, *South Sudan: 2016 Article IV Consultation*, press release, p. 1.

29 South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics, “Consumer Price Index for South Sudan February 2017” (available at <http://www.ssnbs.org/cpi/2017/3/14/consumer-price-index-for-south-sudan-february-2017-1.html>).

30 World Bank, “South Sudan – Overview”, 20 October 2016 (available at <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview>).

As far back as May 2015, Vice-President James Wani Igga implored regional leaders to save South Sudan from economic collapse. Juba has since made further efforts – mostly unsuccessful – through its foreign relations, to secure financial support from external actors, including China. While the economic crisis has affected the ability of the South Sudanese government to operate abroad, including its ability to pay its diplomatic corps and embassy rents, the political consequences of its reduced finances have given greater cause for concern.³¹ The government’s former strategy of buying off defectors and rebels at high prices has become difficult to sustain. Notably, South Sudan’s delayed draft budget for fiscal year 2016–2017 – presented only in October 2016 – allocated about SSP 11 billion for the security sector (mostly for salaries, but including SSP 1,983 million for “operation costs” and SSP 307 million for “new capital expenditures”) and SSP 5 billion for “peace expenditure”, some of which could be disbursed through security organs or the presidency, while putting aside a mere SSP 177 million for social and humanitarian affairs.³²

The July 2016 Juba fighting and ensuing conflict have, at best, severely set back the Addis Ababa agreement and, at worst, fatally undermined it. Even before the July 2016 violence, however, the creation of 28 states through a unilateral presidential decree in October 2015 – in violation of the peace agreement and its provisions for SPLM-IO state representation – meant further political disruption, amidst a proliferation of political administrative units. (The number of states has since increased to 32, with Kiir announcing the creation of four new states in January 2017.) Politics beyond Juba and below the central government level have added depth to the challenges facing the Addis Ababa agreement, underlining the need to consider a wider multiplicity of dynamics devolved from, but connected to, the South Sudanese state at the centre. Partly driven by this redrawn political map,³³ as well as other inter-communal tensions, the geography of the current violence in South Sudan has expanded to include, among other places, the Equatorias, where tensions pre-dating the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement were exacerbated by the withdrawal of SPLA-IO troops from Juba in July 2016. This has underscored the need to address local violence, including locally driven violence and conflicts occurring through the extension of power from central state institutions.³⁴

“The July 2016 Juba fighting and ensuing conflict have, at best, severely set back the Addis Ababa agreement and, at worst, fatally undermined it.”

A fundamental challenge that the reconstituted Transitional Government of National Unity faced after July 2016 was that “South Sudan has already relapsed into civil war”.³⁵ Key military figures in the SPLA appeared strongly opposed to implementation of the Addis Ababa peace agreement. After July 2016, opposition forces denounced President Kiir for abrogating the agreement by attacking Riek Machar and his forces in Juba. Lam Akol, who resigned as the transitional government’s minister of agriculture and food security in July 2016, called the Juba fighting “pre-meditated and well planned” and declared: “the [Addis Ababa] agreement is dead”.³⁶ This followed a meeting of opposition groups, held in Nairobi, Kenya, in August 2016, which produced a communiqué challenging government claims that the Addis Ababa peace agreement could be implemented,

31 De Waal, “When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent”.

32 “South Sudan Budgets Billions for Army, Military Operations in 2016/2017”, *Radio Tamazuj*, 18 October 2016.

33 For example, a separate Shilluk force, the Tiger Faction New Forces, was formed to oppose the creation of the 28 states.

34 Mareike Schomerus and Lovise Aalen (eds.), *Considering the State: Perspectives on South Sudan’s Subdivision and Federalism Debate* (London: Overseas Development Institute [ODI], August 2016), p. 29.

35 Majak D’Agoot and Remember Miamingi, “In South Sudan, Power Flows from the Barrel of a Gun; This Must Change”, *Africa Review*, 2 October 2016.

36 “Press Statement: Dr. Lam Akol Resigns from TGoNU”, 1 August 2016.

and declaring the overthrow of Kiir's government as its ultimate objective.³⁷ In August 2016, the SPLM/A-IO Political Bureau called for a reorganisation of its forces “so that it can wage a popular armed resistance against the authoritarian and fascist regime of president Salva Kiir in order to bring peace, freedom, democracy and the rule of law in the country”.³⁸ In other words, South Sudan may have, or have had, a formal peace, but faces the reality of proliferating informal conflicts.



From left: Professor Peter Woodward, Emeritus Professor of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading, England; and Ambassador Graham Maitland, Chief Director, Central and North Africa, South Africa's Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), Tshwane (Pretoria).

37 This included the SPLM/A-IO, National Democratic Movement, People's Revolutionary Movement/Army, Western Bahr El Ghazal Group, and Eastern Equatoria Group. See "S. Sudanese Opposition Parties Plot to Overthrow President Kiir", *Sudan Tribune*, 25 August 2016.

38 "Resolutions of the SPLM/SPLA (IO) Political Bureau Meeting", 20-23 September 2016, Khartoum, Sudan.

3. Implementing the 2015 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement

The challenges of implementing the Addis Ababa peace agreement remain daunting. The agreement, signed in August 2015, was the result of an intense mediation process under the aegis of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, with critical support provided by external actors such as the AU, the UN, and the Troika (comprising the US, Britain, and Norway), among others.

The IGAD effort was led by three special envoys – Ethiopia’s Seyoum Mesfin, Kenya’s Lazaro Sumbeiywo, and Sudan’s Mohammed Ahmed Moustafa El Dabi – appointed in December 2013, to support the warring South Sudanese parties to resolve their differences peacefully and establish an all-inclusive government. The mediation process took place in four phases, spanning 18 months, with IGAD convening more than eight extraordinary summits and numerous small meetings in support of the process. The negotiations were characterised by sharp differences between the ruling SPLM/A and the opposition on issues including the establishment and composition of the transitional government; the involvement of the Former Detainees group; the participation of Uganda in the process; and the deployment of a protection force. The talks had to be suspended on numerous occasions, and progress was often difficult. IGAD’s approach to, and role in, the negotiations that led eventually to the peace agreement also faced criticism for being exclusionary, with little connection to the reality of the ever more complex struggles of South Sudan;³⁹ for being based on elite-accommodation; for rewarding only those taking up military struggle; and for running the risk of encouraging opportunistic rebellions.

Despite reservations, South Sudanese president Salva Kiir eventually signed the Addis Ababa accord under immense external pressure, including the threat of sanctions by the UN Security Council, nine days after Riek Machar had inked it on behalf of the SPLM/A-IO. The chair of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, former president of Botswana, Festus Mogae, though, criticised both the government and the opposition, in August 2016, for not following the peace deal “from day one”.⁴⁰ Given the circumstances under which the agreement was signed and, in the case of Kiir, under duress, it should not be altogether surprising that its implementation was problematic from the outset and characterised by a lack of confidence, suspicion, and mistrust among the parties, as well as a lack of ownership. Despite the slow establishment of the Transitional Government of National Unity, due to Machar’s delayed return to Juba, some progress was achieved. Key implementation mechanisms and institutions related to the transitional security arrangements were established and partially operationalised, including: the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission, the Joint Operation Centre, the Strategic Defence and Security Review Board, and the Joint Integrated Police-Management Team. But progress in the implementation of the agreement began to stall with differences emerging between Kiir and Machar on issues including the creation of 28 states and the appointment of the speaker of the Transitional National Assembly, and frustration mounted on all sides. Against this backdrop of tension and mistrust, in July 2016, violent confrontations erupted between the presidential and vice-presidential bodyguards in Juba, and the fighting soon spread to surrounding areas, resulting in significant loss of life and the displacement of civilians. Despite calls by both Kiir and Machar for the cessation of hostilities, appeals by IGAD to implement the Addis Ababa agreement fully, and the potential threat of sanctions by the UN Security Council, the situation on the

39 Naomi Pendle, “A South Sudanese Peace?”, LSE *Justice and Security Research Programme* blog, 22 July 2016 (available at <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/jsrp/2016/07/22/a-south-sudanese-peace/>).

40 Justin Lynch, “UN Security Council Diplomats to Visit Troubled South Sudan”, *Associated Press*, 1 September 2016.

ground continued to deteriorate. Machar's subsequent flight from Juba, along with other members of the opposition, and his eventual replacement by Taban Deng Gai as first vice-president, have since threatened to collapse the peace agreement.

The political will of a divided South Sudanese government to implement the Addis Ababa agreement was – as mentioned earlier – in doubt from the start, with divisions over the agreement reflecting long-standing opposition to it led by hard-liners such as SPLA chief of staff Paul Malong Awan. After July 2016, the reconstituted Transitional Government of National Unity has been bitterly contested. Taban's controversial status as the new first vice-president divided the SPLM-IO further. For those SPLM-IO members who did not go along with Taban's appointment, Machar remained "the legitimate first vice-president".⁴¹ However, with Machar driven out of Juba, the fragmented SPLM-IO came out against the post-July 2016 government. The challenges and prospects for the security provisions of the Addis Ababa agreement, in particular, were immense, with the problems evident even before July 2016 in the form of continued ceasefire agreement violations and problems with military cantonment. Demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration also remained extremely contentious. Beyond the national-level conflict, inter- and intra-community fighting have continued to be a major source of violence and insecurity in South Sudan; and these local conflicts have increasingly become part of a complex, interconnected conflict system.

The prospects for the justice and accountability provisions of the Addis Ababa agreement are similarly in doubt. The agreement calls, among other things, for the creation of three key transitional justice institutions: an independent Hybrid Court to prosecute cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes; a Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing; and a Compensation and Reparation Authority. After July 2016, Adama Dieng, the UN Secretary-General's Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, called on South Sudan's transitional government to implement these provisions, and asserted: "It would be a mistake to think that peace, reconciliation and national healing can be achieved in South Sudan without any accountability for the crimes committed."⁴² Overall, the Addis Ababa peace agreement may remain formally in place, but faces extremely challenging new political and military realities that are widening the gaps between its formal provisions and intent, and realities on the ground.

“ The Addis Ababa agreement calls, among other things, for the creation of three key transitional justice institutions: an independent Hybrid Court; a Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing; and a Compensation and Reparation Authority. ”

Amidst worsening humanitarian conditions, the imposition of an arms embargo and targeted individual sanctions has been raised and discussed in the UN Security Council, though the issue has been divisive. IGAD, for its part, remains strongly convinced that the way out of the political crisis in South Sudan does not lie in isolating Juba or in the threat of sanctions and embargos, but in continuing dialogue and more inclusive negotiations. While condemning the violence by both warring parties, IGAD has continued to assert its commitment to the Addis Ababa peace agreement and its support for the Transitional Government of National Unity; to affirm the critical role of civil society groups, faith-based organisations, and women in peacebuilding

41 "The SPLM/SPLA-IO Position on Joint Communiqué Between SPLM/SPLA-IG and the UNSC Members Who Visited Juba", 5 September 2016.

42 UN, "Statement by Adama Dieng, United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide on the Situation in South Sudan", press release, 11 July 2016.

efforts; and to emphasise the need for dialogue at all levels to address polarising trends, including ethnic animosity, in South Sudanese society. It has also supported the creation of the Regional Protection Force. Following the South Sudanese government's acceptance of the force's deployment, IGAD convened an extraordinary summit in December 2016, attended by Kiir, at which he announced plans – welcomed by regional leaders – to conduct an inclusive national dialogue. But the RPF was yet to be deployed in April 2017.

IGAD's engagement – as well as that of the AU, among others – appears to be based on the belief that the Addis Ababa agreement can be salvaged despite forces opposed to the peace; and that there are two coherent sides to the South Sudanese conflict with leaders who can enforce a negotiated settlement. However, this does not reflect the more complex, fluid, and dynamic political and security situation within South Sudan.⁴³ For many, both within and outside the country, the conditions for a genuine and meaningful national dialogue do not seem to exist at present. There is also scepticism in some quarters about how IGAD can build peace in South Sudan as a relatively small inter-governmental organisation with limited resources, while the UN mission in the country, for its part, continues to face obstacles in carrying out its mandate, including the protection of civilians (PoC).



From left: Professor Peter Woodward, Emeritus Professor of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading; Ambassador Kaire Mbuende, Ambassador of Namibia to Belgium and the European Union (EU), Brussels; and Mr Daniel Yifru, Coordinator, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) South Sudan Office, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

43 Nicki Kindersley and Øystein H. Rolandsen, “Briefing: Prospects for Peace and the UN Regional Protection Force in South Sudan”, *African Affairs*, virtual issue, October 2016.

4. Human Rights

Human rights have been the greatest casualty of the current conflict in South Sudan, amidst a deteriorating security situation, deepening humanitarian crisis, increased government repression and intolerance, and lack of accountability for atrocities by all warring sides, including the unlawful killing of civilians, torture, sexual and gender-based violence, looting, destruction of property, and forced displacement.

In November 2016, Adama Dieng, the UN Secretary-General's Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, noted "a strong risk of violence escalating along ethnic lines, with the potential for genocide",⁴⁴ in South Sudan, adding to international concern about the situation in the country. Meanwhile, violations of international humanitarian law, including attacks against UN personnel and humanitarian workers, and restrictions on movement and access, have continued to impede efforts to protect and provide assistance to civilians.⁴⁵ As of March 2017, there were an estimated 4.9 million people classified as food-insecure and 1.9 million IDPs in South Sudan, with about 1.6 million South Sudanese refugees having fled to neighbouring countries, including Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, and the DRC.⁴⁶ The need for key external actors, including IGAD, the AU, the European Union (EU), and the UN, to demonstrate their commitment to resolving the political crisis and providing support for local and national efforts thus remains urgent. On the part of the South Sudanese political leadership, greater accountability for, and commitment to, upholding human rights, implementing the peace process, and undertaking institutional reform are an imperative. Stronger efforts also need to be made – at both the state and societal levels – to end the culture of impunity, and promote peaceful conflict resolution and respect for diversity in the country.

The formal status of human rights in South Sudan – in both its interim and transitional constitutions of 2005 and 2011 respectively, as well as through initiatives such as the cabinet-level South Sudan Human Rights Commission (SSHRC) – is fairly good on paper. In 2015, South Sudan also ratified the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, and became a party to the 2002 UN Convention Against Torture and its Optional Protocol. Even before December 2013, the actual status of human rights in South Sudan, however, was a world removed from these legal paper provisions. Many of the reasons for the gap between theory and practice emanate from the government itself, including its National Security Services, which are empowered by legislation widely described as draconian,⁴⁷ and the SPLA; as well as armed opposition groups. There was a sharp deterioration in the state of freedom of the press and association in 2015, featuring armed attacks against, as well as the intimidation of, journalists and newspapers,⁴⁸ with the situation since only having worsened. In July 2016, for example, Alfred Taban, a prominent journalist and editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Juba Monitor*, was arrested for calling on both President Salva Kiir and then Vice-President Riek Machar to resign for their failure to implement the August 2015 Addis Ababa agreement and uphold the rule of law.⁴⁹ Freedom of movement and association have become similarly limited, with police clearance needed for the holding of meetings and workshops, while fear and mistrust, along with restrictive government policies, have made information-sharing and advocacy efforts by local human rights defenders increasingly difficult.

44 "Risk of 'Outright Ethnic War' and Genocide in South Sudan, UN Envoy Warns", UN News Centre, 11 November 2016 (available at <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55538#WRdkXROGP6A>).

45 See Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (Covering the Period from 16 December 2016 to 1 March 2017), UN doc. S/2017/224, 16 March 2017.

46 UN OCHA, "Humanitarian Bulletin: South Sudan", no. 5, 28 March 2017, p. 1.

47 Human Rights Watch (HRW), "South Sudan: Abusive Security Bill", 15 October 2014.

48 See for example many alerts by the Committee to Protect Journalists, including: "In South Sudan, Editor Arrested As Harassment of Press Increases", 26 July 2016 (available at <https://cpj.org/2016/07/in-south-sudan-editor-arrested-as-harassment-of-pr.php>).

49 Jehanne Henry, "Dispatches: Speaking Truth to Power Is a Crime in South Sudan", 28 July 2016 (available at <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/28/dispatches-speaking-truth-power-crime-south-sudan>).

The limited capacities of the South Sudanese state to protect its own citizens, as well as its implication in human rights violations, has encouraged the creation of armed groups and resort to violence. Against the backdrop of worsening economic conditions, the government's inability to pay its soldiers has further contributed to an increase in armed robberies in and around urban centres. There is growing insecurity in Greater Equatoria due to a lack of the rule of law, with reports of civilians being targeted based on their ethnicity, particularly on the major roads to and from Juba. Rural populations have been particularly badly affected by the conflict, including the concomitant decline in spending on social services; as have women and children. There has been an increase in the recruitment of child soldiers by the warring groups, despite pledges to the contrary. According to the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), 1,300 children were recruited in 2016, bringing the total number of children used in the conflict since December 2013 up to 17,000, with thousands more killed, abducted, and sexually assaulted.⁵⁰ Early and forced marriages were common even before the December 2013 conflict, but the trend has since worsened, while more than half of South Sudanese young women aged 15–24 are estimated to have experienced gender-based violence.⁵¹ Poverty has also increased, due, to a significant extent, to the impact of the conflict on oil production and agriculture-based livelihoods, with an estimated 66 percent of the population living in extreme poverty.⁵²

“The limited capacities of the South Sudanese state to protect its own citizens, as well as its implication in human rights violations, has encouraged the creation of armed groups and resort to violence.”

The South Sudanese leadership has shown little political will to act to curb human rights violations and failed repeatedly to condemn, in the strongest words, such violations. Similarly, there has been very little discussion of accountability at the national level, and doubts remain in several quarters about whether an inclusive national dialogue can be held to address issues such as impunity and transitional justice in an environment characterised by fear, intimidation, and violence. In this context, key external partners – both regional and extra-regional – need to do more to encourage the South Sudanese government and leadership to uphold accepted international human rights standards. IGAD, for instance, has made very little mention of the human rights situation in its public statements on South Sudan. Efforts to follow up on the report of the AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan have been similarly meagre. Both IGAD and the AU need to demand, and expect, more of the South Sudanese government; to avoid making contradictory statements on issues related to human rights and the rule of law; and to demonstrate their commitment to human rights by pressing for institutional reform, truth-telling, and results from initiatives such as commissions of inquiry. Also, it is vital that the Addis Ababa peace agreement – in particular its provisions on transitional justice and security sector reform – are implemented in full. The challenges are significant and include the uncertain political situation, the opposition of influential South Sudanese leaders to the peace agreement, and the widespread and continued conflict in the country. Even so, the AU Commission needs to initiate and form the Hybrid Court of South Sudan as stipulated in the peace agreement. This is key to holding those who have committed human rights crimes to account, and also important for demonstrating the AU's commitment to the resolution of the crisis in South Sudan.

50 UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), "Rise in Child Recruitment As Conflict in South Sudan Enters Fourth Year", news note, 15 December 2016 (available at https://www.unicef.org/media/media_94185.html).

51 Caitlin McGee, "South Sudan: The Deadly Consequences of Child Marriage", *Al Jazeera*, 16 February 2016 (available at <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/02/south-sudan-deadly-consequences-child-marriage-160211123429622.html>); United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "Vulnerable to Violence: Empowering Women in South Sudan", 8 March 2017 (available at <http://www.europe.undp.org/content/geneva/en/home/presscenter/articles/2017/03/08/vulnerable-to-violence-empowering-women-in-south-sudan.html>).

52 World Bank, "South Sudan – Overview".

With an authorised strength of 17,000 troops (including 4,000 for the Regional Protection Force), UNMISS is the main organised framework for external engagement on the ground in South Sudan. The UN operation has, however, faced criticisms over its failure to protect civilians during the July 2016 violence in Juba. Also, the adoption in August 2016 of UN Security Council Resolution 2304, establishing the RPF, has since triggered a surge in aggression against humanitarian personnel and assets. The challenges facing UNMISS, as well as other UN agencies, in providing much-needed humanitarian assistance are thus greater than ever before in a climate of fear and paranoia, amidst South Sudanese government accusations of espionage, pervasive looting, road insecurity, ethnic targeting, widespread harassment, threats of detention, and attacks such as the one against Juba’s Terrain Hotel in July 2016 in which one person was killed and several civilians were raped and beaten.⁵³ Anti-UN sentiments have further been compounded by the UN’s role in airlifting Machar from South Sudan to the DRC in August 2016.

Despite challenges, South Sudanese civil society organisations have continued their efforts to promote human rights through initiatives, such as the establishment of “peace clubs” in Juba; to support the victims of sexual and gender-based violence; and to build local capacity for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. These efforts have tended to be limited in their geography and need to be scaled up for wider impact. Besides conflict-related and government restrictions, civil society also faces significant capacity constraints, with most human rights defenders and organisations lacking adequate financial resources to sustain their activities. They also need education and training, as well as emergency support for relocation in view of their increased vulnerability in the current context. Regional and international human rights bodies can be of vital help in this regard, and should consider giving financial and technical support to local South Sudanese civil society organisations to boost their capacity to defend and promote human rights. Much of the human rights work by South Sudanese civil society groups and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is now also focused on the prospects for a Hybrid Court and for meeting the demands for accountability and effective transitional justice processes across multiple levels in South Sudan.⁵⁴ It is worth noting that, in September 2016, a delegation of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan – established in March 2016 by the UN Human Rights Council – visited the country; and expressed grave concern at “the ongoing impunity and lack of accountability for serious crimes and human rights violations in South Sudan, without which lasting peace cannot be achieved”.⁵⁵



From left: Dr Ibrahim Wani, Former Director, Human Rights Division, United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS); and Dr Khabele Matlosa, Director, Department of Political Affairs, African Union Commission, Addis Ababa.

53 UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), “Statement Attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on South Sudan (Terrain)”, press release, 17 August 2016 (available at <https://unmiss.unmissions.org/statement-attributable-spokesman-secretary-general-south-sudan-terrain-0>).

54 “Human Rights Groups Call for Establishment of Hybrid Court in South Sudan”, *Sudan Tribune*, 14 October 2016.

55 “Human Rights Expert Group Concludes First Visit to South Sudan”, UN News Centre, 16 September 2016.

5. Gender and Peacebuilding

Even before the outbreak of conflict in December 2013, women in South Sudan suffered more than men from inadequate access to services such as education, justice, and maternal and child healthcare.⁵⁶ As of January 2012, for example, only 37 percent of girls between the ages of six and 13 were attending school.⁵⁷

South Sudan's 2011 transitional constitution accords women full and equal dignity, and provides for “affirmative action” through a quota of at least 25 percent representation in the country's legislative and executive organs. At the same time, the constitution includes “customs and traditions of the people” as a source of legislation.⁵⁸ Furthermore, customary laws and courts are the primary means through which the vast majority of South Sudanese access justice. However, in a deeply patriarchal society, these have the “potential to reinforce practices that perpetuate gender inequality.”⁵⁹ Translating constitutional principles on gender equality into practice thus remains a formidable challenge that has been exacerbated by the country's ongoing conflict. A recent study, conducted in Unity in November–December 2015, demonstrates how gender analysis can be used as a powerful tool for understanding the full range of gendered vulnerability in South Sudan. It found an increase in female-headed households since the end of the rainy season in 2014, with males suffering the most number of deaths overall, especially violent deaths. It also found that females were more likely than males to be abducted; and that most child-headed households were led by girls.⁶⁰

Patriarchal gender norms are deeply implicated as drivers of conflict in South Sudan, where they afford men power and privileges over women (as they do elsewhere in the world). Yet men, as much as women, are affected by rigid societal norms that exert pressure on them to conform to their gender identity; and it is vital to address notions of masculinity – particularly those that encourage violence – as much as women's issues, in peacemaking and peacebuilding interventions in South Sudan. Cattle-raiding, for example, is a major driver of conflict and insecurity among pastoral communities in the country. Participating in such raids is seen as a rite of passage for young men and a symbol of manhood, as is owning a gun, with raids often turning deadly in a country awash with small arms, generating cycles of revenge and perpetuating violent conflict. Rising bride prices – customarily paid in livestock – have also made it difficult for men to marry and to achieve manhood, as defined in their local communities. In this context, joining the SPLA or a militia can provide not only a source of income, but also a sense of belonging and self-worth, with many young men continuing to join these groups even when salaries have not been paid. At the same time, it is important to note that women, too, play a role in reinforcing gender identities by, for example, singing songs of praise or shame for men, depending on their success or failure on cattle-raids. Similarly, young girls, by virtue of socialisation, derive self-worth and value from traditions such as bride price.⁶¹ This only underlines the need to address masculinities and women's issues together, as part of a holistic approach to gender, conflict, and peacebuilding in South Sudan.

56 Friederike Bubenzer and Orly Stern (eds.), *Hope, Pain, and Patience: The Lives of Women in South Sudan* (Sunnyside/Auckland Park: Fanele, 2011).

57 Siddhartha Shrestha, “Prioritising Education and Promoting Gender Equality in South Sudan”, UNICEF South Sudan, 17 January 2012 (available at http://www.unicef.org/education/southsudan_61320.html).

58 See Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011, arts. 16, 5.

59 Friederike Bubenzer and Elizabeth Lacey, *Opportunities for Gender Justice and Reconciliation in South Sudan*, Policy Brief no. 12 (Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation [IJR], July 2013), p. 6.

60 “Crisis Impacts on Households in Unity State, South Sudan, 2014–2015: Initial Results of a Survey” (Juba: Office of the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator for South Sudan, January 2016).

61 Saferworld, *Masculinities, Conflict, and Peacebuilding: Perspectives on Men Through a Gender Lens* (London, October 2014).

Upon attaining independence in 2011, South Sudan agreed to the AU's 2006 Post-Conflict, Reconstruction, and Development (PCRD) strategy,⁶² which calls for gender mainstreaming to inform nation- and state-building; and Juba ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in September 2014. In addition, the South Sudanese government and the UN signed a joint communiqué to address conflict-related sexual violence in October 2014. Accurate data on sexual and gender-based violence are difficult to find, but such violence was widespread in South Sudan before renewed conflict in December 2013.⁶³ The challenges of translating avowed principles on gender equality into practice were formidable even then, but are even greater now that they have been exacerbated by the ongoing conflict, in which sexual and gender-based violence have become a weapon of war, with the UN describing women and children “being deliberately targeted, with countless incidents of sexual violence”.⁶⁴ The report of the AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan only further exposed the extent of such violence.⁶⁵ Moreover, women and children compose a majority of those displaced by the conflict since December 2013, including the more than 214,000 people sheltering in UN protection-of-civilian sites across South Sudan,⁶⁶ and have been disproportionately affected due, among other things, to their risk of exposure to gender-based violence, their childcare burden, and the low priority attached to addressing their particular needs by governmental and humanitarian actors. According to a UN survey, 70 percent of women in the PoC sites had been raped, mainly by police and soldiers.⁶⁷

In this context, the country's women have tended mainly to be seen as victims, with less attention paid to their role as actual and potential agents of peacebuilding. Yet women in South Sudan have continually called for the cessation of hostilities and for both sides to abide by signed agreements, campaigned vocally for the inclusion of women in peacebuilding processes, and engaged in persistent advocacy for the incorporation of gender-based perspectives in the August 2015 Addis Ababa peace agreement. Notably, the IGAD-led peace process, when it was initiated, had little to no participation by women, with no women included in the South Sudanese government delegation, and only three women included in the SPLM-IO delegation, to the first high-level roundtable discussion held in Addis Ababa in January 2014.⁶⁸ Women mobilised, though, campaigning actively to strengthen their voices in the peace process. Subsequent negotiation rounds saw women delegates included in the negotiating teams from both the main warring parties, due in large part to these advocacy efforts. Furthermore, the South Sudan Women's Peace Network – with support from UN Women – developed an agenda for peace and sustainable development early on, which sought to define women's priorities in the negotiation process and called, among other things, for a national dialogue to promote national reconciliation, healing, unity, and cohesion. The subsequent Addis Ababa agreement provides for the inclusion of women in the transitional government, as well as their continued involvement in its implementation. It further mandates the Transitional Government of National Unity to review the ongoing constitution-making process and to reconstitute the National Constitutional Review Commission, so as to ensure the inclusion of diverse stakeholders including women.

62 Gilbert Khadiagala, “The Role of the African Union, New Partnership for Africa's Development, and African Development Bank in Postconflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding”, in Devon Curtis and Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa (eds.), *Peacebuilding, Power, and Politics in Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press; and Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2012), pp. 107–120.

63 Jok Madut Jok, “Militarization and Gender Violence in South Sudan”, *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 34, no. 4 (1999), pp. 427–442.

64 Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (Covering the Period from 14 April to 19 August 2015), UN doc. S/2015/655, 21 August 2015, p. 15.

65 “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan”, especially pp. 296–297, para. 1125.

66 UNMISS, “PoC Update”, 3 April 2017 (available at https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/170403_poc_update_-_159.pdf).

67 UNifeed, “Geneva/South Sudan Emergency Session”, 14 December 2016 (available at <http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/unifeed/asset/1796/1796878>).

68 Marthe van der Wolf, “Women Take Role in South Sudan Peace Talks”, *Voice of America*, 16 January 2014 (available at <http://www.voanews.com/a/women-take-role-in-south-sudan-peace-talks/1831552.html>).

However, challenges remain. Greater efforts are needed to ensure that the participation of South Sudanese women in the peace process is meaningful, and that their involvement in decision-making structures and processes is adequate as well as substantive. For example, the Addis Ababa agreement includes clear provisions to ensure the representation of women in the executive, various independent commissions, and monitoring bodies (including JMEC), but the women appointed to such positions are often political nominees who are neither representative nor part of the broader women's movement in the country. With men occupying the positions of president, first vice-president, and vice-president, there were calls for a woman to be appointed speaker of the South Sudanese Transitional National Assembly, but these went unheeded, with Anthony Lino Makana assuming the office in August 2016. For peacebuilding to be inclusive and sustainable, South Sudanese women need to have greater representation in government institutions, including senior leadership, and for this to be representative of their views. As a 2015 global study on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 of 2000 on women, peace, and security showed, gender inclusiveness has positive effects on the signing, implementation, and sustainability of peace agreements, with the participation of women contributing to a 20 percent increase in the probability of an agreement lasting at least two years.⁶⁹ As part of its efforts to increase the involvement of women in national decision-making, the South Sudan Women's Peace Network is establishing a database of qualified South Sudanese women (including those in the Diaspora) to serve as an advocacy tool. UN Women, meanwhile, has supported the establishment of the National Transformational Leadership Institute (NTLI) at the University of Juba, with the aim of building the capacity of South Sudanese women to influence policy- and decision-making and transform their communities in positive and effective ways.

“For peacebuilding to be inclusive and sustainable, South Sudanese women need to have greater representation in government institutions, including senior leadership, and for this to be representative of their views.”

Disconnect between women's representatives and local communities, though, is another key challenge. Women at the grassroots level (including those in IDP camps) are often unaware of women in government and leadership positions who could help them in getting their voices heard at the state and national levels. As part of its efforts to support gender equality and inclusive peacebuilding in South Sudan, UN Women has supported the creation of rural empowerment centres. Several national women's organisations, such as Eve Organisation for Women Development, have also sought to increase their engagement with rural women, with a view to promoting the inclusion of the diversity of women's experiences and interests in peacebuilding processes. Even so, greater and more sustained efforts are needed to bridge the gap between the country's female elite and women at the grassroots level, to promote a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding, and to strengthen local ownership of peace processes at all levels in South Sudan.

Following the events of, and since, July 2016, gender, conflict, and peacebuilding remain important issues in South Sudan, as Zainab Hawa Bangura, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict, emphasised after visiting the country in August 2016. The issue is rendered even more complicated by the breakdown of social norms surrounding such violence and the lasting legacy suffered by survivors and communities.⁷⁰ The AUCISS report recommended that any structured process around healing and

69 Radhika Coomaraswamy, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325* (New York: UN Women, 2015), pp. 36–63.

70 See David Deng and Rens Willems, “Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) in Unity State, South Sudan” (The Hague: University of Peace, March 2016).

reconciliation be gender-sensitive and involve women as key stakeholders.⁷¹ The Addis Ababa agreement provides for the creation – as mentioned earlier – of three transitional justice institutions: a Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing; a Hybrid Court; and a Compensation and Reparation Authority. These mechanisms provide an opportunity to address women’s rights, while promoting a more gender-sensitive South Sudanese state, but are yet to be established. Civil society in South Sudan, as well as external humanitarian actors, need to continue to actively explore ways of strengthening and promoting understanding of the Addis Ababa agreement’s provisions on transitional justice, in support of victims’ rights, but also of gender equality, women’s empowerment, and inclusive peacebuilding.



From left: Ms Salome Zuriel, Conflict Thematic Manager, Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD), Nairobi, Kenya; and Mr Lansana Woneh, Deputy Country Representative for South Sudan, UN Women, Juba.

71 “Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan”, p. 243, para. 876; p. 303, para. 1164.

6. The Role of Civil Society in Peacebuilding

Given the weakness of state institutions at the local and national levels, civil society in South Sudan has for long had a critical role to play in resolving and managing conflicts, building peace, as well as delivering services (including education, healthcare, and community policing).

In Eastern Equatoria, for example, the South Sudan Law Society has trained paralegals, while the Catholic Diocese of Torit formed and trained boma councils in six counties – Torit, Ikwoto, Budi, Lopa, Lafon, and Kapoeta – to help implement the 2009 Local Government Act. It is important to note that civil society in South Sudan comprises a wide variety of groups – both formal and informal – with local community-based organisations and faith-based groups, in particular, playing a key peacebuilding role, particularly at the grassroots level. Despite myriad challenges posed by the current conflict, national and international civil society organisations have continued to carry out a range of activities in support of local and national peacebuilding efforts, ranging from the distribution of humanitarian relief to advocacy for democratic change and respect for human rights. The sector, furthermore, remains a key conduit for sharing information on the human rights situation in South Sudan with external actors, compelling the international community to continue to explore ways of supporting conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts in the country. Though national and local civil society groups have sought, and continue, to play multiple roles and to participate actively in efforts to tackle the deep-seated challenges facing South Sudan – including persistent conflict, widespread corruption, poor governance, and extreme poverty – there are doubts about the extent to which they have been able to, or can, influence elite-level politics and achieve impact beyond local-level improvements in human security.

An important way in which South Sudanese civil society groups have sought to support the implementation of the August 2015 Addis Ababa agreement has been through the dissemination of the peace accord to local communities. Civil society support for the Hybrid Court and other accountability and transitional justice measures, in particular, has been strong. This was especially evident after the publication of an opinion-editorial in the *New York Times*, in June 2016, opposing the Court, supposedly co-authored by Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, but which Machar later disavowed.⁷² Following these developments, a group of seven South Sudanese civil society groups wrote to Festus Mogae, asking the independent Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission to urge the AU Commission to move forward with the Hybrid Court as one important element of a wider push for transitional justice in South Sudan.⁷³ However, the upsurge in conflict in many parts of the country, and a deteriorating political space for civil politics, has meant that the environment in which civil society operates has become even more challenging. This was sharpened by the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2304 in August 2016, authorising the Regional Protection Force, which triggered demonstrations by pro-government civil society groups against the proposed force. Leaders of seven South Sudanese civil society organisations issued a memo to the visiting Security Council delegation in September 2016, in which they rejected the Council’s resolution and the proposed regional troops. The memo also called for international support for people-to-people dialogue; for a civil society role in the popular dissemination of, and education about, the Addis Ababa agreement; and cooperation between civil society organisations and the UN on “human rights-freedoms and democracy”.⁷⁴

72 “South Sudan Needs Truth, Not Trials”, *New York Times*, 7 June 2016 (available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/opinion/south-sudan-needs-truth-not-trials.html?_r=1).

73 “Civil Society Urge Festus Mogae to Support Hybrid Court”, *Radio Tamazuj*, 20 June 2016.

74 “Memo by South Sudan Civil Society Organisations to the UNSC Delegation to South Sudan”, 3 September 2016 (available at <http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/19831/Memo-by-South-Sudan-Civil-Society-Organizations-to-the-UNSC-Delegation-to-South-Sudan.aspx>). These were the South Sudan Civil Society Alliance, Juba; South Sudan Women General Association, Juba; Community Empowerment and Progress Organisation (CEPO), Juba; South Sudan National Youth Union, Juba; South Sudan Chiefs Council, Juba; University of Juba Students Union; and Rally for South Sudan Group.

Meanwhile, the 2014 National Security Service Law – in effect since early 2015⁷⁵ – has extended the powers of the country’s security service to arrest and detain, and enabled it to place intrusive demands on civil society groups that have further limited the space for these groups to function independently. Intrusive government interference, economic volatility, and weak rule of law have together led several South Sudanese civil society organisations to re-locate to neighbouring countries such as Uganda and Sudan, as a means of managing the risks they face. The working environment for media groups and journalists, in particular, has become hugely restricted, even dangerous, in South Sudan. Owing to the declining security situation, restrictions on movement have also curbed the ability of civil society organisations to provide support and services in many areas, with ground transport to or through opposition-held areas particularly badly affected. More generally, the lack of democratic political institutions and of an independent and functioning judiciary have rendered NGOs vulnerable, while weakening their efforts to play a critical watchdog role and promote accountable governance in South Sudan. On the ground level, militarisation poses a major challenge to civil society in its efforts to resolve conflicts and build peace. Limited rule of law and weak governance, together with sustained experience of conflict – including the five-decade (1956–2005) struggle for independence from Sudan – have led to violence being increasingly viewed as an acceptable means to solve disagreements. This militaristic attitude has contributed to the scale of the ongoing violence in South Sudan, while compromising efforts to promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

At the same time, South Sudanese civil society continues to be limited by several internal weaknesses. There are over 5,000 registered NGOs in South Sudan today.⁷⁶ Relations between organisations tend to be characterised by competition in a context of resource

“ There are over 5,000 registered NGOs in South Sudan today. Relations between organisations tend to be characterised by competition in a context of resource scarcity, with a high degree of dependence on external funding. ”

scarcity, with a high degree of dependence on external funding, and civil society groups are unable, by and large, to coordinate effectively to increase their leverage on critical issues of common concern. Local NGOs further face significant capacity constraints (including lack of skills in fundraising, proposal development, and project implementation), leaving many to feel that they are being crowded out by more well-resourced international NGOs. Several South Sudanese organisations also lack clear and achievable objectives, and corruption, as well as embezzlement, are notable problems within the civil society sector, as much as they are in government institutions. Moreover, the current conflict has significantly not only altered the context in which civil society organisations work in South Sudan, but also damaged relations within and between them by sharpening divisions based on a combination of political and ethnic affiliations. There is a sense that civil society activists and leaders sometimes refrain from truth-telling for fear of speaking against their own communities. Decades of conflict and insecurity, combined with the absence of a strong state since independence in 2011, have reinforced self-reliance and an inward-focused mind-set among communities, while hardening local and ethnic allegiances at the expense of national cohesion. The situation has been exacerbated by a tendency to categorise civil society groups as being either pro-government or pro-opposition, with both main parties to the national conflict – the government and the SPLM/A-IO – seen to be trying to win over those groups still perceived as being neutral. Yet it is vital for South Sudanese NGOs to be non-partisan and act with professionalism to contribute positively to peacebuilding efforts.

75 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, UN doc. A/HRC/34/63, 6 March 2017, p. 10, para. 46.

76 CCR, *The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in South Sudan*, p. 9.

It is worth noting the significance of the church, which has a track record of undertaking important work on questions of peace and reconciliation in South Sudan. For example, in May 2014, the South Sudanese government and David Yau Yau's Cobra forces in Jonglei signed a peace agreement, under the auspices of a church initiative led by Bishop Paride Taban, ending a second rebellion by the armed group;⁷⁷ though a faction of the forces has since retreated into the bush, accusing the government of delaying implementation of key provisions of the agreement. Church leaders, in collaboration with local government authorities, have also facilitated cross-border peace dialogues and initiatives to resolve and manage conflict between pastoral communities in the region. In 2013, for example, the Catholic Diocese of Torit in Eastern Equatoria, in cooperation with local commissioners, organised a cross-border peace dialogue, bringing together stakeholders from border communities in South Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya. This later enabled the peaceful return of members of Uganda's Dodoth ethnic group, who had fled from a disarmament exercise into South Sudan, to their home country. However, church groups have limited capacity and face many of the same challenges as other civil society organisations, including a perceived loss in their significance in some quarters.

Finally, when considering the peacebuilding role of civil society, there is an important need to expand analysis beyond Juba, in order to gain a better understanding of the situation facing assorted civil society actors – including traditional authorities – across South Sudan. In the context of the mass displacement that has occurred due to the ongoing conflict, this analysis must also include protection of civilian camps within the country and extend to affected spaces beyond its borders. Equally, there is a need for formal civil society groups to identify ways of reaching out to, and working with, traditional authorities and informal structures at the grassroots level to achieve greater impact.



From left: Dr Tony Karbo, Incoming Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, and Former Director, Karamoja Cluster Project, University of Peace (UPEACE) Africa Programme, Kampala, Uganda; and Dr James Jonah, Former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, New York, United States.

77 "South Sudanese Government, Yau Yau Rebels Sign Peace Deal", *Sudan Tribune*, 9 May 2014 (available at <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article50935>); "South Sudanese Government, Yau Yau Rebels Sign Ceasefire", *Sudan Tribune*, 30 January 2014 (available at <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49787>).

7. The Role of External Actors in South Sudan

While the Intergovernmental Authority on Development has taken the lead role in external efforts to end the ongoing conflict in South Sudan, the Troika – comprising the US, Britain, and Norway – is a key extra-regional actor that has supported the IGAD-led peace process in various ways; and has been committed to reviving and implementing the Addis Ababa peace agreement.

External pressure, led by the US, was key to getting the peace accord signed in August 2015. Despite an increasingly difficult relationship and a decline in its influence with Juba (since December 2013), the US remains one of the most important extra-regional actors engaged with South Sudan. Washington was the biggest contributor of humanitarian aid to Sudan in the 1990s, with expenditure on such assistance exceeding \$12 billion.⁷⁸ The US further played a critical role in the negotiation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, thereafter serving as the agreement's most powerful external guarantor.⁷⁹ After the signing of the CPA, Washington provided crucial support for the work of the Thabo Mbeki-led AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), bringing its influence to bear on behalf of the panel and serving as an important link between it and the UN Security Council, particularly in the run-up to the Southern referendum in January 2011. Following South Sudanese independence in July 2011, the US – alongside the EU and African countries such as Kenya – invested significant resources in capacity-building in the new state. This investment covered the gamut from education and health programmes to infrastructure development and training for government officials. In 2012, South Sudan received close to \$1 billion in humanitarian aid, with more than a quarter of this from the US.⁸⁰ When, in January 2012, Juba – without consultation with its major donors – shut down oil production in a disagreement over transit fees with Khartoum, Washington adjusted its aid programme to South Sudan and organised a donor conference to assist the country in dealing with the impact of the cut in revenues. In 2017 the US remains the largest single donor of humanitarian aid to South Sudan,⁸¹ with total humanitarian funding exceeding \$2.1 billion for the period 2014–2017.⁸²

However, since 2011, political relations between Washington and Juba have gradually deteriorated, notwithstanding the history of US support for the South Sudanese independence struggle. Prior to the outbreak of conflict in December 2013, sources of friction in the bilateral relationship, as viewed from Washington, included South Sudan's support

“ Since 2011, political relations between Washington and Juba have gradually deteriorated, notwithstanding the history of US support for the South Sudanese independence struggle. ”

for rebels in Sudan's border areas of Blue Nile and South Kordofan; the weakness of Juba's efforts to combat corruption and institute effective financial and budgetary controls; human rights violations (including, in particular, the harassment of journalists); and a lack of progress towards the drafting of a permanent constitution. In the

78 Francis Deng and J. Stephen Morrison, *US Policy to End Sudan's War* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS] Task Force on US-Sudan Policy, 2001), p. 3.

79 CCR, *Stabilising Sudan*, p. 29.

80 Data from UN OCHA, Financial Tracking Service (available at <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/211/donors/2012>).

81 Data from UN OCHA, Financial Tracking Service (available at <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/211/donors/2017>).

82 US Agency for International Development (USAID), “South Sudan – Crisis: Fact Sheet #7, Fiscal Year (FY) 2017”, 9 May 2017 (available at https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/south_sudan_cr_fs07_05-09-2017.pdf).

context of the current conflict, for the US the relationship has become only more difficult. The maintenance of the American embassy in Juba has emerged as a key challenge, with Washington increasingly concerned about the safety and security of its diplomatic posts in fragile contexts in the wake of the attack on the American mission in Benghazi, Libya, in September 2012, resulting in the death of the US ambassador, Christopher Stevens, and three other Americans.⁸³ Domestic pressure for an aid drawdown has further increased in the face of a growing number of attacks on aid workers and humanitarian convoys. Since December 2013, at least 79 aid workers have been killed in South Sudan.⁸⁴ Several members of the South Sudanese government, for their part, have come to view Washington with deep distrust and regard it as being aggressive in its role as the pen-holder on tough resolutions in the UN Security Council. Given this leverage, as well as the security interests in the region, that the US has, there is a need for both sides to explore ways of rebuilding their relationship.

Along with the other two members of the Troika, the US has time and again reiterated its support for the IGAD-led peace process in South Sudan. Washington has continued to call for the implementation of the Addis Ababa peace agreement, with then US Secretary of State John Kerry – while on a visit to Nairobi in August 2016 – offering new aid to Juba and accepting Taban Deng Gai’s appointment as first vice-president in the transitional government. As part of an apparent effort to reposition its support for the new regime in Juba, the then US Ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power, and the then US National Security Advisor, Susan Rice, held talks with Taban in September and October 2016, in which the deployment of the Regional Protection Force and the need to implement the Addis Ababa agreement were pushed. The Norwegian foreign minister, Børge Brende, also visited Juba in October 2016 to discuss the Addis Ababa agreement and assess the humanitarian situation. Meanwhile, Britain has increased its deployment to the UN Mission in South Sudan, with about 100 British troops already deployed and the number expected to increase to 400 over 2017.⁸⁵ Most recently, in May 2017, the Troika and the EU issued a joint statement strongly endorsing a call by the AU Commission chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, and the chairperson of JMEC, Festus Mogae, for an immediate end to all military operations in South Sudan and calling on President Salva Kiir to implement an earlier commitment – conveyed to IGAD leaders in March 2017 – to a unilateral ceasefire.⁸⁶ However, there are differences between the US position and the IGAD position, and greater coordination is needed between the AU, IGAD, and extra-regional supporters of the African-led peace process. Notably, the US position favours the imposition of an arms embargo and targeted individual sanctions, but neither measure enjoys the support of IGAD, or of the African Group at the UN.

Beyond the Troika, China – rocked by the death of two Chinese UN peacekeepers in Juba in July 2016 – has continued to offer diplomatic support for the IGAD-mediated peace deal, and shown an increased humanitarian interest in the situation on the ground. China’s support for Khartoum, during the South Sudanese independence struggle, meant that Chinese diplomats initially faced distrustful and hostile attitudes in Juba. However, the signing of the CPA enabled a gradual reorientation and improvement in relations between Beijing and Juba, and after 2011 the bilateral relationship further deepened, led in large part by Chinese economic interests in the

83 “Benghazi Mission Attack Fast Facts”, *CNN News*, 31 August 2016 (available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/10/world/benghazi-consulate-attack-fast-facts>).

84 UN OCHA, “Humanitarian Bulletin”, p.1.

85 Britain’s Ministry of Defence and Mike Penning, “British Troops Continue Support to UN South Sudan Mission”, 3 April 2017 (available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/british-troops-continue-support-to-un-south-sudan-mission>).

86 European External Action Service (EEAS), “Statement by the Troika and EU on the Security Situation in South Sudan”, 8 May 2017.

region.⁸⁷ China is today the largest investor in South Sudan's oil sector, and the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has a 40 percent stake in the country's oil fields.⁸⁸ Beijing, like the Troika, was caught off-guard by the 2012 oil shutdown. It was subsequently pulled into the dispute between the two Sudans and struggled to balance its relations with Khartoum and Juba. In April 2012, Kiir visited Beijing to secure Chinese financial and diplomatic support, but returned without securing the sought \$8 billion loan for development projects.⁸⁹ Rather, President Hu Jintao urged both Sudans to de-escalate the situation and resolve their differences peacefully. Since the outbreak of conflict in December 2013, China has similarly struggled to understand the different positions and responses of the various actors involved within South Sudan, in the region, and beyond. There is limited understanding in Chinese society at large about how the crisis in South Sudan affects China, or about the position of Africa in Beijing's foreign policy, making it difficult for policymakers to mobilise support for greater humanitarian aid. In this respect, China's overall posture has tended to be cautious and reactive, with Beijing tending to see its role in South Sudan in terms of a learning process. Apart from its much reduced oil operations, it has also showed little appetite for more serious economic investments in South Sudan without a credible and lasting peace. In 2015, in a first such instance of its kind, Beijing deployed a combat battalion to the UN Mission in South Sudan.

The role of South Sudan's neighbouring countries has varied and evolved since December 2013, as part of a changing constellation of regional circumstances and interests. From Ethiopia to Uganda and the DRC, refugees are now extending into neighbouring states. As of April 2017, Uganda hosted the largest number of South Sudanese refugees (882,729), followed by Sudan (388,596), Ethiopia (370,081), Kenya (95,748), the DRC (76,693), and the Central African Republic (CAR) (1,639).⁹⁰ As well as deploying his forces to

support Kiir, Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni has, since December 2013, played a continued role in efforts to broker a settlement in South Sudan. Amidst a rapprochement between Uganda and Sudan, there seem to be some signs of a shared interest in fostering regional security and stability. Though relations between the two Sudans have remained strained, the two have also cooperated, albeit warily. Although both Khartoum and Juba accepted a proposal, made by the AU High-Level Implementation Panel, for a safe militarised border zone, the issue of support to rebel forces has continued to strain bilateral ties. Meanwhile, Kenya has been concerned about the negative economic impact of South Sudan's conflict and South Sudanese refugees on its territory, and has made efforts to prevent the SPLM/A-IO using the country as a base, including through the threat of sanctions against belligerents with interests in Kenya.

Outside the region, South Africa's engagement has continued to be notable, mainly for its diplomatic support for AU and IGAD efforts to address the South Sudanese conflict. Tshwane (Pretoria) was in favour of UN Security Council Resolution 2304, and has continued to support efforts to implement the Addis Ababa peace agreement. Since November 2016, Pretoria has hosted Riek Machar, the rebel leader having been denied re-entry into

“As of April 2017, Uganda hosted the largest number of South Sudanese refugees (882,729), followed by Sudan (388,596), Ethiopia (370,081), Kenya (95,748), the DRC (76,693), and the Central African Republic (CAR) (1,639).”

87 See Daniel Large, "China and South Sudan's Civil War, 2013-2015", *African Studies Quarterly* 16, nos. 3-4 (2016), pp. 35-54.

88 Alex Fielding, "China: Africa's New Power Broker", *The National Interest*, 22 June 2015 (available at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-africas-new-power-broker-13157>).

89 Daniel Large, *China-South Sudan: Governance in Emerging Relations*, Policy Briefing no. 77 (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs [SAIIA], November 2013), p. 2.

90 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), South Sudan Regional Update, 1-15 April 2017 (available at <http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/regional.php>).

Eastern Africa by regional states. The South African government has also mounted a notable bilateral political engagement, headed by Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa, as the Special Envoy of President Jacob Zuma; and the ruling African National Congress (ANC) is co-guarantor – alongside Tanzania’s ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party – of an intra-party dialogue process aimed at promoting SPLM unity.

The role of external actors in South Sudan is thus in a critical phase, against the backdrop of continued debate on the deployment of the Regional Protection Force, the deteriorating humanitarian situation on the ground, and an escalation of conflict. The idea of a UN or AU trusteeship has been mooted, and the possibility of withdrawal has been raised, given the conjunction of challenges facing South Sudan and the external pressures on the country.⁹¹



From left: Ambassador Princeton N. Lyman, Former US Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, and Former US Ambassador to South Africa and Nigeria; Professor Ruth lyob, Professor and Research Fellow, Centre for International Studies, University of Missouri—St Louis, United States; and Ambassador Zhong Jianhua, China’s Former Special Representative on African Affairs, and Former Ambassador of China to South Africa.

91 Princeton Lyman and Kate Almquist Knopf, “To Save South Sudan, Put It on Life Support”, *Financial Times*, 20 July 2016.

Policy Recommendations

The following ten key policy recommendations emerged from the Cape Town seminar:

1. Visionary and transformative leadership by the South Sudanese ruling elite that prioritises inclusive state-building and peacebuilding is an imperative. Traditional authorities can play a critical role in this endeavour, but need to move away from ethnic exclusivism. Efforts should be made to encourage the creation of a National Council that brings together ethnic-based institutions, such as the Dinka and Nuer Councils of Elders, and aims to promote inclusivity and unity, while exerting a positive influence on the conduct of SPLA and SPLA-IO soldiers, as well as militia fighters.
2. African leaders and organisations, including, in particular, IGAD and the AU, need to engage South Sudan's political leadership in constructive dialogue for greater accountability for the protection and promotion of human rights, as well as respect for international humanitarian law.
3. The AU Commission needs, as a matter of urgency, to establish the Hybrid Court of South Sudan, as envisaged in the Addis Ababa peace agreement, to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of atrocities, and end impunity for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious crimes under international and South Sudanese law including sexual and gender-based violence.
4. Conflict analysis and peacebuilding interventions need to address both notions of masculinities and women's issues, for a holistic approach to achieving gender equality in South Sudan. Civil society organisations need also to be innovative in designing and implementing programmes that address patriarchy and gender inequities in South Sudan, while key external actors – including the UN as well as major donors such as the US and the EU – must seek to continually assess that their interventions do not inadvertently promote gender inequality.
5. It is vital for South Sudanese civil society organisations to focus on becoming more professional and to avoid being seen as partisan actors, in order to (re-)gain their legitimacy in the eyes of the communities that they engage with and to have an impactful role at the grassroots level. Civil society and faith-based groups also need to make more effective use of coordinating bodies, such as the South Sudan NGO Forum and the South Sudan Council of Churches, to avoid conflict and competition; and to be able to have greater influence at the national level.
6. There is a need for closer coordination between IGAD, the AU, the UN Security Council, and the Troika, as well as other relevant actors including China, on the situation in South Sudan and on strategies to restore order and stability in the conflict-affected country.
7. The deployment of a Regional Protection Force has to be treated as a matter of priority for the restoration of law and order in Juba, with more careful consideration given to the timing and potential impact of an arms embargo and sanctions.

8. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan must take greater responsibility for the provision of security to internally displaced persons under its protection and in its protection of civilian camps. In this regard, UNMISS should further consider initiating dialogue and educational programmes to promote human rights among, and provide conflict management skills to, IDPs to limit violent clashes.
9. Once the situation in South Sudan stabilises, peacebuilding efforts should focus on improving economic conditions, particularly in the agricultural sector, to strengthen community resilience; improve food security; and reduce the vulnerability of ordinary South Sudanese to conflict. Just as important, civil society must be supported in its efforts to combat corruption and address the nexus between conflict and oil-based patronage more effectively.
10. It is vital that security arrangements – including, in particular, issues related to the integration of armed militias – are properly addressed in the peace process in South Sudan, with a view to transforming the SPLA into a professional conventional national army, with a shared institutional culture, that is less likely to fragment along ethnic lines during political crises.



From left: Dr Khabele Matlosa, Director, Department of Political Affairs, African Union Commission, Addis Ababa; Ambassador Princeton N. Lyman, Former US Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, and Former US Ambassador to South Africa and Nigeria; Ambassador Francis Deng, Former Permanent Representative of South Sudan to the United Nations, and Former Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide; Dr Adekeye Adebajo, then Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town; Ambassador Zhong Jianhua, China's Former Special Representative on African Affairs, and Former Ambassador of China to South Africa; and Mr Daniel Yifru, Coordinator, Intergovernmental Authority on Development South Sudan Office, Addis Ababa.

Annex I

Conference Team

1. Dr Dawn Nagar
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3. Nezo Sobekwa
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
Annex II

List of Acronyms

ACORD	Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development
ANC	African National Congress (South Africa)
AU	African Union
AUCISS	AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan
AUHIP	AU High-Level Implementation Panel
CAR	Central African Republic
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Tanzania)
CCR	Centre for Conflict Resolution
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CEPO	Community Empowerment and Progress Organisation
CNPC	China National Petroleum Corporation
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPI	consumer price index
DCA	DanChurchAid
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EU	European Union
GDP	gross domestic product
IDP	internally displaced person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
JMEC	Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NTRI	National Transformational Leadership Institute
PCRD	Post-Conflict, Reconstruction, and Development strategy (AU)
PoC	protection of civilians
RPF	Regional Protection Force
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM/A-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition
SSHRC	South Sudan Human Rights Commission
SSP	South Sudanese pound
TGoNU	Transitional Government of National Unity (South Sudan)
UN	United Nations
UN OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNMISS	UN Mission in South Sudan
US	United States

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VOLUME 1 THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S SECURITY

THE UNITED NATIONS, REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND FUTURE SECURITY THREATS IN AFRICA


The inter-related and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security within the framework of United Nations (UN) reform were the focus of this policy seminar, held from 21 to 23 May 2004 in Claremont, Cape Town.



VOLUME 2 SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRICA

THE POST-APARTHEID DECADE

The role that South Africa has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa's domestic transformation 10 years into democracy were assessed at this meeting in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 29 July to 1 August 2004.



VOLUME 3 THE AU/NEPAD AND AFRICA'S EVOLVING GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE


The state of governance and security in Africa under the African Union (AU) and The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) were analysed and assessed at this policy advisory group meeting in Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004.



VOLUME 4 A MORE SECURE CONTINENT

AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN HIGH-LEVEL PANEL REPORT, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

African perspectives on the United Nations' (UN) High-Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change were considered at this policy advisory group meeting in Somerset West, Cape Town, on 23 and 24 April 2005.



VOLUME 5 WHITHER SADC?

SOUTHERN AFRICA'S POST-APARTHEID SECURITY AGENDA


The role and capacity of the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) were focused on at this meeting in Oudekraal, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005.



VOLUME 6 HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY

AN AGENDA FOR AFRICA


The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and the potential role of African leadership and the African Union (AU) in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.



VOLUME 7 BUILDING AN AFRICAN UNION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY


RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES (RECS), NEPAD AND CIVIL SOCIETY

This seminar in Cape Town, held from 20 to 22 August 2005, made policy recommendations on how African Union (AU) institutions, including The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), could achieve their aims and objectives.




VOLUME 8 THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

This meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 October 2005, explores civil society's role in relation to southern Africa, democratic governance, its nexus with government, and draws on comparative experiences in peacebuilding.




**VOLUME 9
WOMEN AND
PEACEBUILDING IN
AFRICA**

This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations (UN) in 2000.




**VOLUME 13
SOUTH SUDAN WITHIN
A NEW SUDAN**

This policy advisory group seminar on 20 and 21 April 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A).




**VOLUME 10
HIV/AIDS AND
MILITARIES IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

This two-day policy advisory group seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.



**VOLUME 14
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES
ON THE UN
PEACEBUILDING
COMMISSION**

This meeting, in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3 and 4 August 2006, analysed the relevance for Africa of the creation, in December 2005, of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission, and examined how countries emerging from conflict could benefit from its establishment.



**VOLUME 11
AIDS AND SOCIETY IN
SOUTH AFRICA**


BUILDING A COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE

This policy and research seminar, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 March 2006, developed and disseminated new knowledge on the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in the three key areas of: democratic practice; sustainable development; and peace and security.




**VOLUME 15
THE PEACEBUILDING
ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
IN CENTRAL AFRICA**

This sub-regional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.




**VOLUME 12
HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN
SECURITY IN SOUTH
AFRICA**

This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS in South Africa and southern Africa from a human security perspective.



**VOLUME 16
UNITED NATIONS
MEDIATION EXPERIENCE
IN AFRICA**

This seminar, held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006, sought to draw out key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa, and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations' (UN) newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).



**VOLUME 17
WEST AFRICA'S
EVOLVING SECURITY
ARCHITECTURE**


LOOKING BACK TO THE FUTURE

The conflict management challenges facing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the areas of governance, development, and security reform and post-conflict peacebuilding formed the basis of this policy seminar in Accra, Ghana, on 30 and 31 October 2006.



**VOLUME 21
AFRICA'S EVOLVING
HUMAN RIGHTS
ARCHITECTURE**

The experiences and lessons from a number of human rights actors and institutions on the African continent were reviewed and analysed at this policy advisory group meeting held on 28 and 29 June 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa.



**VOLUME 18
THE UNITED NATIONS
AND AFRICA**

PEACE, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SECURITY


This policy advisory group meeting, held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 14 to 16 December 2006, set out to assess the role of the principal organs and the specialised agencies of the United Nations (UN) in Africa.



**VOLUME 22
PEACE VERSUS JUSTICE?**


TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS AND WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS IN AFRICA

The primary goal of this policy meeting, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 May 2007, was to address the relative strengths and weaknesses of "prosecution versus amnesty" for past human rights abuses in countries transitioning from conflict to peace.




**VOLUME 19
AFRICA'S
RESPONSIBILITY TO
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This policy seminar, held in Somerset West, South Africa, on 23 and 24 April 2007, interrogated issues around humanitarian intervention in Africa and the responsibility of regional governments and the international community in the face of humanitarian crises.




**VOLUME 23
CHILDREN AND ARMED
CONFLICTS IN AFRICA**

This report, based on a policy advisory group seminar held on 12 and 13 April 2007 in Johannesburg, South Africa, examines the role of various African Union (AU) organs in monitoring the rights of children in conflict and post-conflict situations.



**VOLUME 20
WOMEN IN POST-
CONFLICT SOCIETIES IN
AFRICA**


The objective of the seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 and 7 November 2006, was to discuss and identify concrete ways of engendering reconstruction and peace processes in African societies emerging from conflict.



**VOLUME 24
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

This report is based on a seminar, held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 29 and 30 May 2007, that sought to enhance the efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to advance security, governance and development initiatives in the sub-region.



**VOLUME 25
PREVENTING GENOCIDE
AND THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT**

**CHALLENGES FOR THE UN, AFRICA, AND THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY**


This policy advisory group meeting was held from 13 to 15 December 2007 in Stellenbosch, South Africa, and focused on six African, Asian and European case studies. These highlighted inter-related issues of concern regarding populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, 'ethnic cleansing', or crimes against humanity.



**VOLUME 29
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
AND PEACEBUILDING IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

**CIVIL SOCIETY, GOVERNMENTS, AND
TRADITIONAL LEADERS**


This meeting, held on 19 and 20 May 2008 in Johannesburg, South Africa, provided a platform for participants from Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe to share insights on sustained intervention initiatives implemented by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in the three countries since 2002.



**VOLUME 26
EURAFRIQUE?**

AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY

This seminar, held from 31 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt); peacekeeping and military cooperation; and migration.



**VOLUME 30
CROUCHING TIGER,
HIDDEN DRAGON?
CHINA AND AFRICA**

**ENGAGING THE WORLD'S NEXT
SUPERPOWER**

This seminar, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 September 2007, assessed Africa's engagement with China in the last 50 years, in light of the dramatic changes in a relationship that was historically based largely on ideological and political solidarity.



**VOLUME 27
SECURITY AND
DEVELOPMENT IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**


This seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 8 to 10 June 2008, brought together a group of experts – policymakers, academics and civil society actors – to identify ways of strengthening the capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to formulate security and development initiatives for southern Africa.



**VOLUME 31
FROM EURAFRIQUE TO
AFRO-EUROPA**

AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY

This policy seminar, held from 11 to 13 September 2008 in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, South Africa, explored critically the nature of the relationship between Africa and Europe in the political, economic, security and social spheres.



**VOLUME 28
HIV/AIDS AND
MILITARIES IN AFRICA**


This policy research report addresses prospects for an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic within the context of African peacekeeping and regional peace and security. It is based on three regional advisory group seminars that took place in Windhoek, Namibia (February 2006); Cairo, Egypt (September 2007); and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (November 2007).



**VOLUME 32
TAMING THE DRAGON?**

**DEFINING AFRICA'S INTERESTS AT THE FORUM
ON CHINA-AFRICA CO-OPERATION (FOCAC)**


This policy seminar held in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa on 13 and 14 July 2009 – four months before the fourth meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) – examined systematically how Africa's 53 states define and articulate their geo-strategic interests and policies for engaging China within FOCAC.



**VOLUME 33
PEACEBUILDING IN
POST-COLD WAR
AFRICA**


PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS

This policy research seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana from 25 to 28 August 2009 took a fresh look at the peacebuilding challenges confronting Africa and the responses of the main regional and global institutions mandated to build peace on the continent.



**VOLUME 37
STATE RECONSTRUCTION
IN ZIMBABWE**


This policy advisory group seminar held in Siavonga, Zambia, from 9 to 10 June 2011, assessed the complex interlocking challenges facing the rebuilding of Zimbabwe in relation to the economy, employment, health, education, land, security, and the role of external actors.



**VOLUME 34
STABILISING SUDAN**

**DOMESTIC, SUB-REGIONAL, AND
EXTRA-REGIONAL CHALLENGES**

This policy advisory group seminar held in the Western Cape, South Africa from 23 to 24 August 2010 analysed and made concrete recommendations on the challenges facing Sudan as it approached an historic transition – the vote on self-determination for South Sudan scheduled for January 2011.



**VOLUME 38
SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA,
AND THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 13 to 14 December 2011, focused on South Africa's role on the UN Security Council; the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the Council; the politics of the Council; and its interventions in Africa.



**VOLUME 35
BUILDING PEACE IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**


This policy seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 25 to 26 February 2010, assessed Southern Africa's peacebuilding prospects by focusing largely on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its institutional, security, and governance challenges.



**VOLUME 39
THE EAGLE AND
THE SPRINGBOK**

**STRENGTHENING THE NIGERIA/SOUTH
AFRICA RELATIONSHIP**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Lagos, Nigeria, from 9 to 10 June 2012, sought to help to "reset" the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa by addressing their bilateral relations, multilateral roles, and economic and trade links.




**VOLUME 36
POST-CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION IN THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO (DRC)**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 19 to 20 April 2010 sought to enhance the effectiveness of the Congolese government, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), civil society, the United Nations (UN), and the international community, in building peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).



**VOLUME 40
SOUTH AFRICA IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 19 to 20 November 2012, considered South Africa's region-building efforts in Southern Africa, paying particular attention to issues of peace and security, development, democratic governance, migration, food security, and the roles played by the European Union (EU) and China.



**VOLUME 41
THE AFRICAN UNION
AT TEN**


PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS

This international colloquium held in Berlin, Germany, from 30 to 31 August 2012, reviewed the first ten years of the African Union (AU); assessed its peace and security efforts; compared it with the European Union (EU); examined the AU's strategies to achieve socioeconomic development; and analysed its global role.



**VOLUME 45
THE AFRICAN,
CARIBBEAN, AND PACIFIC
(ACP) GROUP AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION (EU)**

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 29 to 30 October 2012, considered the nature of the relationship between the ACP Group and the EU, and the potential for their further strategic engagement, as the final five-year review of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 between the two sides approached in 2015.



**VOLUME 42
AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICA,
AND THE UNITED NATIONS'
SECURITY ARCHITECTURE**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 12 to 13 December 2012, considered Africa and South Africa's performance on the United Nations (UN) Security Council; the politics and reform of the Security Council; the impact of the African Group at the UN; and the performance of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.



**VOLUME 46
TOWARDS A NEW
PAX AFRICANA**


**MAKING, KEEPING, AND BUILDING PEACE
IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA**

This policy research seminar held in Stellenbosch, South Africa, from 28 to 30 August 2013, considered the progress being made by the African Union (AU) and Africa's regional economic communities (RECs) in managing conflicts and operationalising the continent's peace and security architecture; and the roles of key external actors in these efforts.



**VOLUME 43
GOVERNANCE AND
SECURITY CHALLENGES
IN POST-APARTHEID
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

This report considers the key governance and security challenges facing Southern Africa, with a focus on the 15-member Southern African Development Community (SADC) sub-region's progress towards democracy; and its peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding efforts.




**VOLUME 47
POST-APARTHEID SOUTH
AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY
AFTER TWO DECADES**

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 28 to 30 July 2013, reviewed post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy after two decades, and explored the potential leadership role that the country can play in promoting peace and security, as well as regional integration and development in Africa.




**VOLUME 44
ACHIEVING THE
MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT GOALS
(MDGs) IN AFRICA**

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 13 and 14 May 2013, considered the progress that Africa has made towards achieving the UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and sought to support African actors and institutions in shaping the post-2015 development agenda.




**VOLUME 48
SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA,
AND INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS (IIAs)**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 17 to 18 February 2014 assessed the principles underpinning international investment agreements, including bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and the implications of these instruments for socio-economic development efforts in South Africa and the rest of the continent.



**VOLUME 49
REGION-BUILDING AND
REGIONAL INTEGRATION
IN AFRICA**

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 28 to 30 April 2014, considered the challenges and potential of Africa's regional economic communities (RECs) in promoting region-building and regional integration on the continent, including through a comparative assessment of experiences in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.



**VOLUME 53
THE AFRICAN UNION**

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CHALLENGES

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 27 to 29 April 2016, revisited the performance and prospects of the African Union (AU) in the areas of governance, security, socio-economic challenges, as well as assessing the AU Commission and its relations with African sub-regional organisations and external actors.



**VOLUME 50
SOUTH AFRICA AND
THE BRICS**


PROGRESS, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS

This policy advisory group seminar held in Tshwane, South Africa, from 30 to 31 August 2014, assessed the potential for increasing the impact of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) Grouping on global politics, and to develop concrete recommendations in support of South Africa's continuing engagement with the bloc.




**VOLUME 54
WAR AND PEACE IN THE
GREAT LAKES REGION**

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 19 to 20 March 2016, assessed the major obstacles to peace and security in the Great Lakes, and considered seven broad issues: security and governance; the cases of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda; as well as the roles of the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) in the region.




**VOLUME 51
SECURITY AND
GOVERNANCE IN THE
GREAT LAKES REGION**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Franschoek, Western Cape, from 9 to 10 May 2015, assessed the obstacles to peace, security, and governance in the Great Lakes region. The report assessed the political situation in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); the roles of Rwanda and Uganda in the region; as well as those of regional and external actors.



**VOLUME 55
THE PEACEBUILDING
ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
IN SOUTH SUDAN**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Tshwane, South Africa, from 11 to 12 December 2015, reflected on the role of, and prospects for, civil society in South Sudan in the areas of peacemaking and peacebuilding. The report also provides policy recommendations for strengthening the capacity of South Sudanese civil society to play a more effective peacebuilding role in the country.



**VOLUME 52
REGION-BUILDING AND
PEACEBUILDING IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana, from 19 to 20 September 2015, assessed key issues relating to region-building and peacebuilding in Southern Africa, while analysing South Africa's leadership role in the sub-region.



**VOLUME 56
AFRICA AND EXTERNAL
ACTORS**

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 24 to 25 August 2016, examined Africa's relations with eight key bilateral actors or blocs and six major multilateral actors, assessing progress made in the continent's efforts to increase its leverage in global politics through engagement with external actors.

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In December 2016, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted about 30 policymakers, academics, and civil society actors to reflect critically upon the challenges of, and prospects for, peacebuilding in South Sudan; and to examine the role of major external actors in supporting local and national peace processes. The seminar had six key objectives: first, to identify the main challenges facing South Sudan's Transitional Government of National Unity; second, to examine the challenges of, and prospects for, implementing the August 2015 Addis Ababa peace agreement; third, to assess the human rights situation in South Sudan, with a view to identifying more effective ways to protect and promote such rights meaningfully, while addressing their violations; fourth, to explore ways of strengthening local, national, and international engagement with issues related to gender and women's empowerment as key aspects of conflict management and peacebuilding; fifth, to understand the challenges facing South Sudanese civil society and to assist the sector in identifying opportunities for peacebuilding, in the context of the current conflict; and sixth, to assess the role of key external actors in South Sudan such as the United Nations, the United States, and China, with a view to identifying concrete ways in which they can support conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts in the country more effectively.



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