



THE IMPLEMENTATION GAP OF THE REGIONAL INTEGRATION AGENDA IN SADC



CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA



POLICY ADVISORY GROUP SEMINAR REPORT

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DATE OF PUBLICATION: JULY 2017

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RAPPORTEURS

DAWN NAGAR AND CHARLES MUTASA

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Acknowledgements

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, would like to thank the Botswana-based Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) organisation for their generous support that made possible the holding of the policy advisory group seminar, “The Implementation Gap of the Regional Integration Agenda in the Southern African Development Community (SADC)”, in Cape Town from 15 to 16 May 2017. The Centre also express their sincere gratitude for the continuous support of the governments of Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Finland.

About the Organiser

The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, was established in 1968. The organisation has wide-ranging experience in conflict interventions in Southern Africa and is working on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organisations. Its policy research focuses on peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa; region-building and regional integration on the continent; relations between Africa and the European Union (EU); achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa; and South Africa’s bilateral and multilateral foreign policy.

Rapporteurs

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Participants of the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Policy Advisory Group Seminar “The Implementation Gap of the Regional Integration Agenda in the Southern African Development Community (SADC)”, The Townhouse Hotel, Cape Town, South Africa.

Executive Summary

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a two-day policy advisory group seminar at the Townhouse Hotel in Cape Town, from 15 to 16 May 2017, on the theme “The Implementation Gap of the Regional Integration Agenda in the Southern African Development Community (SADC)”.

The meeting brought together about 30 key policymakers, academics, and civil society actors to reflect critically on the challenges of, and prospects for, regional integration in Southern Africa; and to assess the implementation gap of its policies and protocols for its 15 member states with a view to accelerating regional implementation of SADC’s policies and protocols and to identify strategies for strengthening the capacity of national partners in furtherance of regional integration.

1. Regional Integration and Implementation: Progress, Problems, and Prospects

The sovereignty of the state has become increasingly challenged in regional integration spaces, with the state viewed as the centre of power around which SADC gravitates. A particular problem in Southern Africa is that the region has no mechanism to effectively deal with governance challenges. SADC needs to organise itself into an engine for the region that deals effectively with regional poverty, inequality, and unemployment. The SADC organisation was created as a result of member states’ that emerged from liberation wars against the apartheid and destabilisation practices with a view to attain independence and socio-economic development and regional stability.

SADC’s regional integration as it currently stands, is not based on the realities on the ground. Thus, assessments conducted of SADC must take into account the genesis of its creation with a view to provide a clear understanding to its citizens of the anticipated results of the regional integration agenda, its design and its implementation framework and modus operandi. Such efforts will lessen misconceived processes and further avoid misconceptions at the national levels of the regional integration agenda and also place due focus on primary and not on secondary effects.

SADC’s transformation ought to reconsider what had led to the strong relations and engagements brought about by key regional initiatives such as the spatial development initiatives (SDIs) of 1995 that were implemented in infrastructure and electricity generation, such as the Maputo Development Corridor (MDC) and the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP), both created in 1995, three years after the signing of the SADC Treaty. It was a partnership between South Africa and Mozambique that led to the creation of the MDC, connecting these two countries; similarly, South Africa invested in the SAPP project using its parastatal, Eskom, as a medium. Both these initiatives have had positive results for Mozambique in strengthening its economy and trade with an industrial regional power.

2. The SADC Parliament: The Domestication of SADC Policies and Protocols

The structural design of SADC and the role of both national parliaments and the regional SADC Parliamentary Forum level are vital in hastening ratification and domestication of SADC's protocols and policies for its regional integration agenda, and in supporting its member states. Implementation and incorporation of these protocols and policies however, into the national policies of member states remains patchy. There seems to be a disjuncture in terms of focus between SADC leaders and the SADC Secretariat.

Thus far, SADC's regional integration remains a state-driven affair, with member states neither willing to cede sovereignty to a supra-national body nor willing to empower organs representing citizens, especially civil society and the SADC Parliamentary Forum. Many SADC leaders are ill-disciplined and seem ready to close down or restructure institutions – like the tribunal – to suit their needs, should their power-bases and interests be in any way threatened, regardless of the fact that they have joined a regional organisation and signed its Treaty.

3. SADC Gender Protocol

The adoption of the United Nations (UN) Resolutions 1325 and 1820 brought to light the huge discrepancies and inequalities in the political, social, and economic conditions of women, inspiring a gender activism determined to establish non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on the African continent that addresses women and gender issues, as well as the inception of numerous journals on gender. In gathering regional lessons learned and in assessing implementation of the SADC Gender Protocol, at the regional level the implementation plan considered frameworks and policies including the revised SADC Treaty; the linkages between the SADC Gender Protocol and the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) (revised in 2015); the SADC Gender Policy of 2007; the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development; and the SADC Gender Mainstreaming Toolkit.

Implementation of SADC's Gender Protocol was further propelled by the global instruments and frameworks that SADC had to implement to create a gender machinery at national levels, including the 2005 Beijing Plus Ten review, and the 2005 progress review of implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These instruments were essential in allowing the SADC Secretariat to lead the process of drafting the SADC Gender Protocol. Both lobbying and advocacy with civil society remain important strategies for the implementation plan of the SADC Gender Protocol. SADC's biggest challenge for implementation of its Gender Protocol however, is its institutional architecture – its Secretariat in particular.

4. Assessing Regional Integration Progress, Prospects, and Challenges, the Case of Namibia and Mozambique

There is a further need for SADC to radically transform key sectors for more efficient corporate governance that is able to address shadow regionalism and the illicit exploitation of natural resources within prudent financial regulatory frameworks that incorporate intra-regional trade through best business practices. Cross-border trade requires governments to address corruption beyond border-posts with trained and professional individuals. Namibia made a conscious effort to sign agreements that set the footprint for development and investment, covering trade, peace and security, trans-boundary natural resources, science and technology,

education and training, and the empowerment of women and youth. Namibia's approach to regionalism is unlike neo-functionalist regional integration (following Ernest Haas's neo-functionalist regional integration theory or Björn Hettne's constructivist approaches to regional integration, for example) in which regional integration projects are dependent on certain factors for success, such as increasing transactions between states that could benefit all member states.

Namibia has signed numerous SADC protocols, including those on mining; energy; control of firearms, ammunition, and other materials; mutual assistance in criminal matters; extradition; mutual defence; finance and investment; gender and development; science, technology, and innovation; the RISDP Desk Assessment; assistance in tax matters; environmental management for sustainable development; shared watercourses; tourism; transport, communications, and meteorology; and wildlife conservation and law enforcement. Namibia is also a member of the Regional Electricity Regulators Association of Southern Africa (RERA). The regional body must however, seek to introduce a well-streamlined implementation plan that includes a framework for monitoring – one that is self-regulatory for its member states. In particular for Namibia, mining tourism, and environmental management lack poor implementation and training at community level. Even though Namibia is involved in mining and water intervention projects, not much is happening in the countryside, given the costs of implementing mining regulatory policies and the level of training that is required.

Very little is known about SADC by the majority of its 281 million citizens throughout Southern Africa. But Mozambique, through its SADC National Committee (SNC), has been creative in promoting the work of the regional body, by making use of the SADC Commemoration Day (an annual event held in August) as a platform to promote SADC's regional integration agenda. Such promotion work involves the hosting of activities such as arranging public presentations by high-level diplomats; the sponsoring and hosting of school competitions; and inviting representatives from SNCs of SADC member states for the cross-pollination of ideas with a view to strengthen SADC's regional integration initiatives. Mozambique has also performed positively in its work on gender equality and women's political participation, though prior to Maputo's elections in November 2014 it performed "modestly in terms of women's representation of 39 and 38 percent in parliament and local government respectively", which is still below the 50 percent representation of SADC's regional goal.

5. Cross-Cutting Issues: Owning the Regional Integration Agenda

Capacity-building programmes could enhance the work of SADC, with a specific focus that takes into account the capacitating of the SADC Secretariat staff in the requisite skills to strengthen the organisation's regional integration implementation work. Such skills ought to include formalising guidelines for implementing and developing model laws and regulations designed specifically for the implementation of SADC's protocols and policies that are not implemented by its member states (according to the 1992 SADC Treaty); creating legal frameworks and laws for its member states regarding non-adherence to implementing regional policies and protocols such as trade agreements by SADC member states; and creating a monitoring and evaluation coordinating unit and framework, as well as providing SADC Secretariat staff with the requisite skills necessary to manage, monitor, and evaluate both their internal and external implementation activities.


CCR's May 2017 policy advisory group seminar thus highlighted the importance of civil society engagement in Southern Africa as a regime that regulates human rights and commands a developmental state agenda. The role of civil society organisations and the private sector is crucially important for SADC's regional integration implementation processes to grow economies and tackle socio-economic challenges, such as unemployment, centred on citizen ownership and participation in shaping and driving the SADC regional integration agenda.

6. Efforts Towards Closing the Regional Integration Gap

SADC must become more visible to the population of Southern Africa, since there is very little known about the regional grouping, and this gap could be addressed through promoting its work. Such promotion activities should consider, for example, making use of advertising through media such as radio and television. Social media such as Twitter and Facebook could also serve as a platform for raising awareness and engagement. Promotion efforts could also consider replicating a model similar to SADC's 2015 *Success Stories* publication, which is a good example of an instrument promoting the work of SADC.

Without civil society organisations, citizens have difficulty voicing opinions constructively, and similar difficulty engaging with governments. For example, the Southern African Development Community Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO), inaugurated in August 2005, was created as an attempt to provide a platform for civil society engagement at the policy level in Southern Africa. Similar initiatives undertaken by civil society organisations include the Botswana-based Formative Process Research on Integration (FOPRISA), with key functions of enhancing SADC's research and analytical framework. Also within the security nexus, the Southern African Defence and Security Management (SADSEM) has been instrumental in the training and capacity-building of SADC's security and defence sectors. In an attempt to establish a SADC Mediation Support Unit (MSU), civil society involvement of NGOs has also been incorporated into these SADC processes.

SADC civil society organisations still face challenges in terms of grasping opportunities from SADC programmes and projects. Projects such as the "The SADC We Want" seem to be alluding to the inclusion of civil society involvement, but SADC citizens are still engaging in actions, such as xenophobia across Southern Africa that do not demonstrate a strong people-to-people bond, and still lack an appreciation of the free movement of people within and across the region. There is also the region's private sector, which is not aligned to a regional integration agenda, together with SADC's failure to market itself as a safe investment destination.



Mr Gideon M Phiri, Former Southern African Development Community Official, Private Sector Adviser and Regional Private Sector Adviser, Fikani Regional Support Services, Lusaka, Zambia.

Policy Recommendations

The following 12 key policy recommendations emerged from CCR's May 2017 seminar:

1. There is need for SADC to revisit its model of regional integration, which is currently linear, to ensure that the Community's integration is more informed by its historical trajectories and principles. There is a further need for SADC to agree on a regional integration model that serves both the leadership and the citizenry. This will make it easier for both state and non-state actors to contribute to SADC's success. Imposed or wrongly adopted models often do not work.
2. For effective implementation of SADC's regional integration arrangement, its member states need to find ways of partnering with various stakeholders, especially civil society, academia, and the private sector.
3. The role of parliaments should become more recognised in SADC's regional integration agenda, which will provide for more timely ratification and domestication of policies and protocols at the national level and prevent unnecessary delays and setbacks of the integration process. The SADC parliamentary forum as well as national parliaments should also help to create the space for civil society organisations to influence the SADC agenda, policies, and programmes. Civil society should enhance its proactiveness and engagement with SADC leadership by learning from the civil society organisations of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); and the SADC National Committees must be enabled to foster participation of civil society organisations and the private sector.
4. The role of the private sector is critical in building Southern Africa's economies, and therefore the private sector needs to be proactive and to organise itself, define its priorities in the regional integration agenda, and mobilise resources necessary for effective advocacy, representation, and information dissemination. A regional private sector apex body that is autonomous and operates independently ought to be set up by non-state actors, but endorsed by SADC's member states.
5. SADC's member states are too dependent on external funding, which often deters the regional integration progress. While SADC has created its own regional funding mechanism, this has not yielded results since member states are still heavily dependent on external funding and do not fund their own projects, which further hampers progress in the regional integration agenda. For regional integration to be effective, member states should therefore ensure adequate funding for their programmes, and move at the same speed of agreed timelines at the implementation level, which accordingly means there is a need to secure buy-in from member states' national institutions and citizens.
6. For SADC regional integration to be successful, there is need for member states to have the political will to establish institutions and mechanisms that will help spearhead the domestication of protocols, policies, and programmes at the country level. SADC thus needs to promote cross-learning and best practices demonstrated by member states. The Mozambique case study on the implementation of SADC protocols and policies needs to be widely shared among SADC member states as a demonstration of political will and good practice that can be emulated and replicated elsewhere on the African continent and beyond.

7. Bilateral and multilateral trade deals that occur between member states, as well as with the international community and external trade partners, complicate the finalisation of SADC's own policies. Such practices thus warrant a legally binding instrument for those members who have agreed to but have not ratified agreements and protocols.
8. In terms of promoting the rule of law and human rights protection, there is need for establishing a powerful regional institution to handle judiciary matters between states, states and individuals or various groups, replacing the SADC Tribunal which was first suspended and then bounced back weakened. In line with this SADC needs to have clear guidelines on tackling issues of subsidiarity when working with institutions such as the International Criminal Court (ICC).
9. When it comes to the implementation of SADC protocols, policies and agreements, variable geometry must be addressed. Clear deadlines and sanctions must therefore be put in place to dealing effectively with SADC issues at member state level.
10. Technology does not automatically translate into socially and ecologically sustainable environmental management and human development, due to the disparate and socially isolated nature of certain environments – for example the Okavango and Cuvelai Basins. There is thus a need to strengthen corporate governance codes and protocols and, similarly, a need for voluntary self-regulation, or sector-wide self-regulation such as following the model of corporate social responsibility, based on meaningful integration and sustained cooperation.
11. SADC must consider codes of conduct or social charters to strengthen sectors on the environment, fisheries, mining, and tourism. Southern Africa should therefore consider corporate “social licences to operate”, such as mining that ensures transparency and accountability.
12. The region should also learn from the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), which has wider-than-industry representation, with NGOs building meaningful relations between scientists and researchers as well as policymakers in respect of key SADC protocols and agreements. There is a great need to strengthen hydrological jurisprudence, by according special legal status to trans-boundary waterways and setting up special forms of guardianship; as well as incorporating trans-national water resources and global principles that can provide status and laws.

Introduction

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted a two-day policy advisory group seminar at the Townhouse Hotel in Cape Town, from 15 to 16 May 2017, on the theme “The Implementation Gap of the Regional Integration Agenda in the Southern African Development Community (SADC)”.

The major focus of the meeting was to assess the gaps between national and regional implementation of SADC’s policies and protocols and to identify strategies for strengthening the capacity of national partners in support of regional integration.

The May 2017 seminar builds on the decade-long work of the Centre that includes collaboration efforts with the South African, Namibian, and Tanzanian SADC Organ Chairs and the hosting of 12 policy seminars on governance and security challenges conducted in the sub-region. In 2007, CCR assisted SADC to develop and refine policies for its security and governance strategies. In 2006, CCR also equipped the SADC Gender Unit to include an article on gender and peacebuilding in its 2008 Protocol on Gender and Development. The Cape Town meeting was also informed by two of CCR’s books – *Region-Building in Africa: Political and Economic Challenges*, published in 2016; and *Region-Building in Southern Africa: Progress, Problems, and Prospects*, published in 2012¹ – as well as policy seminars on governance and security issues held in South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia, Tanzania, and Zambia between 2004 and 2015. CCR also published a report on “Governance and Security Challenges in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa” in September 2013, commissioned by the Norwegian government.²

Background

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was created in 1980, and in 1992 SADCC was reconstituted into SADC, with South Africa joining in 1994. Though trade corridors and a power pool were created, efforts to establish a free trade area, customs union, common market, and monetary union appear to have stalled, even as SADC, the East African Community (EAC), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) are seeking to create a broader free trade area of 26 countries in East, Central, and Southern Africa. In the contemporary relations of SADC’s 15 member states, both with the SADC Secretariat and in bilateral intra- and extra-regional relations among the bloc’s member states, convergence of regional

1 Daniel H. Levine and Dawn Nagar (eds.), *Region-Building in Africa: Political and Economic Challenges* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); and Chris Saunders, Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa, and Dawn Nagar (eds.), *Region-Building in Southern Africa: Progress, Problems, and Prospects* (London: Zed; and Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2012).

2 Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) report, “Governance and Security Challenges in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa” (not linked to a seminar), published in September 2013. See also the following CCR seminar reports: “South Africa in Africa”, Stellenbosch, 29 July–1 August 2004; “Whither SADC? Southern Africa’s Post-Apartheid Agenda”, Cape Town, 18–19 June 2005; “The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in Southern Africa”, Maseru, 14–15 October 2005; “HIV/AIDS and Militaries in Southern Africa”, Windhoek, 9–10 February 2006; “Southern Africa: Building an Effective Governance and Security Architecture for the 21st Century”, Dar es Salaam, 29–30 May 2007; “Security and Development in Southern Africa”, Johannesburg, 8–10 June 2008; “Building Peace in Southern Africa”, Cape Town, 25–26 February 2010; “Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, Cape Town, 19–20 April 2010; “State Reconstruction in Zimbabwe”, Siavonga, 9–10 June 2011; “South Africa in Southern Africa”, Cape Town, 19–20 November 2012; “Post-Apartheid South Africa’s Foreign Policy After Two Decades”, Cape Town, 28–30 July 2013; “Region-Building and Peacebuilding in Southern Africa”, Gaborone, 19–20 September 2015. All reports available at <www.ccr.org.za>.

integration processes still has a long way to go. It is therefore necessary to understand the debates around regional integration in the sub-region in order to have salient discussions on how the SADC Secretariat intends to address the issue of regionalisation and convergence of its own protocols and treaties to augment economic growth for its member states.



Left: Ms Liliane Limenyande, Personal and Research Assistant to the Executive Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town; and right: Mr Fritz Brand, Senior Human Resources Manager, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town.

Seminar Themes and Objectives

The May 2017 seminar that was held in Cape Town, provided a platform for knowledge-sharing and dialogue on the implementation and impact of the regional integration agenda in Southern Africa. The Cape Town seminar sought to achieve four specific aims in particular:

1. Provide an impartial space for engagement between the invited stakeholders, with a view to fostering greater cooperation among them;
2. Increase knowledge about implementation issues at the national level, through exposure to diverse national and regional perspectives;
3. Foster peer learning and exchange on success cases in the implementation and domestication of SADC policies and protocols; and
4. Increase knowledge about SADC's work and disseminate the outcomes of this seminar to a broader audience.

This Cape Town policy seminar brought together 30 diverse representatives including African policymakers, former officials from the SADC Secretariat, national role-players, private sector actors, regional civil society, and members of the academic community. A key focus of the May 2017 seminar was on SADC National Committees (SNCs), and the Botswana-based SADC Secretariat, in assessing critically their efforts to promote regional integration in Southern Africa. Towards these ends, the Cape Town meeting assessed key issues that provided an opportunity to examine contemporary challenges with a view to strengthening the capacity of SADC and its 15 member states in policy development and implementation. The meeting developed concrete policy recommendations that could contribute to these efforts. This report is based on presentations and discussions at the meeting, as well as on a concept note and further research on SADC issues.

The May 2017 seminar sought to achieve five specific objectives:

1. Identify the major policy and protocol implementation challenges facing the SADC Secretariat and its member states;
2. Critically examine the architecture for the implementation and domestication of the Community's policies and protocols;
3. Assess the SADC Gender Protocol;
4. Discuss Prospects, Problems and Progress of implementation of SADC's regional integration agenda in Namibia and Mozambique; and
5. Assess how to close the implementation gap in the policies and protocols of SADC's regional integration efforts.



From top, left to right: Dr Tony Karbo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town; Dr Charles Mutasa, Independent Researcher and Development Policy Consultant, Harare, Zimbabwe; Dr Dawn Nagar, Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town; and Professor Said Adejumobi, Director, Sub-regional Office for Southern Africa, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Lusaka.

1. Regional Integration and Implementation: Progress, Problems, and Prospects

The May 2017 seminar provided analytical reflections on both the nature and the characteristics of the politics and economics of the Southern African Development Community since its evolution, with a view to strengthening its regional integration agenda.

Considerations of SADC's regional integration implementation ought to take into account key deficits and gaps, bearing in mind the different political values among its member states around sensitive issues, as demonstrated by the regional body's inability to form a supra-national entity. Because Africa's liberation movements have not transformed the psychology of liberation into the new psyche for its governmental leaders, the push for civil society engagement from non-state actors must make use of the spaces where civil society can engage with regional integration issues, no matter how small, which must be populated responsibly as well as accountably.

The sovereignty of the state has become increasingly challenged in regional integration spaces, with the state viewed as the centre of power around which SADC gravitates. A particular problem in Southern Africa is that the region has no mechanism to effectively deal with governance challenges. The SADC Parliamentary Forum serves only in an advisory role, and the tribunal does not exist. The regional body thus has little or no power to hold its member states to account and to sanction members. At the regional level, the SADC Secretariat faces a decision-making deficit and a capacity gap. With regard to economic integration, at the continental level at the four Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summits – in 1970, 1973, 1977, and 1979 – it was decided that in order to establish an African Economic Community (AEC), five successive stages would be necessary: a preferential free trade area, a free trade area, a customs union, a common market, and an economic community; these were to be incepted at the regional level throughout all of Africa – Western, Eastern, Southern, Central, and Northern. Currently this integration model appears to be hindered by the capacity gap within the Southern African regional body, the lack of political cohesion of SADC member states, and the dictates of globalisation.

It took Southern Africa 15 years to make the transition from the Front Line States (FLS), formed in 1975, to the formation of a political and economic entity – SADCC, created in 1980 – in which an economic dimension was added to political cooperation, which allowed for broader membership within SADCC.³ It took another 12 years for Southern Africa to form the successor organisation – SADC – in 1992. This transformation from SADCC to SADC took place during the rationalisation processes⁴ between 1991 and 1992 in the face of two major issues:

3 Kaire Mbuende, "Namibia and the Southern African Development Community", in Anton Bösl, André du Pisani, and Dennis U Zaire (eds.), *Namibia's Foreign Relations: Historic Contexts, Current Dimensions, and Perspectives for the 21st Century* (Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia, 2014), pp. 231–252.

4 See Dawn Nagar, "The Politics and Economics of Regional Integration: A Case study of COMESA and SADC, 1980–2015" University of the Witwatersrand, PhD. thesis, 2016, chap 3.

the merging of the preferential trade area – COMESA – with SADCC; and South Africa’s joining of either organisation and how a democratic South Africa would fit into a regional organisation. During the early 1990s, SADCC was also largely concerned with the huge shortage of food in the region.⁵ At the SADCC summit in August 1992, the member states accepted a report of the Joint Council of Ministers on the re-formalisation of SADCC and agreed that the report adequately addressed the issues and concerns of the region with regard to South Africa’s admission. The summit also agreed that the report formed a sufficient basis to strengthen SADCC and provided the new SADC with appropriate legal status and other necessary instruments to create a regional economic community (REC) of Southern African states. Hence the August 1992 Windhoek summit immediately approved and signed a new declaration, a Treaty, and a protocol committing member states to more formal arrangements for cooperation and integration under the framework of the new organisation, SADC. The SADC Treaty specified six important factors and considerations.⁶ The importance of South Africa’s joining the organisation was re-affirmed at the August 1992 Windhoek summit. The summit also “agreed that it was necessary to clarify that relations between SADCC and South Africa will be normalised only when a democratically elected government was in place”.⁷

The August 1992 Windhoek summit also approved the 1993 SADC “Framework and Strategy for Building a Community in Southern Africa”, which articulated regional issues and proposed a timetable as well as the necessary steps required to build an economic community for Southern Africa. The August 1992 Windhoek summit outlined clear objectives for the region’s future engagements, acknowledging that: i) the SADC Treaty should provide an agreement on protocols on specific areas of integration, which should set out principles and objectives for integration, and determine the rules under which member states were to conduct relations; (ii) member states were required to sign the follow-up plan of the Treaty, which provided a timetable for negotiations and protocols; (iii) priority had to be provided by member states for popular participation in ensuring that SADC citizens formed part of the regional integration process and were informed of the direction of the SADC integration process; (iv) movement of people within the region was to be facilitated and encouraged; (v) member states had to work towards progressively removing all barriers to the flow of capital, goods, and services; and (vi) regional peace and security processes were to be prioritised by member states. These principles of engagement set the tone for member states for future engagement in regional integration. Also expressed at the August 1992 Windhoek summit was the hope that a democratic South Africa would join SADC in order to build a new economic order based on balance, equity, and mutual benefit.⁸

But in the restructuring of the institution, the region’s concern was focused on whether SADCC had attained a level of economic development and integration that could withstand a powerful economy like that of South Africa. SADCC member states viewed their organisation as a political institution designed to reduce dependence on the economy of South Africa in terms of trade, transport, communications, and infrastructure, both individually and jointly as a regional bloc. Twenty-five years later, SADC is still confronted with major

5 Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) Summit Communiqué, Windhoek, 17 August 1992. <http://www.sadc.int/files/3913/5292/8384/SADC_SUMMIT_COMMUNIQUES_1980-2006.pdf> (accessed September 2015) cited in Nagar, “The Politics and Economics of Regional Integration”, 2016, chap 3.

6 SADCC Summit Communiqué, 17 August 1992.

7 SADCC Summit Communiqué, 17 August 1992.

8 SADCC Summit Communiqué, 17 August 1992.

divergences in its regional integration agenda given the different agendas of its 15 member states. In order to properly diagnose the gaps in regional integration implementation, the initial genesis of this integration must be therefore understood.

Earlier integration in the 1970s expanded more on economic cooperation, inter-governmentalism, developmental regionalism, political cooperation, old and new regionalism, regionalisation, and other integration processes that evolved across the world. Scholars of regional integration like Joseph Nye,⁹ for example, noted that negotiation processes for regional integration should consider two important variables: “bargaining” and “negotiating” among powerful members within the group. Africa’s states were clustered into regional groupings based merely on a geographical proximity that had no effect on regional integration, with smaller economies having less “bargaining” power and battling in getting the processes of intra-regional trade negotiations correct.

The level of intra-regional trade provides a useful indicator of the extent of economic integration and convergence.¹⁰ For example, regional economic communities can boost regional trade through tariff reductions and limit non-tariff barriers. Southern Africa’s total intra-regional trade in 2016 was six percent, which is relatively low and thus shows that the region should address intra-regional commerce with a view to building its smaller markets and ultimately eradicating poverty.¹¹

The movement of both goods and people is also central to effective regional integration. But the migration movements from within Southern Africa did not advance regional integration. Several core policies meant to implement regional integration to the advantage of Southern Africa are still to be ratified by SADC’s member states. Although most of the 40 SADC protocols have been ratified by member states, the implementation and incorporation of these protocols into national policies remains patchy. SADC thus still requires clear legislative procedures for its regulations, directives, and divisions. At the August 2016 SADC summit of heads of state and government, SADC leaders discussed the lack of ratification of seven protocols vital for regional integration efforts that have not yet come into force, and urged member states that are yet to accede to these protocols to do so. The seven protocols concern science, technology, and innovation; facilitation of movement of persons; trade in services; assistance in tax matters; environmental management for sustainable development; employment and labour; and the new protocol on the SADC Tribunal.¹²

The role of the state as a sovereign entity is paramount and can hamper integration processes if parochial interests are overly enthused with national growth with the intent of pursuing wealth and enhancing economic growth regardless of the costs to the region. Southern African countries are still lacking regional integration policies viable for economic growth, such as government support for small, micro, and medium enterprises (SMMEs) that can grow industrialisation alongside value-added production through intra-regional trade and manufacturing. Such factors are important in fostering growth through the transference of technology and skills to boost development, research, and education supported by strong government policies. These issues should therefore be considered and engender support through state-led policies that are implemented at both national and regional levels.

9 Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane, “Transnational Relations and World Politics”, *International Organization* 25, no. 3 (Summer 1971), pp. 329–349.

10 Richard Gibb, “Rationalisation or Redundancy? Making Eastern and Southern Africa’s Regional Trade Units Relevant”, *Brenthurst Foundation* (2006), p. 5.

11 African Union (AU), African Development Bank (AfDB), and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), “Africa Regional Integration Index Report 2016”, pp. 16–24. <<http://www.uneca.org/publications/africa-regional-integration-index-report-2016>> (accessed 11 June 2017).

12 Southern African Development Community (SADC), “Communiqué of the 36th Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government”, Mbabane, 30–31 August 2016, p. 8. <https://www.sadc.int/files/4914/7274/8383/Communique_of_the_36th_SADC_Summit_Swaziland_31_August_2016.pdf> (accessed 25 March 2017).

SADC also should reassess its own regional integration model. European Union (EU) integrationists, for example, did not adopt the strict linear progression model of region-building that SADC and the preferential trade area embarked on in terms of trade liberalisation at the regional level. Europe embarked on three phases: "Firstly a customs union was formed which eliminated tariffs and established a common external tariff between 1958 and 1968; then came a period of relative stagnation in the 1970s, when a number of non-tariff barriers prevented further progress; and thirdly, only much later in the 1980s, the single European market programme of 1992 was created."¹³



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¹³ European Union (EU) and SADC seminar on "The Regional Integration Process" (1995). See also SADCC Summit Communiqué, 17 August 1992; SADC Summit Communiqués for 1980–2006. <http://www.sadc.int/files/3913/5292/8384/SADC_SUMMIT_COMMUNIQUES_1980-2006.pdf> (December 2015), cited in Nagar, "The Politics and Economics of Regional Integration", 2016, chap 3.

2. Domestication of SADC Policies and Protocols

The SADC Parliamentary Forum

SADC is one of Africa's five regional economic communities that has built its Parliamentary Forum to model the Pan-African Parliament. Yet SADC, in building its Parliamentary Forum with the same governments that were present at the development of the Pan-African Parliament, paradoxically received some push-back from its member states. A SADC Parliamentary Forum is a necessary structure and a critical platform to help move the region together and towards one goal – to define a common agenda to ultimately build a stronger SADC society. This common agenda would, for example, address and ensure momentum on the achievement of good governance for SADC member states; propel industrialisation projects; and address other important issues such as child marriage, which is still an acceptable practice within almost all SADC member states. SADC must also acknowledge the financial implications of legislative implementation, ensure greater commitment to financial obligations, and build a budget that is able to carry such costs, under a SADC parliament. Similarly, a SADC budget office is critical to support member-states' national parliaments and to provide the necessary assistance so that SADC protocols are adequately tabled and discussed, especially in the area of land and waterways.

The regional spirit that characterised the SADC Parliamentary Forum in 1996 and the achievement of common goals was pushed very strongly at a time when the region had just emerged from colonialism and apartheid. One of the main reasons for creating RECs in Africa was to promote sustainable economic policies to address the



From left: Honourable Ms Zephroma Dlamini-Dubazana, African National Congress Whip, Standing Committee on the Auditor-General, Parliament of South Africa, Cape Town; Professor André du Pisani, Professor of Political Science, University of Namibia (UNAM), Windhoek, Namibia; and Professor Said Adejumbi, Director, Sub-regional Office for Southern Africa, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Lusaka.

imbalance between weaker and stronger economies within regional economic clusters. But this momentum and impetus has since somewhat dwindled. SADC's regional protocols and policies are important pathways to promoting industrialisation, which requires compliance with domestic laws and the political will of member states.

The SADC Community and Its Evolution: Assessing the Regional Integration Gap

The evolution of SADC has spanned five decades with a number of assumptions and challenges developed along its journey in forming a community and a development institution from a previous coordinating conference. SADC's development partners were the corner-stone in the organisation's architectural apparatus to ensure its relevance. The current position in which SADC's developmental partners find themselves is a result of the journey that SADC has travelled with them. For example, as a primary condition, the SADC Secretariat was of course implemented by SADC itself – comprising 15 member states – and so the weaknesses of the Secretariat are therefore secondary effects. Thus, in addressing the root causes of its regional integration gaps, SADC ought to separate primary conditions from secondary effects. The SADC Secretariat can thus only be as effective as the governments of its 15 member states intend it to be. In defining SADC's regional integration challenges, its evolving nature and characteristics must be considered from a perspective that considers power relationships – both economic and political levels – among its member states, as well as the benefits derived for all parties in the regional integration trajectory of this community.

Contemporary regional integration challenges in Southern Africa, such as commerce discrepancies in bilateral relations among SADC member states, should also be considered, as it is important to understand the historical dimensions and genesis of such relations. SADC's transformation ought to reconsider what had led to the strong relations and engagements brought about by key regional initiatives such as the spatial development initiatives (SDIs) of 1995 that were implemented in infrastructure and electricity generation. The Maputo Development Corridor (MDC) and the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) were both created in 1995, three years after the signing of the SADC Treaty. It was a partnership between South Africa and Mozambique that led to the creation of the MDC, connecting these two countries; similarly, South Africa invested in the SAPP project using its parastatal, Eskom, as a medium. Both these initiatives have had positive results for Mozambique in strengthening its economy and trade with an industrial regional power. Through the MDC, Mozambique became South Africa's largest trading partner in the region after Angola, with total trade increasing from R900 million in 1992 to R7.4 billion in 2002, resulting in an exceptional regional spill-over that increased Mozambique's economic growth from R47 million to R403 million over the same period.

SADC's regional integration implementation plan should also consider the benefits for all parties in the process. For example, for both the MDC and SAPP, there were winners but there was also a paymaster. South Africa's involvement in the SDIs was a regional strategy to target domestic challenges and thus a springboard to assist its neighbours while attempting to improve the socio-economic woes of its own poverty-stricken society, involving huge skill shortages and poor education, and a lack of the most basic of services such as running potable water, housing and sanitation, and electricity generation. On its part, South Africa, through the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), contributed approximately \$8 billion for the MDC. South Africa's micro-regional



From left seated: Honourable Professor Peter Katjavivi, Speaker of the National Assembly, Parliament of Namibia, Windhoek; Mr Stanley Henkeman, Executive Director, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), Cape Town; and standing: Dr Nkosana Moyo, Executive Chairman, Mandela Institute for Development Studies (MINDS); Former Vice President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the African Development Bank (AfDB); and Former Co-Chair of the Regional Agenda Council on the Future of Africa World Economic Forum, Johannesburg, South Africa.

developmental integration approach in building infrastructure, such as through the MDC and the SAPP initiatives, increased access to electricity for the country's households. For example, in the late 1980s, 85 percent of households in South Africa had no electricity; however by 2009, nearly 85 percent of households in South Africa had electricity. Within the parameters of regional economic integration and convergence, the South African government's domestic condition affected its regional response. However, South Africa was also willing to be a paymaster in the regional integration implementation process and ultimately benefits were gained by both itself and Mozambique, which assisted regional integration convergence.¹⁴

Over time, societies under transformation have a tendency to become more institutionalised, with less focus placed on people. Further understanding of this tendency can be gained by evaluating the aforementioned primary conditions and secondary effects, which can also help illuminate the root causes of contemporary challenges faced. For example, SADC's development partners (South Africa in the MDC initiative) functioned differently within the community at the time the Community was created compared to currently, with trade between Mozambique and South Africa now more lopsided. While it might be that actual trade in goods has improved and is now more value-driven, total commerce is still been conducted more with external partners such as with Europe. For example, while total trade between Mozambique and South Africa increased from R900 million in 1992 to R7.4 billion in 2002, as earlier mentioned, South Africa's total import trade from Mozambique in 2016 was worth R10.1 billion and its total exports to Mozambique were worth R33.3 billion, compared to Europe's R359.4 billion in total imports from and R271.4 billion in total exports to South Africa.

¹⁴ See also Nagar, 'COMESA and SADC: The Era of Convergence', in Levine and Nagar (eds.), *Region-Building in Africa*, 2016, pp. 191-212.

Similarly, societally SADC must create the conditions for ensuring the sustainability of agreements and partnerships. It must also be clear in providing a factual account that recognises both the actors and factors underpinning the relationship between primary conditions and secondary effects on society. Such a monitoring and evaluation framework – going back to the genesis of SADC – would be better able to assess the benefits of regional integration.

SADC needs to organise itself into an engine for the region that deals effectively with regional poverty, inequality, and unemployment. Though there has been movement among member states in phasing down tariffs and applications by member states for derogations,¹⁵ SADC's heads of state must take cognisance of the policies and strategies agreed upon. There is an urgent need for an instrument to monitor protocols, particularly the stalled free trade area protocol, as well as the business instruments critical for regional integration. In assessing SADC's internal institutional challenges, it is important to recognise that SADC lacks special powers and that its Secretariat is poorly staffed and relies heavily on both donors and partners to carry out its activities. The executive secretary's short term in office is also an impediment to the work of the organisation, hindering the continuity of its work.

There is a further need for SADC to radically transform key sectors for more efficient corporate governance that is able to address shadow regionalism¹⁶ and the illicit exploitation of natural resources within prudent financial regulatory frameworks that incorporate intra-regional trade through best business practices. Cross-border trade requires governments to address corruption beyond border-posts with trained and professional individuals. Additionally, national-level implementation of SADC's numerous protocols involves ratification and domestication, as well as administrative, regulatory, and budgetary processes that tend to be complicated, not clearly elaborated, and often poorly understood. In the absence of adequate technical assistance from the SADC Secretariat for national structures and processes, several implementation challenges have persisted.

The structural design of SADC and the role of both national parliaments and the regional SADC Parliamentary Forum level are thus vital in hastening ratification and domestication of SADC's protocols and policies for its regional integration agenda, and in supporting its member states. As previously mentioned, implementation and incorporation of these protocols and policies into the national policies of member states remains patchy. There seems to be a disjuncture in terms of focus between SADC leaders and the SADC Secretariat. Thus far, SADC's regional integration remains a state-driven affair, with member states neither willing to cede sovereignty to a supra-national body nor willing to empower organs representing citizens, especially civil society and the SADC Parliamentary Forum. Many SADC leaders are ill-disciplined and seem ready to close down or restructure institutions – like the tribunal – to suit their needs, should their power-bases and interests be in any way threatened, regardless of the fact that they have joined a regional organisation and signed its Treaty.

Moreover, domestication of SADC protocols and policies could enhance a sense of ownership that promotes buy-in by the various institutions and citizens. But SADC member states face challenges in complying with and implementing these protocols and policies at the national level, such as delays in bringing SADC protocols and

15 Derogations are generally applied as a rule to tariffs that can benefit smaller economies in a free trade grouping and as such is granted a derogation to participate as a non-reciprocal member within a free trade area and thus the exporters of that member state will have non-reciprocal access that is in their favour with markets within that free trade area, *see for example* Nagar, "The Politics and Economics of Regional Integration", 2016, p. 193.

16 Shadow regionalism is the conducting of trade through corrupt practices such as tax avoidance, customs and excise duties, among other things, and not through the official channels generally put in place for trade flowing across borders.

policies to national parliaments for deliberation and legislation. This reflects, in part, a lack of political will and commitment by several SADC member states. Establishing and maintaining the SADC national committees is also replete with challenges that require financial and human resource capacities often lacking in member states.

It is important that in domesticating SADC protocols and policies that the responsible government institutions liaise with the relevant parliamentary standing committees that oversee the respective portfolios, so that adequate time is granted for internalisation processes prior to ratification of these protocols and policies. SADC governments have a tendency to rush issues for ratification without giving parliament officials and other stakeholders, sufficient time to conceptualise or interrogate issues. The SADC Parliamentary Forum should have a specialised structure able to undertake adequate assessments that guide parliamentarians through both legal and financial implications of implementing particular laws. While certain pieces of legislation require substantial funds and expertise to implement, this fact is usually not considered at the adoption level in Parliament and thus hampers the implementation for member states. There is thus an urgent need for Parliaments at the member state level as well for the SADC Parliamentary Forum to take stock of all legislation it passes or adopts, including regional policies and protocols and track whether these are actually been implemented at national level.

The SADC Secretariat needs to boost civil society organisations' (CSOs) ownership of the SADC regional integration agenda. On the other hand, a strong regional parliament is needed to help build the various spheres of government essential for spearheading the SADC regional integration agenda. But there is a lack of buy-in and ownership of the regional integration agenda among national stakeholders, leading in turn to a lack of interest in SADC as a community.

Member States and SADC National Committees

Based on the principle of subsidiarity, policy implementation is the primary responsibility of SADC member states, with the key institutional actors at the country level being those of the SADC National Committees. Article 16A of the SADC Treaty of 1992 (as amended in 2001) outlines the establishment of SNCs with a mandate to "provide input at the national level in the formulation of SADC policies, strategies and programmes of action; coordinate and oversee, at the national level, the implementation of SADC programmes of action; initiate projects and issue papers as an input to the preparation of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) in accordance with the priority areas set out in the SADC Common Agenda; and create a national steering committee, sub-committees and technical committees."¹⁷ The SNCs are mandated to ensure that SADC programmes are implemented at a national level.

It is thus at the national level that the SNCs, in particular, were intended to include the participation not only of government institutions, but also of key non-state actors, to provide a conduit for bottom-up input into SADC processes and policies. Promoting more inclusive approaches to policy development and implementation, and broadening participation of, and consultation with, key national role-players, are thus essential. This can help raise awareness about the benefits of regional integration and, in-so-doing, motivate and capacitate stakeholders to push from the bottom up for implementation of SADC protocols and policies, and contribute to the mobilisation of political will among national governments. However, participation of SNCs and their involvement in policy formulation in SADC member states has been uneven.

¹⁷ SADC, "Agreement Amending the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community", Blantyre, August 2001, art. 19.

The reporting line for state-directed SNCs is to the SADC Secretariat. This has posed a problem for the Secretariat, since the SNCs are state-directed at the national level and are therefore accountable to the Secretariat. The SADC Secretariat's lack of power and authority means that it cannot hold SNCs accountable at the national level.¹⁸ According to the revised 2015–2020 RISDP, a number of challenges include weak alignment between the national development plans of member states and the regional development plan; low levels of domestication of regional policies and protocols; and weak compliance of member states with their regional commitments.¹⁹ The revised RISDP accordingly underscores the need for member states to strengthen the SNCs and provide them with the necessary resources and capacity to undertake their responsibilities effectively.



From left: Professor Tim Murithi, Head of Programme, Justice and Peacebuilding, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town; and Mr Diakolo Muzungu, First Counsellor and Head of Economic Unit, Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa.

¹⁸ Nagar, "The Politics and Economics of Regional Integration in Africa", *esp.* pp. 105–106.

¹⁹ SADC, *Revised Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 2015–2020*, chap. 5.

3. SADC Gender Protocol

The unique nature of the SADC Gender Protocol of 2008 is that it is truly owned by the SADC community and its member states, with a strong framework for monitoring and evaluating targets, timeframes, and follow-up implementation plans with clear guidelines.

Development initiatives in the past too often ignored women and rather focused on the abstract category of “people”. The adoption of the United Nations (UN) Resolutions 1325²⁰ and 1820²¹ brought to light the huge discrepancies and inequalities in the political, social, and economic conditions of women, inspiring a gender activism determined to establish non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on the African continent that addresses women and gender issues, as well as the inception of numerous journals on gender.

Yet, Southern Africa faces regional challenges to its gender development work, such as donor dependency and pre-emptive donor agendas that force competition among NGOs, as well as some SADC governments’ hostility directed at SADC gender experts. Hence it is imperative that Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) foster closer collaboration with each other, in support of gender priorities for Africa at large. The SADC Gender Protocol has also used regional and international instruments to propel the implementation process. The post-2015 development agenda should be viewed as an opportunity to successfully implement the outstanding challenges that Southern Africa has yet to address, including its still often discriminatory gender practices. The timeframe for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – 2015 to 2030 – can and should be used to address these challenges of gender discrimination, particularly discrimination against women.



From left: Ms Magdeline Madibela, Gender Specialist, UN Women, Gaborone, Botswana; Ms Colleen Morna, Chief Executive Officer, Gender Links, Johannesburg; and Mr Diakolo Muzungu, First Counsellor and Head of Economic Unit, Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tshwane.

20 United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 was passed unanimously on 31 October 2000. The resolution (S/RES/1325) was the first ever passed by the UN Security Council that specifically addressed the impact of war on women as well as the contributions of women to conflict resolution and sustainable peace. See <<http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/1325.html#Full>> (30 May 2017).

21 UN Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008). See <<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/391/44/PDF/N0839144.pdf?OpenElement>> (30 May 2017).



From left: Ms Mookho Moeketsi, Director Regional Integration, Lesotho Ministry of Finance, Maseru; Dr Kudrat Virk, Researcher and Independent Consultant, Cape Town; and Ms Magdelaine Madibela, Gender Specialist, UN Women, Gaborone.

In gathering regional lessons learned and in assessing implementation of the SADC Gender Protocol, at the regional level the implementation plan considered frameworks and policies including the revised SADC Treaty; the linkages between the SADC Gender Protocol and the RISDP (revised in 2015); the SADC Gender Policy of 2007; the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development; and the SADC Gender Mainstreaming Toolkit. Implementation of SADC's Gender Protocol was further propelled by the global instruments and frameworks that SADC had to implement to create a gender machinery at national levels, including the 2005 Beijing Plus Ten review, and the 2005 progress review of implementing the SDGs. These instruments were essential in allowing the SADC Secretariat to lead the process of drafting the SADC Gender Protocol. Both lobbying and advocacy with civil society remain important strategies for the implementation plan of the SADC Gender Protocol. SADC's biggest challenge for implementation of its Gender Protocol however, is its institutional architecture – its Secretariat in particular. For example, while external actors have supported SADC's gender work, the re-direction of this gender work from the SADC Secretariat to the peace and security work under the new SADC Organ division, might result in less urgency in implementation of the protocol. It is thus critical that a clear roadmap be designed, providing clarity on how this gender work is to be implemented under the new division.

While there were several challenges along the way in the implementation of the protocol, a task force consisting of the SADC Gender Unit, the SADC Troika, and UN Women, with civil society playing a prominent role, was critical. The SADC Gender Protocol seeks to harmonise the various instruments to which the regional body's 15 member states have subscribed at national, regional, continental, and global levels on gender equality and equity, covering the main conventions and declarations related to such: the Convention on the Rights of the

Child (1989); the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995); the Millennium Development Goal (MDGs) (2000); UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security (2001); as well as the UN Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (2008).

The success of the SADC Gender Protocol also hinged on a clear monitoring and evaluation framework that included a regional action plan for implementation of the SADC Gender Policy; revision of national action plans and funding thereof; integration of the protocol provisions in the revised RISDP; and a regional monitoring and evaluation plan with a reporting template. The key driver to successfully implementing the SADC Gender Protocol was promotion, which included recognition of language barriers at the regional level and designing the medium of communication accordingly. For example, the gender instruments such as audio and visual kits included DVD and radio promotions, were also translated into 23 languages.

Contemporary Issues and Challenges Ahead

Lobbying for the monitoring, evaluation, and reporting (MER) framework for the SADC Gender Protocol to be adopted in 2017, has included a review of monitoring tools and post-2015 re-alignment of national and local action plans regarding the protocol. However, several key challenges remain to be addressed at government levels, including weak and under-resourced national gender machineries. SADC must also address how to implement its gender policies in a way that includes post-2015 development agendas while taking into account that member states are not a homogenous bloc and thus there is no automatic mechanism for domestication of policies. Some lack of buy-in still remains at the member-state level; for example, Mauritius is yet to ratify the SADC Gender Protocol.

At the level of civil society, funding is sorely lacking for strategic and visionary gender work. The coordination of regional gender activities is necessary in an environment of competition for scarce resources. While learnings from the gender work of other regional economic communities, such as the East African Community is critical and could benefit SADC's regional integration gender machinery; such learnings, should first focus on SADC itself before the Community looks externally for lessons, since there are several home-grown lessons within SADC, which could assist SADC's member states in the integration of a regional gender machinery.

Another area of success in relation to implementation of the SADC Gender Protocol has been the SADC Gender Barometer, created in 2014 as a critical assessment tool for measuring implementation success using two yardsticks. The first is the SADC Gender Development Index (SGDI), which is informed by empirical data collected on 23 indicators within six areas: governance; education and training; productive resources and employment; economic empowerment; sexual and reproductive health, including HIV/AIDS; and media information and communication. The second yardstick is the Citizen Scorecard (CSC) which measures citizens' perceptions of, and raising awareness for, the importance of gender issues. The success of the scorecard is clear, as the SADC Gender Protocol is among the best known of the SADC protocols by ordinary citizens. The SADC Gender Policy has identified 16 interventions aimed at increasing access to education and training programmes for both women and men, girls and boys, in order to enhance human capital development in the region, and is seeking to contribute to better health in the SADC community through responsive health delivery, research, and public education policies that are gender-sensitive and address women's empowerment.

However, the Gender Barometer could be more specific and consider broadening its index to specifically name the problem of child marriage in Southern Africa, on the African continent as a whole, and globally, alongside sexual and reproductive health, and more robustly incorporate this indicator to give the problem more prominence. According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the African continent has the highest number of child marriages globally, with eight million child brides in 2016 under the age of 15; this figure is projected to rise to 12 million by 2030.²² SADC member states remain challenged by the high prevalence of child marriage in the Southern African region as well as across the continent at large. In Mozambique, for example, the likelihood that a young woman already has three or more children is seven times higher for those married by age 15 than for those married at an older age.²³ For the period 2008–2014, the proportion of girls married under 15 years old in SADC member states was ten percent in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), two percent in Lesotho, 12 percent in Madagascar, nine percent in Malawi, 14 percent in Mauritius, 14 percent in Mozambique, two percent in Namibia, one percent in both South Africa and Swaziland, six percent in Zambia, and four percent in Zimbabwe. Angola, Botswana, and Seychelles had no child marriages under the age of 15 during this period, with no data reported for Tanzania.²⁴



From left: Ms Catherine Grant Makokera, Senior Consultant and Director, Tutwa Consulting Group, Johannesburg; and Dr Tony Karbo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town.

22 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), “Child Protection”, 2017. <<https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-protection/child-marriage>> (accessed 11 June 2017). See also UNICEF, “A Profile of Child Marriage in Africa”, 2015. <https://data.unicef.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/UNICEF-Child-Marriage-Brochure-High-Single_246.pdf> (accessed 11 June 2017).

23 See UNICEF, “A Profile of Child Marriage in Africa”.

24 UNICEF, “Monitoring the Situation of Children and Women” (2017). <<https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-protection/child-marriage>> (accessed 11 June 2017).

4. Implementation of the SADC Regional Integration Agenda: Namibia and Mozambique

Namibia

Namibia joined SADCC in 1990 (before the transformation to SADC). Given the country's engagement with and implementation of SADC's principles and protocols, and the weight the country gives on its development agenda to not just development but also investment – including mutual benefits, as well as a variable geometry approach to trade speed in tariff-setting timeframes – as well as maintaining its sovereignty of its member states, connects directly to the ideals of a new regionalism. In furtherance of this approach, Namibia made a conscious effort to sign agreements that set the footprint for development and investment, covering trade, peace and security, trans-boundary natural resources, science and technology, education and training, and the empowerment of women and youth. Namibia's approach to regionalism is unlike neo-functionalist regional integration (following Ernest Haas's neo-functionalist regional integration theory or Björn Hettne's constructivist approaches to regional integration, for example) in which regional integration projects are dependent on certain factors for success, such as increasing transactions between states that could benefit all member states.

Namibia has signed numerous SADC protocols, including those on mining; energy; control of firearms, ammunition, and other materials; mutual assistance in criminal matters; extradition; mutual defence; finance and investment; gender and development; science, technology, and innovation; the RISDP Desk Assessment; assistance in tax matters; environmental management for sustainable development; shared watercourses; tourism; transport, communications, and meteorology; and wildlife conservation and law enforcement. Namibia is also a member of the Regional Electricity Regulators Association of Southern Africa (RERA).



Left: Ms Mookho Moeketsi, Director Regional Integration, Lesotho Ministry of Finance, Maseru; and right: Mr Felix Reimer, Governance Advisor, Strengthening the National-Regional Linkages in SADC (SNRL), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Gaborone.

Namibia has various levels of connectivity in the region, but key in defining its relations is its emphasis placed on the development of diplomacy. For example, Namibia's relationship with Zimbabwe is not only bilateral but is also informed by decisions made by the SADC heads-of-state summits, with Windhoek mirroring what SADC requires of it. The country has taken a strong diplomatic position in the region through many agreements signed with other SADC member states. For example, when Namibia joined SADCC in 1990, it did so by also signing a host of agreements in relation to bilateral cooperation with SADCC member states, such as agreements on establishment of diplomatic relations between itself and Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Botswana, including for the latter, agreements on a joint cooperation commission, as well as on cultural and educational cooperation specifically, and a defence and security pact.

While Namibia has signed 27 SADC protocols, 19 of these have not been ratified. The processes of ratification are happening at different speeds – irresponsibly taking a variable geometry approach designed by SADC for trade protocols for the free trade agreements for tariff settings. For example, the process of approval of any SADC protocol is subject to an interface of complex, often competing interests, and on average Namibia takes three to five years before ratification can happen after signing. Moreover, these documents arrive very late and also very close to the ratification deadline date on parliament's doorstep. Generally, these protocols after ratification must be reported on, with progress provided on stages of implementation. Currently the Namibian government, through its parliament, is putting in place a new system to institutionalise this work at executive level, to ensure quicker turnaround time for ratification.

Namibia's developmental approach informs a terrain of economic development and investment that takes into account mutual benefits, with the core centrality of maintaining its sovereignty. The geopolitical context of Namibia has shifted over the years, with the country now trying to attract investment not only internationally, but also from the region beyond only South Africa. For example, the country has bolstered its Walvis Bay project and is currently expanding its port handles from over one million containers as of 2015/2016 to two and a half million by the end of 2017, and five million by 2022, which will place Namibia in the same league as South Africa, Tanzania, and Morocco in terms of berthing strengths. The project is about 70 percent complete, but two main challenges remain. First, the project involves too much focus on external relations and, in-so-doing, forgets the SADC regional integration project and Namibia's neighbouring states. For example, the presence of Chinese shipping companies and Chinese workers has raised concerns about the employment of Chinese workers running Namibia's projects and bringing labour into Windhoek. SADC member-states' projects, work more with external actors in investment schemes instead with their own neighbouring governments. Second, the controversies of excluding Namibia's key partner states in shared watercourses – Angola and Botswana –surrounding the Walvis Bay project have soured relations with these countries, due to the exclusionary nature of Windhoek.

Since the signing of the SADC Treaty in Windhoek in 1992, several key regional protocols and policy instruments have been deliberated further in Windhoek, such as the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO) between 2000 and 2003; the Ministerial Committee of the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC), which considered harmonising the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) (chaired by a Namibian government official); as well as discussions concerning the revised SIPO in 2010. Even though the Windhoek government formed part of these key SADC deliberations, Namibia nevertheless side-stepped SADC when it controversially intervened in the DRC's conflict without seeking approval from SADC. This intervention occurred in 1998 when Namibia, together with Zimbabwe and Angola, signed their own Mutual Defence Pact and sent their troops into Kinshasa to intervene in the DRC's

conflict in 1998. Since then, SADC tightened its regional security policy frameworks and established a regional mutual defence pact (2004), and subsequently a SADC standby force (which is yet to be operationalised, having missed several deadlines since 2010).

Though the 1998 military intervention in the DRC by Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Angola was undertaken without seeking SADC's consent, and controversially so, the May 2017 policy advisory meeting highlighted the importance of drawing lessons from hybrid missions. Given the intricate nature of merging different brigades, SADC could therefore draw lessons from the Namibia-Zimbabwe-Angola intervention to develop an interoperability doctrine for military operations with a view to finalising the 15-brigade SADC standby force. Windhoek is currently assisting SADC in providing military training towards interoperability of the SADC standby force.

With regard to political governance and economic affairs, Namibia is home to two major institutions: the SADC Parliamentary Forum and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Secretariat. But Windhoek has no functioning SADC National Committee. Namibia's government also affords more attention to SACU issues than to those of SADC since Windhoek's government is a major beneficiary of revenue generated from SACU's trade pool, which forms over 60 percent as a contribution to the country's economic budget. Namibia's Ministry of Trade and Industry has assigned only one person to matters concerning SADC, while a full staff complement is assigned responsibility over SACU matters. Since October 2016, Windhoek has begun reviewing its foreign policy with a view to producing a white paper on international relations and cooperation that addresses issues such as its dysfunctional SADC National Committee.

Electronic payment systems and regulatory relations that concern electronic settlements are important for lowering barriers to and therefore expediting trade, and Namibia is thus also a member of the SADC finance resource centre. Namibia is also a member of the Permanent Okavango River Basin Commission (OKACOM), with Angola and Botswana as main partners. But this initiative has been under threat due to mismanagement of water resources by the triumvirate, such as Angola's extraction of large amounts of water for servicing a 100,000-hectare sugar plantation without prior engagement with its partners - Namibia and Botswana. Because of the impact of global climate change, tensions over water in the region are very real. SADC should therefore seek innovative ways to build water resources more equitably among its member states to avoid the potential for conflict over this vital resource.



From left: Ms Grace Karonga, Assistant Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Lilongwe, Malawi; Ms Talitha Bertelsmann-Scott, Head, Economic Diplomacy Programme, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Cape Town; and Ms Jane Katjavivi, Former Head, University of Namibia Press, Windhoek.



From left: Mr Alfredo Nuvunga, Director, SADC National Committee (SNC), Maputo, Mozambique; Dr Margaret Sengwaketse, Research Fellow, Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis (BIDPA), Gaborone; and Mr Charles Minega Regional Advisor, Centre of Studies on Regional Integration (CEDIR) and SADC Law, Eduardo Mondlane University (EMU), Maputo.

SADC also has set in place a coherent regional infrastructural masterplan that ought to be applied as a guiding instrument in the management of water among Namibia, Angola, and Zimbabwe. The SADC masterplan could create an opportunity for the three members in furtherance of regional infrastructure with a view to developing more meaningful engagement in filling additional infrastructural gaps such as railway projects.

But implementation challenges regarding protocols and agreements go beyond the issue of compliance. Given weak oversight and monitoring of how Namibia as well as other SADC member states actually implement SADC protocols and agreements, there is potential for conflict among member states. The regional body must seek to introduce a well-streamlined implementation plan that includes a framework for monitoring – one that is self-regulatory for its member states. In particular for Namibia, mining tourism, and environmental management lack poor implementation and training at community level. Even though Namibia is involved in mining and water intervention projects, not much is happening in the countryside, given the costs of implementing mining regulatory policies and the level of training that is required. The costs of compliance, therefore, must be addressed in relation to the protocols. Mining companies should also bring their part in conforming to SADC’s regulatory mining protocol, and develop mechanisms in support of this protocol.

SADC member states should also look beyond its water protocols to learn from international frameworks governing water resources and river basins. For example, the Okavango River covers an area of 15,000 square kilometres, with the river’s resources shared by Angola, Namibia, and Botswana.²⁵ While at the political level there is some receptiveness for ecologically sound water management, more training is required at the community level. There is thus an urgent need to redefine the ecological importance attached to water management in a holistic way that considers lessons from models in other parts of the world. Civil society, researchers, and local communities are key in assessing international frameworks and standards concerning environment management and should become involved in regional water initiatives. India and New Zealand, for example, employ legal specialists when addressing any environmental protocols, and perhaps SADC could learn from such practices in relation to trans-boundary environmental threats in Southern Africa. Namibia, as its aforementioned white paper is being finalised, is

25 See The Permanent Okavango River Basin Commission (OKACOM), <<http://www.okacom.org/>> (accessed 30 June 2016).

considering the incorporation of legal experts, ecologists, and water scientists when engaging with water protocols. Namibia's white paper makes primary reference to the importance of the blue economy and the growing importance of the oceans, the enhancement of tourism, and mineral resources, as well as Namibia's active engagement in science diplomacy and the global evolution of science. Currently, SADC protocols are lagging behind in this regard, given their imbalance with realities on the ground requiring specialists and oversight capacity.

Mozambique

Mozambique's earlier days of regional integration had a difficult past, as was the case of many other Eastern and Southern African states. Maputo was an active participant in the convergence of the Front Line States, formed in 1975, and in their liberation movements and struggle against white superiority and racism. Already in 1960, Maputo worked very closely with its neighbours against apartheid aggression and found a safe haven in Dar es Salaam for its Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). In 1992 the Mozambican government signed its peace agreement, which ended a 16-year civil war, and two years later, in 1994, Maputo held its first multi-party elections, which introduced a multi-party democracy and also the launch of its economic reform programme.²⁶

South Africa's relationship with Mozambique was among the first to be forged after Maputo's 1994 national elections through the creation of the Maputo Development Corridor between these two countries. Mozambique has experienced economic benefits since the construction of the MDC, as seen in an increase of total trade between South Africa and Mozambique from R900 million in 1992 to R7.4 billion in 2002, resulting in an exceptional regional spill-over in growing Mozambique's economy.²⁷ While Maputo has made some socio-economic progress since ending its civil war in 1992, the country yet remains one of the poorest countries in the world. In October 2016, the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) World Economic Outlook ranked Mozambique 183 out of 189 countries as the poorest globally, with a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of \$1,228. More than half of Mozambique's population lives below the poverty line of less than \$1.90 a day.²⁸

On the security front, intra-state conflict between the Mozambique Liberation Front and the opposition, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), erupted in 2014 when RENAMO's leader, Alfonso Dhlakama, reappeared from hiding and signed a peace deal with the government in anticipation of his participation in the country's presidential elections. Dhlakama's dissatisfaction with the 2014 electoral results exacerbated tensions brewing ever since in Mozambique (although these have become subdued more recently).²⁹

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the intensity of the conflict in 2016 resulted in 12,000 Mozambicans fleeing their country and into Malawi.³⁰ In June 2016, mediation ensued between RENAMO's Dhlakama, and the Mozambican President Felipe Jacinto Nyusi of the ruling party – FRELIMO – led by Botswana, Tanzania, South Africa, the EU, the United Kingdom (UK), the Vatican and the Catholic Church. But limiting mediation to two parties will not ensure sustainable results due to the lack of

26 See also Gwinyayi Dzinesa and Dimpho Motsamai, "Renamo's War Talk and Mozambique's Peace Prospects", *Institute for Security Studies (ISS) policy Brief* (2013).

27 See SADC@35, "Success Stories", vol. 1, 2015, <<https://www.tralac.org/images/docs/7910/sadc-success-stories-final-2015.pdf>> (accessed 25 March 2017), p. 7.

28 Adjusted for purchasing power parity. See Barbara Tasch, "The 25 Poorest Countries in the World", 2016, <<http://uk.businessinsider.com/the-25-poorest-countries-in-the-world-2016-4/#25-tanzania-gdp-per-capita-20541430-1>> (accessed 16 June 2017).

29 "Mozambique Rebel Leader Dhlakama Accuses Govt Troops of Violating Ceasefire", *News24*, 29 January 2017, <<http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/mozambique-rebel-leader-dhlakama-accuses-govt-troops-of-violating-ceasefire-20170129>> (accessed 26 March 2017).

30 See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in Africa", *Report of the General Assembly*, A/71/354 (23 August 2016), <<http://www.unhcr.org/excom/unhcrannual/5808d8677/assistance-refugees-returnees-displaced-persons-africa.html?query=mozambique>> (accessed 30 June 2017), p. 6.

consideration in establishing an inclusive national dialogue platform (INDP). Such a dialogue calls for the inclusivity of all stakeholders including civil society groups, political parties, labour, business, and religious groups, among others, to discuss economic growth and development, decentralisation, and reintegration of RENAMO forces, as well as public and electoral reforms.³¹

With regard to SADC regional commitments at the national level, and unlike most SADC countries with unsuccessfully implemented SADC National Committees, Mozambique has also had relative success with inclusive participation by non-state actors in its SNC, compared to more limited involvement in the national implementation processes of SADC policies in countries such as Malawi and Namibia. In furtherance of SADC's work and with a view to assist in the smooth operationalisation and the domestication of SADC's protocols and policies at national level, in 2003 Mozambique's government created its SNC – the Comissão Nacional da SADC (CONSADC). CONSADC is a state-funded SNC that is headed by the minister of foreign affairs and cooperation. This SNC has been quite progressive in implementing SADC's regional integration work and has also maintained a strong focus on delivering of SADC's regional integration implementation framework and roadmap. In furtherance of these aims, CONSADC introduced monthly meetings held at the technical level, and an annual meeting (at least once a year but at times twice) at the ministerial level with chief executives of non-state actors to review progress and assess the challenges of implementing SADC's sectoral work.

Very little is known about SADC by the majority of its 281 million citizens throughout Southern Africa. But Mozambique, through its SNC, has been creative in promoting the work of the regional body, by making use of the SADC Commemoration Day (an annual event held in August) as a platform to promote SADC's regional integration agenda. Moreover, the commemoration of the SADC Day takes not only place at national level but each year in one focal province. Such promotion work involves the hosting of activities such as arranging public presentations by high-level diplomats; the sponsoring and hosting of school competitions; and inviting representatives from SNCs of SADC member states for the cross-pollination of ideas with a view to strengthen SADC's regional integration initiatives. Mozambique has also performed positively in its work on gender equality and women's political participation, though prior to Maputo's elections in November 2014 it performed "modestly in terms of women's representation of 39 and 38 percent in parliament and local government respectively",³² which is still below the 50 percent representation SADC regional goal.

Since its creation in 1992, SADC has not done much to build its academic research and thus there is a severe knowledge gap in basic understanding of regional integration. Such gaps are also seen in the dearth of academic institutions to support its work. In this regard, the Centre of Studies on Regional Integration (CEDIR) was initially established in 2007 as a Project through the initiative of the Faculty of Law of the Eduardo Mondlane University (EMU) based in Maputo. In November 2008, the University's Council adopted a Resolution to grant CEDIR its autonomy. CEDIR is an autonomous organ (research centre) of the University. In furtherance of its work, a three-month fellowship programme for CEDIR fellows with the West African Institute (WAI) was also developed

31 See The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), *Conflict Trends*, issue 1 (2017), p. 33.

32 Colleen Lowe Morna, Sifiso Dube, and Lucia Makamure (eds.), *SADC Gender Protocol 2015 Barometer* (Johannesburg: Southern Africa Gender Protocol Alliance, 2015), p. 99.

between CEDIR and WAI as part of their bilateral cooperation, which was funded/organised by the Centre for European Integration Studies (ZEI) of the University of Bonn, Germany. The WAI/CEDIR programme was to enhance capacity building programmes on African Regional Integration Studies and academic cooperation between WAI and CEDIR and foster comparative studies within the African Universities and Research Institutions on the regional integration process in Africa and beyond. CEDIR also organised an international conference for WAI partners, produced the preliminary paper on the proposed project to create the Association of African Regional integration Studies (ARISA) and facilitated the inclusion of WAI within a global network on Academic Institutions (RISC) – Consortium on Regional Integration and Social Cohesion.



Mr Boichoko Ditlhake, Executive Director, Southern African Development Community Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO), Gaborone.

5. Closing the Implementation Gap: Progress, Problems, and Challenges

Towards Building a SADC Community of Practice

One of the major factors causing the implementation gaps in SADC's regional integration work is the lack of knowledge of its regional integration agenda, and lack of capacity and skills in both design and implementation of the regional body's policies and protocols at both regional and national levels. While the SADC Secretariat remains the sole bearer of developing implementation frameworks for its member states, the regional body lacks the capacity, authority and skills to do its work effectively. Thus the implementation of policies and protocols that ought to happen at the national levels has been hampered by the lack of guiding implementation principles by SADC for its member states. Such deficiencies as the lack of a clear regional strategy for policy implementation by SADC have resulted in the stalling of regional integration by member states.

Capacity-building programmes could therefore enhance the work of SADC, with a specific focus that takes into account the capacitating of the SADC Secretariat staff in the requisite skills to strengthen the organisation's regional integration implementation work. However, more pressing is the implementation of capacity-building programmes that are to be urgently upgraded at the national level. Such skills ought to include formalising guidelines for implementing and developing model laws and regulations designed specifically for the implementation of SADC's protocols and policies that are not implemented by its member states (according to the 1992 SADC Treaty); creating legal frameworks and laws for its member states regarding non-adherence to implementing regional policies and protocols such as trade agreements by SADC member states; and creating a monitoring and evaluation coordinating unit and framework, as well as providing SADC Secretariat staff with the requisite skills necessary to manage, monitor, and evaluate both their internal and external implementation activities.

At the national level, capacity-building programmes ought to consider programmes for SADC's member states that improve their understanding of the principles of regional integration and help them gain knowledge to execute policies efficiently. Such programmes should be conducted with a view to empowering member states with skills that will enable them to set clear strategies and guidelines for policy implementation and, at the country level, to close the regional integration knowledge gap by empowering academics and practitioners to enhance the work of SADC.

But as was identified at CCR's May 2017 policy advisory group seminar, capacity-building activities should be focused on strengthening the work of both the SADC Secretariat and its member states – a challenge, given the rapid dwindling of interests by international partners to fund SADC's work, particularly its capacity-building initiatives. Thus there is a need for the SADC Secretariat and its partners to fund more innovative ways of garnering funding support for capacity-building programmes for SADC and its member states. The sporadic nature of funding has further eroded regional integration efforts with the multiple agenda-setting by SADC's partners and funders, which has further strained relationships between SADC and its cooperating partners. Thus the various regional activities and demands placed on the regional body with a view to secure funding have further hindered regional integration implementation and diverted the regional body from effectively doing its core work.



From left: Dr Wolff-Christian Peters, Consultant, Regional Integration in Africa, Bonn, Germany; and Dr Thomas Munthali, Director for Knowledge and Learning, African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), Harare.

In order to build a strong regional community of practice, it is imperative that the alignment of region-building activities of Southern Africa’s organisations avoid duplicating regional efforts and rather create more cohesion in executing their activities. A stronger regional partnership could also promote more meaningful engagement that would have greater potential for strengthening SADC’s overall implementation plans and also help lessen the funding burden on the regional body’s programmes. SADC must address how to provide information about its partners by possibly updating its website and making available a list of its partners there. At the national level, funding should also be made available by member states to fund their own frameworks and design roadmaps. Budgets at the member-state level should therefore be adopted for each protocol’s implementation plan, rather than adopting blanket funds that may leave other protocols without the financial resources necessary to implement them effectively.

There should also be a rethink in the working relationships among SADC, its international cooperating partners, and its regional organisations with a view to creating and adopting a clear framework of engagement and a stronger, more coordinated approach. In this regard, the Zimbabwe-based African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) has for a number of years been a key proponent in the building of SADC’s institutions. The GIZ capacity-building programme as well as the EU have been long-standing support partners of SADC in providing crucial assistance in furtherance of SADC’s region-building and regional integration work. Also as a frontrunner in region-building, the ACBF has a critical role to play in building capacities and forging stronger partnerships with a view to achieving a wider regional reach in SADC’s integration efforts. The ACBF has been working with a number of Africa’s regional organisations over the years, developing governance principles for Africa’s governments on the whole. For example, the ACBF has recently developed a governance and leadership framework that was supported by the GIZ and EU capacity-building programme and produced a report that provides a model for governments to assess and develop.³³ This report could be useful in assisting Africa’s

33 African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), *Transformative Leadership for Africa’s Development* (2015).

governments to adopt a model of transformative governance that could effectively influence electoral governance norms. More recently, the ACBF is also providing support to the SADC Parliamentary Forum, which has reached a second phase in its implementation plans. It is envisaged that the SADC Parliamentary Forum will ultimately serve as a model for Africa's regional economic communities.

Structural Causes: Political Governance Challenges

While SADC's capacity-building programmes could potentially enhance the work of its member states, SADC should be cognisant of the fact that member states are at different stages of political governance. SADC member states are not a homogenous bloc given their varying histories, geographies, and economic sizes, as well as their different stages of political governance often still fuelled by corruption. For example, the Mo Ibrahim Index that reflects on levels of convergence of SADC's regional integration agenda – observed in 2015/2016 that there is more divergence than convergence among SADC member states particularly regarding electoral reforms and governance issues as a whole.³⁴ These varying levels of political and governance challenges among SADC member states have invariably become a major constraint in the implementation frameworks of SADC's regional integration processes. Policy implementation has also been further stalled or hampered by issues concerning sovereignty, with member states lacking the political will to implement integration policies and protocols.

Economic Integration Challenges: Multiple Memberships and Variable Geometry

SADC's regional integration agenda has also become too broad, with the regional body furthermore placing unrealistic economic targets on its member states. SADC must take into account the economic differences among its 15 member states in designing macro-economic principles and policy guidelines for these states. Due to the major economic differences among SADC's member states, it is unlikely that they will achieve macro-economic convergence as one of the criteria that sets out SADC's linear model for achieving successful regional integration. SADC has also been challenged by frameworks set at the continental level, such as the African Union's (AU) approach to forming a Continental Free Trade Area (C-FTA) through three RECs viewed as the building blocks to integrating the continent through trade – COMESA, the EAC, and SADC – formed through the Tripartite Agreement in October 2008 with over half of Africa's states (26 states); as well as the AU's *Agenda 2063*, which is a vehicle to fast-track infrastructural projects through trade and economic growth. Monitoring mechanisms would thus serve as important tracking instruments to SADC as well as provide basic knowledge on the challenges it faces, while still taking into account the continental agendas. Evaluation frameworks must therefore be designed with a view to producing effective assessments of the progress and challenges faced by SADC and its partners, and of major issues concerning variable geometry, which has a direct impact on the pace of SADC's achievement of regional integration.

Since the signing of the October 2008 Tripartite Agreement, several smaller economies have become dependent on other forms of securing economic growth to protect their industries from trade being diverted away from smaller businesses. This has mainly entailed signing external trade agreements that could potentially

34 Mo Ibrahim, "Ibrahim Index of African Governance", <<http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iig>> (accessed 12 June 2017).

protect smaller industries, resulting in the criss-crossing of trade agreements and overlapping of memberships by several of SADC's member states with other regions. For example, of the AU's 55 member states, 26 are members of two regional economic communities and 20 are members of three RECs. In SADC, 13 of 15 member states are in the SADC free trade area (FTA), excluding Angola and the DRC. Moreover, SADC's trade liberalisation takes on an asymmetrical structure, which means that the 15 countries are classified into three groups – SACU; least-developed countries (Angola, the DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe); and developed countries (Seychelles and Mauritius) – and have varying tariff settings and protectionist clauses attached to trade policies at national levels.

Thus CCR's May 2017 policy advisory group seminar also highlighted the importance of addressing linear models of regional integration, which appear not to correspond to today's world with its various processes and degrees of integration globally. Moreover, SADC appears to be duplicating its own linear models with member states joining several other trade schemes with their own protocols and policies. In the area of trade, customs, and economic integration, the Tripartite Summit in Kampala, Uganda, in October 2008³⁵ defines the free trade process and membership agreements in Article 1 of the Tripartite memorandum of understanding (MOU) and came into force in January 2011.³⁶ The 2008 Tripartite Summit agreed that the FTA would take into account the principle of variable geometry – which allows member states of a regional grouping to cooperate in separation from other members, as well as allowing flexibility for progression in cooperation in a variety of areas and at different speeds – as an attempt to help manage the overlapping REC memberships of member states. Similarly, SADC's trade protocol, which is moving towards an FTA, also (like COMESA) took on a variable geometry approach. Such “doubling up” of efforts complicates regional integration efforts for SADC within a tripartite bloc, with the same processes repeated within SADC. Thus, trade liberalisation through bilateral trade agreements further hampers the principle of variable geometry, and appears to contrast with trade protection and incremental integration (as variable geometry provides), since the pace of integration varies between these two approaches: trade liberalisation and variable geometry.³⁷ There is a further disconnect between regional policies and national implementation plans, which lack the involvement of the private sector, civil society, and national parliaments feeding into conversations at the heads-of-state summit level, for creating the potential of regional value chains.

Furthermore, SADC's member states have to conform to various rules of origin (ROOs) under the various requirements of regional economic communities. For example, in the case of the COMESA-EAC-SADC tripartite bloc, each REC's FTA has its own rules of origin, which vary across products and transition phases; hence there are several different tariff rates complying with the tariff rates assigned to the products. These rules have become major obstacles to convergence of trade agreements and the COMESA-EAC-SADC bloc has not completed the negotiating process, which has been ongoing as the tripartite FTA was signed by only 16 member states and its rules of origin have not been finalised.³⁸

35 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit of Heads of State and Government, Final Communiqué, Kampala, 22 October 2008, p. 3. See also Article 1 of the Memorandum of Understanding on Inter-Regional Cooperation and Integration Among COMESA, EAC, and SADC, January 2011, p. 3 (available at Tralac Law Centre), cited in Nagar, “The Politics and Economics of Regional Integration”, 2016, esp. chap. 4.

36 COMESA-EAC-SADC Second Tripartite Summit Communiqué, Johannesburg, 12 June 2011, p. 4.

37 See Nagar, “The Politics and Economics of Regional Integration”, 2016, chaps 4 and 5.

38 Gerhard Erasmus, “The Tripartite FTA”, 2015. See also Minutes of the Meeting of COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Trade and Customs Committee Meeting, Lusaka, 9 February 2015 (available at Tralac Law Centre).

With regard to soft issues, the SADC Secretariat should also consider how to address the low levels of trust and perceptions of disproportionate gains that hamper community-building. One approach to increasing levels of, and commitment to, regional integration implementation could be to incentivise poorer economies through the trade revenue generated in the bloc, to spearhead integration. A development-led regional integration approach could be a dual benefit for both core economies and peripheral states partnering with a stronger economy, such as South Africa and Mozambique's Maputo Development Corridor initiative undertaken in 1995. Another example is that of COMESA's Regional Payment and Settlement System (REPSS), created to make trade conducive for its member states. The system provides a regional link for member states' national payment systems to regional central banks to effect payment and settlement of trade, and include banks in Asia and Europe as well as Africa. The REPSS is viewed as an innovative online system with standards based on those of the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). The COMESA clearinghouse also serves as an agent of the central banks in formulating bilateral agreements that could assist inter-regional trade among its member states – a lesson that SADC could expand on in its own regional policies. On its part, SADC has also developed its own electronic settlement system since 2015 – SIRESS – which is operational in nine of its 15 member countries, which is positive and such initiatives should be further promoted to build Southern Africa's regional integration work.³⁹

Promoting SADC's Work: Towards Knowledge-Building, Academic Institutions, and Forums

SADC must become more visible to the population of Southern Africa, since there is very little known about the regional grouping, and this gap could be addressed through promoting its work. Such promotion activities should consider, for example, making use of advertising through media such as radio and television. The advocacy framework adopted for the rollout of the SADC Gender Protocol, as mentioned earlier, was an example that CCR's May 2017 policy advisory group seminar highlighted as a possible model to be reproduced. Social media such as Twitter and Facebook could also serve as a platform for raising awareness and engagement. Promotion efforts could also consider replicating a model similar to SADC's 2015 *Success Stories* publication, which is a good example of an instrument promoting the work of SADC.

Greater effort is also required at both national and regional levels to increase the visibility and operations of the SADC National Committees. However, member states are challenged and still hampered by a lack of knowledge and education about how to conduct and effect implementation of regional integration. Trade policies and data collection are severely lacking, and economic data collection is undertaken by only a few organisations within the Southern African region. Data from the SADC Secretariat concerning its member states have been sparse. The Stellenbosch-based Tralac Centre is one of the few centres working to provide reliable data concerning performance indicators of regional integration. The Tralac regional monetary yearbook is another example that could also be expanded on with regards to increasing knowledge about SADC and its member states.

Similarly, not many non-governmental organisations are dealing with the issue of trade and regional integration in Southern Africa. It is thus crucially important that funding support is provided by developmental partners to streamline efforts in support of the ACBF capacity-building programme, which has already established itself as

39 See SADC@35, "Success Stories", 2015, pp. 8-9.

a regional anchor, and to build the capacity of RECs as well as capacitate governments and civil society partners at the national level with a view to building a community of practice. Such a community could include, for example, the various stages and steps of the implementation of the capacity-building programme to assess the efficacy of the overall programme. For such a programme to work, both practitioners and regional integration experts, as well as academics and think tanks (like CCR), should garner efforts towards forming partnerships that can successfully build a community of practice for a well-integrated capacity-building programme. Thus far engagements have received a positive response from, and reactions by, member states in reinvigorating SNCs, and such initiatives would further enhance SADC's capacity deficit more effectively. SADC must build a strong base – a “coalition of the willing” – and identify those institutions that are committed to the interests of SADC and to making the organisation work.

The formation of a SADC Institute, with a view to promotion, teaching, research, and publication of modules and courses on SADC's regional integration architecture, and also to influence the development of regional norms and values concerning regional integration, has become increasingly necessary. SADC and its member states must establish as well as identify practical and effective platforms and clear periods for reflection and learning concerning the regional body's implementation gaps, challenges, and progress, as well as provide exchange of ideas and learnings in a conducive space (a trust-building community) in order to have constructive engagement with government officials, civil society, research institutes, and possibly the media. Such platforms should also provide the space to formulate and design good governance criteria and codes of conduct for SADC member states.

Academics and national partners should support closer collaboration with SADC and its member states to establish a platform for learning and to engage in forums (such as the May 2017 CCR seminar) with a view to providing constructive engagement and an opportunity for critical reflection and implementation of identified gaps in regional integration implementation. While a SADC regional development fund has been institutionalised, the fund requires resources. Member states therefore must assess how they can contribute more effectively to SADC funding. As assessment of contemporary issues facing SADC and the rebuilding of its institutional architecture has recently commenced at the SADC Secretariat, with institutional reforms under way to reduce financial dependency on international cooperating partners by SADC and to enhance the funding by its member states. Reforms are also necessary regarding SADC's regional-national linkages to allow for an enhanced implementation of policies and Protocols. SADC must also take into account the huge youth unemployment in the region, such as through a youth programme fund contributed to by all member states that is able to provide education, particularly at tertiary levels, to capacitate youth with skills and training to create conditions for employment. Similarly, there is a need to address all government programmes from the bottom up, including acceptable representation of women and physically challenged individuals.

Ultimately, SADC's regional integration plans ought to take on a holistic approach that is central to the principles of ownership and accountability at the individual level. Thus a key question that ought to be considered is the roles that individual organisations can play in regional integration and in supporting Africa's RECs. In order for individual organisations to fulfil their roles, creativity and purpose are necessary: spaces must be invented and capacitated without waiting on invitations by RECs. A key example has been Malawi's creation of its National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE) Trust – a civic education model created that provides knowledge on, and assessing the benefits and costs of, regional integration.

Civil Society and the SADC Community

Participatory governance is an important regional objective. Article 5 of the SADC Treaty of 1992 sets out the Community's responsibility to "encourage the peoples of the region and their institutions ... to participate fully in the implementation of the programmes and projects of SADC".⁴⁰ Thus as defined in the SADC Treaty, civil society is viewed as an important vehicle for partnering with member states and meaningfully engaging in their governance issues in Africa. Since the 1992 Treaty, there has been a strong contingent of NGOs in Southern Africa that have significantly impacted on political processes with a view to protecting the rights of individuals against the state. The collective nature of civil society is to empower citizens and to enhance participation with the state. Hence, civil society is viewed as a panacea to cure or remedy bad governance that aspires to democratic governance. Without civil society organisations, citizens have difficulty voicing opinions constructively, and similar difficulty engaging with governments. For example, the Southern African Development Community Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO) inaugurated in August 2005, was created as an attempt to provide a platform for civil society engagement at the policy level in Southern Africa.⁴¹ Similar initiatives undertaken by civil society organisations include the Botswana-based Formative Process Research on Integration (FOPRISA),⁴² with key functions of enhancing SADC's research and analytical framework. Also within the security nexus, the Southern African Defence and Security Management (SADSEM) has been instrumental in the training and capacity-building of SADC's security and defence sectors.⁴³ In an attempt to establish a SADC Mediation Support Unit (MSU), civil society involvement of NGOs has also been incorporated into these SADC processes.⁴⁴

CCR's May 2017 policy advisory group seminar thus highlighted the importance of civil society engagement in Southern Africa as a regime that regulates human rights and commands a developmental state agenda. The role of civil society organisations and the private sector is crucially important for SADC's regional integration implementation processes to grow economies and tackle socio-economic challenges, such as unemployment, centred on citizen ownership and participation in shaping and driving the SADC regional integration agenda.

SADC civil society organisations still face challenges in terms of grasping opportunities from SADC programmes and projects. Projects such as the "The SADC We Want" seem to be alluding to the inclusion of civil society involvement, but SADC citizens are still engaging in actions, such as xenophobia across Southern Africa that do not demonstrate a strong people-to-people bond, and still lack an appreciation of the free movement of people within and across the region. There is also the region's private sector, which is not aligned to a regional integration agenda, together with SADC's failure to market itself as a safe investment destination.

40 SADC Treaty, August 1992, art. 5.

41 CCR and Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), seminar report "The Peacebuilding Role of Civil Society in Southern Africa", from a policy advisory group seminar held in Maseru, 14-15 October 2005, <<http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za>>. See also Joseph Ngwawi, "AU Moves to Strengthen Involvement of African People", Southern African News Features (SANF) 07 no. 28 (2007).

42 Gavin Cawthra and Jonathan Mayuyuka Kaunda, *Towards Political and Economic Integration in Southern Africa: Prospects of the 2007 FOPRISA (the Formative Process Research on Integration in Southern Africa) Annual Conference* (Gaborone: Lightbooks, 2008).

43 CCR seminar report "Whither SADC? Southern Africa's Post-Apartheid Security Agenda".

44 See discussion on a SADC meeting, "Dlamini-Zuma: Post-Council Media Briefing by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Chairperson of the SADC Council of Ministers", 27 February 2009, <<http://www.polity.org.za/article/sadc-dlamini-zuma-post-council-media-briefing-by-nkosazana-dlamini-zuma-chairperson-of-the-sadc-council-of-ministers-27022009-2009-02-27>>.

Thus civil society must use the available spaces creatively. SADC has committed itself to achieve and encourage democratic states and human rights, and its member states should therefore actively construct a development and human security approach for the Community's citizens. Civil society has also been actively engaging in gender issues in the SADC region, resulting in an increase of strong women and human rights organisations emerging in Southern Africa that are working towards ending violence against women and children. One such initiative is Women and Law in Southern Africa (WLSA), which allows for expertise and support at a community level to be translated into policy at the political and government level. Other active organisations include the Poverty Observatory, the SADC Pioneering Framework, and SADC Protocol Tracking.



From left: Dr Tony Karbo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, and Dr Dawn Nagar, Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town.

Policy Recommendations

The following 12 key policy recommendations emerged from CCR's May 2017 seminar:

1. There is need for SADC to revisit its model of regional integration, which is currently linear, to ensure that the Community's integration is more informed by its historical trajectories and principles. There is a further need for SADC to agree on a regional integration model that serves both the leadership and the citizenry. This will make it easier for both state and non-state actors to contribute to SADC's success. Imposed or wrongly adopted models often do not work.
2. For effective implementation of SADC's regional integration arrangement, its member states need to find ways of partnering with various stakeholders, especially civil society, academia, and the private sector.
3. The role of parliaments should become more recognised in SADC's regional integration agenda, which will provide for more timely ratification and domestication of policies and protocols at the national level and prevent unnecessary delays and setbacks of the integration process. The SADC parliamentary forum as well as national parliaments should also help to create the space for civil society organisations to influence the SADC agenda, policies, and programmes. Civil society should enhance its proactiveness and engagement with SADC leadership by learning from the civil society organisations of ECOWAS; and the SADC National Committees must be enabled to foster participation of civil society organisations and the private sector.
4. The role of the private sector is critical in building Southern Africa's economies, and therefore the private sector needs to be proactive and to organise itself, define its priorities in the regional integration agenda, and mobilise resources necessary for effective advocacy, representation, and information dissemination. A regional private sector apex body that is autonomous and operates independently ought to be set up by non-state actors, but endorsed by SADC's member states.
5. SADC's member states are too dependent on external funding, which often deters the regional integration progress. While SADC has created its own regional funding mechanism, this has not yielded results since member states are still heavily dependent on external funding and do not fund their own projects, which further hampers progress in the regional integration agenda. For regional integration to be effective, member states should therefore ensure adequate funding for their programmes, and move at the same speed of agreed timelines at the implementation level, which accordingly means there is a need to secure buy-in from member states' national institutions and citizens.
6. For SADC regional integration to be successful, there is need for member states to have the political will to establish institutions and mechanisms that will help spearhead the domestication of protocols, policies, and programmes at the country level. SADC thus needs to promote cross-learning and best practices demonstrated by member states. The Mozambique case study on the implementation of SADC protocols and policies needs to be widely shared among SADC member states as a demonstration of political will and good practice that can be emulated and replicated elsewhere on the African continent and beyond.
7. Bilateral and multilateral trade deals that occur between member states, as well as with the international community and external trade partners, complicate the finalisation of SADC's own policies. Such

practices thus warrant a legally binding instrument for those members who have agreed to but have not ratified agreements and protocols.

8. In terms of promoting the rule of law and human rights protection, there is need for establishing a powerful regional institution to handle judiciary matters between states, states and individuals or various groups, replacing the SADC Tribunal which was first suspended and then bounced back weakened. In line with this SADC needs to have clear guidelines on tackling issues of subsidiarity when working with institutions such as the International Criminal Court (ICC).
9. When it comes to the implementation of SADC protocols, policies and agreements, variable geometry must be addressed. Clear deadlines and sanctions must therefore be put in place to dealing effectively with SADC issues at member state level.
10. Technology does not automatically translate into socially and ecologically sustainable environmental management and human development, due to the disparate and socially isolated nature of certain environments – for example the Okavango and Cuvelai Basins. There is thus a need to strengthen corporate governance codes and protocols and, similarly, a need for voluntary self-regulation, or sector-wide self-regulation such as following the model of corporate social responsibility, based on meaningful integration and sustained cooperation.
11. SADC must consider codes of conduct or social charters to strengthen sectors on the environment, fisheries, mining, and tourism. Southern Africa should therefore consider corporate “social licences to operate”, such as mining that ensure transparency and accountability.
12. The region should also learn from the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), which has wider-than-industry representation, with NGOs building meaningful relations between scientists and researchers as well as policymakers in respect of key SADC protocols and agreements. There is a great need to strengthen hydrological jurisprudence, by according special legal status to trans-boundary waterways and setting up special forms of guardianship; as well as incorporating trans-national water resources and global principles that can provide status and laws.



From left: Ms Germaine Habiaryemye, Senior Admin Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town; Mr Paul Mulindwa, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town; and Ms Rosaline Daniel, Senior Project Officer, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town.

Annex I

Agenda

Sunday, 14 May 2017

18:45 **Welcome Cocktail**

19:30 Dinner

Day One: **Monday, 15 May 2017**

08:30 – 09:00 **Registration**

09:00 – 09:20 **Welcome and Opening Remarks**

Dr Tony Karbo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town

09:20 – 09:30 **Poem on SADC**

Mr Gideon M Phiri, Former Southern African Development Community (SADC) Official, Private Sector Adviser and Regional Private Sector Adviser, Fikani Regional Support Services, Lusaka, Zambia

10:00 – 11:15 **Session I: The Major Implementation Challenges facing the Southern African Development Community Secretariat and its Member States**

Chair: **Professor André du Pisani**, Professor of Political Science, University of Namibia (UNAM), Windhoek, Namibia

Professor Said Adejumbi, Director, Sub-regional Office for Southern Africa, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Lusaka

Honourable Ms Zephroma Dlamini-Dubazana, African National Congress (ANC) Whip, Standing Committee on the Auditor-General, Parliament of South Africa, Cape Town

- 11:15 – 12:30** **Session II: The Architecture for Implementation and Domestication of SADC Policies and Protocols**
- Chair: Mr Stanley Henkeman, Executive Director, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), Cape Town
- Honourable Professor Peter Katjavivi, Speaker of the National Assembly, Parliament of Namibia, Windhoek
- Dr Nkosana Moyo, Executive Chairman, Mandela Institute for Development Studies (MINDS); Former Vice President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the African Development Bank (AfDB); and Former Co-Chair of the Regional Agenda Council on the Future of Africa World Economic Forum, Johannesburg, South Africa
-
- 13:30–14:45** **Session III: The Implementation and Promotion of SADC’s Gender and Development Protocol: Instruments and Strategies used by SADC Member States**
- Chair: Mr Diakolo Muzungu, First Counsellor and Head of Economic Unit, Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Tshwane
- Ms Colleen Morna, Chief Executive Officer, Gender Links, Johannesburg
- Ms Magdeline Madibela, Gender Specialist, UN Women, Gaborone
-
- 15:00–16:15** **Session IV: The Implementation of the SADC Regional Integration Agenda: The Case of Mozambique**
- Chair: Dr Margaret Sengwaketse, Research Fellow, Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis (BIDPA), Gaborone
- Mr Alfredo Nuvunga, Director, SADC National Committee (SNC), Maputo, Mozambique
- Mr Charles Minega, Regional Advisor, Centre of Studies on Regional Integration (CEDIR) and SADC Law, Eduardo Mondlane University (EMU), Maputo
-
- 16:15–16:45** **Session V: Day One Wrap-Up**
- Chair: Dr Tony Karbo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town
- Ms Catherine Grant Makokera, Senior Consultant and Director, Tutwa Consulting Group, Johannesburg

17:30–19:00 **Centre for Conflict Resolution Public Dialogue: “Implementation and Impact of Regional Integration in Southern Africa”**

Chair: Dr Wolff-Christian Peters, Consultant, Regional Integration in Africa, Bonn, Germany

Dr Nkosana Moyo, Executive Chairman, Mandela Institute for Development Studies; Former Vice President and Chief Executive Officer of the African Development Bank; and Former Co-Chair of the Regional Agenda Council on the Future of Africa World Economic Forum, Johannesburg

Ms Talitha Bertelsmann-Scott, Head, Economic Diplomacy Programme, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Cape Town

Day Two: Tuesday, 16 May 2017

09:00–10:00 **Session VI: The Implementation of the SADC Regional Integration Agenda, Prospects and Challenges and the Case Of Namibia**

Chair: Ms Mookho Moeketsi, Director Regional Integration, Lesotho Ministry of Finance, Maseru

Professor André du Pisani, Professor of Political Science, University of Namibia, Windhoek

10:15–11:45 **Session VII: The Cross-Cutting Issues of Ownership of The SADC Regional Integration Agenda**

Chair: Professor Tim Murithi, Head of Programme, Justice and Peacebuilding, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town

Mr Boichoko Ditlhake, Executive Director, Southern African Development Community Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (SADC-CNGO), Gaborone

Mr Gideon M Phiri, Former SADC Official, Private Sector Adviser and Regional Private Sector Adviser, Fikani Regional Support Services, Lusaka

12:00–13:15 **Session VIII: Closing the Implementation Gap**

Chair: Professor Said Adejumobi, Director, Sub-regional Office for Southern Africa, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Lusaka

Dr Wolff-Christian Peters, Consultant, Regional Integration in Africa, Bonn, Germany

Dr Thomas Munthali, Director for Knowledge and Learning, African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), Harare, Zimbabwe

14:30–15:00 Session IX: Rapporteurs' Report and the Way Forward

Chair: Dr Tony Karbo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Dr Dawn Nagar, Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Dr Charles Mutasa, Independent Researcher and Development Policy Consultant, Harare

Annex II

List of Participants

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14. Professor Peter Katjavivi
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32. Dr Kudrat Virk
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4. Ms Maria Nantege
CCR Intern

Annex III


List of Acronyms

ACBF	African Capacity Building Foundation
ACCORD	The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
AfDB	African Development Bank
AEC	African Economic Community
ANC	African National Congress
ARISA	African Regional Integration Studies Association
AU	African Union
BIDPA	Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis
CCR	Centre for Conflict Resolution
CEDIR	Centre of Studies on Regional Integration and SADC Law
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
C-FTA	Continental Free Trade Area
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSC	Citizen Scorecard
CSOs	civil society organisations
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EMU	Eduardo Mondlane University
EU	European Union
FLS	Front Line States
IJR	Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front
FSC	Forest Stewardship Council
FTA	Free Trade Area
GDP	gross domestic product
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INDP	Inclusive National Dialogue Platform
MINDS	Mandela Institute for Development Studies
MDC	Maputo Development Corridor
MSU	Mediation Support Unit
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MER	monitoring evaluation and reporting framework (for SADC Gender Protocol)
NGOs	non-governmental organisations
NICE	National Initiative for Civic Education
OAU	Organisation of African Unity

OKACOM	Permanent Okavango River Basin Commission
FOPRISA	Process Research on Integration
OPDSC	Organ on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation
RECS	regional economic communities
RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance
REPSS	Regional Payment and Settlement System
RERA	Regional Electricity Regulators Association of Southern Africa
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
ROOs	rules of origin
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SADC-CNGO	Southern African Development Community Council of Non-Governmental Organisations
SADSEM	Southern African Defence and Security Management
SAPP	Southern African Power Pool
SARPCCO	Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation
SDIs	Spatial Development Initiatives
SGDI	SADC Gender Development Index
SNRL	SADC National-Regional Linkages
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ
SMMEs	small micro and medium enterprises
SNCs	SADC National Committees
SWIFT	Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNAM	University of Namibia
WAI	West African Institute
WLSA	Women and Law in Southern Africa

Other Publications in this Series


(Available at www.ccr.org.za)



VOLUME 1 THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S SECURITY

THE UNITED NATIONS, REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND FUTURE SECURITY THREATS IN AFRICA


The inter-related and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security within the framework of United Nations (UN) reform were the focus of this policy seminar, held from 21 to 23 May 2004 in Claremont, Cape Town.



VOLUME 5 WHITHER SADC?

SOUTHERN AFRICA'S POST-APARTHEID SECURITY AGENDA


The role and capacity of the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) were focused on at this meeting in Oudekraal, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005.



VOLUME 2 SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRICA

THE POST-APARTHEID DECADE


The role that South Africa has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa's domestic transformation 10 years into democracy were assessed at this meeting in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 29 July to 1 August 2004.



VOLUME 6 HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN SECURITY


AN AGENDA FOR AFRICA

The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and the potential role of African leadership and the African Union (AU) in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.



VOLUME 3 THE AU/NEPAD AND AFRICA'S EVOLVING GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The state of governance and security in Africa under the African Union (AU) and The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) were analysed and assessed at this policy advisory group meeting in Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004.



VOLUME 7 BUILDING AN AFRICAN UNION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES (RECS), NEPAD AND CIVIL SOCIETY


This seminar in Cape Town, held from 20 to 22 August 2005, made policy recommendations on how African Union (AU) institutions, including The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), could achieve their aims and objectives.



VOLUME 4 A MORE SECURE CONTINENT


AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE UN HIGH-LEVEL PANEL REPORT, A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

African perspectives on the United Nations' (UN) High-Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change were considered at this policy advisory group meeting in Somerset West, Cape Town, on 23 and 24 April 2005.




VOLUME 8 THE PEACEBUILDING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

This meeting, held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 14 and 15 October 2005, explores civil society's role in relation to southern Africa, democratic governance, its nexus with government, and draws on comparative experiences in peacebuilding.




**VOLUME 9
WOMEN AND
PEACEBUILDING IN
AFRICA**

This meeting, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 October 2005, reviewed the progress of the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peacebuilding in Africa in the five years since its adoption by the United Nations (UN) in 2000.




**VOLUME 13
SOUTH SUDAN WITHIN
A NEW SUDAN**

This policy advisory group seminar on 20 and 21 April 2006 in Franschhoek, Western Cape, assessed the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A).




**VOLUME 10
HIV/AIDS AND
MILITARIES IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

This two-day policy advisory group seminar in Windhoek, Namibia, on 9 and 10 February 2006 examined issues of HIV/AIDS and militaries in southern Africa.



**VOLUME 14
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES
ON THE UN
PEACEBUILDING
COMMISSION**

This meeting, in Maputo, Mozambique, on 3 and 4 August 2006, analysed the relevance for Africa of the creation, in December 2005, of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission, and examined how countries emerging from conflict could benefit from its establishment.



**VOLUME 11
AIDS AND SOCIETY IN
SOUTH AFRICA**


BUILDING A COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE

This policy and research seminar, held in Cape Town on 27 and 28 March 2006, developed and disseminated new knowledge on the impact of HIV/AIDS in South Africa in the three key areas of: democratic practice; sustainable development; and peace and security.




**VOLUME 15
THE PEACEBUILDING
ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
IN CENTRAL AFRICA**

This sub-regional seminar, held from 10 to 12 April 2006 in Douala, Cameroon, provided an opportunity for civil society actors, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the United Nations (UN) and other relevant players to analyse and understand the causes and consequences of conflict in central Africa.




**VOLUME 12
HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN
SECURITY IN SOUTH
AFRICA**

This two-day policy seminar on 26 and 27 June 2006 took place in Cape Town and examined the scope and response to HIV/AIDS in South Africa and southern Africa from a human security perspective.



**VOLUME 16
UNITED NATIONS
MEDIATION EXPERIENCE
IN AFRICA**

This seminar, held in Cape Town on 16 and 17 October 2006, sought to draw out key lessons from mediation and conflict resolution experiences in Africa, and to identify gaps in mediation support while exploring how best to fill them. It was the first regional consultation on the United Nations' (UN) newly-established Mediation Support Unit (MSU).



**VOLUME 17
WEST AFRICA'S
EVOLVING SECURITY
ARCHITECTURE**


LOOKING BACK TO THE FUTURE

The conflict management challenges facing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the areas of governance, development, and security reform and post-conflict peacebuilding formed the basis of this policy seminar in Accra, Ghana, on 30 and 31 October 2006.



**VOLUME 21
AFRICA'S EVOLVING
HUMAN RIGHTS
ARCHITECTURE**

The experiences and lessons from a number of human rights actors and institutions on the African continent were reviewed and analysed at this policy advisory group meeting held on 28 and 29 June 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa.



**VOLUME 18
THE UNITED NATIONS
AND AFRICA**

PEACE, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SECURITY


This policy advisory group meeting, held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 14 to 16 December 2006, set out to assess the role of the principal organs and the specialised agencies of the United Nations (UN) in Africa.



**VOLUME 22
PEACE VERSUS JUSTICE?**

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS AND WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS IN AFRICA

The primary goal of this policy meeting, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 May 2007, was to address the relative strengths and weaknesses of "prosecution versus amnesty" for past human rights abuses in countries transitioning from conflict to peace.




**VOLUME 19
AFRICA'S
RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT**

This policy seminar, held in Somerset West, South Africa, on 23 and 24 April 2007, interrogated issues around humanitarian intervention in Africa and the responsibility of regional governments and the international community in the face of humanitarian crises.




**VOLUME 23
CHILDREN AND ARMED
CONFLICTS IN AFRICA**

This report, based on a policy advisory group seminar held on 12 and 13 April 2007 in Johannesburg, South Africa, examines the role of various African Union (AU) organs in monitoring the rights of children in conflict and post-conflict situations.



**VOLUME 20
WOMEN IN POST-
CONFLICT SOCIETIES IN
AFRICA**


The objective of the seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 6 and 7 November 2006, was to discuss and identify concrete ways of engendering reconstruction and peace processes in African societies emerging from conflict.



**VOLUME 24
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

This report is based on a seminar, held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 29 and 30 May 2007, that sought to enhance the efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to advance security, governance and development initiatives in the sub-region.



**VOLUME 25
PREVENTING GENOCIDE
AND THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT**

**CHALLENGES FOR THE UN, AFRICA, AND THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY**


This policy advisory group meeting was held from 13 to 15 December 2007 in Stellenbosch, South Africa, and focused on six African, Asian and European case studies. These highlighted inter-related issues of concern regarding populations threatened by genocide, war crimes, 'ethnic cleansing', or crimes against humanity.



**VOLUME 29
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
AND PEACEBUILDING IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

**CIVIL SOCIETY, GOVERNMENTS, AND
TRADITIONAL LEADERS**

This meeting, held on 19 and 20 May 2008 in Johannesburg, South Africa, provided a platform for participants from Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe to share insights on sustained intervention initiatives implemented by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in the three countries since 2002.



**VOLUME 26
EURAFRIQUE?**

AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY

This seminar, held from 31 October to 1 November 2007 in Cape Town, South Africa, examined the relationship between Africa and Europe in the 21st Century, exploring the unfolding economic relationship (trade, aid and debt); peacekeeping and military cooperation; and migration.



**VOLUME 30
CROUCHING TIGER,
HIDDEN DRAGON?
CHINA AND AFRICA**

**ENGAGING THE WORLD'S NEXT
SUPERPOWER**

This seminar, held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 17 and 18 September 2007, assessed Africa's engagement with China in the last 50 years, in light of the dramatic changes in a relationship that was historically based largely on ideological and political solidarity.



**VOLUME 27
SECURITY AND
DEVELOPMENT IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**


This seminar, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 8 to 10 June 2008, brought together a group of experts – policymakers, academics and civil society actors – to identify ways of strengthening the capacity of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to formulate security and development initiatives for southern Africa.



**VOLUME 31
FROM EURAFRIQUE TO
AFRO-EUROPA**

AFRICA AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY

This policy seminar, held from 11 to 13 September 2008 in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, South Africa, explored critically the nature of the relationship between Africa and Europe in the political, economic, security and social spheres.



**VOLUME 28
HIV/AIDS AND
MILITARIES IN AFRICA**


This policy research report addresses prospects for an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic within the context of African peacekeeping and regional peace and security. It is based on three regional advisory group seminars that took place in Windhoek, Namibia (February 2006); Cairo, Egypt (September 2007); and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (November 2007).



**VOLUME 32
TAMING THE DRAGON?**

**DEFINING AFRICA'S INTERESTS AT THE FORUM
ON CHINA-AFRICA CO-OPERATION**


This policy seminar held in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa on 13 and 14 July 2009 – four months before the fourth meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) – examined systematically how Africa's 53 states define and articulate their geo-strategic interests and policies for engaging China within FOCAC.



**VOLUME 33
PEACEBUILDING IN
POST-COLD WAR
AFRICA**


PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS

This policy research seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana from 25 to 28 August 2009 took a fresh look at the peacebuilding challenges confronting Africa and the responses of the main regional and global institutions mandated to build peace on the continent.



**VOLUME 37
STATE RECONSTRUCTION
IN ZIMBABWE**


This policy advisory group seminar held in Siavonga, Zambia, from 9 to 10 June 2011, assessed the complex interlocking challenges facing the rebuilding of Zimbabwe in relation to the economy, employment, health, education, land, security, and the role of external actors.



**VOLUME 34
STABILISING SUDAN**


**DOMESTIC, SUB-REGIONAL, AND
EXTRA-REGIONAL CHALLENGES**

This policy advisory group seminar held in the Western Cape, South Africa from 23 to 24 August 2010 analysed and made concrete recommendations on the challenges facing Sudan as it approached an historic transition – the vote on self-determination for South Sudan scheduled for January 2011.



**VOLUME 38
SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA,
AND THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 13 to 14 December 2011, focused on South Africa's role on the UN Security Council; the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the Council; the politics of the Council; and its interventions in Africa.



**VOLUME 35
BUILDING PEACE IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**


This policy seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 25 to 26 February 2010, assessed Southern Africa's peacebuilding prospects by focusing largely on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its institutional, security, and governance challenges.



**VOLUME 39
THE EAGLE AND
THE SPRINGBOK**

**STRENGTHENING THE NIGERIA/SOUTH
AFRICA RELATIONSHIP**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Lagos, Nigeria, from 9 to 10 June 2012, sought to help to "reset" the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa by addressing their bilateral relations, multilateral roles, and economic and trade links.




**VOLUME 36
POST-CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION IN THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 19 to 20 April 2010 sought to enhance the effectiveness of the Congolese government, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), civil society, the United Nations (UN), and the international community, in building peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).



**VOLUME 40
SOUTH AFRICA IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 19 to 20 November 2012, considered South Africa's region-building efforts in Southern Africa, paying particular attention to issues of peace and security, development, democratic governance, migration, food security, and the roles played by the European Union (EU) and China.



**VOLUME 41
THE AFRICAN UNION
AT TEN**


PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS

This international colloquium held in Berlin, Germany, from 30 to 31 August 2012, reviewed the first ten years of the African Union (AU); assessed its peace and security efforts; compared it with the European Union (EU); examined the AU's strategies to achieve socioeconomic development; and analysed its global role.



**VOLUME 45
THE AFRICAN,
CARIBBEAN, AND PACIFIC
GROUP AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION**

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 29 to 30 October 2012, considered the nature of the relationship between the ACP Group and the EU, and the potential for their further strategic engagement, as the final five-year review of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 between the two sides approached in 2015.



**VOLUME 42
AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICA,
AND THE UNITED NATIONS'
SECURITY ARCHITECTURE**


This policy advisory group seminar held in Somerset West, South Africa, from 12 to 13 December 2012, considered Africa and South Africa's performance on the United Nations (UN) Security Council; the politics and reform of the Security Council; the impact of the African Group at the UN; and the performance of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.



**VOLUME 46
TOWARDS A NEW
PAX AFRICANA**


**MAKING, KEEPING, AND BUILDING PEACE
IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA**

This policy research seminar held in Stellenbosch, South Africa, from 28 to 30 August 2013, considered the progress being made by the African Union (AU) and Africa's regional economic communities (RECs) in managing conflicts and operationalising the continent's peace and security architecture; and the roles of key external actors in these efforts.



**VOLUME 43
GOVERNANCE AND
SECURITY CHALLENGES
IN POST-APARTHEID
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

This report considers the key governance and security challenges facing Southern Africa, with a focus on the 15-member Southern African Development Community (SADC) sub-region's progress towards democracy; and its peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding efforts.




**VOLUME 47
POST-APARTHEID SOUTH
AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY
AFTER TWO DECADES**

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 28 to 30 July 2013, reviewed post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy after two decades, and explored the potential leadership role that the country can play in promoting peace and security, as well as regional integration and development in Africa.




**VOLUME 44
ACHIEVING THE
MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT GOALS
IN AFRICA**

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, on 13 and 14 May 2013, considered the progress that Africa has made towards achieving the UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and sought to support African actors and institutions in shaping the post-2015 development agenda.




**VOLUME 48
SOUTH AFRICA, AFRICA,
AND INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 17 to 18 February 2014 assessed the principles underpinning international investment agreements, including bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and the implications of these instruments for socio-economic development efforts in South Africa and the rest of the continent.



**VOLUME 49
REGION-BUILDING AND
REGIONAL INTEGRATION
IN AFRICA**

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 28 to 30 April 2014, considered the challenges and potential of Africa's regional economic communities (RECs) in promoting region-building and regional integration on the continent, including through a comparative assessment of experiences in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.



**VOLUME 53
THE AFRICAN UNION**

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CHALLENGES

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 27 to 29 April 2016, revisited the performance and prospects of the African Union (AU) in the areas of governance, security, socio-economic challenges, as well as assessing the AU Commission and its relations with African sub-regional organisations and external actors.



**VOLUME 50
SOUTH AFRICA AND
THE BRICS**


PROGRESS, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS

This policy advisory group seminar held in Tshwane, South Africa, from 30 to 31 August 2014, assessed the potential for increasing the impact of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) Grouping on global politics, and to develop concrete recommendations in support of South Africa's continuing engagement with the bloc.




**VOLUME 54
WAR AND PEACE IN THE
GREAT LAKES REGION**

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 19 to 20 March 2016, assessed the major obstacles to peace and security in the Great Lakes, and considered seven broad issues: security and governance; the cases of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda; as well as the roles of the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) in the region.




**VOLUME 51
SECURITY AND
GOVERNANCE IN THE
GREAT LAKES REGION**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Franschoek, Western Cape, from 9 to 10 May 2015, assessed the obstacles to peace, security, and governance in the Great Lakes region. The report assessed the political situation in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); the roles of Rwanda and Uganda in the region; as well as those of regional and external actors.



**VOLUME 55
THE PEACEBUILDING
ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
IN SOUTH SUDAN**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Tshwane, South Africa, from 11 to 12 December 2015, reflected on the role of, and prospects for, civil society in South Sudan in the areas of peacemaking and peacebuilding. The report also provides policy recommendations for strengthening the capacity of South Sudanese civil society to play a more effective peacebuilding role in the country.




**VOLUME 52
REGION-BUILDING AND
PEACEBUILDING IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA**

This policy advisory group seminar held in Gaborone, Botswana, from 19 to 20 September 2015, assessed key issues relating to region-building and peacebuilding in Southern Africa, while analysing South Africa's leadership role in the sub-region.



**VOLUME 56
AFRICA AND EXTERNAL
ACTORS**

This policy research seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 24 to 25 August 2016, examined Africa's relations with eight key bilateral actors or blocs and six major multilateral actors, assessing progress made in the continent's efforts to increase its leverage in global politics through engagement with external actors.



VOLUME 57
BUILDING PEACE IN
SOUTH SUDAN:

PROGRESS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

This policy advisory group seminar held in Cape Town, South Africa from 14 to 15 December 2016, reflected critically on the record of, and prospects for, civil society in peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts in South Sudan.

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In May 2017, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, hosted about 30 diverse representatives including African policymakers, former officials from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Secretariat, national role-players, private sector actors, regional civil society, and members of the academic community. A key focus of the May 2017 seminar was on SADC National Committees (SNCs), and the Botswana-based SADC Secretariat, in assessing critically their efforts to promote regional integration in Southern Africa. The seminar had five key objectives: first, to identify the major policy and protocol implementation challenges facing the SADC Secretariat and its member states; second, to critically examine the architecture for the implementation and domestication of the Community's policies and protocols; third, to discuss Prospects, Problems and Progress of implementation in Namibia and Mozambique; fourth, to analyse the cross-cutting issue of ownership of the regional integration agenda; and fifth, to assess how to close the implementation gap in the policies and protocols of SADC's regional integration efforts.



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