

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MIGRATION IN AFRICA



Editors

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Africa**

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INTRODUCTION

The Political Economy of Migration in Africa

Ufo Okeke-Uzodike, Christopher Isike and Emeka Iloh

Immigration: Its Key Drivers and Importance

At an estimated 250 million people, migrants make up about 3% of the global population. Clearly, migration is a common phenomenon among human beings who either choose to move or are forced to do so by natural disasters (such as drought, flooding, climate change, and environmental degradation) or human-inflicted factors (such as conflict or wars). Like a moth to a flame, human beings are drawn to environments that are conducive enough to offer them positive or satisfactory opportunities, particularly for economic gains, improved living conditions, personal safety, and professional development or growth. As with others, African migrants are often driven by such factors. Over the years, migration from Africa has been closely associated with exigent external and internal factors. For instance, as African economies shrink under severe global pressures or as natural disasters, bad governance, or conflict/war ensue, some Africans seek to exit from their countries in pursuit of greener pastures in neighboring countries (primarily) and, a lesser extent, beyond in Europe, North America and elsewhere. In essence then, there is a clear and compelling evidence that human mobility and migration are often closely associated with prospects for ample opportunities and huge benefits.

Largely, most immigrants move about their activities in their host countries without much public issues or rancour. However, when faced with tight economic circumstances, the presence of immigrants may be quickly politicized for political gains. This often plays out in the form of public criticisms and claims that the nation is being flooded through the borders and that major burdens are being imposed by immigrants on citizens and tax payers by reducing job opportunities for local job seekers, committing crimes, threatening local cultural norms and values, etc. However, others argue that immigrants actually provide substantial benefits in host countries by providing needed skills for employers, enhancing economic growth through hard work and entrepreneurship, expanding culture by introducing new ideas and customs, and connecting the world more effectively (McCarthy, 2018). For instance, looking at the impact of immigration on total American economic outputs and income, Giovanni Peri (2010) argues:

Statistical analysis of state-level data shows that immigrants expand the economy's productive capacity by stimulating investment and promoting specialization. This produces efficiency gains and boosts income per worker. At

the same time, evidence is scant that immigrants diminish the employment opportunities of U.S-born workers.

Clearly, for industrially advanced countries, migrant flows tend to pose largely manageable problems that are far marginal when compared to the benefits. Ian Goldin (2016) underscored that point when he argued emphatically that “immigration is good.” This was despite legitimate concerns about migrant numbers that can stretch the carrying capacity of host countries: “migration has always been one of the most important drivers of human progress and dynamism”.

The Costs of Emigration

Despite the general assumptions that associate migration with the imposition of burdens on host countries while providing new sources of financial flows into home countries, the objective reality is often quite different. Indeed, after many years of emigration by educated and professionally qualified and skilled individuals to more industrially developed countries, the social, economic and political costs begin to pile up dangerously for many prolific exit-point communities and countries. As Anelli and Peri (2017: 553) argue, “economically stagnant areas.... may be deprived of talent through emigration. This may harm dynamism and political and economic change” the home countries require for social transformation and development. Therefore, it is important to underscore not only the huge social and economic costs (such as brain drain) faced by many African countries due to high levels of emigration by professionals and skilled persons, but also the associated losses of initiative and vitality and the allied negative impact on political and economic change (Anelli and Peri: 2017)

Indeed, contrary to stereotypes by many distant observers, Africans are often amongst the best educated migrant communities in North America and many Western European destinations. As reported by the Pew Research Center, “69 percent of sub-Saharan African immigrants in the United States have some college education. That number is six percentage points higher than the level for native-born Americans” (Solomon, 2018). Although those figures are less for individual European countries, the mere fact that struggling African countries are unwittingly exporting some of their best qualified human capital to industrially advanced Western countries should be issues for serious concern on both sides of the immigration divide. Quite aside from the fact that African migrants are often unintended exiles, many are typically subjected to discriminatory and dehumanizing experiences in Europe, North America and elsewhere. This is evidenced, for instance, in the fact that their comparatively high levels of education and employment rates do not shield them from being filtered out of many lucrative opportunities available to other groups. In the main, they are largely banished to low and exploitative jobs and incomes (Solomon, 2018). This is quite aside from the fact that, generally, migrants are remunerated poor (by between 13 and 42 percent for the same job when compared to national workers (ILO News, 2020).

So, while African migration provides short-term relief for many individuals and their families, the short, medium and long-term impacts on national and regional political economies can be negative and massive retardation of economic growth, social change and development. For instance, the immediate effect of annual brain drain could be the challenge of filling the resulting human capital gaps across a wide range of sectors such as health care, education, industry, and engineering. Since it takes many years to train professionals and even more years to develop them as experts in specific areas, and given that no African country is anywhere near its threshold for human capital requirements, the region's net losses of developed talents constitute unfolding national and regional tragedies.


Nevertheless, despite its negative impacts on Africa, migration contributes (arguably) to economic development in some countries through substantial amounts of financial inflows or remittances. Cross-border movements of people also contribute not only to information sharing and the associated reductions of informational frictions across countries, but also stimulates bilateral financial flows as migrants create or integrate into pre-existing international business and financial networks -- thereby bolstering business and financial contacts and activities between their home and host countries (Kugler, Levintal and Rapoport, 27: 2). This is despite several efforts by the African Union through its regional policy suggestions and migration policy frameworks as captured in: Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action 2018-2030. By increasing investments and consumption expenditures of recipient families, remittances also contribute to poverty reduction and improved service procurements for the families in terms of better homes, healthcare services, capital assets (land, houses), education, basic needs (food, clothing, and shelter), education opportunities, and other investments. Moreover, migration contributes to the acquisition of scarce skills for personal use and for the training of others within Africa.

Concluding Thoughts

Sadly, as things stand now, African countries have largely remained consumers of policies on immigration as developed and implemented by other countries. Indeed, there have been some progress with differential levels of easing of otherwise rigid restrictions of human movements within some regional economic blocs such as: Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); East African Community (EAC); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); and Southern African Development Community (SADC). Still, very little concrete progress has been achieved across blocs. Most African countries invest little effort in designing "africentric" immigration policies that would allow easier human movements of African people across regional states. In fact, it is far easier for a European or an American to travel unofficially across Africa (even without visa requirements) than for an African to receive a visa for non-official travel. Not surprisingly, Africans are far more likely to be enslaved or killed as migrants in some African countries than in Europe or North America. Clearly, from a purely competitive angle, Africa's non-visionary political leaders have remained largely oblivious of available opportunities to harness potential African and non-African skills

they need for transformative change and development of their countries. There is also the matter of adopting a collective action approach to addressing the issue of immigration and migration with a view to national and regional solutions. Such an approach could go a long way toward ensuring that the unique interests of Africans and the continent are appropriately organized and shepherded.

While some host countries experience comparatively manageable negative aspects of immigration, the problems often pale when compared to the benefits. Goldin punctuates that point when he argues that “in the age of globalization, barriers to migration pose a threat to economic growth and sustainability.” However, his cautionary note quoting John Stuart Mill is worth a critical assessment with migrant home countries in mind: “we need to ensure that the local and short-term social costs of immigration do not detract from their role ‘as one of the primary sources of progress’”. Does that equally apply to the home countries of migrants? Perhaps, scholarly assessments must now begin to ask that question more seriously. This book is an initial attempt to identify the key issues and to plot a better way forward.



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Part One

**Migration, Development and Socio-Economic
Issues in Africa**

CHAPTER ONE

Factors Influencing Remittances among Igbo Migrants in Lagos

Nnanna Onuoha Arukwe and Aloysius Odii

Introduction

Remittances constitute one of the major flows of financial resources in the worldwide economy (Yaseen 2012), and a major source of income for developing countries around the world (Afaha, 2013). Remittances act as a mechanism for the survival of the poor in developing countries, a risk-sharing mechanism, a stable source of investment and future consumption smoothening (Ratha, 2003). On the migrants' part, it is a portion of the money earned that is sent back to the place of origin. Mostly, however, remittance is focused and counted in financial terms (Azeez & Begun, 2009), meanwhile the nonfinancial aspect is neglected perhaps for lack of proper statistics.

The impact of remittance on the economy of a country is an important issue for discussion, and so far, has generated a lot of debate. Ratha (2003) was of the view that remittances can bring about economic growth, and increase the level of household's consumption and investment. Meanwhile, Akinpelu et al. (2013) and Odionye and Emerole (2015) argue that it is not always the case. Iheke (2012) nonetheless revealed that in the case of Nigeria, from early 2000 to 2009, remittances alone grew the economy and specifically in 2008, it grew the economy by a whopping \$7billion. This obviously could lead one to conclude that remittance has positive and significant impact on Nigerian's economy (Odionye & Emerole, 2015).

No doubt, Nigeria is the largest recipient of remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa, and with projected remittances of \$22.3 billion in 2017, it is tipped to continue this trend (World Bank, 2017). Although this figure may not be complete considering that there is prevalence of informal transfer mechanism that account for about 50 percent of total flows to the country that are often neglected (Iheke, 2012). The huge amount of finance involved in remittances makes it necessary to understand remittance behaviour especially among a group with high inclination for migration.

The Igbo people of South-eastern Nigeria are considered one of the most migratory groups in Nigeria and beyond (Ojukwu 2009; Olowa et al., 2013), and sometimes, this is suggested as a major cause of underdevelopment in the region (Udenta & Nwosuji, 2015; Igwe & Obiakor, 2015; Osondu et al., 2014). The reason for the high rate of migration among the Igbo people is, according to Carling (2006), they are highly mobile and have successfully built networks that act as an important resource for both internal and international migration.

Moreover, the Igbo of south-eastern Nigeria are prominent not only in migration but in entrepreneurship. In Lagos, for instance, according to Ogunlewe (2013), the Igbo have been there since the 15th century when the “Aro” and other Igbo first settled in good numbers in a place now called “Oyingbo” in the era of Benin and the Portuguese trade, and have made innumerable contributions to the development of the city. Maliga (cited in Orugun & Nafiu, 2014) revealed that a research conducted by an independent body shows that 74% of investments in Lagos are owned by the Igbo, 5% by Hausa/Fulani, 15% by foreigners (non-Nigerians), 5% by other Nigerians (non-Igbo, Hausa, and Yoruba), 1% by the Yoruba which includes Mike Adenuga. In Lagos, statistics shows that Igbo investments are not less than N300 trillion. In other parts of the country, for instance, Abuja, it is double of that at about N600 trillion. In Kano and Kaduna, Igbo investment runs up to N10 trillion (Udegbe, 2013). The vehicle spare parts market – or “Ngbuka” as it is popularly called, among others - is one area the Igbo people have maintained dominant share in investment.

The Igbo people have a long history of migration (Olowa et al., 2013), and could also be said to have a long history of remittances considering that long history of migration is associated with long history of remittances (Tailor, Jorge, Richard & Alejandro, 2005). Igbo migrants remit because they keep a strong attachment to the land of their ancestors (Pérouse de Montclos, 2005). However, little is known about the factors that influence their remittance behaviour. Also, across the globe, international remittances are paid closer attention to than domestic remittances even though internal migrants around the world far outnumber international migrants (Mckay & Deshingkar, 2014). Domestic remittances are pervasive and important and have equally been noted to play the role of poverty reduction to many households (Odozi, Awoyemi & Omonona, 2010; Odionye & Emerole, 2015) making it a serious area of interest that demands investigation. It is therefore against this background that this study aimed to understand the factors that influence remittances behaviour of Igbo migrants in Lagos state.

Methods

Study Design

This study made use of cross-sectional survey research design to specifically investigate those factors that influence Igbo migrants in Lagos to remit to their community of origin. The study was designed to collect data from a random sample of Igbo vehicle traders in Lagos since it was not possible to collect data from all the traders given the available resources, time, and other constraints.

Study Area

The area of study was Lagos. Lagos is a major financial centre in Africa and also regarded as the busiest commercial area in Nigeria and the entire West African region. It covers a land mass of 3,496.449 k/m². Lagos was once an island located between the sea and the lagoon, which is what gave it its name in Portuguese (Law, 1983).

Portuguese explorer Rui de Sequeira visited the area in 1472, naming the area around the city Lago de Curamo. Lagos was once the capital of Nigeria and it went on to become the capital of Lagos State, after its creation. However, the state capital was later moved to Ikeja in 1976, while the federal capital also moved to Abuja in 1991. Lagos state has 20 local governments and they are: Agege, Ajeromi-Ifelodun, Alimosho, Amuwo-Odofin, Apapa, Badagry, Epe, Eti-Osa, Ibeju/Lekki, Ifako-Ijaye, Ikeja, Ikorodu, Kosofe, Lagos Island, Lagos Mainland, Mushin, Ojo, Oshodi-Isolo, Shomolu, and Surulere.

Lagos is ranked among the top 10 choice destinations for rural-urban migration in the world (Abimboye 2014). The reason for this is that Lagos has successfully established itself as the nation's commercial capital; people then migrate to this state with the hope of finding greener pasture.

The study was conducted in Mile 2, Ladipo, and Iyana Itire in Amuwo-Odofin, Mushin, and Surulere local government areas, respectively. This is because these areas are renowned for dealing in vehicle spare-parts, and they are markets heavily dominated by people from the Igbo ethnic group in Nigeria who were the target respondents for this study.

Study Population

The study made use of the total number of registered store owners collected from the executive committee of each of the auto spare parts markets. From the lists, Iyana Itire has 490 store owners; Ladipo has 2257, while Mile 2 has 482. These, when put together, stood at a total of 3,229.

Sample Size and Sampling Technique

Taro Yamane formula for determining sample size was used at an estimated 4 percent level of precision leading to a sample size of 524. The researchers made use of multistage cluster sampling technique to select the respondents. First, the three areas of study, which are Ladipo, Iyana Itire and Mile II, were purposively selected because they are the main markets for vehicle spare parts in Lagos and majority of the marketers are Igbo migrants. The markets have complexes and warehouses that are used by the marketers for business; they were all considered for the study. Each of the three business areas were allocated proportionate sample employing the Bowler's Proportional allocation formula. Systematic sampling technique was then used to distribute the questionnaires to 524 respondents. In the end, Iyana Itire auto spare parts market with a population of 490 received 80 questionnaires, Ladipo auto spare parts market with a population of 2,257 received 366 questionnaires while Mile 2 auto spare parts market with a population 482 received 78 questionnaires.

Methods of Data Collection

The quantitative method of data collection method was used to collect data from the respondents. The questionnaire instrument employed contained closed and open-

ended questions to enable respondents exhaust their options. It was divided into two sections: Section A contained question on demographic characteristics such as age, sex, marital status, ethnic group, and religious affiliation. Section B dealt with specific issues concerning migration as well as knowledge and attitude towards remittances.

Method of Data Analysis

Data that were collected from copies of the questionnaire were coded and analysed with the use of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS, version 20) software. The Chi-Square (X^2) was used to test for the relationship that exists between the variables. Binary logistic regression was used to predict the factors that influence remittances behaviour.

Findings

The participants were aged 19 and 59 years, with mean age of 36.50 years and a standard deviation of 8.36. They have lived in the study area between 1 and 44 years, with a mean year of 14.21 years and a standard deviation of 8.99. Also, they have traded as vehicle spare parts marketers between 1 and 30 years, with the mean trading years of 9.11 and a standard deviation of 6.18.

Table 1 Showing Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

Characteristics	Frequency (N=524)	Percentage (100)
Sex		
Male	496	94.7
Female	28	5.3
Marital Status		
Single	203	38.7
Married	309	59.0
Widowed	6	1.1
Divorced	4	0.8
Separated	2	0.4
Highest Educational Qualification		
No formal education	11	2.1
Primary Education	88	16.8
Secondary Education	352	67.2
Tertiary Education	73	13.9
Religious Affiliation/Denomination		
Catholic	243	46.4
Anglican	95	18.1
Pentecostal	174	33.2
Islam	2	0.4
ATR	3	0.6
Judaism	7	1.3
Community of Birth		
In community of origin	442	84.4
Outside community of origin	82	15.6
Characteristics of Area of Birth		
Rural	326	62.2
Urban	198	37.8
Economic Activity before Migrating		
Trader	201	38.4
Civil servant	16	3.1
Unemployed	266	50.7
Teacher	18	3.4
Farmer	23	4.4
Remitting to Community of Origin		
Yes	447	85.3
No	77	14.7

Table 1 shows the distribution of the respondents. It reveals that over ninety percent (94.7%) of the respondents are males, and about three-fifth (59%) of them were married. Only as little as 2.1 percent of the respondents had no formal education, while

majority (67.2%) completed secondary education. Catholics dominated (46.4%) the religious affiliation of the respondents, followed by Pentecostals (33.2%). Over eighty percent (84.4%) of the respondents were born in their community of origin, and more than sixty percent (62.2%) were born in a rural area. Finally, about half of the respondents were unemployed before migrating to Lagos. Meanwhile, more than four-fifth (85.3%) of the respondents admitted to have remitted.

In table 2, a univariate comparison in remitting to community of origin was presented across the demographic factors. It shows that sex is associated with remittance with males remitting than women (86.5%; $p = .003$); educational qualification is associated with remittance, with those in high level having more than four-fifth of the proportion (87.1%; $p = .028$). Finally, the family being the decision maker for the migration also shows significant association with remitting behaviour ($p = .008$).



Table 2 Factors Influencing Remittance to Community of Origin

Factor	Category	Number	Remittance		
			% remit	χ^2	<i>p value</i>
Sex	Male	429	86.5	8.730	.003
	Female	18	64.3		
Marital Status	Never married	166	81.8	2.854	0.091
	Ever married	281	87.5		
Educational Qualification	Lower	77	77.8	4.802	0.028
	Higher	370	87.1		
Religion	Non-Catholics	238	84.7	0.089	0.765
	Catholics	209	86.0		
Community of Birth	In community of birth	375	84.8	0.277	0.599
	Outside community of birth	72	87.8		
Characteristics of Community of Origin	Rural	277	85.0	.023	.880
	Urban	170	85.9		
Economic Activity before Migrating	Working	214	82.9	1.902	0.168
	Not working	233	87.6		
Decision Maker to Lagos	Family	300	88.5	9.742	.008
	Self	104	82.5		
	Friends	43	72.9		

In table 3, the factors which have significant association with remittances were included in logistic regression models to predict the factors that most influence remittances. The analysis identified factors that influence remittances behaviour of Igbo migrants in Lagos. It shows that sex of the respondent was associated with remittances. Specifically, males are 3.854 times or 74% ($1/3.854 - 1(100) = 74\%$) more likely to remit to their community of origin than females ($\beta = 1.349$; wald = 8.962; $p < .003$). Level of education was found to be associated with remittance. Thus, those with high level of education are 2.670 or 62.5% ($1/2.670 - 1(100) = 62.5\%$) more likely to remit to their community of origin than those with low level of education ($\beta = .982$;

wald = 10.406; $p < .001$). Also, who took the decision for the migration was found to be associated with remittances. If the decision was taken by the family members, the migrant is 1.784 or 43.9% ($1/1.784 - 1(100) = 43.9\%$) more likely to remit than if it was taken by him/herself or friends ($\beta .579$; wald = 4.845; $p < .028$).

Table 3 Key Factors Associated with Sending Remittances to One's Community of Origin

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% C.I. for EXP(B)	
							Lower	Upper
Age	.016	.019	.674	1	.412	1.016	.978	1.055
Sex	1.349	.451	8.962	1	.003*	3.854	1.593	9.323
Level of education	.982	.304	10.406	1	.001*	2.670	1.470	4.849
Years lived in Lagos	.042	.027	2.526	1	.112	1.043	.990	1.099
Years traded in Lagos	.039	.037	1.148	1	.284	1.040	.968	1.118
Decision to migrate	.579	.263	4.845	1	.028*	1.784	1.065	2.986
Constant	-1.988	.808	6.054	1	.014	.137		

Note: Age was left in years. Sex was coded: 0-female, 1-male. Level of education 0-low (no formal education and primary), 1-high (secondary and tertiary). Years lived in Lagos was left in years. Years traded was left in years. Decision to migrate was coded: 0-self/friends, 1-family members. (* $p < .05$)

Discussion

The study examined the factors influencing remittances behaviour of Igbo migrants in Lagos. First, the study confirms that indeed, the proportion of traders in the area that remit was high (85.3%). This is quite similar to the findings of Pérouse de Montclos (2005) that almost 83% of Igbo migrants in Cameroun remit money home once or twice a year. Furthermore, it buttresses the argument that Igbo migrants keep a strong attachment to the land of their ancestors and constantly make efforts to develop it through remittances. This act is deeply rooted in their philosophy. Igbo proverbs like “*Aku luo uno o kwuo onye kpatalu ya*” (when wealth gets home, it reveals who made it) has been a guiding principle for the development of Igboland. Evidently, many towns and villages where they are resident usually feel their impact during festive periods when they travel to their community of origin. Thus, efforts are continually made even by migrants to develop the region and improve the lives of families left behind. Again, another philosophy that explains why Igbo people remit is Igbo proverbs like “*onye ayana nwane ya*” (do not leave your brother behind). This explains the attachment Igbo people have for themselves especially since each person is seen as a ‘being’ in relation to others (Arinze, 1970). As such, those that are in better positions often support the upcoming ones especially those in their community of origin.

Further, the study showed that sex, level of education, and who made the decision to migrate, were strong predictors of remittances. The study identified sex as an important feature that influences remittances. So, being a male predicts that one would remit. It is important to note that this may be because the study area is men-dominated. Fairly used vehicle spare parts trade is very demanding and oftentimes the traders are stained with grease, oil, etc. This may explain the low percentage of women in the trade. On the other hand, men are most times saddled with most of the financial responsibilities at home and therefore appear to be more pressured to remit. Findings from Niimi and Reilly (2008) further confirm that differences in remittances among men and women are not attributable to behavioural differences but household-head status as well as earnings.

The study's attempt to separate years of living in Lagos and years of trading in the business area was borne out of the assumption that not all the migrants would have been economically active as soon as they entered their destinations. Besides, half of them were unemployed before migrating and most also come from a community of origin that is rural. Despite this separation, the study did not find years of living in Lagos as well as years of trading to be significantly associated with remittances contrary to the findings of Mahapatro (2017) in India. Obviously, migrants on getting to their destinations, might need time to settle before remitting. To Igbo migrants, this might be unnecessary considering that they appear to keep a strong attachment to their community of origin so one doesn't necessarily have to be at certain age, or live a certain period before remitting.

Level of education was found to be an important factor influencing remittance among Igbo traders. Those who have completed secondary education and those that have other qualifications higher than secondary school certificates were found to be more active in remitting to their community of origin. This is quite similar to the findings of Bollard et al. (2011) to the effect that when it comes to the decision to remit at all combined with the decision on how much to remit, more educated migrants remit more. In fact, education is important in remittances and could go as far as determining the channels of remittances as shown in a study by Kosse and Vermeulen (2014) where they found that higher educated migrants were less likely to make use of informal means or bring cash to the recipient themselves.

Remitting to community of origin is most times seen as a family obligation more especially if the decision to migrate was taken by the family. As noted by Stark (1991), most migrants do not take the decision to migrate in a social vacuum, families are likely to have some influence. A family in a rural/urban area can invest in a relative by providing him/her with every necessary means to migrate to a place with more opportunities with the sole intention of risk aversion or business since the migrant later remits to his/her family. The finding of this study, that one would remit if the decision to migrate was taken by one's family members, gives credence to the

importance of household in migration decision as previously found by Fleischer (2007) and Tucker et al. (2013).

Conclusion

The study showed that certain factors influence migrants' remittance behaviours. These factors include sex, educational qualification, and who the decision to migrate came from. Half of the migrants were unemployed before migrating thereby underscoring the need for employment opportunities in rural areas where they migrated from. Secondly, having understood through this study that remitting is relatively high among the traders and is in fact their guiding principle, government could assist by designing programs that encourage remittances to rural areas. This is crucial considering that remittances have been noted to help reduce poverty in rural areas and as well act as important source for development.



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CHAPTER TWO

Impact of International Migration on Socioeconomic Development in Nigeria

Samuel Oyole Ekoja and Raymond Tavershima Anumve

Introduction

Development is the key issue in all human societies as it involves transition from one phase of human existence to another. The desire for change and growth to a better society is at the core of all efforts in every human society. Man is at the centre of the development process; man uses his labour, power, and intellect to attain this end. Growth and development cannot take place independent of man, as man is of essence in the development process. The critical need for labour, especially skilled labour, becomes important when talking about development. The movement out of the borders or frontiers of a country for periods, by citizens, has implications that could be either negative or positive. The movement (migration) usually has implications on both the destination and the home (source) country. The contributions of qualitative labour, especially its intelligentsia, to the development process in any country, cannot be overemphasized. Labour constitutes an essential commodity in the development process of any country because it is labour that is exerted in the process of work. Man must of necessity exert his labour (intellect) on a commodity to transform it into an object of value. Man carries with him this essential commodity (labour power) where ever he goes. A developing country like Nigeria has critical need for a labour-force that will drive the development process. Interest in the skilled migrant population of any country is very important because of the expected contributions that they make to the economy.

Technology has also played a great role in the migration process as the world became more integrated and smaller as a result ocean-going vessels in the earlier epoch and cheaper costs of air travels in recent times. Globalisation was further enhanced through technology and has played a leading role in the movement of people, goods, and services, across borders. The movement of people and services across borders is one of the key features of a globalised world. As the world shrinks, it is intricately linked through technology (Gilpin, 1987). More and more people have access to information about far flung places and are able to move to places far from where they were born. The global integration of national economies has increased the number of people who migrate for the purpose of work. Auderbert and Dorai (2009, p. 9) stated that 'The increasing interconnectedness of social, economic and political systems, as well as of individuals and places, has had far-reaching consequences on the relations between people and space in the contemporary era.'

The world has become intrinsically interlinked because of the expansion of information technology with events in one part of the world affecting other parts. Auderbet and Dorai (2009, p.10) further said that, “migration is a constitutive element of globalisation and one of the most symbolic effects of free trade of goods and cross border connectedness.” People are able to move to distant lands at a cost cheaper than what was possible in earlier periods, owing to the fact that technology reduced the cost of movement. Information technology has afforded people the opportunity to choose from a wider array of choices of destination countries than were earlier feasible. The world has not only become truly a global village, but has also become miniaturized.

Nigeria, with an estimated population of 198 million, (NPC, 2018), is considered the highest population in Africa. The country’s population counts as the seventh highest in the world with a very high youth population (United Nations, 2017) which a decade ago was tenth highest (Afoloyan, Ikwuyatun and Abejide, 2008). Its citizens are dispersed in different parts of the world, with destination countries in Africa and other parts of the world especially the developed world of Western Europe and the United States. Western Europe is a destination country because of the common voyage and historical ties with Britain which once colonised Nigeria. According to Akindele and Basse (2000), Britain hosts the largest group of Nigerians in Europe, some in their third generation, playing active roles in British economy. It must be noted that most Nigerians that had gone to Europe for further studies during the colonial and early years of independence returned home after their studies because there was no compelling reason to stay back. They were assured of good jobs and income on their return. The economy was stable in the early years of independence, coupled with the oil boom of the early 1970s and the accompanying increase in revenues.

Massive outmigration of skilled Nigerians occurred after the Nigeria civil war between 1967 and 1970 when Nigerians of eastern descent migrated out of the country. There was net migration of West Africans into the country after the war years because of the boom in the economy occasioned by the increase in oil prices in the 1970s and the associated development projects that were carried out. Many neighbouring West African citizens came to the country for the purpose of work. The economy, however, took a plunge in the early 1980s with the country expelling fellow West Africans who were tagged illegal immigrants. Many Nigerians followed suit in later years within that decade. Nigeria in recent times has witnessed outmigration of its population due to the increase in unemployment and forced displacement occasioned by economic recession. According to Darwal and Vester (2014, p.323) OECD data showed that “about 34.5% of the migrants had tertiary education”. Recent trends indicate that Nigerian professionals have migrated to the developed world especially the US and UK. Nigerian migrants become desperate in recent times owing to the state of the economy. This desperation has manifested in the suicidal attempts to cross into Europe through the Sahara desert and the Mediterranean.

It is based on the above backdrop that the paper explores the theoretical framework underlying migration and its implications on socioeconomic development Nigeria. Lastly, the paper makes informed conclusion and recommendations.

Definition of Concepts

International Migration

International migration is a feature of the present global economic system which has made people to be increasingly mobile owing to the easy access to information. One feature of the present international migration process is the tendency for the migratory flow to move from the developing part of the world to the more developed parts of the world. Koser (2010, p.303) defines 'International migrants as people living outside their home country for over a year.' International migration can be seen as the movement of a person out of the country of his nationality to another country for the purpose of settlement or living for a period exceeding a year. The United Nations defines an international migrant as 'a person who stays outside their usual country of residence for at least one year' (Koser, 2007, p.4). For King and Skeldon (2010, p.3) 'international migration is a "distinctive social process" in which the container of the state has fundamentally different functions from a region or census tract within a country.'

For the purpose of this work, international migration is the movement of persons from their place(s) of origin to another territory especially outside the African region, for a period exceeding one year or permanently, for the purpose of work. International migration within Africa can be taken as an extension of internal migration because of the artificial boundaries that were created during colonialism (Adepoju, 1998). International migration should therefore include the crossing of a political border (especially out of Africa) for specific periods and for the purpose of work. This shall exclude refugees, victims of trafficking, and those who migrate for the purpose of seeking political asylum in other countries.

Development

Development is a multifaceted phenomenon which involves improvements in the standard of living, which should include both qualitative and quantitative change (Rodney, 1982). It could be viewed or measured from the angle of the Gross National Product (GNP) and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Todaro and Smith (2003, p.51) noted that development "must represent the whole gamut of change by which an entire social system, tuned to the diverse basic needs and desires of individuals and social groups within the system, moves away from a condition of life widely perceived as unsatisfactory towards a situation or condition of life regarded as materially and spiritually better".

During the declaration of the Second UN Development Decade on January 1, 1971, the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed that the following elements are fundamental to development: "(i) A minimum of standard of living compatible with

human dignity; (ii) Underpinned improvement of the well-being of the individual; (iii) Sharing of benefits by society at large; (iv) More equitable distribution of wealth and income; (vi) A greater degree of income security, and (vii) The safeguard of the environment” (Udogu, 2004, p.12).

When talking about development, the issue of economic growth usually arises. It should be noted at this point that economic growth does not connote economic development. Economic growth emphasizes the market and free enterprise with the intention of integrating them into the world economy with less government interference (Aluko, 2004). Uwatt (2004, p. 133) defines economic growth “as the steady process by which the productive capacity of the economy is increased overtime to bring about rising levels of national income (gross national product or income). It is often measured by a percentage change in gross (or real) per capita national product (GNP).” It has to do more or less with openness of an economy in order to increase trade.

Economic development, on the other hand, is the ability of a people to increasingly take control or secure their basic needs. It should also mean access to quality education, good housing/shelter, access to financing, and qualitative means of transportation, all of which will in turn entail increased output by citizens. It means the capacity of the national economy to increase the Gross National Product (GNP).

Based on the above, it could be said that development is the improvement in the quantity and quality of life of a people in a given society. It involves the satisfactory meeting of basic human needs, and the freedom to make profound or desirable choices. Economic development, then involves access to qualitative education, healthcare, and the basic needs of life. Non-economic indicators of development are: gains in literacy, increased level of schooling, improved access to health services, and access to qualitative housing.

Literature Review

Literature on international migration is replete with arguments for migration both as a cause of development and the effect of development. Development spurs migration to other places because of the expansion of markets. Development at urban centres and the need for less skilled labour at industrial locations, drives migration from rural locations to locations where opportunities exist for paid employment. Out migration from a location usually has the debilitating effect of removing labour from the source location and adding to the destination location. The migration process involves removal of labour from one location to another which involves increased mobility of labour and displacement of the most active population out of the source country. Migration in turn affects the resources available to the source country (Abreu, 2012).


Some of the migration literature state that migration spurs development as access to information and modern means of transport furthers the process. Scholars on international migration and development are divided broadly into two schools: the Optimistic School (Liberal view) and the Pessimistic School (Radical View). Some scholars see migration as a harbinger of goodwill while those on the opposing side view it as detrimental to the development of less developed countries.

The liberal school supports migration as a cause of development both for the individual and source country (Harris & Todaro, 2003; Bauer & Zimmermann, 1998; Massey, 1998). The school sees the individual migrant as making a rational decision to move out of a border to another place where his skills will be useful and more rewarding. It sees international migration generally as good for both the origin country and the destination country because of the contribution the migrant makes to the new country and the remittances sent back to the home country. This perspective sees migration as a win-win situation for both the destination country and the origin country. The free movement of labour across borders is seen as a prerequisite for development. The migrant is seen as sending remittances, and new ideas, they are also agents of change when they return to the source country. Thus, migration is generally beneficial to the source country because migrants play positive roles and serves as agents of modernisation when they eventually return to their source country. Proponents of this line of thought liken migration the transformation that took place in Europe and the United States during the era of slavery (de Haas, 2010).

As for the radical approach, migration is seen more as driven by the owners of the means of production who seek to get cheap labour. This perspective is rooted in the writings of scholars like Andre Gunder Frank, Paul Baran, Emmanuel Wallerstein, and others who dwelled extensively on dependency theory, development and underdevelopment, and world systems theory. The migrant, in the views of this school of thought, is compelled to sell his labour power which deprives the country of the scarce human resources that would have been used for development. International migration, to this perspective, is seen as a selective process which takes out the young and the best from less developed countries to better developed ones. International migration, therefore, is exploitative of developing economies and beneficial to the destination country, which is usually more developed than the sending country. This view sees migration as emanating from the capitalist expansion of markets to less developed parts of the world. Migration is seen as a cause of the underdevelopment of less developed countries since denies such countries one of the essentials needed for their development, that is, skilled manpower. The depletion of scarce human resources from developing countries is seen as the cause of their underdevelopment. For this school of thought, remittances increase the dependency of developing countries on the more developed ones. Remittances are seen as increasing consumerism, ostentatious living, and inflation in the receiving countries. Therefore, migration is seen as more as beneficial to the more developed countries, than the less developed ones.

The arguments for and against migration and development is summarised by de Haas (2010: 229) in the diagram below:

Opposing Views on Migration and Development



Theoretical Explanation of Migration in Nigeria

The study adopted the historical structural approach, a strand of Marxism, as theoretical framework of analysis. Priore (1979), Wallerstein (1974), Castles (2008), Kosack (2008), and de Haas (2010), are the main proponents of this Marxist inspired theory. The theory came into being in response to earlier international migration theories which were not able to put migration in a proper theoretical perspective. This theory took a more holistic approach to the migration phenomena. According to Piche (2013, p.149) “immigration has become a structural necessity in response to Western capitalism.” He further stated that “Castles and Kosack’s key contribution was to highlight the structure of employment, with immigrants at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder.”

Earlier migration theories have tended to focus only on the micro aspect, ignoring the macro aspect of migration. The theory laid bare the fact that remittances alone cannot spur development as the loss of manpower also negatively affects the development prospects of less developed parts of the world.

The basic assumption of this theory is that migration emanates from the expansion of global capital which created the situation that made people move. Migration is viewed as providing cheap labour from developing nations for more developed markets. It infers that, the nature of modern capitalist economy creates conditions where cheap labours are created for the market. Abreu (2012, p.34) states that “capitalist accumulation in the advanced industrialized economies intrinsically requires a constant inflow of workers, which creates a structural incentive for immigration to occur.” The favourable living conditions found in developed country serve as incentives for the movement of labour out of the deplorable conditions in developing economies.

This theory helps to explain both internal and international migration as a phenomenon from the expansion of world capitalist economy. The theory links the structural changes in developing countries to the migratory process which was inspired in the first place by the world capitalist economy. It does not use the individual as the basis for its theoretical premise or as its unit of analysis but starts from the macroeconomic level. It states that migration is part of a larger structural change which emerges because of the growth of capital. Modern migration is viewed as historically tied to the penetration of capital and commodity to developing economies and the creation of new relations of production. This relationship tends to displace the worker from his place of usual residence. The historical structural school further views migration as the globalization of labour supply (Abreu, 2012).

The unequal distribution of wealth and political and economic power, between the global North and South, intensifies the migration process. To understand the phenomenon, there is the need to go to the basis of society to explain the international migration process. Migration is not a rational or voluntary decision as posited by the neoclassical theorists. Instead it needs to be located in the capitalist process in which cheap labour is recruited from the global South to the North to maintain the North's dominance over the South. Migration and development are viewed, in this perspective, as a vicious circle where the resources of poor countries are exploited to the advantage of rich countries. Historical structural theory "linked migration to the macro-organisation of socio economic relations, the geographic division of labour, and political mechanisms of power and domination" (Massey, 1993:41). The world is thus divided based on the organization of labour relations in which developing nations are placed on the lower rungs of society with certain predetermined roles. The developing world is thus placed in the position of providing cheap labour and raw materials for the market of the global north. This is consolidated through the creation of institutions (such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) which reinforce the status quo. The global south is further linked through the prescription of international institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

The historical structural approach shifts focus from the individual which neo-classical economic theorists focused on, to at the structure of the society which creates conditions for migration. It deviates from the individual and group as the main decision maker in the migration process, and focuses on structural factors which create conditions for migration to occur. The major thrust of the historical structural approach is that inequalities among nations create capitalist expansion the Western nations. It starts from the premise that nations are unequally endowed with political power, and unequal power creates an unequal economic position which emanated from the expansion of capital. The expansion of capitalism therefore serves to perpetuate and reinforce the existing inequality among nations. Inequalities among modern economies spur movement of persons from less developed economies into more advanced ones. The nature of modern economies is such that there are high demands for certain specialised types of labour. Suitable political and economic

environment are created to facilitate the movement of specialised group of persons by fashioning policies that create enabling environment to facilitate the movement of such type of people through the issuance of visas or work permits for certain categories of workers. The unequal distribution of economic and political powers across the globe helps to intensify international migration from less developed parts of the world.

Even though this theory focuses on the macro level rather than the micro level of migration, individuals are seen moving or migrating because the economy is conditioned to make them migrate. Individual migrants are not making free choices but are compelled into moving because of broader structural processes. The economic conditions which are creations of the market economy created the condition for the international migration of persons. This has become an integral part of the process of the market economy. Migration is therefore viewed as a structural consequence of the expansion of markets rather than a rational decision taken by individual migrants. The penetration of capital into any economy stimulates the movement of labour or creates a mobile population. The population in such economy is incorporated into the market economy and are of necessity commodities. They cannot be divorced from the influence of global market but tied to the dictates of the market. They are considered as part of the production process.

This approach shows the close relationship that exists between the flow of raw materials, capital, and labour. It shows that labour, like any other commodity which can be bought and sold, tends to flow in the direction of raw materials. The flow of labour and raw materials is usually towards the direction of more developed economies, from less developed ones.

Impact of International Migration on Socioeconomic Development in Nigeria

According to Afolayan, Ikwuyatun and Abejide, (2008), Nigeria has the highest population in Africa and counts as the tenth highest in the world. Its citizens are dispersed in different parts of the world both in Africa and other parts of the world, especially Western Europe and the United States. As already mentioned earlier, Western Europe has remained a destination country because of the historical ties with Britain which once colonised Nigeria. To Akindele and Bassey (2000), Britain hosts the largest group of Nigerians in Europe, some in their third generation, playing active roles in British life. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed migration of skilled Nigerians out of the country, occasioned by the slump in oil prices and the harsh economic policies of the government. There was also political repression by the military governments of the day, which made substantial parts of the intelligentsia to migrate out of the country.

Migration out of the country, which started in trickles in earlier the years of the economic decline, increased exponentially with the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP) in June 1986. A noticeable trend in the migration process in

Nigeria is the emigration of highly educated and skilled workers who are in their prime. The policy shift from full employment to less government intervention in critical areas like health, housing, and education - which was what SAP aimed to attain - meant that many jobs were lost. The SAP negatively impacted on the citizenry, and led to strike action by trade unions and mass demonstration/disobedience by the people. There was the massive clampdown by the military on citizens, which led to massive increase in the movement out of the country by those who could afford the means to travel. Adesina (2007, p.8) captured what was the prevailing condition: The escalating wave of penury and erosion of real incomes due to spiralling inflation occasioned by the devaluation of the nation's currency, the Naira, in the 1980s and 1990s meant that a large percentage of the population underwent severe hardship. By 1999 the country had become classified by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as one of the worst performing economies on the African continent (National Concord, 1999, p. 11). The army of unemployed rose geometrically. The urban job market not only became oversupplied but also unpaid. Unemployed graduates littered the streets. All these induced not only an exodus from the country but also brought about a profound redefinition of what it meant to have either job or social satisfaction.

The middle class, which would have been the driver of the economy, was wiped out owing to the prevailing economic situation. Many Nigerians had to leave the country in search of greener pastures after the oil-dependent economy collapsed. The economy had recessed with many Nigerians out of job. Fellow West African professionals who had come into the country left in droves for other parts of the world (Adepoju, 2011). Nigeria which was once a destination country for migrants from other parts of the continent had its citizenry displaced, due to the economic downturn, to countries in both developed and the developing countries.

Conclusion/Recommendations

The paper concludes that the precarious economic condition owing to the policy enunciated by the government and the position of the country in the global economic system has led to continuous migration of its skilled out of the country. Increasing poverty and bad governance have been the major push for massive migration out of the shores of Nigeria. The loss of most of the best minds who could have contributed to the development of the country has impacted negatively on the development aspirations of Nigeria.

One of the crucial recommendations to make would be to harp on the need for good governance in Nigeria as its absence creates the conditions under which most of its citizens migrate. The emigration of most of the citizens in the 1980s, 90s, and even currently is traceable to bad governance. The government needs to remedy the outmigration of skilled Nigerians by the provision of sound policies and basic social services that meet the basic minimum requirement of the people.

There is the need to tackle poverty through sustained people-focused development policies. Government policies should target creation of employment opportunities for

the teeming graduates who are daily churned out of the nation's educational institutions.



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CHAPTER THREE

Migration and Development in Africa

Chinonso Ihuoma

Introduction

Within the last two decades, migration has remained a central subject of political debate worldwide. The World Economic Forum (2017) notes that migration has shown an unbroken upward trend, be it of people who have left their homelands voluntarily for economic or other reasons, or of those who have been forced to leave their homes (refugees, displaced persons, etc.). Ban Ki-moon (The UN former Secretary General) (2013) sees migration as an expression of the human aspiration for dignity, safety, and a better future. He notes that “it is part of the social fabric, part of our very make-up as a human family. International migration is a growing phenomenon, both in scope and in complexity, affecting almost all countries in the world.” Research done by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2011) estimated that in 2010 there were some 214 million international migrants worldwide; and in 2009, there are also some 740 million internal migrants. According to the World Economic Forum (2017),

The world has an estimated 244 million international migrants (UNDESA, 2016) and 763 million internal migrants (UN DESA, 2013); while international migrants account for a relatively small share of the world’s total population (about 3.3% in 2015). Of the 244 million international migrants recorded in 2015, 58% stay in developed nations (19).

The UN Population Division has reported that as of the year 2013, 3.2% of the world’s population lives outside their country of origin, which is an increase of 33% compared to the year 2000. European countries host a large number of such migrants, reaching a total of 72 million (United Nations 2013). Thus, migrants make up more than 1 billion people, or one-seventh of the world’s population (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013a; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013b; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2016). As observed by Piece (2012, p 3),

One of the major determinants of migration is globalization, and this phenomenon has led to the existence of factors which encourage migration and they include factors as diverse as international patterns of demand for and supply of labour; the relative cheapness of

international transport; the advent of systems of electronic communication; and the emergence of transnational family networks.

What this implies is that as a result of availability of job opportunities abroad, people tend to migrate. This is necessitated due to the easy flow of information, made possible by access to internet facilities. Also, transnational marriages are taking place; people marry outside their countries of residence and with the need to live together, migration occur.

Migration exists both at the international and national/local levels. It has been seen to contribute to the development of host countries and have also deprived countries of origin of some degrees of development. A typical example is the large migration of Africans into Libya which contributed to the development of the country's economy during Gadhafi's regime while following his death, emigration has affected the country's development and relationship with other African countries. International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated the total number of foreign nationals living in Libya before the crisis at 2.5 million, including 1 million Egyptians, 80,000 Pakistanis, 59,000 Sudanese, 63,000 Bangladeshis, 26,000 Filipinos, 10,500 Vietnamese and 'a large population of Sub-Saharan Africans mainly from Niger, Chad, Mali, Nigeria and Ghana' (IOM, 2010). Besides Libya, migrants also fled to Tunisia (43.8%) and Egypt (32.4%), while Nigerien and Chadian borders have also experienced waves of migrants with respectively 13.1% and 5.1% of the total flow (Bredeloup & Pliez, 2011).

Historically, immigration flows into Libya began in the 1960s just after the discovery of oil and hydrocarbons reserves there. In the following two decades, the rise in oil revenues together with ambitious economic and social programs and the country's structural lack of indigenous manpower, continued to attract large numbers of immigrants, particularly those from neighboring Arab countries, and especially Egypt and Tunisia. Meanwhile, a number of severe droughts and violent conflicts in the Sahel region triggered other refugee and migrant flows to Libya – mostly Nigerien Tuaregs and also Tubu refugees. (Bredeloup & Pliez, 2011).

Migration has intensified with the growing trend in globalisation, as globalisation facilitated the rapid movement of people, goods, and services. This link between migration and globalisation will be explored later in this study.

Statement of Problem

Migration has directly and indirectly affected development in Africa. Like any other major global phenomenon, migration of humans into (immigration) and out of (emigration) of Africa, have had both positive and negative impacts on the continent's and Nigeria's development. While many countries have benefitted from the gains of migration which have led to their development, the case has been relatively different for some others like Nigeria. This paper tries to examine the negative and positive effects of migration on Nigeria's development.

Conceptual Clarification

Migration: According to Everett (1969), migration is a permanent or semi-permanent change of residence. This way, migration simply means the movement from one location to another. It could be national, trans-national, or continental, movement; it could be inward (immigration) or outward (emigration).

Development: As conceptualized by Ihuoma (2017), it is a process which lead to a change in situation, usually intended as something positive or desirable.

Globalization: This is the interconnectedness of different groups of people within and across regions of the world, due to the growing social, economic, and political networks, as well as education, and information, and communications technology (ICT).

Reasons for Migration

According to World Economic Forum (2017), factors that necessitate migration include, but are not limited to the following:

Economic factors: These relate to the labour market of a place, the employment situation, and the overall state of the economy. Favourable economic conditions at the destination – the prospect of higher wages, better employment opportunities, and prospects for wealth creation – and the desire to escape the domestic social and political situation of their home region, can draw migrants to their destination. All these come under what is often referred to as push and pull factors that cause migration. Some of the push factors are: unemployment or lack of employment opportunities, rural poverty, and unsustainable livelihood. The pull factors include: job opportunities, better income and prospects for wealth creation, industrial innovation and technical know-how for a new industry, and pursuit of specialized education.

On the one hand, economic factors have contributed to both emigration and immigration in Nigeria. Many people, as a result of economic factors, have left their states of origin to another state in the country just as many cities have become migrant cities for the same reason; for instance: Onitsha, Lagos, Port Harcourt, Abuja, amongst

others. On the other hand, economic factors have also been identified as some of the reasons behind migration across the country's borders.

Socio-political factors: These include: family conflicts and unification, quest for independence, ethnic, religious, racial and cultural issues; warfare, or the threat of conflict; among others. Socio-political factors are also divided into push and pull factors. The push factors include: political instability; safety and security concerns (ethnic, religious, racial, or cultural persecution); conflicts or threat of a conflict; slavery or bonded labour; inadequate or limited urban services and infrastructure (such as healthcare, education, utilities, transport, and water). The pull factors include: family reunification; independence and freedom; integration and social cohesion; affordable and accessible urban services (such as healthcare, education, utilities and transport).

Ecological factors: These include environmental factors, such as climate change and the availability of natural resources that cause individuals to migrate in search of more favourable ecological conditions. The push factors here include: climate change (such as extreme weather events); crop failure, and scarcity of food. The pull factors include: abundance of natural resources and minerals (e.g. water, oil, uranium); favourable climatic conditions. These factors constitute one of the major reasons for immigration into Nigeria as many multinational companies that are interested in the abundant mineral resources in the country come to establish in the parts of the country where the mineral resources they need, are located.

Having outlined the various reasons people migrate, what follows is an assessment of the direction of causal link between migration and development in Nigeria.

Migration and Nigeria's Development

There are different manifestations of migration which has affected development of both the country of origin and host countries; this view is supported by Piece (2012). There is need to understand that the effect of migration on development of the countries of origin has played a role in their underdevelopment. International migration has affected the development of countries of origin through loss of essential human resources, often referred to as "brain drain", as well as through potential depletion of the national labour force due to movements at all skill-levels.

It is a fact that remittances are sent home, International remittances account for more than 10 percent of gross domestic product in many developing countries. In 2012, remittances received by developing countries were nearly three times the amount of official aid and about 2/3 the foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to the same group of countries. Not only are remittances larger, they also are more resilient in time of global economic crisis. There is strong empirical evidence that remittances from abroad contribute to reduce poverty in receiving communities, and lead to an increase in health investment, education and small businesses (Edwards & Ureta, 2003,

Mendola, 2006 & Yang, 2008). Yet, it cannot be ignored that emigration still has contributed significantly to a lower development rate.

On a daily basis, there is the movement of Nigerians to various parts of the world. These movements have various development effects both for individuals and the Nigerian society at large. Globally, migration occurs on daily basis and many of them result in permanent settlement, this phenomenon has impacted the societies involved on both individual and societal level; this would further be explained.

Impact of Migration on Development at the Individual Level

- **Brain Drain:** Migration of citizens from Africa has led to the development of the continent's human resources especially when they go abroad to train or acquire skills which would contribute to either the Gross National Product (GNP) or the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of their countries. However, Nijkamp et al (2012) noted that in most cases, they usually do not return to invest their acquired skills and knowledge in their countries of origin, thus leading to brain drain. According to the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2011), the global number of foreign students pursuing tertiary education abroad increased from 1.6 million in 1999 to 2.8 million in 2008, and a reasonable number of the above are from developing countries.

Highly skilled labour migration was previously seen as a winner-takes-all game, in which developed countries make full use of their powers of attraction to entice the best among the world's tertiary educated persons, to the detriment of the developing countries that had invested in their education. The important pre-condition for these development gains is the setting up of effective policies and enabling environments covering all aspects of the migration cycle (Piece 2012). To this end, there is no disputing the fact that in cases where the immigrants are already (highly) skilled, they bring with them new skills and knowledge, which allow native workers to specialise in what they do the best, and may at the same time create new economic opportunities and promote innovation (Lewis, 2011; Peri & Sparber, 2009; Moretti, 2004).

- **Migration and Human Rights Violation:** Human Trafficking is a crime against one of the fundamental human rights of victims. Every denial of these rights hampers development of the individuals whose rights are denied. Labour rights, for instance, are essential to prevent migrants from being exploited. Yet, for many years, women and children from Africa have been transported across their national frontiers into other countries and continents. African states have been affected by trafficking, they have served as recruitment states, destination states and even transit route. (Example, Libya remained a transit country into Europe because of its proximity to Italy).

Trafficking has for long been seen as a gender crime, but the fact remains that it is not really a gender based crime but often. However, 'the bulk of the gender trafficked is usually the female and this makes trafficking a 'gendered'

crime/problem....there is also rising the need for domestic workers which fuel trafficking...trafficking is like a cancerous cell that needs to be aggressively handled' (Ihuoma, 2017:pp. 6-9). The question to be considered is; how has trafficking affected the development of Nigeria? In trying to attempt an answer to this, it is pertinent to recall that Migrants in irregular situations are particularly vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.

Human trafficking and migrant smuggling add a further layer of complexity to the challenge of upholding the human rights of migrants. Any discussion on the contribution of international migrants to development should thus include a consideration of their human rights (Piece 2012). Trafficking and human development are interwoven. This is because these victims transported (most times deceptively) away from their homes are denied of opportunities of contributing to the development of their home country.

Impact of Migration on Development at the Society Level

- **Unemployment:** In some countries of destination, labour markets are highly dependent on foreign workers, some being permanent, others circular, or temporary. Piece (2012) points out that migrants often fill jobs that the native-born population is unwilling to take. It is pertinent to point out that when developing countries are so dependent on expatriates or immigrant labour, it will lose confidence in its local labour force. It is not as if these expatriates are cheaper than the indigenous labour force. It is however the case that in many situations, they contribute to the development of the local human resources when they are employed on a temporal base to train and equip the indigenous labour force. What is unfortunately more common in many countries in Africa is that there expatriates are not employed to train local indigenes, but to fill in job vacancies.

- **Development of Local industries:** Migration from the period of the 20th century was encouraged by the phenomenon 'globalisation' which allows for the easier movement of people, goods and services from one end to another. It could be argued that migration was not necessitated by globalisation, but the point remains that the concept of globalisation which led to the easing up of national boundaries played a very important role in promoting migration. This is because, with the easy movement of people, thanks to globalisation, came the movement of capital and assets from developed countries to the developing or underdeveloped ones. People's movements from one country or continent to another have had significant impacts on the flow of ideas, innovations, economic development, trade, and investments (Gheasi & Nijkamp, 2017). This spread of ideas and knowledge is vital for the new economic landscape of the world. One of the effects of the massive spread of ideas and capital is what is known as Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). Some benefits of FDI include: building up local human resources and improving technological capabilities to

raise the capacity to capture productivity spill-over from Transnational Corporations (TNCs) (Dirk, 2006). Countries such as Singapore and Ireland (where local suppliers have become global exporters) have benefited from FDI in the long-term and are emerging global developing economies. However, many African countries, except South Africa's automotive industry (which provides a useful view on the importance of knowledge and skills to investment decisions) (Dirk & McGrath, 2005), are yet to fully tap into the benefits of FDI as have many Latin American and Asian countries.

Yet, FDIs have been seen to negatively affect the economic growth and development of underdeveloped countries and the developing countries as well. Because of the above differentiations, the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in driving economic growth and development has been a contested one ever since the UN development decade of the 1960s. There have always been views in favour of FDI and against it. Some argue that FDI leads to economic growth and productivity increase in economies, and hence contributes to differences in economic growth and development performances across countries. But, others stress the risk of FDI in destroying local capabilities and extracting natural resources without adequately compensating poor countries.

FDI can raise economic growth by increasing capital or employment, directly or indirectly, among local suppliers and competitors, or increasing the efficiency by which these factors are used (by using superior technology, or locating in high productivity areas, or through productive spill-overs) (Dirk, 2006).


Globalization is the driving force behind Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). FDI led to the presence of many transnational corporations that in many cases produce goods that local industries cannot compete with, therefore leading to dependence on cheap imported goods rather than the promotion of the indigenous manufacturing of such goods.

- **Concentration of prime population abroad:** As a result of emigration, Africa's prime population is largely concentrated outside the continent, where they are contributing immensely to the development of their host communities. Many African youths leave the shores of Africa in order to access better education and to enjoy certain conducive educational environments. Most of them remain abroad after their studies, while a few return home to their countries of origin.

The educational system in Africa does not favour some fields of study in terms of providing the practical requirements for some courses (as a result of lack of laboratory and practical equipment to back up theoretical studies). This is one of the reasons for the desire to seek scholarships to study abroad.

The picture below depicts the age bracket of migrants. The picture shows that those regularly migrate are those within the prime age bracket. Large number of migrants in their primes, leave their countries to other countries where they end up developing the host country and depriving their countries of origin the labour force needed to develop.

International Migrants by Age and Development Group 2015 (UNDESA, 2016)



From the chart above, it could be seen that the greater number of migrants fall between the prime ages of 30-39, while the remarkable rise in the number of migrants by age distribution began from the ages of 20, and then gradually slopes before rising again at age 75+.

Conclusion/Recommendation

Migration has for years been a determinant of development in many parts of the world. This paper did not try to debunk the fact that migration has contributed to Nigeria's development. This paper weighed the positive and negative effects of migration on Africa's economy. While many developed countries benefit from migration, many countries in Africa are yet to benefit as much as they lose from migration.

However, migration and its promises can be utilised in the development of the country, through partnership whereby some multinational companies could be invited into the country without offering them a tax haven. The taxes they pay could be channelled to infrastructural and manpower development. Many developed countries of the world

credit the bulk of their revenue to taxes and this could also be utilised in Nigeria since Nigeria is a land of opportunities.

On the same vein, the states in the country could competitively encourage the development of its manpower; thus creating a wealth of human capital that would restructure the face of the country. This could be done through the encouragement and facilitation of the development of technical and vocational education which would create a population that is ready to industrialise and attract global workforce as seen in many developed countries; thus utilising the global phenomenon of migration for its development.



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CHAPTER FOUR

Migration and Brain Drain in Nigeria: A Threat to National Development

Onyemaechi Christopher Ugwuibe and Francisca N. Onah

Introduction

Population movements especially of skilled human resource have become a major feature in developing countries like Nigeria. Nigeria is a complex and large country occupying 923, 768 square kilometres with more than 36, 450 kilometres of land. According to Dayo (2018) Nigeria has a population of more than 186 million people many of whom engage in migration to improve their lives. Migration is a natural human reflex and is as old as humanity. The natural reflex in contemporary times have always been justified by economic, social and political crises. Migration is the process of moving, either across an international border, or within a given locality. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), (2004), migration has been part of human history. People have migrated from country to country or within the same country. According to Khalid (2008), almost 200 million people, or one out of every 35 persons across the globe, are living out of their home country. In Nigeria the migration of people has been a regular and common phenomenon right from the pre-colonial era to the colonial and up to the post-colonial periods. However, in recent times migration of highly skilled persons and/or professionals, popularly known as brain-drain, has attracted public concern, especially in developing economies like Nigeria.

The motivations of humans for moving away from their home country to another country are dynamic and cannot be generalized. The reason may be that developed economies encourage brains and offer them better opportunities than less developed countries. Such movement of skilled persons is known as brain-drain. Human resources constitute the most important factors of production. Kinard (1988), asserted that human resources are more important than physical and financial resources. Without the required human capital in the form of stocks of skills, physical capital in the form of machines and other resources will not give rise to rapid economic growth and development of any nation. In the words of Dayo (2016), apart from political and cultural factors, the reasons many Nigeria's best brains leave are economic which include poor salaries, lack of job opportunities, unemployment and inflation. Some skilled workers decided to relocate from Nigeria in search of job satisfaction, higher standards of living, better salaries and quality of education.

Nigeria has, over the years, struggled with the crisis of brain -drain in all sectors; scientific, engineering, technical and managerial. For instance, as at 2010, a total of

637 medical doctors left Nigeria, accounting for 36 per cent reduction in expert migration figures. Also about 227 medical doctors migrated from Nigeria in 2014 alone. On November 17, 2015 the Institute of International Education (IIE) disclosed that a total of 9,494 Nigerian students are currently studying in colleges and universities in the United States. According to the report, Nigeria is the leading source of students from Africa and the 15th largest worldwide, of international students studying in America since 2012 (IIE, 2015). Currently, IOM (2004) states that there are about one billion migrants around the world. This number includes 214 million international migrants and 740 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). Take a moment and consider your personal migration. Are you where you were born? Have you moved, and, if so, for what reason? How many times have you moved? Many of us move by choice, others by necessity, and others by force.

For example, Nigerian students in the US studying primarily at the undergraduate level have about 50.2 percent enrollment at the undergraduate level, 35.2 percent at the graduate level and 12.6 percent pursuing optional practical training (IOM, 2004). Approximately two percent engage in non-degree programs or short-term studies. From the above figure it is estimated that over the next decade, Nigeria will need to train an additional one million health care professionals and find ways to retain more of the doctors, nurses, pharmacists, laboratory technicians and administrators it currently produces. It is on this premise that this study focuses on migration and brain-drain syndrome in Nigeria and the threat(s) the syndrome poses to her national development.

Objectives of the Study

Considering migration and brain-drain as important issue for developing nations like Nigeria, this study sought to:

1. Identify the causes of migration and brain-drain phenomenon in Nigeria.
2. Examine the implications of brain-drain in Nigeria.
3. Suggest ways of retaining and sustaining highly skilled human capital in Nigeria.

Methodology

Data for the study were extracted from secondary materials such as text books, journals articles, official publications and newspapers using content analysis.

Conceptual Issues

Migration

A reasonable population across the globe victims of migrants. Migration certainly has been part of human history. A great wave of migration subsequently took place in the Holy Bible, the book of Exodus (Chapter, 3) reads,

The story of the Exodus – is the story of the movement of the people of God away from slavery and injustice to freedom and new life. It is perhaps the

world's greatest and best-known migration story. Exodus began with the Hebrews being oppressed by their taskmasters. Their persecution was increased with the orders of the King of Egypt to have all newborn Hebrew boys killed. However, one was protected and hidden until he was three months old, at which time he was placed in a basket in the river... Also in (Exodus 3:1- 3:12), God migrated with the Hebrews as recorded

According to International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2011) migration is simply the movement of people from one area of a country (or from one country) to another area of the same country (or to another country) for the purpose of establishing a new residence. Although the definition of migration varies from different perspectives, there is a consensus that it involves the movement of people across a recognized political boundary to establish permanent or semi- permanent residence. Many a times it involves the departure of highly skilled individuals from organizations, industries and educational institutions. Migration is categorized into “*internal migration*” which involves a change of residence within a country and “*international migration*” that involves a change of residence between two countries.

The United Nations (2009), refers to international migrant as any person who changes his or her country of usual residence. Thus, international migration includes movement of many kinds, such as people leaving their countries of origin for economic reasons, to join their families abroad as refugees and so on. An internal migrant includes an internally displaced person, a trader who relocated his or her business to another part of the country, a transferred public servant or a Nigerian university graduate who is deployed by the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) to serve the nation in another location or state of the Federation (Oyeniya, 2013). Migration involves different motivations, with far-reaching impacts or consequences to the individual and the places of origin and destination. Although there exists several reasons people may be motivated to migrate, however for the purpose of this paper, we shall focus on the movement of people that involves crossing from one country to the other either for a short or long period.

Brain Drain: An Overview

Brain-drain simply means emigration of intellectual like doctors, engineers, teachers, technicians, administrators etc, from one country to another. Brain-drain paralyzes the overall developments of the home country of and the emigrating individual(s). According to Stenman (2006), brain -drain is a large emigration of individuals with technical skills or knowledge from one country to another usually for better conditions of service and good living environment. The British Royal Society, more specifically defined brain-drain as the outflow of scientists to North America (Shin, 2002).

UNESCO noted that brain-drain is an odd form of scientific exchange among states that is characterized by a movement in one direction, which inevitably flows to developed countries (<http://www.sudaneseonline.com/cgi-bin/eneews> 2008). These

two international bodies, the British Royal Society and UNESCO view brain-drain as emigration of scientists to developed countries. But UNESCO extends the destination of these scientists across the globe. Nevertheless, it could be observed that brain drain is not flowing to one direction- it that involves different nations of the world (<http://www.answers.com/topic/brain-drain>. 2008). It is usually considered an economic cost on the part of the home countries since migrants usually take with them the fraction of value of their training sponsored by governments or other organizations in their home countries.

Utile (2008) conceptualized brain-drain as “the mass exodus of highly trained and well experienced academics from countries with poor conditions of service to those with better work conditions in search of greener pasture”. This is evidence in Nigeria where there are mass exoduses of people on daily basis. Brain-drain is considered to have marred African continent- its degree of occurrence varies from one country to another (Anekwe, 2009). While its occurrence is very minimal in the western world, it is endemic in developing economies. This cannot be separated from the fact that factors prompting brain-drain in developing –nations have been more widely in most countries in the global West. The lure of well-maintained high-tech facilities in rich economies, in particular, is seductive for manpower assets in developing societies (Hagopian, et al. 2005). Job security, prestige and high salaries prevailing in their work settings equally attract such skilled individuals (Hagopian, et al. 2005).

According to Emeghara (2013, p.13) brain-drain is closely related to waste. This can be seen in situations where some qualified and competent Nigerian medical doctors are working as taxi drivers in countries like - Canada, Italy, United States of America, Germany, France, Malaysia, etc. The obvious implication of this scenario is that their home country (Nigeria) is being deprived of valuable contributions and skills are grossly underutilized in these development.

It is important to note that the abandonment of a country by professionals or highly skilled human resources in favor of another country, for better pay package or living conditions has had many negative impacts on development in Nigeria. In this case, the receiving countries are the winners while the sending countries could be described as ‘losers’. The receiving countries in our discussion are: United States, Australia, UK, and West Germany, France, Japan, Canada to mention but a few. The sending countries include Nigeria, Ethiopia, South Africa, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Ghana, etc. Nigerians and several other Africans are the most educated ethnic groups in the United States (Emeghara, 2013).

Factors that influence Brain-Drain in Nigeria

Many factors influence the decision by highly skilled professionals to migrate out of Nigeria. Three of them are presented below:

A) The Leadership Question

Nigeria, referred to as the “giant of West Africa” (Maybe because of the size of its population) is blessed with abundant human and natural resources but is not blessed with good leadership. Leadership according to Yaqub (1999) initiates and maintains social structure. Leadership is the capacity to allocate scarce resources which determines the locus of power (Audu, 2009). In fact, understanding leadership of a society is tantamount to understanding the macro-system. The reason for this is not far-fetched from the fact that the quality of leadership can have far reaching effects on the lives and welfare of members of a society (Yaqub, 1999). Leadership is the capacity to provide direction, align people, and mobilize resources to realize an expected goal(s).

The causal impact of leadership on brain-drain in Nigeria cannot be over-emphasized. The function of allocating resources is one paramount duties of leadership. If our leaders allocate resources judiciously to the benefit of the larger society, it can translate to development that will permeate all facets of the economy. If, on the other hand, leaders allocate disproportionately to benefit only their selfish ends, then the resultant social problems will lead to brain-drain (Segun, Ilemobola & Onome, 2014). There is no doubt that the quality of leadership has significant effect on the migration of brain drain in any given society.

B) Education Inducement Factors

The quality of, and access to education at all levels (primary, secondary and tertiary) in Nigeria, have been a great source of concern to the general public. The majority (36%) of Africans in the United States, come from West Africa; 24 % come East Africa; 22% from North Africa; 8% from Southern Africa and 3% from Central Africa (World Bank, 2007). According to World Bank, as at 2007, the majority of Africans in the US are Nigerians with a population of 134,940, followed by Ethiopians (69,553), Ghanaians (65,572), South Africans (63,000) and Sierra-Leoneans (20,831).

In Sub-Saharan Africa, primary school enrollment rate between 1999 and 2005 increased by 13% from 57% in 1999 to 70% (UNESCO, 2008). However, there are still 33 million children out of school as of 2005 (UNESCO, 2008). In primary schools across the continent, there is very common to see high student to teacher ratio in classrooms. The student-teacher ratios of some African countries, Nigeria inclusive, range from 40:1 to as high as lack of adequate learning materials as well as 83:1 (UNESCO, 2008). Besides, lack of adequate learning materials as well as conducive learning environment affects the quality of education received. For instance, many students often do not have access to textbooks for their classes (UNESCO, 2008). This is often coupled with poor educational infrastructure.

At the tertiary level, the situation is even more disheartening. The absence of qualified and seasoned academia has affected the process of critical thinking and knowledge-production. In some of our tertiary institutions, there are issues of irregular payments

of coupled nonpayment of Earned Allowances (EA). Often times, teachers teach for extended periods without commensurate pay. This has several negative effects on the motivation and efforts put into teaching. All these has contributed to the quest for better living wage in better developed societies.

C) High Rate of Youth Unemployment

Unemployment has remained a major problem bedeviling Nigerian youth causing frustration, dejection and over-dependency on family members and friends, who also have their own problems to contend with. The high rate of unemployment among Nigerian youths contributes to the mass exodus of members of the educated class from the country. Youths occupy a prominent place in any society. They are one of the greatest assets any nation may aspire to have in great numbers. In the case of Nigeria, they out-number the middle-aged and the aged (Onyekpe, 2007).

Besides, the National Youth Development Policy (2001) asserts that the youth are the foundation of a society; their energies, inventiveness, character and orientation define the quality and pattern of development and security of a nation. The youths constitute about 40 percent of the more than 180 million population of Nigeria. Nigeria's unemployment rate is projected at over 11 percent compared to the average rate of 9.5 percent in sub-Saharan Africa. Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics cited in Fanimó & Okere, (2012), stated that "the national unemployment rate increased to 23.9 percent in 2011 compared to 21.1 per cent in 2010 and 19.7 per cent in 2009". This is an indication that majority of Nigerian youths are in the underemployed and unemployed categories. Also, according to the National Bureau of Statistics report as of June 5, 2017, a total of 58.1% of Nigeria youth within the age bracket of 15-34 are unemployed.

With regard to the education of these youths, Nigerian universities admit less than 15% of the students that apply (Nunn, 2005) and graduate about four million people with less than 200,000 getting jobs" (Fanimó & Okere, 2012). This means that institutions of higher education are producing more graduates than the labor market can handle. As expected, "the incidence of poverty among young people in Nigeria is over 80% (African Economic Outlook, 2013). In situation as these migration can be considered as a survival strategy. Hence, intellectuals and professionals are literally forced out of Nigeria to countries that need and will appreciate them.

Theoretical Framework

Among the theories that scholars have applied in explaining migration and brain-drain, this study adopted the institutional theory. The institutional theory was propounded by North, (1990). Peters (2000) defines an institution as a formal or informal, structural, societal or political phenomenon that transcends the individual is based on more or less common values, has a certain degree of stability and influences behaviour. It considers the processes by which the structures, schema, rules, norms and routines become established as authoritative guidelines for social behavior(s). Institutions have been defined as rules, enforcement mechanisms and organizations.

Institutions encompass “the public bodies through which the state discharges its most fundamental responsibilities, maintaining law and order, investing in essential infrastructure, and raising taxes to finance such activities” (World Bank, 1991). The state can influence economic outcomes by providing the necessary macroeconomic environment that sets the right incentives and provides the institutional infrastructure – property rights, peace, law, order and rules which encourages long-term investment; as well as by ensuring the provision of basic education, health care and all basic infrastructures. Therefore, institutional framework in a country can influence the level of such country’s economic progress (Rodrik, 2008; Osabuolien, 2011). From the institutional viewpoint, Nigeria is expected to facilitate and generate ideas that will stimulate innovations, encourage human capital development and correct government failures. But on the contrary, the institutional characteristic in Nigeria is to a reasonable extent resistant to positive change. These manifests in several ways such as: policy inconsistency in term of charge of government, widening investment gap, chronic balance of payment problems, high unemployment rate and increase of migration for greener pasture. According Zucker’s (1987) the institutional theory has the following tenets:

- a) a rue-like, social fact quality of an organized pattern of action and
- b) an embedding in formal structures, such as formal aspects of organizations that
- c) are not tied to particular actors or situations (non-personal/objective).

Application of the Theory

Migration and brain-drain in Nigeria make up biting issue arising from the weakness of institutions. Institution are supposed to be concerned with the task of attracting and retaining financial and quality human resources and putting to productive use. National development is the result of efficient use of quality human and financial capital through institutions and organizations.

Weak institutions are often central to the failure of development efforts. For example, poor management of public resources undermines the state as a guarantor of public welfare and security. Consequently, developing capacity at the organizational or institutional level involves reforming, as and where necessary, the structures, mandates, functions, remuneration, management systems, corporate culture and operational processes of organizations – especially the public sector. This calls to mind the institutional and structural arrangement for achieving the desired policy goals targeted at achieving national development. In this context, institutional administrative structures and facilities for attaining this highly desirable goal may take the form of good health, good condition of service, necessary research and teaching facilities, zero tolerance to corruption, adequate employment generation strategies, infrastructure and investment. However, if the institutional setting in a country is poorly managed, the realization of the full benefits of even the best quality human resources would be illusory. It is on this basis that the theory gives an understanding of the significance of institutions in addressing migration and brain-drain issues in Nigeria.

Migration and Brain-Drain in Nigeria: Implication for National Development

The ambiguous nature of development has made it difficult for scholars to advance a precise meaning. Gboyega (2003) described development as an idea that embodies all attempts to improve the conditions of human existence in all ramifications. It implies improvement in material well-being of all citizens, not the most powerful and rich alone, in a sustainable way such that today's consumption does not imperil the future. It also demands drastic reduction of poverty and inequality of access to the good things of life. It seeks to improve personal physical security and livelihoods and expansion of life chances. According to Onah (2005), development is not static but is a continuous improvement in the capacity of the individual and society to control and manipulate the forces of nature for the enhancement of the living standard of the people in a society. From the various meanings of development outlined, it can be deduced that development is not limited to economic growth or per capita income alone, rather it encompasses the economic, administrative, political, social, cultural, religious, and living standard of the people in a given society.

At this point, national development can therefore, be seen as “the ability of a country or countries to improve the social welfare of the people by providing social amenities like good education, pipe-borne water, etc (www.wiki.answers).” This means that ensuring human welfare is the ultimate goal of national development. Thus, widespread improvement in the quality of life occasioned by a rise in productivity, standard health care system, adequate employment, etc. indicates national development. One central issue that has attracted a lot of public attention has been whether brain-drain has positive or negative impact on developing countries. Some schools of thought focus on the high detrimental effects arising from loss of intellectuals from developing countries while others see it as less critical than it is usually portrayed.

However, the threat posed by the departure of intellectuals to national development cannot be quantified. Migration of human resource to a greener pasture and where there are promises of security and financial stability has left Nigeria in a messy situation. For example in the health sector, it is obvious that only less than one-third of the registered Nigerian doctors practice in the country while over two-third of this class of professional are migrating abroad for better career development. This level of exodus of health workers has crippled the health sector having the number of dynamic and innovative people in the health care sector.

The medical doctor to patients' ratio in Nigeria is one to 30,000, while states in some part of the country especially the Northern states are as worse as one doctor to 45,000 patients (Osazuwa, 2017). The ratio is sharply against the World Health Organization (WHO) standard of one medical doctor to 600 patients. Public health experts have postulated that Nigeria needs at least more 200,000 doctors for its population to meet the global standard set by the WHO. This represent one of the impacts of the ugly

phenomenon of brain-drain in the nation's health sector which is a threat to national development.

Concluding Remarks

This study focused on migration and brain-drain in Nigeria. The institutional theory was to anchor the study. The study revealed that there is a significant causal relationship between the quality of leadership and the exodus of intellectuals from one country. Other factors that affect migration are: poor teaching and learning facilities, high rate of youth unemployment among others.

Based on its findings, the study recommended that:

1. For Nigeria to improve the well-being of the greater majority of her citizens, there is need for leaders who have passion for human capital development.
2. There is also the need to improve on the quality of education offered in Nigeria.
3. There is the need to improve staff remuneration, learning and teaching environment and infrastructure. These will go a long way in preventing brain-drain to a reasonable extent in Nigeria.

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CHAPTER FIVE

International Migration and Development in Africa: The Nigerian Experience

Kalu Oko Ulu and Joseph Chimaobi Okogbuo

Introduction

In the present era of globalization, international migration has become a reality that touches nearly all corners of the globe. The number of international migrants worldwide has continued to grow rapidly in recent years. The trans-Atlantic slave trade brought large numbers of Africans to the United States as forced migrants from the 16th to the 19th centuries. Significant voluntary migration from Africa to the United States did not begin until the 1980s. According to Mberu and Pongou (2010) modern transportation has made it easier, cheaper and faster for people to move in search of jobs, opportunity, education and better quality of life. At the same time, conflict, poverty, inequality, and a lack of sustainable livelihoods, compel people to leave their homes to seek a better future for themselves and their families abroad. Countries of destination benefit significantly from migration as migrants often fill critical labour gaps, create jobs as entrepreneurs, and pay taxes and make social security contributions. Some migrants are among the most dynamic members of their host society, contributing to the development of science and technology and enriching their host communities by providing cultural diversity. Crossing borders – whether by choice or necessity – brings both risks and opportunities (Landau and Achiume, 2015).

Despite the significant benefits of migration, some migrants remain among the most vulnerable members of the destination society. Migrants are often the first to lose their jobs in the event of an economic downturn. Some work for less pay, for longer hours, and in worse conditions, than native-born workers. While migration is often an empowering experience, some migrants endure human rights violations, abuses, and discrimination. Migrants, particularly women and children, usually fall victims to human trafficking and the heinous exploitation that it entails.

The phenomenon of international migration comes with opportunities and challenges including those which can be termed social, economic, health, political, and environmental. In Africa, the opportunities may include free movement of the population, expanded trade, widened employment opportunities, and international remittances. The challenges may include: scarcity of standardized relevant international migration statistics; lack of human resources and institutions to handle international migration; security concerns; spread of diseases such as Human Immuno-deficiency virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS), ebola virus, tuberculosis and malaria; trafficking of women and children;

management of labour migration; brain-drain; and adoption and implementation of appropriate policies on international migration in cooperation with other nations (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa-ECA, 2004:45)

According to the International Organization for Migration-(IOM) (2004) many parts of the African continent are currently affected by a shortage of qualified human resources, created in part by the large-scale departure of professionals and university graduates. Thousands of African professionals - including medical doctors, nurses, accountants, engineers, managers and teachers - leave their home country each year to pursue better prospects in other countries – both on and outside the continent. While this movement may have some beneficial effects in certain locales, in most of these countries, it hampers sustainable development. This is particularly the case when it affects priority development sectors such as health and education, in countries that have limited ability to attract and retain qualified workers. The outward movement of human resources can lead to the deterioration of basic social services, slow the development of the private sector, and heighten the dependency of African economies on costly foreign expertise.

In the light of the above introduction, the primary task of this paper is to investigate the impact of international migration on development in Africa, with particular focus on Nigeria.

Migration in Nigeria: Historical Overview

Migration is as old as human history. Documented history of migration in the territory that is now Nigeria dates back to four simultaneous slave trades in Africa between 1400 and 1900, the largest being the 15th century transatlantic slave trade in which 12 million slaves were exported from west, west-central, and eastern Africa to European colonies in the Americas. The three other slave trades – the trans-Saharan, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean – which began before the transatlantic, involved another 6 million people. Estimates from Harvard economist, Nathan Dunn, indicate that Nigeria lost about 2 million people during the 500-year period, out of which about 1.4 million slaves were shipped to the Americas (Mberu&Pongou, 2010).

The arrival of the British in the mid-19th century provided a framework for large-scale migration as the British needed a large labor force for mines, plantations, and public administration. The resulting rural-rural migration moved people to work as either migrant tenant farmers, farm laborers, and/or migrant traders. In addition, migrant laborers from different parts of the country, especially from rural areas, moved into Nigeria's regional headquarters and administrative and market centers in search of trade and gainful employment. Destination cities included Lagos, Kano, Zaria, Enugu, Ibadan, Sokoto, and Kaduna. Of particular importance to rural-urban migration was the creation of mining towns, and the linking of seaports in Lagos and Port Harcourt to rural areas via railways. During the colonial rule, Nigeria also experienced

international flows. Geographer Adejumo Afolayan and colleagues have found evidence of immigration and emigration as far back as 1903.

An estimated 10,000 to 30,000 Tuaregs from Niger moved into Kano city and its environs between 1914 and 1922. Kano city offered better grazing facilities, wells for pastoralists and their flocks, veterinary services, and lower taxes. For similar reasons, another 250,000 people moved into the northwestern region of Nigeria between 1931 and 1952 from French West Africa, which extended from Lake Chad to Dakar, Senegal, and from the Sahara to the Gulf of Guinea. The flow dates back to the beginning of the 20th century. In addition to pull factors, the British colonial administration was considered less oppressive than that of the French.

On emigration, an estimated 6,500 Nigerians moved to the then Gold Coast (now Ghana) and Cotonou-Parakou in Dahomey (now Benin) to work on rail lines and in gold mines between 1900 and 1902. After the railway was completed, some of the migrants became traders, and many left for Côte d'Ivoire after World War I. Côte d'Ivoire needed labor for cash-crop plantations established by the turn of the 20th century and the infrastructure improvements (ports, warehouses, railroads, and roads) designed to aid agricultural exports.

According to Ghana's 1948 census, there were about 46,800 Nigerians, a number that later rose to 100,000 in 1959 following Ghana's economic development and the country's vigorous Pan-African movement after its independence. Though estimates vary depending on the source, Ghana's alien expulsion order of 1969 expelled about 140,000 Nigerians between December 1969 and early June 1970, according to the Nigerian High Commissioner. Professor Adejumo Afolayan and colleagues have found that the experience influenced Nigerians' migration decisions, such as movement to other destinations (in particular Côte d'Ivoire), shorter stays, and circulatory movements.

During the colonial period, thousands of Nigerians from Hausaland and Borno in northern Nigeria migrated to Sudan. Sociocultural ties, especially ethno-religious affinity, explain the Nigeria-Sudan connection, which remains strong today. About 257,000 people left Nigeria's northwestern region according to Nigeria's 1952-1953 census. Their destinations included the Gold Coast, Dahomey, and Togo, out of which 28,000 people were mostly from Northern Sokoto. Substantial emigrant streams were particularly reported for the Yoruba of southwest Nigeria to Côte d'Ivoire, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Dahomey, Mali, Togo, Niger, and Ghana. These movements were linked to the artificial nature of colonial boundaries, which split the people of common culture and ethnic groupings into different countries.

Methodology

According to Biereenu-Nnabugwu (2010:18), method is conceived as a means of achieving an aim, a definite way of ordering activity or indeed a systematic technique

for observing, measuring, recording, describing and experimenting. Thus, it is a useful scheme for ordering or gathering research data, a basis for inference and interpretation, as well as for theoretical explanation and prediction. This study relied on documentary method of data collection. Documentary method involves establishing information or gathering data based on published documents such as books, journals, periodicals, conference papers, research reports, technical reports of concerned agencies, etc (Ugwu, 2012). It is the use of documents to support the viewpoint or argument of an academic work (Scott, 2006). In this study, views from literatures will be used to determine the nexus between migration and development in Africa and establish how the high rate of Nigerians migrating to other countries of the world has affected Nigeria's development. Data collected were analyzed using content analysis.

Theoretical Framework

This study is anchored on the neo-Marxist instrumentalist theory of the state. This framework is believed to possess strong analytical basis for explaining and understanding high rate of migration and its development implications on Africa in general and Nigeria in particular.

The Marxist instrumentalist theory of the state postulates that the state is an instrument in the hands of the ruling class for enforcing and guaranteeing the stability of the class structure itself. The instrumentalist theory of the state was formulated and popularized by such scholars as Sweezy (1942), Miliband (1969; 1977; 1983), Draper (1977); Marx and Engels (1970), Lenin (1974), Jessop (1977; 1982), Poulantzas (1969; 1973, 1978); Okolie (2004); Domhoff (1978; 1976; 1986-87; 1990); Barrow (2008; 2002) Barrow (1993; 2000); and Wetherly (2008).

The above instrumentalist scholars generally argued that the state has remained a veritable and potent instrument for domination, deprivation, suppression, and alienation of the many by the very few who control state power. That is, the state is just an instrument in the hands of the ruling class for the pursuit of their personal and/or private group interest(s). The instrumentalist theoretical propositions are firmly anchored in classical Marxism (Barrow 2001). In fact, Jessop (1982) observes that the instrumentalist thesis can be traced back, at least, as early as the German Ideology (1845-46), where Marx and Engels (1970:80) claimed that the state:

is nothing more than the form of organization which the bourgeois necessarily adopt both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interest...the State is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests.

The instrumentalist thesis projects that the state is normally the State of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which by its means becomes also the politically dominant class and so acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class (Engels, 1972). Engels also reiterated that the ancient state was, above

all, the state of the slave owners for holding down the slaves, just as the feudal state was the organ of the nobility for holding down the peasant serfs and bondsmen, and the modern representative state is an instrument for domination and exploring wage labour by capital (Barrow 1993).

The major concern of this theoretical proposition is to reveal the various ways in which the modern state is used as an instrument for the exploitation of wage-labour by capital and/or the maintenance of class domination in the political sphere (Jessop, 1982). In this light, Lenin (1974:12-15) describes “the state as an instrument for the exploitation of the oppressed class”. In a capitalist society, the oppressed class are those easily exploited, dominated and alienated from the surplus values in a state. On the other hand, the capitalist class otherwise known as the ruling class simply refers to the group of individuals who occupy the same position in the nation’s economy. Those people who really own and control the economy, that is, the economically powerful ones, are those who use their economic weight to dominate others and influence policies in the polity. They occupy the managerial and ownership functions of corporations (Mintz, 1989; Zeitlin, 1974; Useem, 1984). Miliband (1969:23) asserts:

The ruling class of capitalist society is the class which owns and controls the means of production and which is able, by virtue of the economic power thus conferred upon it, to use the state as its instrument for the domination of society.

Nicos Poulantzas (1969) considers the state to be ‘only a simple tool or instrument manipulated at will by the ruling class (Poulantzas, 1969:74). This means that the relation between the bourgeois class and the state is an objective relation, and the function of the state is a determinate social formation interest of the dominant class. This implies that the state in a capitalist society basically functions to foster, advance, and defend capital accumulation and profit (Asobie, 1990; Onuoha, 2000), contrary to the general assumption that the state is an unbiased umpire and neutral power broker with respect to the interest of capital and labour.

Application of the Theory

Resulting from the above, instrumentalist scholars generally argue that the state has remained a veritable and potent instrument for domination, deprivation, suppression, and alienation of the many by the very few who control state power. Some of the reasons many people leave the borders of their home country for other countries in search of a better life include: situations of being deprived, suppressed, and/or economically alienated. This is explainable within the framework of the Marxian instrumentalist theory of the state.

The Trend of Migration in Nigeria since Independence

Migration within and out of Africa is an important demographic dynamic closely tied to broader social, economic, and political processes (Landau and Achiume, 2015). Flows from Nigeria to countries beyond the region did not occur on a large scale

until after independence in 1960. From the 1950s through the 1970s, emerging elites moved mainly to the United Kingdom due to colonial ties, for educational pursuit, and in a few cases for administrative reasons. The expectation was that Nigerian students would return with valuable skills needed for nation building. Indeed, most Nigerians educated abroad in the 1960s and 1970s readily came home after completing their education to assured plum jobs in the civil service or the burgeoning oil and private sectors of the economy. After independence in 1960, this largely highly skilled migration to the United Kingdom continued, although an increasing proportion of Nigerians also migrated to the United States for study, business, and work. As political tensions engulfed Nigeria, and as its economy stagnated in the late 1970s and 1980s, the stream of emigrants increased. Unlike previous emigrants, this latter group of Nigerians tended to stay abroad for longer periods after graduating, and some never returned (Mberu and Pongou, 2010).

Consequently, a well-developed trend of professional migration emerged. By 1978, an estimated 30,000 Nigerian graduates from UK higher institutions were living outside Africa, with 2,000 of them living in the United States. In 1984, the Nigerian population living in the United States had increased to 10,000 according to Afolayan and colleagues; many were highly skilled (Afolayan, 1988). In addition to the poor economy, Nigerian-based professionals left because of the austerity measures of the Structural Adjustment Program, which the government agreed to as a condition of a loan from the International Monetary Fund in the mid-1980s. Because the program included devaluing the national currency, wages for professionals became lower, and working conditions worsened. As desperation in the country continued, many less-educated youth became significant part of the emigration stream. By the early 2000s, an increasing number of Nigerians had migrated to countries such as Spain, Italy, Ireland, Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium, as well as the Gulf states.

More recent migrants to continental European countries are reported to be less skilled on average, and more often work in the informal service, trade, and agricultural sectors. However, the United Kingdom and the United States (through student and professional migration as well as the green card lottery) generally continue to attract the relatively higher skilled workers out of developing countries like Nigeria. In addition, relatively highly skilled nurses and doctors were recruited from Nigeria to work in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. In 2017, it was reported that greater number of Nigerian emigrants who are highly skilled nurses, doctors and academic professors, lived in America and Europe.

Migration of Nigerians to America and Europe

Globally, there were an estimated 258 million international migrants in 2017. Of the 146 million international migrants living in the global North in 2017, 89 million or 61 percent originated from developing countries, while 57 million or 39 percent were born in the North. Meanwhile, 97 million or 87 percent of the 112 million international migrants residing in the South in 2017 originated from other parts of the developing

regions, while 14 million or 13 percent were born in the North (United Nations, 2017). Figure 1 and Table 1 below show the number of immigrants in the United States in millions from 1900 to 2016 as adopted from Camarota and Zeigler (2017:3).




Table 1: Immigrant Population in the U.S. by Country and Region 1990-2016

Region	1990	2000	2010	2015	2016	Growth 2010-2016	%Growth 2010-2016
Sub-Saharan Africa	264,775	690,809	1,326,634	1,716,425	1,783,623	456,989	34%
Nigeria	55,350	134,940	219,309	323,635	306,874	87,565	40%
Ethiopia	34,805	69,531	173,592	228,745	244,924	71,332	41%
Ghana	20,889	65,572	124,696	155,532	171,428	46,732	37%
Kenya	14,371	41,081	88,519	129,905	129,670	41,151	46%
Somalia	2,437	36,139	82,454	89,153	93,020	10,566	13%

Source: 2016 American Community Survey from American Factfinder at Census.gov

An important dimension of recent trend of emigration from Nigeria is the flow of mostly economic migrants to diverse destinations around the world, particularly Europe. These movements are largely clandestine, involving risky passage via diverse transit points, such as through Senegal to Spain by way of the Canary Islands (Camarota and Zeigler, 2017). Individual stowaways hide aboard ships destined for Southern Europe or headed a far away East Asia. Unscrupulous agents, smugglers, and traffickers exploit desperate youth with promises of work and passages to Italy, Spain, France, etc. Such circumstances make them vulnerable to criminal gangs along the way.

Nigeria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that in 2008, at least 59,000 Nigerians without valid traveling documents were in North Africa seeking to migrate to Western Europe. About 8,000 were in Morocco, 16,000 in Algeria, 20,000 in Libya, and about 15,000 in Mauritania. Most of them got stranded in Senegal and Morocco for several years. Some ended up in jails in North Africa, or died on the perilous desert trails or in dangerous sea voyages with overcrowded rickety boats, which often capsize. The Nigerian Foreign Minister reported that over 10,000 Nigerians died between 1999 and 2002 while trying to cross to Europe through North Africa. Those who reach Europe today are increasingly being repatriated on arrival or soon thereafter.

In response, the Nigerian government has launched several initiatives, one of which is cooperation with the Moroccan authorities. The arrangement, which began in 2005 and is still in place, in its first year resulted in five joint operations that repatriated some 1,700 Nigerian nationals. The government is currently working with the International Organization on Migration (IOM) to facilitate the voluntary return and reintegration of Nigerian migrants living illegally in the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Italy. The government has also launched campaigns on the dangers of illegal migration and has supported linking the IOM program to its poverty-eradication strategies. But the truth is that none of these strategies and/or approaches has reduced the rate at which Nigerians are migrating to the United States and Europe.

The Nigerian Diaspora

There is no consensus on the exact number of Nigerians who live outside the country. Estimates from the last decade vary widely, from 3 to 6 million (the Nigerian National Volunteer Service, 2006) to 15 million (2002 *Christian Science Monitor* article), to about 20 million (Lagos-based Bank of Industry, 2009).

The bases for these estimates remain unclear, hence we use the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) estimate of about 1.13 million Nigerians living in another country in 2010. This number has consistently increased since 1960 (see Table 2). Of this group, 62 percent are in other African countries, with smaller shares in Europe and North America; a small presence in Asia, and a minimal presence in Oceania, Latin America, and the Caribbean.


Table 2: Nigeria's Emigrant Population, 1960 to 2017

Year	Number (in thousands/millions)
1960	94.1
1990	447.4
2000	488.2
2005	972.1
2010	1,127.70
2017	1,235

Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2009; UN,2017

Presenting a similar picture but with a breakdown by country that uses 2000-2001 census data, the University of Sussex's Global Migrant Origin Database reveals that nearly a quarter of Nigerians emigrants were in Sudan, with 14 percent in the United States, 9 percent in the United Kingdom, 8 percent in Cameroon, and 5 percent in Ghana (see Figure 3). Much smaller populations were scattered across other parts of Africa, Europe, and Asia.

Figure 3. Nigerian Emigrants by Country of Residence (percent of total), 2000-2001



Source: Development Research Centre (DRC), Global Migrant Origin Database, 2007

The question one may want to ask is: “Why is Sudan home to the largest population of Nigerian emigrants”? The most common explanation is a long history of sociocultural ties between Sudan and northern Nigeria, where most Nigerians in Sudan are from. Also, northern Nigerians who travel over land for the annual Islamic pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia go through Sudan, and many have settled there over the years.

In the 1993 Sudanese census, West Africans, under the label Nigerian tribes, were estimated to be about 1.4 million or 7.4 percent of northern Sudan's total population. The Hausa in Sudan, who work mainly in agriculture, are believed to be the largest Hausa Diasporas in the world. The Fulani among them can be divided into cattle owners and urbanized Fulani, while most of the Kanuri, believed to be among the earliest dwellers, have been fully Arabized (Keshi, 2010). Nigeria's ambassador to Sudan between 2005 and 2007, Mr. Dahiru Suleiman, was quoted in the Nigerian media as saying that Nigerians hold positions in the Sudanese government and the security services like the police but that most are subsistence farmers, poor, and/or poorly educated.

Recent actions of the Sudanese government suggest concerns about the legal status of these settlers. In March 2010, it was widely reported that Sudan deported 58 Nigerians, all northerners, and most of them women. The Sudanese authority said that some of the deportees had fake/ expired travel documents. However, journalist Ajikanle Nurudeen reported that the deportees were sent home because they were a nuisance to Sudan, as most of the deported women were blind and were beggars.

In recent years, Sudan has become a destination for younger Nigerians for work and study. BBC Sport journalist Oluwashina Okeleji reported that Nigerian footballers play in the Sudanese league to get on the radar of European scouts and hope to ultimately move to Europe (Mberu and Pongou, 2010).

For most educated Nigerians, the United States and the United Kingdom have been the top destinations. Using 2003 data, researchers from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) found that Nigeria has the second-highest percentage of highly skilled expatriates in OECD countries after Taiwan (de Haas, 2006). The US Census Bureau's 2008 American Community Survey (ACS) estimated a population of 206,604 Nigerian foreign born, making Nigeria the largest African source country of immigrants to the United States. According to the 2006-2008 ACS three-year estimates, Texas had the most Nigerian immigrants (about 17 percent of the population estimate for that three-year period), followed by Maryland and New York (about 12 percent each). The Nigerian Foundation in Houston, Texas, has estimated the size of the Nigerian community there (including US-born children) at 150,000 to 250,000. The US Department of Homeland Security's 2009 *Yearbook of Immigration Statistics* reported that 105,667 Nigerians obtained lawful permanent resident status in the United States between 2000 and 2009, with 15,253 in 2009 alone, 60 percent of them as immediate family members of US citizens. Nigerian adults

in the United States in 2008 were highly educated according to the 2008 ACS: 60.5 percent had a bachelor's degree or higher, more than double the share among all foreign-born (27.1 percent) and native-born (27.8 percent) adults.

In terms of industry, Nigerian immigrants in the civilian labor force were concentrated in educational services, and health care and social assistance (45.4 percent). Over half of Nigerian-born men and women reported working in management, professional, and related occupations. About 154,000 Nigerian-foreign-born were in the United Kingdom in September 2009 according to the Annual Population Survey of the UK Office for National Statistics. This made Nigeria the second-largest African source country after South Africa, and the ninth-largest overall. About 95,000 of the Nigerian-foreign-born lived in London, where the population was the fifth-largest of all foreign-born groups. Between 2007 and 2008, 10,560 Nigerians were granted British citizenship. The United Kingdom issued 1,690 settlement visas to those applying in Lagos and Abuja between April 2008 and March 2009. During the same period, the UK government granted 23,750 family visit visas at its Nigerian posts. Most of the Nigerians who migrate to the United Kingdom are work-permit holders, students, and refugees and asylum seekers. About 76 percent of Nigerians were employed, 7 percent were unemployed, and 17 percent were inactive in 2005-2006 (see United Nations Refugee Agency, 2015). According to the Labor Force Survey and Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) calculations, 50 percent of Nigerians were employed in public service and 27 percent in health and social work in 2005-2006 (de Haas, 2006).

Nigeria's Migration Policy and Regional Integration

The primary law governing immigration into Nigeria is the Immigration Act of 1963, currently governed by the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Following the principles of international law, the act provides that an alien can only enter Nigeria with a valid passport or other travel document and a visa or recognized entry permit. Admission into Nigeria is under specified conditions, including duration of stay, place of residence, place of employment, and restricted movement within the country (de Haas, 2006).

Migrants of African origin wishing to reside in Nigeria are required to regularize their papers after which they are issued a resident card. The card and registration allow them to bring family members, work, and own property and businesses in Nigeria. Migrants and members of their families are protected under the Nigerian constitution to seek redress in a court of law on any issue of conflict and entitled to earn the same wages as their Nigerian counterparts (Afolayan, 1988).

According to Brown (1989:251-273) Nigeria's policy on migration and migrant workers' rights is greatly influenced by the ECOWAS Treaty and its numerous protocols, conventions, and decisions. ECOWAS was founded in Lagos in May 1975 to strengthen regional economic integration through progressively freer movement of goods, capital, and people, and to consolidate states' efforts to maintain peace,

stability, and security. Nigeria has played not only a primary role in its founding, but also contributes about 32 percent of its budget as well as hosts its headquarters.

Onwuka (1982) revealed that the protocol on free movement of persons, residence, and establishment, adopted in 1979, outlined a three-phase implementation: (1) the right of entry, abolition of visas, and stays of up to 90 days; (2) the right of residency after 90 days to seek and carry out income-earning employment; and (3) the right of establishment of enterprises.

According to researcher M. Leann Brown, an estimated 2 million West Africans (as many as half of whom were Ghanaians) were employed illegally in Nigeria in the early 1980s, notably in oil-related industries, ports, textiles, hotels, security firms, teaching, and domestic services. Their presence fueled concerns about illegal activities such as smuggling of goods across the borders, prostitution, destitution, and vagrancy (Brown 1989).

Indeed, the protocol on free movement of persons was widely perceived as causing or exacerbating Nigeria's severe economic, social, and political problems, culminating in the Aliens Expulsion Order of 1983, during which nearly 1.5 million illegal West African migrant workers were expelled. While the precise number of aliens affected may not be known, the massive volume of illegal migration in Nigeria was obvious as it was estimated that at least 700,000 Ghanaians, 180,000 Nigeriens, 150,000 Chadians, 120,000 Cameroonians, 5,000 Togolese, and 5,000 Beninois, among others, were forced to leave (Adepoju, 1984).

The Nigerian government later amended the order so that certain skilled foreigners, such as secretaries, nurses, teachers, masons, and carpenters, could stay four weeks longer or become regularized. Also, employees of federal, state, and parastatal institutions, as well as citizens of ECOWAS states, Cameroon, and Chad who had come to Nigeria before 1963, were exempted. Despite the closure of the border in 1983, the government did not have the resources to prevent unauthorized movements. In 1984, Chadians, Cameroonians, and Nigeriens fled drought at home to come to northern Nigeria, with some Chadians also escaping political instability. Also, a significant number of illegal aliens did not heed the 1983 expulsion order, while others managed to filter back, prompting the military government that ousted the civilian government in December 1983 to issue a second order in May 1985: illegal migrants had to either regularize their residency permits or leave the country. Again, an estimated 700,000 persons were expelled, out of which 300,000 were Ghanaians and 100,000 were Nigeriens (Adepoju, 2007). Despite the emotions stirred by both expulsions, Nigeria was assessed to have acted within its rights under the ECOWAS agreement.

Impact of International Migration on Development in Nigeria

Crossing borders, whether by choice or necessity, brings both risks and opportunities (Landau and Achiume, 2015). As Africa's most populous country, Nigeria deals with a

range of migration issues, from massive internal and regional migration to brain-drain as a large, well-educated, highly skilled or talented Nigerians are in the West (mainly the United States and the United Kingdom) contributing immensely to the development of the western economy at the expense of their home country. Thousands of Nigerians seek economic refuge each year, and some also migrate illegally, transiting through North Africa and then crossing the Mediterranean to Europe.

Poverty drives much of this movement: more than 70 percent of Nigerians live below the national poverty line. At the same time, Nigeria is home to a large number of foreigners, including those attracted by the oil-export boom from the 1970s and displaced by political conflicts and civil wars in West Africa. Nigeria faces a number of complex challenges related to migration.

Positive Effects of migration in Nigeria

Godson (2010) revealed that international migration of highly skilled and other Nigerians to developed countries is not entirely negative. A study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago estimated that Nigerians in the US alone send \$1.3 billion each year, or more than six times the annual flow of US aid to Nigeria. A small sample survey of just over 100 Nigerians in Chicago found average remittances of \$6,000 per year. Migration is a decision that impacts the welfare of the household, the home community, and in the end the whole economy in various ways (Azam and Gubert, 2006). According to Nwajiuba (2005), the main channels through which migration alleviates poverty are increased incomes from remittances, access to finance for starting a new business, as well as tapping on to the knowledge and resources provided by the international community of the migrant diaspora. Besides pure monetary gains, migration and remittances allow for higher investment in health care and education. According to official estimates, migrants from developing countries sent over \$315 billion to their origin countries in 2009, three times the size of official development assistance (Ratha&Zhimei, 2010). Migration contributes to human capital formation. There is a growing body of evidence suggesting that the income from remittances is spent on education and health rather than everyday consumption (Adams, 2005; Adams et al., 2008). Also, it gives room for increase in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

Social impacts of migration can be rewarding experience as it improves household welfare; but in most cases, moving to another country and being separated from one's immediate family takes place at considerable emotional costs and increases the risks of family breakdown, fragmentation of social networks, and psychosocial stress (Kahn et al., 2003; D'Emilio et al., 2007). This simply implies that not all impacts of migration are positive: brain-drain and exploitation of migrants by unscrupulous recruiters or employers are reportedly widespread.

Negative Impacts of Migration on Nigeria

a) Brain Drain

The World Bank Development Prospects Group reported in 2007 an estimated emigration rate of 36 percent for Nigerians with tertiary education. This large number of Nigerians leaves the country for one reason or the other. In general, key drivers of migration of this class of people include higher wages in the destination country, secure employment or job security, career advancement and/or training, access to the best facilities and technologies, and political and economic circumstances at home. Nearly all of these are relevant to brain-drain from Nigeria.

According to Skeldon (2009) this issue is of great concern to African countries since essential skills for development in the region have been lost, thereby worsening the already inadequate capacity to meet development challenges. Many parts of the African continent are currently affected by shortage of qualified human resources, created in part by large-scale departure of professionals and university graduates. Thousands of African professionals including medical doctors, nurses, accountants, engineers, managers, and teachers, leave their home countries each year to pursue better prospects in other countries – both on and outside the continent. While this movement may have some limited beneficial effects in certain locales, in developing countries this brain-drain hampers sustainable development (African Union, 2006).

b) Capital Flight

Lack of academic experts in Nigeria due to the massive outflow of many Nigerian academics into foreign universities, has resulted in thousands of Nigerian students travelling on annual basis for further studies abroad. By this, Nigeria has lost a lot of revenue to the international community; the cash transferred to schools abroad would have been channeled to estate development, local fees payment, infrastructural and agricultural development in Nigeria.

In fact, the resulting brain-drain issue has heightened the dependency status of the Nigerian economy and compelled her to resort to the costly services of foreign experts in many areas, especially in the industrial, technological, and oil sectors of the economy. Nigeria has suffered a great deal in terms of capital flight in the hands of expensive foreign experts as they are paid in hard currencies (Dollars, Pounds Sterling, and Euro) to manage the key sectors of the economy. This colossal financial loss and capital flight on yearly basis have kept Nigeria perpetually on her knees.

The emigration of highly skilled persons implies a colossal loss of human resources that would have been invested in the education sector. Indeed, this has reduced Nigeria's productive capacity and worsens the business environment, especially in small economies (Docquier et al. 2010).

Nearly 15,000 Nigerians migrated legally to Europe and North America every year from 1995-2001, whilst there are estimated to be some 200,000 to 300,000 first- and

second-generation Nigerians living in the US, including perhaps as many as 21,000 Nigerian doctors. In Europe, it is estimated that there are some 45,000 Nigerians in the UK, 17,000 in Italy, and 15,000 in Germany. The exodus of Nigerian academics and students is said both to reflect and to have reinforced a decline in standards of university education in Nigeria. As a result, there are now said to be more Nigerian academics in the US than in Nigeria, with many not assuming jobs in relevant fields but working instead as taxi drivers, factory workers, or in other unskilled or low-skilled occupations.

Due to inflation, salaries in 1991 were so low that a professor in Nigeria earned 1 percent of the salary of his counterpart in South Africa, leading to low morale and low quality of teaching and research and a series of industrial strikes. Many professors sought better opportunities in the private sector or as consultants to international organizations or government; others migrated to the Middle East, South Africa, and other countries especially the United States and United Kingdom as their policies favor entry and permanent settlement of highly skilled migrants.

The significant number of Nigerians going to Europe through African countries like Libya in recent years is quite worrisome. Despite Nigeria's cooperation with several African and European governments, the European Union, the United States, and intergovernmental agencies on illegal immigration and human trafficking, yet the tempo is still high and challenging. Of the 150 million migrants in the world, more than 50 million are estimated to be Africans. Given that the number of migrants is rising and that this trend is likely to persist in the foreseeable future, the management of migration has necessarily become one of the critical challenges for States in the new millennium (African Union, 2006:3). This has a great implication on Nigeria's development.

It is argued that from independence to date, the levels of development in most of sub-Saharan Africa remain very low. By almost every development indicator, sub-Saharan Africa is categorized as and remains the least developed region of the world. Sub-Saharan African countries take the bottom place in the ranking for the Human Development Index, which is calculated on the basis of income, literacy, and life expectancy (UNDP 2009).

Findings

- International migration remains a threat to development in Africa at large, and Nigeria in particular.
- The adverse effects of international migration on Africa far outweighs the perceived advantages.
- In 2017, Nigeria recorded over 1.2 million emigrants. This is a colossal loss of human resources that would have been invested in different sectors of the Nigerian economy.

- Nigeria spends so much to sponsor her children's education in foreign universities due to lack expertise orchestrated by mass emigration of Nigerian experts in search of greener pastures abroad.
- The resulting brain-drain has heightened the dependency status of the Nigerian economy and compelled her to resort to the costly services of foreign experts in many areas, especially in the industrial, technological, and oil sectors of the economy.

Recommendations

- Nigeria needs to address the rate of poverty and more importantly the ethno-religious, political, and oil-related conflicts that push many to leave home. In addition, she needs to ensure a more dynamic economy that would absorb the teeming unemployed youth, who, in desperation, migrate illegally.
- The government needs to invest more in basic infrastructure, reduce corruption, and enhance security. This will attract the diaspora's commitment and even increase their return rate.
- Nigeria should work towards the elaboration and implementation of policies that facilitate the diaspora participation in social development. The Nigerian state should create an enabling environment for Nigerians in the diaspora, especially those in highly technical fields and high demand, to carry out some of their professional activities in their home countries as well in the entire continent without necessarily needing to give up their employment abroad. Nigeria should create an environment conducive to circular migration (brain circulation)
- There is need for strict adherence to Regional and International instruments protecting migrants and encouraging cooperation between security agencies, especially for more effective border controls.
- Nigerian government should encourage and promote FDI in order to generate employment and reduce migration outflow.
- African countries should cooperate in addressing the fundamental causes of migration and asylum seeking in countries of origin, transit, and destination

Conclusion

The number of international migrants worldwide has continued to grow rapidly in recent years reaching 258 million in 2017, up from 220 million in 2010 and 173 million in 2000. Nigeria and Africa at large need the formulation of workable policies to manage the risks/ losses from brain-drain. Until this is done, international migration will remain a threat to development in Africa at large and Nigeria in particular.

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Part Two

**Migration, Human Trafficking and the Governance
Question in Africa**

CHAPTER SIX

The African Union and Migration: Implications for Human Trafficking in Africa

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The African Union and Migration: An Introduction

The on-going process of regional economic integration in Africa, through the formation of RECs, was designed in large part to facilitate labour mobility and economic development. Many of such RECs or their precursors now exist such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC). There are also regional dialogues such as the Migration Dialogue for West Africa (MIDWA) and the Migration Dialogue for South Africa (MIDSA) (Adepoju, 2016). The AU at the level of the Heads of State Executive Council adopted the Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) in 2006 with the prioritisation of youth employment and harmonised labour market information systems. The Framework urges, among others, a comprehensive approach to regulatory and administrative measures to ensure safe, orderly, and productive migration. Since then, the efficacy of the framework has been evaluated and subsequently altered. Members met in Zanzibar in 2016 to update the MPFA and created a ten-year action plan for its implementation. This means that the AU has a position on migration as articulated in two policy documents: the MPFA and the African Common Position on Migration and Development (ACPMD), both introduced in 2006. In the MPFA, the AU provides for member states and African RECs to formulate policies that exploit migration for development. The ACPMD proposes eleven priority migration-related policy issues and recommendations for national, continental, and international action (Fioramonti and Nshimbi, 2016).

There is also the Joint Labour Migration Programme (JLMP) which is a four-year AU-led initiative for regional integration and development in Africa, co-sponsored by the AU Commission (AUC), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). It was endorsed by the Extraordinary Session of the AU Labour and Social Affairs Commission (LSAC) in Windhoek, Namibia, in April 2014, and adopted by AU Heads of State and Government at the 24th Session of the AU Assembly in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in January 2015. The JLMP mainly aims at strengthening the effective governance of labour migration and the promotion of decent work against the background of regional integration and inclusive development in Africa. The goals of this programme are consistent with Articles 6 and 71 of the Abuja

Treaty and the various AU goals seeking continental free movement and exchange of labour between member countries (Fioramonti and Nshimbi, 2016).

Also, the 2013 Youth and Women Employment Pact for Africa includes promotion of regional and sub-regional labour mobility and calls for an AU and RECs Labour Migration Plan. The AU aims to facilitate migration in Africa as well as tackle issues such as brain drain, brain waste, and security risks of migration. At the 17th Ordinary AU Summit held in Malabo in July 2011, African Heads of States and Government adopted a declaration which included commitments to harmonise labour market information systems (LMIS), address skills mismatch, and seek coherence in certification systems (Dimechkie, nd; Tambi, nd). The African passport is also a project of the AU. The Union aims to establish a common market enabling the free movement of all factors of production including labour, and abolishing all visa requirements for African citizens in all member states by 2018. In addition to this, the AU seeks to use migration as a means of development. This will be done through the promotion of low cost remittance transfers as well as human capital transfers (Tambi, nd). Additionally, the AU aims to improve the mobility of the African population as a method of inducing a brain gain. By promoting investment in the productive capacity of African states through increased education funding, they aim to expand student and academic mobility. In this way, African states, which are depicted as homogenous sufferers of the brain drain, can in fact experience a brain gain as those in education as well as the educated are able to go abroad and put their skills to use. The risks and downsides of migration are also addressed in the MPFA (Fioramonti and Nshimbi, 2016; Tambi, nd).

Realising the significance of labour migration, the Abuja Treaty encourages AU member states to adopt employment policies that will eventually allow free movement within the planned African Economic Communities (AEC) to be completed by 2028. The Treaty also calls on AU members to establish the right of residence and establishment for any citizen of a member state. The 1998 AU Protocol on Relations between the AEC and the RECs provides for inter-REC cooperation. For instance, at their 2005 Summit, COMESA, EAC, and SADC, proposed stronger and deeper economic integration, resulting in a tripartite free trade area for 26 African countries. Three years later, the tripartite leaders drew up a harmonisation programme for trading arrangements, free movement of people, joint implementation of inter-regional infrastructure programmes, and institutional arrangements for cooperation (Aniche, 2014; Fioramonti and Nshimbi, 2016).

There is also the intra-Africa Talent Mobility Partnership Programme (TMP) which is a voluntary initiative between selected African countries in West, East, and Southern Africa. The Africa Centre for Economic Transformation (ACET) in Ghana leads the programme in West Africa, while the Regional Multidisciplinary Centre of Excellence (RMCE) in Mauritius coordinates the programme in East and Southern Africa (Fioramonti and Nshimbi, 2016). The initiative seeks to establish Schengen-type

mechanisms for the movement of skilled labour as well as the development of skills in the regions. The World Bank's sponsored TMP also aims to promote the opening up of borders, establishment of common legislations and policies for labour mobility between African countries, and acceleration of economic integration. The TMP is premised on the understanding that professional skills inevitably move from areas of surplus to areas of scarcity. Therefore, an efficient regional labour migration framework would balance out the shortages and surplus supply of talent between sending and receiving countries within RECs and across the continent. The TMP's interventions are expected to enable the private sector in the participating RECs to source skills that are essential to boosting competitiveness, economic growth, and transformation. The TMP memorandum of understanding (MOU) prepared for participating countries addresses key issues aimed at tackling the challenges encountered by labour migrants such as regulations that hinder the granting of work permits, common standards on which qualifications for given professions can be evaluated, and the establishment of labour information systems (Fioramonti and Nshimbi, 2016).

The fact that all AU member states have signed into the JLMP can be interpreted as a commitment to achieving an effective continental labour migration regime for Africa's integration and development and to encouraging labour migration across national borders. State commitment to the free movement of labour is also seen in the voluntary participation in international projects that promote the transfer of skilled labour across borders such as the TMP (Fioramonti and Nshimbi, 2016).

The African Union (AU) now aims to criminalise and prosecute those involved in human trafficking and people smuggling in Africa (Tambi, nd). The UN defines human trafficking as:

the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs (UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000, p. 2).

Sometimes, there is a thin line between human smuggling and trafficking. This is precisely because what may start off as a human smuggling transaction ends up as human trafficking (IOM, 2010; Batsyukova, 2012). Trafficking can take different forms, and the crime in essence has three phases: recruitment, transportation, and exploitation. Recruitment for trafficking can be partially deceptive, fully deceptive, or

forced. In a partially deceptive recruitment, victims may be informed of the nature of the work but not of the conditions. While some victims are fully deceived as to what they are signing up for, others can be taken by force by the recruiters or directly by the traffickers. The recruiter is often someone known to the victim, in which case the offer of a job or an education opportunity may seem perfectly normal. Recruiters are usually good at manipulating people's dreams of a better life and using customs and traditions (such as fostering) to hide their intent. Once the victim is recruited, he/she is usually transported to another location (IOM/UNHCR, 2011).

The objective of this paper therefore is to examine AU role in promoting regional migration and the implication for human trafficking in the region. To achieve this objective, the paper is divided into five parts. After this introduction is a discussion of migration and human trafficking. This is followed by a section which considers the history of migration and trafficking in Africa. Then, there is a discussion of the AU's continental and regional integration projects and their implication on human trafficking. The last part offers a conclusion and suggests recommendations.

Migration and Human Trafficking

Smuggling of migrants is necessarily transnational, while trafficking in persons may be transnational or perpetrated within the borders of one state. Smuggling of migrants does not involve the exploitation of a person. On the other hand, exploitation is the purpose of trafficking in persons (TIP) and thus a key element of its definition. Also, the consent of a victim of trafficking (VOT) is irrelevant when any of the means provided for by the Protocol against TIP has been used, while in the case of smuggling of migrants, it is the smuggled migrants that resort to smugglers to emigrate (UNODC, 2015). Based on the above clarifications (as adopted by the 160 UN member states that have ratified the Protocol), there are three distinct "constituent elements" of trafficking in persons: the act, the means and the purpose. All three elements must be present in order for a case to be defined as a TIP. Each element has a range of manifestations (UNODC, 2014).

The TIP Protocol specifies that "the act" means the recruitment, transport, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons. "The means" refers to the method used to lure the victim. Possible means are threat, force, deception, coercion, abduction, fraud, abuse of power or a position of vulnerability, or giving of payments or benefits. "The purpose" is always exploitation of the victim, although this can take on various forms, including sexual exploitation, forced labour, removal of organs or a range of other forms (UNODC, 2014). Most trafficking flows are intra-regional. This means that the origin and the destination of the trafficked victim is within the same region. Often, the flow can also be within the same sub-region. For this reason, it is difficult to identify major global trafficking hubs. Victims tend to be trafficked from poor countries to more affluent ones (relative to the origin country) within the region. Most victims of TIP are foreigners in the country where they are identified as victims. In other words, these victims have been trafficked across at least one national border. Domestic trafficking

is also widely detected, and for one in three trafficking cases, the exploitation takes place in the victim's country of citizenship (UNODC, 2014).

While a majority of trafficking victims are subjected to sexual exploitation, other forms of exploitation are increasingly detected. Trafficking for forced labour has increased steadily in recent years. Some 40 per cent of the victims detected between 2010 and 2012 were trafficked for forced labour. Trafficking for exploitation that is neither sexual nor forced labour is also increasing. Some of these forms, such as trafficking of children for armed combat, or for petty crime or forced begging, can be significant problems in some locations, although they are still relatively limited from a global point of view. Even though males still comprise the vast majority of TIP, the share of women victims is nearly 30 per cent (UNODC, 2014).

The forms of exploitation vary according to context as the victims are trafficked to areas where the potential profit from their exploitation is the highest. Some forms of exploitation include sexual exploitation (pimping networks), forced labour (domestic work, gold mining sites, agriculture, fishing, construction, manufacturing, livestock), exploitation through begging and removal of organs. Forced labour accounts for 37 percent while sexual exploitation accounts for 53 percent of trafficking in Africa, while the rest is made of other forms of exploitation, including forced child begging or recruitment of child soldiers (UNODC, 2015).

To keep their victims in situation of exploitation, the traffickers exert several forms of control, including violence and threats of physical and psychological abuse on victims and their families, deception, blackmail, forcible confinement, debt to finance the trip, use of occult practices, psychological influence, manipulation or conditioning. The victims dare not to ask for help because most of the time they do not speak the language of the host community or are simply distrustful and too afraid of being exploited again or suffering new forms of violence by trying to escape (IOM, 2015; UNODC, 2015).

It has been observed that in spite of some legislative progresses made in some countries, there are still very few convictions for trafficking in persons. Only 4 in 10 countries reported having 10 or more yearly convictions, with nearly 15 per cent having no convictions at all (UNODC, 2014).

A Brief History of Migration and Trafficking in Africa

Africa has a long tradition of migration and human trafficking. The slaving and trading wars propelled massive population displacements and forced migrations, which continued right down to the nineteenth century (Osaghae, 2006). But trading in humans for sundry reasons predated the nineteenth century transatlantic slave trade in Africa. During this period, in Southern Africa, for instance, people migrated for work, trade, and cultural reasons. Large-scale migration towards South Africa became particularly significant after the discovery of diamonds in 1860s and gold in 1880s, which contributed to the development of an organised regional labour migration

system. Others migrated from conflict torn or minority ruled countries (e.g., Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe) to Tanzania and Zambia. Today, migration towards South Africa from the Southern African region and other parts of Africa remains mainly motivated by trade as well as opportunities to work (Crush, Williams & Peberdy, 2005; Fioramonti and Nshimbi, 2016).

During the apartheid regime, skilled professionals drawn mainly from Ghana and Nigeria migrated clandestinely to the then homeland states in South Africa. The numbers were small, mostly teachers, university professors, doctors, lawyers, nurses and engineers. After independence in 1994, the prospects of a booming economy in a democratic setting opened a floodgate for immigration into South Africa resulting in highly skilled professionals from Ghana and Nigeria migrating to South Africa to staff the universities and other professions. Also, tradesmen from Mali and Senegal - including street vendors and small traders, and a wide range of illegal migrants - allegedly migrated to South Africa engaging in illicit activities. Some of these illegal immigrants entered the country without proper documentation while others overstayed the legal residency (Adepoju, 1998).

In West Africa, migrants have historically included refugees, cross-border traders, professionals and clandestine workers. During the colonial era, Burkinabe, Malians and Togolese were contracted or subjected to compulsory work in plantations, mines and road construction in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria. These oil and gold economies historically attracted regional migrants while Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mali, and Togo supplied labour. Population pressures, poverty and post-independence conflicts have further spurred migration (Fioramonti and Nshimbi, 2016). A more recent phenomenon, one that accelerated in the 1960s and the 1970s, is the migration of ECOWAS nationals to Europe. This increase of migration to European shores has been fostered by the recurrent crises in West Africa, which pushes people out of their homes in search of livelihoods. Migration to Europe is also the result of the relative lack of economic opportunities in West Africa when compared to Europe (Altai Consulting, 2015).

Continental and Regional Integration and Human Trafficking

The objective of Africa's continental and regional integration programmes is to reduce to the barest possible minimum irregular forms of migration such as human trafficking, as evidenced by the MPFA, ACPMD and the existing RECs in Africa. In spite of these efforts, it appears that irregular migration and the various forms of human trafficking are not reducing. A case in point is the "Triangle of Shame". This is the Niger/Chad/Nigeria border. In this zone, hundreds of girls trafficked from Edo State, Nigeria, end up in the sex industry in Italy (Adepoju, 2005; Yaro, 2008; Sofie and Olsen, 2011).

In some cases, migration of children and child fostering are frequent and accepted practices that are considered to be strategies for coping with poverty. In Burkina Faso,

9.5 percent of children from age 6 to 17 do not live with their parents, and out of these 29 percent live abroad, mostly in Cote d'Ivoire. These practices increase children's vulnerability to traffickers, and can be used to cover practices that amount to trafficking (Carling, 2006; Shaw, 2007). For example, Kebede (2001), described a range of situations faced by Ethiopian women who become VOTs. Often the woman (or young girl) is promised legitimate work but forced into prostitution on arrival. In some cases voodoo rituals are used to bind the girl and her family to an agreement. In some cases, prostitution is considered legal as in Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Mauritius and Uganda, and this can make it difficult to enforce laws against trafficking (Shaw, 2007).

Victims are transported from countries and regions of origin to destination countries and regions, which can be domestic or international. It can be done illegally with the help of smugglers, or by using legal travel documents and routes. Transportation can be done by air, sea or land. In short, it can be any type of relocation: from a short bus trip to a months-long journey across countries. Usually, however, travel arrangements are made by the recruiters or traffickers (or their agents). The victim might also begin to feel loyalty towards the traffickers, as a survival mechanism, and might potentially suffer from memory loss and be unable to recount their story, due to post traumatic stress syndrome, or a forced drug habit. Victims are often accompanied and are kept from making contact with other people. Sometimes, the victims give misleading information. As a result, victims of trafficking (VOTs) are often unable to find their way back and might not even know the country of their destination. Once at the destination, exploitation awaits the victim. It should be noted, however, that some VOTs might already be exploited while making the journey, and that some people may become VOTs along the migration route (IOM/UNHCR, 2011; IOM, 2012).

The purpose behind recruiting and transporting someone is personal profit through exploitation. The traffickers can receive direct financial gain or profit through the free or almost free services and labour provided by the victim. The exploitation can happen in various ways and different situations. However, the local context determines who is at risk of trafficking and how they can be exploited. Common forms of exploitation include sexual exploitation, forced labour, slavery, servitude, forced begging, forced marriage, forced military service (child soldiering), and removal of organs (IOM/UNHCR, 2011).

Martin, Martin and Weil (2002) estimated that 15,000 Malian children between the ages of 12 and 18 had been sold into forced labour on northern Cote d'Ivoire plantations over a period of few years, with even greater numbers pressed into domestic service. Black (2004) estimated that 10,000 Nigerian prostitutes work in over 300 brothels in Europe and South America. It became so easy to get Nigerian documents with false information that the Dutch authorities came to view them as invalid until verified (Gastrow, 1999; Shaw, 2007).

Movements are more clandestine and spontaneous involving riskier passages and trafficking via more diverse transit points. Some of the migrants enter the host countries clandestinely as tourists or students and later work and live there without officially changing their status. Others travel via intermediate countries such as Cape Verde, Gambia or Guinea to obtain false documentation for a fee *en route* to Italy, Libya, Portugal, or Spain invariably via another country, giving rise a multi-polar and multidimensional migratory path. While some continue with the traditional two-step moves from a village to a coastal city and then to Europe, many others pursue varied routes through Sahelian or coastal African cities to reach Europe (Adepoju, 2000).

The irregular routes to Europe are numerous but most move through Libya. These routes are dynamic and shift according to levels of control along particular borders. For example, sea crossings to the Canary Islands and through the Strait of Gibraltar decreased in response to greater controls put in place since 2006. The journeys are often fatal, with migrants perishing not only in the Mediterranean but also in the Sahara, and the numbers of deaths along the way are increasing (Altaï Consulting, 2015). Several migration theories (such as theories on new economic labour and transnationalism) have shown that former colonial push-pull models cannot grasp the complexity of the current focus on communities, households and migrant's agency. Trends are changing in terms of migrants' profiles, routes taken and destinations chosen (Sofie and Olsen, 2011). There are however three main routes to Europe from Africa. These are: the Central Mediterranean Route through Niger, the Central Mediterranean Route through Mali, and the Western Mediterranean Route from Mauritania (IOM, 2015; UNODC, 2015; Adepoju, 2016).

The Central Mediterranean Route through Niger is the most prominent route to North Africa and Europe. Agadez in Niger, is the main hub for smuggling to Europe. Migrants found on this route are from all over West Africa. From Agadez, there are two main routes north, either through Libya or Algeria. The route to Libya moves from Agadez to Dirkou, Seguidine, Madama, and Tummo and often ends up in Sebha. It costs around USD 150-200. The route to Algeria moves from Agadez to Arlit, Assamaka and In-Guezzam and often ends up in Tamanrasset for about USD 100. From Tamanrasset, migrants move with smugglers and continue either through the desert to the Libyan border or continue up north to Morocco. The journey to Morocco passes through Ghardaia and then Oran, Maghnia and over the Moroccan border into Oujda and Nador. Local authorities estimated the number of people transiting through Niger on their way to North Africa in 2015 at 80,000 to 110,000 (2,500 per week) (IOM, 2015; Adepoju, 2016).

The Central Mediterranean Route through Mali is an alternative to the Nigerien route and is often taken by Malians and migrants from the Atlantic coast of Africa, including Gambians, Guineans, and Senegalese. This route, although still active, has suffered from the conflict in North Mali that triggered more irregular and unsafe journeys. The route often moves from Gao to Borj Mokhtar (Algerian border) and ends up in

Tamanrasset. From Libya, migrants move to either Italy or Malta. The main departure point for boat crossings across the Mediterranean along the Central Mediterranean route is Libya. Libya is the main departure point for boat crossings to Italy, with 83 percent of boat arrivals in Italy in 2014 having departed from the Libyan coast. Earlier in 2012, while Libya was still the most common departure point, not less than 40 percent of all arrivals in Italy had departed from the Libyan coast (UNODC, 2015; Adepoju, 2016).

The Western Mediterranean Route from Mauritania to the Canary Islands in Spain received significant flows until 2006, when increased controls decreased movements along this route. In addition, the land routes to Morocco through the desert are constrained by the Mauritanian military zone in the north east of Mauritania (East of the 10th Meridian West and North of the 20th parallel) at the Algerian, Moroccan, and Malian borders for security reasons. For those who take the route from Morocco to Spain, sea routes traditionally cross the strait of Gibraltar from Tangier to Tarifa (a distance of only 14-30kms), and land routes involve crossing the fences into the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa. Recent trends also show sea crossings to these enclaves (by taking a boat from one side of the border to the other). Most of the migratory flows in the Western Mediterranean were traditionally carried out by sea; however, in recent years, the sea crossings have decreased, as a result of greater monitoring, and the flows overland have increased. In 2013, nearly two-thirds of the detected irregular border crossings on the Western Mediterranean route were reported at the land borders in Ceuta and Melilla. In 2014 there were 7,842 detections of illegal border-crossings along the Western Mediterranean route, which is an increase by 15 percent when compared to 2013 (6,838) (IOM, 2015; UNODC, 2015).

In more recent times, migrants have attempted to enter Ceuta by boat by sailing around the coast. Traditionally, migrants made the crossing with smugglers, which was quite expensive and could cost them up to USD 3,000. More recently, migrants have started to make the journey on their own. Typically, a group of migrants put their money together and buy vessels with which to make the journey (usually basic rubber dinghies and sometimes row boats). As a result, the vessels are much less seaworthy, making the journey more dangerous. In more recent years, controls in Tangier have increased and successful sea crossings have become more and more difficult (UNODC, 2014; Adepoju, 2016). There is also a route by air that is utilised by migrants that can afford it. Sometimes it is carried out with the help of a smuggler and sometimes it requires the purchase of a visa. In Senegal, this practice is commonly used by migrants wishing to reach Europe (mainly Italy and Spain). Some Senegalese first move to Morocco by land and then fly to Europe from there, as they do not need a visa to enter Morocco (a 45-day visa is issued on arrival) and flights from Morocco to Spain and Italy are cheaper than from Senegal (UNODC, 2014; IOM, 2015).

A majority of the migrants on this route are from West Africa (in particular Malians) but also Cameroonians, Algerians, Moroccans, etc. Migrants that wish to cross the

fence into Melilla tend to wait in the forests surrounding Nador (Gourougou) and Oujda for long periods of time. They usually make the attempted crossings in very large groups (sometimes more than a hundred people and lately even several hundreds) who storm the fences together, allowing some migrants to pass through while the majority are stopped by authorities. Those that storm the fences are typically young and strong men of sub-Saharan origins. The fences are six metres high and topped with barbed wire in most parts, so it requires a lot of strength and is quite dangerous. Very few women have ever crossed the fences. Migrants that can afford to do so also tend to avoid the crossing of the fences in favour of crossing the border with a fake or rented Moroccan passport, as Moroccans are permitted into these enclaves for limited periods of time without visa requirements. Algerians tend to use this technique more than West Africans for they can pass more easily for Moroccans. A forged Moroccan passport costs around USD 2,000, which is also why West Africans are less likely to adopt this method (IOM, 2015; Adepoju, 2016).

EU member states' authorities registered 114,000 arrivals of irregular migrants identified/rescued during the first 8 months of 2014 in the central Mediterranean region, which is six times higher than in 2013 at the same period. Italian authorities, through their Mare Nostrum operation, supported by civilian vessels, rescued 150,000 migrants between 2013 and 2014. The Libyan coast is by far the most concerned, with nine departures out of ten leaving from this country. Among the migrants rescued in this part of the Mediterranean, nationalities identified include among others Malians, Senegalese, Nigerians and Gambians. (UNODC, 2015).

While much focus has been put on deaths at sea in the discourse around irregular migration to Europe, some experts in the region believe that deaths in the desert are probably even more commonplace. Migrants interviewed in Libya and Niger reported that many were injured during these expeditions, while malnutrition and dehydration in the desert were also commonplace. Migrants generally eat once a day, sometimes contending with only biscuits, and trips often take much longer than expected, sometimes several weeks, due to mechanical issues. These lead to migrants being exposed to shortage of water and food. Expectedly, migrants who become ill are often dumped by the smuggler in the desert to prevent the rest of the group from being contaminated (IOM, 2013; Adepoju, 2016).

Deaths in the Mediterranean represent 73 percent of the total number of deaths at sea globally, making it the deadliest sea in the world. In 2014, an estimated 2,993 people lost their lives while attempting to cross the Mediterranean compared to an estimated 600 in 2013. The 2015 figures are likely to surpass those of 2014, as from the January 1 to September 16, an estimated 2,812 have already perished in the Mediterranean. Of those who lost their lives in the Mediterranean in 2015, sub-Saharan Africans were the largest identifiable group (IOM, 2015; UNODC, 2015; Adepoju, 2016). Smugglers in Libya use vessels that are not seaworthy. They are usually dinghies that have the capacity for a maximum of 30 people but are often filled with over 200 people. These

boats are difficult to manoeuvre due to their weight and inadequacy. Migrants interviewed in Nigeria who had returned from Europe described long journeys of up to eight days at sea. Travellers on board were often sick, without adequate food or water, and often resorted to drinking sea water in order to survive (Altai Consulting, 2015).

Undocumented migrants are vulnerable to abuse. In South Africa, sectoral studies reveal widespread economic and sexual exploitation in sectors with large number of irregular migrants, accompanied by substantial fear among migrants (Black, 2004). Trafficked women can even find difficulties in obtaining public help. For example, in South Africa many shelters for battered women require a South African identity card as a condition of entrance (Shaw, 2007). Most women migrants from Ethiopia to the Middle East are transported by either traffickers or smugglers, and are not recorded in official statistics.

Not all African countries in the West Africa region experience the same levels of trafficking. Mauritania reported fewer case of trafficking while Nigeria is reported to experience particularly high levels of trafficking with the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) reporting that there are no less than 100,000 Nigerians trafficked each year, particularly women in a context of sexual exploitation, and young boys in a context of labour exploitation (Adepoju, 2016). The number of women who arrived irregularly by boat in Italy in 2014 in the context of trafficking for sexual exploitation increased by 300% when compared to arrivals in 2013 and Nigerian women account for most of the increase (but there was also an increase in the numbers of trafficked Cameroonian women). Some actors in Italy also felt that there is a demand for the women in Europe, which also encourages the flow. In addition to Italy, these women are also trafficked to Spain, the UK, Belgium, Finland, Russia, France and Norway. Some of them are also trafficked to Saudi, Kuwait, the Emirates and Egypt to undertake domestic work (IOM, 2015).

It has been observed that most VOTs into Italy that come from rural areas in Edo State, Nigeria, tend to be 22 years old or younger, and quite innocent. They always have a very basic level of education and either come from very large families or are orphans. Most VOTs believed that they were coming to Italy to do domestic work but even those that realised that they would be forced into prostitution were not aware of the level of exploitation that they would be exposed to. Most of them believed that they would make much more money than they actually do, which is generally common for all migrants, not just the VOTs, and most were not aware of the modalities of their prostitution. They did not realise they would be soliciting on the street. Traffickers organised the entire journey for the women, from their location of origin, to the final destination, through an integrated trans-national criminal network (UNODC, 2014; IOM, 2016).

More recently, cases of young boys and girls being trafficked to Belgium for sexual exploitation have been reported. Perhaps, one of the most popular child trafficking cases in the last decade is the “Ark of Zoé” incident, in which a French association tried to take 103 children to Paris (de Andrés, 2008).

Child trafficking also occurs in a context of forced begging. An example is what obtains in Senegal where some of those who begged are trafficked from neighbouring countries. They are often threatened with physical and emotional abuse if they fail to meet the established daily quota for begging (IOM, 2015; UNODC, 2015).

The crime of TIP affects virtually every country in every region of the world. Between 2010 and 2012, victims with 152 different citizenships were identified in 124 countries across the globe. Moreover, trafficking flows criss-cross the world. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has identified at least 510 flows based on official data reported by national authorities (UNODC, 2014).

Since UNODC started to collect information on the age profile of detected trafficking victims, the number of children among the detected victims has been increasing. Globally, children now comprise nearly one-third of all detected trafficking victims. Out of every three child victims, two are girls and one is a boy, or in a ratio of two is to one. In Africa, children comprise a majority of the detected victims.

Italian authorities have reported that criminal networks accept even human organs as payment from migrants who are not able to pay for their trips. The migrants may be abandoned in the desert, transformed into objects of exploitation or subjected to other forms of abuse, or held in inhumane conditions. Some migrants may find themselves stranded in their migratory journey for various reasons (theft of their personal effects and financial resources, health problems putting them in critical financial situations, insufficient resources to continue their journey, etc.) and have to find the funds needed to continue their journey. Finding such resources may be by working, borrowing, receiving remittances or engaging in unlawful activities or by contracting a debt to the smugglers with the hope that they will repay the debt progressively or when they arrive their destination (UNODC, 2015).

TIP and smuggling of migrants generate and feed corruption. Corruption in the context of TIP may be visible both in the act of trafficking itself, in the criminal justice system, or in the protection of victims. Corruption in smuggling of migrants is also found at several levels and primarily through border crossings, facilitation of the stay in a given territory or production of travel and identity documents. It manifests in complicity or inaction of border authorities, obstruction, communication of information, etc. It may involve administrative or diplomatic authorities (consulates, prefectures, etc.), border officers, customs officers, immigration officers, police, traditional authorities, judicial authorities, private sector, and civil society (IOM, 2015; UNODC, 2015). The bottom-line is that traffickers and smugglers take undue advantage of AU’s promotion of

migration in Africa to embark upon both regular and irregular transit migration to traffic and smuggle migrants to Europe and other destinations. The resultant effect is increasing human trafficking in Africa.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Migration has dominated news cycles and academic conversations in recent years as illegal migration from Africa through the Mediterranean, and the many resultant deaths have been discussed frequently. A great deal of the discourse in the field of migration focuses on the movement of people from the global south to the global north. That trend in migration discourse ignores the fact that migration between developing countries accounts for almost half of all migration cases (Shaw, 2007). Irregular migrants are victims of serious violations of their physical integrity throughout their journey and are particularly vulnerable to abuse. The vulnerability of migrants, in such conditions, is very high. The perpetrators of such abuses may be the smuggling and trafficking networks, the authorities of transit countries, militias or other armed groups controlling these regions (UNODC, 2015).

It can be concluded that AU's promotion of regional migration does not reduce TIP on the continent. This is because, despite the moves towards regional integration, as defined by different stages of RECs in Africa, there is also a concomitant rise in human smuggling and trafficking on the continent. This disjuncture suggests that, Africa should rethink the neo-functional strategy to regional integration and embrace post-neofunctional approach (a composite of neo-nationalism, post-nationalism and humanism) which advocates that regionalism in Africa should proceed from national integration and establishment of regional security organisation (Aniche, 2018).

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CHAPTER SEVEN

Globalization and its 'Born Throwaways': Exploring the Impact of Neo-Liberal Reforms on Irregular Migration in Africa

*Elias Chukwuemeka Ngwu, Anthony Chinedu Ugwu
and Emeka Charles Iloh*

Introduction

Migration is an age long phenomenon but its tide has been given a boost by contemporary globalization (Nwanunobi & Ezeah, n.d.). This has resulted in unprecedented movement of people within and across national boundaries. For instance, it is estimated that about 258 million people reside in countries other than their country of birth (*International Migration Report, 2017*) compared to an estimated 120 million people in 1990 (The World Bank, 2012); and that about 3.4% of the world population is accounted for by international migrants.

The *International Migration Report* (2017) suggests that international migration makes an important contribution to population growth in many parts of the world, including the reversal of population decline in some countries or areas. Between 2000 and 2015, for instance, migration is said to have contributed 42% of the population growth in Northern America and 31% in Oceania. It has also been reported with respect to Europe that the size of the total population would have declined during the period 2000-2015 were it not for migration. Interestingly, as of 2017, around three quarters (74%) of all international migrants were of working age, or between 20 and 64 years of age, compared to 57% of the global population. Since international migrants comprise a larger proportion of working-age persons compared to the overall population, a net inflow of migrants lowers the dependency ratio, that is, the number of children and older persons compared to those of working age in the destination countries. With regard to the origin countries, however, it has been noted that in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean, the net impact of migration on population growth is negative in most countries, particularly in some small developing countries where the negative impact of outmigration on the size of the population could be substantial, especially among adults of working age. It is for this that Africa has come to be rightly regarded as a continent of mass displacement and forced migration caused by poverty and violent conflict, with millions of Africans waiting to cross to Europe at the first opportunity (Black, Crush, & Peberdy, 2006) in what is generally referred to as irregular migration.

Irregular migration occurring from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb to Europe has increasingly been viewed as a security problem associated with international crime, trafficking, and terrorism (Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2014; Cuttitta, 2007;

Goldschmidt, 2006; Lutterbeck, 2006). One fallout of this is that African migrants have become the object of hostility and victims of obnoxious state policies in both destination and transit countries in the migration value chain.

Even though the depiction of African migration as being driven by despair has been challenged by a handful of modernization scholars on the ground that “such ideas are based on assumption, selective observation or journalistic impressions rather than on sound empirical evidence” (Flahaux & Haas 2016, p. 2), there is no doubting that heightened migration is an inevitable outgrowth of unfulfilled liberal promises. Against the backdrop of this contestation, this paper brings into bold relief the nexus between the dislocation of African political economy arising from the implementation of globalization’s handmaid, neoliberal reforms, and the swelling number of displaced Africans desperate to flee their countries, even at great risk to their persons. The paper also highlights how the implementation of neoliberal immigration policies in destination countries has created an army of irregular migrants in transit countries who become a mass of social outcasts, or ‘born throwaways’ in some parlance, and targets of local law enforcement agents, and victims of modern day slave merchants, including organ harvesters.

Some Conceptual Issues

Globalization

Globalization has been the subject of intense debate among intellectuals regarding its meaning and consequences (Akopari, 2000). It is viewed by some as a purely economic phenomenon that involves the spatial reorganisation of production and the expansion of trans-border financial flows in ways that defy state borders. This view holds that the linkages between national economies have been profusely intricate, and that the world has become a 'global village' as a result. From a purely economic perspective, therefore, globalization refers to the international integration of economies with regard to markets for goods, factors of production, and technology (Bigsten & Durevall, n.d). Others perceive it as a socio-cultural process, involving not only a diffusion of cultural ideologies (McGrew, 1992) but also a diffusion of tastes, exemplified in the phenomenal spread of the fast-food industry (Shaw, 1999). Yet, globalization also has a political component involving an emphasis on the dismantling of authoritarian political structures, the building of western-styled democratic institutions and erosion of state power. With the abatement of the cold war, neo-liberalism, the dominant element of globalization, became a hegemonic international force, and globalization came to be rightly perceived as a western ideology reflecting a complete system of ideas, values, and orientations (Ahmed, 1999).

Regardless of the ideological posturing and the political pretensions associated with the term, globalization exhibits certain obtrusive and incontrovertible characteristics, namely:

- the integration of financial markets across the world;
- the increasing power and outreach of international corporations;

- increasing international communications through technological innovations such as the Internet;
- high mobility of capital unencumbered by state restrictions;
- a rise in the power of capital vis-à-vis social entities, including the state and labour; and
- the rise to hegemony of the neoliberal ideology which emphasizes economic and political liberalization and a curtailment of state power (Mengisteab, 1998, p. 2; Marshall, 1999, p. 259).

Globalization and Africa's Development

Opinion is divided on the consequences of globalization. One perception led by the United States and its western allies, along with the dominant Bretton Woods institutions, argue that globalization with its intrinsic free market principles offers incredible opportunities for development. This perspective is consistent with the old modernization assumption that sanctifies international free trade as the engine for growth and development. This view implies that the liberalization of global trade ensures the free movement of labour, capital, and technology, which become available to countries that lack them. For Africa, it is argued that private investments would create jobs for the unemployed millions (The Economist, cited in the Sunday Times, 5 March 2000).

This view was sharply counteracted by critics who saw globalization as nothing more than 'myths' (Akilagpa, 1999). Drawing on the challenges which neo-liberal economic policies posed to Africa in the past, these critics opined that rather than ameliorating, globalization would compound Africa's developmental crisis by reversing the few gains it made during the cold war years, and exposing the continent 'to the profit maximizing greed of western corporations' (Tandon 1998, p. 3). In fact, some critical observers not only expressed caution in celebrating whatever opportunities globalization apologists claimed it offered, but were also critical of the very analogy of the 'village' used to describe globalization. According to such critics, the inequitable distribution of gains and pains among regions and countries stands in stark contrast with life in a village.

Hamelink (1994, p. 1), for instance, stated thus:

the authors of [the village imagery] know very little about village life. In the village, most people know what is going on and know each other. The opposite is true in the real world; there is more going on than ever before, yet most of us know very little about it and the majority of the world's citizens have little knowledge or understanding of each other. Even in relatively smaller regions such as Western Europe, there are myriad cultural differences that often obstruct meaningful communication.

It was further argued that even within industrialized countries such as the United States and United Kingdom there were marked differentiations, and that they were being further deepened in the face of globalization. This, according to Yearley (1996,

p. 23), showed that even 'a global world is not a uniform world', and that rather than promoting a uniform world, globalization is exacerbating differences between regions and between countries.

In his famous Reith lecture on globalization, Giddens (1999) observed that the share of world's poorest fifth population in global income dropped from 2.3 percent to 1.4 percent over the past 10 years, coinciding with the thickening of globalization. While at the same time, the proportion taken by the world's fifth rich has risen from 70 percent to 85 percent. He noted further that 20 SSA countries now have lower incomes per head than they did two decades ago. Giddens further explained with respect to sub-Saharan Africa that the asymmetry in the distribution of benefits under the current orthodoxy, and in particular the tendency for multinational corporations to control its resources, depicted globalization more as promoting global 'pillaging' than establishing a global 'village'. This pillaging, coupled with vast differences between the urban centers and the rural areas, accentuated by globalization, altered the dynamics of migration in Africa.

Migration: Nature and typologies

Conventional definitions view migration as the movement of people from one country to another for settlement that is often permanent. A more working definition has however broadened the definition to encompass the movement of people from one location to another within and beyond their country of normal residence. This intra- or inter-state migration can either be permanent or temporary. The decision to migrate permanently may be spawned by unfavourable economic, political or environmental conditions prevailing in the home country. And, even though there is a strong attachment of the emigrant to the home country and to relatives, the net benefits of permanent migration are generally considered to outweigh the advantages of not migrating. Temporary emigrants on the other hand, are those who consider the attachment to their relatives strong enough to outweigh any potential advantages migration may offer and thus demonstrate desires to return home when conditions that precipitated their initial movement have stabilized (Akokpari, 2000).

A further dichotomy in the migration discourse is whether the movement is voluntary or forced. In general, voluntary migrants are those who relocate within or beyond their countries of origin at their own discretion rather than for uncontrollable factors. Voluntary migrants mostly, though not always, include people seeking better social and economic opportunities in other regions or countries. This category of emigrants is often referred to as economic refugees and includes professionals who see the salaries and working conditions in their home countries as incommensurate with their expertise. In recent years, growing economic adversities have also compelled unskilled individuals to take economic refuge in relatively affluent countries where they engage in unskilled jobs or more generally in informal market (Akokpari, 2000).

Involuntary or forced migrants on the other hand are those who relocate either proactively or reactively because of conditions beyond their control. This is the category of migrants conventionally referred to as refugees. According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR):

A refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group. Most likely, they cannot return home or are afraid to do so. War and ethnic, tribal and religious violence are leading causes of refugees fleeing their countries (<https://www.unrefugees.org/refugee-facts/what-is-a-refugee/>).

A key question facing host countries in recent years is whether to consider economic refugees as forced migrants. Two main contrasting views have been canvassed on this. The first view, consistent with prevailing international orthodoxy, posits that economic refugees are not covered by international protocols. According to this view, migration caused by declining opportunities is purely voluntary since existing international instruments do not classify economic crises among the phenomenon or events that may 'seriously disturb public order' and therefore warrant migration. In this wise, economic refugees who fail to procure the relevant migration documents are often referred to as 'illegal' emigrants by the host country precisely because in terms of the immigration laws, these are unauthorized entrants (Akokpori, 2000). This category of emigrants is often, sometimes wrongly, associated with criminal activities and become the objects of pursuit by the security establishment in the host country.

A second view, which is antithetical to the conventional position, depicts economic migrants as refugees. This perspective equates the unpropitious economic conditions in a country to a violation of the basic human rights of the citizens. Thus, like wars, which threaten the right to life and peace, economic hardships are seen as equally threatening the right to employment and decent living. For this view, then, deepening economic crisis dramatized in astronomical inflation, unemployment and declining standards of living, are sufficient causes for forced migration. However, as noted earlier, international conventions do not so far recognize migration based on economic adversities as forced; and people who migrate on this reason without formal documentation often risk harassment from immigration and law enforcement authorities in the host country. The contention, however, is that in whatever form or type migration takes, it is sparked or facilitated in recent years by the force of globalization. Given that majority of those displaced by war and conflict in Africa take refuge in neighbouring African countries, with neither the means nor the connections to make it to the industrialized countries, it follows that the bulk of outmigration from Africa is economically induced (Akokpori, 2000). And, since economic migrants are prime targets of state security apparatuses in industrialized countries, prospective economic migrants have since abandoned the formal migratory processes and have opted to travel via several irregular routes.

Understanding Irregular Migration

The meaning of irregular migration has been a subject of some irregular interpretations with the effect that it has often been used interchangeably with 'illegal migration'. However, 'illegal migration' has increasingly been restricted to cases of smuggling and trafficking of persons (Lopez-Lucia, 2015). Jordan and Düvell (2002, p. 15) defined an irregular migrant as someone who crosses a border without proper authority or violating conditions for entering another country. International Organization for Migration (IOM), on its website, conceives of irregular migration as the movement of people that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries (<https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms>, June 2018).

Kuschminder, de Bresser & Siegel (2015, p. 10) identified three principal ways migrants can enter irregularly:

- Entering a country without proper authority, either through clandestine entry or with fraudulent documents;
- Entering with authorization but overstaying that authorization; and
- Deliberately abusing the asylum system.

Morehouse and Blomfield (2011, p. 4) documented eight ways in which non-nationals become unauthorized migrants:

- Illegal entry (illegal border crossing)
- Entry using false documents
- Entry using legal documents, but providing false information in those documents
- Overstaying a visa-free travel period or temporary residence permit
- Loss of status because of nonrenewal of permit for failing to meet residence requirements or breaching conditions of residence
- Being born into irregularity
- Absconding during the asylum procedure or failing to leave a host state after a negative decision
- A state's failure to enforce a return decision for legal or practical reasons (toleration).

De Haas (2008) noted a critical difference between irregular *entry* and irregular *stay*. According to him, a migrant could enter a country without documentation and thus be considered irregular, but that individual could later acquire regularization, and his stay therefore ceases to be irregular. Conversely, a migrant could enter regularly, such as with a visa, but could become irregular by overstaying the visa. For instance, it has been reported that prior to 2014, the majority of irregular migrants residing in the EU entered regularly, either based on short-term visa-free regimes or with a visa, but they overstayed their visas or took up employment in violation of their visa restrictions, and thus became irregular migrants (Kuschminder, et al. 2015). The World Bank (2011)

reported that the main irregular migration flow within Africa is the trans-Saharan migration route, with 90% of the migrants planning to migrate to Europe.

Neoliberal Reforms and Irregular migration in Africa

The ‘thickening’ of globalization from the 1990s involved the implementation of a set of neoliberal reforms prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This entailed opening national markets to foreign competition, reducing the role of the state in providing services, and abolishing subsidies to the poor (Gumede, 2016). Africa’s experience with neoliberal reforms has, however, been criticized on several grounds. First is that neoliberal economic reforms have largely failed to generate socio-economic recovery and a broader social well-being (Konings, 2012) but has instead resulted in stalled growths, low investment rates, increasing volatility in economic performances, growing aid dependency, and a worsening income distribution (Oya, 2007). It has also been argued that the social impacts of economic liberalization, such as reduction in state expenditure on health and education, and introduction of user-fees, have further exacerbated social hardship (Murphy, 2017), and proven to be disappointing (Abrahamsen, 2000; Ferguson, 2006; Harrison, 2010).

The political liberalization of many African states has, nonetheless, been credited with changing Africa’s political landscape in certain respects. Between 1990 and 2004, for instance, multiparty elections were held in 42 African countries and a wave of constitutional revisions enshrined rights of expression and association (Rakner & Svasand, 2005, p. 85). This notwithstanding, multiparty elections have done little to alter the dynamics of authoritarian and neo-patrimonial regimes in Africa (Chabal & Daloz, 1999). For one thing, many African elections have been little more than elaborately staged ceremonies that authoritarian leaders used to ratify their rule (Murphy, 2017). Konings (2012, p. 4) surmised that neoliberal reforms in Africa within the formal structures of liberal democracy and a market economy, have failed as evidenced by “the ongoing power base of incumbent political leaders; the acquisitive nature of opposition parties and the lukewarm commitment to democratization by western states.

In the views of Ngwu (2016, p. 2):

the past few decades of democratization in Africa has remained utterly indistinguishable from what it was during the draconian military rules. The ophelimities of life have retained their illusory characteristics, the looting of the nation’s treasury has continued unabated, and life has, more than ever before, become nasty, brutish, and indeed short in the mist of heightened insecurity across the length and breadth of the country and grinding poverty in the midst of plenty, both of which have made life for the man in the street largely meaningless.

Elsewhere, Egwu (2016, p. 1) noted that “despite the progress in electoral democracy and impressive growth rates, Nigeria continues to be buffeted by human security challenges”.

In spite of these stark realities and the protestations of African scholars on the undesirability of neoliberal prescriptions for Africa’s development, African political leaders and policy makers were hard put to implement these prescriptions in anticipation of the much craved and highly elusive foreign direct investment (FDI), and also for some other self-serving purposes.

However, an IMF internal paper published in June 2016 has, for the first time, conceded that the neoliberal package prescribed by the Bretton Woods institutions did not deliver on its promises. The report, titled “Neo-liberalism: Oversold”, and which was written by top IMF economists Jonathan Ostry, Prakash Loungani and Davide Furceri, looked at two aspects of the neoliberal strategy – the removal of barriers to capital flow, called ‘capital account liberalization’, and cutting public spending to reduce fiscal deficits and public debt, referred to as ‘fiscal consolidation’ or austerity and came to three disquieting conclusions (Gumede, 2016). First is that the IMF/World Bank neoliberal reform strategies have not boosted economic growth. Second is that they have increased inequality; and third is that the increased inequality in turn hurts the level and sustainability of growth. The report acknowledged that the removal of barriers to capital flow, or financial openness, has often resulted in short-term speculative, so “hot”, inflows in developing countries (Ostry, Loungani & Furceri, 2016), which, unsurprisingly, did not boost growth or allow the developing country to share the costs of such destabilization with the industrial countries (Gumede, 2016).

In sum, the impact of neoliberal structural adjustment programs has led to economic hardship, political instability and conflict in many developing countries. And even in cases where neoliberal reforms may have in some cases lifted economic growth, it brought in its wake little equity, jobs or social security. Consequently, neoliberal structural adjustments often enriched the already well-off political and economic elites, autocratic regimes and leaders, and impoverished ordinary citizens. World Bank and IMF-inspired economic reforms have also often led to political and social instability, as typified by the 2011 North African youth uprisings – the Arab Spring, and the numerous ethno-religious conflicts bedeviling much of the African continent as well as the pervasive insecurity experienced in the continent (Gumede, 2016).


Tellingly, neoliberal reforms in Africa have also begotten an army of economically displaced citizens eager to flee their native countries by whatever means in desperate search for greener pastures that often turn grey, or even blue, as most are unable to reach their intended destinations. Often barred by highly restrictive neoliberal anti-immigration policies in the destination countries, these mostly irregular migrants end up in one or the other transit country. There, they become social outcasts and targets of ferocious law enforcement agents. The unluckier ones among these desperate

voyagers are known to have ended up in the belly of sharks while traveling ramshackle boats and canoes. Numerous others have also become victims of modern day slavery, brazenly traded in open slave markets that have sprouted in many of the transit countries as have been copiously reported in the international media in recent times. This is particularly the case in sub-Saharan Africa with its large population of emigrants, comparable only to Syria currently, undergoing harrowing experiences in transit countries, mostly in North Africa.

A Pew Research Center analysis of the latest United Nations data on the number of emigrants, or people living outside their country of birth, reports that sub-Saharan African nations account for eight of the 10 fastest growing international migrant populations since 2010. The number of emigrants from each of these sub-Saharan countries grew by 50% or more between 2010 and 2017, significantly more than the 17% worldwide average increase for the same period. At the country level, only Syria had a higher rate of growth in its number of people living in other countries (Connor 2018, para. 2). As shown in the figure below, the total number of emigrants worldwide from all sub-Saharan African countries combined, grew by 31% between 2010 and 2017, outpacing the rate of increase from both the Asia-Pacific (15%) and Latin America-Caribbean (9%) regions. Only the Middle East-North Africa region saw a larger increase (39%) of people living outside of their birth country during the same span, driven largely by people fleeing conflict in Syria. Overall, some 25 million sub-Saharan migrants lived outside their countries of birth in 2017. And as international migration increased, the breakdown of where sub-Saharan emigrants live also changed. In 1990, 75% of emigrants from the region lived in other sub-Saharan countries, a share that dropped to 68% by 2017 (Connor 2018, para. 3).

Sub-Saharan African countries trailed only Syria in growth of emigrant populations worldwide, 2010-2017

People living outside their birth country (emigrants), by country of origin



Note: Syria is the only non-African country of the 10 nations whose emigrant populations worldwide grew fastest in 2010-2017.
 Source: Pew Research Center analysis of United Nations data, accessed Dec. 23, 2017.

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Source: Connor, P. (2018). International migration from sub-Saharan Africa has grown dramatically since 2010, February. <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/02/28/international-migration-from-sub-saharan-africa-has-grown-dramatically-since-2010/>

Over the same period, the share of sub-Saharan emigrants who live in the United States climbed from 2% to 6%. This has helped make African immigrants a small but fast-growing slice of the overall U.S. immigrant population. As of 2017, nearly 1.5 million sub-Saharan immigrants lived in the U.S., according to UN data. More substantially, the share of sub-Saharan migrants living in European Union countries, Norway and Switzerland rose from 11% in 1990 to 17% in 2017 (Connor, 2018). It has further been reported that whether their destination is a neighboring country, Europe or the U.S., many sub-Saharan emigrants face obstacles to relocating. For example, reports indicate that hundreds of thousands of emigrants from south of the Sahara Desert gather in Libya in hopes of crossing the Mediterranean into Europe. Many live in overcrowded, crime-ridden camps while they wait to make the journey, with some being sold in slave auctions.

Meanwhile, sub-Saharan emigrants are only part of Africa's international migration story. North African nations have also experienced decades of significant outmigration to Europe and other parts of the world. In 2017, about 5.2 million North African immigrants lived in EU countries, Norway and Switzerland, compared with about 3 million in 1990.

Understanding Neoliberal Anti-Migration Policies

In recent years, irregular migration has been the subject of increasing and ongoing public debate in both Europe and the United States. In Europe, this issue rose to greater public prominence during the summer of 2008, with daily reports of unauthorized migrants reaching Mediterranean shores and others tragically losing their lives in the process. Consequently, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic came under political and public pressure to reduce irregular migration, with majorities across countries viewing it as a problem. The political pressure to reduce the number of new arrivals has tested mainstream political parties across Europe, which faced a rapidly growing challenge from populist groups advocating radical responses. Some EU member states responded to this pressure by taking unilateral measures, such as suspending *Schengen* and constructing fences. Migration control has thus become one of the Union's top priorities, and engagement with source and transit countries is rapidly becoming the instrument of choice to reduce flows.

In addition, development has come to be seen by policymakers as a means of tackling the root causes of irregular migration, such as poverty and conflict. Addressing these root causes through development was one of the elements of the European Commission's proposal of November 2016 for a new European Consensus on Development as well as one of the main objectives of the European External Investment Plan. Its principal strategy has been engagement with third or transit countries. It has however been observed that in the rush to pursue this strategy, many assumptions have been made without fundamentally questioning how and when migration and development should be linked or whether this linkage should be made at all. The net effect is that recent efforts to expand engagement with third countries

have only served to further blur the distinction between migration management cooperation and development cooperation (Connor, 2018). In other words, the concept of the 'root causes' of irregular migration in EU policy has not been fully clarified. It could be said to encompass a wide range of causalities such as poverty, human rights violations, conflict, political instability, food insecurity, and a lack of access to natural resources.

While development cooperation policies have implicitly been addressing these root causes for decades, making the link between migration and development raises serious questions as to what constitutes a successful outcome. According to Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), development cooperation policy's primary objective should be the reduction and eradication of poverty. However, current efforts to link migration and development appear to prioritise migration management over poverty reduction. There is, therefore, a clear danger that aid is diverted to "promote EU migration and security interests in ways that stretch the definition of official development assistance" (Funk, Mc Namara, Pardo, & Rose 2017, p.2).

Even though the dual objectives of reducing irregular migration and poverty may not necessarily be mutually exclusive, it has been argued that making a direct link between the two threatens to undermine development principles. This is particularly well-evidenced by the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) and the Partnership Framework with third countries set up in November 2015 and June 2016 respectively. Both aim to manage migration and address the root causes of forced displacement, and use money allocated from the European Development Fund for these purposes. A breakdown of approved EUTF projects however reveals that a large amount of funds have been allocated to fighting irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking, and little to enhancing legal migration and mobility. Many of those directly involved with the EUTF admit that it cannot address "root causes", as is its stated objective. It is, therefore seen as a political gesture to leverage African cooperation on migration or, in a word, for buying African cooperation. This is evidenced by the launch of 'migration compacts', which channels aid through the EUTF conditioned on cooperation on migration management. And even this more limited and transactional ambition for the EUTF has been questioned on the basis of the relatively small amounts of money on offer (the EUTF has 1,982 billion Euros to which 500 million has been added to implement the migration compacts) and the complex political, economic and security factors that shape African migration policies (Castillejo, 2016).

The European Parliament and human rights organizations have similarly criticized the EUTF's use of development aid to stem migration flows. They argue that even if the instruments of EU development policy are used at the same time to tackle the root causes of forced migration, the eradication of poverty should remain the main objective. Instead, the 'migration compacts' negotiated under the Partnership Framework with third countries appear to be diverting funds away from traditional

development concerns. The mobilization of €8 billion in support of the partnerships by 2020, for instance, was not a result of additional commitments, but of redirecting existing development funds away from development assistance to tackling migration into the EU.

Recent efforts to link migration and development have also led to the emergence of the concept of 'conditionality' as a means to ensure implementation. With this concept, the amount of aid received by a partner country would depend on its willingness to increase its cooperation with the EU on migration matters. Development cooperation would then be used as leverage to secure third-country commitments related to readmissions and border control. In other words, development aid becomes a bargaining chip in negotiations that follow the objective of improving migration management. Such conditionality runs counter to traditional development principles enshrined in Article 208 of the TFEU, which are based on the needs of the populations in third countries. As has been explained, the danger in making development conditional upon the tightening of borders is that it places the rights of migrants at risk and often results in migrants taking alternative, more dangerous, routes. Other types of conditionality, such as the signing of readmission agreements, may be less controversial in terms of representing an immediate threat to migrants' rights but still compromise the principles upon which development is undertaken.

Meanwhile, even if the premise of allocating development aid money to counter-smuggling and migration management activities were accepted, many practical obstacles render this kind of assistance problematic. For instance, it is on record that a segment of African migrants, in conjunction with the locals, have set up migration economies along major migratory routes from where they extract rents. Such that all along the migratory routes, from countries of origin in West Africa and the Horn of Africa, to transit states like Niger and Libya, a plethora of local actors with vested interests that run counter to the EU's own objectives and values hamper efforts to create meaningful partnerships for migration management. The activities of these migrant merchants, coupled with the frightening economic reality in most SSA countries, ensure that the out-migrant population from the zone is not about thinning. Instead, it has continued to rise in spite of the fences that have gone up in most of the destination countries. This has given rise to the current migrant glut and the sprouting of modern day slave markets in many of the transit countries in North Africa. Whether those countries will have the capacity to contain these immigrants in and keep them in subjugation under whatever guise, or whether there will be an immigrants' backlash as never before witnessed, remains to be seen.

Summary and Conclusion

This paper highlighted how the adoption of policies of free trade, economic liberalization, and neoliberal economic models under the aegis of globalization, by uncompetitive sub-Saharan African countries, has worsened poverty, widened inequality, and resulted in conflicts, social dislocations, and forced migration from the

region towards the industrialized nations, particularly in EU. The paper further highlighted how the increasing flow of economic migrants, who travel mostly via 'irregular' routes, has met with rising fences, aid-for-migration-control, and other ingenious neoliberal anti-migration policies in destination countries, resulting in large pool of migrants stranded in the transit countries, especially in North Africa. The paper also highlighted how these economic migrants, often associated with crimes and other illegal activities in both the destination and transit countries have become outcasts and therefore the targets of law enforcement agents in their countries of temporary residence. Worse still, the massive irregular flow of economically and socially displaced persons has fed into modern day slavery and organ harvesting trade that is difficult to quantify. The paper concludes that these obnoxious outgrowths of globalization are bound to worsen regardless of the apparent repudiation of globalization by its avid promoters, the United States and Great Britain, under the current spate of ultra-nationalism evidenced in Trumpian doctrine and Brexit respectively.



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CHAPTER EIGHT

Labour Migration and Productivity of Cassava-Based Farmer Households in Ebonyi State, Nigeria

Simeon C. Onya and Ikenna V. Ejiba

Introduction

In Nigeria, labour is a major constraint in peasant production (Gocowski and Oduwole, 2003). The availability of labour has been found to have impact on planting precision, better weed control, timely harvesting and crop processing (Oluyole and Egbetokun 2009). The increasing absence of people within the active age could be attributed to farm drudgery, absence of social infrastructure in the rural areas, poor farm income and generally low life expectancy in rural areas. As a result, young people within the active working age who are to cope with the challenges of modernizing agricultural production are compelled to migrate to urban centre in search of white-collar jobs and improve standard of living.

Generally, migration is a regular occurrence in the life of a nation (Ofuoku, 2012). Migration is the movement of people from one geographical location to another, either on a temporary or permanent basis (Ekong, 2003). Rural-urban migration is the dominant pattern of internal migration. The movement of people is a selective process that affects individuals or families with particular economic, social, educational and demographic characteristics (Ofuoku and Chukwuji, 2012).

Labour-migration from rural areas is now increasingly becoming an important livelihood strategy and escape out of poverty, which has become a safety net against income shortfall due to crop failure or low productivity created by drought or floods. Aside from deteriorating employment opportunities at home and better prospects in urban areas, the increased mobility of the population from the rural areas is due to improved communication and road networks (Deshingkar, 2004).

The effect of labour migration is a double-edged issue and has lots of ambiguities. On one hand, loss of labour to migration can reduce the agricultural production in migrant-sending household. Furthermore, migration can decrease farmers attention to the appropriate use of technology and change labour quality (from adult male members to female, child, and elderly members) and other inputs, which would ultimately cause a decline in productivity (Yue and Sonoda 2012). But on the other hand, scholars advocating New Economics of Labour Migration argue that migration and remittances might increase agricultural productivity through providing better access to information and more flexible liquidity as well as enabling rural households to overcome credit and risk constraints (Wouterse 2010). The New Economics of

Labour Migration (NELM) theory indicates that migration and migrants' remittances have competing effects; they can relax or tighten labour and credit constraints for rural households. In particular, negative effects would imply that migration exacerbates labour shortages, while positive effects would indicate that migration complements productivity or household income by relaxing credit or risk constraints (Sirkeci, *et al.*, 2012).

Migrants are usually concerned with the benefits they hope to gain by moving and usually give less thought to the problems that they will incur as a result of the process. In this case the pull factor may be at work. Labour or rural-urban migration may be a livelihood diversification strategy diversifying the portfolio of the rural farm people as insurance against risk regarding their livelihoods. Taylor *et al.*, (2003) found that labour shortages due to migration negatively affect cropping income of migrant-sending households. However, he also showed that migrant remittances positively compensate for the lost labour, contributing to household incomes directly and also indirectly by stimulating crop and possibly self-employment production. Loss of labour due to migration has been found to have a negative impact on crops, but remittances partially offset some of these losses (Rozelle *et al.*, 1999).

Migration of labour force from the rural to urban areas is predominant and is perceived to be the cause of labour shortage for agriculture in the rural area. The lack of basic amenities, services and infrastructure serve as a disincentive for people to stay back in the village. There are few or no other opportunities for livelihood activities apart from farming and a few formal sector employments. This together with poor and declining soil fertility and erratic rainfall pattern continue to intensify migration in the rural area.

Labour migration may result in drastic decrease in the labour which in turn reduces total cropped area and quality of work giving rise to reduced food production, reduced household wealth increased vulnerability in many rural areas, food insecurity (Mini, 2011).

The agricultural sector suffers from low productivity due to constraints of credit, labour and insurance. Subsistence-oriented farming, together with declining farm sizes, makes it difficult for farming households to meet their basic requirements. The stagnating industrial sector does not provide sufficient opportunities for the rural population to earn a living. Hence, rural farming households are increasingly looking for opportunities away from the agriculture sector and relying on migration as a livelihood strategy to meet their basic requirements and enhance their income levels. It is unclear whether migration of active labour from the household improve or decrease the productivity of cassava based farmers in the study area

The results of this study will contribute to the existing body of knowledge on labour migration and productivity of cassava-based farmer households in Ebonyi State,

Nigeria. Information from this study will be useful to agricultural policy makers in order to create or amend existing policies on labour migration and productivity in rural areas in the country.

In view of the strategic role agricultural productivity plays in bringing about development in rural areas by way of food security and poverty reduction, attempts to retain the labour force in the rural areas is important. The results of this study will unveil the causes of migration of active labour proffer suggestions on how to tackle the issue of labour migration of the youth and make agriculture very attractive to them. This would help bring about food security and poverty alleviation as farmers will sell surpluses to meet other social needs including their children education if the youth are engaged in agricultural production. This study will contribute enormously to the current debate on labour mobility.

Objectives of the Study

The aims to determine the effect of labour migration on productivity of cassava-based farmers in Ebonyi state. The specific objectives were to:

- i. examine the socioeconomic profile of migrant and non-migrant cassava based farmers;
- ii. estimate the productivity of cassava for the migrant sending and migrant non-sending farmers;
- iii. determine the effect of labour migration on productivity of cassava-based farmers in the study area;

Methodology

Study Area

The study was carried out in Ebonyi State, Nigeria. It is located in the South Eastern region of Nigeria. It covers an area of 6,421.2 square kilometers, has a population of 2,176,947 (NBS, 2006), and accounts for 1.6% of total Nigeria population. The state is characterised by mean annual rainfall of between 2250 mm in the south and 1500 mm in the North with an average temperature of about 27°C and relative humidity of 85%. The people are predominantly farmers who grow crops such as cassava, rice, yam, maize, oil palm and vegetables and rear livestock. Non-farm employment activities common in the area ranges from hired farm labourers petty trading to civil service.

Sampling Technique

Multi-stage sampling technique was used in selecting 131 cassava based farmers for the study. Ebonyi State is made up of 3-agricultural zones namely Ebonyi South, Ebonyi North and Ebonyi Central Agricultural zones. In the first stage, one Local government was randomly selected from each of the agricultural zone. In the second stage, five villages were randomly selected from each of the selected local government area from which the list of cassava farmers in the villages formed the sampling frame of the study. The final stage involved the random selection of 10 cassava farmers from

each of the villages to get 150 respondents for the study. Out of the 150 questionnaires given to the respondents 139 were returned while 131 were considered valid for the study. Of these 131 respondents, 81 were migrant sending households while 50 were households without migrants.

Data Analysis

Descriptive Statistics (such as percentages and means) and 2-stage least square method were used to analyze the data collected.

Model Specification

Decisions about migration of active labour are taken at the household level, and household resources are therefore expected to influence these decisions. This brings the problem of endogeneity in analysing the effect of migration on productivity of cassava-based farmers, and so, it is necessary to consider the problem of endogeneity in the empirical analysis of labour migration and productivity of cassava-based farmers and the application of a suitable econometric approach is also essential. In this study, labour migration and productivity of cassava-based farmers is estimated using a two-stage least-square regression. This econometric approach overcomes the problem of endogeneity associated with the analysis on hand. In the first stage, the migration decision is estimated by the equation:

$$M_i = \mu + \gamma^*L_i + \lambda_iZ_m + \varepsilon_m \dots \dots \dots (1)$$

Where,

M_i = number of persons between the age of 15-60 years that have migrated

Z_m = Characteristics of the household affecting migration

ε_m = error term

L_i = vector of regressors excluded from the outcome equation.

The details above indicate that labour migration is seen as a dependent variable which is a function of household characteristics and other factors. However, in this case, the direction of casual relationship between labour migration and household characteristics cannot be determined as it could very well be that both are determined by household resources which has not been factored into this equation, and hence, would be included in the error term (ε_m).

In the second stage, the predicted labour migration variable is included as an independent variable in the regression: The assumption of the New Economics of Labor Migration is to test the statistical importance of these coefficients. This study used the model proposed by (Rozelle *et al.*, 1999). If productivity is constrained and number of labour (M) and remittances (R) are important in shaping productivity constraint, constrained productivity Y^c depends on number of labour migrant (M), remittances (R) and the household's characteristics (ZY)

$$Y^c = \text{Agricultural Productivity} = \frac{\text{Value output(₦)}}{\text{Input costs(₦)}} \dots \dots \dots (2a)$$

$$Y^c = \alpha + g_1M + g_2R_2 + g_3Z_Y + v_i \dots \dots \dots (2b)$$

The null assumption associated with the New Economics of Labor Migration is that neither the number of labour migrant nor remittances affect productivity (that is, $g_1 = g_2 = 0$).

Where,

M = predicted fitted values from the first stage regression

R = Remittance from the migrant

Z_Y = same vector of explanatory variables

v_i = error term

g = is the unbiased and consistent estimation of the effect of labour migration on the outcome of choice.

The socio demographic variables include the income (farm and non-farm income, remittance), value of assets, fertilizer use, farm size and the demographic variables (age, level of education, and number of labour migrant, household size, migration experience and farming experience).

Results and Discussion

Socioeconomic Characteristics of Households with Migrants and Households without Migrants

The results on the socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents are presented in Table 1. It can be seen that the age of household-heads of majority (44.44%) of households with migrants fall within 61 years and above, while the age of household-heads of majority (46%) of households without migrants fall within 31 to 40 years.

This explains the fact that migrant-sending households have older household heads than migrant non-sending households. As a result, older household-heads are likely to send their wards out to seek employment elsewhere.

The gender distribution of the respondents showed that 41% and 59% of the household with migrant(s) had female and male household-heads respectively, while 54% and 46% of the households without migrant(s) had female and male household-heads respectively. This implies that majority of female-headed households do not allow their wards to migrate. Since females are considered as being the weaker sex, they need their children to be around to help them in farm and other house chores.

The distribution of the respondents based on their educational level showed that majority (49.38%) of the households with migrant had secondary education while majority (52%) of the households without migrant had primary education. This goes to show that migrant sending households were more educated than the households without migrant. Education of the households with migrant expose and inform their decision to allow their wards to migrate knowing the comparative advantages of

migrating to the urban area where infrastructural facilities and employment opportunities are more accessible.

The farm size of the respondents showed that majority (64.20%) of the households with migrant cultivated less than a hectare while majority (76%) of the households without migrant cultivated between 1-2 hectares of land. By implication, households without migrant had a large farm size than households with migrant. This could be because households without migrants could have relatively larger members thereby prompting them to cultivate more cassava land.

The farm income of the respondents showed that majority (53%) of the households with migrant made less ₦50, 000 per annum from their farm while majority (56%) of the households without migrant earned between ₦50, 000-100,000 per annum. The high farm income of household without migrant could be explained by their large farm size. It is expected that, with large farm size, output and income will be equally high.

The nonfarm income of the respondents showed that majority (43.21%) of the households with migrant had above ₦150, 000 annually while majority (66%) of the households without migrant had less than ₦50, 000 per annum. In all, households with migrant had farm income lower than the income got by the households without migrant; but the nonfarm income of households with migrants was higher than the income got by households without migrants. This result is in line with the finding of (Zahonogo, 2011), who found that migration had a negative impact on the agricultural income but had a positive impact on non-agricultural activities in rural areas.

The distribution of the respondents based on the labour used by the households showed that majority (77.77%) of the households with migrants made use of hired labour while 22.23% made use of family labour. On the contrary, majority (88%) of the households without migrants made use of family labour while 12% made use of hired labour in their cassava production. This is expected: households that have more of their active labour as emigrants will resort to hiring labour for their cassava production.

Table 1: Socioeconomic Characteristics of Migrant and Non Migrant-Sending Cassava-Based Farmers

Variable	Household with Migrant		Household without Migrant	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Age Group				
31-40	08	9.88	23	46.00
41-50	14	17.28	11	22.00
51-60	23	28.39	06	12.00
61 and above	36	44.44	10	20.00
Sex				
Female	33	40.74	27	54.00
Male	48	59.26	23	46.00
Educational Level				
No Formal Education	01	1.24	14	28.00
Primary	09	11.11	26	52.00
Secondary	40	49.38	08	16.00
Tertiary	31	38.27	02	4.00
Farm Size				
Below 1ha	52	64.20	07	14.00
1-2ha	20	24.69	38	76.00
Above 2	09	11.11	05	10.00
Farm Income				
0-50000	43	53.08	08	16.00
50001-100000	23	28.40	28	56.00
100001-150000	11	13.58	10	20.00
Above 150000	04	4.94	04	08.00
Non-farm Income				
0-50000	05	6.18	33	66.00
50001-100000	16	19.75	13	26.00
100001-150000	25	30.86	04	08.00
Above 150000	35	43.21	0	00.00
Household Labour Use				
Family Labour	18	22.23	44	88.00
Hired labour	63	77.77	06	12.00

Source: Field Survey, 2017

Productivity of Cassava-based Farmer Households with Migrants and Households without Migrants

The productivity of migrant and non migrant-sending cassava-based farmers is presented in Table 2. The value of cassava output per acre was found to be ₦428000 and the cost of cassava production was ₦194501 for households with migrants while the value of cassava output per acre was found to be ₦411276 and the cost of cassava

production ₦91543 for households without migrants. The productivity of cassava was found to be 2.2 for households with migrants and 4.49 for households without migrants. This goes to show that the value of cassava output and the cost of production of households with migrants were higher than those of households without migrants. The reason could be as a result of higher education of migrant-sending households and the high number of hired labour employed in their production process. The high education of households with migrants enable them to apply improved technology thereby increasing output per hectare, though, it was not reflected in their productivity because of the high cost of production resulting from higher number of hired labour used for production. Also, the cost of family labour used seems not to be valued by the households without migrants as their production cost was low.

Table 2: Productivity of Migrant- and Non-Migrant-Sending Cassava-Based Farmers

Productivity	Household with Migrant	Household without Migrant
Value of cassava output/acre	₦428000	₦411276
Cost of production/acre	₦194501	₦91543
Cassava productivity	2.2	4.49

Source: Field Survey, 2017.

Effect of Cassava-Based Farmer Households Characteristics on Labour Migration and Productivity

The estimation of the effect of cassava-based farmer households' characteristics on labour migration and productivity is presented in Table 3. The table shows the estimated two stage least square results.

The effect of labour migration on productivity was significant and negative at 10% level. The result indicates that productivity of cassava based farming households reduced as each family member leaves the farm. This situation presents a constraint to farm families as they have to resort to hired labour if productivity would have to be sustained. This is in line with the findings of Maharjan *et al.*, (2013) who noted that migration led to decline in the use of family labour in crop farming.

The coefficient of age was positive and significant at 5% and 1% for labour migration and productivity of cassava respectively. This goes to show that as the age of the household-head increased, productivity and the tendency for one or more household member to migrate also increased. This an indication that aged household-heads have more labour migrants and could do well in cassava farming than the young ones because of their experience.

Also, education was positive and significant at 1% and 10% for labour migration and cassava productivity respectively. This implies that educated people have more

tendencies to incite their wards to migrate than uneducated ones. Also, educated people have more tendencies to improve their productivity through innovative information on better ways of farming than uneducated ones.

The coefficient of farm size negatively influenced the labour migration at 5% level. This is an indication that households with large farm size tend to keep their active labour force so that they can help in the farm work than those with small farm. Also, due to migration of active labour force in some households, the heads have no option than to farm a small piece of land that he can work on with the available children.

The value of productive assets negatively influenced the labour migration at 5% level. This implies that households with more productive assets tend to disallow their wards from migrating than households with less productive assets. This could be because availability of productive assets provides households with a level of fulfilment, thus serving as a dis-incentive against migration of family members.

The coefficient of fertilizer use positively influenced the productivity of cassava farmers at 1% level. This is in line the expectation that the use of fertilizer will increase the productivity of farm crops.

The coefficient of farm income was negative and significant at 10% level for labour migration. This implies that a decrease in farm income pushes households to induce their wards to migrate. This is in line with the views of Zahonogo, (2011) who noted that migration is a business to compensate the weakness of the agricultural income, suggesting that policies for improving household income can contribute to reduce migration influx.

The coefficient of non-farm income was positive and significant at 5% level for labour migration and statistically not significant for cassava productivity of the farmers. This could be that remittances received by the households as a result of migration are channelled into non-farm activities making migration of active labour of the family attractive while neglecting the agricultural sector.

The coefficient of remittance and migration experience were positive and significantly influenced labour migration at 1% and 5% level respectively, but was not statistically significant for productivity of cassava. This implies that the higher the remittance received by the household, the more the household pushes the family members to migrate but the result of the migration in form of remittance is not invested to compensate for labour shortage, rather it is diverted into nonfarm activities. Also households with migration experience are likely to send their wards out of the rural area than households without migration experience.

The coefficient of farming experience positively influenced the productivity of cassava based farmers at 10% level. This implies that farmers with more experience are likely to do well than those with less experience.

The coefficient of household size was positive and significantly influenced the productivity of cassava based farmers at 10% level. This implies that households with more available labour are better off than those with less available labour. This could be as result of the use of family labour which reduces the cost of production of the households.

Table 3: Estimation of Labour Migration and Productivity of Cassava Based Farmers Using Two-Stage Least Square

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	
	(i) Labour Migration	(ii) Productivity of Cassava
Constant	-10.789 (2.45)**	0.478 (6.91)***
Age	8.6531 (2.28)**	2775 (6.80)***
Education	0.088 (4.11)***	690.8 (2.70)**
Farm Size	-104.85 (-2.30)**	960.21 (0.42)
Value productive Assets	-0.067 (-3.15)**	42.121 (0.51)
Fertilizer use		71.826 (3.41)***
Number of Labour Migrant		-2640 (-1.79)*
Farm Income	-0.0053 (1.89)*	0.7122 (1.11)
Nonfarm income	0.00031 (2.51)**	72.12 (0.42)
Remittance	0.2432 (10.03)***	313.51 (1.51)
Migration experience	79.28 (2.36)**	
Farming experience		295.41 (1.88)*
Household Size	-2003 (1.33)	2099 (2.09)*

Source: Field Survey, 2017. Numbers in parenthesis are t- statistics, * significant level at 10%, **significant level at 5% and *** significant level at 1%

Conclusion and Recommendations

It was found that migrant households were older in age, more educated, had more non-farm income and hired more labour than households without migrants. On the other hand, households without migrants were more of female headed than households with migrants, had large farm size, made more income from farming and used more of family labour.

In terms of productivity, households without migrants were found to be more productive than households with migrants. The reason could be because of the high number of hired labour employed by migrants' households in a bid to fill the gap in farm labour. However, the households being more educated could apply improved technology thereby increasing output per hectare; which was not reflected in their productivity because of the high cost of production resulting from employment of hired labour for production.

Besides, age, education, farm size, value of assets, farm income, non-farm income, remittances, and migration experience significantly influenced labour migration; while age, education, fertilizer use, number of labour migrant, farming experience, and household size significantly influenced productivity. Labour migration was therefore found to significantly affect productivity of farming households. In addition, the study revealed that for households with migrants, remittances from migration, contribute to diversification of income sources out of agriculture. Hence, households with migrants had less agricultural productive assets, cultivated less land, and realized relatively smaller income from farm production. By way of recommendation, the problem of infrastructural deficits in rural areas has to be addressed to reduce migration of household members. This will help boost productivity of farm families thereby improving the overall local economy of the area. Policies should also target actions to provide producers with timely input and subsidise fertilizer in other to enhance their productivity. Land use act should be reviewed to enable potential investors acquire unused land for cassava production.



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
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CHAPTER NINE

Neo-Slavery and Human Trafficking in Sub-Saharan Africa

Felicia Osondu Okwueze and Okwudili Benson Ugwu

Introduction

Background to the Study

“Who is the highest bidder? 800 Dinar! 1,000 Dinar! 1,100 Dinar! In the end, the winning bid is 1,200 Libyan Dinar – the equivalent of \$800 (€680). A done deal; however, this isn't just any auction for a car or a piece of art” Cascais (2017). What is being sold here is a group of frightened young men from Sub-Saharan Africa. Libya is a well-known jumping-off point for migrants seeking refuge on European shores. Bernard Smith reports that hundreds of people are being auctioned in modern day slavery markets in Libya for as little as 400 USD. Many from sub-Saharan Africa, are fleeing war and persecution; others from impoverished nations in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia have made the treacherous journey in search of better economic opportunities. Human trafficking as a modern day form of slavery has been an old practice. Article 3 of the United Nations (UN) Palermo Protocol (2002), defines human trafficking in persons to mean: the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of threat, force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or position of vulnerability or giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation, Mandisa, & Lanier, (2012).

Fernand Braudel (1902-1985), a French historian noted that slavery is endemic in Africa and part of the structure of everyday life. In the olden days, as Europeans demand grew, African Chiefdoms organized raiding parties to seize individuals from neighboring societies (Braudel, 1988). Some tribes launched wars especially for the purpose of capturing slaves. Captured slaves were force-marched to holding forts along the West African coast before being loaded on ships.

It is believed that slavery has been abolished about 150 years ago, yet there are more people in slavery today than at any other time in our history. Between 600,000 to 800,000 people are trafficked across international borders each year. In the words of Carolyn Spring, “there is a slave trade still in this country—yes, the real and horrific sex and human trafficking trade run by organized criminal gangs, which is appalling and must be stopped”. But there’s the hidden slavery too of children exploited and used within their own families, within organized and ritual abuse. For instance, in 2017, Interpol, which is an international Criminal Police Organization that facilitates international police cooperation, reported that some 500 people, including 236 minors, had been rescued in simultaneous operations across Chad, Mali, Mauritania,

Niger and Senegal. Forty suspected traffickers were arrested. The Interpol-led action comes amidst a global outcry sparked by footage of Africans being used as slaves in Libya, often the final transit for migrants wanting to reach Europe (Irish, 2017).

In recent times, a new form of slavery have emerged where young men and women are indirectly sold and sexually exploited for financial gains. Some of them especially the female ones are moved unknown to their parents, to be engaged in odd jobs. False promises are often offered to their families before luring them to Europe. Human trafficking has truly become a global threat to vulnerable men, women and children worldwide. It is an injustice that affects millions of people every year on every continent and all socioeconomic levels. There are different reasons for trafficking on human beings. People can be trafficked for the purpose of labour exploitation including domestic servitude, child exploitation, organ removal and rituals, begging, armed conflicts, and so on. The trafficking of people especially children and women is one of the greatest violation of human rights in the world today. Every year, hundreds of thousands of people are moved both within and across borders. Their rights to education, health, growing up within a family, protection from exploitation and abuse are denied. This study investigated the causes, extent and effects of human trafficking in sub-saharan Africa as well as the modus operandi of the traffickers.

Early forms of slavery in Africa

In the 18th century, Africans who were enslaved were mostly prisoners of war or captives from slave raids. As the demand for slaves grew, so did the practice of systematic slave raiding, which increased in scope and efficiency with the introduction of firearms to Africa. While the traditional African slavery was practiced largely to help African communities produce food and goods or for prestige, slave labor on European plantations in the new world was crucial to the economies of the colonial powers (Wright, 1993).

In 1807, slave trade was outlawed in Britain and the United States. France did the same in its colonies in 1848. By the dawn of the 20th century, European forces had defeated most African trading states and the trans-Saharan and East African slave trades came to an end (Wright, 1997). Although the colonial authorities tried to stop or suppress slavery, it is worrisome to know that slavery continued in many parts of Africa in other forms—such as debt slavery, military slavery, and criminal slavery (Foner, 2012). Chattel slavery also existed which was a type of slavery where the slaves were treated as the property of the owner. Here, the owner is free to sell, trade, or treat the slave as he would other pieces of property and the children of the slave often are retained as the property of the master (Alexander, 2001). Then there was also domestic slavery, where slaves worked primarily in the houses of their masters but retained some freedom. Domestic slaves could be considered as part of the master's household and could not be sold to others without extreme cause. The domestic slaves could own the profits from their labor and could marry and pass the land on to their children in many cases (Rodney, 1966).

There are other, forms of slavery in Africa, mostly involving human trafficking. Human trafficking is the trade of humans for the purposes of forced labor, sexual slavery, or commercial sexual exploitation for the traffickers or others. Human trafficking is a crime against the person because of violation of the victim's rights of movement through coercion (United Nations, 2014).

Human Trafficking, a form of neo-slavery

The word “trafficking” includes the word “traffick” which means transportation or travel. Trafficking is believed to be a lucrative industry and has been identified as one of the fastest growing criminal industry in the world (Ochab, 2017). There are two types of human trafficking internal trafficking (within the country) and external (cross-border). Human trafficking is the illegal trade of human beings which can either be for the purposes of reproductive slavery, commercial sexual exploitation, forced labour, or a modern-day form of slavery (Ajagun, 2012). The Trafficking Act (2003), Section 64 defines the word “trafficking” as:

All acts involved in the recruitment, transportation within or across borders, purchases, sale, transfer, receipt or harbouring of a person; involving the use of deception, coercion or debt bondage for the purpose of placing or holding the person whether or not in voluntary servitude (domestic, sexual or reproductive) in forced or bonded labour or in slavery-like conditions.

In his write-up on the Catholic Mission and Human Trafficking in Nigeria, Lewu (2006), pointed out that Human Trafficking according to the pastoral letter of the Catholic Bishops Conference of Nigeria in 2001, is the forceful or deliberate movement of persons to other areas or countries for the purposes of forced labour, rituals, or prostitution. It is also referred to as modern-day slavery whereby women and girls are sold and bought for the purpose of providing sexual gratification to fee-paying clients. FitzGibbons (2003), described human trafficking as modern-day slavery and bondage in which victims suffer in silence under slave-life situations of forced labour and commercial sexual exploitation from which they are helpless.

Human trafficking which entails the trafficking of people especially young and able-bodied people for forced labour and prostitution has become a recurrent problem not only in Nigeria but globally (Madunagu, 2002). According to Oloko (1999), human trafficking has been used as an umbrella term for activities in which one person or group of persons hold another person in compelled service. It is secret, underground, concealed, and an illegal business. In a similar definition, Shelley (2010), noted that, Human trafficking is the trade of humans, most commonly for the purpose of sexual slavery, forced labour, or commercial sexual exploitation for the trafficker or others. This may encompass providing a spouse in the context of forced marriage, or the extraction of organs or tissue.

Human trafficking has been properly viewed as an unwanted activity by different countries around the world. These countries have formed organizations, enacted laws and launched educational programs, geared towards the prevention of human trafficking. The National Agency for Prohibition and Trafficking in Person (NAPTIP) is an organization formed by the Federal Government of Nigeria to help in the control of human trafficking. Different countries have had different approaches when attempting to prevent human trafficking. Government agencies have also been formed to combat the menace.

According to Yaro, (2010), governments around the world are working hard to stop human trafficking, not only because of the personal and psychological tolls it takes on society, but also because it facilitates illegal movement of immigrants across borders, and provides a ready source of income for organized crime groups (and even terrorists) through intricate money laundering schemes. As a result of the strong global resistance against this serious crime, Nigeria has joined other nations of the world in the war against human trafficking. This, she has done by, setting up a task force on human trafficking, involving Law enforcement agencies and the National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Person (NAPTIP) (Kigbu and Hassan, 2015).

NAPTIP is charged with the responsibility of enforcing, administering and managing the law prohibiting human trafficking and other related matters. It has offices in the six geo-political zones in Nigeria. There is also the Devatop Center for Africa Development (DCAP), which is a non-profit organization with focus on combating human trafficking, gender-based violence, child abuse and providing educational supports to vulnerable children. The Women Trafficking and Children Labor Eradication Foundation (WOTCLEF) is another strong women organization in Nigeria which has taken a strong stand against women trafficking and child labor. WOTCLEF advocated for the establishment of NAPTIP. Since 1998, a Coalition against Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation of Children-Nigeria (CAHTSEC) was established. It is a non-profit organization working in Nigeria and West African region preventing and combating human trafficking in children and women, child slavery and sexual violence. Other countries of the world have created other agencies and several other organizations all over the world that are fighting against human trafficking. For instance, we have Awareness against Human Trafficking (AAHT) which is a non-governmental organization fighting against human trafficking in Kenya. It was founded in 2010 by Radoslaw Malinowski whose aim is countering human trafficking by organizing workshops on human trafficking in Kenya. They equally protect victims of human trafficking by prosecuting offenders. In London, there is also an organization called the Anti-Slavery International. It is an international organization that fights for the abolition of slavery. It was founded in 1839 and is the world's oldest international human rights organization. We also have Agape International Missions based in California which strengthens California State laws to protect victims of sex trafficking. These are to mention just but a few among countless organizations scattered all over the world, fighting against human trafficking. The question remains,


in spite of the existence of all these organizations, why has the business continued to thrive.

Nature and forms of trafficking in Africa

The United States, in its 2017 Trafficking in Person's Report listed, 13 African countries as among the 23 worst offenders for human trafficking (Akwei, 2017). They placed countries in three tiers with the worst being in tier 3. These are countries whose governments do not fully meet the [Trafficking Victims Protection Act's (TVPA)] minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so". (Akwei, 2016). The worst African offenders include Burundi, Central African Republic, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, South Sudan and Sudan. According to Akwei (2016), the 23 worst offenders in human trafficking are grouped together with China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. However, no African country was placed among the best (Tier 1) countries whose government fully meets the Trafficking Victims Protection Acts (TVPA) minimum standards. Most African countries are seen to fall within Tier 2 and Tier 2 watch list countries. Countries like Angola, Botswana, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia and Uganda, are among Tier 2 countries. These are countries that are making significant efforts to bringing themselves into compliance with the standards but have not fully met the minimum. While Somalia and Libya failed to make any of the Tiers, they are placed under special case due to the ongoing conflicts in their countries (Philipp, 2005).

According to Okoronkwo (2007), the activities of traffickers constitute grave violation of human rights in the world today, since they have turned human beings, mostly women and children, into commodities transported across borders. UNICEF (2017) reported that African young men, women, and children, continually and routinely face sexual violence, abuse, and detention along the central Mediterranean migration route from East, West and North, Africa to Italy. Annie & Lorenzo (2016) noted that women are treated like objects to trade, buy, exploit and resell, and the reception centers are acting as sorts of warehouse where these girls are temporarily stocked. Many Nigerian women, for instance, arrive Italy with debts of about £40,000 for their journey from Nigeria to Italy, which they are expected to pay back. It is a clandestine business driven by criminals, who make enormous profit from the exploitation of victims of trafficking. According to UNICEF Nigeria (2005), Nigeria officials rescued more than 100 children from child traffickers in the year (2005).

Figure 1



Overview of Human Trafficking in Contemporary Africa between 2010 and 2012.

The above table shows the number of human trafficking cases by regions: Africa, East Asia Pacific, Europe, Near East, South/Central Asia and Western Hemisphere. Europe has the highest number of cases (2600) between 2010 and 2012, as shown in the graph above. The US State Department annually investigates more than 100 countries for its trafficking in persons. Investigation shows that Russia, China and Belarus are the highest traffickers in the world. In its report, Russia recently expanded bilateral agreements with North Korea that allow for labor camps and “slave-like conditions” for workers within Russian borders. About 20,000 workers from North Korea are sent to Russia each year. The country has been rated Tier 3 since 2013. According to The Diplomat report, in China also, demographic challenges created by the one-child policy have led Chinese men to find wives through sex trafficking. In Iran, migrants, particularly those from Afghanistan are coerced into combat roles in Syria, and children as young as 3 years old work as street beggars under the threat of physical and sexual abuse. Belarus is equally a country in Eastern Europe that is landlocked between Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, and Latvia. In Belarus, while trafficking is sponsored and controlled by organized crime syndicates, theirs is state-sponsored. North Korea also has one of the most unique human trafficking situations in the world. This is because it is almost exclusively a source country for people to be trafficked out of. The country has forced labor camps that house 80,000 to 120,000 people- many of whom have not been charged with crime. Yemen, an Arab country found at the southern end of the


Arabian Peninsula is a country that has experienced several civil wars. As a result of the existing conflicts in the area, over 3million people have been displaced, and human traffickers prey upon those displaced people especially children. In 2016, more than 11,000 Nigerian women and girls arrived Italy by sea.

Algeria, due to its location, is a hotbed for human trafficking. It is a North African country and is the gateway to Europe for migrants from Mali, Cameroun, Cote d'Ivoire, and Nigeria. Most migrants enter Algeria by boat en route Europe. However, many times, after entering Algeria, their journey to Europe is thwarted as many run out of money or their money is stolen. Being a foreign country for the migrants, and with no means of survival, most of them resort to work as sex workers, laborers, domestic servants or they are forced to beg until they collect enough money to pay traffickers to get to Europe. Libya which is in North Africa and situated between Algeria and Egypt is the second special case. Libya is an oil rich country that was controlled by Muammar Gadhafi before he was killed in 2011. The country is a magnet for human traffickers because of its position between Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa, and because Gaddafi's regime profited from trafficking. In fact, trafficking is the second biggest industry in Libya, just behind oil. Many people are held for ransom on their way from Africa to Europe (Younes, 2017). During detention, people are held in overcrowded centers where they are tortured, arbitrarily murdered, and sexually assaulted. The conditions in Libya are so horrendous that before women head to Libya, they take contraceptives to avoid getting pregnant by rapists (Grimminck, 2017). Even Somalia, Venezuela, Bangladesh and many others are not left behind in the trafficking business.

In Nigeria, the craze to go to Europe began in the late 1980s when some young Benin girls were taken by Nigerian pimps to work in factories and do household chores for "kind" Europeans. Nigerian trafficking gangs equally use a mix of false promises of legitimate employment and traditional "juju" ceremonies to recruit and gain psychological control over their victims. The women are led to believe that terrible things will happen to their families if they fail to honor their debts. They are then forced into prostitution on streets and brothels across Europe. On arrival, they then discover that they had been deceived. To escape deportation or suffering, most of them resort to prostitution. But they managed to come back home with so much money that they converted to Nigerian naira. The notion soon spread around town that their people are picking dollars on the streets of Europe. Since then, it is no longer a matter of being lured there under false pretence, but of girls begging to be taken there by sponsors. In contemporary Nigeria, it is one of the greatest human rights abuses being witnessed which now involves trafficking of people (males and females) as labourers, prostitutes, hawkers, leading to child abuse (Ladan, 2005)

Figure 1.1.5. Various Routes and Modus Operandi of Trafficking Across Africa

Main overland trafficking routes: Nigeria to Europe



Source: Police of the Generalitat of Catalonia




Smuggling of migrants has really become a source of huge global concern, with a large number of countries affected as origin, transit, or destination points. The profit-seeking criminals involved in the process, smuggle migrants across borders and between continents. The modus operandi of the trade of human trafficking across Africa are generally the same. What happens is that these syndicates use a combination of shipping routes, flights, and various methods of ground travel across several continents to reach gateway countries in Central or South America. From there, they make their way to the U.S. through complex networks, called “pipelines” of human smuggling contacts. For instance, travelers from South Africa are not required to obtain entry visas. Because of this, majority of African migrants heading to the U.S. through Latin America do so by obtaining fake South African passports and traveling to Brazil (Ramsey, 2011). Most refugees stranded in Libya come from West Africa, from countries such as Nigeria, Guinea, Burkina Faso or Ivory Coast. Many Eritreans and Somalis are also among those who hope to find a better future in Europe. Oftentimes, they use a route crossing Niger's desert city of Agadez, where they encounter human traffickers, who promise to get them to the Mediterranean Coast and on to Europe. That journey, however, often ends in Libya where most of them are sold into many forms of slavery.

Nigerian traffickers, according to the diagram above, can take routes like travelling from Nigeria – Iran – Europe. Then Nigeria – Libya –Italy – Europe. Again, Nigeria – Senegal – Spain – Europe. The most dangerous part of the route is a 1,000-kilometer journey from the Southern border of Libya’s desert to the 500-kilometer sea passage

to Sicily. In 2015, about 4,579 people died while making the crossing. It is estimated that at least 700 children were among the dead (Ojeme, 2017).

Report by International Organization for Migration (IOM) held that “sex trafficking” phenomenon is experiencing exponential growth. The number of potential human trafficking victims arriving in Italy by sea has increased by more than 600 per cent over the last three years, soaring from 1,500 in 2014 to more than 11,000 in 2016 (Torris, 2017). This growing trend has continued for the better part of 2017 and is carried out through the efforts of a well organized and coordinated network through both the receiving countries and exporting nations. Another report entitled “*Young Invisible Enslaved*” by Save the Children, reveals that over 715 kilometers from Kano (Nigeria) to Agadez (Niger), young victims suffer violence and forms of coercion in the hands of smugglers, corrupt boarder police or criminal running gangs. From Agadez, they make a journey of about 3,500 kilometers through the desert in some pickup trucks overloaded with people to Libya. This is where violence and physical abuse are part of the rule. These traffickers operate as syndicates, run by the head pimps referred in most cases as “Madam” or “Mama”, who usually resides in the foreign country and receives, houses and deploy the unfortunate girls once they arrive Europe. For the head pimp to operate effectively, the head pimp keeps a line of staff or co-conspirators, who play specific roles in getting the girls and facilitating their trips to Europe. Among these are recruits, trolleys, passport racketeers some of whom are believed to include embassy staff, immigration officials, law enforcement agents and even fetish priests whose job it is to administer fearsome oaths on the victims to bind them perpetually to the ‘Madam’. In some cases, the agents cajole desperate, poor, and greedy parents to sell off totally, valued family property such as a house or a parcel of land to finance their daughter’s trip overseas usually unaware of the predicament awaiting their children overseas (Abubakar, 2001). Before these victims are taken from the shores of the country, they are made to swear to certain fetish oaths of secrecy, allegiance to the ‘Madam’, and a commitment to pay back the funds used for their trips, which usually turn out to take several years due to frequent manipulations. In this way, the victims are held spellbound to their madam and become easily controlled and continually intimidated against escaping.

Figure 2: Migrants' Routes from East and West Africa to Europe



Source: *The Wall Street Journal* (Retrieved 20/2/18)

This is another map showing the movement of migrants from both East and West Africa to Europe. From the diagram above, Migrants from West African countries like Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Mali, and Niger, converge at Agadez and through the Sahara Desert to Libya. Migrants from East African countries like, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan converge at Khartoum and travel through the desert to Libya. From Libya, they head out on boats to Europe. The duration of the unknown journey may last from two to eight months. The girls are exposed to several risks along the routes such as: restriction of movement at transit camps, sexual violation, pregnancy, hunger, thirst and sandstorms in the deserts, drowning at high sea, and repatriation before arrival at destination. If they arrive successfully in Europe, the girls are often made to undergo a process of ritualistic initiation which may involve collection of underwear, pubic hair and other items deemed fit for the fetish ordeal (Ikeora, 2016). The exercise is further aimed at instilling more fear in the girls in order to prevent them from revealing anything that could lead to the arrest of the 'madam'. After all these grueling experience, the girls are dispossessed of whatever travelling documents made for them by the madams so that they lose their identity. In this way, it is difficult for them to get off the hook of their enclaves as they are pushed into the streets to begin a lavish but profitless sale of their bodies for the sole benefits of their captors (Adebayo, 2001). At the end of the day, the trafficked remain victims of the traffickers' manipulations.

The traffickers place the victims in the streets or sell them out to bars and hotels for prostitution and all sorts of things, like begging on the streets using force or inflicting violence where the women do not cooperate. The madams who are mostly Nigerians live with the women, and are responsible for handling all the money earned to repay the debts incurred in their transportation. The debt is usually between 50,000 to 100,000 dollars. To make as much as 150,000 dollars, one would have had sex with several partners a day for three years. The traffickers occasionally give them peanuts; say 50 dollars a week if they choose to. Otherwise, they only feed them and give them nothing. Ironically the girls are made to believe by their tormentors that these monies they make are being sent to their helpless parents and such. Some feel consoled that if they are suffering, the benefits of the suffering are not lost to the parent after all. But again that is another myth as no such thing ever happens. Occasionally, a parcel consisting of cheap apparel may be sent in the name of the girl and the poor woman in the village would jump for joy that her daughter was doing well abroad. Consequently the poor woman will spread the 'good' news around and would want to introduce the "good job" to another woman so that her daughter can be trafficked, so it goes round the family. Apparently, this crime against humanity continues to spread and has finally become the order of the day. Most people in Nigeria fall into this trap due to the quest for the promise of better life outside Nigeria. Whenever any of them pay up their debt, they are reported to the police and deported without any properties (NAPTIP News 2005).

Human Trafficking and Human Rights Violation

Human trafficking, violates human rights of individuals trafficked due to its dehumanizing nature. Sex trafficking specifically violates women's right to life, liberty and security of person. The fundamental individual right to life, liberty and security of person is reflected in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Also, Article 4 of the UDHR also holds that, "No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms". This practice also involves exploitation and deprivation of liberty that portray the situation and the nature of the treatment of their victims as tantamount to slavery. Slavery-like practices that can manifest in sex trafficking situations, including servitude, forced labor, debt bondage, and forced marriages. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), there are about 21 million people around the world trapped in some form of slavery in some form of forced labor, the term used to describe all forms of modern slavery including, trafficking, debt bondage and child labor.

In some cases, some of the victims are believed to consent to what is being done to them even though the distinction between coercion and consent is complex. How should coercion be characterized? Coercion comes in when the use of force is applied in the course of persuasion. Does someone with a gun to his/her their head consent to hand over his money when robbed? Most would say no. But does someone who sells his kidneys because his children are starving consent or the gullible ones who,

irrespective of all the warnings in the media still want to travel to Europe by all means to make money.



Trafficking flows from poor regions towards more affluent ones

The arrows show the flows that represent 5% and above of the total victims detected in destination subregions



Looking at this diagram from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), one can see that in issue of trafficking, there is a consistent flow of trafficking from poor regions of the world to more affluent ones for instance, Sub-Saharan Africans, South Asians, East Asians, Eastern and Central Europeans are all moving to the Middle East. Then we can also see those of South Americans, Sub-Saharan Africans, East Asians moving to West and central Europe. All those moving to the Middle East and West and Central Europe are all connecting routes to arrive at their final destination which are North America, Central America and the Caribbean. While very few make it to their final destination, others either lose their lives on the way due to one reason or the other and some others get trapped on the way. This flow is not static, but investigation shows that these are their major routes where trafficking occurs. What is usually ignored is the psychological impacts of human trafficking on the individual victims.

Psychological Impacts of Human Trafficking

Human trafficking has a lot of consequences on the victims and the country in general. Victims of human trafficking are exposed to psychological problems such as social alienation both at home and host countries, stigmatization, social exclusion and intolerance. There is total loss of their dignity both as human beings and as women

because of the condition under which they work (Ajagun, 2012). Some of the victims of trafficking especially, the young girls are being trafficked without their consent, to be subjected to become sex workers As Amalu (2007), stated, that some of these sex workers may break down psychologically and mentally as a result of stress from overwork and daily humiliation by their clients. The possibility of contracting Sexually Transmitted Disease (STD) and the deadly HIV/AIDS is very high among the victims and if this should occur, it may result in loss of employment, poverty, sickness and eventual painful death.

To this effect, the Federal Government for instance, has responded to the issue of human trafficking in Nigerian society by the enactment of the Enforcement and Administration Act, 2003. This law established the NAPTIP (Kigbu and Hassan, 2015). NAPTIP was vested with the responsibilities of enforcing the laws against trafficking in person, investigation and prosecution of persons suspected to be engaged in trafficking in persons and to take charge and coordinate their rehabilitation and counseling of trafficked persons; and other related matters. In recognition of the fact that human trafficking is not only a violation of human rights, but a crime that is against all laws. Both government and non-governmental organizations all strive to curb the menace of such crime.

Theoretical Framework

Human trafficking is global in scope and international partners are essential to its success. Therefore, a combination of theories like rational choice, victimology, demand theory, and economic theories are required to explain human trafficking of young women and girls for involuntary prostitution. Human trafficking for involuntary prostitution requires a network of variables in order to construct a comprehensive view of its occurrence (Mandisa et al, 2012).

Lanier and Herry (2004) pointed out that when a crime is an out come of several cliff causes, an integrated framework as a conceptual absorption approach is required to analyse the sequential claim of events. The purpose of integrating theories is to present an interaction of probabilities from different theoretical perspectives that could explain the factors contributing to a person committing a crime.

Rational Choice Theories

Rational choice theory originated during the late 18th century with the work of Cesare Beccaria (Moran, 1973). It postulates that criminals are rational beings who make decisions to commit crime based on the costs and benefits involved in the process of crime perpetration. Deterministic in nature, criminal decision making process is based on free will, which necessitates observation of opportunities, circumstances and situations that could affect the successful perpetration of the planned crime (Lanies and Harry, 2004).. Brown, Esbenson, and Geis, (2008) noted that rational decision making pertaining to crime also involves the choice of the victims determined by the type of crime, modus operndi, where and when to commit it and what to do afterwards.

Demand theory

This theory was developed by an English economist, Alfred Marshall (1842-1924). Demand theory is a theory relating to the relationship between consumer demand for goods and services and their prices. People demand for goods and services in an economy to satisfy their wants. The demand of a product at a certain price reflects the satisfaction that an individual expects from consuming the product. The demand for prostitutes can be classified into three categories; users or purchasers of sex, profit earning from selling sex and socio-cultural attitudes towards sex, (Hugles, 2004). The motives behind purchasing or owning prostitutes and depicting sex services in the manner in which writers do, may contribute to human trafficking of young women and girls for involuntary prostitution

Economic Theory of Crime

The economic theory of crime explains that criminals might commit crime if the expected gains from legal work are less than the ones that are to arise from illegal work. The underlying principle of the economic theory is that, criminals commit crime because they have perceived the benefits from the crime to outweigh the possibility of being prosecuted and incurring costs. (Eagle & Betters, 1997), (Pearson and Siven, 2007).

In applying these theories to this work, one can see that the crime of human trafficking is an outcome of several factors and causes. Taking the idea of the rational Choice theory, it believes that these criminals are rational and intelligent beings. They convince, decide when, where and how to recruit their victims. They constitute intelligent syndicates that are well connected globally. They thrive and succeed in this business because there is a high demand for their victims especially women and girls for sex trade. The victimization paradigm explains that many people fall victims due to harsh economic conditions, environmental factors or lifestyle. Women and children routinely face sexual violence, abuse and detention along the central Mediterranean route A victim, for instance, was warned by traffickers in these words, “Listen, don’t struggle if you are raped” (Elbagir, et al, 2018). Looking at the economic theory of crime, we can see that these syndicates engage in their illicit and dangerous ventures not for anything but for economic gains. Their gains seem to outweigh their losses and that is why it has continued unabated.

Ways of Combating Human Trafficking

In suggesting ways of combating these trafficking, the question that comes to mind is, why is the flow more to Europe and none to Africa? It is a sign that something is fundamentally wrong with all the sending nations. Africans need to look inward and discover those problems that are continually driving away our young energetic youths to Europe. The fight against human trafficking is a fight that requires a joint effort of states, nations and the entire international community. Human trafficking is a crime jointly carried out by organized syndicates that are internationally connected. In fact, almost every country in the world is affected by trafficking, whether as a country of

origin, transit or destination for victims. Currently, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), has promised to be offering practical help to states fighting against trafficking, not only helping to draft laws and create comprehensive national anti-trafficking strategies but also assisting with resources to implement them. States receive specialized assistance including the development of local capacity and expertise, as well as practical tools to encourage cross-border cooperation in investigations and prosecutions. In furtherance to this, UNODC also produces research and issue papers on trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling and engages in both broad and targeted awareness-raising on these issues, notably through the Blue Heart Campaign against Human Trafficking. UNODC's normative work on promoting the Protocols and capacity-building engages with Member States and working-level practitioners in providing legislative assistance, strategic planning and policy development, technical assistance for strengthened criminal justice responses, and protection and support to victims of trafficking in persons and smuggled migrants. .

The adoption in 2000, by the United Nations General Assembly of the *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking In Persons, Especially Women and Children* marked a significant milestone in international efforts to stop the trade in people. As the guardian of the Protocol, UNODC addresses human trafficking issues through its Global Programme against Trafficking in Persons. A vast majority of States have now signed and ratified the Protocol. But translating it into reality remains a problem. Very few criminals are convicted and most victims are probably never identified or assisted.

Conclusion and Recommendations

It is worrisome that irrespective of the excruciating agonies, loss of lives, and trauma experienced by victims of trafficking, thousands of Africans still fall victims to the evil practice of human trafficking. This is an indication of the hopeless conditions in many African nations as well as ignorance. A former victim who had escaped from the syndicates reported that many of the young girls out on the streets are trapped.

Commenting on Britain's 2015 anti-slavery act, which was designed to tackle slavery in the UK, James Brokenshire, was quoted as saying that the act would "send the strongest possible message to criminals that if you are involved in this disgusting trade in human beings, you will be arrested, you will be prosecuted, and you will be locked up". The British government has legislated that any business or part of a business that has a global turnover of 36 million Pounds or more and supplies goods and services in the UK will have to produce and publish an annual slavery and trafficking statement in a "prominent" place in its website every year. These are part of steps taken by the UK government to ensure that there is no slavery in any UK-based business outfit, including supply chains. This law applies also to foreign company's subsidiaries that carry on businesses in the UK, (Kelly, 2015).

In Nigeria, for instance, NAPTIP and other organizations have been doing their best in this fight. At the individual level, recently, the Benin Monarch, Oba of Benin (Oba Ewuare 11) placed a curse on the perpetrators of human trafficking in Edo State as well as native doctors who administer oaths of secrecy on victims. He did this out of concern because, Edo state is Nigeria's trafficking hub and one of Africa's largest departure points. Each year, tens of thousands of migrants are illegally smuggled from there. The Monarch, therefore, assembled all his Chiefs, Enogie, Edionwere, priests of different deities in Benin and native doctors at his palace, with a view to unleash different curses on the perpetrators. He believed that this oath of secrecy administered on the victims had been encouraging the illegal trade. He then invoked his power as the spiritual leader of Benin Kingdom and nullified all the oaths of secrecy administered on all victims of human trafficking and urged them to speak out and seek assistance, Ebegbulem, (2018). Meanwhile, the Edo statehouse of Assembly is about to pass a bill to prohibit trafficking in person and establish Edo state task force against trafficking in person African countries should, as a matter of urgency institute such act (like in the UK) and enforce it adequately. Even death sentences should be passed on the traffickers to discourage them from embarking on such illicit business. While governments can never fully reverse the trauma of human trafficking, they can help survivors pursue the justice they deserve and return to life of their choosing in life with dignity and free will. Again, a victim-centered and trauma-informed approach is equally needed to combat this menace. This requires, first and foremost that, the criminal justice system should not penalize victims of human trafficking when they are forced to commit crimes as a direct result of their exploitation. When forced criminality takes place as part of the scheme, victims' should not be further punished by the very system meant to protect them: and when they are, their conviction should be expunged. They should receive support and the comprehensive services to which they are entitled. "And a lot of times you'll wind up going from one situation like that to another and not even realizing the pattern of it, until you're able to get around somebody who can help you."

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CHAPTER TEN

State Failure, Irregular Migration, and Human Trafficking in Post-Gaddafi Libya

Freedom Onuoha and Chukwuma Okafor

Introduction

The last decade has witnessed an unprecedented explosion in the number of illegal African migrants seeking to leave the continent. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), no fewer than 17 million African migrants left the continent in 2017 alone in search for greener pastures in different countries outside Africa (NAN, 2018). Many of these migrants have been exposed to diverse dangers posed by harsh weather along perilous transit routes in the Sahara-Sahel region, attacks by bandits, recruitment by violent extremist groups, and exploitation by human trafficking gangs.

Particularly worrisome is the desperation by migrants to reach Europe through the coast of North African countries, especially Libya. According to the International Organization of Migration (IOM), over 600,000 African migrants have arrived in Italy through the perilous Central Mediterranean route since 2014, and nearly 120,000 arrived in 2017 alone. This has resulted in increasing level of irregular migrants from numerous African countries to Libya as transit point into Europe (Premium Times, June 2, 2018). About 82% of all migrants were travelling to Italy from Libya. Yet, the route is notoriously dangerous, with risks including making a journey through the Sahara Desert, indefinite detention in bleak conditions in Libya, and capsizing at sea (Kirwin and Anderson, 2018).

The issue of irregular migration and human trafficking has increasingly attracted attention in research, policy, and security circles in Africa. . One of the reasons for this growing attention is the dynamics of state failure following the ousting of the regime of President Maummar Gaddafi Libya, which have made the North African country a hub of irregular migration. Irregular migrants originating from, transiting through, or destined for, Libya are particularly vulnerable to exploitation by crime organizations involved in human and organ trafficking. As a result, a growing security challenge in post-Gaddafi Libya is the increasing commoditization and sell of African migrants by strong cartel of human traffickers that emerged in the aftermath of the uprising of 2011 and eventual collapse of the Libyan state (Sawani, 2014; Pedde, 2017).

It is in the light of the above that this paper seeks to examine how the failure of the Libyan state following the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, created the permissive

environment for the rise of criminal commoditization of illegal migrants by gangs that specialized in human and organ trafficking. The aim is to provide an evidence-based approach to understanding linkages between state failure, irregular migration, and human trafficking in the post Gaddafi Libya. The paper is divided into six parts. Following this introduction, section two contains a brief clarification of key concepts, while section three highlights the drivers of irregular migration in Africa. Section four discusses the connection between the failed Libyan state and upsurge in the trafficking of irregular migrants. Section five proffers some policy recommendations of how to tackle irregular migration and human trafficking by rebuilding and repositioning the Libyan state. The last section contains the concluding reflections.

Conceptual Clarifications

Given the tendency for concepts to elicit varying interpretations in discourses like this, matters of conceptual clarification are pertinent. Accordingly, the term state failure, irregular migration, and human trafficking will be clarified to achieve a shared understanding of their meaning as used in this paper.

State Failure

Academic debates continue to proliferate on the meaning and analytical utility of the concept of state failure. Those who use the term do not agree on a single definition, but a loose consensus has emerged that there are manifest characteristics of state failure which includes: breakdown of the critical national institutions, failure of the state to maintain law, order, and the security of its citizens; unemployment and failure of providing the basic fundamental social services, among others.

Thus, state failure has been defined as the condition of losing both effectiveness and legitimacy by any given state (Goldstone, 2008; Rotberg, 2002). Effectiveness in providing security and provision of the basic needs of the population, and legitimacy in securing the goodwill, trust, and backing of the citizens, are the criteria that guarantee the stability of a state. Thus, the escalation of ethnic or religious conflicts, state predation, regional or guerilla rebellion, democratic collapse and succession, or reform crisis in authoritarian states, are indicators or the pathways to state failure (Goldstone, 2008; p. 288-289).

State failure is the collapse of a state's security architecture, evident in the loss of capacity to maintain order or monopolize the use of force within its known territorial jurisdiction (Herbst, 1996). Once a state loses the capacity to maintain law and order as well as perform basic functions of providing public good like security, such state could be regarded as failed state (Moritz, 2013). Socio-political and economic dysfunctionality, often resulting in the outbreak of crisis in most African States, has been singled out as one among the numerous factors responsible for state failure in Africa (Engel, 2014). Relevant to the analysis of this paper is the understanding that the vacuum created by state collapse in post Ghaddafi Libya have made African migrants to erroneously believe that the development will grant them unfettered

access to transit through Libya into Europe. On the contrary, the failure of the Libyan state has heightened the risk of embarking a journey to Europe through Libya.

Irregular Migration

There is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration. Halili and Ibrahimi (2017) view irregular migration as the movement that takes place outside of the applicable procedural rules of the receiving, transit, and origin countries. It simply denotes illegal entry of migrants into a given country without recourse to immigration laws and conditions of such country. It is often prompted by people's search for greener pastures instigated by civil wars, insecurity, and harsh economic environment from their countries of origin (Harwood, 2015). State Commission on Migration (n.d) identified the followings as types of irregular migration: human trafficking, illegal border crossing, illegal transportation of a person across the border (smuggling), and overstay on the territory of the country after the period of the legal stay expires.

Irregular migration poses multiple challenges to countries of origin, transit, and destination, as well as to migrants themselves. Migrants in irregular situation are particularly vulnerable to discrimination, exploitation, and abuse. Such migrants are also in danger of being exploited by crime organizations involved in human trafficking and migrant smuggling.

Human Trafficking

Human trafficking has been defined in different ways. As such it is difficult to locate any single definition which may be regarded as entirely satisfactory. A working definition of the term therefore is essential to achieve the objectives of this study. Ogunlela (2012, p.3) defines human trafficking as “all acts and attempted acts involved in the recruitment, transportation within or across borders, sale, transfer, receipts or harboring of a person involving the use of deception, coercion or debt bondage for the purpose of placing or holding the person whether for or not in involuntary servitude in false or bonded or in slavery-like conditions”.

This definition recognized both the internal and international dimensions of human trafficking. However, it limits our understanding of trafficking to the challenge of 'exploitation' in slave-like condition, overlooking the fact that they could be subjected to other forms of brutal treatment such as organ harvesting. According to article 3, paragraph (a), of *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children* (2014), human trafficking is defined as:

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefit to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, as a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other

forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

The definition locates the purpose of trafficking on exploitation. It equally recognizes that the removal of a victim's organs, which may be used for different purposes, could be a motive behind trafficking in persons.

Human trafficking and illegal border crossing are the second largest crime industry in the world, which is run by large international criminal networks. As a result of tight immigration policies and improved border monitoring technologies in developed countries, an increasing number of irregular migrants who journey through fragile and failing states such as Libya become victims of criminal groups involved in human and organ trafficking.

Drivers of Irregular Migration in Africa

The challenges of state collapse and immigration crisis in the post-Gaddafi Libya, with the attendant ordeals suffered by thousands of African migrants in the hands of armed militias who specialize in smuggling, appropriation, and auctioning of African migrants in Libyan slave market, have amplified concerns about the drivers of irregular migration in Africa. Using the peculiar drivers of irregular migration in the horn of Africa region as point of departure, Horwood (2015) opines that challenges that are connected to livelihoods and unemployment, armed conflict, and insecurity, social and political oppression, environmental fragility and natural disaster, are some of the drivers of irregular migration.

Multiplicity of factors have been singled out in this paper as the most critical drivers of irregular migration in Africa. These factors include: state fragility, leadership and corruption, unemployment, poverty, conflict and insecurity which have brought about numerous peace support operations (PSO) in Africa, porous borders, high scale environmental stress associated with climate change, environmental degradation and limited adaptive capacities across Africa, the warped value of get-rich-quick, poor standard of education, among others.

Fragility of African states: State fragility has been a notable driver of irregular migration in Africa, which has heightened people's vulnerability to being trafficked or abused in transit and destination states. Generally, fragile states are considered to have capacity problems, which usually prevent them from adequately dealing with complexities arising from the political, economic, environmental, and social management of their societies. They are usually States with very weak and faltering governance processes and institutions that deny the political authority the ability to maintain law, order and security within the state's territory. Many African states are considered less stable due to their social, political, economic, and demographic vulnerabilities. According to the 2017 Fragile State Index, the most fragile country in Africa is South Sudan, followed by Somalia, Central African Republic, Sudan,

Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, Guinea, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Ethiopia. Some of these states, especially South Sudan, Somalia, Congo, Guinea and Nigeria, are host to ongoing or simmering violent conflicts that have displaced many, and forcing several thousands to flee as refugees or migrants.

Weak and corrupt political leadership: Poor leadership is another driver that contributes to irregular migration in Africa. Many migrants are fleeing from political persecution and economic marginality in their home countries hoping to transit from Libya to greener pastures in Europe. According to the Transparency International (TI) global assessment report of 2017 released in February 2018, countries that performed abysmally below 30 percent in the corruption perception index were mainly from Africa such as Guinea Bissau, Nigeria, South Sudan, Somalia, Niger, Gabon, among others. Outside the reputational risks and cost of bad leadership associated with corruption in Africa, Kimenyi and Mbaku (2011,) argue that the negative impacts of corruption on African economies have outweighed the gains recorded over the years. African countries are endowed with strategic human and natural resources; however, its greatest challenge has been failure by its leadership to utilize these resources for the wellbeing of their citizens. Inept leadership and corruption remain the greatest bane on African development as the resources in the continent are diverted for personal use by the elite resulting in the impoverishment of the masses. This mismanagement of resources breeds unemployment, youth restiveness, and insecurity, which threaten the many states in Africa and induce various forms of irregular migration.

Table 1: Top 20 African Countries in the Corruption Perception Index of 2017

S/N	African Country	Point Scored	Global Ranking
1	Somalia	9	180
2	South Sudan	12	179
3	Sudan	16	175
4	Libya	17	171
5	Guinea Bissau	17	171
6	Equatorial Guinea	17	171
7	Angola	19	167
8	Eritrea	20	165
9	Chad	20	165
10	Republic of Congo	21	161
11	DR Congo	21	161
12	Zimbabwe	22	157
13	Burundi	22	157
14	Central Africa Republic	24	156
15	Madagascar	24	156
16	Mozambique	25	153
17	Cameroon	25	153
18	Uganda	26	151
19	Nigeria	27	148
20	Guinea	27	148

Source: Adapted from <https://www.pulse.ng/bi/politics/these-are-the-21-most-corrupt-countries-in-africa-id8021690.html>.

Prevalence of Unemployment: Another pertinent driver of irregular migration in Africa is the high rate of unemployment, especially among young people. Recent statistics show that unemployment among young people aged 15–24 years old in sub-Saharan Africa has hovered between 12% and 14% since the global financial crisis of 2008 (Dzimwasha, 2017). This is higher than the 9–10% in South Asia over the same period. The data does not include youth in vulnerable employment and

underemployed in informal sectors, who make up at least 70% of the workforce. The situation in Africa will be compounded by the fact that the youth population is expected to double to over 400m people by 2045 (African Development Bank, 2015). As a result, unemployed youths who have lost hope in the leadership of their countries to provide them with decent jobs have either joined criminal gangs or undertaken the perilous journey through the Sahara Desert to reach Libya with the hope of making to Europe. A study by the International Labour Organizations (2016) noted that among the key factors shaping young people's decision to migrate are elevated unemployment rate, increased susceptibility to under paid jobs, and lack of good quality job opportunities.

Widespread Poverty: There is widespread poverty in rural communities and among female-headed households. Poverty is endemic in Africa. The poverty level in many African states heightens arising from the fact that majority of the populace are without gainful employment or underemployed. The worsening environments for service are unfavorable. Harsh economic realities, including inflations of stable food and services, have subjected the citizens to excruciating poverty and other vulnerabilities that are pushing Africans to seek greener pasture(s) outside their country of origin and most of them end in Libya. Nigeria is one of the countries whose citizens swarm to Libya in the desperation to cross over to Europe. Nigeria, for example, has the largest extreme poverty population in the world as at June 2018 (see Figure 1), with over 87 million or nearly 50% of its estimated 180 million population living below poverty line (Punch, 2018). The implication is that many Nigerians who are below the poverty level are forced to look beyond the country for survival, or engage in kidnapping. People living in extreme poverty are unable to meet even the barest minimal needs for survival.

Violent conflicts and crisis: Africa is host to various forms of violent conflicts and insecurity that have forcefully uprooted thousands of people from their countries into neighboring countries including, Libya. Scores of deaths and refugee crises arising from variants of violent conflicts and humanitarian crises in South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Chad, Niger, among others, are well documented. This ugly trend of protracted conflicts and insecurity in major African states, has made Momodou (2017) to point out that Ethiopia alone hosted nearly 740,000 refugees mostly from Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, and South Sudan, the largest refugee population in a single African country. Central African Republic has its own share of conflict troubles that have added to the refugee problem in the continent (see Table 2).

Table 2: Refugee and IDPs Indicator Scores for 2018

S/No	African Country	Population of Refugees and IDPs	Global Rank
1	Sudan/South Sudan	127.2	1
2	Somalia	126.0	2
3	DR Congo	125.1	3
4	Chad	123.2	4
5	Central African Republic	122.3	5
6	Uganda	115.6	9
7	Burundi	113.5	11
8	Liberia	113.4	12
9	Zimbabwe	111.8	13
10	Ethiopia	110.6	15

Source: Adapted from <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/2018/06/18/refugees-and-idps-indicator-scores-2018/>

In Nigeria, more than 2 million people have been forcibly displaced by the insurgency waged by the Islamist militant group, Boko haram, since 2009 (Onuoha and Oyewole, 2018). An estimated 195,350 persons have sought for refugee-status in neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Violent conflicts and insecurity within African have made the continent host to the highest number of peace support operations such as the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), United Nations Mission in Dafur (UNAMID), African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), among others.

Weak border security management: The nature of Africa's international borders is another important factor that has aided the escalation of illegal migration and consequent commoditization of trafficked migrants. The porosity of these borders owes as much to the way the colonialists carved up the African continent as to the nature of their management by post-colonial African states. Most African governments find it extremely difficult to administer international boundaries that divide 177 cultural and ethnic groups (Okumu, 2010). Given the arbitrariness of the colonial boundaries, people living along the borders, some of who belong to the same ethnic group, operate as if the boundaries never existed. Given this tendency among the local inhabitants, cross-border movement reflects and responds to the dynamics of political, economic, social, cultural, and environmental exigencies. Post-colonial borders are known for their acute shortage of security and law enforcement officials. The few that are deployed are poorly trained, made to work with inadequate and obsolete

equipment, and are sometimes poorly remunerated. Profit-seeking criminal gangs take advantage of these porous borders to perpetrate or facilitate trafficking in migrants. Estimates from two of the principal smuggling routes - East, North, and West Africa to Europe and South to North America - suggest that the smuggling of migrants generates around \$6.75 billion a year for criminals operating in these regions alone (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2018).

Pressing environmental challenges: The rise in the scale and intensity of environmental stress associated with climate change, environmental degradation, and limited adaptive capacities across Africa, is another escalating factor aiding irregular migration in the continent. Much of the African continent is experiencing harsh environmental change related to degraded soils, water resources, and biodiversity, and extreme and unusual weather conditions. Such stresses amplify pressures on already fragile ecosystems, exacerbating the failure by governments to provide sufficient food and water to populations. It is not a coincidence that many fragile and conflict-affected countries in Africa are the very same ones experiencing acute food insecurity, and producing the most forced migrants. Moreover, environmental stresses constitute a direct factor in several violent conflicts especially in and around the Sahel, forcing affected populations to take extreme measures in competing for scarce resources. Some vulnerable populations have therefore migrated to areas that are habitable, while many others have decided to head to Europe via Libya (Tinti, 2018).

The Failed Libyan State and the Trafficking of Illegal Migrants

Migration of whatever variants has served different purposes in the past. For example, in Morocco after independence, the government encouraged its citizens to emigrate to other countries as a strategy for reducing unemployment. Following the discovery of crude oil in Libya in 1963, the Libyan state encouraged immigration of foreign nationals to meet the labor needs of the country's booming oil industry (Svoboda, 2016). With the outbreak of the Libyan uprising, the situation has changed to something ominous in the past few years in the aftermath of the fall of Muammar Gaddafi's government in Libya. The most shocking contradiction in the recent trajectory of the Libyan state is the rapid decline of Libya from former safe haven for African migrants (during the reign of Muammar Gaddafi) to a slave market (in the post-Gaddafi Libya) where numerous African migrants are bought and sold in scenes reminiscent of the transatlantic slave trade (Guizani, 2017).

Before the outbreak of the Arab Uprising in 2011, Libya under Ghaddafi was one of the most stable countries in Africa, though not without its own internal contradictions suppressed by Ghaddafi's dictatorial tendencies. The Libyan uprising began on February 17, 2011 as a wave of anti-regime revolutionary demonstration against the government of Muammar Ghaddafi. The uprising was instigated and emboldened by the successive overthrow of repressive regimes in Tunisia and Egypt (Barany, 2011). The uprising had its strongest outburst in the form of sustained protests and demonstrations in the Eastern city of Benghazi which is known for its history of

galvanizing rebellion against the government in Tripoli over the years. Factors such as unemployment, repressive policies of the Ghaddafi regime, strangulation of political freedom, high media censorship, and dominance of single political party, contributed to the outbreak of the uprising.

As the uprising gained momentum following weeks of sustained protests across major cities in Libya, Muammar Ghaddafi authorized aggressive crackdown on protesters and the rebels. With rising violence, scores of deaths, and human rights abuses carried out under the Muammar Ghaddafi command, international community through the United Nations and NATO's led coalition forces, intervened under the guise of the responsibility to protect (R2P) to counter Ghaddafi's air bombardment of the rebel groups and protesting citizens. On October 20, 2011, the former strongman of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi, who had ruled the oil-rich North African country for over four decades, was captured and killed in his hometown of Sirte (Larémont, 2013).

Gaddafi's overthrow is significant in that it was done in concert between Libyan rebels and European and NATO powers who worked with one another to achieve an overthrow of the regime. Following the eventual ousting of Ghaddafi's regime, the UN backed a transition government in Tripoli to restore law and order. However, several attempts by the international community to stabilize Libya through state-building has failed as different armed groups have emerged in the aftermath of the uprising to exercise control over portions of the collapsed Libyan state (Chivvis and Martini, 2014).


The fall of the Ghaddafi regime in 2011 led to proliferation of weapons and armed criminal gangs that are divided along ideological and clan lines in Libya, making the prospects of nation building and democratic rule in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprising a daunting task. As pointed out by Goldstone (2008), the fundamental indicator of state failure or failed states is the proliferation of regional or guerrilla rebellion, democratic collapse, and succession or reform crisis in authoritarian states, escalation of ethnic or religious conflicts, state predation/oppression, among others. Rather than serving as attractive spot for African migrants in search of opportunities to sell their labour to a booming oil economy, post-Ghaddafi Libya has become a failed state whose territory has been transformed into a market space where diverse criminal gangs and militia groups sell African migrants or their organs harvested in the cruelest manners.

The declaration of independent governments within the post-Gaddafi Libya in the East, West, and Southern Libya, by armed militia groups such as; Islamic State in Libya (ISIL), Ansar Al-Sharia in Libya, Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council (BRSC), Derna Mujahedeen Shura Council (DMSC), Libya Shield forces, Misratan Third force and many other armed groups, have heightened security tension and undermined the prospects of having a unified and stable Libya (Arraf, 2017). Thus, the daunting task of state-building in post-Gaddafi Libya is how to curtail and reign in these armed groups

into having government of national unity. These armed groups, with other criminal gangs, have gained territories and power, making political transition more complicated to implement and the prospects of state building a more difficult task to achieve due to competing interests. The contestations among these rival groups on the one hand, and the continuing struggle between these forces and the United Nations-backed transitional government of National Unity in Tripoli on the other hand, have made post-Ghaddafi Libya a collapsed state.

Prior to his demise in 2011, Gaddafi blocked those trying to reach Europe, as part of a \$5billion aid package from Italy (Tinti, 2018). In the post-Ghaddafi era, however, migrants going through Libya to reach Europe face impossible choices as their fate hung perilously between the devil of criminal gangs operating in Libya and the deep blue Mediterranean Sea. Getting on a boat is very risky: many die before they reach the European coast or a rescue ship. Remaining in Libya, whether in detention centres run by the administration or a criminal organization, exposes them to unbelievable levels of violence and exploitation (Guardian, 2017). The vulnerability of African migrants in Libya have become glaring as majority of detained migrants in Libyan prisons or the holding centres, are tortured, abused, raped, shot to death in an attempt to escape, and are sold for piecemeal amounts to owners of farmlands, as slaves for domestic shores and commercial sex workers at night clubs and brothels in Libya (Zimmerman & Stockl, 2012; Porsia, 2015; Guizani, 2017; BBC, 2018). This partly explain why North Africa accounted for most of global migrant deaths and disappearances between January and June 2017, as depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Global Migrant Deaths and Disappearances, 1 January to 30 June 2017



Source: Guardian, “Migrant sea route to Italy is world’s most lethal” 11 September, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/11/migrant-death-toll-rises-after-clampdown-on-east-european-borders>

The eventual collapse of Libyan state brought about increased movement of people through Libyan territory, arising from security breaches and lack of quality surveillance across its borders. This development has amplified human trafficking and smuggling by various state and non-state actors that specialize in human and organ trafficking as a result of failed post Ghaddafi Libyan state (Plaut, 2018). Investigative reports by BBC and CNN, among others, have documented the connivance and complicity of Libyan state officials in this reprehensible sale of African migrants. Data in Table 3 contain the list of individuals, including government officials, security agents, and criminal organisations, identified by the United Nations as involved in human trafficking in Libya.

Table 3: List of Persons accused of Human Trafficking in Libya

S/NO	Name	Designation	Status	Remarks
1	Mus'ab Abu-Qarin	Leader of transnational trafficking network	Non-State Actor	Travel ban and Asset freeze
2	Amid Husain Al-Kuni	Governor of Ghat in Southern Libya	State Actor	Travel ban
3	Quren Salih Quren Al-Qadhafi	Libyan Ambassador to Chad	State Actor	Travel ban
4	Abdulqader Mohammed Al-Baghdadi	Head of the Liaison office of the Revolutionary Committees	Non-State Actor	Travel ban
5	Safia Farkash Al-Barassi	Undisclosed	Nil	Travel ban and Asset freeze
6	Abdullah Al-Senussi	Director Military Intelligence	State Actor	Asset freeze
7	Fitiwi Abdelrazak	Leader of transnational trafficking network	Non-State Actor	Travel ban and Asset freeze
8	Abdulqader Yusuf Dibri	Head of President Muammar Gadhafi's Personal Security	State Actor	Travel ban
9	Abu Zayd Umar Dorda	Director External Security Organization and Head of External Intelligence Agency	State Actor	Asset freeze

11	Ermias Ghermay	Leader of transnational trafficking network	Non-State Actor	Travel ban and Asset freeze
12	Abu-bakr Yunis Jabir	Defence Minister	State Actor	Asset freeze
13	Mohammed Kachlaf	Commander of Shuhada Al-Nasr brigade and petrol refinery guard of Zawiya's refinery	State Actor	Travel ban and Asset freeze
14	Matuq, Mohammed Matuq	Secretary for Utilities	State Actor	Travel ban and Asset freeze
15	Sayyid Mohammed Qadhaf Al-dam	Undisclosed	Nil	Travel ban
16	Aisha Muammar Muhammed Abu Minyar Qadhafi	Undisclosed	Nil	Travel ban and Asset freeze
17	Hannibal Muammar Qadhafi	Undisclosed	Nil	Travel ban and Asset freeze
16	Khamis Muammar Qadhafi	Undisclosed	Nil	Travel ban and Asset freeze
18	Mohammed Muammar Qadhafi	Undisclosed	Nil	Travel ban and Asset freeze
19	Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Qadhafi	Leader of Revolution and Supreme Commander of Armed Forces	State Actor	Travel ban and Asset freeze
20	Mutassim Qadhafi	National Security Adviser	State Actor	Travel ban and Asset freeze
21	Saadi Qadhafi	Commander Special Forces	State Actor	Travel ban and Asset freeze
22	Saif Al-Arab Qadhafi	Undisclosed	Nil	Asset freeze
23	Saif Al- Islam Qadhafi	Director, Qadhafi Foundation	State Actor	Travel ban and Asset freeze

24	Abdelhafiz Zlitni	Minister for Planning and Finance in Qadhafi's Government	State Actor	Travel ban and Asset freeze
25	Ahmad Oumar Al-Dabbashi	Commander of Anas Al-Dabbashi Militias, leader of transnational trafficking network	Non-State Actor	Travel ban and Asset freeze
26	Abd Al-Rahman Al-Milad	Commander of the guard in Zawiya	State Actor	Travel ban and Asset freeze
27	Libyan African Investment Portfolio	Libyan State Institution	Nil	Nil
28	Libyan Investment Authority	Libyan State Institution	Nil	Nil

Adapted from <https://eritreahub.org/un-issues-official-list-of-those-accused-of-human-trafficking-in-libya>

Arising from the challenges of state failure, irregular migration, and human trafficking in the post-Ghaddafi Libya, a fundamental concern borders on measures to be adopted in the short-term to strengthen the Libyan state, as well as long-term measures aimed at addressing the complex drivers of illegal migration in Africa mature

Combating Irregular Migration and Human Trafficking Through State Building

Stemming the tide of illegal migration and associated human trafficking in Libya requires the repositioning of the Libyan state through rebuilding of state structures, reconciliation of rival factions, and restoration of the state monopoly of violence. This will be achieved through concerted efforts by the international community to demobilize various armed non-state actors such the brigades and armed militias (Sawani, 2017). In view of the above, the following policy measures are hereby suggested.

- The United Nations should tighten the noose on arms flow into Libya to force the militias to accept a negotiated end to the crisis.
- The AU should partner with the UN in organizing a high-level mediation involving regional powers such as the US, Russia, China, the UK, France, and Germany to develop a united approach to reigning in the militia groups.
- There is the need to support phased disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programmes and Security Sector Reforms (SSR) with inbuilt confidence-building mechanisms to gain the buy-in of rival armed groups competing for the control of the Libyan state.

- The Internationally recognized government in Libya should be assisted with necessary gadgets and equipment to ensure strong and effective border surveillance, inspection, and control, to better combat irregular migration and human trafficking.
- National reconciliation dialogue should be made a top priority by the UN-backed government in Tripoli, which should have its aim at reconciling all the divergent interest groups. Libyan leaders should demonstrate the political will and love for their country in this regard.
- Reestablishment, strengthening, equipping, and re-orientation of Libyans in various state institutions especially, the security sector, are necessary in maintaining national security.
- There should be overhaul of social and economic policies in Libya in order to integrate its vast/teeming population that are unemployed and ready to work.
- The African Union should leverage on regional policies and conventions to pressure member states to undertake economic and political reforms that will improve the living conditions of its citizens.
- Countries of the Sahara-Sahel region should consider establishing a special regional taskforce on tackling illegal migration and human trafficking in the region. African leaders should demonstrate greater political will and commitment to address challenges to human security in their countries, such as poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, political repression, and marginalisation.

Conclusion

This paper began with the position that the increasing level of commoditization of African migrants by different armed militia or criminal gangs in Libya that specialize in trafficking in migrants and their organs, is traceable to the collapse of the Libyan state in the aftermath of the overthrow of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. State collapse heightened the rate migrants wanted to emigrate into Europe. However, the gap created by the collapse of the state was gradually filled by the existence of different armed groups laying claims to the control of the Libyan state.

In the absence of predictable legitimate income streams, both state and non-state actors have engaged in the buying and selling of migrants to generate funds for their sustenance and operations. In other words, both state and non-state actors take advantage of the non-existence or dysfunctionality of state institutions to commoditize migrants. Therefore, irregular migration that feeds into human trafficking flows could be significantly stemmed if policies to combat migration and trafficking are integrated into overall efforts at rebuilding the collapsed Libyan state and promoting development in fragile African states that are the origin of irregular migrants.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

Nature versus Human Contrivance: Advancing the Centrality of Poor Governance to Irregular Migration in Africa

Michael I. Ugwueze

Introduction

Globally, there is an upsurge of migration in recent times as the world sees larger numbers of migrants than at any other time in history (African Union, 2017). According to the United Nations (2017), the number of international migrants moved from 173 million in 2000 to 258 million in 2017. Of this figure, the number from Africa reached 34 million, with nearly all of them being youths whose estimated median age was put between 27.6 in 2000 and 30.9 in 2017, and almost half of them are women (United Nations, 2017). More people have also been forcibly displaced than during, or any time since, the World War II, with figures reaching over 65 million by the end of 2015 (African Union, 2017). These trends continue to take shape even against the backdrop of the growing securitisation of migration, the externalisation of border control, and increasingly restrictive migration policies, which have largely contributed to irregular migration. In the midst of these growing trends, irregular migration has become one of the greatest security concerns confronting the global community in recent times (International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 2018). Not only does this trigger trans-border crimes such as terrorism, human trafficking, and the resurgence of slavery; it is also the major cause of brain-drain in Africa.

Many observers and analysts have attributed the reasons for this increase in irregular migration to global inequality, poverty, conflict, gender discriminatory practices, terrorism, climatic change, and repressive policies on migration by advanced countries (Afifi, 2011; Kelsaite & Mach, 2015; Browne, 2015; Kelly and Tondo, 2018). Browne (2015), for instance, argued that while irregular migration is not a first choice for anyone, it is caused by the repressive policies on legal migration by more developed or developing countries; although it gains momentum not necessarily by the repressive policies of states, but by other networks and reinforcing mechanisms such as pressures from socio-economic poverty, insecurity, and poor governance in the out-migrating states.

Despite these observations, the root cause of irregular migration remains a contentious debate among scholars. While many favour irregular migration as a natural consequence of climate change (Adepoju, 1983; Afifi, 2011; Kelsaite & Mach, 2015), others blame it on human contrivance arising from poor economic conditions such as poverty and unemployment (Shimeles, 2010; UNICEF, 2014; Crush et al, 2015; de Jager & Musuva, 2016), and violent conflicts that are throwing up more internally

displaced persons (IDP) and refugees across the world (Wijk, 2010; Browne, 2015; Kuschminder et al., 2015; Reitano et al., 2014). Although others have also mentioned poor governance as one of the causes of irregular migration (African Union, 2017; Akinleye, 2017), it has not been central to existing studies. Thus, this paper seeks to examine the contributions of poor governance to the problem of irregular migration among young Africans.

In addition to this brief introduction, this paper proceeds as follows: the next section looks at the concept of irregular migration, and effort was made to situate it within a context that will permit our understanding of its causes and consequences in Africa. The third section discusses the methodology adopted in carrying out the research; and the fourth offers a brief review of literature on the theoretical debates around irregular migration. This is meant to provide the necessary background for analyzing the contemporary migration trend among African youths. The findings of the paper are presented in section five which specifically looks at the centrality of poor governance to irregular migration. The final section contains the conclusion which also embodies the recommendations.

Understanding Irregular Migration

Traditional understandings of migration and migrants have focused predominantly on the dichotomy of categorisations based on time and space, location and direction, state perspective and causes (Collyer and Haas, 2012). Time and space have to do with whether the migration is permanent or temporary, domestic or international; location and direction deal with immigration and emigration, origin and destination and/or home and host of migration. State perspective deals with whether the migration is legal or illegal and regular or irregular; and finally, causes deal with whether migration is forced, voluntary, or induced by labour, studentship, retirement, or family reunion (Collyer and Haas, 2012, p.470). It is against the state perspective that irregular migration is explained in this paper.

Irregular migration is an extremely difficult subject to deal with both in conceptual explication and in empirical analysis. This is essentially because it is not a migration trend that is officially documented (Adepoju, 1983; African Union, 2017; United Nations, 2017). As such, irregular migration has been given different interpretations; it is sometimes used synonymous with undocumented migration, illegal migration, unauthorised migration, unofficial migration, clandestine or transit migration (see Lohrmann, 1987; Collyer and Haas, 2012; IOM, 2011).

While all these interpretations satisfy the position of this article, the term 'irregular migration' will be used in place of other terms interchangeable with it. There is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration. Its conceptions by the destination and sending countries are also different. Destination countries conceive irregular migration as entry, stay, or work in a country without the necessary authorisation or documents required under immigration regulations. The sending

countries, on the other hand, see it as a process in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid passport or travel document and which does not fulfil the administrative requirements for leaving the country (IOM, 2011).

Similarly, De Haas (2008) explained irregular migration by categorising it into two – irregular entry and irregular stay. A migrant can enter a country without documentation and thus be considered irregular, but that individual can later be regularised, and his/her stay is therefore valid. A good example is the case of the Malian migrant Mamoudou Gassama whose stay in France was regularised by the French President, Emmanuel Macron, after his legendary rescue of a four-year old French citizen who was dangling on a balcony of a high building in Paris on 27 May 2018. Gassama had not the necessary papers to take up a residency in France and had been living in temporary accommodation before this historical incident (Aljazeera, 2018). On the other hand, a migrant can enter a country with valid document, such as with a visa, but can become irregular by overstaying the visa. According to De Haas (2008: 1310), ‘the majority of irregular African migrants enter Europe legally and subsequently overstay their visas,’ thus becoming irregular migrants. Kuschminder et al. (2015) also identified three conditions under which irregular migration could be summarised. These are, entering a country without proper authority, either through clandestine entry or with fraudulent documents; entering with authorisation but overstaying that authorisation; and deliberately abusing the asylum system. While all these explanations subsist, this paper adopts IOM’s (2011) definition of irregular migration as a movement of people that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit, and receiving or destination countries.

Methodology

Although this study is about irregular migration among young Africans across the globe, it focused on the routes that connect Africa with Europe, particularly through the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea.¹ Africa was chosen because of the conventional wisdom that poverty, unemployment, violent conflicts, climate change, and more recently poor governance, are the root causes of irregular migration. With the popular images of extreme poverty, starvation, tribal warfare, environmental degradation, and abuse of power adorning African countries at all corners, the choice is further justified.

In West Africa, for instance, the main migration route to Europe passes through the Niger-Libya border region, which is mainly populated by two rival Saharan tribes – the Tuareg and Toubou. Although colonial borders separate these tribes, their allegiance to each other remains far closer to their tribal affiliations than the central governments of Niger or Libya (Funk et al., 2017). The neglect of the Tuareg and Toubou by the Nigerien and Libyan governments, respectively makes for alternative source of survival for the two communities which migrant smuggling through the connecting

¹ These routes – Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea – represent the two most dangerous land and sea routes that have claimed the lives of many young Africans trying to cross to Europe in recent time.

routes readily provides. This could be the major factor that accounts for the high volume of irregular migration that takes place within the Niger-Libya borders.

At the receiving side, Europe was chosen because it remains the major destination point for African migrants (Adepoju et al., 2009). Meanwhile, irregular migration occurring from sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb to Europe has increasingly been defined as a security problem associated with international crime and, particularly since the terrorist attacks of 11 March 2004 and 7 July 2005 in Madrid and London, respectively (Lutterbeck, 2006; De Haas, 2008).

The data used in confirming the hypothesis that poor governance is the major cause of irregular migration among young Africans were generated through both primary and secondary sources. For the primary source, the study utilised key informant interviews (KII) of some Nigerian-Europe-bound Libyan returnees. For the secondary sources, we culled information from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), World Migration and local newspaper reports, as well as other documented evidence from the United Nations and EU commissioned papers, and other journals.

Glaser's (1965) Constant comparative method (CCM) was applied in the data analysis. This method is concerned with generating and plausibly suggesting (not provisionally testing) many properties and hypotheses about a general phenomenon which may be causes, conditions, consequences, dimensions, types and processes that result in an integrated theory (Glaser, 1965). In CCM, no attempt is made to ascertain either the universality or the proof of suggested causes or other properties. Since no proof is involved, the CCM does not require consideration of all available data, nor is the data restricted to one kind of clearly defined case. As such, CCM increases the battery of alternative approaches useful to researchers particularly in the areas that raise problems of secrecy, sensitivity, taboo topics, stigma, and legality, and where people are usually adept at covering the facts when necessary (Glaser, 1965: 436). Glaser's CCM can be described in four stages: (1) comparing incidents applicable to each category, (2) integrating categories and their properties, (3) delimiting the theory, and (4) writing the theory.

Applying Glaser's four stages to our study, we theoretically compared all the categories that explain the cause of irregular migration and integrated them into three perspectives. We then moved to delimit the centrality of poor governance and to sieve out a theoretical explanation that it is the major cause of irregular migration among young Africans. Because of the so many indicators of poor governance, and the improbability of convincingly relating all the indicators to irregular migration in this paper, the article utilised the following: 1) lack of responsiveness; 2) lack of transparency, accountability and inclusiveness; and 3) lack of development initiatives, as three indicators of poor governance. These areas were chosen because they represent the three factors that are mostly abused in the political system of most countries in Africa. Many African states run unresponsive, unaccountable and

exclusionary governance that is bereft of development initiatives. Besides, the indicators chosen for this study are central to poverty, insecurity, and lack of climate change mitigation that combine to drive irregular migration in the continent. The next section examines the theoretical debates on the root causes of irregular migration in Africa.

Theoretical explanations of the causes of irregular migration

There have been several perspectives to the explanation of the major causes of irregular migration across the globe. According to Gubhaju and Jong (2009, p.32), 'while each one of these perspectives has established their own niches within the set of available theories that attempt to explain migration behaviour, the question as to which is the more valid explanation for migration behaviour remains unresolved.' Some of the existing theories, including the push-pull theory (see Schoorl et al. 2000; Eurostat and NIDI, 2000; Wijk, 2010; Browne, 2015; African Union, 2017), have tried to explain the major causes of irregular migration. In particular, African Union (2017) has used the push-pull theory to summarise the root causes of irregular migration in Africa. The push factors include lack of socio-economic opportunities and the rule of law, poor governance, patronage and corruption, political instability, conflict, terrorism, and civil strife. The pull factors include real or perceived opportunities for a better life abroad, higher income, improved security, and superior education and health care in countries of destination. The traditional push-pull theory stresses that people are pushed to migrate from a place with poor social, political or economic conditions, and pulled to a destination with better living conditions (Wijk, 2010). The basic assumption of this theory is that the more disadvantaged a place is, the more likely it will produce out-migration, including irregular migration (Eurostat and NIDI, 2000).

Outside the traditional push-pull narrative, lower costs of migration, improved communication, especially social media and the internet, greater information availability, and the need to join relatives, families and friends, are some other factors that warrant decision to embark on irregular migration (African Union, 2017). This latter position explains the social network theory of migration. This theory emphasises the role of family and friends in the process of migration (Boyd, 1989; Mullan, 1989; Massey et al., 1993; Wikj, 2010). According to the theory, social networks of family and friends influence the decision-making process of migrants especially regarding where to migrate and how to facilitate their travels (Boyd, 1989; Massey et al., 1993). Mullan (1989), argued that migration is rarely undertaken as a completely independent event; rather it is often a decision made easier by being accompanied or received by, friends and relatives among whom a first or second-hand knowledge and information essential to facilitating the migration process is shared. Against the backdrop of this situation, human traffickers often influence irregular migration behaviours (Wikj, 2010).

There are therefore existing schools of thought that attempt to explain the root causes of irregular migration using either the push-pull or the social network theories. The first school of thought has used the push factor caused by climate change to explain

irregular migration (Afifi, 2011; Kelsaite & Mach, 2015; Emoche, 2018; Udeh, 2018). Using Niger as a study focus, Afifi (2011) robustly traced how the push factor inherent in the vicious cycle of environmental degradation results in income reduction, poverty, and unemployment; thus, leading to migration among the Nigeriens. The implication is that climate change remains a natural push factor that significantly influences irregular migration of Nigeriens both within and outside Africa. In Afifi's (2011) empirical analysis, draught, soil degradation, shrinking of the Lake Chad, deforestation, and sand intrusion, are responsible for increased migration of Nigeriens to Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Chad, Benin, Togo, France, Italy, Germany, and the United States. In Nigeria, analysts have also used the natural push factors to explain the southward migration that is largely fuelling the problem of herdsman-farmers conflict particularly within the Middle Belt that serves as the transit point between the north and the south (Emoche, 2018; Onumah, 2018; Udeh, 2018). If the climate change argument should be taken to constitute the major cause of irregular migration, then Europe and North America should not have been the highest destination regions for irregular migrants. This is because the climate conditions of these regions are not the best in the world compared to those in many Asian and African countries, including Nigeria. Often, we hear of all kinds of natural disasters, including hurricane, cyclone, wild fire, ocean surge, earthquakes, landslide and many others in these regions more than we do in Africa, but migrants prefer to go and face these challenges than stay back in their continent that records fewer occurrences of these natural disasters.

The second school of thought prefers to explain the root causes of irregular migration based on human-contrived push factors, including poor economic conditions such as poverty and unemployment (Shimeles, 2010; UNICEF, 2014; Crush et al, 2015; de Jager & Musuva, 2016; Food and Agricultural Organisation [FAO], 2016a; 2016b; Crush & Tawodzera, 2017). For instance, Crush et al (2015) and de Jager & Musuva (2016) had earlier argued that prolonged economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe led to a major exodus of migrants to neighbouring South Africa. Crush & Tawodzera (2017) used food insecurity to explain the cause of both international and irregular migrations of Zimbabweans to South Africa and other parts of the world. Similarly, UNICEF (2014) observed that unemployment and underemployment mostly in rural areas are among the principal drivers of youth migration. According to Shimeles (2010: 4), 'irregular migration is driven by motives to improve livelihoods with notable evidence on changes in labor market status.' This explains the import of the term 'economic migrants' in irregular migration discourse which refers to those migrants whose aim was to better their livelihood in the destination countries given the poor economic conditions such as poverty and unemployment at their home countries. This school provides the most enduring narrative of the major causes of irregular migration. According to a Libyan returnee, the economic situation of Nigeria made her to fall victim of irregular migration. While narrating her ordeal to the researcher, it was obvious that the interviewee fell prey to human traffickers who promised her a better life in Italy but was stuck in Libya where she was treated like a slave; surviving on one meal per every three days, and sometimes per week (Anonymous, 2018a).

The third school of thought implicated irregular migration on prolonged violent conflicts such as wars, insurgency, terrorism, militancy, and many others (Wijk, 2010; Browne, 2015; Kuschminder et al., 2015; Reitano et al., 2014). Using Angola as an example, Wijk (2010) argued that prolonged wars account for irregular migration of Angolans to Netherlands. Similarly, Browne (2015) and Kuschminder et al. (2015) observed that irregular migrants passing through the North African region tend to be from countries which are experiencing conflict and thus producing refugees and asylum-seekers. The region also plays host to increased number of Syrians, Somalians and Eritreans (Reitano et al., 2014; Browne, 2015).

Given the challenges posed to the internal dynamics of migrant-receiving states by this migration trend, countries are tightening their migration policies. Meanwhile, as countries continue to tighten their legal pathways for migration, migrants are falling prey to smugglers and human traffickers, and majority of them end their lives while trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, and the Sahara Desert (African Union, 2017; Browne, 2015). Migrants who lost their lives at sea in the course of transiting from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, to Europe, Australia and North America between 2009 and 2017 have been estimated at 25,832 on board 218 boats (Williams and Mountz, 2018). Between 2016 and 2017 alone, more than 5,000 migrants lost their lives while trying to cross these dangerous terrains via an unsafe transport system; and more others ended up as slaves in Libya, sex workers in Italy, criminals across the globe, and domestic servants in other parts of the world (Williams and Mountz, 2018; Raghavan, 2018).

Although all these factors appear highly convincing and indispensable, they are insufficient in explaining the cause of irregular migration in Africa. There is still the need to more specifically relate the push or pull factors in Africa to poor governance. The next section examines the centrality of poor governance in the whole debate about irregular migration by young Africans.

Centrality of Poor Governance in the Irregular Migration Debate

Poor governance, like irregular migration, is fraught with semantic confusion that makes its definition highly improbable. For this reason, we decided to limit our discussion of the centrality of poor governance in irregular migration to three critical areas that link it with climate change, poor economic conditions and violent conflicts – the three major drivers of irregular migration identified in literature. In his article titled ‘Voting with their feet? Why young Africans are choosing migration over the ballot box’, Akinleye (2017) argued that wherever poor governance exists, the most vulnerable to discrimination, whether official or unofficial, tend to migrate in search of a better living condition. Therefore, to limit the push and pull factors that cause irregular migration among young Africans to poor economic conditions, violent conflicts and climate change alone, is to overlook the sufficient condition while addressing only the necessary conditions. This illogical move in research results in


faulty policy outcomes and breed a situation where the more solutions that are applied, the more the problems escalate.

The most commonly cited reasons for young people's migration from Africa to Europe and other parts of the world are often weaved around the search for economic opportunities (Adepoju, 2002; Shimeles, 2010; UNICEF, 2014; Crush et al, 2015; de Jager & Musuva, 2016; FAO, 2016a; 2016b; Crush & Tawodzera, 2017). However, there is an increasing realisation that migration involves a mixture of motivations. Thus, the term "economic migrant" does an injustice to the individual, who may have taken to the road because of a number of different factors, including the absence of a level playing field in their home countries (Akinleye, 2017). As such, the nepotism that limits the opportunities of the youths from gaining meaningful employment at their home countries is part of the broader problem of poor governance. This results in a sharp drop in economic opportunities and other social services, low investment in the educational sector, and government's preference for elephant projects that only enrich a few while leaving the majority in penury.

Highlighting the centrality of poor governance to irregular migration, Funk et al. (2017) argued that no development could eradicate obvious push factors of irregular migration except if such development is aimed at promoting good governance. According to them, 'if development aid is to be targeted at decreasing irregular migration then it is most effective if transmitted through the medium of governance aid' (Funk et al., 2017: 8).

Poor governance through corruption-induced discrimination, repression and under-representation, has largely contributed not only in laying the foundation for irregular migration among young Africans but also in nurturing it to maturation. This can be explained in two folds: first as a push factor from which perspective poor governance is seen as laying the foundations for climate change problems, poor economic conditions, and violent conflicts (see figure 1); and second, as a pull factor from which perspective good governance in one environment can attract migrants from other environments.

Figure 1: Centrality of poor governance to irregular migration



Source: Author's development

On the push side, the implication of figure 1 is that poor governance is reflected in lack of: (a) responsiveness; (b) transparency, accountability and inclusiveness, and (c) development initiatives. Lack of responsiveness to governance results in inadequate preparation for and attention to early warning signals of climate change- and violent conflict-related issues that could induce irregular migration. In the same vein, lack of transparency, accountability, and inclusiveness, is mostly demonstrated in the marginalisation of people in the distribution of commonwealth. This is the major cause of poverty and unemployment as well as violent conflicts which drive irregular migration. Using the irregular route that connects Niger to Libya, Funk et al. (2017) argued that the marginalisation of the Toubou tribe by both the Muammar Gaddafi regime and the deeply divided post-Gaddafi political leadership had sown a climate of political distrust, weak government institutions, and limited economic opportunities within the region, thus, fuelling irregular migration through the Niger-Libya borders. Across the Nigerien side, similar conditions of the Tuareg result in making irregular migration a lucrative business due to high economic dependency on migrant smuggling that could sustain entire communities. Meanwhile, the Niger-Libya border which passes through the Sahara Desert remains the most notorious irregular migration route connecting Europe with West Africa, and Libya usually serves as the transit country where migrants are sometimes treated as slaves.² Example, a Malta-

² Several commentaries and interviews with Nigerian returnees from Libya confirm this proposition. Many of the returnees affirmed how they were locked in a room for days without food or water and which resulted in the death of many, including women.

bound musician from Nigeria who was returned from Libya maintained that he had never seen any suffering in life that equaled his experience in Libya (Anonymous, 2018b).

These suggest that poor governance is at the centre of irregular migration even when the visible signs are implicated on climate change, poor economic conditions, and violent conflicts. Essentially, these three factors that are constantly mentioned in literature are plausible necessary conditions for irregular migration among young Africans³, but they do not constitute the sufficient condition. Indeed, without poor governance, the impact of climate change would not be felt because there would be proper attention to early warning signs. The same applies to poverty and unemployment. A poorly governed state lacks development initiatives that could galvanise all the sectors of the society towards wealth creation and other desired ends. Violent conflicts that result in monumental destruction such as extremism, terrorism, militancy, wars, *etcetera*, are also implicated in a lack of responsiveness on the part of political leaders.

On the pull side, if poor governance is a factor that could push people away from their societies, then good governance is a pull factor that attracts migrants to environment where it obtains. This explains why Africa is confronted with the problem of emigration, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), comprising mostly of European countries, is faced with the problem of immigration. Countries that were once migrant-receiving could metamorphose into migrant-sending countries when the political leadership ceases from being responsive and accountable. According to Adepoju (2008), since the late 1980s, traditional labour-importing countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Zambia, and attractive destinations for migrants such as Nigeria, Senegal, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, have experienced endemic corruption, and political and economic crises, which also spur out-migration of their nationals. Between 1975 and 1986, Nigeria used to be a major migrant-destination country due to its robust economic opportunities. However, for close to two decades, Nigeria has greatly suffered irregular migration from its teeming youths due to increasing poor governance in the country. This is typical of how a migrant-receiving country can become a migrant-sending country.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The study identified three perspectives in literature that explain the major causes of irregular migration. These are: climate change, poor economic conditions, and violent conflicts. This paper takes the position that there is a logical sequence that relates poor governance with these factors which combine to push young Africans into irregular migration. The study theoretically assumes that poor governance is the major cause of irregular migration, which explains why poor governing countries of Africa the worst

³ The major victims of lack of responsive, accountable, transparent, inclusive and development-oriented governance.

are affected in irregular migration trend. While climate change, poor economic conditions, and violent conflicts are the necessary conditions for irregular migration, poor governance constitutes the sufficient condition for irregular migration.

Given the difficulty in obtaining accurate data on irregular migration, the study theoretically connected poor governance with mostly the push factors identified in literature which combine to escalate the challenge of irregular migration among young Africans. The three identified schools also laid the foundation for understanding the contributions of poor governance to irregular migration in Africa. Thus, among all the integrated theories that explain the cause of irregular migration, poor governance is a major contributor. To curtail the problem of irregular migration in Africa, the paper makes the following recommendations:

- Civil society and other non-governmental organisations should intensify their pressures on governments across African states to initiate policies, programmes, and legislations aimed at constructively engaging the youths in governance.
- Development partners and other donor agencies should channel their development grants to Africa to CSOs and NGOs that are involved in youth empowerment at the rural areas instead of giving to government agencies and institutions that are perceived as complicit in irregular migration problems, including poverty and youth unemployment.

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Part Three

**Conflicts, Security and Irregular
Migration in Africa**

CHAPTER TWELVE

Conflicts, Migration, and Poverty in South Sudan 1955-2016

Primus Fonkeng

Introduction

Historically, South Sudan was made up of three regions: Upper Nile, Bahr El Ghazal, and Equatoria. These were later subdivided into ten states in 1994, and then even further into 32 states under President Kiir. It is in this latest configuration that South Sudan has experienced its most extreme and widespread ethnic fratricide. The proliferation of ethnic conflicts and high influx of refugees have hampered efforts to achieve progress in economic and social developments in South Sudan. The difficulty in fully implementing peace agreements and the emergence of new conflicts, continue to create forced migration and involuntary resettlement in the area (Deng and Cohen, 1998). The ongoing conflict in South Sudan has engulfed almost every part of the country. The situation has never been more horrendous. Civilians are often targeted, leading to widespread killings and forced displacements. Thousands of people are now confined in Protection of Civilian Sites (PoCs), while hundreds of thousands have crossed the borders into neighboring countries. It is not certain if these individuals will return home under the same security arrangement as before. The war also has strong ethnic and regional dimensions. The government relies on ethnic militias, while rebel groups primarily recruit from their own ethnic bastions. These rebels and opposition factions are now saying that they will not trust the lives of their families to government forces or their allied militias.

Some of the violence in South Sudan is motivated by tussles for political position or against perceived marginalization. But much conflict is also caused by more localized disputes over land. In the Equatorias, Western Bahr El Ghazal, and Upper Nile, there have been fighting over territory and perceived cultural subordination. The *Arrow Boys* in Western Equatoria reportedly oppose the government in protest at what they see as pastoralist communities encroaching on their farmlands (*Sudan Tribune*, 2015). Meanwhile, the *Agwelek Forces* in Upper Nile are partly activated by fears that the government wants to seize lands belonging to the Shilluk. Conflict is also partly catalyzed by desires to reclaim land following the turmoil and displacement that came with the country's two-decade liberation war with Sudan during which many people were uprooted. After the end of the war, some opted not to go back to their areas of origin. Contests over land where they settled have sometimes turned violent. In South Sudan, land is synonymous with economic wellbeing and community integrity. Land equals life. This is why resistance against land encroachment and the expanding dominance of other groups can serve as such potent rallying cries. Conflicts about land is thus at the heart of most of the violence. For the various groups that face such

threats, any peace deal that emerges from the National Dialogue, to be acceptable, may have to include the return and protection of land.

In fact, independent South Sudan experienced a growing trend of armed conflicts in several parts of the country which negatively affected the already fragile economic and development systems by destroying the few infrastructures, killing thousands of civilians, and forcing others out of their homes. With several conflicts experienced in South Sudan, focus was shifted from one refugee crisis to the other, leaving several refugee problems unsolved. During these prolonged periods of armed conflicts, food production was reduced considerably. In some cities such as Juba, Abyei, and many others, armed conflicts are recurrent leading to a great proportion of the country's resources channeled towards the war effort. Furthermore, because of prolonged insecurity, many people, mostly young, active, and intellectual, left South Sudan and settled in neighboring countries, such as Zambia, Republic of Sudan, Kenya, and Ethiopia but sometimes also in other more prosperous regions of the continent (notably South Africa). Thus, South Sudan has suffered a double loss due to forced migration, namely, forcing productive people out of their homes and confining them in refugee camps; and losing the intellectual human capital to neighboring countries. Many economic and political analysts insist on the role played by western governments and/or multinational companies in armed conflicts on South Sudan and their consequences on human and economic development of the people. They base their accusation on the fact that most, if not all, weapons and other military equipment's used in these destructive conflicts come from industrialized countries. The motive of sponsoring armed conflicts in South Sudan is to have easy access to the minerals and other natural resources in the country. As Adepoju (1982, 24) explains, 'these conflicts [in South Sudan] find their roots in economic factors'.

Conflicts in South Sudan

The civil war in South Sudan occurred in three stages: 1955–1972, 1983–2005 (Woodward 1990), and 2013-2016. When the Ottoman Empire collapsed in the late 1880s, the British Government moved into Egypt and utilised Egyptian administrators to govern what is present-day the Republic of Sudan and Southern Sudan. Egypt gained its independence in 1922 and Britain, in order to maintain its control over the strategically important Nile River valley, became more involved in Sudan. In 1930, the British introduced what they termed the Southern policy, aimed at erecting and enforcing barriers to the penetration of Northerners into the South not only through religion but also through commerce (Keller, 2000). As independence approached in Sudan, gross inequalities between the North and the South remained, and politics was moving too fast for Southerners to organise and become effectively involved.

This led to the eruption of a mutiny of Southern soldiers at the Torit Barracks in the Southern province of Equatorial in August 1955, resulting to widespread killings of Northerners in the South. The interim Government of the National Union Party that emerged retaliated in the South, but Sudan nonetheless achieved independence on 1

January 1956, even as Southerners were mobilizing for a civil war which continued until 2005, with an eleven year respite between 1972 and 1983 (Bwolo, 1998). Over forty years of its independence, Sudan witnessed civil unrest between the Northerners and the Southerners. In 1969 the civilian government of Muhammad Ahmed Mahjoub was ousted by a military coup headed by Ga'afar Numeiri, with the support of the Sudan Communist Party. Numeiri moved quickly to find a political solution with Southern rebels, which was reached with the signing, in 1972, of the Addis Ababa Agreement (Rothchild and Hartzell, 1993). The Agreement called for granting of Regional Autonomy to the South.

However, hard-line Islamists began in 1977 to demand a revision of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the implementation of Sharia the Islamic law. By the early 1980s, Numeiri began to capitulate to the demands of the fundamentalists, distancing himself from the South. On 5 June 1983, he issued a Republican Order abrogating the Addis Ababa Agreement and returning regional powers to the central government; he later declared Sudan an Islamic State (Jok and Hutchinson, 1999). These acts triggered Sudan's second civil war and the mobilisation of Southerners by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), under the leadership of John Garang who was able to unify all the rebel forces in the area and took both military and political command. SPLA was able to take and hold significant parts of the South over a long period of time, disrupt oil drilling operations, exploit non-petroleum primary products, and use the proceeds from their sale to sustain the movement and its army.

The country's North-South civil war lingered for over 20 years before a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was finally concluded in January 2005 (Mosley, 1997). Under the agreement, Southern Sudan gained semi-autonomy, and in the future a referendum was to be held on whether or not it should become independent. In March 2005, United Nations peacekeeping forces of about 10,000 troops were deployed to the border zone between the North and the South. The prolonged civil war made progress toward a stable government in Sudan almost impossible left. It left the South so poverty-stricken that, should it become an independent nation, it would be one of the poorest in the world. The region certainly has very little infrastructure, as hunger and malnutrition are recurring features, leading to the movement of people to and resettlement in other areas.

Conflicts in the Centre: Nuba and Abyei

The socio-cultural differences between Northern and Southern Sudan and the recent discovery of oil also generated conflicts between the Government of Sudan and some tribes in the central region. Close to two million Nuba people live in the centre of the country between the Khartoum government in the North and the Southern based SPLA rebel forces in the South. The various Nuba tribes who settled around different hills in the area, speak fifty diverse dialects and languages, have struggled for decades against Khartoum's attempts to impose rigid Islamic codes of behaviour. They also wanted to enforce a Sudanese Arab identity on them. Many are Muslims, yet their adherence to

traditional Nuba values has led to persecution by the fundamentalists in government, who insist on implementing sharia law throughout the country (Moszynski, 1998).

Commander Yusef Kuwer, the acknowledged leader of the Nuba, joined John Garang's SPLA in 1984 and returned to the Nuba Mountains in 1987 to head the Volcano Battalion D. He explained his reasons for continuing to fight against the Sudanese government as follows: "Sudan is an African State. The very name Sudan means black, from the colour of its people, but the northerners have always referred to black men as slaves" (Collins, 1995). Negotiations between the Sudanese government and the opposition to end the conflict went on under the auspices of a regional grouping, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). There was little progress, even though an agreement was signed that a referendum should be held in the South to determine whether it should secede or have autonomy in a federal or confederal state.

Further south of the Nuba Mountains is Abyei, a disputed oil-rich area located between the Bahrel-Ghazal and south Kordofan provinces. The area is geographically, ethnically, and politically situated between Northern and Southern Sudan. Abyei is a home to the Ngok Dinka tribe, and bordered to the north and north east by the Misseiriya who are an Arab cattle herding tribe. Every year, the Misseiriya passed through the Abyei for grazing of their animals. Historically, the relations between the Ngok Dinka and the Misseiriya have been harmonious and even mentioned as a model for North-South collaboration.⁴ However the North-South conflict where the Misseiriya was armed by the regime of Khartoum and the Ngok Dinka was fighting on the SPLM, side has complicated relations. The boundaries of the Abyei area constitute a much contested issue, and the decision on the status of this area was not included in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), instead it was decided through the protocol on the resolution of Abyei conflict, that the demarcation of the Abyei border should be solved by an Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC).

The final report of the ABC came in July 2005, and their findings were seen as favourable to the Ngok Dinka and hence more favourable to Southern Sudan. In the CPA, it is stated that the ABC decision should be final and binding, but as of October 2007, the National Congress Party (NCP) from Eastern Sudan has still not accepted the conclusion of the commission. The NCP leadership now seems convinced that the South will vote for independence, and this view affects their approach to the implementation of the CPA (International Crisis Group, 2007). Many in the North seem to see secession in the South as a disaster, and one reason for this is probably the extensive oil production in the South particularly in Abyei. Resolving the Abyei crisis is crucial as the area has been pointed out as the place where the risk of returning to conflicts is largest.

⁴ For a full text version of the protocol on the resolution of Abyei conflict. see, <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSP/db900SID/SZIE-5ZJR4Z?openDocument>. ; Brosche, « CPA New Sudan, Old Sudan or Two Sudans ? » p.35.

The spark for the current fighting can be traced back to July 2013, when president Kiir fired Mr. Machar and his entire cabinet after a protracted power struggle within the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Upon his dismissal from the government, Mr. Machar announced he would run for the presidency in elections then scheduled for 2015. On 15 December 2013, after days of rising tension over political issues, various elements of the presidential guard started fighting in their barracks in the capital, Juba. The fighting quickly spread to the general headquarters of the Sudan's People Liberation Army (SPLA) and to other military installations. By 16 December, it had spilled out of the barracks into residential areas of the capital, pitting rival supporters and resulting in large scale killings and human rights abuses. Since then, this picture was replicated in most parts of the country. A ceasefire reached in January quickly fell apart days later as fighting resumed, with each party accusing the other of violating the ceasefire. After months of intense peace talks and external pressure, a second ceasefire was signed in May but it too was ineffective as violence continued unabated (International Crisis Group, 2015). Political experts held that the current conflict is part of a political tug of war between Mr. Machar and president Kiir. The president has accused his former deputy of attempting a coup d'état while Mr. Machar is convinced the president is assuming dictatorial powers.

While some analysts maintain that the violence is political not tribal, it is of concern that the conflict has been running along ethnic lines, with the Nuers backing Mr. Machar and the president receiving his main support from the Dinkas, the largest ethnic group in the country. George Omondi, a research fellow at the Kenya-based Africa Research and Resource Forum, is among those who dispute the view that the fighting has tribal origins. In an interview with Africa Renewal, Mr. Omondi said it appears that Mr. Machar and his group feel that the president is consolidating power around him and are therefore determined to stop him. Even as regional leaders strive to bring peace, the two sides continue to accuse each other of escalating the war. South Sudan's strategic importance in East Africa has added a sense of urgency to regional efforts to end the war. There are fears that the war could degenerate into a regional conflict if left unresolved, as evidenced by the presences of Ugandan troops fighting on the side of the government. Meanwhile, South Sudan's relations with its northern neighbor, the Republic of Sudan, has been less than cordial since Sudan was split into two. The two ceasefire agreements, brokered by international mediators, including leaders of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and supported by the United Nations and the African Union, have so far been unable to stop the fighting.

Forced Migration

The representative of the United Nations Secretary General on internally displaced persons has developed the following working definition of internally displaced persons: "Persons who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violation of human rights or natural or man-made disasters, and who are within the territory of

their own country” (Marchal, 1996). According to the representative’s report on internally displaced persons (E/CN.4/1996/52Add.2), the number of internally displaced persons has escalated in recent years, now reaching an estimated 30 million more than the number of refugees. By 1997, years of warfare left up to 4 million Sudanese internally displaced, with up to 1.5 million internally displaced in the south, and 1.8 million, most of them southerners, having migrated to Khartoum. Milliard Burr corroborates the above estimate of 1.8 million and adds that this included an estimated 1 million displaced children living in the Khartoum area.⁵

At least 20,000 Sudanese children have been separated from their parents. Most are boys between the ages of 7 and 17, some of whom have been lost in the confusion of fighting. In Sudan, the cities of Wau, Juba, Malakal, and Khartoum, became common destinations for children sent out of the war and drought-affected south. But as these economically stagnant cities became saturated with migrants, the children who went there were less and less able to find refuge, work, or schooling. Many joined the escalating number of street children living marginal lives filled with begging, petty crime, drug abuse, and prostitution.

When conflict erupted in South Sudan in 2013, more than 2,400 South Sudanese refugees crossed the border into Uganda, escaping violence at home. The journey took days, sometimes weeks, often on foot. The roads were too risky, so they hike through the bush, fleeing gunfire and bombs, and the widespread threats of rape, torture, kidnapping, and death. By the time they reach the border, many lost track of their spouses and children, many watched their loved ones die. A UN human rights commission warned that South Sudan is showing signs of impending genocide with the potential for a repeat of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. More than one million South Sudanese sought refuge in neighboring countries with Uganda sheltering about 600,000 refugees (Reuters, 2016). Concerning displacement of people, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that over 2 million people were displaced to neighboring countries, about 1.5 million of them displaced internally and over 500,000 as refugees in neighboring countries. After a pause, sporadic clashes occurred in 2015, leading to 1.95 million internally displaced people and a projected 293,000 refugees within the Republic of Sudan. In addition, about 270,000 more people sought refuge in neighboring countries by the end of 2015, including those who left in 2014 (United Nations Press Release, 2016). The most acute displacements within the country was experienced in the three states that witnessed the most active hostilities, namely, Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile.

On the eve of the fifth anniversary of South Sudan’s independence on 9 July 2016, sporadic gunfire erupted in Juba, the capital city. Fighting quickly spilled over, resulting in hundreds of deaths and causing thousands to flee to neighboring Central Africa Republic, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Uganda. By mid-July, about 300 people,

⁵ A Working Document: Quantifying Genocide in the Southern Sudan 1983-1993, Washington DC, US Committee for Refugees, p.48

including 33 civilians and two Chinese peace keepers, had been killed in the fighting, 750,000 (Global Trends Report, 2015). The latest outbreak of fighting exacerbated refugee outflows, particularly from cities such as Juba, Wau, and Bentiu. In addition, thousands of people sought shelter at the UN mission in Juba (Landsous, 2016). It is quite evident that the war in Sudan has been a major reason for the internal displacement of children, from areas like Juba, Wau, Yei, and Narus. This has been aggravated by the split between the SPLA-Torit and the SPLA-Nasir. Notwithstanding, other political, human, economic, social, and physical factors, have been responsible for this displacement. The government has forcibly evicted civilians, including children, neither for imperative military nor security reasons, but as a political move to systematically weaken the SPLA.

Poverty and Humanitarian Crises

The conflicts in South Sudan resulted to food deficits, famine, and diseases, killing some 500,000 people. In 1988, when famine was exploited as a political weapon, some 250,000 people died, half of the victims being children. Most state-run health and welfare programmes were destroyed, leaving an entire generation of children without protection and basic necessities for survival. By 1984, drought and famine occurred in the western provinces resulting to death of 250,000 people with children forming about 80 percent (International Crisis Group, 1998). HRW/Africa concluded that armed conflicts and deliberate government strategies largely caused famine in South Sudan. Famine occurred as a result of the political process of impoverishment emanating from the transfer of asset from the weak to the politically strong. Four specific groups were responsible for the famine in South Sudan as a weapon of war: the government militias, the other rebel groups, the army, and the traders connected with the military, who systematically attacked civilians, looted cattle, prevented civilians from fleeing besieged towns, created artificial scarcities of food, obstructed relief efforts, and extracted maximum profits in times of scarcities. The early group was the SPLA which consistently seized government held towns, obstructed relief, raided, destroyed and looted villages, and forced requisitioning of food from rural people. Although the SPLA policy began to change in early 1988, it did not abandon its famine-creating practices.

Following recent conflicts, the major humanitarian consequences are widespread displacement due to violence; high rates of deaths, diseases, and injuries; severe food insecurity and disrupted livelihoods, and a major malnutrition crisis. The United Nations Humanitarian Plan reported that some 5.8 million people were estimated to be in some degree of food insecurity as of September 2014. This number was projected to increase to 6.4 million during the first quarter of 2015 (United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan, 2015). Reports from the international humanitarian organization maintained that, over 235,000 children under 5 years were malnourished in 2015 and 50,000 of them could die if assistance is not scaled up. The International Crisis Group on its part, in November 2014, estimated that the death toll could be between 50,000 and 100,000 since the war broke out in December 2013. Reports say

thousands of women and girls have been raped by both rebel and government fighters (International Crisis Group, 2016).

The war disrupted service delivery systems, particularly in the three states most affected. Many of the 1,200 schools in Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile, were closed due to the conflict. Water supply in towns, including major hubs such as Bentiu and Malakal, were not functioning or accessible to civilians. The UN humanitarian organ says, an estimated 184 health facilities in the three conflict states were either destroyed, occupied, or were not functioning. According to Lydia Wamala (2016), communications officer for the U.N.'s World Food Program (WFP) in Uganda, eighty-six percent of the new arrivals were women and children, with few or no resources to start their lives anew. Months later, the organization faced funding shortfalls, and in August 2016, it cut food rations in half for all but the newest and neediest arrivals. Consequently, acute malnutrition rates rose which left refugees more susceptible to other conditions such as malaria, tuberculosis, and respiratory disease.

Disruption of Education

The conflicts in South Sudan seriously disrupted the provision of educational services, since most schools in the rural areas ceased to function, when the war began in 1983 (Santino, 1984). In 1986, the US State Department stated that the education of nearly half a million children was disrupted due to civil war. Education reflects a sign of normalcy for children living in distressed circumstances; access to education indicates that the society is meeting an essential development need of children since education is a key contributor to the development of human resources at the local level for the shift from relief to rehabilitation. To ensure access to education, articles 28 of the 1989 CRC states that: “the child has a right to education, and the state’s duty is to ensure that primary education is free and compulsory” (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986: 315). In spite of this stipulation, access to primary education remained low throughout South Sudan during the years of conflict.

The national average for children completing four years of basic education in the country was put at 44%. Moreover, enrollment rates for the whole of South Sudan stood at 58% for boys and 43% for girls. Of the estimated 1.000.000 primary school-age children, only 30% received basic education. In addition, the community schools continue to operate under very difficult circumstances (UNICEF 1989). Furthermore, more than 50% of the accessible primary school age population is out of school because of lack of functioning schools caused by the dearth of trained teachers, lack of school materials, and insecurity. Food scarcity and the absence of accommodation for teachers are yet another bottleneck as well as long distances for teachers to be trained. These factors have contributed in retarding educational advancement in South Sudan.

Obviously, the war in South Sudan is responsible for the disruption of child education. Nevertheless, both the government and the rebels are using the situation of war to their advantage, and to the detriment of the local populations. However, both the

government and the rebels are systematically creating a vicious circle. They allege that due to the war, there is poverty and educational facilities are destroyed. This lack of education forms the basis for an illiterate population, which as a result of low employment rates (or unemployment), are easily recruited to fight for the government or the rebels.

Today, South Sudan is one of the poorest and least literate states in the world. This is as a result of the following factors: SPLA attacked missionary schools, claiming they hinder their recruitment; the destruction of the southern socio-cultural identity by the government, hastened the collapse of SPLA domination, Islamisation, Arabization, and acculturation of the south. It is thus logical to infer that poverty, illiteracy, and the disruption of southern cultures, are being used as instruments of war policy by the government, which consistently and systematically violate the rights of children.

The Way Forward

This article highlighted the magnitude of the phenomenon of conflicts and forced migration in South Sudan. It traced its historical evolution and its different manifestations, intensity, and atrocity in time and space across the country. The article insisted on the negative effect of the phenomenon of conflicts and forced migration on socio-cultural, economic, ecological, demographic and political settings of the communities in South Sudan. All these problems contribute negatively to the South Sudan's effort towards a sustainable development. It was observed that to address the forced migration problem requires a good analysis and response to the root causes of the problem which are economic and political in nature.

South Sudan is endowed with vast resources, yet the recurrent conflicts in the capital city Juba, the rich oil city Abyei, and other areas like Wau and Yei, have made the country to continue to experience extreme poverty, humanitarian crises, and very low level of development. Arguably, one of the solutions to the issues of forced migration, extreme poverty, and complex humanitarian crises, is a peaceful resolution of the numerous conflicts in the area. A sustainable peace process in South Sudan should involve the internally displaced persons alongside other government officials, tribal leaders, academics, partners of Sudanese and international humanitarian organisations, and representatives of women and youths groups. They would meet on regular basis to exchange views and build trusts. This will help the high level mediators build grassroots support for the peace talks. African Union and United Nations mediators currently in Juba need to travel to IDP camps, interact with camp leaders, brief them of high-level developments, and ensure their input. There can be no meaningful peace process without the participation of the IDPs and the local leaders.

Provision of education to refugees and IDPs is a reconstruction and development issue that needs the attention of agencies committed to reconstruction and development. The nature of post-conflict reconstruction makes inter-sectoral collaboration particularly urgent. Education system needs to collaborate across sectors on

HIV/AIDS programmes, health education, safety and security in schools, landmines awareness, and psychosocial support. Reconstruction in the education sector must be aligned with social and economic development planning and public sector and labour market reforms. Education has a role to play in preventing conflict and promoting reconstruction but only as a part of wider social, economic, and political efforts. Without these linkages, and sustained and strategic investments, education reconstruction will not succeed to yield sustainable development.

Before gaining independence in 2011, South Sudan was a collection of sovereign ethnic nationalities. These groups have maintained much of their autonomy since then, and community preservation is still at the forefront of many concerns. In the absence of a social contract binding disparate groups into a cooperative national political society, local ethnic communities find solace in their own sovereignty. It is within these settings that people derive social and economic wellbeing, find a sense of cultural heritage, and seek solidarity. The only way to get these communities to concede certain powers and become active parts of the broader state is through meticulous nation and state building projects that provide security and general development. So far, pragmatic and realistic strategies along these lines are severely lacking in South Sudan. To succeed, the National Dialogue will have to provide the right environment and build the trust necessary to bridge these deep and long standing divides.

While progress is being made towards the holding of the National Dialogue, there are fears over both its design and the compatibility of the demands that will arise. South Sudan's conflicts encompass a vast range of historical, political, social, and economic disputes and grievances. The tensions span from the corridors of power in Juba to the local level across all 32 states. They involve some personalized tussles, but also and more importantly many comprehensive structural grievances and problems. The government can be commended in calling the National Dialogue, but at the same time, it is clear that it is entering the process in a position of relative strength. This means it may be less open to demands from a wide variety of opposition groups, rebels, and state representatives. But unless the talks can resolve complex local crises with deep roots, there is little hope they will resolve regional let alone national ones.

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Ecowas Treaty on Migration, and Challenges of Internal Security in Nigeria

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Introduction

Migration is a complex phenomenon that links flow of goods, finance, and people. As a complex phenomenon, scholars such as Michela (2009) and Thompson (2013) have used different terms for the varieties of migration that come to portend some negative implications like terrorism, insurgency, arms smuggling, and trans-border crimes. In most of the earlier parts of this year 2018, there have been substantial political and economic debates on migration. This comes as debates solely concentrating on the phenomenon of migration with security threats arising from civil wars, poverty, unemployment, and many more (David, 2013; Walton & Jenna, 2014; Marie-Laurence & Hein, 2016). Specifically, Anna (2006) argued that world migration has been going on for millennia because of the impact of colonization struggles, civil wars, and geopolitical and ethnic divisions. Therefore, the mass global movement of people has reached an unprecedented magnitude basically because of ease and free movement between regions and countries of the world. Accordingly, the International Organization of Migration (IOM) (2014) sees migration as the movement of people either across international borders or within a territorial state. The import is that whenever residents of a defined territory cross a specific administrative or political boundary permanently, migration has taken place.

It is not debatable that the movement of people has featured throughout human history. So substantial is the legacy of migration that the freedom of movement within and across borders was enshrined in article 13 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 (James, 2016). The International migration report of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2013) states that over 232 million people migrate between countries annually. Two of the reasons for such mass movements are the political unrest and conflict in parts of the Middle East and North Africa. According to National Population Commission (NPC) (2006), the latest available figures indicate that the number of immigrants residing in Nigeria has more than doubled in recent decades, from 477,135 in 1991 to 971,450 in 2005. In fact, the International Migration Report of 2017 stipulated that the number of international migrants worldwide has continued to grow sporadically in recent years reaching 258 millions in 2017, up from 220 million in 2010 and 173 million in 2000. Accordingly, the Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC), (2017) report, maintained that the number of West Africans who had settled within African countries between 1960 and 1990

amounted to 30 million. Most movement however, occurs within the region, with estimates putting intra-regional migration at 70 to 83% of all West African migration (Mandiogou and Robin, 2010)

Due to the extent of migration in today's world, Sajjadpour (2005) maintained that all human society in a one way or the other is faced with the challenges of migration. Seyed and Mohsen (2016) posit that scholars in theoretical and academic fields such as demography, sociology, social psychology, political science, economics, and major planning experts, agree that migration occurs when the social needs of society actors (employment, education, services, health, income, etc.) are not met. In Africa, the migration of Africans within West Africa predates the colonial era. Reflecting on this, Fadayomi, Fayomi, and Adejumo (2014) averred that in the pre-colonial era, migrants considered the West African Sub-region as an economic community where people moved along with the flow of trade in goods and services. It became necessary, therefore, that mutual existence among West African countries transformed into an idea to set up a platform for the evolution of Diaspora communities such that the flow of migrants between the countries became inevitable. Given this, the West African Regional Economic Community created the protocols to facilitate free movement of persons and economy in the region (Fadayomi, 1987). Peter (2008) posited that contrary to the still prevailing notions caused by sometimes one-sided media coverage, that a large share of African migrants relocates to Europe and developed states of the North; more than two-thirds of all migrants from sub-Saharan Africa rather migrate to countries within sub-Saharan Africa than to Europe. The point here is that more and more people in Africa depart their home countries (either voluntary or due to circumstances) to other African countries than to Europe.

Therefore, the mass flow of migrants into any country has been increasingly conceptualized as a foundational ground for internal security threat, with problems such as crime, trafficking, and terrorism (Castle, Dehaas & Miller, 2014). Globally, the concept of internal security has gained more public attention since the 9/11 incident in America (Kettle, 2004; Gabriel, 2006). Wojteaszeky (2009) described internal security as the crucial function of the state that focuses on eliminating or mitigating threats to the constitutional system, law, and order, as well as providing protection of the public interest of members of the society. Because of the very many ways in which insecurity affects human lives and existence, the concept of insecurity has been ascribed different interpretations in association with the various ways in which it affects individuals. Some of the common variables and descriptors of insecurity include: want of safety; danger; hazard; uncertainty; want of confidence; doubt; lack or inadequate protection; lack of stability; to mention a few. These different descriptors all refer to a state of vulnerability to harm, loss of life, property, or livelihood. Reflecting on this, Beland (2005) sees insecurity as "the state of fear or anxiety stemming from a concrete or alleged lack of protection." It refers to a lack of or inadequate freedom from danger. This definition reflects the state of Nigerians in their country arising from the influx of migrants.

The main focus of this paper is to interrogate how migration influx to Nigeria has resulted to internal insecurity in the country. In doing this, the study first examines relevant literature on migration and migrant influx. Secondly, it adopts a propositional and methodological consideration and framework for an analytical approach that is best suitable for the study. Thirdly, we present a thesis that deals with the analysis of geopolitics of migration and internal insecurity in Nigeria. Through this, the effects of migration in Nigeria will be highlighted before the conclusion and recommendations of the paper.

Conceptual Discourse

Migration

Migration is the movement of people from one location to the other with the purpose of taking up a permanent or temporary residence. It can occur in several dimensions. The dimensions here are the movement of people from neighbouring countries, specifically ECOWAS countries, to Nigeria, as different from the movement of people within Nigeria (that is, rural-urban migration) therefore, in the context of this papers, migration is the movement of people from one country to another in search of improved livelihood or survival.

Internal Security

Internal security implies the totality of a nation's equilibrium state, which must be maintained to enhance the safety of its citizens. This is dependent on the state's performance of its responsibilities without unnecessary interruptions by any form from groups or institutions within and outside the country. Therefore, internal security is quite an important aspect of national security/development, including the development of an even larger geopolitical region.

Geopolitics

Coined by the Swedish legal jurist, Rudolf Kjellén, the term 'geopolitics' here implies the explanation of the geographic influences on why people migrate, why institutions are created, and why links are established by nations. Kjellen argued that states, in order to survive in world affairs, had to apply five complementary forms of policies in order to be strong, self-determinant, and powerful. Among those policies is geopolitics, followed by *Econopolitik*, *Demopolitik*, *Sociopolitical*, and finally *Kratopolitik*.

Interrogating literature

Our review on the nexus between migration and internal insecurity is meant to demonstrate the relationship and influence of geopolitics on migration and internal insecurity in Nigeria. As scholars continue to debate on the nature and nexus between the two concepts migration and insecurity, we aim to demonstrate not only what writers and thinkers have said on migration and the internal insecurity caused by migration, but also the causes of migration in Africa and Nigeria. It would be a mistake to conclude that the global war on terrorism, the migrant's crisis, and all forms of security challenges, have nothing to do with migration induced by geopolitics. This is

because, migration as the relocation of people within space that involves their permanent or temporary change of residence is directly related to closeness of destinations countries (Mfukidze, 2006). In recognition of this position, Vidya (2014) and Tamirace (2016) averred that the link between migration and internal security are housed by geopolitics and as such become a recurring issue in recent times despite policies to see how the risk associated with the two concepts can be minimized. That is why, the members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sought to reduce the risk of the two interrelated phenomenon beyond ECOWAS borders (ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration) (ECAM, 2008).

Guild (2005), Klein (2006), and Stivachtis (2008), believe that few scholars have linked the concept of migration to insecurity issues. For Anna (2006) migration control, asylum and admission to citizenship, family reunification, and the development of migrant enclaves, have all intensified the security issues that a nation needs to address to protect its own citizens. This is because the movement of individuals or groups from one society to another, for residing either temporarily or permanently, has generated series of internal security in host communities (Gurgler, 1978). The point here is that as migrants gain entrance into their host communities, there are possibilities that their values and culture vary from those of the host communities; and such variations can gradually lead to culture-clashes and then to threats of insecurity. Scholars such as Ruggie (1983), Thakur (2006), and Newman (2007), agreed that there are common denominators to explain how migration has been presented as a source of security threat in the ECOWAS region. In support of this notion, Campbell (2003) argued that countries perceive large-scale international migration as a threat to their economic well-being, social order, cultural and religious values, and political stability. Specifically, Stivatchis (2008) insisted that the more a migrant community seeks to integrate itself into the host community, the more its attempts constitute an insecurity threat to the life of that society.

Thus, for Ford (2011), what may constitute the nexus between migration and internal security challenges resulting from migration is dependent on the attitudes of migrants towards the host communities as well as cases of undocumented migrants. However, the debates on the migration-internal security nexus tends to spread to other aspects of security that are linked to internal insecurity, such as national security and human security (Lutterbeck, 2006; Koser, 2011; Thompson, 2013, Kerwin, 2014, and World Bank, 2014). Most positions on migration and national, internal, and human security challenges as these relate to Nigeria are hinged on the thinking that at the micro level, insecurity in Nigeria is traceable to the activities of migrants.

In view of this, Chukwuma (2006) and Egbeto and Salihu (2014) believe that the problem of internal security crisis cannot be properly understood nor decoded without the analysis and interpretation of the underlying causes, types, and effects of migration particularly, irregular migrants. In relation to this, Van Hear, Bakewell, and Long (2012) posit that voluntary and forced movement, as well as temporary and

permanent movements happening through regular and irregular routes, are the drivers of migration. However, within the context of ECOWAS, different conditions and contexts in ECOWAS countries influence the decision of individuals to migrate. On a large context, Flahaux and De Haass (2016) and UNICEF report of (2016) outlined that migration in West and Central Africa is foremost voluntary and driven by underdevelopment, poverty, education, employment, and economic growth. Statistics show that in recent times, there are ten times more migration movements within West Africa than towards European countries. In the 20th century, Africa witnessed several forms of civil wars, as well as religious, electoral, and ethnic violence. These increased the rate of migration in West Africa. As Black (2004) averred, Africa is the region with the largest refugees such that about one out of three refugees worldwide are in or from Sub-Saharan Africa (Gleditsch, Peter, Margareter and Havard, 2002; and Lucas, 2006).

Regarding other possible causes of migration from Africa, Suliman (1994), Caliham, Eriksen and Herrick (1994), and UNEP (2008), assert that environmental degradation, desertification, and deforestation, along with natural disasters like floods or drought, are all factors which singly or jointly result in migration as a coping strategy of households. These views, however, were faulted by Castles (2002) quoted in International Organization of Migration (2008), when he contended that environmentally-induced migration position as not a valid ground to cause the ills of insecurity experienced by West African countries. In view of this, Richard (1998) cited in Castles (2004) held that while environmental factors do not play a part in forced migration and displacement, they are closely linked to social and ethnic conflicts, weak states, and abuse(s) of human rights.

Methodology

In this study, we adopted the descriptive-analytic approach, and the data collection procedure was documentary method. This entails any written material (whether handwritten, typed or printed) that is already in existence, produced for some other purpose than the benefit of this study. Data collected were classified and analyzed using descriptions based on logic and reasoning. This created the basis for interpretation of the situation arising from migrants' inflows into Nigeria and the influence of geopolitics as a foundational basis in contemporary border challenges.

Theoretical Frame of Analysis

This study was anchored on the proposition emanating from network theory of migration as the framework of analysis. Lucia (2011) argued that this theory has an interdisciplinary character. Other aspects of the network theory of migration are cumulative causation theory and system theory of migration, both of which that can be subsumed under the network theory. Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaci, Pellegrino, and Taylor (1993) attempted to explain migration within the context of West African countries as a network of countries joined together to enhance co-operation among members states. Massey et al (1993) cited in Weeks (2008) averred that network

theory of migration explains migration as that framework of analysis where migrants set up interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas, through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin. The implication is that migration is a network or processes in which migrants help each another by communicating with close friends and family members, and by so doing decrease their psychological and financial costs, as well as increase their social security (Castles et al; 1998).

Similar to network theory of migration is the cumulative causation theory developed by Gunnar Myrdal in 1956, and further developed by Douglas Massey and his colleagues Goldring and Durand in 1994. Both scholars argued that why migration flow continues to expand is basically because of cumulative causation of social capital generated by the first migrant to relatives, friends, and others, in the country of origin (Jennissen, 2004). The implication is that migration not only creates a cumulative causation effect, it also encourages other relatives and friends to migrate. Closely related to network theory and the cumulative causation theory of migration is the system theory of migration. Regarding this theory, Magobunje (1970) who was the proponent of system theory, adopted the systematic lens to view the migration process, highlighting its foundations in general system theory of the 1950s and 1960s. The theory demonstrates the importance of geography when migratory movements arise in response to earlier existence of linkages such as political system or colonial ties and trade flows. These serve as links between sending and receiving nations (Castles and Miller, 2009). The focus of the system theory is on the macro- and micro-linkages of places involved in the migration process.

The major assumptions of this theory are as follows:

- Migration expands until network connections are wide enough that all people who wish to migrate to other countries can do so without difficulties;
- Controlling migration in the light of borders and policies is very difficult as migrant networks are created outside the country, and occur irrespective of policies (Casles and Miller, 2009).
- Migration alters the social, cultural, economic, and institutional conditions in both the sending and receiving ends (de Haas, 2009b).
- The migrants' network root is traceable to geographical, sociological, and anthropological origins.
- Migration existed due to links between countries of origin and destination.

From the above, the network theories of migration (cumulative and system theories) entail that migration within the ECOWAS region continues to expand over time without difficulties, not only because of the ECOWAS free trade movement, but also other links. This is because as it stands now, the West African Regional Ministerial Meeting on Participation of Migrants in the Development of their Country of Origin,

organized by the International Organization for Migration in Dakar (October, 2000), underscored the urgency for strengthening further regional networks and integration processes, with emphasis on free movement of persons and the right of residence and establishment; among others. The rationale, therefore, is to promote dialogue and cooperation through several networks on migration and development between various sub-regional organizations, most especially in ECOWAS countries and Africa, in order to harmonize, coordinate, and integrate regional migration policies as well as cooperation at inter-regional and regional levels. It becomes vital to assert that controlling migrants will be very difficult because for most “irregular” West-African migrants, migration is “regular” in the sense that movements of citizens of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are prescribed by the freedom of movement protocols of ECOWAS (Vittorio, Katharina, Melissa, and Zachary, 2017). Vertovec (2002) and Dustman & Glitz (2005) asserted that the existence of systems for migrants such as ECOWAS treaty on free movement for irregular migrants, forced or voluntary migrants increases the likelihood that these networks and systems created by ECOWAS protocol will influence and cumulatively increase the decisions of migrants to migrate.

The postulations and assumptions here are that, there are correlations between wage differentials or employment rates of countries in ECOWAS, and as such makes migration flow easy. The easy flow of migrants is built on the link among these countries. These links are either institutional or geographical. The migrants’ flows and activities that are linked to a series of networks are deep-rooted in geography. Their activities over the years in West African countries have recently proven that geography still matters and that the position of states in the geographical region presents opportunities to migrate, and imposes no limitations on any state (Francis, 2002). In response to this assumption, Bilger and Kraler (2005) argued that geographic mobility has always been an integral aspect of the social process of the world. This is stimulated by large economic and social inequalities, and facilitated by an improved system of communication and transportation among these regions. The point is that migration from some countries is possibly more to regions with geographical affinities than others; and as such, despite the intensity in the flow among West African countries, it remains the least understood demographic phenomenon in West Africa.

Geopolitics of Migration and Internal Insecurity in Nigeria

Here, we demonstrated that geographical conditions/links (which include geographical proximity) significantly influenced ECOWAS formation and its protocols. Also, geographical proximity accounts for increased migration movements among West African Countries. Africa has long been described as an extremely mobile continent. Early scholars and analysts involved in the migration debates concluded that migration began in many sub-Saharan African countries as a result of colonial ties and practices (Eicher and Baker, 1984). Bilger and Kraler (2005) believed that the instability in the continent and its settlements is closely related to the mobility of its population. As movements across the region were unstructured and occurred in

groups, migrants' demographically undifferentiated movement continued to occur. It would be a mistake, however, to think of the cross-border migration among West African countries of ECOWAS in the same way we think of the migration of people to Nigeria from other places such as South Africa, Morocco, or Mozambique, since the latter is an entirely different phenomenon based on geography.


The internal flow of West African migrants is the result of movements in a borderland that has been created through possible affinities of borders (geopolitics) of neighbouring countries and the resultant political implications of the ECOWAS free movement protocol. It is our thesis that geopolitics has created the basis for ease of migration flow, and ultimately for much of the insecurity in the ECOWAS region. What geopolitics does is to combine the fields of geography and international relations to create a comprehensive overview of political developments. The current thread of migration and internal security challenges in Nigeria cannot be separated from the impact of geopolitics. Considering recent developments in geographical territories of Nigeria, geopolitics offers us some insights about the internal migration within West African countries and its effects. That is why Mohammad, Rebaz, Zahra, and Abdolahi (2013), sees geopolitics is at play in every region for the establishment of peaceful and friendly relations among nations.

Therefore, the present internal security challenges in Nigeria - with particular reference to Benue and Nassarawa in the North East region - are a huge problem. The capacity of the Nigerian state to effectively contain and curtail domestic threats to security of its people, institutions, and structures, is at an all-time decreasing basically as a result of geopolitics spillover. The number of deaths recorded in Benue and other parts of the country, despite security personnel, can be said to be a by-product of the influence and impact of the geopolitics of movement from West African countries into Nigeria. We make bold to say that ever since the thirty-year war which ended with the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, and later led to the emergence of a central bureaucracy within a given territory, migration from one country to another has been primarily regulated by the decision of each sovereign states regarding who gained entrance and exit of its boundaries.

However, in recent times, the influence of geopolitics and the force of globalization has broken multiple barriers on how best each state can control its borders and ensure its internal security. Nation-states over the years have continued to battle with the challenges of addressing continued migration issues in Europe, Africa, and Asia, despite border mechanisms by these regions (Francesca and Todd, 2013). We agreed with the standard beliefs that the process of migration is caused by numerous factors such as: security, economic, political, communication and demographic factors, and so on. However, we hold that what aids these factors is the place of the geography of countries. In our context, geopolitical conditions constitute a potential factor for causing insecurity in Nigeria due to the geographical closeness of the ECOWAS countries. Our thinking is that the current internal security challenges facing Nigeria

are caused by the geographical dilemma of the Nigeria state particularly the North-East and North-Central regions of the country, geographical positions to neighbouring countries of Mali, Niger, and others in West Africa, have always been exposed to insecurity challenges.

The above position is related to that of Vittorio *et al* (2017) who averred that intra-regional migration in the West African region accounts for 75 per cent of all moves, with migration to Europe accounting for only 15 per cent. The import is that within West Africa, migration is considered an intra-African livelihood strategy, which is generally of a temporary and circular nature. Rata and Shaw (2007) insist that in spite of the volatility of contemporary migration flows and the great diversity of stages and destinations, 80% of the movements still take place between neighbouring countries; 10% take place between more distant countries of the sub-region, and the remaining 10% of migrants leave the sub-region for other African countries (Central and North Africa) and other continents.



Map of ECOWAS. Source: Ghana Press (February 21, 2018)

Given the above map, members of ECOWAS are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Duruiheoma (2018) averred that Nigeria remains the most populous in Africa, the seventh globally with an estimated population of over 198 million. The recent World Population Prospects predicts that by 2050, Nigeria will become the third most populated country in the world. The import of this, is that Nigeria accounts for more than half of the total population of ECOWAS and yet Nigeria is feeling threatened by her neighbours' geographical linkages.

It is important to state that West African migrants threaten the internal security of Nigeria. The manifestations can be categorized into three: criminal activities, religious sectarianism, and economic disorder. Our interest here is to attempt an explanation of one of these classifications, namely, security challenges. It is important to note that in the views of this paper, some of the activities of irregular, forced and voluntary

migrants have several security effects. Victor (2009) maintained that apart from networks of parallel trade in mining of solid minerals, violent crimes such as armed robbery, car theft and smuggling, in North-East Nigeria are allegedly linked to the presence of immigrants from neighbouring countries, especially Niger and Chad. The reason for this linkage is that these two countries (Niger and Chad) have close contact with states and local communities in Nigeria which include: Jalingo, Jimeta-Yola, Gashua, Dikwa, Mubi, Gembu, Damaturu, Maiduguri, and so on. It is on record that the leader of the Islamic movement that started the December 1980 disturbances in Kano (that is, Muhammadu Marwa, alias Maitatsine) was an illegal immigrant from Cameroon who had multiple followers in Nigeria.

Table 1. Asylum seekers and Refugees in Nigeria by Country of origin as at April 29, 2014

Seekers	Asylum			Refugees		
	Country	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Central African Republic	42	47	89	7	8	15
Chad	62	21	83	41	30	71
Cote d'Ivoire	42	17	59	74	31	105
Cameroon	12	6	18	249	299	548
Democratic Republic of Congo	249	219	468	366	231	597
Eritrea	32	2	34	2	0	2
Guinea	6	1	7	10	7	17
Sudan	1	3	4	37	10	47
Sierra Leone	1	1	2	12	13	25
Syrian Arab Republic	6	4	10	7	2	9
Togo	9	2	11	6	3	9
Liberia	2	2	4	68	55	123
Mali	118	24	142	74	24	98
Others	5	5	10	7	6	13
Total	587	354	941	960	719	1,679

Source: NCFRMI Statistics, 2014

The table above shows that Nigeria as member of ECOWAS hosted a total 1, 679 refugees as at April 29, 2014. The males were 57 per cent while the female were 43 per cent. The highest asylum seekers and refugees originated from the Democratic Republic of Congo with (35.6 per cent), closely followed by Cameroon (32.6 per cent). Other countries include Mali, Chad and Cote d'Ivoire. The implication is that the inflows of migrants who are either asylum seekers or refugees are mostly from neighbouring countries, into Nigeria increased in sequence. Also, there are indications that over the years, an increasing total number of immigrants arriving Nigeria ranged from 268,763 in 1991 (NPC, 1991), to 2,154,000 in 2005, and 2,472,945 in 2006 (NIS, 2009).

Table 2. Volume of Movements into and out of Nigeria, 2012 and 2013

ARRIVALS	2012	2013
Nigerian arrivals	1,495,045	1,578,715
Foreign arrivals	803,463	956,081
Total arrivals	2,298,508	2, 534,796
DEPARTURE		
Nigerians departures	1,810,816	1,760,530
Foreign Departures	839,957	861,240
Total Departures	2,650,773	2,621,770

Source: NIS, 2013

Data shown in Table 2 indicate that there were 803,463 foreign arrivals to Nigeria in 2012, which increased by 19 per cent to 956,081 in 2013. Accordingly, Isiugo-Abanihe (2014) argues that the Nigerian Migration Country Profile of 2014 is a clear indication that Nigeria has the right environment which acts as or a pull to foreign nationals. Nigerian arrivals or return migrants were 1,495,045 in 2012 and 1,578,715 in 2013 (Table 2). These are huge numbers which, with the addition of the larger number of departing Nigerians, represent a large international migration turnover in the country. The consistent increase in the number of arrivals could be an indication that Nigeria has become a focal point for global mobility as a result of its geographical affinities with other countries within West Africa. Ojo (2011) argued that the security challenges during former President Goodluck Jonathan's administration between January 1 2010 and June 30, 2011, were over fifty cases of bomb blasts across the country, with a casualty figure of over 800 people dead and many people injured were traced to the activities of foreign militias from neighbouring countries. It is also held that they have successfully infiltrated into institutions and communities that are supposed to deal with such illegal and violent activities. Narratives about nationals of other African countries, especially Nigeria's West African neighbours, who illegally acquire Nigerian citizenship and enrol into critical national programmes, abound. These imply that Nigeria is a country under attack from illegal immigrants.

Vincent (2013) posited that most Nigerians will be hurt if they realise that the terrorist atrocities they suffer in the country are mainly the handiwork of foreigners. The pain is that these foreigners, most of whom come into the country illegally through Nigeria's porous borders, are killing and maiming Nigerians, and destroying both private livelihoods and the national economy. To add credence to these, Bayo, George, Bode, and Femi (2011) averred that the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) in March 2013 deported 57 illegal Nigerians in Lagos following the arrest of some suspected members of Boko Haram and the discovery of bombs and two AK-47 rifles at Ijora in Lagos. They further stated that the said 57 illegal immigrants were among the 92 suspects arrested by the Police in Lagos. Asiwaju (1992) and Victor (2009) both believed that migrants' networks in West Africa contribute to internal insecurity.


There is also the question of proliferation of small arms and light weapons, which has made the incursion of elements involved in criminal enterprise much more deadly, as they even possess the firepower to take on, not only civilian populations but also state agents attempting to enforce the law. This part of the insecurity question is also traced to very mobile networks of lawbreakers, including immigrants, who roam freely across the porous Nigerian borders, wreak havoc, and simply disappear. The point is that despite the good intentions of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement, criminal elements like drug cartels, armed gangs, and global terrorist networks, have taken advantage of the efforts in the sub-region towards free movement, improved trade relations, and closer ties, to cause havoc.

Aderanti (2005) contended that the formation of ECOWAS was a bold attempt to stimulate the kind of homogeneous society which once existed in the sub-region. The ECOWAS leaders realised that efforts to enhance the living conditions of their people, as well as achieve an egalitarian distribution of income, can be achieved faster within the framework of regional economic integration. Therefore, close socio-cultural ties among the economies in the region, and historical record of free labour migration, made ECOWAS integration imperative. With the ratification of the Protocol of the Treaty on Free Movement of Persons, Onwuka, (1982) insisted that Nigerians were concerned about the possible influx of ECOWAS citizens into their country and demanded that the effects of the protocol be closely watched and monitored. Unfortunately, the warning fell on deaf ears as increasing number of citizens from ECOWAS countries have continued to gain entrance into, as well as exist in Nigeria, without proper documentation. In fact, border posts and checkpoints on international highways, which hitherto controlled free movement of persons and goods, were scrapped. The result is that Nigeria became vulnerable to all types of internal threat/security crisis.

Implications of the Internal Security Challenges resulting from the ECOWAS Treaty on Movement of Persons

According to Igbuzor (2011), West Africa is among the most insecure regions in the world, and Nigeria is the most insecure country in the region as it has consistently ranked high among the countries in West Africa with huge insecurity challenges. These challenges have the following implications:

- Insecurity discourages investment as it makes investment unattractive to business people. That is why countries considered to be insecure, have high cost of doing business either because of direct loss of goods and properties, or the high cost of taking precautions against business risks and uncertainties.
- When there is a high level of insecurity in a particular area or region, there will be migration of people from the area; and this could lead to the dearth of skilled labour. Insecurity affects the general human security of the people as the situation promotes fear, while at the same time limiting the peoples' ability to work effectively.

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- Insecurity affects sustainable developments which aim to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Therefore, security is crucial for sustainable development. In the absence of security, economic growth and development cannot be sustained as it destroys economic, human, and social capital. Under conditions of peace and security, people and government can direct their efforts and resources towards improving human life.
 - In insecure areas, there is usually a deployment of government troops in strategic locations to quell or control some of the threats. Besides, the government normally sets up commissions of enquiry to examine the remote and immediate causes of these conflicts. All of these activities usually lead to diversion of scarce human, material, and financial resources to resolve such conflicts.
 - Poor image in the international community: Internal security threats have lowered the image of the country and make her unattractive in the eyes of the international community. Nigeria is no longer respected globally and many investors are forced to relocate to other West African countries due to threats to lives and properties.

Conclusion and Recommendations

By looking at the proposition that geopolitics influenced the formation of ECOWAS and the subsequent migration flows, we concluded that geopolitics is the major cause of the high rate of migration and internal insecurity in Nigeria. Thus, we recommended:

- The development of Nigeria's national interests to supersede the BIG-brother roles she plays in ECOWAS.
- A revisit of ECOWAS protocol on free movement to correct the framework that has led to porous borders in the region.
- The empowerment of personnel of the Nigeria Immigration Service, Customs, and other agencies, to tackle porous borders and immigrants inflow into Nigeria.

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CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Terrorism, Migration and Economic Setback in some African States

Kelechi Johnmary Ani and Victor Ojatorotu

Introduction

Terrorism and insecurity of lives and property in Northern Mali, Northeastern Nigeria, and Western Cameroon, have had dangerous tolls in several countries in Africa. The situation is worsened by the large-scale trade in arms from Libya to West African and Central African States, and from Somalia to other East African States. All the regions of Africa continue to experience one form of terror attack or another: From Mauritania to Tunisia, Egypt, Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, South Sudan to Central African Republic, as well as Cote D' Ivory, Mali, Libya, Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Migration has become a strategy for saving lives.

The West African region has been affected by the wave of terrorism. The Sahel region of Africa has been referred to as the corridor of all dangers or Sahelistan. Laurent (2013) used the concept of Sahelistan to refer to an unsafe region where jihadists undergo military training and prepare terrorists for trans-national attacks. The quest by many of the migrants running away from their terror-stricken societies to get to Europe and America, has also generated a peculiar push and pull effects on the continent. This study focuses on the dynamics of terrorism in many parts of the African continent as well as how it has led to progressive legal and illegal migration into many parts of the globe, notwithstanding the heavy risks of loss of lives and property that are involved in such migrations

Conceptual Clarifications

Terrorism is a planned and systematic use of violence, fear, threat, and force in order to intimidate, extort, demand, and induce psychological trauma on victims, civilians, non-combatant groups, or third parties, as a means of attaining political, economic, social and/ or criminal goals of an individual or group. Some analysts tend to use the word terrorism and insurgency to mean the same thing. The concept of insurgency has become a very topical theme in contemporary global affairs. It is a concept that has divergent meaning to different people, depending on their ideological, geographical, religious, and social perception of the group classifying and being classified as insurgents. Insurgency in politics and international relations is any kind of armed uprising against an incumbent government. It is an organized, armed, political struggle whose goal may be the seizure of power through revolutionary takeover and replacement of the existing government (Calvert, 2010; Desai & Eckstein, 1990). In recent African history, the Tuareg insurgents were able to take up arms and dethrone the constitutional government of Mali in 2012. The violence and disorder that greeted

the Malian State in the course of the activities of the insurgents led to increased insecurity in the Sahel region as well as massive migration from Mali to neighbouring states and beyond (Ani, 2013a).

Laqueur (1977:5) has stated that a comprehensive definition of “terrorism does not exist nor will it be found in the foreseeable future and to argue that terrorism cannot be studied without such a definition is manifestly absurd”. Terrorism involves significant personal danger (Jenkins, Johnson & Ronfeldt, 1977). While some terrorists enjoy their risk, others neglect the height of risk involved (Crenshaw, 2012). The commitment of a terrorist is strong enough to make the risk of personal harm acceptable and perhaps to outweigh the cost of society’s rejection, although defiance of the majority may be a reward in itself (Crenshaw, 2012). It should be noted that ‘violence or threatened use of violence’ appears in many definitions of terrorism. During the era of colonialism in Africa, what is considered today as ‘freedom fighters’ were termed terrorists by the colonial masters. Today, the idea of cyber-terrorism naturally destroys or rarely adopts the use of violence or threat of violence. Consequently, terrorism has multiple definitions but the researchers adopts the definition of Schmid and Jongman (1988). They argue that:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population and serve as message generators. Threat and violence based communication processes between terrorist (organization), victims and main target (audiences), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion or propaganda is primarily sought (Schmid & Jongman, 1988:28).

The organized nature of terror attacks destroys the general supposition that terrorists are irrational collection of people who cannot be characterized in general (Taylor, 1988). In Nigeria, the Boko Haram sect as well as the different groups of the Niger Delta militants have used acts of terrorism as a tool to attain their group objectives. For each of these groups sampled, the idea of ‘group objectives’ reveals the existence of a group psychology which “provides a powerful explanation for the uniformity of behavior within the diverse population of terrorist groups” (Post, 1987:25-26). While the Boko Haram uses acts of terrorism to attain their brand of *haram Islam* (fake Islam), the Niger Delta militants employ terror to promote their case against environmental degradation of their communities.

The leadership pattern and dynamics of every terror sect influences the activities of its followers, especially in relations to motivation to attack in a given location or migrating

to a new environment for training and attack. The terrorism-prone individual “who obtains psychic gratification from the experience is likely to be a follower, not a leader who commands but does not perform the act” (Crenshaw, 2012:109). The members of the Al-Shabab, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Fulani Herdsmen, ISIS in Libya, Boko Haram sect, and the Niger Delta militants, tend to exhibit total commitment to their leaders. The leaders constantly contact other armed groups from other continents of the globe. They get financial, strategic, and other forms of support like physical training. The Boko Haram and Al Shabab have a history of sending members to Afghanistan and Pakistan for further training on terror strategies, which speaks volumes of the strategic global affiliations. Consequently, threatening to expel and kill dissident members of the sect and rewarding faithful members in strategic trainings through contacts with other foreign terror fighters (FTFs) as well as other forms of promotion within the sect, increase the motivation and disposition of members of terrorist groups.

Theoretical Framework

This study is based on the migration system theory. The migration system theory came to limelight in the 1970s. It was pioneered by Mabogunje (1970) in a study on systemic approach to rural-urban migration. Mabogunje (1970) maintained that migration is a systemic pattern of exchanges across time and space, set within a wider environment. For Mabogunje (1970), the state of the system, and the scale and direction of migration flows, depend on feedback mechanisms and changes in the environment, rather than conditions that initiated the movement. From Mabogunje’s position, one could argue that environmental changes that affect cash flow and security could promote systemic migration.

Migration system theory has been used to explain international migration. Scholars (Fawcett, 1989; Gurak & Caces, 1992) maintain that international migration consists of states and mechanisms that connect flow of goods, capital remittances, ideas and information, across sovereign borders, thereby leading to different forms of exchanges. The theory maintains that migration alters the socio-cultural, economic and institutional conditions in both the sending and receiving countries, sometimes influencing a developmental trend, which sustains systemic migrations (de Haas, 2009). The sending countries receive foreign direct investments, while the receiving countries enjoy productive outputs from the commoditization of labour by the migrants. Thus, the migration system theorists argue that geographical conditions of host and targeted countries determine systemic migrations. When those geographical conditions become dehumanizing due to a number of factors that include terrorism, migration becomes the ultimate path for many individuals. Migration further restructures the societal and developmental conditions of both the sending and receiving states (de Haas, 2008).

Mangalam and Schwarzweller (1970) present migration system as consisting of a donor subsystem and a recipient subsystem, linked to the migration collectivity. They

argued that migration system is meant to maintain dynamic equilibrium of the social organization at the place of origin. However, this study maintains that the equilibrium is also exported into the receiving country as the migrants go there to fill the labour need and in many cases at cheap costs, thereby creating increased access to cheap labour and advancing productivity.

Overtime, the theory was neglected by scholars; especially due to the growing wind of migration restrictions, xenophobia, and racism, across the globe. However, the theory maintains that migration arises as a response to tensions originating within a system (Blackwell, 2014). Tension arises when power and prestige are not balanced; and if responses within the system do not lead to a solution, then migration outside the system is the likely outcome (Hoffmann-Nowotny, 1981). Other factors such as terrorism, can also lead to systemic migration. In such situations, migration is a response to systemic stimuli (Blackwell, 2014).

The conditions of terrorism, civil war and other forms of armed conflicts in many African States (which create opportunities for acts of terror) result in migration to Euro-American States Paradoxically, when there is mass exodus of skilled manpower of a given society due to the activities of terrorists, the productivity of the sending state drops, which naturally affects processes of nation building. It is often the critical skill population that tends to migrate first and in many cases through official or legal means, to new and peaceful states, where they are 'easily welcomed' and assimilated. But the citizens of terror-ravaged environments, who have low formal skills, usually look for asylum, sometimes migrating through illegal routes of the high sea and wilderness, and thereby facing huge risks to their lives and property.

Methodology

This study is a qualitative research. Data collection were largely from secondary literature from Kenyan, Nigerian, and South African universities, as well as security materials from Chadian consulates. The researchers however, did extensive focus group discussions in north-eastern Nigeria and South Africa. The researchers also used email and telephone discussions to sample the opinions of scholars from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Cameroon. A total of nine focus group discussions, comprising 6-10 persons each, were carried out. Four were done in Maiduguri (including one at the Chadian Consulate, Maiduguri), while one was done respectively in Yola, Abuja, and Damaturu. Two focus group discussions with Cameroonians were carried out in Unit 15 of Mafikeng, South Africa. The interviews involved both men and women. Data collected were analyzed using historical content-analysis and interpretation.

Terrorism and Migration: Identifying the Nexus

Schmid (2016:5) maintains that "the interface between terrorism and migration is a rich field for research that deserves all the attention it can get so that well and ill-founded concerns can be separated and policies can be built on solid evidence". Migration is often driven by the search for better life. Individuals living in terror-

stricken settings easily engage in migration to the land of their dreams where they could escape terror attacks. Many of those living in the poverty-stricken and oppressive settings of Nigeria and Somalia, easily believe that migration is a way to escape their sufferings. Sometimes, those who have been radicalized begins to carry the negative wind of terror influence to those living in peaceful cities within Africa. In that scenario, the domestic or international plans to lunch terror attacks on relatively peaceful administrative cities like Abuja, Paris, and London would be hatched and implemented by terrorists who would travel a long distance, sometimes across borders of sovereign states to lunch their terror onslaught. Unfortunately, some migrants become terrorists in their new environments. Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, Central African Republic, and South Sudan are among the African countries that have recorded high terror fatalities that have continued to cause both regular and irregular migrations, most times facilitated by free movement protocols among African states.

African regional organizations in a bid to promote economic integration came up with the protocols of free movement. ECOWAS states signed the free movement protocols; but in 1983 and 1985, many Ghanaians living in Nigeria were expelled from Nigeria. In 1986, the Nigerian State expelled citizens of Cote d' Ivoire notwithstanding the existence of ECOWAS entry permit into West African States for 90 days without visa requirements. East African Community and SADC all have the same visa free entry requirements but their implementations and implications on intra-African States migration have remained problematic. For instance, in South Africa, there is widespread xenophobic-driven terrorism on migrants from other African States because many of the indigenous South Africans feel these foreigners from other African States are taking their jobs or engage in criminal activities. In most cases, when protests arise in South Africa, foreigners bear the brunt, thereby sustaining the wave of continuous migration as many critical skill migrants in the country soon lose faith in the *Ubuntu* posture of South African foreign policy and continue their search for more hospitable environments.

Schmid (2016) reveals that migration control, as a strategy used by a number of states to manage terror-driven migration, has its own challenges. The position of this study is that it has been widely acknowledged that the strategy of migration control undermines the rights of bona fide migrants to move. Sometimes, it breeds xenophobic attacks on foreign residents as currently witnessed by the populist attacks on foreigners in Germany due to the terror killing of a German citizen in August 2018. It also undermines the culture and disposition to be hospitable to foreign settlers or migrants. At the long run, the policy undermines the over-all positive contributions of professionals of foreign descent to national development in their host country. In worst case scenarios, the act of controlling migration as a strategy to counter terrorist infiltration sometimes undermine the rights of undocumented citizens as currently experienced in India, where millions of undocumented citizens face multiple challenges in their bid to maintain their citizenship rights.

Causes of Terrorism and Migration

There are many causes of terrorism and migration in Africa, mainly, religious radicalization, illiteracy, poverty, bad governance, and resource quest. Many African states are weak, and this has given room for the growth of terrorism and the resultant migration. Fearon and Laitan (2003) have argued that financially, organizationally, and politically weak central governments render insurgency more feasible and attractive due to weak local policing and inept as well as corrupt counter-terror practices. Weak government institutions in Somalia, Libya, Mauritania and Mali, gave unlimited opportunities for terrorism to flourish. Over the years, terrorism gripped all facets of the national lives of the above listed countries and they became training and recruitment grounds for many terrorist groups in different parts of the globe.

Other factors that drive migration in Africa range from poverty, sit-tight leadership, civil war, political violence, terrorism, to climate change. Zoubri (2017) maintains that climate change in the Sahel will have major effects on the socio-economic and political developments of the region, thereby exacerbating the strains and contradictions already existing across the different communities and cities in the region. The negative effects of climate change have continuously reduced resources and access to food as well as physical security thereby generating mass migration.

In Nigeria, the debt burden is high; successive governments have been unable to firmly and proactively deal with the monsters of kidnapping in the Niger Delta, as well as Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen terrorism. These have led to increased terrorism in the Northeast and South-south states. The Nigerian media are constantly projecting and revealing alleged cases of financial embezzlement of fund that was meant for counter-terrorism and internally displaced persons. Since the sources of terrorism are manifold, any society or polity that permits opportunities for terrorism is vulnerable, and government reactions that are inconsistent or wavering between tolerance and repression will most likely encourage terrorism (Crenshaw, 2012). And, when terrorism gets hold of a given society, the civilian population will begin to migrate in their numbers.

While terrorism causes migration, migration on the other hand can drive terrorism. Thus, members of some terrorist groups can penetrate Euro-American states as immigrants with hidden intensions unleash terror attacks in these states. For instance, Walid Salihi (that has several other names) who championed the Police Station attack in Paris on 7th January, 2016 during the Charlie Hebdo terror attack anniversary, was registered in the Recklinghausen Asylum Centre, Germany (Schmid, 2016). Similarly, Mullins (2016) reveals that 25,000 or more Algerian asylum seekers reached United Kingdom since 1980, out of which about 44 has been involved in terrorism. Out of 85,000 Somali refugees seeking asylum in USA, 36 have been suspected of having links with terrorists (Schmid, 2016).

Resistance organizations like African National Congress (ANC) and the African Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) over the years turned to terrorism as a way of pursuing their goals of nationalism and colonial freedom. Decades after independence of many African States, the contemporary Biafran and Ambazonian peoples that are agitating for independence are the people that currently receive the full weight of state-sponsored terrorism. Both the Biafran and Ambazonian agitations emerged as reactions to the perceived marginalization of the masses from affected region of Nigeria and Cameroon. The Nigerian state has declared the Independent People of Biafra (IPOB) a terrorist organization, while the Cameroonian State uses all forms of excessive security force to destroy Western Cameroonian villages. In the latter case, men are killed, and women are raped, all of which make up a state-terror strategy of intimidating a group into acceptance of second-class citizenship as well as sustaining the status quo of a Francophone dominated Cameroonian State. In Cameroon, the Ambazonian people continually migrate to other parts of Africa and the globe as an escapist strategy to the mass discontent, insecurity, and state-terrorism from the Paul Biya-led government. On the other hand, the deep ethnic cleavages in Nigeria sustained the massive onslaught by the military on the IPOB members and other citizens living around the IPOB strongholds.

Terrorism and Migration in Sovereign African Houses

The idea of sovereign houses is an indirect reference to independent African States. House denotes both a physical structure built with block, mud, bricks or wood. But in this study, house connotes a sovereign geographical space. The metaphoric description of an independent state as a house, was been done by scholars like Akinwumi (2009) and Maier (2000). Akinwumi (2009) in the Third Inaugural Lecture of Nasarawa State University, Keffi presented a paper titled *Before we set the House Ablaze: Let us Consult our Oracle (History)*. Maier titled one of his works as *This House has fallen: Nigeria in Crisis*. In his, Maier stated that his purpose was to portray the most intractable crisis points of ethnic and regional tensions threatening the survival of what is perhaps the largest failed state in the Third World (Maier, 2000). This study is not principally aimed at identifying failed African houses, but it tries to unravel how terrorism has set a number of African sovereign houses ablaze leading to mass migration as people will naturally struggle to migrate to safer countries.

Sovereign houses or states arise from the interplay of power relations within a geopolitical milieu, which gives birth to membership in the comity of nations. Every sovereign house uses institutional and non-institutional forces of coercion, discipline, and surveillance to sustain their foundation and nation building process. However, in different places and times, insurgents, terrorists, and militias in many countries have unleashed violence, fear, and onslaught on both institutional and non-institutional structures and establishments within the state in order to weaken it or take over the power-structure and attain political leadership.

In Nigeria and Kenya, there is extensive historical evidence that migrants from their neighbouring states have penetrated their countries to plan and execute terror attacks on the citizens. The role of Cameroonians in championing the Maitesine crisis which led to the untimely death of thousands of Nigerians remains memorable in the minds of Nigerians, especially those living in the northern parts of the country. Over half a million Somali refugees are found in Kenya. Schmid (2016) reveals that a Somali refugee in the Kakuma camp was one of those that planned the Nairobi West Gate Shopping Mall attack of 21st September, 2013. Again, investigations revealed that there was existing communication between another of the terrorist and a refugee in Dadaab, which housed the largest population of Somali refugees in Kenya. Thus, the penetration of Alshabab and Boko Haram members into refugee and IDP camps to radicalize them and use them for terror activities goes further to dislocate the economy of many African states.

Implications of Migration

One fundamental negative implication of terrorism in Africa is the rate of forced migration from African States to Europe and America. Before the consolidation of the dangerous wind of terrorism across the continent, many of the contemporary African migrants had genuine businesses that they were doing in their home countries. But when terror groups like Boko Haram, Al Shabab, and Muslim Brotherhood, took over parts of Nigeria, Somalia, Mauritania, Kenya, and Egypt, they forced thousands of African men and women who had lost everything they survived on, to migrate to Europe. Many others were forced out of their country by civil war and the act of terror that accompanied it. That is the situation in Libya, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, etc., where progressive conflict led to the rise of massive terrorism. Thousands of African men and women have lost their lives in the desert routes to Europe; others died under dehumanizing conditions on the high sea, some in cargoes, others in ships, and hundreds drowned. On 12 June 2018, Aljazeera reported how Italy refused the ship carrying migrants that were escaping the war-torn state of Libya from docking. The terrible tale of woes that have befallen millions of men and women who successfully landed the shores and borders of their dream country remains another problematic dimension to the African migration issue. Many of them were gathered and kept in asylum concentration camps for months and years without access to sustainable social amenities. In such concentration camps, they battled all manners of disease.

The rise of populist governments across the globe, from President Trump in USA, to the new populist leadership in Spain and Italy, as well as the anti-refugee foreign policy of Hungary, are strong challenges to the vision of many Africans who desire to enter the Euro-American countries. The rise of popular party movements that are against refugees in Germany, France, and United Kingdom, where foreign refugees have been fingered for successfully launching terror attacks and sentencing people to their early deaths, have also made asylum and migration much more difficult for Africans that are fleeing from terrorism in their countries. As these populist governments in Europe and

America continue to encourage xenophobia against African migrants, they restrict asylum opportunities for migrants and also tighten the opportunities of these foreigners to make a living in their new host countries. These countries should not take all the blames because the national interest of every country should be to ensure the protection of lives and property of their citizens. Since available evidence have confirmed the facts about the objectives of foreign terrorist fighters, who are exported to Europe and America to unleash terror, it is understandable, therefore, for leaders in such Euro-American countries to exercise some control about who enters their countries, and from where. However, migration control must endeavour to accommodate professional migrates, who travel to enhance the national development trends of the host state.

The increasing trend in migration from Africa to Europe led to the 2006 Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development in Rabat, Morocco. The meeting brought together European and African states, especially those from North Africa, West Africa, and Central Africa, to discuss migration issues across both regions. The meeting gave birth to some positive initiatives like the Seahorse Atlantic Network that promotes multilateral information dissemination across Spain, Portugal, Senegal, Mauritania, Cape Verde, Morocco, Gambia and Guinea Bissau with the aim of checking illegal migrations and cross-border crime. Recently, the Khartoum Process or European Union–Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (HOAMRI) came to limelight in 2014 following the EU-African states meeting in Rome. These initiatives and ministerial meetings, as well as networks, all aimed at ensuring sustainable management of migration of Africans to Europe.

The European Union has granted the already operating civilian mission EUCAP Sahel Niger, the right to expand their action on combating irregular migration coming from Sub-Saharan Africa through the establishment of an outpost based in the desert town of Agadez, which has remained a main hub of migrants from the era of Trans-Saharan slavery till date. The aim is to check the migratory trend from there through Libya to the shores of the Mediterranean as 90% of the West African migratory traffic passes through there (*Sotto La Lente Migrazione*, 2015).

Economic growth and development only take place during peace times. An environment characterized by bombing and continuous killing by terrorist organizations can hardly achieve sustainable business enterprises. When men begin to run from the activities of terrorist, they are often dislocated from the immovable factors of production that sustained their small and medium scale enterprises. In many cases, the terror sects take over such businesses and due to lack of entrepreneurial skills, they supervise their collapse, with negative implications on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country.

The economy of Somalia was very badly destroyed by the activities of Al- Shabab that they began to depend on financial aid and donor support from agencies/ countries,

especially Turkey, to sustain nation-building process in their country. The Isalay Air field and major business centers in Somalia were largely destroyed by Al-Shabab (Ani & Ojakorotu, 2017). The large percentage of small and medium scale enterprises, as well as companies in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Bauchi, and other north-eastern states of Nigeria, largely collapsed to the destructive activities of the Boko Haram sect.

The massive destruction of world heritage centre by Tuareg insurgents and the terrorists that aligned with them, who also destroyed Timbuktu and other tourist sites in Mali, affected the national tourism economy (Ani, 2013c). In Egypt and Algeria, Muslim Brotherhood, Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, as well as Al Shabab, ensured that tourists were no longer safe in those states, thereby weakening their national economies (Dahir, 2017).

The regular reports on the abduction and killing of western tourists in parts of terror-stricken African States, have negatively affected the image and economies of the countries involved. Zoubir (2017) maintains that the kidnapping of foreigners, one of the main sources of revenue for jihadists, has deterred foreigners from travelling to the Sahel states. States in the Sahel, namely, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Nigeria, Sudan and Eritrea.

Egypt's GDP which was driven by tourism dropped to the all-time 13% low after the revolution that rocked Egypt, as Egyptian tourists dropped from 14 million arrivals in 2010 to 9 million in 2015 (Dahir, 2017). Following the heightened terror attacks in Kenya, USA and Britain issued a travel advice in 2003 warning their citizens not to travel to Kenya. It was followed by the suspension of British Airways regular and chartered planes to Nairobi. That led to the closure of 90% Kenya's oversea markets (Wesley & Lumumba, 2012), and loss of over 500,000 direct jobs and 2.5 million indirect jobs (Gitu, 2003). Wesley and Lumumba (2012) reveal that terrorism also led to 5% fall in the net foreign direct investment of Kenya, thereby affecting her gross domestic product.

The millions of dollars spent by the Nigerian, Chadian, Cameroonian, Kenyan, and Egyptian States in their counter-insurgency activities deny other sectors of the economy the resources for social development. The West gate terror attack was said to have cost the Kenyan Government, 10 million Kenyan Shillings. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) maintain that Kenyan economy has been hard-hit by terrorism. In 2008, for instance, Kenya's stock market dropped from 64,555 million Kenyan Shillings in 2007 to 41,943 million Kenya Shillings due to terrorism and insecurity in Kenya.

As more people join terror movements across Africa and unleash mayhem on the continent, they weaken nation building processes, and promote mass opposition and criticism of governments in terror affected states.

Policy Position and Recommendations

- Migration influences the dynamics of political economy of Africa, hence should be positively promoted;
- Euro-American states gain from the formal and informal skills of migrants, hence should balance their negative reportage by promoting documentation of positive contributions of migrants;
- Skilled manpower that are driven abroad due to terrorism contributes to the gross domestic product in host states and the foreign direct investment in sending states, hence should be encouraged;
- Migrants from terror-stricken states are not necessarily terrorists, hence the culture of xenophobia and islamphobic attacks on migrants in Euro-American states should be proactively managed by security agencies in those countries;
- Euro-American institutions established to manage migration should promote healthy conditions for the promotion of the international political economy of migration; and
- The economic contributions of migrants in every sovereign state should be assessed as a way of ensuring sound foreign policies.

Conclusion

This study showed that all the regions of the African continent have been inflicted by the negative wind of terrorism, insecurity, and migration. The study gave examples of how weak institutions in Somalia, Mali, and Nigeria, created room for the growth of terror activities by Al Shabab, Tuareg fundamentalists, Fulani herdsmen, and the Boko Haram sect. The immediate implications of the terrorism include: the rise of institutions and groups that check/ control migration of Africans to Europe, and the rise of populism and strong xenophobic attitudes to migrants, especially Africans, in Europe and America.

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CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Refugees: Benediction or Curse to Cameroon's Economy, 1982-2017

D.N. Keming

Introduction

The phenomenon of displacement of persons in the world is as old as the hills although it became as a global concern only recently with the creation of international organisations like the League of Nations in 1919 and most particularly the United Nations Organisation (UN) formed in 1945. This global displacement of persons could be voluntary or involuntary, and generated by natural and manmade causes. Either of the causes has often generated displaced persons such as: refugees, environmental migrants, stateless persons, illegal migrants, economic migrants, exceptional leave to remain, and asylum seekers.⁶ In the midst of all these, it became difficult to define a refugee and determine who should benefit from international protection. It was in the light of this confusion that the world governing body (UN) decided to come up with a legal framework defining and determining the particular displaced persons to benefit from the status of refugees. This decision led to the creation of the UN organ known as United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1951 and its subsequent Protocol in 1967.⁷ This was however followed by other national (Cameroon's Refugee Status Eligibility Commission and Refugee Appeals Board)⁸, continental [Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) later African Union (AU)]⁹ and inter-continental organisations. With the existence of these organisations, one would imagine that the plight of refugees was over, but it became more complex with divided perceptions of people even within academia as to the advantages and disadvantages offered by refugees to recipient countries.

⁶D.N. Keming, "The United Nations High Commission For Refugees In Cameroon: A Historical Investigation From 1982 To 2011", Ph.D Thesis, Department of History, University of Yaounde I, July 2016, pp.20-40., D. N. Keming, "Differentiating Refugees from other Displaced Persons: Cameroon Experience", *Revue scientifique pluridisciplinaire du département d'Histoire de la Faculté des Arts et Sciences humaines de l'Université de Yaoundé I, (HABARU)*, Vol. I N^o 2, Juin 2014, pp.356-362 (22pages)

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷Archives of National Assembly (ANA), Bill 777/PJL/AN, N^o79/R/AN, Relating to the Status of Refugees in Cameroon:, Presented on behalf of the Foreign Affairs Commission, June 2005, pp.2-3. ANA, Law N^o 2005/006 of 27th July 2005 Relating to the Status of Refugee in Cameroon, 2nd Ordinary Session, 27th July 2005, p.6. Archives of National Assembly (ANA), Bill 777/PJL/AN, N^o79/R/AN, Relating to the Status of Refugees in Cameroon: Presented on behalf of the Foreign Affairs Commission, June 2005, pp.2-3.

⁹HCR, *Module de formation: introduction à la protection Internationale des Réfugiés*, Genève, HCR, 1992, pp.33-34.

Our experience in Cameroon has proven that refugees constitute a far powerful economic resource than a liability to economic development if well handled. Demographers have concluded that a large, youthful, and productive population is an unbeatable developmental force; and this is vividly a true depiction of refugees. Based on this premise, China is predicted to top the world economy (35.2% by 2019¹⁰) today, and Nigeria the richest African country (\$406.0 billions)¹¹ due to their large population. In all, articulating the definition a refugee is a subject of serious concern developed subsequently.

Definitions of a Refugee

Etymologically, the word refugee comes from the verb to refuge, which means (sanctuary, shelter, protection, asylum, and to harbor). According to the Cambridge Dictionary, a refugee is defined as a person who has escaped from their own country for political, religious or economic reasons or because of a war.¹² This definition has a lot of lapses and thus controverts that of many scholars and the UNHCR. Against this meaning, many scholars have given varying definitions to the term refugee. According to O.C. Eze, a refugee is defined as a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling, to avail himself of the protection of that country.¹³

This definition ties with that of the convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees drafted in 1967. It should be noted that such a definition has shortcomings, as it does not consider all refugees emanating from similar violence; thus, it remains incomplete. In relation to these lacunae, African scholars under the OAU in 1969 added something new to the previous definition that made it more complete and accepted by the UNHCR and the international community. Article 1 of the OAU convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa stipulates that the term refugee shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place or outside the country of his nationality.¹⁴

The most important parts of a refugee definition are that refugees should be outside their country of origin, the purpose of their flight has to be fear of persecution, the fear

¹⁰International monetary Fund, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/the-worlds-biggest-economies-in-2018/>, retrieved Sunday 13th May 2018, at 11:51am.

¹¹https://www.google.cm/search?q=largest+african+economy+2018&rlz=1C1AVFB_enCM772CM774&oq=Largest+African+economy&aqs=chrome.2.69i57j0l5.10796j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8, Sunday, 13th May 2018, at 12:01pm.

¹² New Cambridge, *Advanced Learner's Dictionary*, Cambridge, University Press, 2003, p.1048.

¹³ O. C. Eze, *Human Rights in Africa*, Lagos, Macmillan Nigeria Publishers Ltd, 1984, pp.170-172.

¹⁴ UNHCR, “Statut de l’office du Haut-commissaire des nations unies pour les réfugiés”, Genève, *UNHCR*, Octobre 2006, p.3, HCR, *Module de formation...*, 1992, p.33.

of persecution has to be well-founded (they have to have experienced persecution or be likely to experience it if they return). The persecution has to result from one of the five grounds listed in the above definition, and they have to be unwilling or unable to seek the protection of their country. Added to the five grounds, are external aggressions, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of the refugee country of origin or nationality.

According to D.P.O. Connell, states are not obliged to admit aliens. To him, article 14 of the universal declaration of human rights (UDHR), which stipulates that everyone has the right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution in another country, is only extraordinary.¹⁵ The enlarged definition of a refugee by the OAU is justified by the fact that Africa seemingly produced a colossal number of displaced persons and refugees compared to other continents of our planet. For example, in 1995, Africa had a total of 11.81million displaced persons, the greatest in the entire universe.¹⁶ This resulted from the multiplicity of wars, political crisis, socio-economic dominations, and natural deserters.¹⁷

Weaknesses in the Definitions

It has to be underscored here that the UNHCR and AU definitions of a refugee are highly problematic as they disagree in so many respects. For instance, according to the UNHCR, displaced persons still within their national territory are not treated as refugees, meanwhile according to the AU definition, they are all considered refugees. To the AU, they are refugees because they are victims of perhaps external aggression and domination, and have a founded fear(s) of persecution though they may not have been targeted for reasons underscored in the UNHCR Convention of 1951 and the 1967 Protocol. It would appear the AU's definition was influenced by Africa's history of slave trade, colonialism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism. Although accepted to be the best refugee definition so far, it is handicapped by the absence of funds and a continental refugee governing body to handle the African displaced classified as refugees. These lacunae give more weight to the UNHCR which offers a governing body and resources to humanise refugees in the human planet. However, these resources are generated by member countries including Africans. The necessity for an African refugee body, just like in many country levels, could provide substantial meaning to the AU's definition of a refugee. The absence of such a continental body provides primacy to the UNHCR universally accepted definition, which classified refugees into two distinct groups.

Types of Refugees

There are chiefly two major types of refugees, namely: rural and urban.¹⁸ In relation to David's point of view, rural refugees are again sub structured into refugees in camp and those in settlements. The word rural as defined by Cambridge Advanced Learners

¹⁵ D. P. Connell, et al, *International Law*, V.2, 2nd edition, London, Stevens and Sons, 1970, p. 740.

¹⁶HCR, "Aider les réfugiés : L'UNHCR en bref", Genève, HCR, septembre 2006, p. 8.

¹⁷D. Mayer, *Afrique Terre des Réfugiés: que faire?* Paris, L'Harmattan, 1984, p.19.

¹⁸ Mayer, *Afrique Terre des...*, 1984, pp.113-119.

Dictionary, Collins English Dictionary & Thesaurus, and Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, refers to the countryside.¹⁹ The UNHCR usually calls on all states to promote durable solutions in order to assist refugees in a spirit of international solidarity and burden sharing.²⁰ Rural refugees who live in camps are well secured and served with social amenities as observed in Cameroon. Such amenities may be lacking but they are generally available compared to those who live in spread abodes like the CAR refugees in the Eastern Region of Cameroon.²¹ Those rural refugees who live in camps are always on defined spots and can be reached at any time when the need arises.²² Rural refugees that live in settlements are not often organised and grouped as they are usually scattered in various locations and across a number of villages²³ alongside with the local population. Examples were Nigerian refugees in Bamenda/Adamaoua and over 100,000 CAR refugee herdsmen in Bertoua/Adamaoua regions of Cameroon.²⁴

The word urban, according to Cambridge Advanced Learners Dictionary, Collins English Dictionary & Thesaurus, and Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, means city or town. Therefore, urban refugees are those who live in towns and cities of host countries. Urban refugees are largely individuals who actually device plans to escape their home country to another for fear of persecution in order to enjoy certain freedoms.²⁵ Their exile is usually politicised, well thought of, well organised, and highly ambitious than rural refugees. This is justified by the fact that they do not often settle at the frontiers alongside the rural population as the rural refugees, but prefer mostly the major towns of their host countries. Also, urban refugees could descend from both neighbouring countries and continents. For example, by December 2008, Cameroon hosted 5 Yugoslavian refugees, 1 Iraqi, 1 Iranian, 62,919 Chadians, and 86 Liberians.²⁶

Far-fetched, it will be wrong to conclude here that urban refugees always plan for their exile, are organised professionals, job seekers, and students. This is so because in Douala and in Yaounde, there was a composition of old and unproductive refugees (including unskilled young men/women and unaccompanied children) who only

¹⁹ (Paperback (ed.), *Collins English Dictionary & Thesaurus*, Third edition, Westerhill Road, Harper Collins Publishers Limited, 2006,666; J. Crowther, (ed.), *Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary*, Fifth edition, Oxford University Press, 1995, p.1032; New Cambridge, *Advanced Learner's Dictionary*, Cambridge; University Press, 2003,p.1097.

²⁰ UNO, *Yearbook of the United Nations*, Vol. 38th, New York, Nijhoff Publishers, 1984, p.937.

²¹ Interview with Nouhou Zedou (Male) aged 28, trader, Bertoua 6th November 2012, Interview with Achirimbi Peter Ngwa, aged 50, Driver, Kouba, 4th November 2012.

²² Interview with Ahmadou (male), aged 75, farmer, Langui, 12th January 2011.

²²S. Mone, "The benefit of hosting refugees",New Vision, available at [https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1452952/-and-company LTD](https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1452952/-and-company-LTD), added 10th May 2017 09:43 AM 5th May 2018 at 09 :28 am

²⁴ <http://www.unhcr.org/46fbcd924.html>, Downloaded on the 30th December 2010 at 2:30pm.

²⁵ Interview with Monni Cathie Danielle, aged 47, assistant director, UNHCR sub office (Bertoua), 3rd November 2012.

²⁵ UNHCR, "Refugee Population and Changes: Annual Statistical Report, Chapter 4 ", Yaounde, UNHCR Manual, December 2008.

depend on the UNHCR for survival. This kind of composition is an indication that they come from neighbouring countries but are not always willing to settle with the rural population or the nearest villages of Cameroon frontiers for various reasons. In an interview with a mixture of CAR and Chadian female refugees in Nlongkak, they explained that their attraction to Yaounde was the job avenues and better security.²⁷ Their stay in Cameroon is largely dependent on the country's policy towards foreigners in general and particularly on refugees.²⁸ To this extent, how far are refugees considered as an economic catalysts or liabilities to Cameroon is a subject of great concern.

The Refugee Population and Capital Transfer

The strength of every economy is largely determined by the size, human resources, and age composition of its population.²⁹ In this direction, the skilful the larger and the more youthful the population, the stronger and the more productive the economy. The refugee population in Cameroon reflected this description and positively helped to expand the economy of the country. This is so because many business operators benefitted from the needs and demands generated by the refugee communities in the country. For instance, in 1978, Cameroon received approximately 40,000 Equatorial Guinean refugees in Olamze and Ambam, and 100,000 Chadian refugees in Kousserie in 1979. The presence of the large refugee population increased the size of the market as well as the amount of liquid cash in circulation brought into the country by the refugees. Note has to be made that, the refugee population increased the demand for goods and services, and provided a large and cheap labour force to the benefit of Cameroon employers. For example, following the influx of Chadian refugees to Kousserie in 1979, the price of sugar doubled there, oil prices and all other items of basic necessities increased to the benefit of Cameroonian business persons.²⁹

The contribution of refugee population to Cameroon's economy from 1982 to 2017 can therefore be analysed or streamlined basically into tangible and intangible wealth. From an intangible flank, the size of the refugee population, the inestimable injection of external funds, their human resource capital, services, and tangible goods brought in to Cameroon, constitute an immeasurable wealth. Accordingly, UNHCR statistics from 1982 to 2010, Cameroon received 1,374,880 refugees³⁰ as illustrated below. In a similar vein, Cameroon hosted another 350,000 duly registered refugees by 2017³¹

²⁷This was a collective interview with a group of eight refugee women of Central African Republic and Chadian origin selling groundnuts at Nlongkak road junction. It has to be recalled that there were so many of them but only eight opened up for conversation.

²⁸ Keming, "Differentiating Refugees from... ", 2014, pp.362-3.

²⁷<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/459601468337158089/Theimpacts-of-refugees-on-neighboring-countries-a-development-challenge>.

²⁸[http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DEV/DOC\(2017\)1&docLanguage=En](http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DEV/DOC(2017)1&docLanguage=En),https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/LOSCHMANN%20et%20al_paper.pdf, 5th May 2018, 2:00pm.

²⁹Keming, "The United Nations...", p. 88, 2016.

³¹ UNHCR "Fact Sheet-Cameroon", *UNHCR*, May 2017, pp.1-3

mostly from Nigeria, Chad, and Central African Republic that added to the country's population; and this was significantly a blessing than a curse to the country.

Table 1: Statistics of Refugees in Cameroon from 1982 to 2010

Year/Country	Eq,G	Chad	NBA	BDI	RWA	DRC	COB	LIB	GHA	NIG	RSA	CAR	Others	Total
1982														36,800
1983														4,200
1984														13,700
1985			100											35,200
1986		53,354	96										50	53,600
1987		53,200	67										400	53,600
1988		50,784	41										335	51,160
1999		48,524	39										340	48,630
1990		49,476	30										370	49,876
1991		44,843	17										377	45,237
1992		41,749	7										477	42,233
1993		43,200												44,000
1994		41,000												44,000
1995		44,400		200	500									45,945
1996		44,556		237	650			187	115		255	168		46,407
1997	100	44,100		200	700	100		200			300			47,100
1998		3,053		332	1,227	182	230	167					916	47,057
1999		44,600			100									49,200
2000		42,300		1,40	1,754									43,680
2001		39,300		287	802	232	68	17		14,988	348		143	41,186
2002		39,294		289	890	236	71	18		14,998		342	144	56,286
2003		39,293		289	888	236	71	18		1,700			143	58,288
2004		39,303			1,037	592	183	75		7,453		712	7	51366
2005		39,303		232	1,037	592	183	75		9,711		712	163	54013
2006	44	7,095		269	1,303	661	159	85		2,953		22,342	13	36930
2007	36	5,974		266	1,362	691	149	85		2,872		48,498	23	61963
2008	37	4,427		260	1,369	684	146	86	4	2,861		3,683		15565
2009	36	4,716		256	1,438	714	160	88	4	2,861		80,880		93162
2010	34	8,475		260	1,505	696	162	66	5	2,873		88,410		104,496
TOTAL	287	876319	397	3377	16562	5616	1582	1167	128	63270	903	245747	3901	1,374,880

Source: Adapted by author from www.unhcr.ch, retrieved on the 25th June 2010.

The above statistics refer only to the refugees duly registered and assisted by the UNHCR in the corresponding years. From the table, read the total number of refugees from different countries is as follows: (Eq. G) Equatorial Guinea - 287, Chad - 876.319, (NMB) Namibia - 397, (BDI) Burundi - 3.377, (RWD) Rwandi - 16.562, (DRC) Democratic Republic de Congo - 5.616, (COB) Congo Brazzaville - 1.582, (LIB) Liberia1 - 167, (GHA) Ghana - 128, (NIG) Nigeria - 63.270, (RSA) Republic of South Africa - 903, (CAR) Central African Republic - 245.747, and others - 3.901refugees.

The above statistics shows that there were a total of 1.724.880 refugees added to an estimated 21.000.000 million Cameroonians. Note has to be made here that the statistics are only about refugees actually registered by the UNHCR and it is possible that the undocumented refugee population that infiltrated and integrated with the

locals could even double this number; thus; making it difficult to determine their actual value to Cameroon's economy.³² However, if we rely on the UNHCR figures, it implies that 1.724.880 extra mouths needed to be fed although by the UNHCR, the refugees were never satisfied and supplemented their daily meals by purchasing food and other items from Cameroonian traders. This is justified by the fact that in areas heavily invaded by refugees, the prices of food and other items skyrocketed. As stated above, even the food stuffs distributed to the refugees by the UNHCR was purchased from Cameroonian traders.³³

Far more, the human resources and age composition of the refugees was of great significance to the growth of Cameroon's economy. This is so because they were largely composed of youth most of whom: lawyers, teachers, medical doctors, mechanics, construction/wood workers, plumbers, electricians, designers, journalist, and architects³⁴, who are the locomotives of every vibrant economy. This wonderful blend of human resource capital remains the dream of every country that seeks development, especially Cameroon, designed to attain its vision 2035³⁵ as an emerging country in the human planet. To this end, if all refugees were a melange of the above professionals, every country seeking development will like to admit refugees unconditionally because: they will provide cheap labour required for economic growth; experts; and available funds; and they will speed up economic development. Thus; the refugee population was largely a blessing to Cameroon than a curse. However, the wonderful advantages offered by the transfer of capital and the available huge refugee population in Cameroon, the disadvantages of the presence of refugees in the country are worthy of examination.

The presence of refugees on Cameroon soil did not only influence the economy positively but also negatively. The era from 1979 to 1982 witnessed a large flow of Chadian refugees into Cameroon at the time the government was seriously affected by an economic depression. The influx of these refugees came with emergency

³² Group discussion with seven relief workers, in Langui, 13th January 2011.

³³ Interview with Melingui Justine, aged 33, chief of health department, Langui, 11th January 2011., Interview with Ndoman Alexis Avom, aged 42, relief personnel, Langui, 13th January 2011.

³⁴R.Zetter, "Are refugees an economic burden or benefit?"

<http://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/preventing/zetter.pdf>, accessed on the 5th May 2018 at 1:00pm.

³⁴ Cameroon Vision 2035 outlines the goals and priorities for the country in becoming an emerging economy by 2035. The Vision highlights Cameroon's desire to develop its industries, substantially increase exports, provide import substitution, and open local markets to foreign investments. The document recognises Cameroon's need to increase agricultural productivity through sustainable intensification, improve infrastructure and narrow the gap between the rich and poor. The challenges recognised include rapid urbanization, an ageing and increasing population and poor governance. Lack of capital for investment also makes it difficult to invest in adding value to products and agricultural goods. The vision includes language regarding climate change and environmental protection, but the concrete ways to integrate environmental sustainability objectives is lacking. See also, The REDD Desk, "A Collaborative Resource for REDD Readiness", available at <https://theredddesk.org/countries/plans/cameroon-vision-2035>, accessed the 16th May 2018 at 06:54 am.

requirements for security, shelter, and accommodation. Though, it may be argued that these emergencies were not solely the burden of Cameroon government but also of the UNHCR and other partners. It should however be clarified here that Cameroon as a major partner had its own share of responsibility in terms of materials, financial and human resources, to complement the task of the UNHCR. This share of responsibility was never previewed in the national budget and consequently created leakages in the resources of the country at a time Cameroon was undergoing economic crisis. The observation on the negative implication of the refugees on the economy of Cameroon was presented by Issa Saibou. He asserted that in 1992, it was decided that the Poli Faro camp facilities were to be transferred to the authorities of Cameroon but this was postponed as a result of the economic depression in the country and the continuous influx of refugees.³⁶

The heavy requirements to better the lives of the refugees such as the construction of their camps, weighed heavily on Cameroon. This so because the government of Cameroon had the responsibility to provide land to host the many refugees in the different parts of the country. To do this, the local population lost their farmlands, firstly for the construction of the refugee camps, and secondly for the refugees to use for the cultivation of crops for consumption and for sale. For example, in Langui, reasonable hectares of arable land were lost by the local population for the construction of the 706 lodgings to host approximately 4000 Chadian refugees.³⁷ According to Adamou, he lost his farmland of over 2 acres to the Chadian refugee community in the area, partly for the construction of the camp and partly for the cultivation of food crops to feed the traumatised refugee families in the locality.³⁸ The loss of the land to refugees affected the quantity of food production and cash crops for sale by the locals but greatly increased the national average since a huge number of refugees engaged in the agriculture sector. This decrease in the local's production negatively affected the domestic output to the advantage of the refugees.

Equally, the presence of a large number of refugees in the country created a very serious imbalance in the supply of goods and services. For example, in a place like Kousserie, the drastic increase in population led to a high demand for goods and services. This increase in the demand for goods and services were not covered by supply and this immediately resulted in the shortage of goods of basic necessities.³⁹ The immediate consequence of this shortage was black-marketing or the introduction of artificial scarcity that became rife in the region. Another implication of this shortage

³⁶Saibou, I., "L'impact socio-économique du séjour des réfugiés Tchadiens à Kousseri (1979 à 1982)", *Ngaoundéré Anthropose*, Vol. 2, 1999, p.129.

³⁷ Interview with Ahmadou Daihrou, aged 55, farmer, Langui, 11th January 2011, Interview with Malolo Priso, aged 38, chief of logistics and distribution, Garoua, 10th January 2011, Interview with Younoussa Bouba, aged 30, head of department, Langui, 12th May 2011, Interview with Monni Cathie Danielle, aged 47, assistant director, HCR sub office (Bertoua), 3rd November 2012, Interview with Nouhou Zedou (Male) aged 28, trader, Bertoua 6 November 2012.

³⁸Interview with Adamou Ibrahim, aged 47, farmer, Langui, 11th January 2011.

³⁹ CRC, Secteur Logistique/Distribution: Objectifs du 1^{er} Semestre, Garoua, Jan.-Juin 2010, p.6.

was the increase in the prices of goods. For example, between the months of March and September 1980, a packet of sugar initially sold in the area for 270 FCFA suddenly rose to 400 FCFA. In the same light, the price of a kilogram (Kg) of meat formerly sold at 500 FCFA increased to 700 FCFA; and 100kgs of rice initially sold at 12.000 FCFA increased to 17.000 FCFA. Issa Saibou added that, the town of Kousserie became a centre for the commercialisation of stolen and trafficked objects from the Chadian capital (N'Djamena).⁴⁰

According to Saibou, an air conditioner could be cheaply afforded for 10.000 FCFA, a car for 30.000 FCFA, and a good quality radio that was formerly sold for 50.000 FCFA was then sold for 10.000 FCFA.⁴¹ Note has to be made here that even without refugees, Cameroon will never be free from the sale of stolen and trafficked property. Making a similar point, Erin maintains that: “[...] Americans are more likely to drown in a bathtub than be killed by a terrorist, and crime rates in cities that protect refugees are lower than in ones that don’t.”⁴² Despite the American case, refugees to an extent negatively affected business activities and the mentality of the youth, as they [the youth] were badly oriented to illegal businesses. The sudden increase in the prices of goods of basic needs like soap in the region was a blessing to the economic operators as they made heavy benefits from their sales and high turn-over was realised by traders in a short while. This should not in any sense be interpreted of any economic benefit as the economy suddenly became inflationary⁴³ and the purchasing power of Cameroonians in the region was negatively affected. However, in the minds of economic operators, such an inflationary economy was the best moment for them especially to those who had sizeable stock of goods to generate quick and hot cash from their buyers.

With the presence of huge refugee population in Cameroon, and in order to make them self-reliant and economically productive, it inadvertently imposed economic developmental projects on the refugee organs of the government. The economic implications of the presence of refugees on the economy of Cameroon were not only focused on rural areas as the urban sector was not left out. In terms of projects, urban refugees in Douala and Yaounde were covered by UNHCR/CRC Projects which funded

⁴⁰ Saibou, “L’impact Socio-économique...”, 1999, p.129.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p.131.

E. Rubin, “Statistics Show Syrian Refugees Help Host Country Economies”, available at <https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2017/05/12/statistics-show-syrian-refugees-help-host-country-economies/> 12th May 2017, reached 5th May 2018 at 4:15pm., https://search1.cnet.com/int/content/tech+industry/syrian-refugee-sues-facebook-to-stop-fake-news@DJQdl88bRlqpHNNp?gclid=Cj0KCQjwrLXXBRCXARIsAlttmRP7jaVtJcHw11TsAm5MrhBZkkcrYQcUbX7jicWYRopYZEa-.3aiWkrYaAskiEALw_wcB&each=AdNetA_CNET_38&ssid=ah7860038&q=refugee%20benefits&pid=839438341269157912&ssq=1, reached on the 5th May 2018 at 10 :49 Am.

⁴³ UNHCR Standing Committee, “Social and Economic Impact of Large Refugee Populations on Host Developing Countries”, 6th January 1997, p.3.available at <http://www.unhcr.org/excom/standcom/3ae68d0e10/social-economic-impact-large-refugee-populations-host-developing-countries.html>, accessed on the 5th May 2018 at 1:00pm.

social and economic demands of refugees. Although these projects were fully sponsored by the UNHCR, they still negatively affected the economy of Cameroon. For instance, the projects sponsored refugees interested in self-reliant activities, and professional trainings like: tailoring, mechanics, carpentry, driving, and computing. It is worthy of note that the refugees flooded these training sectors leading to increase in the cost of training since the burden of training was covered by the UNHCR and not by the refugees themselves.

Such an increase in the cost of training made it very difficult for an average Cameroonian to obtain similar training since the professionals preferred refugees whose cost of training was rapidly covered by the UNHCR/CRC Project and at reasonable amounts. This was so because the ordinary natives could not meet the heavy charges levied by the trainers on the refugees.⁴⁴ This adjustment in the training centres was also visible in the commercial sector for refugees involved in trade. In an oral question and answer with Cameroonian female traders, they complained that their income from the sales of groundnuts had dropped tremendously do to the invasion of the sector by the refugee women from Chad and CAR.

In a similar vein, the UNHCR/CRC Project also offered scholarships covering transportation, housing, books, and fees to refugee students in Cameroon. It is quite true to say here that the scholarships were sponsored by the UNHCR but it has to be underscored that this negatively affected Cameroon government. This is so because up to the early 1990s, the only financial obligation to enter the state universities in Cameroon was to pay a registration levy of 3000 FCFA per student. The registration fee as it was called was subsidised by Cameroon government and students even received a monthly allowance of up to 45.000 FCFA.⁴⁵ All the refugee students in the University of Yaounde at the time were treated in discriminated of Cameroonians. This implies that both the refugees and Cameroonians students enjoyed equal benefits of free education, free hostel, free food, and free study allowance. Such an unequal treatment of students cannot be underestimated as it drained a reasonable amount from the state resources. The money was spent in the form of increased subventions, allowances, housing, and feeding in the University of Yaounde.

In a related manner, the UNHCR in collaboration with Cameroon government improvised a secondary and high school in the Langui neighbourhood in Garoua in order to absorb the refugee students in the area. It may be argued that the schools came in to serve Cameroonians who lacked institutions in the area and as most of them prior to the presence of refugees used to cover lengthy distances on foot before they could reach their schools. Nevertheless, with the creation of the schools, the government of Cameroon recorded some financial drawbacks because it was not programmed in the national budget. Though the UNHCR provided largely for the required funds in the construction of the schools, the project seriously affected the state resources. This is so

⁴³Information gathered from tailors in the Briqueterie neighbourhood in Yaounde who sought for anonymity.

⁴⁴Interview with Atangana Jean Claude, aged 55, Teacher, CRC headquarters (Yaounde), 23rd August 2009.

because the state provided the land for the construction of the schools. In order to do this, Cameroonians in the area lost their farmlands which were their sources of income and were consequently motivated financially before their displacement in which the state contributed as well.⁴⁶

In the Eastern Region, the natives lost their arable lands because land was used for the erection of schools and medical centres. The government in this direction also contributed financially to the projects, a contribution which was not previewed in the national budget. The implications of this contribution on the national budget could not be underestimated. Although, a wide majority of the population considered the invasion of refugees in the areas as a blessing to them⁴⁷, it brought a lot of pressure on state funds. This was because the presence of refugees was accompanied by schools, health services and the provision of jobs.

All these transformed the purchasing power of the natives very positively, but its effects on the government of Cameroon were negative to some minimal extent.⁴⁸ Mathematically, for the period from 1982 to 2010, Cameroon received 1,374.880 refugees. Assuming that one refugees came into Cameroon with 500 FRS, that means: $500 \times 1,374.880 = 687.440.000$ frs liquid cash was injected into Cameroon's economy. In addition, if the UNHCR spent 500 FRS per refugee a day, this implies: $500 \text{ FRS} \times 1,374.880 = 687.440.000$ frs. Therefore, the total amount of money pumped into Cameroon's economy by the UNHCR and refugees will amount to $687.440.000 \times 2 = 1.374.880.000$ frs. So, if UNHCR amount per day was fixed, the intangible wealth brought in by refugees was inelastic. No one can therefore state with precision the amount of money and wealth generated by refugees in Cameroon for within the period of study. Refugees were truly an overwhelming blessing to Cameroon's economy. What follows are efforts to explain this blessing considering specific sectors of Cameroon's economy.

The Creation of Jobs

The presence of huge refugees in Cameroon did not only provide a larger market but readily available cheap labour force and jobs benefitting Cameroonians. This is so because some of the skilled refugees offered their human knowhow and services at giveaway compensation to Cameroonian employers just to survive. According to Michael:

In the United States, the average refugee becomes a net contributor to public coffers eight years after arrival.[...] That study found refugees actually pay back more in taxes than what they receive in benefits - about \$21,000 more in the first 20 years in the United States.[...] not

⁴⁶ Interview with Aminah (female), aged 55, Seamstress, Langui, 13th January 2011.

⁴⁷ Interview with Mbatoa Emmanul (Native), aged 35, Garga Sarali, 6th November 2012.

⁴⁸ Interview with Yaouba Martins (native), aged 38, HCR/Federation of the Red Cross auxiliary, Garga Sarali, 6th November 2012., Interview with Goma Samuel (native), aged 38, CRC relay personnel, Garga Sarali, 6th November 2012.

only do refugees work as employees, but many open their own businesses and become employers, expanding their positive impact on the economy by creating jobs. In Turkey, one recent study found Syrian refugees have invested almost \$334 million into the Turkish economy, with more than 10,000 Syrian-owned businesses employing an average of 9.4 workers.⁴⁹

The above examples are typical of the Cameroon situation as other also affirm that: “in 2014, the average refugee had paid \$21,000 more in taxes than they had received in benefits from government assistance.”⁵⁰. In addition, the other refugees who lacked economic potentials, especially those not covered by the UNHCR, engaged in cheap activities that earned them the cash to cater for their families. For refugees covered by the UNHCR, projects were set aside to provide better conditions for the refugees, and this benefitted Cameroonians who were contracted to execute the projects. For example, the presence of Equatorial Guinean refugees in Ambam and Olamze provided Cameroonian technicians with job opportunities as they were contracted to construct the camps in which the refugees occupied. Similarly, Chadian refugees in Maltam, Koussrie, Tapare, Poli Faro, and Langui camps also provided numerous jobs to Cameroonians even if the jobs were temporal.⁵¹ With the availability of a huge skilled and unskilled refugee population, the contractors, most often Cameroonians, won contracts that were easily realised with the available cheap labour force provided by refugees. Obviously, Cameroonian contractors earned much money comparatively if they had to make use of domestic workers; this is thanks to the cheap labour force provided by refugees.⁵²

In addition, the transfer of Chadian refugees from Kousserie to the banks of the Poli Faro River provided the refugees with enough arable land. The refugees further benefitted from farm tools and seedlings from the UNHCR and the société de développement de coton (SODECOTTON). This introduced the refugees to new farming techniques of growing cotton to the extent that they increased the revenue of SODECOTTON to 100.000.000 FCFA in 1986, 160.000.000 in 1987, and 1.000.000.000 in 1988.⁵³ It is very imperative to recall here that the revenue of SODECOTTON grew steadily because of the huge cheap labour force that led to a drop in the prices of cotton supplied by the locals due to a large output generated by the refugee cheap labour force.

⁴⁸C. Michael, “The Real Economic Cost of Accepting Refugees”, 14th September 2017,p.2., available at <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/real-economic-cost-accepting-refugees> accessed on the 4th May 2018 at 08:46 am.

⁴⁹ <https://www.refugee-economies.org/>.
<https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economicrefugee.asp> 5-05-18 accessed on the 4th May 2018 at 9:50 am.

⁵⁰ Group discussion with five CRC personnel (Malolo Priso, Younoussa Bouba, Mandara Adamou, Njikam Ousmanou and Melingue Justine) in Nkolere (Garoua), 7th January 2011.

⁵² Interview with DjinueMagloire, aged 68, CRC worker, Nkolere (Garoua), 13th January 2011.

⁵³ Kabawwu, “The Refugee Problem...” 1998, p. 23.

Apart from the above advantages, the negative effects of refugees on the economy of Cameroon could also be analysed from the point of the creation and provision of job opportunities. It is of interest to recall that in any market economy where supply is more than demand; there is always a drop in the prices of goods and services. In the wake of a mass flow of refugees in the country, most Cameroonian stakeholders preferred creating and providing jobs but to the unskilled/skilled refugees than to the ordinary Cameroonians because of cheap labour. Most of the refugees needed shelter and food for their survival and thus accepted jobs for little or no pay as long as this could permit them have a place to rest and food to feed their families.⁵⁴ They rendered cheap services as night and day guards, housemaids, beer parlour attendants, and as cleaners. In relation to this, Elmer maintained that he paid for the services of a day and a night guard of Chadian origin in Garoua for 10.000 FCFA monthly.⁵⁵

The Commercial Sector

The income earned by the refugee population also trickled down to the local population thus positively transforming the economy of the localities occupied by refugees in Cameroon. For example, before the outbreak of the crisis in Chad, Kousserie was more of a rural area, but the influx of the Chadian refugee population in the area brought in wealth that developed and enlarged the town with the effect that it became more of an urban settlement. The presence of the refugees in Cameroon improved on the commercial ventures in the country. For example, in Maroua and Garoua, Chadian refugees got involved in the transportation of rice and millet, and sold perfumes and groundnuts.⁵⁶

These commercial undertakings were not only limited to the rural areas. This is so because they were also observed in the urban environs like Douala and Yaounde especially as the UNHCR provided capital for the urban refugees who were interested in commercial accomplishments. With these resources, the refugees somehow boosted the commercial sector in these towns as there was an explosion of bars, shops, restaurants, cold stores, tailoring workshops, poultry farming, and road-side vendors. A DRC refugee vendor in Bali (Douala) maintained that his cosmetic business was growing daily thanks to the financial assistance he benefited from the UNHCR/CRC Project for urban refugees. He added that a very large majority of refugees from varying nationalities were involved in commercial activities in the same town.⁵⁷

What was introduced as the UNHCR/CRC Project for urban refugees in Cameroon since 1998 to July 2011, greatly improved the economic welfare of the country especially in Douala and Yaounde. For example, the micro project funds disseminated

⁵⁴ Interview with WakaTali, aged 35, pharmacist, Langui, 12th January 2011.

⁵⁵ Interview with Yang Elmer Baweh, aged 37, taxation agent, Yaounde, 15th September 2010.

⁵⁶ Interview with Adamou (male) aged 40, WATSAN field supervisor, Langui, 10th January 2011., Interview with Ahmadou (male), aged 75, farmer, Langui, 12th January 2011.

⁵⁷ Interview with Makiadi, Albert Mbofor, aged 43, CAR refugee, Douala, 14th November 2012

by the project to the urban refugees in Yaounde and Douala stood at 4.059.390 million FCFA in 1998/1999, and 11,073.000 million FCFA in 2000/2001.⁵⁸ This shows that between 1998 and 2001, the UNHCR injected a sum of 15.132.390 million FCFA into refugee's business activities in Cameroon and this obviously increased the amount of money in circulation to the benefit of Cameroon. Pat maintains that: "Refugees' purchases benefit local and national economies of host country, cash aid has greater economic impact than in-kind food aid economic benefits exceed amount of donated aid"⁵⁹. The positive contribution of this amount of money in the economy of the country cannot be underestimated. The economic activities created by the refugees absorbed a good number of jobless Cameroonians like in the beer brewing and beer parlours opened by refugees. Also, goods were supplied or brought closer to the door steps of Cameroonians and at cheaper and affordable prices, by the large number of refugees. Besides, the economic activities created by the refugees contributed to the revenue of the councils through taxes levied within their jurisdiction especially in Yaounde and Douala.⁶⁰

Besides, individuals like Amadou (a Chadian refugee) in Langui benefited 50.000F CFA as microfinance from the UNHCR for transforming maize and after a year saved 170.000 FCFA. This made it possible for her to rear goats in addition to her maize transformation.⁶¹ This assistance should be appraised from a very positive dimension because the quantity of food produced by the refugees boosted the supply of food to Cameroonian consumers at a reduced and affordable price. In spite of the numerous advantages, the presence of a huge refugee population to a certain extent equally affected the country negatively.

It should be remembered that the invasion of the market sector by the refugees was equally witnessed in Mokolo market in Yaounde. According to Patrick and Nassourou, the sale of perfumes used to fetch them a lot of money and they could make as much as 20.000 FCFA a day. They however regretted that with the invasion of this market sector mostly by CAR, Nigerian, and Chadian refugees, the prices of their products dropped drastically with the result that they hardly realised up to 5.000 FCFA daily from the business again.⁶²

This is similar to the charcoal business in Langui where Chadian refugees were noted to have destroyed trees meant for environmental protection in order to make cash from the sales. This increased supply while demand remained constant and resulted in the

⁵⁷ Interview with Mbatoua Emmanul (Native), aged 35, Garga Sarali, 6th November 2012. UNHCR, "Operation of Assistance...", 2012, p.16

⁵⁸ A. D., Etoga, "Le Cameroun et le Haut-commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) de 1978 à Nos Jours", Mémoire de Maitrise en histoire, Université de Yaoundé I, 2003, pp.54-55.

⁵⁹ P. Bailey, "Refugees Can Offer Economic Boost to Their Host Countries", in *Society, Arts & Culture*, 20th June 2016, at <https://www.ucdavis.edu/news/refugees-can-offer-economic-boost-their-host-countries/> downloaded on the 5th May 2018, at 3:00pm

⁶⁰ Patrick is involved in the sale of second-handed cloths and Nassourou in perfumes. The informants refused to completely reveal any further information about them.

drop in the price of charcoal. This means that the income of the local population in the sector was badly affected. In the Eastern Region, CAR refugees invaded with huge herds which largely increased the number of cattle in the area.⁶³ Similarly in the North West Region and Adamaoua in 2003, about 20.000 Nigerian refugees fleeing the Mambila-Taraba ethnic violence in Nigeria flooded the cattle market with approximately 40.000 cattle.⁶⁴ The implication of this was that the quantity of beef supplied for sale in the regions rose thus; lowering the prices and earnings from the trade. This had a double-edged implication as the native dealers in this trade witnessed a drop in their earnings while the local consumers were contented because of the drop in the price of beef in the regions.

Besides, refugees in Cameroon equally invaded the commercial sex industry leading to a drop in the demand and in the income of the Cameroonian sex workers. Before the coming of the refugees, Cameroonian whores were very proud and demanded high charges, but the few refugees in this domain accepted payments cheaper than what Cameroonian sluts requested. The effect was that some customers preferred refugees who were easily affordable and cheaper compared to the proud and expensive Cameroonian whores. In an open conversation with refugee girls in Yaounde and Douala, they freely confessed that the easiest way for them to make money in these two towns was to compete with the Cameroonian girls in the commercial sex industry.⁶⁵

The argument advanced for joining this business was that upon their coming to Cameroon, they had to undergo a very complicated process of determination lasting sometime over a year or two. Since the process was too long, the outcome was unpredictable and because they had no source of income or people to rely on for lodging and feeding, they had no choice in offering their bodies in exchange for money just to survive. This situation was made worse by the fact that in the process of determination of the refugee status, they did not receive assistance of any form from the UNHCR. This was confirmed by Mbaitom Françoise, a CAR refugee, who alleged to have been awaiting her refugee status determination since 2010 and as such lived without assistance from the UNHCR except during an illness.⁶⁶ On her part, she was surviving from the sale of groundnuts.

Agriculture

Cameroon's food production was equally affected positively by the presence of the refugees. The UNHCR distributed food to the 26.000 of the over 85.000 CAR refugees in Adamaoua and in the East, on a regular bases. The advantage was that some Cameroonians around the refugee communities were also offered food by the UNHCR

⁶² Interview with Hamadou Dajo, aged 39, CAR refugee representative, Garga Sarali 7th November 2012.

⁶⁴ <http://www.unhcr.org/46fbc924.html>, downloaded on the 30th December, 2010 at 2:00pm.

⁶⁵ Group discussion With refugee girls in Yaounde, (CRC Headquarters) 12th September 2010 and Douala (UNHCR Headquarters), 15th November 2012.

⁶⁶ Interview with Mbaitom Françoise, aged 36, CAR refugee, HCR field office Bali (Douala), 15th November 2012., Interview with Mbaindinkang Matcheu, aged 20, CAR refugee, HCR field office Bali (Douala), 15th November 2012.

and its partners.⁶⁷ Despite the UNHCR's attempt to secure food for the refugees in the rural areas, it was not still enough due to the large size of the refugee population. Most of the CAR and Nigerian refugees in the East, Adamaoua, and the North West Regions, were herdsmen and were therefore not interested in farm work or even lived in camps and settlements.⁶⁸ The UNHCR did not refuse to shelter these refugees in the camps and settlements. One of the reasons that explain why they were not living in camps and settlements was that about 95 per cent of them were herdsmen. For this reason, they were highly mobile in search of pastures. This was the case with about 20,000 Nigerians with over 40,000 cattle in the North West and Adamaoua Regions of Cameroon.⁶⁹

The refugees' unwillingness to involve in agriculture largely generated food insecurity leading to malnutrition amongst them. According to UNICEF in 2010, malnutrition survey revealed 11.6 per cent prevalence in Cameroon's Eastern Region and a high mortality of children below 5 years.⁷⁰ To eradicate this malaise, the UNHCR encouraged agriculture and not the distribution of food to the refugees. The UNHCR distributed 80 per cent of farming seeds and tools to the refugee population and 20 per cent to the natives. Equally, Cameroon government distributed cassava tubers and provided training on the cultivation of maize, cassava, and market gardening. The reason for this method was to increase the number of refugees practicing agriculture so that they could grow adequate foodstuff in the country. Following the encouragement of the UNHCR and its partners, 6,000 refugees were involved in agriculture in 2011.⁷¹ In addition, the Spanish and Cameroonian Red Crosses in collaboration with the UNHCR distributed farming inputs and technical assistance in over 12 settlements in the East and Adamaoua.⁷² In a similar programme, International Relief and Development also distributed maize seeds, machetes, and hoes to 3,000 refugees/nationals and 49,000 cassava cuttings were planted in a 30 hectares farm in the East and Adamaoua.⁷³

The involvement of refugees in the agricultural sector positively affected Cameroon despite the negative impacts. In a conversation with Ngum John, he regretted that the invasion of refugees in the harvesting and gathering of palmnuts largely contributed to the drop in the price of a bunch of palmtree from the former 40 FCFA each to 25 FCFA.⁷⁴ Though the drop in these prices benefitted the few employers as they realised more dividends, a very narrow section of Cameroonians in these areas were negatively affected as some suffered a slash in wages due to the inundation of the sector by refugees.

⁶⁷ Interview with Ismael (male), aged 60, notable, Langui, 11th January 2011.

⁶⁸ Interview with Hadhijo Ibrahim, aged 45, CAR refugee, Garga Sarali (Bertoua), 6th November 2012.

⁶⁹ <http://www.unhcr.org/46fbc924.html>, downloaded on the 30th December, 2010 at 2:00pm.

⁷⁰ UNHCR, "Operation of Assistance...", 2012, p.14.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.15.

⁷² <http://www.unhcr.org/4b1cbb9.html>, accessed on the 4th December 2011 at 3pm.

⁷³ CRC, "Annual Statistics of the HCR/CRC Project for rural refugees", Yaounde, UNHCR, January 2011, p.11.

⁷⁴ Interview with Ngum John, aged 40, palm-nuts harvester, Disangue, 16th July 2011.

Far and wide, another economic consequence of the refugees on the government of Cameroon resulted from the joint management of projects. For example, project N^o 78/EP/CMR/EM/1 over Equatorial Guineans in 1978 and that of 1982, which had to do with the transfer of Chadian refugees from Kousserie to the banks of the Poli Faro River, negatively weighed on the resources of the state of Cameroon. The government was involved in the transportation of the refugees and the drainage of the marshy banks of the Faro River. Again, the government provided over 2.000 acres of land for the refugees to cultivate cotton, and about 1.000 acres for the growth of food crops.⁷⁵ The effects of these projects resulted to the waste of resources of the government of Cameroon because many natives lost their grazing and arable lands, which were their main sources of income, to refugees. Consequently, there was a drop in the standards of living of the concerned Cameroonians, and a slowdown in the economic activities due to the limited cash to be spent or in circulation among nationals.

Conclusion

After a critical analysis of the influence of a very huge refugee population in Cameroon, capital transfer, employment opportunities, commerce, and the agricultural industry in the country from 1982 to 2017, our results reveal that refugees positively contributed far and large to the growth of Cameroon's economy. On the other hand, although on a comparative analysis refugees were by far largely a blessing than a curse to Cameroon's economy, they also constituted to a limited extent some negative consequences such as pressure on the state to construct schools and hospitals not previewed in the national budget. By implication, the presence of refugees in some areas in Cameroon rather awakened the government to realise that such facilities were lacking or even absent. Based on this premise, Cameroonians should rather wish to have refugees all over the country so that in an attempt to fully respect and apply its commitment with the UNHCR, development will trickle to every part of the country. Based on the above findings, this study recommend that:

- The AU should create an African refugee body.
- African countries should pull funds to cater for their refugees since some of the refugees defined by the AU are not considered by the UNHCR.
- The AU requires a common constitution and a standing army for intervention during emergencies.
- There is a need to create a forum for academics to rethink AU refugee policies and to form a true United States of Africa to mitigate the rampant violence on the continent.

In spite all that has been revealed from the results of our findings, our study by far remains subjective and open to criticisms. This stance is based on the presumption that: the case of Cameroon is not universal, the refugees may not have the same potentials, their human resources may not be adequately exploited by the recipient

⁷⁵CRC, "Annual Statistics of...", p.132.

country and may differ depending on the composition of the refugees and the recipient economy. Therefore, we hereby submit that the admission of refugees should not only be perceived as an obligation, human rights to shelter but far beyond a heavenly responsibility must of necessity by every country. If there is any county under the sun which considers refugees as a problem rather than a solution to its economy, then that country certainly is unable to tap its very own potentials and should favourably redesign its refugee policies.



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1	Achirimbi Peter Ngwa	50	Driver	Kouba,	4 th November 2012
2	Adamou (male)	40	WATSAN supervisor	Langui,	10 th January 2011
3	Adamou Ibrahim	47	Farmer	Langui	11 th January 2011
4	Ahmadou (male)	75	Farmer	Langui	12 th January 2011
5	Ahmadou Daihrou	55	Farmer	Langui	11 th January 2011
6	Aminah (female)	55	Seamstress	Langui	13 th January 2011
7	Atangana Jean Claude	55	Teacher	Yaounde	23 rd August 2009
8	DjinueMagloire	68	CRC worker	Garoua	13 th January 2011
9	Goma Samuel (native)	38	CRC worker	Garga Sarali	6 th November 2012
10	Hadhijo Ibrahim	45	CAR refugee	Garga Sarali	6 th November 2012
11	Hamadou Dajo	39	CAR refugee	Garga Sarali	7 th November 2012
12	Ismael (male)	60	Notable	Langui	11 th January 2011
13	Makiadi Albert Mbofor	43	CAR refugee	Douala	14 th November 2012
14	Malolo Priso	38	Logistics staff	Garoua	10 th January 2011
15	Mbaindinkang Matcheu	20	CAR refugee	Douala	15 th November 2012
16	Mbaitom Françoise	36	CAR refugee	Douala	15 th November 2012
17	Mbatoa Emmanul	35	Notable	Garga Sarali	6 th November 2012
18	Melingui Justine	33	Health worker	Langui	11 th January 2011
19	Monni Cathie Danielle	47	HCR worker	Bertoua	3 rd November 2012
20	Ndoman Alexis Avom	42	Relief personnel	Langui	13 th January 2011
21	Ngum John	40	Palm-nuts harvester	Disangue	16 th July 2011
22	Nouhou Zedou	28	Trader	Bertoua	6 November 2012
23	Waka Tali	35	Pharmacist	Langui	12 th January 2011
24	Yang Elmer Baweh	37	Taxation agent	Yaounde	15 th September 2010
25	Yaouba Martins	38	CRC worker	Garga Sarali	6 th November 2012
26	Younoussa Bouba	30	Relief worker	Langui	12 th May 2011

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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

The Burden of Nature: Oil, Profit and the Displacement of Indigenous Peoples in the Third World

Olawari D.J Egbe

The turtle is a great healer and teacher on our spiritual journey. Its pace reminds us to slow down and pay more attention as we interact with the world. The turtle shows us everything we need is always within us. The spiritual journey results when our inner life connects with our outer surroundings. Our goal is to find the balance and live with the tension between social turbulence (the red rocks) and serenity (the open sky)

- Joe Geshick (LaDuke, 1999, p. iv).

Introduction

Why is humanity so much in a hurry not to learn from the turtle, as Joe Geshick opines above? Why would natural resources constitute a curse to the people so endowed? Was it an error or deliberate design of nature that indigenous peoples are the inhabitants of resource-rich lands in hemispheres North and South (Lenox, 2012)? The enormity of this paradox is that, matters of indigenous peoples, are no longer the concern of peculiar nation-states alone, but are now matters of high international politics, engaging the attention of global organisations, human rights groups, and intergovernmental organisations such as the United Nations, the African Union, etc (Venkateswar & Hughes, 2011; Hall, 2013).

A recent concern that has attracted global attention is that a spectre is conquering minorities and indigenous peoples globally. This is the spectre of peace-time wars initiated and perpetrated by global capital personified and executed by Transnational Corporations (TNCs) (Gilpin, 1971; Kovel, 2002; Moore, 2015; Patel & Moore, 2017) and the nation-state in collaboration. The TNCs, like an octopus, has spread its tentacles to acquire indigenous peoples' territories usually pristine forests rich in oil and gas, mining and arable lands (Gilpin, 1987; Spero & Hart, 2009) by any means possible including legal means but not excluding brute force, violence, repression, and suppression (Bodley, 2008).

A major fallout of this scenario is that indigenous peoples, all over the world, are threatened by these heinous acts. Some either willingly relocate for development projects such as industrialisation, agribusiness, oil and gas, etc, with presumed overall benefits to all (Basu, 2007), or choose to remain for lack of alternative. When they

remain, they risk the health hazards associated with such projects (Fleischman & Franklin, 2017).

Therefore, while industrialisation brings about presumed progress to modern civilisation through the TNCs, indigenous peoples and their environment where civilisation's much needed resources are extracted are made to suffer untold consequences; plights for which Bodley (2008) described indigenous peoples as 'victims of progress' and Marx (1960, p.529) described the process as "capitalism's destructive progress". Regarding this onslaught on indigenous peoples Victoria Tauli-Corpus (an indigenous Filipino and chair of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) lamented that,

An aggressive drive is taking place to extract the last remaining resources from indigenous territories...There is a crisis of human rights. There are more and more arrests, killings and abuses. This is happening in Russia, Canada, the Philippines, Cambodia, Mongolia, Nigeria, the Amazon, all over Latin America, Papua New Guinea and Africa. It is global. We are seeing a human rights emergency. A battle is taking place for natural resources everywhere...Much of the world's natural capital-oil, gas, timber, minerals-lies on or beneath lands occupied by indigenous people (Mowforth, 2014, p.12).

Thus, instead of pleasuring in nature privileged resource abundance, indigenous peoples are made to suffer untold misfortunes. Globally, while the displacement of minorities and indigenous peoples resulting from TNCs' expansion is commonplace; the presumed benefits of TNCs' projects are not only unevenly distributed but also the side effects from such projects are borne by indigenous peoples in greater degrees, proportions or percentages. For example, the plight of peasant farmers in the Gambella Region of Ethiopia remains deplorable following Ethiopia's villagisation¹ programme (HRW, 2012a & 2012b). The Gambella region is reputed for its rich arable land. However, the indigenous peoples were compelled to move outside their ancestral lands to enable the Ethiopian Government undertake merchandised agriculture; a venture for which Human Rights Watch described the Gambella region as simply 'Waiting Here For Death'. Thus, while the ceaseless jamborees and fanfares from the TNCs and the nation-state in reaping maximum gains in profits continue unabated, indigenous peoples suffer unbearable pains from such projects.

This TNC/Nation-state alliance is not without resistance from indigenous peoples. There are recorded cases of resistance by the Myans in Mexico, the Chilkat in Alaska, the U'wa in Colombia, the Ogoni and Ijaw in Nigeria's Niger Delta, etc (Gedicks, 1993, 2001; Peluso, 1992; Frynas, 2000). In all of these resistance cases, there were profit-induced collaborations between global capital (through TNCs) and the governments of resource-rich nation-states in either applying physical force or palliatives like giving out a paltry, insignificant, despicable and often contemptible monetary compensations

or inducements to break-up the ranks of indigenous peoples' opposition to resource exploitation (Hand, 2005; Foster, 2012).

This scenario raises the obvious question: why will the nation-state undertake a policy that will in the long term, result in incur incalculable costs? The answer is usually that the nation-state has no option since it is already incorporated into the yoke of development dictated by globalisation and executed by TNCs (Scholte, 1997; Weiss, 1997, 2000; Ughi, 2012). The nation-state is further incorporated into global capital by transferring the resources of indigenous peoples to TNCs and in the process get highly militarised to arm itself for global commerce against indigenous peoples and their environments (Shiva, 2001). Thus, whereas the nation-state is a willing victim in globalisation's yoke, indigenous peoples by being members of the nation-state are subjugated to a global system that "has put profit above life, commerce above justice, ethics and ecology...denying food to the hungry and feeding the markets...denying medicine to the ill so that the global pharmaceutical industry can make profit...", (Shiva, 2001, p.15).

This paper proceeds as follows: The section after this introduction focuses on the theoretical framework and extant literature. The third section assesses the burden of nature: how nature's bounties are so plundered by global capital to the extent that these bounties become a burden on the aborigines of such lands. Section four concludes the paper.

Theoretical Framework and Extant Literature

The Victims of Progress Theory

Discourse on indigenous peoples is inundated with theories, hypotheses, postulations, theoretical frameworks, etc, of equal importance. This paper relies on the '*Victims of Progress Theory*'. The 'Victims of Progress' theory, with John H. Bodley (2008) as its key proponent, asserts that while civilisation, industrialisation, technology, and globalisation have brought development to both hemispheres, North and South, indigenous peoples fondly called the 'Fourth World', have been made to suffer untold consequences. For this reason, Bodley (2008) referred to them as 'victims of progress'. The ugly consequences, according to Bodley (2008, p.15) are that,

Indigenous peoples and their cultural patterns are being drastically impacted as the scale of global society and market economy continues to expand. For many years most people did not realise that increasing the scale of societies, markets and economies could actually reduce human well-being by negatively transforming the socio-cultural systems and ecosystems that support people. Indigenous peoples were the first to be negatively impacted by a global growth process...

Bodley (2008) further asserts that global capital and governments often argue that indigenous peoples have not chosen the path of progress to benefit from progress

(technology, modernity, goods, etc) derivable from global capital. This is why progress is being pushed upon indigenous peoples. Sadly, it is realised that the real reason for pushing progress on indigenous peoples was and remains to exploit and destroy their resources; a process Marx (1960, pp.529-530) called “destructive progress”. Bodley (2008, p.167) further indicates that “the price of forcing progress on unwilling recipients has involved the deaths of millions of tribal people, as well as their loss of land, political sovereignty, and the right to follow their own life style”.

The ‘Victims of Progress’ theory, therefore, holds that the much cherished progress of the global North rather destroys indigenous peoples, their cultures, and their environment. It also has the potential of becoming the victim of its own progress unless by means of “safeguarding the rights of indigenous peoples to maintain their independent existence and manage their own natural resources...which represents genuine ‘progress’ that in the long run will benefit the entire international community” (Garcia-Contreras, 1997, p.188). Thus, for the entire international community to benefit from the progress advanced by the global North, indigenous people who are knowledgeable and in perfect harmony with nature should be seen as co-partners in the attempt to explore or benefit from nature.

Explaining Indigenous Peoples, Indigeneity and their Characteristics

Reference to indigenous peoples is always in the plural because diverse groups spreading across the entire globe constitute indigenous peoples (Hughes, 2003). Arising from the global spread in indigenous peoples, and governments’ legal manipulative devices to divide or decimate the ranks of indigenous peoples and their struggles for self-identity and self-determination (Bodley, 2008), there is a global consensus that a universal definition may be undesirable. Instead, there are emphasise on the peculiarities of indigenous peoples in a given country or context (ACHPR & IWGIA, 2010; Feiring, 2013).

Not oblivious of this fact, this paper still makes a survey of scholarly definitions of indigenous peoples. A burgeoning literature exists on indigenous peoples and it is vast in descriptions of indigenous peoples (Popova-Gosert, 2009). However, central to a discourse on indigenous peoples, also referred to as the ‘Forth World²’, is the recognition of their distinctiveness in economic, political, cultural and social characteristics vis-à-vis their dominant neighbours (Ohenjo, et al, 2006; Gausset, Kenrick & Gibb, 2011).

Available scholarly writings indicate that there are over 7,000 indigenous societies globally (Hughes, 2003). Characteristically, they are distinguished by their unique traditions in cultural, social, economic and political tenets that separate them from their dominant neighbours wherever they live (Meyer & Alvarado, 2010). According to Hughes (2003, p.13) “indigenous peoples are the disadvantaged descendants of those peoples that inhabited a territory prior to the formation of a state”. For Kuhnlein and Receveur (1996, p.418) “indigenous people” refers to a cultural group in a particular

ecologic area that developed a successful subsistence base from the natural resources available.

The plural form, 'indigenous peoples', refers to several cultural groups. Anaya (2004, p.3) erstwhile UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, asserts that indigenous peoples are "living descendants of pre-invasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others. They are culturally distinct groups that find themselves engulfed by other settler societies born of forces of empire and conquest". Elsewhere Anaya (1998, p.96) describes indigenous peoples as "the culturally distinctive and more or less cohesive groups whose ancestors were the original inhabitants of lands now dominated by others". In avoidance of specifics, Bodley (2008, p.186) asserts that indigenous peoples are "whoever they say they are". This description implies that only indigenous peoples that can define themselves. It is in such premises that the Awa in Columbia asserts that,

we base our existence, origin, identity, knowledge, and autonomy on the forest where we have been able to structure our way of life according to the natural environment, building cultural practices transmitted from generation to generation, consolidating the particulars of our culture, based on our Ancestral Territory, and continually fighting to consolidate a strong people with cultural identity in support of autonomy (Bodley, 2008, p.186).

Despite the insistences indigenous peoples defining themselves, international organisations, however, have adopted formal definitions. For example, the ILO Convention No. 169 article 1.1 (b) (2000), describes indigenous peoples as,

...peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.

Jose Martinez Cobo's *'Study on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations'* to traverse the politics of indigeneity provided the following definition which is adopted in this paper as the working definition of indigenous peoples. According to him,

Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and

their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems (Davis, 2016, pp.27-28).

However, any discourse on definition of indigenous peoples' must put the following into consideration:

- a) "priority in time, with respect to the occupation and use of a specific territory;
- b) the voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness, which may include the aspects of language, social organization, religion and spiritual values, modes of production, laws and institutions;
- c) self-identification, as well as recognition by other groups, or by State authorities, as a distinct collectivity; and
- d) an experience of subjugation, marginalization, dispossession, exclusion or discrimination, whether or not these conditions persist" (Bodley, 2008, p.188).

The enormity of these features is a pointer that providing a consensus definition of indigenous peoples is an uphill task (Coates, 2004).

Aside definitional sojourns, the element of indigeneity needs to be clarified. According to de la Cadena & Stern (2007, p.11) indigeneity is "a process; a series of encounters; a structure of power; a set of relationships; a matter of becoming, in short, and not a fixed state of being". For Buttler & Scott (1992, p.109) indigeneity is the "invocation of an identity for the purposes of political resistance to a hegemonic threat of erasure or marginalisation". Though so much scholarly disagreements exist, what separates indigenous peoples from majority tribes wherever they live is that "indigenous peoples are not only native to their countries, but are also there first and are still there and so have rights of prior occupancy to their lands" (May-Bury-Lewis, 2002, p.6). According to Fagbayibo (2009, p.3), what characterises distinguishes indigeneity include, among others: "cultural distinctiveness; the extent to which their culture and way of life are under threat; dependence on the immediate natural environment; a history of suffering from colonisation, discrimination, domination and exploitation; self-identification; and political and social marginalization".

Some other scholars identify an indigenous person as possessing the right to self-identification and self-determination as an individual, and accepted by the indigenous community as their member. They identify indigenous people as: having and exhibiting historical continuity with pre-colonial societies; having a language often different from the national languages; having unbreakable link to territories and the surrounding natural resources; and having culture, and beliefs. They live in geographically isolated regions that are difficult and inaccessible; they possess distinct social, economic or political systems, primarily subsistence production, and an unflinching commitment to maintain and reproduce their ancestral lands (Carpenter, & Wood, 1937; Venkateswar & Hughes, 2011). However, possessing the aforementioned unique features exposes indigenous people to a number of

vulnerabilities including lack of access to education, living on lands that are prone to natural disasters, and inadequate and poor access to healthcare. All of these vulnerabilities affect their productivity and incomes and above all infringe on their human rights (Ohenjo, et al, 2006).

The question of indigeneity has oftentimes been misconstrued in a number of ways. First, the argument that indigenous peoples clamour for special rights to be accorded them is interpreted as being selfish. Scholarship instead aver that indigenous people suffer certain unfair treatments on account of their peculiar culture, mode of production, and inferior demographic position vis-à-vis other groups in the state who do not suffer discrimination or marginalisation. Second, that giving special rights to indigenous peoples will lead to tribalism and ethnic conflict. This argument is not tenable as “there exists a rich variety of ethnic groups within basically all African states, and multiculturalism is a living reality. Giving recognition to all groups, respecting their differences and allowing them all to flourish in a truly democratic spirit does not lead to conflict, it prevents conflict” (IWGIA, 2006, p.24).

The totality of these characteristics of indigenous peoples point to the fact that the indigenous peoples’ common bond with the land is the basis of their indigeneity and that “indigenous peoples’ cultures cannot be preserved without a certain degree of control over land and natural resources” (Gocke, 2013, p.89). The bond in reference here is that indigeneity bestows on indigenous peoples the rare quality of living in harmony with nature. Little wonder, indigenous peoples define themselves within the context of a territory and a specific way of living in harmony with the environment (Carpenter & Wood, 1937; Shiva, 2005; Popolo, Ribotta, & Rodriguez, 2007).

Indigenous peoples are oftentimes treated with disdain, sustained attack by government and global capital. However, “while the particular histories of different indigenous peoples differ, they have in common a history of conquest by another group and subordination within their present states, even where they may not numerically be in a minority. Further, the tragedy of the treatment of indigenous peoples is not merely historical; it continues today” (Iorns, 1992, p.200).

The Burden of Nature: Resource Appropriation, Displacement and Resistance

The earth does not belong to man: man belongs to the earth. This we know: all things are connected. Whatever befalls the earth befalls the sons of the earth. Man did not weave the web of life. He is merely a strand in it. Whatever he does to the web, he does to himself.

-Chief Noah Sealath (in McKisson & MacRae-Campbell, 1990, p.2)

Loss is the word that succinctly describes the myriad of challenges faced by indigenous peoples globally (Hughes, 2003; Ulfstein, 2004). Among other challenges, land loss

is the most devastating, excruciating and alienating for without land what is the indigeneity in indigenous peoples? It is land that sustains, that gives indigenous peoples a reason for living, and it is an ancestral gift to be bequeathed to younger generations (Hughes, 2003; Popova-Gosart, 2010; Roudart & Mazoyer, 2016).

However, global capital and governments, in collaboration for want of resources and profit, alienates indigenous peoples of their only ancestral gift-land. Land alienation is the harbinger to other sundry challenges including resource depletion, loss of contact with ancestry, denial of freedom to practice their customs and to perform customary rites to commemorate a terminal or upcoming season (Beauclerk & Narby, 1988). This plight of indigenous peoples rather than being ameliorated is being made worse by government activities such that,

...the most critical government policies to affect self-sufficient tribal peoples were those relating to their possession of the land. Any modification of the traditional people-land relationship would undoubtedly have a major impact on all aspects of small-scale society. As soon as government control was firmly established and the administrative structures were in operation, officials turn their attention to the problem of defining tribal land rights in order to maximise economic productivity...the general effect of the land policies imposed by governments was reduction of the territory available to indigenous populations (Bodley, 2008, p.95).

What is obvious so far from the plight of indigenous peoples is that government interests and citizens' interests, especially indigenous peoples are parallel (Scott, 1977). This is because "human welfare and the environment have been increasingly left to the vagaries of market, with government playing almost second role in trying to ensure a basic level of welfare for their populations" (Jochnick, 1999, p.64). The remaining part of rest of this section highlights and discusses the gifts of nature that rather than constituting a blessing constituted a burden in compelling displacement of indigenous peoples.

a. Exploitation of Land and Displacement

Pristine forests used by indigenous peoples and hitherto inaccessible to government and global capital, suddenly became object of attention and extraction due to dwindling global reserves (Leech, 2006) and TNCs' global search for resources to meet ever-increasing avidity for resources to meet local consumption. National governments on their part see in global capital a worthy partner in resource extraction for purely profit or rentier reasons.

Indigenous peoples are at the receiving end of economic globalisation, for with the expansion in population, growth in technology, communication, trade and discovery of oil and gas in commercial quantity, the isolation of the most remote areas on planet earth has ended (Lile, 2006). With the discovery of valuable resources in indigenous

territories, lands in indigenous areas have remained threatened by agribusiness, oil and gas, timber logging, road and dams constructions, etc. Certainly, oftentimes, indigenous peoples are subjected to voluntary or involuntary displacement (Hoshour, 2012).

b. Conflict-induced Displacement

A number of unending conflicts in the past, especially during the Cold War in places like Angola, and Sudan had resource exploitation as the underlying causal factor. Oftentimes, a number of scenarios played out. First, resources avidly coveted for by TNCs are found in indigenous lands. To exploit these resources, indigenous peoples do resist the extraction on account of ancestral explanations, environmental degradation, health reasons, etc. The ensuing conflict of interests brings the government into the scene, to intervene by brute force to ensure indigenous peoples succumb. The entire Niger Delta resource and environment induced resistance is a case in point.

Second, states of the global North do support warring factions to secure valuable resources-oil, gas, and rare minerals such as uranium, diamond, gold, etc. For example, the Angolan conflict mainly between the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and the UNITA (National Union for Total Independence of Angola) factions with support from the erstwhile Soviet Union and the United States respectively was a case in point (Sotunmbi, 1981). The sluggishness with which the conflict in Sudan came to an end is further traceable to Cold War support for the resources in Sudan.

Worthy of mention is that most of these resources that are highly coveted for by governments and TNCs are domiciled in the territory or backyard of indigenous peoples; and most of the times, indigenous people suffer involuntary displacement to escape from the crises that usually ensue.

c. Eco-tourism-induced Displacement

Eco-tourism is defined as “purposeful travel to natural areas to understand the culture and natural history of the environment, taking care not to alter the integrity of the ecosystem in question, while producing economic opportunities that make the conservation of natural resources beneficial to local people” (Burns, 2007, p.83). Eco-tourism is undertaken by tourists seeking leisure, excitement, pleasure, and so on in pristine areas especially in indigenous lands (Butler & Hinch, 2007). The objects of tourist attraction such as game reserves attract foreign nationals to spend their leisure or vacation.

However, the “economic, technical and cultural marginalisation of tourism exposes cultural minorities to discontinuity, disturbance, divergence, even disintegration, and usually to a dangerous dependency” (Rossel, 1988, p.13). Eco-tourists, like former explorers, slave merchants, and even colonialists, while in search of pleasure

unconsciously trespass and contaminate indigenous peoples' sacred sites, unless where eco-tourists are conducted and guided by indigenous peoples (Zeppel, 2006). Conducting or guiding eco-tourist by indigenous peoples is usually rare since in most instances indigenous peoples are either not consulted or deliberately evicted to temporary camps to make way for the booming business (Hughes, 2003).

A major fallout of eco-tourism in Africa is that in most parts of Africa, governments suddenly decide to declare certain areas conservation areas, usually indigenous peoples' lands (Hughes, 2003). This trend is commonplace in East and Southern Africa. For example, Tanzania and Kenya are two countries with huge conservation areas specifically designed as eco-tourist areas that earn these countries enormous foreign exchange at the expense of indigenous peoples (Barume, 2010). Such huge foreign exchange earnings are not without dire consequences since,

...tourism in the impoverished world is a product of global economic inequality and often disproportionately favours a few special-interest groups...indigenous peoples are 'marginalised' by tourism, or made to feel like inferior outsiders, when they must interact with wealthy outsiders who flaunt their economic, technological, and cultural superiority. They also...have no direct control over the tourist trade, cannot set prices, and enjoy only a small proportion of the profit from tourism (Bodley, 2008, p.162).

Furthermore, indigenous peoples are subjected to varying discriminations where,

In extreme cases...tour organizers have set up artificial villages and relocated native groups for the convenience of tourists...More serious consequences of tourism have occurred when indigenous groups...have been removed from their own lands to allow tourists greater access to observe wildlife...Tourists are escorted about and insulated from unpleasant truths. Often they return home believing themselves to be 'experts' on the peoples they visited, but knowing little about the larger realities of land rights, discrimination, and economic exploitation (Bodley, 2008, p.162)

From environmental, economic and psychological perspectives, indigenous peoples do suffer other untold consequences where,

tourists may unwittingly degrade the environment, increase pressure on local resources, distort local value systems by the sudden injection of cash into the economy, and create internal inequalities and dependency...The critical element is that indigenous peoples must be allowed to control their own cultural and territorial resources (Bodley, 2008, p.163).

d. Law-induced Displacement

The law, as lady justice is presumed to symbolise, may not be blind after all to marginalised and exploited groups like indigenous peoples globally. In matters of economics, governments globally have deployed the law as an instrument for criminally dispossessing nature's gifts from indigenous peoples. What explains the extensive use of the law as an instrument of state nationalisation of land is that "lands used or occupied by communities are unoccupied, poorly developed, or vacant. These are generally lands belonging to communities whose use and occupation of lands are almost invisible" (Barume, 2010, p.65).

In Nigeria, there have been cases of deliberate expropriation of indigenous lands through a number of legal instruments. Among others, the 'Land Use Act' (29th March, 1978), the Petroleum Act (1969), the Petroleum Profits Act (1959), the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Act (1990, 1993), Oil Pipelines Act (1978), and the Oil in Navigable Waters Act (1979) readily comes to mind (Olisa, 1987; Omorogbe, 2001; Ojo & Gaskiya, 2003; Atsegbua, Akpotaire & Dimowo, 2003). By these acts, land and all resources on, under, and within it, were declared as state owned. One of the immediate consequences of such laws is that a sort of displacement is imposed on the indigenous peoples in the areas that were the focus of the law. The manner of displacement implied here may not necessarily involve the physical relocation of indigenous peoples, it could be the abdication of land ownership to the nation-state which deprives indigenous peoples of their means of livelihood (Basu, 2007; Cotula, Vermuelen, Leonard, & Keeley, 2009).

Agricultural lands have also, by legal means, been taken from the peasant communities for industrialised agriculture without due compensation, or even common consultation. Section 44(3) of the Land Use Act (1978) affirmed the expropriation. It held that the "control of all minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in, under or upon any land in Nigeria, its territorial waters, and exclusive economic zone...oils and gas vested in the Government of the Federation and shall be managed in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly" (FGN, 1999 Constitution). This obnoxious law is tantamount to government corruption, i.e. government appropriation of indigenous lands or resources or allowing global capital to appropriate resources (Hand, 2005).

As further example, in the recent past, 2000 hectares of land in Sogho and Ue-Ken Ogoni Communities in Khana and Tai Local Government Areas respectively were acquired by the government of Rivers State, Nigeria, through the Land Use Act (1978) for a twenty billion naira Banana Plantation Project. The affected Ogoni communities protested against the project. The protest led to loss of lives and destruction of properties (Ogali, 2017). However, the dispossession upheld. What is worrisome is that, such dispossession of arable lands displaces indigenous people of their sources of economic wellbeing, and perpetuates poverty and hunger in the process.

At a global trend, laws by the United Nations International Court of Justice (ICJ) have been used to dispossess indigenous peoples of their lands; as was the case in the ICJ judgment on the border dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula. Although the ICJ judgment settled the border dispute between Nigeria and her Cameroonian neighbour; the judgment on the other hand, unfair to the indigenous peoples of Bakassi who are originally Nigerians (Nicholas & Baroni, 2010). By the ICJ judgment, were the Bakassi indigenous peoples transferring their citizenship to Cameroon or was the judgment just meant to legally allow Cameroon exploit the oil and gas resources in the disputed peninsula or were the indigenous peoples expected to relocate and to where? Assuming the Bakassi indigenous peoples are to relocate to somewhere else, some of the pertinent questions would be: what happens to their ancestry, and the graves of their ancestors? What happens to the existing bond between forest and people?

e. Resource Exploitation-induced Displacement

Resource extraction remains a key source of foreign earning for states and a source of profit(s) for TNCs; and a major albatross to indigenous peoples (Lile, 2006; Doyle & Whitmore, 2014). As indicated in Table 1 below, there is no known place where resources are extracted that is devoid of protracted conflict between indigenous peoples on one hand and government and TNCs on the other (Hinchman, 2003; Lerner, 2006; Wangari, 2007; Yakovleva, 2014; Peter & Sriskandarajah, 2016; Firmin & Debere, 2016). The bitter conflict between these parties is one in which indigenous peoples directly get into conflict against giant oil TNCs. But why would the weak initiate a fight against the strong? This is because,

The petroleum industry highlights the most important contrasts between the tribal and commercial worlds over the material and social basis of human well-being, and tests the ability of indigenous people to mobilise international support for the peaceful defence of their human rights to protect their societies, cultures, ecosystems, and territories. Conflict between oil companies and indigenous peoples is dramatic verification that loss of political control over territory and resources is the primary reason why indigenous peoples become “victims of progress” (Bodley, 2008, p.231).

Table 1: Indigenous Peoples under the Threat of Displacement

Country	Indigenous People/Location	Environmental Organisation/Activist	Environmental Threat
Ecuador plan mine Amazon	Shuar Indigenous People	Acción Ecológica	Ecuadorian Government to build a mega-copper on ancestral lands in the Southern Ecuadorian
Honduras Community	Lenca Indigenous	Berta Cáceres (murdered March, 2016)	Opposition to the construction of the Agua Zarca Dam
Bangladesh	The Phulbari agricultural region		The Phulbari Coal Project-open pit coal mine
Peru	Amazonian Province of Bagua	The Federation of Native Communities of the Corrientes River Basin (FECONACO) and Survival International	Oil, mining, logging, and agriculture on indigenous territories to facilitate the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the U.S.
Nigeria	Indigenous People of the Niger Delta	Multiple activist groups including INC, MOSOP,	Oil and gas exploration exploitation activities IYC, etc

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In Cameroon, intensive logging in forest areas inhabited by indigenous people has earned the government in Yaoundé a huge foreign exchange. For example, statistics from the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) indicates that,

in Cameroon...with an annual production of more than 2.5 million cubic meters of timber, the forestry sector is the State's third source of hard currency (after agricultural and petroleum exports)...A regional forestry policy known as the 1999 Yaoundé Declaration, with an action plan called *Plan de Convergence*, states clearly that within the framework of the fight against poverty, Congo Basin countries intend to derive as much revenue as possible from forestry...Another project to exploit more than 50 million cubic tons of cobalt/nickel in the middle of Cameroon's tropical forests will surely affect ancestral lands of indigenous Baka ("Pygmies") people. Oil exploitation will also increasingly affect land rights of African indigenous peoples as the continent

continues its exploration efforts pushed by world powers in search for market diversification (Barume, 2010, pp.70-71).

However, while this enormous foreign exchange is good for the government, such proceeds have not had positive impacts on the indigenous peoples who suffer displacement as a result of commercial logging.

f. International Donors-induced Displacement

International donors like the Bretton Wood trio of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), are often applauded for helping to fund development projects in various parts of the Third World. However, these donor agencies are environment blind in their policies, especially in financing projects such as dams that are not environment friendly (Thomas, 1992; Rich, 1994, 2013; Timamy, 2007). It is the cry and complaints of Indigenous peoples that such projects affect them negatively (there are negative health impacts of some the projects; there are cases of invasion of strange species of insects and grasses to the environment; some of the projects have adverse affect on the local economy, etc) (Peet, 2009). More so, the donor-supported projects are often cited in territories of indigenous peoples who in the long-run suffer land loss and several human rights violations. It is the clarion call of indigenous peoples that donors must integrate human rights in their development projects (Barume, 2010; World Bank & OECD, 2013).

Conclusion

The central question of this paper was on why nature's bounties constitute burdens to the people living in territories where nature chooses to endow these bounties. The paper asserts that nature's endowment of resources in indigenous peoples' territories is simply deliberate: it endows its pristine resources in territories occupied by those who values, cherishes, sustains, and sees the "soil as a partner to be cherished" (Passmore, 1974, p.4) and who naturally makes a life out of it.

Both in the North and South hemispheres, natural resources are scarcely located endowed in environments whose cultural conducts often devalue, and degrade nature (Burns, 2009). Nature's wealth is scarce in places and among peoples with an industrial view of the earth, who see the earth as a resource to be plundered and consumed; the land "as a captive to be raped" (Passmore, 1974, p.4) and those considered as the leprosy of the soil (Harrison, 1990, p.129).

On the contrary, most natural resources are located in territories occupied by people treated as fringe people. This is because nature is not oblivious that man is not only renowned for what it can create, but most essentially by what he refuses to destroy. Indigenous peoples are therefore divinely and naturally synonymous with territories and peoples who refuse to destroy, who hears when the forest talks/speaks, who tills, and keep the resources for the owner-nature (Beltran, 2000; Lenox, 2012).

However, nature's deliberate design/scheme has become a burden. Global capital's ravaging avidity for nature's bounties through TNCs is the burden indigenous peoples have to bear. Global capital's search for profit and natural resources to meet the avid consumption demands of the affluent North, coupled with the developmental aspirations of Third World governments constitute a problem for indigenous peoples (Leech, 2006). In these circumstances, indigenous peoples become 'victims of progress' (that is of development projects undertaken by governments and TNCs). They suffer from displacements, threatened ecosystems, and asymmetrical wars³ to defend their sovereignty, territories, human rights, cultural integrity, etc (Leech, 2006).

Among these ugly consequences of many TNC-government development projects in indigenous communities, displacement stands out as the most devastating to indigenous peoples as it dispossess them of their territory, resources, livelihood, home, harmony with nature (Conable, 1989). There two most important cases of displacement. First, there is development-induced displacement of indigenous peoples to give way for; agro-business, construction of dams, roads, ports, railways and mines and logging, and in rare circumstances oil and gas explorations. Second, there is involuntary displacement resulting from gradual loss of arable land for subsistence purposes, namely, farming, fishing, etc. In this case, affected communities are physically present but the environment has been rendered unsuitable for their wellbeing. Therefore, inhabitants of such communities are as good as displaced.

In all instances of displacement described above, how are displaced people compensated? What circumstances justifies development-induced displacement (Penz, 2002; Couldrey & Morris, 2002)? The primary explanation often advanced for development-induced displacement is the public interest argument, which is explained based on cost-benefit perspective. This perspective holds that the proposed projects will add net benefits to the entire population. Therefore, the negative fallouts of development-induced displacement are the necessary sacrifices or costs for realising to the gains of development projects. But, what if the benefits exceed the costs and what is the guarantee that the costs will be evenly spread to the entire population? The fact remains that oftentimes, the costs of development projects are never evenly distributed to the entire population but are borne by the indigenous peoples-the real 'Victims of Progress'. Thus, indigenous peoples of resource-rich territories suffer higher degrees of development vis-à-vis people in areas where resources are not exploited on daily basis.

Notes

1. "The concept of 'villagisation' refers to the resettlement of people from scattered areas into villages, in order to ensure efficient control and to provide basic social services and infrastructure...The main objective of villagisation is to provide, or improve, access to basic economic and social services" (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p.12).

2. According to Iorns (1992, p.201) “the term ‘the Fourth World’ was coined by George Manuel, in George Manuel & Michael Posluns (1974), *The Fourth World: An Indian Reality*. It is now used to refer to aboriginal peoples who are in an inferior position to the dominant society with respect to culture, politics, and economics”.
3. Asymmetrical wars are wars instigated by the weak against the strong.

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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

Cattle Herding and Irregular Migration: The Bane of Sustainable Development in Nigeria

Florence Ebere Nnanwube

Introduction

Cattle herding is among the oldest means of raising cattle in human history. It is a form of pastoral farming. Other animals which are also herded include sheep, goat, camel, donkey, etc. Certain tribes across Africa are known for cattle rearing and herding. In Nigeria, the Fulani tribe is famous for cattle production, and is known as the largest producer of beef, milk, horns, skin, and other by-products of cow (Abbass 2012, in Idowu and Okunola, 2017). Besides the Fulani, there are other groups involved in cattle herding in Nigeria, although many are not commonly known. Some of these include: the Kanembu, the Kanuri, the Shuwa, the Touareg, the Arabs, etc (Blench, 2010; Braukamper, 1996, in Olayoku, 2014). This study shall discuss herders in general except on specific instances where specific references will be made to the Fulani herdsmen.

The pattern of cattle herding practiced in Nigeria is largely dependent on transhumance, particularly from the northern to the southern region. This practice is also spread across West Africa, and is duly recognized and protected by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) protocol of 1979, relating to free movement of persons, residence, and establishment, as the organization sought to abolish obstacles to free movement and residence within the community (ECOWAS, 1979).

The underlying reasons prompting transhumance can broadly be categorized into three factors, which include: changes in weather, gradual extinction of grazing lands, and economic considerations. For changes in weather, the rainy and dry seasons in Nigeria trigger transhumance. It has been observed that during the dry season, herders migrate more from the north towards the south in search of pastures and water for their herds (Olubode and Ajibade, 2010; Olobatoke and Amusian 2017), and their stay extends into the rainy season, hence, they maintain all-year round presence in the south (Olayoku, 2014). According to some scholars, herders are usually found around the southern region during the rainy season (Abbass, 2012 in Idowu and Okunola, 2017). The recent experiences of inconsistent pattern of rainfall, commonly explained with reference to climate change, have also been notable for contributing to transhumance (Olayoku, 2014; Okeke, 2014; Ibrahim, Abdulrrahman and Umar, 2015; Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and ECOWAS, 2012).

On the issue of gradual extinction of grazing lands, scholars have highlighted the fact that available grazing lands are going extinct as a result of both natural causes [such as desertification of the northern range lands (Okeke, 2014), occasional appearance and disappearance of non-consumable grass (FAO and ECOWAS, 2012)] and human actions. Some of the human actions usually referred to are: over-grazing (Okeke, 2014); blockage of livestock pathways through land use; urbanization and increase in population, leading to diminishing of available grazing lands; drying of water holes (Ibrahim et al 2015). Others are increased mining; lack of better support to cross-border transhumance in developing policies; legislation and regulation which were mainly focused on modernizing transhumance (FAO and ECOWAS, 2012); massive acquisition of lands by capitalist farmers (Okeke, 2014), and so on.

More so, herders also embrace transhumance due to economic considerations. Basically, pastoralism is the cheapest means of raising cattle. There is also the reason that herders embark on transhumance to maintain close proximity to their markets to save time and reduce cost of production (Blench, 1994 and 2010 in Okeke, 2014; Olayouku, 2014), and transportation. African Union (2010, p. 11) also noted with regards to transhumance as a form of rational movement, that “Such movements are not random or irrational but highly strategic and drawn on local information gathering and risk analysis, supported by extraordinary traditional systems of governance and decision-making.” However, these movements, many a times, amount to irregular migration and generate controversies within the Nigerian context on regular basis as against only during short and long range transhumance along blocked cattle corridors as recorded by the FAO and ECOWAS (2012).

Like other forms of irregular movement, transhumance comes with grave consequences, the most common of which is encroaching into the space of other land users—particularly the sedentary farmers whose economic livelihood is also dependent on the same land the herders often encroach on. It goes beyond the loss of planted crops through unregulated grazing, to over grazing, contamination of rural water sources like streams with cattle dung and hooves, to actual loss of lives, slaughtering of cattle over lost crops, destruction of housing and properties, and general insecurity resulting from physical violent clashes from attacks and retaliations between farmers and herders.

While the farmers-herders clashes have been on for over 20 years in the history of Nigeria (BBC, 2016 in Idowu and Okunola, 2017), it has become more precarious in recent times. Hence, this needs careful investigation as it has resulted to grievous consequences. That concerns the people’s rights to their space and the general sustainability of Nigeria’s development. Thus, this paper details the means through which irregular migration of cattle herders across the country frustrates sustainable development. It also outlines basic steps which can be taken to end unregulated cattle herding in Nigeria.

Operationalization of Concepts

Some important terms which were used in this paper shall be explained in this section. The terms include: cattle herding, irregular migration, rural economy, sustainable development, and transhumance.

Cattle herding: This is the practice of controlling a herd(s) of cattle roaming in search of pasture and water.

Irregular migration: This is defined as the process whereby an individual or a group of persons cross a “border without proper authority or violating conditions of entering another country” (Jordan and Duvell, 2002, p.15, in Kuschminder, De Bresser and Siegel, 2015). In line with the discourse of this paper, irregular migration indicates the unregulated movement of cattle herders as well as the uncontrolled grazing of cattle by cattle herders across Nigeria. This definition is in tandem with the view that individuals’ migration to a location can be termed irregular when they deliberately abuse the conditions of asylum (Uehling, 2004, in Kuschminder et al, 2015). But since this paper does not deal with asylum seeking, unchecked transhumance and cattle grazing shall be deemed as abuse of migratory freedom.

Rural economy: This implies agricultural production predominant in the rural areas. That is farming and agricultural production as the economic base of rural areas.

Sustainable development: This is the sort of development which can last and be maintained over a long period of time and therefore beneficial to future generations.

Transhumance: This is the movement of cattle across long distances in search of pasture.

Theoretical Frame Work

Frustration-Aggression Theory

Originally formulated as a hypothesis by Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer and Sears (1939, p. 1, in Sturmey, 2017), the frustration-aggression hypothesis states that “the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration, and contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression.” In this definition, frustration-aggression is not understood as an emotional experience, but as “[A]n interference with the occurrence of an instigated goal-response” (Dollard et al., 1939, p.7 in Sturmey, 2017). This means that frustration is an action rather than an emotion; hence, it can be tested and discussed objectively with observable events as regards the causes and effects, or frustrating events and responses.

The consequences of frustration includes: aggression, development or increase of prejudice (Grossarth-Maticek, Eysenck and Vetter, 1989 in Sturmey, 2017) and depression (Seligman, 1975 in Sturmey, 2017). Some early publications on frustration-aggression hypothesis suggest that the threat of being punished for aggressive behavior

itself can also be a frustration that can, again, increase the tendency for aggressive reactions in further interactions (Breuer and Elson, 2017). Morlan (1949 in Sturme, 2017) agrees with the emerging view that the expression of aggression impulse does not result in catharsis. That is, the idea that “the frustration of an aggressive impulse increases the strength of the aggression” (p.3) as he had earlier suggested, but that instead, such aggressive impulse sets up a vicious cycle that leads to further aggression.

Dollard et al (1939 in Sturme, 2017) suggested that the strongest aggressive reactions are those directed towards the perceived sources of frustration, and this can be viewed as a type of retaliatory behavior (Zillmann and Cantor, 1976 in Sturme, 2017). In another vein, aggression can equally be directed towards individuals not responsible for the cause of the frustration, hence the term—displaced aggression (Breuer and Elson, 2017). There is also the angle of instrumental value; that is, the degree to which the aggression contributes to overcoming the frustration (Buss, 1963, 1966; Thompson and Kolstoe, 1974).

The recurrent farmers-herders conflict in Nigeria in no small measure qualifies as a situation of frustration-aggression; notably triggered by frustrations such as damage to crops, cattle rustling, pollution and contamination of watering points, occupancy of grazing land, and grazing in protected areas (FAO and ECOWAS, 2012). From the facts in the FAO and ECOWAS document, the farmers and the herders alike have been responsible for causing each other frustrations in various ways, sometimes deliberately and sometimes not. And just like Dollard et al (1939) suggested, that aggression is often caused by frustration, just as frustration would lead to aggressive behaviour, these frustrations by each of the parties are always met with aggressive reactions of varying degrees, ranging between rustling of stray animals, to destruction of agriculture, life and household properties in extreme cases of intense violence, as recently recorded in Benue, Plateau, Kogi, and some other states in Nigeria. From every indication, these aggressions are deliberately aimed at achieving some instrumental value—the quest to exercise equal rights over land and land resources use.

More so, as suggested by Dollard et al (1939), some aggressions have been directed at the sources of frustration (eg, in situations where the farmers fine the herders, or kill straying cattle, or herders kill bandit rustlers, or farmers caught slaughtering cattle). However, realities indicate that displaced aggressions have been strongest, judging from the fact that reprisal attacks are often launched at members of the out-group who may have not necessarily been involved in triggering the frustrations. Instances of this abound in the recent invasions of churches in Benue state as suspected Fulani herdsmen invaded a catholic church, killed two priests and seventeen parishioners during morning mass on April 24, 2018, in Ayar Mbalom village. Barely 24 hours after the incident, were 16 more villagers killed in Ali Agundu and Tsav council wards of Guma Local Government Area (Linda Ikeji, 2018). There is also a case of another massacre of over a hundred persons in Barakin-Ladi and Riyom LGAs of Plateau state

on June 25, 2018, over missing cows (Nigerian Tribune, 2018). Female farmers who may not have been responsible for any prior aggressions also constantly get raped and killed on their farms by intruding herders, as recorded recently in Anambra state (Ujumadu, 2018).

As a result of these aggressive reactions, bearing on the consequences of frustration outlined above, tension, fear and aggression (also likely prejudice) for Fulani herdsmen have grown across the Nigerian states, such that the south eastern state governors have refused the request by the federal government to donate the states' lands for ranching (Linda Ikeji, 2018). These consequences cannot also be one-sided, as the herders are always fully armed, using sophisticated weapons to wage deadly reprisals on their sources of aggression (Idowu and Okunola, 2017).

Discussion

Irregular Migration of Cattle/Herders as a Challenge to Sustainable Development in Nigeria

The political economy around the use of arable land by herders and farmers across many agrarian rural communities in Nigeria has resulted in violent conflicts between herders and host communities. States like Plateau, Taraba, Benue, Kogi, Imo, Enugu, Ekiti, Oyo, Ebonyi, Delta, Zamfara states, etc have witnessed various levels of clash between farmers and herdsmen. The hotbed of these conflicts are Benue, Taraba, Nasarawa and Plateau states in the north-central region of Nigeria (McGregor, 2014; Nigeria Watch Newsletter, 2014, in Olayoku, 2014).

As highlighted earlier in the introduction, these clashes arise when herders allow their herds to graze on planted crops and vegetables. Ofuoku and Isife (2009) found the contamination of streams by cattle, the raping and harassing women from host communities by herders, disregard for local authorities, over-grazing of land, and indiscriminate bush burning by herders, as the root causes of these conflicts in Delta state. In Kogi state, Olobatoke and Amusian (2017) identified the intrusion of herders into farms, occasioned by scarcity of pasture and water, as well as the location of farmlands along grazing routes; a factor which was also identified by the FAO and ECOWAS (2012).

Consequent upon these intrusions, cattle herders face the following retaliatory actions from host community members: the slaughtering of stray cattle, harassment by authorized youths in a bid to making them pay local levies, cattle rustling by community miscreants (who get killed by herders if caught) (Ofuoku and Isife, 2009). Poisoning of fields or complete prevention from entry; and in reaction, the herders wage deadly attacks on their hosts (Okeke, 2014).

FAO and ECOWAS (2012) had grouped the causes of farmers-herders conflicts across West Africa into the following categories: conflicts over damaged crops, conflicts over cattle rustling, conflicts over use of watering points, conflicts over land, and conflicts

over use of protected areas. FAO and ECOWAS (2012) explained that conflicts result when herders set bushes ablaze with the intent to enable fresh grasses spring up. This consequently razes down agriculture, destroys standing hay and crop residues in fields that are entered into livestock feed and other ruminant livestock. Also, communities install agricultural zones without due consideration for cattle movement, pasture, and water. Additionally, there is lack of mutual pastoral and agrarian calendars whereby products of the harvest and by-products are left at the field pending the work schedule of the farmers. These often attract pastoralists to such fields, and they end up being fined, usually more than the crop year monetary value. Sometimes, bandits kill an entire herd, which often leads to bloody retaliation(s) from the herders, who in turn rustle stray animals of other farmers to increase their herds and market value.

The shallow water in some valleys that are naturally rich in pasture are also occupied by crop fields (as part of irrigation) or vegetable gardens, and conflicts also arise when herders try to access streams reserved for irrigating dry-season crops or intruding into prohibited village wells. There are also cases of installing field ‘traps’ around ponds used by the transhumant. Grazing lands are also being occupied without compensation due to growth in population (FAO and ECOWAS, 2012). The prevalence and perpetuation of these attacks and reprisals through destruction of lives and properties points to issues surrounding entitlement of land ownership, and ease of access and use of land by both parties. What results is that host communities feel obliged to exercise security over their property, while herders feel entitled to all existent grazing areas as Nigerian citizens.

While the government and other citizens in ‘safer’ zones seem unperturbed, the crisis keeps ruining the human capital and financial inputs being made towards developing the rural economy and infrastructure. Agribusinesses, lives, food, and properties, are destroyed; security is lost; poverty reduction is stalled rather than controlled; and sustainable development in rural areas and Nigeria at large is threatened. One of the primary reasons for all these and related woes is that the government has failed to mediate and set up judicial commissions to oversee to the clashes, and thus, culprits resolve to taking laws into their own hands (Olayoku, 2014).

Already, statistics have frequently proven an existing wide urban-rural divide in terms of social amenities and standard of living; with rural residents having a much lower standard of living compared to urban residents due to higher rate of absolute poverty spread across more than half the rural population (Nigerian Bureau of Statistics, 2007). How much worse these conditions have escalated with the recurrent violent aggressions occasioned by the irregular migration of herders and cattle into farmlands shall be detailed in the following sections of this paper.

Irregular Migration of Cattle/Herders as a Threat to Agribusiness Development in Nigeria

Many farmers across Nigeria have experienced the loss of agricultural investments worth huge amounts to the burning of their plantations by herdsmen, harvesting of mature plants to feed cattle, and the routine grazing of cattle on foliage. In some instances, certain agribusiness entrepreneurs have experienced this menace for about ten years. The Cable (2017) reports the destruction and burning of 20 hectares of orange and cassava plantations worth 200 billion naira, belonging to a former top government official in Kwara state.

Olobatoke and Amusian (2017) found that farmers and herders alike lose their crops and cattle to attacks and reprisals resulting from the encroachments. In their study of Kogi state, about 69.60% of farmers abandoned their farmlands partly due to low productivity. This is supported by Nweze (2005 in Ofuoku and Isife, 2009), who also observed that many herders have lost their herds which has also led to dwindling productivity in their herds. Olanipeku (2018) also reported a similar incidence on a farmland belonging to another former top government official who disclosed that herders burn his farm as a yearly routine to enable fresh grasses spring up in days for their cattle to graze on. Crops damaged include: oil palm, yam, and cassava plantations in Ondo state. In another incidence, herdsmen set ablaze 100 acres of mangoes and pineapples in Osun state, and about 200 plants of tomato and cucumber in Ikoyi town. A farmer also reported that herders harvested mature cucumbers, cassava and plantain bunches from the plantations to feed their cattle (Onyirioha, n.d.). On the part of cattle production, Joseph (2012) reported the slaughtering of 500 cows at the border town of Shatse during a heavy conflict.

A lot more instances, both unreported and reported cases, keep recurring. Incidences like these are capable of discouraging unemployed youths who have interest in farming, from proceeding with their plans. The incidences can also reduce the labour availability for agribusiness owners, and also lead to high production cost in value-added goods occasioned by scarcity of primary goods. Such can also rob young agribusiness entrepreneurs of their life savings and investments in one night of conflict from unregulated grazing and bush burning. This in turn aggravates unemployment level since these plantations employ many skilled and semi-skilled labours. Affirming this, the chairman of Miyetti Allah expressed that farmer-herder conflicts would destroy agribusiness and adversely affect the diversification policy and processes of the government if it is politicized (Ogo-Oluwa, 2017).

Irregular Migration of Cattle/Herders as a Threat to Security of Lives, Food and Properties

Olobatoke and Amusian (2017) found that both the farmers and herders lose their houses to attacks and reprisals resulting from the encroachments. Farmers constantly live in fear of being attacked by approaching herdsmen as 81% expressed being socially insecure. Nweze (2005 in Ofuoku and Isife, 2009) also observed that many farmers

and herders have lost their lives. Other losses, as observed by Ofuoku and Isife (2009), include reduction in the output of farmers, disease outbreak, erosion, loss of lives, loss of houses and properties, etc. Another side to the problem is food insecurity which is partly as a result of the abandonment of farms by farmers (Ibrahim et al, 2015).

In an attempt to highlight the level of insecurity experienced through violent conflicts, Idowu and Okunola (2017) branded Fulani herdsmen terrorists, as the series of attacks perpetuated during their intrusions have claimed hundreds and thousands of lives. This view is also shared by the Nigerian Military and politicians, who classified some members of the Fulani herdsmen as Boko Haram collaborators (McGregor, 2014 in Olayoku, 2014). Also, due to this irregular migration, camel pastoralists from Niger Republic are alleged to be involved in some conflicts within the north-western and central regions of Nigeria (Blench, 2010; Abbass, 2012, in Olayoku, 2014).

Considering the waste of human life that have resulted on account of farmers-herders conflicts, Olayoku (2014) documented reported deaths attributed to herders-farmers violent clashes across different states in Nigeria between years 2006 and 2014. According to him, in the second half of 2006, 22 deaths were recorded and Kano state accounted for the most fatalities, with its record of 10 deaths. In 2007, the number doubled to 54 with Delta state accounting for the highest number of casualties, with 17 deaths. In 2008, the figure declined to 31 with Anambra recording 9 casualties which was reportedly the highest among the other states involved. In 2009 the number skyrocketed to 83 casualties as conflicts were recorded in many states including Benue, Plateau, Jigawa, Nasarawa, Kebbi, Imo, Borno, Oyo, and Zamfara. Nasarawa state recorded the highest number of deaths at 47 casualties in a conflict which was sustained for two days. In the same year, conflicts in Borno state took a twist as rebels dressed in military uniform, armed with sophisticated weapons, and reported to be from the Republic of Niger and Chad, raided Fulani communities in Abadam and MallamFatori (Musa, 2009, in Olayoku, 2014).

In 2010, the casualties dropped to 39 deaths and Niger state recorded 15 casualties which was reportedly the highest. Then in 2011, the figure geometrically rose to 116 spread across Abuja, Cross River, Plateau, Benue, Imo, Nasarawa, Katsina, and Zamfara. In same year, Benue attacks which recorded 27 deaths in February and 38 deaths in June being the highest for the year, displaced people with an alleged engagement of Fulani “mercenaries” from Lake Chad, together with sophisticated weapons, bullet proof vests, military uniforms, horses, and motorbikes (Uja, 2011, in Olayoku, 2014).

Year 2012 recorded more casualties which stood at 128 deaths across Delta, Enugu, Taraba, Nasarawa, Benue, Borno, Abuja, Cross River, Jigawa, and Ogun states. Cross River recorded 40 fatalities deemed the highest for the year. Nasarawa and Benue states experienced a 3-day non-stop violence, as 50-armed Fulani attacked a border town (Shatse) at dawn, recording casualties on both sides (Joseph, 2012, in Olayoku,

2014). In 2013, casualties slightly reduced to 115 deaths, with Benue state recording 20 fatalities in September and 17 in May and thus had the highest fatalities for 2013. In 2014, the fatalities escalated over a thousand as over 1200 lives were lost. About 40 lives were lost in Enugu, properties were destroyed, and people fled their homes (Mikailu, 2016).

Amnesty International (AI) (2018) reported that in 2017, more than 549 lives were lost and thousands displaced as a result of inter-communal conflicts linked to farmers-herders clashes in Nigeria. The figure was eventually pinned at 894 (Owolabi, 2018). As given in the report by AI, herdsmen killed, looted, and burned the houses of villagers in three communities of Atakad district of Kaura, Kaduna state, leaving 21 villagers dead. In June of the same year, scores consisting mostly of herdsmen and their families, were killed in Mambilla Plateau of Taraba state. And in December, herdsmen attacked at least 5 villages in Demsa L.G.A of Adamawa state in a retaliatory attack. The surviving victims reported being attacked by herdsmen in collaboration with a fighter jet and bomb explosives from a military helicopter as they attempted fleeing. The attack left at least 86 people dead. Reflecting on the conflicts for the year 2018, Amnesty International reported that not less than 1,813 Nigerians have lost their lives to herders-farmers conflicts beginning from January to June 2018. This figure is more than double the lives lost in 2017 (Owolabi, 2018).

As suggested earlier, the major cause of conflicts keeps revolving around the invasion of farmlands by cattle herds (Olayoku, 2014). Thus, conflicts resulting from cattle grazing accounted for 35% of all reported crisis between 1991 and 2005 in Nigeria (Fasona and Omojola, 2005 in Olayoku). In addition to violence, herders have also been reported to have carted away with goods and cash worth five hundred thousand naira in Lagelu Local Government Area of Oyo state (Punch, 2015, in Idowu and Okunola, 2017). The once relatively peaceful rural areas of Nigeria have become the hotbed of violence and turbulence. Relatives can no longer afford to travel home and see their loved ones without being afraid of what might happen to them; and affected farmers flee their homes and find shelter in government-owned buildings like schools, which have been turned into IDP camps.

Irregular Migration of Cattle/Herders as a threat to Poverty-Reduction Campaigns and Rural Development

Olobatoke and Amusian (2017) reported that 45.6% of farmers surveyed in Kogi state could not repay the loans they collected; 83.5% find it difficult to feed, and 70.9% could not pay their children's school fees after the intrusions and clashes. Opoku (2015, in Olobatoke and Amusian) also lends credence to this. Ofuoku and Isife (2009) also observed that the loss of products in storage and reduction in the output and income of farmers negatively affect their savings, credit repayment ability, as well as the economic welfare of urban dwellers who depend on rural farmers for food supply and consequently discouraging farming and rural economic development. This is most glaring in instances of farmers abandoning their farms for fear of insecurity.

In accordance with these observations, Ibrahim et al (2015) added that farmers-herders conflicts reinforce circles of poverty and hunger; destroy social status; and affect women and children, and destabilize children's education through mass displacement. Adisa (2012) reported that more farmers lose materially compared to herdsman. According to him, 91% of farmers suffered income loss, 85% loss of yield, 23% loss of household resources, and 23% lost stored products. On the other hand, 14.3% of the herders suffered loss of income, 8.9% yield loss, 7.1% stored products, and 3.8% household resources.

Just as the Nigerian civil war and Boko Haram terrorism, left victims displaced and incapable of sustaining their once-thriving livelihoods, the violent clashes between farmers and herders have drastically reduced the income of farmers to the extent that many can no longer continue training their children in school, afford to feed, or repay loans. A similar situation is also applicable to the herders who lost their cattle in great numbers, precariously reinforcing abject poverty among the already rural poor and retrogressing the campaigns against poverty escalation in Nigeria. The situation leaves relatives of the affected farmers who may be urban residents, with the double burden/obligation of catering for these farmers, thereby slashing their own income, a situation which can reduce their own standard of living. Farmers who lack this kind of privilege are left on their own to suffer more terribly. These issues invariably stagnate development prospects of the rural areas.

Way Forward


Having noted that the farmers-herders conflicts frustrate sustainable development in Nigeria, the study recommends that:

1. Unbiased security checks be enforced at the borders in order to combat the intrusion of rebels and hired international mercenaries into the conflict zones.
2. Stakeholders involved in cattle and crop producing rural areas (such as community chiefs, traditional rulers, and leaders of cattle herders association-Miyetti Allah) should be made to educate their followers on the need for fair play, by not escalating further clashes through unjust imposition of excessively high fines over damaged crops. This thus calls for proper education of both farmers and herders by the authorities they respect.
3. Cattle production has been contributing significantly to food security in Nigeria. It is therefore necessary that cattle corridors be established and carefully demarcated from agricultural lands. Adequate measures must be also put in place to ensure that herders maintain their corridors to arrest unregulated and disturbing cattle grazing.
4. Host communities of these herders should draft a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to ensure the herders stay loyal to the authorities of their host communities, maintain cordial relationship with the community members, as well as abstain from areas prohibited from grazing and drinking. Such MoU will equally protect the rights of the herders.

5. Finally, to demonstrate responsible leadership, security agencies should be neutral in dealing with the conflicts by eschewing favoritism and dutifully bringing defaulters of law to book.

Conclusion

This study examined irregular migration of cattle herders across Nigeria as the root cause of frustrations leading to deadly aggressions among farmers and herdsmen in many rural communities. The study argued that the violent conflicts resulting from these aggressive behaviors militate against campaigns for sustainable development in Nigeria, noting that they hinder agribusiness development, security of lives and properties, poverty reduction campaigns, and invariably sustainable rural development as a result. The study concludes that one of the solutions to curbing these conflicts lie in promoting peaceful coexistence between farmers and herders, by adequately educating both parties through village meetings and sensitizations, bearing in mind that Nigeria needs farmers and herders alike to remain food secure.



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CONCLUSION

Towards Regional Policy Coordination on Migration and Development

Ufo Okeke-Uzodike, Christopher Isike and Emeka Iloh

As societies become more diverse, there are both opportunities and challenges. Experiences of discrimination on the basis of one's socio-economic, cultural or religious background continue to be commonplace. A priority will be to promote the means for intercultural dialogue and the inclusion of migrants into the economic, social and cultural lives of the societies in which they live. It is also crucial to mention the striking feminization of migration. As women now comprise 48 percent of all international migrants, efforts to promote the inclusion of migrants must also adequately address the particular experiences of female migrants across the world (Amrith, 2014).

Human mobility is as old as human existence and shall continue to remain part of our lived reality which cannot be simply wished or legislated away. Whether in the form of forced migration through the transatlantic slave trade or the free movement of people across borders and continents globally, humans have always moved from place to place in search of better livelihood opportunities and life circumstances. Either way, Africa has had its fair share of people movements into and outside the continent from (and to) different parts of the world. From the Palaeolithic period through to the modern and contemporary periods of migration history, Africa has always been at the centre of these people movements. Historically, migration has been conducted within the continent itself in an unrestrictive way as a strategy to cope with local poverty, drought, or conflict. This is no different from the economic, environmental and socio-political factors, which mainly drive migration in Africa today. Human movements within and between states in Africa are often broadly shaped by economic factors such as trade, markets, search for grazing land, better job opportunities and environmental challenges such as famine and drought, which cause economic dislocations with implications for social and political stability.

At the root of the economic and socio-political challenges which drive immigration in Africa today, is the weak and artificial nature of the post-colonial state – particularly in terms of its formation, activities and management, and essence. The modern state system that Africa inherited from its colonial conquerors was an imposition that was vastly different in its purpose from the European state system it was putatively

patterned after. For example, apart from the fact that Africans were seldom consulted nor participated in any meaningful way (if at all) in the formative processes of state-making, the African state was established as an instrument for the classical exploitation of Africa's natural resources for the direct benefit of European colonial states. This was in direct contrast to the conceptualisation, design and effect of the administrative structures and operational systems emplaced to drive the socioeconomic and political development of European states. In this way, the foundation of the domineering, parasitic and conflictual character of the African state was laid from its inception. Aspects of the resultant effects -- such as the preponderance of corrupt and sit-tight ruling elites, lack of transparency and accountability, leadership ineptitude, authoritarianism, and despotic military rule -- have reproduced traditional and emergent human security challenges, which further weakens the legitimacy and capacity of the state in Africa to transform the life circumstances of its peoples. In turn, these security challenges have served to trigger mass movements of people as they seek succour elsewhere within the continent or even exit to other regions of the world.

Host countries of African migrants within the continent have responded in varying ways to an increasing trend of human movement. From the south to the north, and from the east to the west of the continent, migration in Africa has sparked conflicts in ways that compromise prospects for economic or political integration of the continent. In South Africa, for example, which is a popular migrant destination for many Africans – horrific incidents of xenophobic violence have repeatedly claimed lives and destroyed properties worth millions of US dollars on a fairly regular basis since the late 1990s (see Lamdau, 2013). This violence, which targets and scapegoats African migrants for various reasons such as 'stealing of jobs', overcrowding service provisions and infrastructures, and criminal activities, has spanned decades with the first recorded incidents in 1996 when there was mass revolt against the issuance of visas to immigrants (Monson and Arian, 2011). This phenomenon, which many refer to as 'Afrophia', came to an initial climax in 2008 following the violent attacks that gripped many South Africa's townships, killing about 50 African immigrants, leaving over 100 people injured, and displaced thousands. In its wake, 342 foreign-owned shops were looted; and 214 of those were also burnt down⁷⁶. Since then, there were 161 violent attacks against African migrants between 2010 and 2015 (Crush and Ramachandran, 2015), which destroyed more lives and properties, killed and displaced more people than during the 2008 violence. In 2019, another series of deadly attacks and looting were unleashed against other Africans and some foreigners.

One important difference with the 2019 attacks was that although the vast majority of South Africans may not be xenophobic, growing numbers are beginning to accept the long-running (but thinly disguised) rhetoric from government officials and segments of the media blaming policy failures and economic challenges to the activities of

⁷⁶ See <https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/xenophobic-violence-democratic-south-africa> Accessed 10/04/19.

foreigners and illegal migrants – ranging from direct criminality to the subversion of the will of South African people and national sovereignty through “state capture.” Ignoring the fact that South Africa has experienced some of the highest levels of violent crimes in the world (for decades), government officials ignore their own agency after years of undelivered promises such as arresting high levels of extreme inequality, massive levels of unemployment (particularly among the restive and politically active youths), and generally ineffectual policing. From RDP to GEAR and from AsgiSA to NGP and NDP, a series of South African governments have failed over decades to deliver the economic transformation and prosperity anticipated and promised to their citizens⁷⁷.

Not surprisingly, black foreigners (as easy targets) have been readily used as political foils for the failures of ineffective government policies. Sometimes, senior officials in the ruling African National Congress (ANC) and South African government appear focussed on encouraging attacks on foreigners by using openly xenophobic language to motivate, stimulate or even endorse such attacks. For instance, what are ordinary South Africans to make of a statement by the ANC which simultaneously called for an end to attacks on migrants while arguing for effective border controls on the grounds that: ‘law-abiding citizens are understandably sick of those who are breaking the moral fibre of our society by turning our kids into prostitutes and drug addicts’⁷⁸? Of note, this perception of African migrants and the xenophobic behavior it produces is not only applicable to only government functionaries from the ruling ANC. The former Mayor of Johannesburg, Herman Mashaba who was a member of the Democratic Alliance has severally echoed these sentiments in both the public and social media spaces especially on Twitter where he has over a 100,000 followers. Some of his vitriol against African migrants in South Africa, which echo stereotypes of African migrants, include a 2018 tweet following his first citizen’s arrest of an African migrant pushing a cow’s head in a trolley in the central business district (CBD) of Johannesburg: “We are (not) going to sit back and allow people like you to bring us Ebolas in the name of small business. Health of our people first. Our health facilities are already stretched to the limit”. However, as one scholar warned underscoring the complex mix in the xenophobic violence between local social and political factors: ‘This is not just about people who are poor and disappointed ... a lot is about local-level politics’⁷⁹. For another astute observer, the political system has become so convoluted that the key players and their cohorts lack the political will to stop the violence: ‘Now the whole world has seen the truth’⁸⁰.

⁷⁷ RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme); GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution framework); AsgiSA (Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa); NGP (New Growth Path); and NDP (National Development Plan 2030). These are official policy frameworks introduced by South African Government since 1994 to drive or support rapid social and economic transformation.

⁷⁸ Jason Burke, ‘We are a target’: wave of xenophobic attacks sweeps Johannesburg”, **The Guardian**, Tue 10 Sep 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/10/we-are-a-target-wave-of-xenophobic-attacks-sweeps-johannesburg>. Accessed, 3 April 2020.

⁷⁹ Jason Burke, op cit.

⁸⁰ Jason Burke, op. cit.

To the North of the continent, multiple agencies and researchers have released research reports of horrid, dehumanizing treatment of African migrants in Libya (Amnesty International, 2015; Human Rights Watch, 2014; UNSMIL and OHCHR, 2018). The joint report published by United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) declared that:

African migrants and refugees suffer unimaginable horrors during their transit through and stay in Libya. From the moment they step onto Libyan soil, they become vulnerable to unlawful killings, torture and other ill-treatment, arbitrary detention and unlawful deprivation of liberty, rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, slavery and forced labour, extortion and exploitation by both State and non-State actors (2018: 4).

In the West of the continent, Fulani herders moving with their cattle across national boundaries have triggered a long-drawn conflict with farming communities in Benue and Taraba states of Nigeria as discussed by Nnanwube Ebere Florence and Emmanuel, C. Ojukwu, Nzube, A. Chukwuma and Samuel N.C. Nwagbo. In East Africa, Al Shaabab, designated as a terrorist group, exports religious violence from Somalia to countries like Kenya where it continues to unleash violence against the Kenyan people -- highlighting the securitization discourse of migration in the continent.

Irrespective of these and other challenges of the migration context of Africa, human movements across the continent continue unabated and are estimated to be a \$78 trillion enterprise covering intra-trade, commerce and tourism businesses. This is besides other benefits such as skills, knowledge and labour transfers, pan-African social integration and trans-border infrastructure, and shared development (AU, IGAD and IOM, 2018). This underscores the notion of migration as a positive phenomenon. In fact, some scholars have argued that it is not migration that should be problematized especially if the historical contexts, devoid of the negative extremities, are taken into consideration. Rather, it is the management, hijacking and usurping of the many facets of migration -- manipulated for different political, social or economic outcomes -- that require intense critical scrutiny (Geiger and Pecoud, 2013; Xiang and Lindquist, 2014). The state's complicity in this regard in the case of post-apartheid South Africa is well documented (see Peberdy, 1999; Gordon, 2010). For Gordon (2010: 49), "the increasing movement of people and labour across national borders represents an area that has not been satisfactorily factored into the South African government's vision of the future as its policies that seek to control and regulate the movement of people and labour across the nation's porous borders are characterised by ambiguities, contradictions and confusing doublespeak". This kind of policy environment helps to give credence to the media and popular representation of African migrants as "illegals", "aliens", "invaders" and thus "criminals", "job-seekers" and "threats" who must be dealt with or even decimated (if it becomes convenient). Such interlinked and institutionalised conceptualization of the individual migrant transforms his/her experience of the migration process accordingly. It is exactly such

broad characterizations of the 'migrant' and the motive and duration of stay that lies behind Vigneswaran and Quirk's (2015) argument that the concept mobility is more appropriately suited in the examination of the many facets of people movement in Africa.

However, as some of the preceding chapters have shown, it is not only the state and its policies (or lack thereof) that shape the context of human mobility in Africa; economics also plays a crucial role. For instance, according to Adepoju (2000), the deterioration and shortage of land has been instrumental in forcing many people in rural areas across Africa to migrate to urban areas in search of jobs and other livelihood opportunities. In this way, families left behind from both internal migration and external emigration often rely on the financial support of their relatives who have who migrated to the cities and other parts of the world (Joseph, 2010: 66). And although one of the benefits of migration is skills transfer through labour mobility, there is a possibility that the home country may suffer brain drain if significant numbers of needed labour emigrate for greener opportunities elsewhere. Also, at the family level, economic factors of risks and returns can become relevant as a family decides, for instance, on whether diverting resources for emigration will be more profitable than investing in farming tools.

There are many examples of the dynamism and complexity of the many factors that combine to create the migration context both as an instrument of socio-economic growth and development on the one hand, and of stagnation, dependency and underdevelopment on the other hand given the negative impacts of brain drain, human trafficking and irregular migration. Clearly then, everyone may not benefit at the same time from migration – while some win, others may lose.

In addition, spill overs from a positive turn, such as open borders for sub-regional mobility, could become negative outcomes in another region; this is amply demonstrated by the on-going conflicts between cattle herders and local farmers in Nigeria. Also, the findings in part three of this book show that migration can breed violent conflicts and insecurity, especially when it is unregulated. The cases of people -- displaced due to intra-state conflict or terrorism in their home country (or home region) in Africa -- whose presence in a neighbouring state/home region as refugees (IDPs) triggers new conflicts, helps to underscore this reality.

Those are important dynamics to take into consideration in a continent that is intensifying its integration and cooperation efforts through open borders. It is also a note of caution to champions of the rights perspective (such as NGOs and INGOs) as they justly pursue the rights of migrants and refugees to be integrated into national policies. The resulting unanticipated ripple effects may have the potential to spread more broadly than 'residential' permits. For academics, there is the question of how the empirical knowledge they generate can benefit policy making and implementation so that migration can be managed in ways that reduces the negative effects while appropriating the relevant positive impacts.

In essence then, the prognosis for the future of migration in Africa is ambivalent; dire on the one hand and promising on the other! Basically, the region is at crossroads on migration issues as the African Union continues with its efforts of pushing for, and trying to craft, a coherent and actionable regional policy framework on migration (African Union: 2018). The future will be particularly dire or uncertain if it carries on with the current patchwork approach to addressing critical challenges facing it, including: sustained brain drain and wasted human capital; perennial need for human capital development and technical assistance; local and exported conflicts; and inadequate foreign direct investments. It will be especially challenging as pressure for intra-Africa migration increases with projected population growth of an estimated 970 million working age (15-64yrs) people by 2050 (AfDB, 2015). According to Goldstone (2019) “if fertility remains as high as 3.5 children per woman in 2050 and 2.65 in 2100, which is the UN “high variant” scenario, then Africa’s total population would soar to 2.8 billion by 2050 and 6.2 billion by 2100”. Goldstone summarised his findings thus: “Africa is enormously varied. About the only firm statement one can make is that Africa will be the most demographically dynamic continent in the world in this century. It will also be the source of virtually all labor force growth in the world, and by far the youngest region, in the 21st century” (Goldstone, 2019 available in <https://www.hoover.org/research/africa-2050-demographic-truth-and-consequences>).

Basically, Africa’s emerging demographic reality has implications not only for migration within the continent, but also for global migration into Africa. Clearly then, the interconnection between national, regional and global forces in shaping the migration context in the continent, coupled with the weaknesses of state institutional capacity to mitigate the negative impact are, collectively, serious causes for concern (see Andersson, 2016; Flahaux and de Haas, 2016; Fosu, 2017). Indeed, the salience of the state as the primary mode of organization in Africa is not in doubt. Thus, viewed from that perspective, the centrality of the state in enabling societal development, poverty alleviation, infrastructural provision and efficient service delivery through good governance will be better understood in terms of how the absence of those pacifying attributes may lead to conflict and emigration. The fluid interaction between state-development/under-development, conflict and migration that produces the distinct character of the political economy of Africa that fosters migration has been well discussed in this book and other academic literature.

On the other hand, the horizon looks promising for migration in Africa as other non-state actors have become more active. For instance, the African Development Bank (AfDB) now has a focus on infrastructural development and investments across countries to stimulate economic cooperation for development. Also, although still fragmented, more statistical information, generated by international institutions such as UNCTAD and UNCHR, are being mobilized to enable evidence-based decision making on regional economic integration, economic development and protocols on immigration, and refugee movements in Africa. What these tell us is that improving the migration experience of migrants, both home and host society, will require more

than conciliatory efforts at border management, which seems to be the focus of most national governments. Migration in Africa reflects many of the dysfunctions and drivers that embed crippling underdevelopment in the region: weak state systems, neo-colonialism, classical resource extraction, agricultural decline, exploited labour, corruption and poor governance, and armed violence and conflict. In the light of these, migration in any of its forms is an outcome that assumes a miniscule position, and the migrants become victims of powerful socio-political forces that are invisible to them. To overcome such challenges, African governments need to break or bypass the impediments that push their political economies towards the dysfunctions that feed the migratory behaviour of their citizens. That entails building bridges by revisiting and revamping or strengthening relevant AU instruments such as the African Peer Review Mechanism⁸¹ for more effective regional/sub-regional policy coordination on vital matters such peace, human capital development and retention; and economic and migration policy cooperation and coordination.



⁸¹ PA Jiboku and U Okeke-Uzodike (2016), Regional Economic Integration and the Governance Challenge in Africa: Missing Links in the African Peer Review Mechanism, **Africa Development**, XLI XLI(2 2)

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