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Migration and Governance in Africa

Lessons for Policymakers



Editors

**Ufo Okeke-Uzodike
Hakeem Onapajo
Chinonso Ihuoma**

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INTRODUCTION

Migration in Africa: Role of Leadership

Ufo Okeke-Uzodike, Hakeem Onapajo, and Chinonso Ihuoma

As the world gets smaller and economic competition is based more and more on creativity and technological innovation, the place that attracts the world's best minds will have a distinct advantage. We are that place. If you walk the streets of Tokyo or Beijing, it is not difficult to distinguish native from tourist. If you walk the streets of New York or the malls of Los Angeles, good luck in trying to figure out who is home and who is not. America may not be a melting pot, since each immigrant group tries to retain an element of their identity, but in its own often imperfect way, it is a place that is built to encourage, accept, tolerate and even absorb diversity. A place with roots everywhere has a tremendous edge in a global economy. We can do business anywhere, and host workers from anyplace. We are also a place that allows individual freedom and creativity. Even if economies are growing faster in other places, freedom and tolerance of diversity will remain a key part of America's appeal (Cohen, 2013).

It may be safe to say that there are no places or territories where human communities sprouted (like seeds) from the ground. As such, all human communities everywhere (essentially) are the net results of migrant behaviors (ancient or contemporary). While some communities were made up of people who relocated in prehistoric times and could lay claim to being among the "original" settlers in particular places, many others resettled more recently (relatively) in areas already claimed or considered home by others. In essence, human movements have always been integral, historically, to quests by all human communities and nations for personal safety and communal security, development and prosperity. While people were largely pushed (for instance – by war, famine, drought, flooding, crop failures and safety hazards) into involuntary decisions to leave their homes and communities in ancient times, such challenges appear to have become less crucial in contemporary times with the advent of national, bilateral and multilateral aid systems.

By contrast, other factors that were previously either less important or non-existent (such as prospects for wealth or better employment, personal safety, social services, political stability, fertile land, and good climatic conditions) have become so important or alluring that they pull people in contemporary times to emigrate voluntarily to promising host countries. As the world has become increasingly smaller, we have

started to witness significant varieties of problems such as severe economic challenges, tumultuous and frequent climatic changes, institutional realignments, growing human and national security issues, socio-cultural and political conflicts (often driven by extreme poverty, social exclusions and gender-based discriminations). Often overwhelmed by the associated pressures, many policymakers seem to lack clear and effective answers to growing expectations and aggressive demands by their constituencies for service deliveries, good jobs, and other opportunities and quality of life improvements.

Faced with severe budgetary limitations and competing needs, many governments are further compelled by growing public access to technological innovations in communication systems, which have become key instruments for organizing and facilitating civic dissent, disobedience, and collective actions. While some people – particularly those with sellable skills, ambition and competitive capacity – seek to emigrate, governments usually push back by squishing the opposition to regain control while looking the other way as many citizens exit in search of improved conditions and better fortunes elsewhere.

Sadly, while many migrants were once welcomed with open arms in some countries, they are increasingly abhorred and demonized in the 21st century as numbers grew rapidly and as government and opposition leaders adopted populist covers to explain policy failures or win electoral contests. Indeed, despite loud complaints and draconian anti-migrant measures being contemplated or introduced by governments in many host countries around the world – from Italy, Germany, Australia and South Africa to the United Kingdom and the United States -- migrants generally add far more value to their host communities than they (or their home countries) receive for their efforts. For instance, as British Home Secretary, Theresa May triggered a row with some colleagues in 2015 when she attempted to meet draconian immigration reduction targets by targeting the children of illegal immigrants by way of school enrolment. Nicky Morgan, then Education Secretary, challenged May's policy plans including discriminatory admission policies, school immigration checks, and legal passports for admission of new pupils. Arguing that the plans were not just impractical, Morgan insisted that they were also dangerous since they deprioritized children in a way that can only 'concentrate children of illegal migrants in the least popular schools in any area, jeopardizing our increasingly important focus on tackling both segregation and extremism' (Watts, 2016). For Angela Rayner, Labor's shadow Education Secretary, the issues were morally deplorable:

Denying innocent children, because of the circumstances of their parents, the right to a good education is disgusting. It's not a British value that we have... One in eight UK nationals don't have a passport either so it's completely impractical... Rather than deal with the problems in her own department Theresa May was trying to offload

the failings of her department and blame children, innocent children, in that (Watts, 2016).

Basically, the vulnerabilities of migrants has created scenarios around the world where they are used for simplistic victories by politicians. Driven by political considerations, government and opposition leaders often use migrants as political toys in pursuit of personal gains or points scoring. Quite aside from tendencies sometimes to bury moral considerations and authority, some often employ other strategies such as ignoring the truth if blatant lies are more convenient. For instance, it was for such reason that Theresa May (as British Prime Minister) “claimed to Tory delegates at the start of October [2016] that people across Britain found ‘themselves out of work or on lower wages because of low-skilled immigration’ – and that this was a reason for restricting immigration” (Stone, 2016). In response, George Osborne, the former Chancellor of the Exchequer (finance minister) rejected the assertion as contrary to ‘hard data’:

...we are close to full employment in this country, so I think the argument that somehow immigrants are taking jobs that are leaving a load of people unemployed in Britain doesn't really stack up because there aren't loads of people unemployed in Britain. I'm not saying the quality of work is as good as it could be, you could improve the skills, but the hard data is that the employment rate is the highest in the world, the unemployment roll is the lowest since 1971. So I don't really buy he (sic) argument that there's a big pool of British people who don't have jobs and who need jobs (Stone, 2016).

Clearly, the British are not alone in demonstrating willingness to address immigration matters based on questionable motivations. In the United States, President Donald Trump was so frustrated with lawmakers seeking a bipartisan immigration policy that included Haiti, El Salvador and some African countries that he blurted disparagingly: ‘Why are we having all these people from shithole countries come here’ (Barron, 2018)? The censures that followed summarily from around the world included an equally rancid comment from Vicente Fox, Mexico's former president: ‘Your mouth is the foulest shithole in the world. With what authority do you proclaim who's welcome in America and who's not. America's greatness is built on diversity, or have you forgotten your immigrant background, Donald’ (Washington Examiner, 2018)?

Locally in the United States, many others accused Trump of racist and elitist bigotry on immigration. For Rev. Al Sharpton, Trump's “whites only” bigotry is used instrumentally to “disparage people of color... from a racist and bigoted point of view. And the danger is that he is now putting that into policy in America” (Barron, 2018). For the NAACP – an eminent civil rights organization -- Trump was sinking “deeper and deeper into the rabbit hole of racism and xenophobia,” which they deemed a “low point” from a “continuous lowbrow, callous and unfiltered racism repeatedly espoused by President Trump” (Barron, 2018). While John Brennan (former CIA director) noted that Lady Liberty was “weeping” in dismay with Trump's “atrocious” comment, James

Comey (former FBI director) provided the ancient inscription on America's Statue of Liberty: "Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, the wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden door!" He then underscored his contribution by affirming his belief that the United States is a country of immigrants: "This country's greatness and true genius lies in its diversity" (Barron, 2018).

Such sentiments notwithstanding, immigration issues have remained attractive and powerful instruments for demagogic governments and politicians who use them to stir nationalist fervor, secure electoral support, or divert popular attention from government failures. In fact, public attitudes against immigration and migrants in the most anti-immigrant countries of the Western world such as Italy, France, Germany, Spain, United Kingdom or Netherlands -- or in Africa such as South Africa -- are often shaped by politicians whose finger-pointing narratives or policy prescriptions seek to drum up nationalist fervor while blaming immigrants for socioeconomic problems facing their country (McCarthy, 2016). In consequence, intolerance or xenophobic attitudes and violence have increased globally -- especially in European countries and, increasingly, in the United States. In fact, countries that were previously immigrant-friendly (such as Australia, France, New Zealand, South Africa, and USA) have become increasingly less hospitable. For instance, an opinion survey of migrants in Australia shows that the country has become more racist and less "caring" and "friendly" (Minear, 2014).

So, regardless of whether push or pull factors are at work, migrancy is a coping strategy employed by individuals in pursuit of their narrow or broad interests. Ravaged by socioeconomic and political challenges (often leadership-induced), many Africans navigate terrains drenched with political and cultural cleavages, underdeveloped infrastructures, suffocating business environments, social exclusion and inequalities, conflicts, and poverty. In many source countries, government officials are so desperate for financial resources to implement projects that they target the relatively huge remittance inflows from nationals serving as migrants in foreign lands. For instance, the top 5 countries globally that received the highest amount of remittances in 2019 as a percentage of their gross domestic product (GDP) were: Tonga (37.6% of GDP), Haiti (37.1%), South Sudan (34.1%), the Kyrgyz Republic (29.2%), and Tajikistan (28.2%) (World Bank 2020). For comparatively bigger countries such as India (USD83.1 billion), China (USD68.4 billion), Mexico (USD38.5 billion), the Philippines (USD35.2 billion), and Egypt (USD26.8 billion), remittance inflows may represent relatively significant chunks of their national budgets or Foreign Direct Investments (World Bank, 2020). Not surprisingly, many source countries introduce or tweak policies to encourage or facilitate transfers from host countries.

In essence, due to poor leadership and the associated governance, poverty remains the major push factor prompting migration. In this way, due to chronic structural and other developmental challenges, which prevent or impede sustained economic growth,

transformative change and development compel many young Africans to emigrate from their countries in desperate and urgent efforts to alter their life prospects in foreign lands. This book -- ***Migration and Governance in Africa: Lessons for Policymakers*** -- is dedicated to the close linkage between leadership/governance and the migratory decisions of Africans since the postcolonial period. Regrettably, one of Africa's biggest tragedies (in many ways) over the years has stemmed from the dominance of assessments (scholarly and otherwise) that link migrancy with huge benefits that ostensibly accrue to the migrants' countries of origin. The net effect (for decades) has been that governments of many host countries within Africa and globally have often emplaced restraining policies to slow down, limit or even stop immigrants from entering or staying within their territorial boundaries. Indeed, some academics and policymakers are still embroiled deeply in debates over who benefits from migration – source or host country? For many others, the case is largely settled as growing evidence continue to pile up overwhelmingly in favour of host countries being the principal beneficiaries.

In essence then, this book is an attempt to provide alternative insights and policy ideas for African governments on how best to rethink or reconceptualise their skilled staffing difficulties and the associated implications and impacts on their issues such as: human capital development and retention problems; slow economic growth; socio-economic and political disorders; and persistent underdevelopment and poverty (Uzodike, 2020: 3). To rephrase and redirect Steven Cohen (2013): with the world getting smaller and economic competition based increasingly on creativity, communications, big data applications and changes in technology and technological innovation, countries that have some of the best minds that the world has to offer will have a distinct advantage. Given its competitive youthful population, Africa can be that place -- if its governments endeavor to harness their youthful energies directly for contributive transformative change and development.

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Part One

**Migration Policy, Governance
and Environmental Issues**

CHAPTER ONE

United States Immigration Policy and International Migration Crisis

*Micheal Ifeanyichukwu Abada, Ifeoma Nneka Okafor
and Solomon Salvation Eze*

Introduction

Donald Trump in his electioneering campaigns promised the United States of America a restrictive immigration policy that will help to strengthen America once again. The immigration policy of Trump is geared toward revamping or mainly eliminating such social policies like Obama care, reduction in taxation, and re-orienting the defense policies in the bid to achieve the “America first” objective (Orozco, 2016). The immigration policies of the United States cover areas such as deportation, elimination of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) and Deferred Action for Parents Arrival (DAPA), reduction of Central Americans in USA, travel ban, construction of border wall and taxation on remittances.

In view of these, structures have been put in place to enforce immigration laws through cooperation with locales, thus reducing refugee admission and other executive actions of previous administration that enhanced immigration into United States (Pierce, Bolter & Selee, 2018). The immigration policies introduced into the United States since 2016 have caused great pressure and exodus of people, thereby preventing individual country citizens with track records of terrorism from gaining admission into America (Trump, 2017). The most hit by this policy are Central Americans who migrate to escape dire political and economic instabilities at home. The inability to gain direct access have pre-empted the search for alternative destinations which had brought the rate of apprehension at the U.S-Mexican border to its lowest level at 26 percent fall. The implication is the fall in tourism, international students decline by 7 percent and campus enrolment fall (Pierce & Selee, 2017).

The states bordering the United States of America like Mexico and Canada with majority of the European Union member states have recorded additional influx of refugees, asylum seekers and economic migrants. Refugees were to Canada, because traditionally, she has been providing higher social assistance and safety nets for refugees (Proctor, 2017), while in the Europe, refugee and economic migrant crises had escalated due to migrants from Iraq, Iran, Somalia, Libya, North Korea and Sudan. These are citizens escaping violence and extreme hunger at home who have found alternative destinations to Europe. These underscore the fact that Mexico is at the

receiving end as its share in the migration crisis is due to majority of migrants from Central America to United States who use Mexico as their transition route.

With the anti-immigration policy of the United States, Mexico has change from being a transition route to becoming a destination country. In the first three month of 2017, Mexico had received more asylum applications than neighbouring countries (Isaacson, Meyer & Smith, 2017). Anti-immigration policies like deportation, extreme vetting, elimination of DACA and DAPA, building of border wall, and taxation on remittance etc, had resulted to relocation of people to other choice destinations like Mexico, Canada and Europe. Arguments on the problematic nature of immigration policies had necessitated scholars like Mclean & McMillian (2003) to reflect on the hostility shown to the immigrants. The destination countries accuse immigrants of taking over their jobs or undermining their culture. According to McKenna and Feingold (2006), immigrants never stole the jobs of the citizens rather they perform jobs which the citizens cannot perform. They further claim that migrants give the United States economic edge following their innovative and entrepreneurial spirit. But for Ebaidalla and Edriess (2015), immigrants are more concerned with not only the development of the destination country but also the development of their home countries. At this juncture, it could be ascertained that scholars do not agree on the actual problems of migration and its resultant crisis. But myriad of researchers like McLean and McMillian (2003), McKenna and Feingold (2006), Ebaidalla and Edriess (2015), Goldstein and Pevehouse (2006), Schmitter and Lefkofridi (2016), and Bouvier (1988), are yet to reach compromise on the nature and implications of migration on international crises.

Literature Review

The review of extant literature in the issues of concern in this paper was done using the thematic approach under the following:

- **Border Management Measures and Increasing Black Economy Across the Border**

The International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2016) has premised that border management intervention contributes to the catch-up with the targets of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This indicates that:

Prime among the goals is goal 10, target 10.7, facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation planned and well managed migration policies. Also are the numbers 9, 16, and 17 which touch upon building resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation.

The argument of the International Organization for Migration is veritable and convincing considering the contributions of migration to the realization of the Sustainable Development Goal on safe and orderly migration. But, there appear to be weaknesses on the provisions as the migration and border management practices are

plunged with problems of abuses and cases of corruption by border officials; and these make the entry of terrorists and criminals possible.

According to Rusev (2013), cross-border management can be traced to corruption which has manifested between border officials and transnational criminal organizations or terrorist groups engaging in human trafficking and smuggling. Corrupt practices by the cross-border agents and criminals include: forging of documents, transportation, and facilitation of illegal border crossing, which are all means used to circumvent border integrity (Rusev, 2013). To Dimant (2014), cross-border corruption is caused by selective migration. He emphasized that migrants from corrupt-ridden countries boosts, the corruption levels of their target countries.

Furthermore, Border Management Authority Bill (2015) sees border management measures as an interagency exercise geared towards securing the borders of the republic and national (security and sovereign) interests of the state. Consistent with the aim and intent of the national security strategy of the United States of America is the strengthening and control of borders and immigration system toward national security (NSS, 2017). The aim of the integrated border patrol network of the U.S. covers all the strategic environment of the state - the air, land, and sea borders.

Based on the promotion of national interest and border security, Border Management Authority Bill (2015) and National Security Strategy (2017), see border management as a major strategy for promoting border security. Border management is an inter-agency framework which combines efforts of the traditional border authorities and the national security agencies in the bid to protect the air, land, and sea borders. The European Parliament sees the combination of the inter-agency framework as the promotion of trade and way forward in border control. Buttressing the above contributions, Morris, George, Haseley, Parker & Sherman (2014) maintain that border management involves real time collaboration that empowers government and industry to work together to create safer, more standard, and cost effective perimeters. However, the tactics of border management is usually constrained by lack of resources needed to perform the security screening for both people and goods. Hence, the increment in trade and movement of people across borders, complex supply chains and increasing criminal activity, tend to pose problems to border management (Morris et al, 2014).

Newman (2011) maintains that border management should not be base on the traditional territorial boundary which is simply relies on delimitation and demarcation. Its utilization has become outdated, as it encourages illegal economic activities across borders. The extant literature shows reveal that border management measures do not only end either in the use of physical barriers, electronic devices, and intelligence, or in the use of the different capabilities of security personnel and agencies. Rather, border management is dependent on the combination of the strategies and an interagency framework. Thus, the major problem which confronts

every immigration policy is how to adopt the best strategy that can cover the various borders (land, sea and air) so as to keep out the army of illegal immigrants.

- **Cross-Border Integrity and Central American New Choice**

Unlike other American past and former Presidents, the immigration policies adopted by Donald Trump have certain promises which previous immigration policies lacked. Barack Obama's Comprehensive Immigration Reforms (CIR), promoted citizenship and resident legalization and authorization for illegal aliens as exemplified in Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (Ting, 2016). Donald Trump in his maiden speech to the U.S. Congress on February 28, 2017, stated that the increasing anti-immigration enforcements and merits-based immigration system will benefit the country as it will improve jobs, wages, and security (Gubernskaya & Dreby, 2017). The immigration policy of Donald Trump has led to the redirection of the choice of immigrants from the Northern Triangle Central American countries (Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras) to Mexico. This is one of the effects of the border management enforcement adopted by Trump, which has generally tamed the level of migration to the United States.

The surge of migrants from the Northern Triangle countries is predicated on the dire condition that prevail in the region-El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. These countries are bedeviled with violence and homicide rates that amongst the highest in the world. Another reason for the surge is the nature of violence against women, and gender-motivated killings, which are equally known and predominant in the area (Musalo & Lee, 2017). The prevailing condition of molestation, coupled with high economic hardship, had made many women, men, and children in the area to risk themselves through mountain regions, rivers, corrupt Mexican border officials and smugglers, to get to the United States of America. However, the current border management strategies of the U.S, with its increasing use of modern technologies, information sharing, and inter-agency collaborations have made it easier to apprehend many of the immigrants.

Moreover, Kerlikowske (2017) has noted that the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) of the United States of America has played a very formidable role in safeguarding and managing America's borders and creating awareness to prevent terrorist attacks, intercept malicious criminals and materials, and enforce U.S. laws at the borders. Since entry into the United States of America has become highly regulatory and restrictive following the border management strategies, Mexico has become an alternative safe haven for Central Americans. However, with the building of the border wall, efforts in crossing to America by the Central Americans have become frustrated. It is fruitful to recall that during Obama's regime, he was able to build about 649 out of the planned 652 miles of fencing which is around 99.5 percent of the fencing project. The project includes 299 miles of vehicle barrier and 350 miles of pedestrian fence (Farley, 2011).

Consolidating on the above landmark achievements, President Trump in one of his campaigns promised to build 55 feet high border wall along the entire 2000 miles of the United States/ Mexican border (Laurent, Oddo, Brandy & Knox, 2017). The border wall initiated by Trump was in accordance with the Executive Order 13767 signed by President Trump for the purpose of deploying all available means to securing the United States border integrity. Compared to the Trump administration, President Obama's wall covered only about 13.48 percent of the American/Mexico border. These indicate that from 2004 through 2010, U.S. Border Patrol witnessed an unprecedented build-up of resources that increased its ability to decrease the flow of illegal activities by drug and alien smuggling organizations (Schroeder, 2016).

The U.S. border patrol agents have continued to fill the capacity gap by hiring more agents. They receive situational updates about the border environment so as to perform their duties effectively. Currently the border patrol agents have continued to perform the function of apprehension which was designed to stop re-entry of persons that had been caught (Schroeder, 2016). The increased activities of the border security and border wall have led to recent increase in the number of persons apprehended along the U.S / Mexican border.

According to Amnesty International (2017), the number of irregular entries into the United States of America is currently much lower when compared to other decades. It has been revealed that the number of nationalities classified as non-Mexicans by the United States has continued to grow. In 2016, about 91 percent of the family units apprehended by the U.S. Border Control came from the Central America Northern Triangle, and 79 percent of them are unaccompanied children (Amnesty International, 2017).

In the same year, the total number of people who gained unauthorized entry into the United States from Central America was about 60000, while those apprehended totals 300000. The achievements of the Custom and Border Protection Commission have led to a stronger border management regime in the U.S.(Orozco, 2017).

Table 1: Performance Measures of Customs and Border Protection Strategic Goals.

Performance Measures	Fiscal Year 2013	Fiscal Year 2014	Fiscal Year 2015	Target Result 2016	Fiscal Year 2017	Target MET 2018
Percent of people apprehended multiple times along the southwest borders.	16 %	14%	14%	17%	12.3%	MET
Rate of interdiction effectiveness along the southern border between ports of entry.	—	79.28%	81.0%	81%	82.67%	MET

Source: U.S. CBP performance, 2016

The table shows the performance report in the area of apprehension and interdiction from fiscal year 2013 to 2018. The table reveals that in the year 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 apprehension continued has continued to decrease. It fell from 16 percent in 2013 to 12.3 percent in 2016. This reveals a reduction in the number of migrants that want to sneak into the United States. The reduction in the level of apprehension can be traced to the increasing level of interdiction along the southern border. There is three percent (3%) increase in the level of interdiction which was about 79.28 percent in 2013 and has increased to 82.67 percent in 2016. The success of the apprehension tactics in checkmating the inflow from the points of entry shows the successes of the security enforcement strategies (Rosenblum and Hipsman ,2017). It can be said that the level of apprehension led to proportionate reduction in the level of asylum seekers since the period of Trump’s presidency, especially seekers from Central America. In 2016 alone, 8781 people applied for asylum in Mexico and amongst those that applied 91.6 percent are from the Northern Triangle of Central America. In addition, eight percent increase in the number of those recognized as refugees received complementary protection between 2015 and 2016. In Mexico, efforts have been made to accommodate asylum seekers and refugees, especially unaccompanied children. This has increased the number of modules and shelter housing for unaccompanied children. The Mexican government through the National Protection System has set state and municipal Congresses toward improving the protection of migrants’ children.

There are contributions by the United Nations in making Mexico a destination country instead of a country of origin and transition. The assistance of the UNHCR has been

significant and geared at ending the refugee and asylum problems in the region. However, in October 2016, UNHCR released a job announcement to hire additional agents for COMAR's offices in Mexico City (Isacson, et al, 2017). Several humanitarian assistance have been given by the community members of migration routes; most importantly, Tenosique area, which is known to be predatory, has been kind to migrants. There exist underground network of concerned volunteers at points along the routes, to offer water to migrants, warn of dangerous areas, shelter unaccompanied children who may qualify as refugees, and inform migrants about the possibilities of seeking protected status inside Mexico (Isacson et al, 2017). Of particular interest to this study is that the Mexican government's efforts at protecting asylum seekers and refugees have made Mexico the best choice for the Central American countries.

Theoretical Framework of Analysis

The theoretical framework for the study is the theory of Securitization as propounded by Ole Waever (1987), and later expanded by his colleagues in the Copenhagen school. It described security as the subjective and socially constructed process by which a threat to a particular referent object is acknowledged and deemed worth protecting. The argument of the theory is premised on existential threats and urgent measures to counter the threats (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998 and Waever, 1995).

The theory holds that the security actors in a state are always at the lookout to identify any threat against the state, be it political, social-economic, military, or even environmental threats; and are supposed to take any emergency action(s) that will lead to mitigation or complete eradication of the threats.

This theory can be used to explaining the United States Immigration policy and how it has contributed to the international migration crisis. The current U.S. president, Donald Trump, adopted a nationalist and supremacist policy on immigration based on an idea that immigrants are threats to U.S. culture, employment, security, and welfare. The immigration policy under Donald Trump is a response to such threats as terrorism, drug trafficking, nuclear weapon proliferation, and cyber-attacks. The measures which have been adopted to counter these threats include: border management ; erecting of a border wall to keep out drug traffickers from Mexico, asylum seekers and refugees from troubled regions; and policy of extreme vetting which has placed ban on countries with terrorist potentials, from entering into the United States of America. This forms the thrust of the National Security Strategy of Trump directed at defending the country and putting the safety of the Americans first.

Methodology

Methodologically, the paper utilized qualitative method. Data for the study were gathered through secondary sources, and analyzed using content-analysis approach.

Findings

The immigration policy of the United States of America has largely curtailed the avalanche of threats which U.S. faces because of migrants. Most of the immigrants are people escaping dire security threats in their home countries, and with the U.S. anti-immigration policy, Mexico has become their choice alternative. Mexicans are very accommodating as it regards Central American migrants. However, the refugees especially women and unaccompanied children continue to live endangered lives. Having migrated because of dire economic hardship and violence in their countries, they also face similar fate during their transit period. The journey to the Central American is characterized by dangerous situations like rape, kidnapping, beating, severe bodily harm, luring into prostitution and even death (Mittelstadt, 2017).

Conclusion and Recommendations

The United States immigration policy since the beginning of Trump's administration has caused a lot of problems for immigrants. Family separation due to deportation, apprehension, and interdiction across the America borders have caused great number of unauthorized migrants to seek for other alternatives. Hence, there is today increased migration crises in Mexico, Canada, and Europe.

The study aimed at assessing the impact of America's border control measures on migration into Mexico. The theory employed is securitization theory which emphasized how a state employs available machinery to quell impending dangers to its sovereignty and economy. The findings reveal that the immigration policy of the United States of America has curtailed the avalanche of threats which U.S faces because of migrants.

The study recommended, among other policy options, collaborative efforts by U.S.A., UN, Mexico, and the Central American countries, in addressing the root causes of the migration crises and their effects on the global economy in contemporary time.

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CHAPTER TWO

Migration and the Dislocation of Nigeria's Social Fabric: The Governance Question

Mbanefo Odum

Introduction

One of the assumptions of the Evolutionary Theory, as an aspect of Social Change Theory, is that change is a constant feature in every society. As indicated by Onuoha (2009), the evolutionists consider change to be normal and inevitable. There are different factors that give rise to social change. Whereas certain societal changes occur in a very slow and gradual process, some others are comparatively faster or, we can say, less-gradual. Equally, there are various forms of societal changes that create varying shades of impacts on the society. While there are changes that lead to positive outcomes and improvements in the existing conditions, others lead to negative and undesirable impacts on the social fabrics of the society.

Migration is not a strange phenomenon. It is experienced universally, though its occurrence and effect on the different countries of the world vary. As indicated by Itumo, Nwobashi, and Igwe (2017), cases of migration had existed in Africa prior to the colonial period and this was occasioned by such factors as long-distance trade, search for pasture, plantation agriculture, industrial production, and armed conflict. According to Nnoli (2006, p.121) this pattern of cross-border economic and other activities that started in the pre-colonial era continued in the post-colonial period “as if the colonial and postcolonial state boundaries do not exist”.

Nigeria is not spared from the incidence of migration. In general terms, one can say that at some point, the trend of migration in the country was to some extent regulated. At some point, however, the rate and trend of migration changed pattern as it became more irregular. Many people can still recall the popular short television clip that featured prominently on the national television during the 1980s, featuring a young man named Andrew, who decided to *check out* of the country owing to harsh economic conditions. Many years down the line, things appear to have worsened both in terms of the prevailing economic conditions and the number of people *checking out* or wishing to *check out*.

It is a truism that societies with a high level of social instability induce her citizens into forced migration. From whichever way one looks at it, irregular migration has certain impacts on the social fabrics of a nation. What are the trends of migration in Nigeria? In what respects have they caused dislocation on the social fabric of the country? To what extent has the nature of governance in Nigeria contributed towards provoking

irregular migration? It is believed that by finding the correct responses to these questions, we can come up with informed suggestions that would be useful in guiding policy decisions and actions regarding the subject matter.

Conceptual Explications

Social Fabric

Hornby (2015) defines fabric as material made by weaving wool, cotton, silk, etc.; the basic structure of a society or an organization that enables that society or organization to function successfully. Citing the example of a good family as fabric of the nation, Odumosu (2017) sees the concept as the structure, framework, or composition of a material or unit of existence. When we look at the first definition according to Hornby, we can see that fabric is actually made by weaving. What this calls to mind is that we can think of fabric as a network of pieces of threads that are crafted into a material, or a network of different units that forms a structure. When we remove all the strands of wool/cotton/silk contained in a piece of cloth, the cloth will cease to exist. Threads can only become a cloth when woven together. It goes without saying that it is the nature of threads that determine the nature of the cloth and not vice versa.

In line with the above, we may begin to understand social fabric from the viewpoint of the basic structure on which society is framed. It is the social fabric of a society that gives the society its general outlook. Drawing from the analogy of silk threads producing a silk cloth, we can therefore understand that a society made up of good families is most likely to be a good society, while the one made up of bad families will invariably turn out to be a bad society. Thus, when we talk of social fabrics, we think of roles, values, behavioral order and indeed, the various structures that form the framework of the society.

Migrant and Migration

Generally, a migrant is seen as a person that has moved from one territorial boundary to another with the intention of settling there for a long period of time. Going by such qualifiers as *international* or *cross-border*, there could be intra-national, intra-border, and international migration. Itumo, Nwobashi, and Igwe (2017) see migration as the movement of people across national, regional, or/and continental borders. The United Nations Organisation (cited in Koser, 2000) defined an international migrant as a person who stays outside their usual country of residence for at least one year. This means that someone in transit or a tourist that visited a country briefly cannot be termed as a migrant.

Moreover, migration can occur voluntarily or on the basis of forced conditions; hence, we hear of such terms as voluntary/forced migration. Whereas there are some migrants that follow due procedures established by the host country before taking up residence, there are others that do not. Hence, we hear of such terms as legal/illegal migrants or regular/irregular migration. Koser (2000) explains irregular migration as

the act of entering a country without proper authority, and irregular migrants as those who may have entered a country perfectly legally but remain there after their visa/permit must have expired, that is, in contravention of the authorities. Also included are people moved by migrant smugglers or human traffickers who deliberately abuse the asylum system. In this paper, we see a migrant as someone that left his/her area of residence to take up residence in another country. Thus, we are hereby looking at migration from the cross-border or international perspective.

Governance

Various writers and scholars have attempted to explain the concept of governance from different perspectives. According to Odum (2017), governance can be defined simplistically as the activities undertaken by those who govern, or the actions they take in the discharge of their duties. *UNESCO* (2017) views it as relating to structures and processes that are designed to ensure accountability, transparency, responsiveness, rule of law, stability, equity and inclusiveness, empowerment, and broad-based participation. Lynn, Heinrich and Hill (2000) view governance as a regime of laws, administrative rules, judicial rulings, and practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable government activity. The *Institute on Governance* (2017) explains it in terms of who has power, who makes decisions, how other players make their voices heard, and how account is rendered. Bevir (2013) describes governance as all of the processes of governing, whether undertaken by a government, market or network; whether over a family, tribe, formal, or informal organisation or territory, and whether through the laws, norms, power, or language of an organized society.

Governance can be seen from a public institution-related perspective. Hence, Nnoli (2003) presents it as the manner in which a government carries out its functions. World Bank (cited in Ezekwesili, 2011, p. 171) posits that ‘governance is the manner in which public officials and public institutions acquire and exercise the authority to provide public goods and services, including the delivery of basic services, infrastructure, and a sound investment climate’. Veltmeyer (2009) attempts to highlight the relational quality of the concept by seeing it as a term that denotes a particular set of interactions between the civil society and governments. In the same vein, UNECA (cited in Jacob, 2016) defines it as a process of social engagement between the rulers and the ruled in a political community.

Judging from the opinions of scholars, it is evident that governance can assume different shades or qualities. Hence, we hear of such things like good governance, bad governance, qualitative governance, responsive governance, and ineffective governance. For instance, Obialor and Cornel (2017), citing UNESCAP, stated that the concept of good governance often emerges as a model to compare ineffective economies and political bodies with viable economies and political bodies. In recent times, the concept of good governance has permeated intellectual discourses in a way that makes it seem as if ‘governance’ is an incomplete term when presented without a qualifier. Tandon (2000, p. 2) explains that the concept of good governance became

prominent 'when donors decided that it was not enough to institute economic reforms in Africa, but that it was necessary, in addition, to reform the manner in which African governments were carrying out the business of governance'. Veltmeyer (2009, p. 228) describes good governance as an array of practices that maximize the common/public good and, in more specific terms, 'a relation between social organizations and government that conforms to the following "democratic" principles: transparency, effectiveness, openness, responsiveness and accountability; the rule of law, acceptance of diversity and pluralism, and social inclusiveness'. In general terms, when we talk of good governance, the picture we should have in mind is that of efficient institutions and effective stakeholders committed to efficient policymaking and implementation for the development of the society. Just as Heller and Til (1982) stated that the essence of leadership is followership, so too does it need to be understood that the people remain an indispensable component of governance.

Theoretical Perspective

We cannot talk about governance without incorporating the issue of leadership. Barron and Greenberg (1990) define leadership as the process whereby one individual influences other group members towards the attainment of defined group, or organisational goals. Certo (2002) defines the concept as the process of directing the behaviours of others toward the accomplishment of some objectives. Rollinson (2008) views leadership as a process in which a leader and followers interact in a way that enables the former to influence the actions of the latter in a non-coercive way, towards the achievement of certain aims or objectives. Indeed, there are various other definitions of leadership by different scholars, but what appears common among them is that it is the duty of the leader to influence and give direction to the people s/he is leading, for the attainment of desired goals. Though the idea of *Leadership Substitutes* espoused by Kerr and Jermier (1978) seem to point in the direction that there are situations which enable followers or subordinates to function well without the guidance of a leader, it does not remove the relevance of leadership in every organisation or society.

There are different theories of leadership, and the Contingency Perspective is among them. The underlying feature of Contingency leadership theories is that they recognise that there are different styles of leadership and that there is no single style that can be described as being the most appropriate for all situations. Thus, it is the situation that determines the best style to be adopted. This explains the reason Contingency theories are also referred to as Situational theories. According to Sapru (2013), Situational theories of leadership are based on the idea that successful leaders must change their leadership styles as they encounter different situations. Also, Rollinson (2008) indicates that the basic assumption of the Contingency perspective is that effective leadership requires a leader to adopt a style of behaviour that matches the conditions in which leadership is to be exercised. This implies that a (particular) leader should possess the ability to respond to situations as they arise by adopting the necessary leadership style necessary for each situation. Implicit in this idea is that a leader ought

to be a repository of different leadership styles so as to be able to ‘pull out’ the relevant style from his/her stock whenever the situation arises. However, Fiedler’s (1967) strand of Contingency theory seems to point in the direction that a leader’s style is fixed and cannot be varied. Thus, there is a kind of leader (person) that is most suitable for every situation. Either way, the main ingredient to be taken is that in order to have effective leadership, the leader needed must be the type with the right attributes to handle the situation on the ground. This can be understood within the context of the general saying about *peace-time* or *war-time generals*. A leader that constantly preaches peace may not likely function well under a war situation, and a leader that preaches war at all times may not be effective under moments of peace.

The relevance of this theory to the study is that change is constant and it has the capacity to impact on the society. For this reason, the correct leader must be in place at all times to drive the wheels of governance. That is, the type of governance must be in line with the exigencies of the moment. In raising the question of governance vis-a-vis the issue of migration and the dislocation of Nigeria’s social fabric, it is unavoidable to beam searchlight on the nature of the country’s leadership.

Brief Discourse on Nigeria’s National Fabric

Nigeria is a product of colonialism. The pre-colonial traditional societies had values, orientations, and structures that sustained them prior to the advent of colonial rule. Though they have some peculiar differences, there are certain values these societies shared in common not just among them but with the other African societies. An instance is the African sense of communal living. Whether referred to as *Ubuntu* (by the Bantu speaking people in South Africa) (Odumosu, 2017), or as *Onye aghana nwanne ya* (no one should forsake a relation) (by Igbo people in the eastern part of Nigeria), the central idea about communal living is that individuals understand that their existence is intricately tied to the existence of other members of the community; and that the pain inflicted on one person affects all, just as one person’s joy is shared by everybody.

In the traditional societies, migration and assimilation of migrants were common, and these were sustained through the people’s proclivity towards hospitality and accommodation. Things considered as crime were highly prohibited and deterrence was achieved mainly through moral suasion. Commenting on the Igbo traditional societies, for instance, Nnoli (2017, p.30) notes that “crime was regarded as disruptive of the fabric of the universe, kink in the normal flow of life forces which the social order keeps alive”. As such, criminal acts were attached with serious social stigma. The family unit served as a powerful agent for social control; and the urge to protect family’s name was a strong reason to deter people from engaging in anti-social behaviours. Balogun (1983) also indicates that belief in superstitions were widespread within traditional societies. These superstitious beliefs and their unquestioning attributes helped in some respects in the maintenance of social control and order. Also, the main occupation of the people before the advent of colonialism was subsistence

agriculture and other related businesses that were conducted in manners that allowed members of the family to bind together. That way, it was easier for older members of the society to play their roles fully as agents of socialisation for the younger ones.

Some of these attributes of traditional African societies started eroding during the colonial era. Odum (2016) captures how the colonialists began introducing divisive measures between the northerners and the southern migrants that had lived peacefully together prior to colonialism. Also, Nwankwo (1998) captures how the colonialists, in their bid to maintain direct control and domination over the colonised territories, began to introduce different measures such as taxation. By introducing this measure, people were compelled to find means of earning colonial currency and this warranted them to leave their families and join colonial service or take up jobs in plantations. This trend affected the family system and the high level of cohesion it had always enjoyed.

Furthermore, colonialism equally disrupted the traditional process of social responsibility between the government and the governed. It distorted the traditional structure for governance by establishing a new system oriented towards satisfying foreign interests while relegating the needs of the indigenous peoples to the background. In general terms, the people directed their allegiance to the colonial authority. This pattern of governance weakened the citizens in terms of demanding for the accountability of office holders and even denied them the opportunity of making contributions towards public policy making and execution.

It is worthy to note that in the process of introducing a new system of governance and administration, the colonialists created “a legal-rational order and a modern bureaucratic state in Nigeria” (Balogun, 1983, p. 72). Maintenance of law and order (as defined by British standards) was taken seriously and the local people were compelled to accept the new system. As Odumegwu-Ojukwu (1989) observed, the people developed the faculty for fawning obedience before authority, thereby promoting the culture of respect for law.

Nigerians experienced trauma after the termination of the colonial rule. The first came during the early days of independence through a military coup, which watered the ground for the continuous stay of the military on the political scene. Another was the civil war. The hatred and bitterness that trailed the war were such that keep breeding the spirit of vengeance and destroying opportunities for fostering national cohesion and nation-building. These events distorted the texture of the national fabrics. Again, the incursion of military into politics further dampened the spirit of accountability that had already been deeply eroded during the colonial period. This situation contributed to the failure of successive governments as they had the leeway to act as unguarded masquerades that had the liberty to act without restrictions. With time, all facets of the national life began to suffer. The economy witnessed serious downturn, social infrastructure began to witness decay, opportunities for survival within the country

shrunk drastically, and people began to face serious hardships. All these negatively impacted on the system and adversely affected the people's values, orientations, attitudes, and general thinking process.

Nigeria and the Incidence of Migration

Migration is a social phenomenon propelled by several factors. Koser (2009) enumerates some of the causative factors to be grounded on economic reasons, security, and lack of development. Chances of migration are higher in countries burdened by a weak and deteriorating economy as well as a highly unmanageable level of unemployment. Citizens of such countries are likely to embark on migration especially when they nurse the feeling that they can access job opportunities in other countries. In the face of a very weak economy, the temptation is high for citizens to migrate to safer zones in order to be protected against economic problems and to secure the future of their families. Again, citizens of a country can be compelled to embark on migration for security reasons. This usually happens when it appears to them that the state is incapable of offering them protection against security challenges. Furthermore, citizens of a country can be forced into migration due to lack of basic infrastructure and poor level of development. For instance, it is common for citizens from poor countries to embark on migration for the purposes of accessing quality education and high standards of living. Also, individuals with terrorist orientations can embark on migration for the purpose of finding fertile grounds for perpetrating their illicit acts. Such fertile grounds are mainly countries with very porous borders and weak security frameworks. It is necessary to point out that the existence of these factors may not necessarily promote migration. The major factor that makes migration more feasible is the existence of migration networks. In sum, migration is being driven by increasing disparities across nations or across cities (in the case of intra-national migration). Given these array of drivers of migration, where does Nigeria fit in?

Nigeria is a fertile ground for migration both as a country of origin (emigration) and, to some degree, a country of destination (immigration). Placed in a historical perspective, the trend of migration in Nigeria shows that, like other African countries, the largest number of persons who crossed African borders during the pre-colonial and even colonial times included “nomads, undocumented migrants, migrant labourers, seasonal as well as oscillatory labour migrants and refugees” (Nnoli, 2006, p.6). Various accounts (Azikiwe, 1970; Ebo, 1989) show that there were cases of emigrations during the colonial period, in search of qualitative Western education. Itumo, Nwobashi and Igwe (2017) indicate that Nigeria became a major migration-receiving country in the early 1970s due to the oil-led employment in various sectors of the economy. By becoming a major country of immigration during the days of oil/economic boom, cases of emigration by Nigerian citizens during the period were most unlikely to be predicated on economic problems.

Nigeria began to witness series of challenges as she advanced in age. The period of oil boom soon gave way to periods of economic adversity that resulted from bad

governance. The dark days of military rule jeopardised democratic freedom and created a sense of insecurity across the country. Succeeding civilian regimes did not show significant difference in terms of offering security and rescuing the country from socio-economic quagmire. Despondency mounted higher and higher in the country as the economy got weaker; as unemployment maintained steady increase; as infrastructural decay got worse; and as economic hardship in the land escalated. In fact, almost all the conditions that fuel migration, as enumerated by Koser (2009), exist in Nigeria. It is not surprising, therefore, that the incident is on the increase. The tallest dream of many a great number of Nigerian youths today is to leave the country. It is this situation that creates the enabling environment for the thriving of human trafficking business. The migration industry is booming in the country and despite the disturbing tales by deportees, there is an undying demand for migration. The number of Nigerians applying for the United States Visa Lottery on a yearly basis is amazingly high. There are open advertisements by various agencies offering assistance for a fee to those wishing to win visa lottery, and patronage usually remains high.

Itumo, Nwobashi, and Igwe (2017) expose further migration-related challenges facing the country to include the issue of security threats. They point out the issue of Boko Haram terrorists that not only have foreign nationals as members but also allege to be receiving training and arms in Afghanistan. This underscores the contention of Ezirim, Onuoha, and Nwogu (2014) that Nigeria's land, sea, and air borders are porous. Hence, the country is highly prone to irregular immigration.

Migration and Dislocation of Nigeria's Social Fabrics

The incidence of migration has impacted differently on the Nigerian society. There are some positive aspects to it. For instance, there are foreign-based Nigerians that make remittances from their countries of destination. Equally, there are those that, after residing for many years in their host country, return to Nigeria with their savings and the skills they acquired, to invest in the country. There are also Nigerian citizens that, while still residing in their host country, organise community development activities/projects either severally or collectively under the umbrella of Diaspora associations such as the Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation (NIDO). However, migration has its negative sides, especially as it affects Nigeria's social fabric.

One of the problems facing Nigeria with regard to migration is the incident of 'brain drain'. Many professionals and able-bodied men and women have left the shores of Nigeria to invest their skills and talents outside the country. A clear example is the trend where highly qualified Nigerian medical doctors migrate to Saudi Arabia and other foreign countries where they offer their services (Okonkwo, 2018; Olukotun, 2018; The Guardian, 2018).

Some of the foreign cultures and practices currently observable in Nigeria, which constitute threats to the family institution, are traceable to returnee migrants or even those that embarked on short visits. For instance, the bold demands being made in

some quarters of the country for the legalisation of same sex marriage, enjoy serious support mostly from returnee migrants. Other observable/ related practices that threaten the marriage institution include: entering into marriage with the sole intention of securing travel visa, or for the purposes of having the opportunity to inherit a man's property after throwing him out of his home; engaging in avoidable divorce (without any sense of guilt); desiring to have children outside marriage, and raising them as a single parent.

Cocaine and other hard drugs are not indigenous to Nigeria. Trafficking and consumption of such substances cannot entirely be dismissed as some of the effects of migration. Though the government made serious attempts to arrest the situation by setting up an agency like the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), the negative effects the trend has had on the social fabric of the country remain huge. It is common knowledge that migration-induced conflict has disrupted peace and social stability in Nigeria. A ready example is the menace of Boko Haram already highlighted in the preceding section. Equally, Nigeria's President, Muhammadu Buhari, recently linked the rampaging killer-herdsmen—that are currently unleashing terror in various parts of the country— to Libya. There is no doubt that by threatening peace and security in the country, the activities of these groups are disrupting the very fabrics of the Nigerian security system.

Cases related to irregular migration have projected Nigeria into bad light across the globe. In their desperation to realise their migration-related dreams, a good number of Nigerians have demonstrated their readiness and eagerness to cheat and engage in all manner of dishonest practices such as owning and using fake passports and breaking travel rules indiscriminately. Equally, the nefarious activities of some Nigerians that have established migration industries that specialise in cross-border human trafficking are suggestive of their poor moral standing and level of depravity.

It is quite agreeable that the issue of migration has adversely affected many Nigerians by depleting their sense of patriotism. Many a great number of Nigerian youths are now caught up with the attitude of: "Anywhere but Nigeria". That is to say, they prefer to go to any other country rather than remain in Nigeria. With this kind of attitude, they cannot show any positive commitment towards the country.

Migration and the Governance Question

Scholarly discourses and even comments from casual observers point in the direction that governance in Nigeria is far from being satisfactory. Given the enormous natural resources at the disposal of the country, it stands to reason that the main problem of the country has to do with poor governance and inefficient management of these resources. The lamentations of Achebe (1983), which he made roughly thirty five years ago concerning the failure of leadership in the country, was re-echoed by Anyaoku (2011), who states that the governance and leadership question continues to dog the footsteps of Nigeria. There is no sign in sight that there is an abatement of the problem.

High levels of corruption, weak accountability system, continuous decay of social infrastructure, neglect of development projects, and general failure of the public sector, have continued to define the system. When we weigh these conditions on the scale of the causative factors of migration enumerated by Koser (2009), which include security and economic issues as well as lack of development, we can see the connection with governance. Poor governance exacerbates these negative conditions.

The desire by increasing number of Nigerians to *check out* mounted higher with the brazen manifestation of poor governance and the worsening socio-economic conditions. The television clip, referred to earlier, was done in the early 1980s when the country adopted austerity measures, and the people began witnessing serious economic hardship. The conditions that led to the unbearable situation, which Andrew (the character) lamented about, are yet to improve. In fact, things worsened with the passage of time. The prolonged stay of the military within the political arena unleashed a lot of harm on the system through such means as placing restrictions on political freedom, and mismanagement of the economy. The civilian governments that succeeded the military junta proved incapable of reversing the ugly trend of bad governance. The Naira continued to depreciate, inflation mounted higher, citizens continued to live under very harsh economic conditions, and people are increasingly sinking into a state of despondency. The net result of these situations is that more and more Nigerians are developing the urge to escape from the harsh socio-economic conditions that appear to be irreversible. As such, the majority of Nigerian citizens embarking on irregular migration in recent times are doing so because of issues related to poor governance.

On the other hand, it is the failure of governance and public institutions that make Nigeria's territorial borders very porous, which leads to irregular immigration and the concomitant security challenges. Indeed, good governance would have stemmed the tide of irregular migration and its negative consequences on Nigeria.

Conclusion

In the light of the popular saying that 'no man is an island', it is understandable that different societies are interdependent in one way or the other. As such, migration is not entirely a bad phenomenon. It has its positive sides that cannot be over-emphasized. The concern here is the aspects of migration that are disadvantageous to the social fabric of the Nigerian society.

The escalation of the incident of irregular migration in Nigeria is traceable to poor governance. Indeed, bad governance accounts for the unbearably harsh socio-political and economic problems as well as the ineffectiveness of governmental institutions such as the security and immigration agencies. It is the harsh and unbearable socio-economic conditions in the country that have made many Nigerians to see migration as a 'do-or-die' affair. With weak government institutions, it becomes possible not only for irregular immigrants to gain easy access into the country, but also for Nigerian

citizens desirous of embarking on irregular emigration to have their way with relative ease. In light of this, the good governance option becomes imperative. That is to say, any serious attempt aimed at checking the incidence of migration vis-à-vis its negative consequences on the country's social fabric must perforce begin with ensuring that the trajectory of governance is headed in the right direction. The following recommendations are therefore put forward:

- Nigerians must always ensure that they have good leaders who are capable of managing the socio-economic and political affairs of the country efficiently. To this extent, they must perforce vote for suitable candidates during elections.
- The government must deal with the socio-economic challenges facing the country through such means as creating an environment conducive for the teeming unemployed youth to be gainfully employed. This will include promoting the culture of hard work and entrepreneurship, which will begin from creating the correct conditions for the private sector to thrive.
- There is need to reverse the poor state of social infrastructure that presently characterize the country in order to make life bearable for Nigerians.
- There is need to protect the good aspects of the local culture that help in sustaining the social fabrics of the society. Back in the days when criminal acts were attached with serious social stigma, and the family unit served as a powerful agent for social control, it was unthinkable for individuals to brazenly celebrate ill-gotten wealth or support corrupt practices. In effect, there is need to reinvent the culture that deters people from engaging in anti-social behaviors. Agencies of government such as the National Orientation Agency must take this seriously.
- There is urgent need to reverse the situation where most citizens, especially the youth, are continually losing faith in the country. It is this situation that leads to despondency and the consequent burning desire to migrate to foreign countries at all costs. Thus, measures must be taken to ensure that Nigerian citizens have faith in Nigeria. This cannot be achieved by merely embarking on preachy exercises without addressing the fundamental problems that generated despondency. There is no better way of making citizens have faith in the country than offering them good governance. Government must serve the interest of the people through responsive service delivery; and public office holders must BE SEEN to be working in public interest.
- The porous the Nigerian borders serve as danger signals. Hence, there is every need to ensure adequate policing of the borders. Though this might appear difficult in some respects, such measures as having a national identity card or reliable database for Nigerian citizens, can help in checking the trend of irregular immigration.

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CHAPTER THREE

Irregular Migration and Underdevelopment of Africa: An Assessment of African Union Policy Response

Emeh Ikechukwu Eke and Obinna Ngozi Ihejirika

Introduction

That African youths have been travelling to their death is a truism confirmed by the pictures and video clips of migrants from Africa struggling to keep afloat in the Mediterranean and a white man cutting open a black young man and harvesting his kidneys. In 2016 alone, more than 2,000 African migrants drowned in the Mediterranean Sea (Maggie, James & Duncan 2016). These are young Africans who, driven by exciting tales of places with better opportunities, left Africa for Europe (Mohamed, 2016). This situation is however, not peculiar to Africa because according to *The Guardian Newspaper* of September 2017, since 2014, more than 22,500 migrants have been reported to have either died or vanished into the thin air across the globe.

Even though several economic statistics have described Africa as a continent with unprecedented growth and economic opportunities (Abebe, 2018), the images and scenario described above create alarming impressions of Africa as a crumbling and hopeless continent whose energetic young ones desperately risk their lives to escape. Indeed, many Africans embrace migration (whether irregular or regular) as a positive phenomenon that douses pressure of youth unemployment and through remittances, reduces poverty in their countries of origin. These remittances serve as the most important and reliable source of foreign exchange in most African states. The remittances afford poor families the privilege and opportunity to provide some comforts and necessities of life that are hitherto lacking (Shimeles & Nabasaga 2016). These reasons may have spurred Long & Crisp (2011) to assert that migration has long been an integral feature of the African society and economy even prior to the colonial days. However, the establishment of new and artificial borders that cut across established communities, clans and ethnic groups in Africa and subsequent introduction of large-scale commercial enterprises led to increase in the case of migration. But how did these migrants become irregular migrants?

According to the International Organization of Migration (2013), because irregular migration refers to “movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the origin, transit and destination countries”, a migrant is considered irregular when he does not meet the immigration requirements for entering, residing or working in a given transit or receiving country. This definition may have formed the basis for viewing irregular migration as a difficult and dangerous journey that imposes a great

deal of hardship on the people concerned by exposing them to a variety of human rights and protection risks. There is consequently, a growing concern by some states who regard it as a violation of their national laws as well as a threat to their sovereignty, security and economy (Long & Crisp, 2011).

This paper attempts an interrogation into the upsurge of irregular migration of African youths, the possible relationship between irregular migration and underdevelopment of Africa, and the policy approach of African Union in abating irregular migration of African youths.

Method

This is a qualitative research. Data were generated from secondary sources. Content analysis was used to analyze the data generated.

Review of Relevant Literature

The review of relevant literature was done thematically.

Perspectives to Migration

Migration scholars have argued extensively for and against migration to both sending and receiving countries. However, it will be appropriate to understand the concept of migration. According to UKessay (2013), migration refers to moving from one place to another for the purposes of performing specific tasks. This movement can be either of two forms: immigration (which means to relocate into a new environment, most times a country, in order to settle down there); and emigration (which means relocating out of one's country to another).

UKessay (2013), further noted that the negative impacts of migration to a sending country far outstrip all perceived or anticipated benefits. It argued that migration constitutes a brain drain problem and loss of investment arising from funds invested in public infrastructures to give the migrant basic education, while creating high unemployment for receiving countries which usually result in the perceived slavery for migrants in receiving countries.

Contrary to this opinion, Dilip & William (2007) asserted that migration is good for economic growth, hence the World Bank estimation that if the labour force in high-income countries were to grow by 3 per cent, even if the additional workers were all migrants, there would be \$356 billion in annual global economic gains. They further stated that the benefits of migration go not only to industrial nations but also to developing countries, who now receive more than \$165 billion annually in remittances (money sent home by workers abroad). These remittances reduce poverty as they generate direct income transfers to the migrants' households (Gumisai, 2006). Even the African Union Commissioner for Social Affairs, Mustapha Sidiki Kaloko, concurred that migration has the potential to reduce youth unemployment by contributing to economic development through, remittances and by importing skills, knowledge and technology to both the countries of origin and destination. It not only

broadens the opportunities available to individuals, it is also a crucial means of broadening access to resources and reducing poverty.

During the inaugural African Development Week ministerial meeting held in Addis Ababa between 31 March and 5 April 2016, leaders of African governments reaffirmed the need to promote migration in Africa for development (Ligami, 2016). In the words of Shimeles & Nabasaga, (2017) migration has served as a lifeline for many African countries through the flow of remittances, which have become the most important source of foreign exchange, providing consumption smoothing for poor families, and serving as a source of investment at the household level for education, assets, and other amenities. It also reduces inequality in Africa.

Migrants constitute a development resource for their home countries. Migrant remittances, according to Nyberg-Sorensen et al (2002) are double the size of aid and are well targeted at the poor. The remittance practices of migrants have direct effects on the households who receive these 'migra-dollars' as money is primarily spent on current consumption (food and clothing), as well as investments in Millennium Development Goals-related areas such as children's education, healthcare and agriculture (Economic Commission for Africa, 2006). Remittances are therefore agents of local and national development in the home countries of migrants. The contributions of migrants to development extend beyond economic gains to encompass cultural enrichment and exchange, social welfare and political advocacy (Shimeles & Nabasaga, 2017).

Migration from Africa to developed countries is therefore a mutually beneficial phenomenon, which results in development gains for both home and host countries. Regardless Shimeles & Nabasaga's (2017) position, the positive benefits of migration have often been underplayed and undervalued by developed countries especially in times of economic downturn (Pringle, 2010).

There are, however, legitimate concerns about large-scale migration. The possibility of social dislocation is real. Based on the argument that migrants take up the scarce opportunities in their host countries and destroy their economies, migrants are highly vulnerable to racism, xenophobia, and discrimination. This is manifest in the climate of economic downturn and growing unemployment levels in many migrant-receiving countries. Thus, migrants are blamed for many of the ills besetting previously burgeoning economies in developed areas of the world. In addition, increasing migration means that states have become more multi-cultural, multi-racial and multi-religious. This has brought about the challenge of accommodating diversity and the reality of finding political, legal, social and economic mechanisms to ensure that mutual respect and mediation of differences is guaranteed (ILO, IOM & OHCHR, 2001).

Vulnerability of migrants according to Maggie, James and Duncan (2016), has been accompanied by rising hostility to them in places like Italy, as the country feels the strain of thousands of arrivals each month. In Italy's Milan, for instance, it is on record

that Casa Pound, a far-right group, called for a rebellion against the arrival of more than 80 migrants in a district of Italy's second-largest city.

Migration is closely linked to security concerns at the individual, national and global levels. Nyberg-Sorensen et al (2002:8) asserted in this regard that current alarmist commentary on migration includes "apocalyptic visions of a western world beset by massive migration pressure from 'barbarous', 'degenerating' regions of the developing world, coupled with overwrought anxieties about growing 'imbalances' between the native population and other racial categories" On the part of developed migrant-receiving states, the prevailing view is that immigration pressures have reached intolerable levels. Unfortunately, xenophobia, racism and discrimination have become commonplace as current international disputes about national identity have shown. The circumstance leading to cases of many Nigerians in South Africa losing their homes, businesses and lives are example of outright discrimination and xenophobia in host countries. It is becoming more common globally (Babalola, 2017). A rough estimation has it that at least 118 Nigerians have been killed in South Africa in the last two years (Asadu, 2018).

The loss of human capital is a key challenge as African states already face serious human resources shortages due to skills migration to developed states. Educated Africans are leaving the continent in droves in search of larger pay cheques and superior working conditions in developed states (Pringle, 2010). Kohnert (2007: p) found that "between 33 percent and 55 percent of Africans with higher education left Angola, Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Tanzania in search of a better life and employment in the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries. For example, about 20 000 Nigerian and 12 000 South African doctors migrated overseas, whereas only 33 000 remained in South Africa". This is the brain-drain phenomenon that negative affects the development of African (Kohnert, 2007).

Development and Underdevelopment Issues in Africa

Discussions on the good and bad aspects of migration usually lead to inquiry into the development and underdevelopment of Africa. According to Bhattacharyya (2007), Africa is falling behind the rest of the world in terms of economic wellbeing, and her contributions to global poverty decline is disappointing. The continent has remained largely underdeveloped regardless of the presence of huge natural resources (gold, cocoa, bauxite, oil, diamond, timber, etc) and human resources. Several decades after the end of colonialism, most parts of Africa are still grappling with high poverty rate, corruption, lack of basic infrastructural facilities in all sectors of the economy, unemployment, high mortality rate, political instability and insecurity of lives and property (Senanu, 2014). In fact, absolute poverty in many of the African nations is still rising (Sachs 2005).

According to Emeh (2013:7), poverty has formed an indelible part of African peoples and states and has over the past decades continued an unrelenting ravage of the continent. Indeed, poverty has become one easy and most empirical evidence of

underdevelopment and backwardness of Africa. Although poverty is today accepted as a major global problem as more than one-fifth of humanity is languishing in abject penury, Africa, especially its sub-Saharan region would appear to be worst hit. Despite its enormous human and material resources, poverty has not only widened but has also deepened and become ramified, engulfing overwhelming majority of African people and states. It has persisted and appears to defy every solution. This may have informed the opinion that the economic future of Africa is very bleak (Nnadozie, 2010).

There exists a galore of reasons deduced to the present development crisis in Africa. According to Olutayo, Olutayo & Omobowale (2008), the scramble for Africa by European imperial powers brought an end to independent development in Africa. According to Simensen, cited in Senanu (2014), colonialism is linked to Africa's underdevelopment from the perspective of exploitation of precious natural resources from the continent to develop the jurisdictions of their colonial masters at the detriment of African countries. Ghana, for example, was colonized by Britain and numerous resources including gold, diamond, bauxite, timber, etc. were exploited to the benefit of Britain.

Worthy of mention, is the world capitalist system in which African countries play very weak roles of producing raw materials with less or no value. According to Olutayo & Omobowale (2007), state capitalism endorsed in the colonial era and the latter part of the 1960s, is now perceived as a hindrance to development. In contemporary times, most African countries have endorsed capitalist oriented policies since the 1980s. Some of such policies are: significant devaluations, removal of government subsidies and price controls, cuts in public expenditure with deep public sector retrenchments; privatization, relaxation of foreign exchange controls, increase in interest rates to real levels; withdrawal of protectionist measures, and increase in agricultural producer prices. Most of these policies are without recourse to peculiarities and developmental trajectories in the continent.

Despite the fact that the continent's problems are multifaceted, corruption, particularly in countries where it has become an integral part of the social fabric, is a major handicap to their development efforts. The financial resource involved in these corrupt deals could have been channeled into useful projects that should help stimulate growth and development in Africa. Sadly, no regime or government in Africa after independence has been excluded from corruption allegation, except of course, Nelson Mandela of South Africa. Corruption that has eroded institutions in African countries worsened the underdevelopment situation in the continent (Shirley 2005; Easterly 2002) and created a rational justification for lots of youths to engage in both regular and irregular migration.

Causes of Irregular Migration of Africans

According to Marie-Laurence and Hein (2014), Africa is often seen as a continent of mass displacement and migration caused by poverty and violent conflicts. Media outlets have effusively portrayed Africa as a 'continent of poverty and conflict to explain the exodus of desperate Africans fleeing poverty at home in search of the

European 'El Dorado'. This exodus is premised on the assumptions that African migration is driven by poverty and violence. Situations of extreme poverty, starvation, lack of warfare, and environmental degradation, amalgamate into an image of African misery.

In the words of Ola (2018), the reason many people pay up to \$10,000 to risk their lives, their freedom and their dignity to get to Europe, is economic opportunity because the scale of the unemployment problem in Nigeria is phenomenal; hence, there are more unemployed people in Nigeria than the entire population of Belgium. Supporting this economic opportunity claim, Kermal (2018) asserted that with European per capita income roughly 11 times that of most of sub-Saharan Africa, and tens of millions of young Africans with poor job prospects, the attraction of migrating to Europe is and will remain intense.

Re-echoing the economic opportunity dearth as a case of emigration from Africa, Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor asserted, at the G-20 summit in Berlin 2017 that "when there is too much hopelessness on the continent, young people say they have to find a new life elsewhere" (Pelz, 2017) All over the continent, there is widespread frustration among young people over limited economic opportunities, growing corruption, rising unemployment and limited opportunities for political participation (Pelz, 2017). This growing frustration has prompted many to leave their homes and embark on a dangerous journey across the Mediterranean Sea. With few jobs and dim prospects at home, millions of youths and young adults in Africa have chosen to migrate clandestinely (Gumisai, 2006). Little wonder Mohamed worryingly said that "demand for migrant is bound to remain high from people disappointed by a lack of opportunity at home. From what I have seen in their faces, they are determined." As if she was responding to Mohamed, a young lady named Yunis Sola queried, "why will I not be determined if I work more and earn less. When you work more and earn less, sometimes you suffocate. You feel like moving because if... I can work for one hour somewhere else and get more dollars that perception will push me to go out there" (www.dw.com/en/the-migration-dilemma-we-were-treated-like-animals).

Little wonder Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary-General asserted that most people who seek to migrate are pushed by circumstances in their home countries. In some of these countries war, poverty and persecution has prompt people to become labour migrants because in their countries, jobs are scarce or salaries are too low to afford a decent living (Gumisai, 2006). The above assertions have demonstrated that young people make illegal sea journey because of numerous and complex issues such as poverty, misconception, policy and institutional problems; but, the strict visa regimes of developed countries are also among some of the causes of irregular migration (Kaledzi, 2017).

From a different dimension, Gumisai (2006) asserts that some of the causes of migration to industrialized countries are: labour shortages in certain sectors in these countries, an expanding global economy, and the long-term trend of ageing

populations. They face shortages in highly skilled areas such as information technology and health services, as well as in manual jobs in agriculture, manufacturing and construction. Many in these countries turn blind eyes to irregular migration to fill jobs locals do not want to take on.

Irregular Migration and Underdevelopment of Africa

Migration and underdevelopment are closely related. They can hardly be discussed separately. This is amply explained by the push and pull factors theory that draw from the assumption that migration tends towards the developed countries, where people go to for greener pastures or better infrastructure and amenities; but most importantly to seek opportunities for survival. This may have propelled Orovwuje (2014) to assert that every year thousands of desperate young Africans brave the sea in fragile small boats in search of a better life in Europe. They travel from the poverty-stricken village life of Africa to high sea between Africa and Europe. Most times, they die unnoticed and undocumented. The core driving factor is the remittances which have been touted as great means of foreign exchange for the countries of origin and pressure stabilizers for the families of the migrants. However, the case of brain drain has been difficult to overshadow by the remittance excuse. According to Chimanikire (2005), when highly qualified people leave their home country, the investment made by the developing countries in their higher education is lost. Africa is certainly experiencing a debilitating flight of professionals and skilled people escaping their countries' economic crisis. The level and trend of brain drain has reached unsustainable heights. In the last few years, the brain drain has escalated in magnitude to levels that have serious implications on economic growth in countries like Nigeria.

According to the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, migration brings with it "many complex challenges". The issues include: human rights, economic opportunity, labour shortages and unemployment, the brain drain, multiculturalism and integration, and flow of refugees and asylum seekers. Policy makers also must grapple with issues of law enforcement. Especially in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the US in 2001, many are focusing on human and national security. He furthered that "we cannot ignore the real policy difficulties posed by migration, since such movements of people pose difficult questions for many governments and for the international community. This may have prompted Gumisai (2006) to assert that one of the most pressing concerns of governments and citizens in industrialized countries is irregular migration, which comprised illegal entry, bogus marriages, overstaying temporary admissions, abuse of asylum systems, and the difficulty of removing unsuccessful applicants.

The worst effect of irregular migration is the brain drain phenomenon which has had huge and unquantifiable negative impacts on Africa's development with more than half of all highly educated migrants from Africa currently living in the US, Germany, Britain, France, Canada, Australia and Spain. In many African countries particularly smaller nations such as Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, and Namibia highly-skilled workers migrate at a rate 20 times that of the general population (Gumisai 2006). The

reason according to Chimanikire (2014) is decline in real savings compounded by high levels of taxation and rising unemployment levels. The decline in real gross domestic product (GDP) is reflective of failure to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and increased external debt due to chronic foreign currency shortages to procure raw materials, fuel, electricity and spare parts, against a background of rising production and labour costs due to high inflation. The contraction in the formal sector, owing to companies' downsizing reduction in working periods, and closure, have led to significant fall in employment levels. Growing lawlessness and politically-motivated violence are some of the push factors for many intellectuals and professionals. The dissatisfaction goes deeper than economic and political circumstances to include housing, medical services, education, and a viable future for children. Against this background, many skilled persons and professionals have migrated to other countries and the potential for emigrating among African university students and others is very high.

Theoretical Discourse

In recent years, migration has been at the front burner of global and continental discourse, highlighting the migration/development nexus as well as the examination of the policy responses of the African Union in mitigating the menace of irregular migration at the continental level. These issues call for examination of theoretical underpinnings of migration and development, keeping in mind the assumption that the root causes of migration are numerous and complex (UN, 2006). It has been underscored in the literature that there are several migration theories and models which are crucial in the explanation of irregular migration phenomenon such as Neoclassical Economics, The New Economics of Migration, Segmented Labour Market Theory, World Systems Theory, Social Capital Theory and Cumulative Causation Theory (Ekatarina, 2011).

Anchoring on the neoclassical economics theory of migration, this paper married the Push-Pull model and the Macro-Meso-Micro level of analysis framework to establish factors that involved in an individual's decision to migrate, as well as how to curb such motivations.

According to the Push-Pull theory of migration, people migrate for Environmental, Economic, Cultural and Socio-political reasons. Within these reasons are 'push' or 'pull' factors. The push factors are those that force the individual to move, and in many cases, because the individual risks something if he stays. Push factors may include conflict, drought, famine, or extreme religious activity. Poor economic activity and lack of job opportunities are also strong push factors for migration. Other strong push factors include race and discriminating cultures, political intolerance, and persecution of people who question the status quo.

Pull factors are those factors in the destination country that attract the individual or group to leave their home. Those factors are known as place utility, which is the desirability of a place that attracts people. Better economic opportunities, more jobs, and the promise of a better life often pull people into new locations. Sometimes

individuals have ideas and perceptions about places that are not necessarily correct, but are strong pull factors for that individual. As people grow older and retire, many look for places with warm weather, peaceful and comfortable locations to spend their retirement after a lifetime of hard work and savings. Ideas about and desire for such ideal places are pull factors too (<http://eschooltoday.com/migration/the-pull-and-push-factors-of-migration.html>).

According to Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, & Taylor (1998), the pull-push model works at both the macro and the micro level. At the macro level, migration results from the uneven spatial distribution of labour vis-à-vis other factors of production, most importantly capital. In some countries and regions, labour is plentiful and capital is scarce, so the wage level is correspondingly low. In other countries the opposite prevails. The result is that workers move from low-wage to high wage economies. At the micro level, migration is the result of decisions made by individual 'rational actors' who weigh up the pros and cons of moving relative to staying, based on information about the options especially in this days of globalization. What is missing in this analogy is the meso level which Zohry (2009) sees as the analysis of migration networks and the contact between migration networks in origin and the national diasporas in the countries of destination.

More elaborately, Zohry (2009) observed that at the macro level analysis of irregular migration phenomenon, the political, economic and legal framework in both countries of origin and destination should be taken into consideration. The political framework in the country of origin includes political stability and democracy. A fragile state is expected to have less control in its borders. Migrants' smugglers are expected to find it easy to recruit more potential migrants to cross borders illegally. Democracy gives hope to potential migrants to stay in their homeland. It also means the respect of human rights by the state and the work towards fulfilling the needs of youth in the society so that the propensity of illegal migration decreases. Political framework in the country of destination includes the state's attitudes regarding immigration and the forces pro or against migration. The economic framework in the country of origin includes factors related to labor market regulations, unemployment rate, and welfare system (pension plans, social security system, health insurance, etc.). Such factors affect the propensity of irregular migration negatively or positively according to the economic performance of the country and its ability to create productive work opportunities for the youth and fresh graduates. Economic framework in the country of destination includes factors related to labor market regulations, unemployment rate, welfare system, and the structure of the economy (formal versus informal economy). Bade, (2004) and Ceschi et al. (2005) aptly documented that illegal migrants are absorbed in the informal economy of the country of destination. This may explain why countries like Italy and Spain, with a large informal economies, are the main countries of destination for illegal migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa. Finally, the legal framework in the country of origin includes factors related to international, regional, and bilateral treaties and agreements that define and are meant to guide human mobility from the country to other countries, and the

repatriation agreements between the country of origin and countries of destination. With respect to destination countries, legal framework includes all the above mentioned factors in addition to regulation, naturalization, and integration schemes.

The micro level deals with individual migrants and potential migrants and as such seems to be problematic. It includes factors such as socio-demographic and economic framework in both countries of origin and destination. Factors related to the socio-demographic framework in the country of origin include individual characteristics (age, sex, education, employment status, marital status, etc.) and household characteristics, as well as migration intentions. Economic framework includes the cost of migration and remittances of migrants to their home country. Factors in the micro level in the country of destination include socio-demographic framework factors: individual characteristics (age, sex, education, employment status, marital status, etc.), legalization, and coping strategies of migrants in the destination (Zohry, 2009).

At the meso level, Haug (2008) held that migration networks play a major role in stimulating migration streams between a specific country of origin and countries of destination. According to him, migration networks and the contact between migration networks in origin and the national diasporas in the countries of destination plays a key role in irregular migration escalation. Therefore, the study is anchored on the neoclassical economics theory of migration.

Findings and Discussion

A. Africa is Underdeveloped Despite her Enormous Resources: African states are largely underdeveloped. Fortunately, they have the required resources to rejuvenate their economies. Recall that civilization started from Africa (Barnal, 1991). The art of writing that emerged from Egypt is not more important than the fact that other prominent civilizations in Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Oyo, Ghana, Mali, Songhai, and so on, emerged in Africa even before the dominance of Roman and Greek civilizations. The implication of the foregoing is that Africa needs to reinvent Africa. Hence it has been asserted that Africans had developed ways of exploiting their environment, used same to satisfy their wants and needs, and had created institutions around these survival techniques ever before the establishment of the first trading port by the Portuguese along the coast of Elmina in 1482 (Olutayo, Olutayo & Omobowale, 2008). The onus is on the African Union to chart a new course, for Africa towards reinvention. African youths are not happy leaving their home countries, being aware of the risks involved but as the German Chancellor Angela Merkel said, "when there is too much hopelessness on the continent, young people have no option than to find a new life elsewhere" This is because all over the continent, there is widespread frustration among young people over limited economic opportunities, growing corruption, rising unemployment and limited opportunities for political participation. African leaders have the option of implementing the advice of their own- Nana Akufo-Addo, the Ghanaian

President, to show more commitment to the developmental needs of Africa and stop stockpiling their countries wealth in foreign countries.

B. Africa's Underdevelopment drives migration, while Stricter Border Controls, and Stringent Visa Requirements of developed countries propel Irregular Migrations of Africans:

Recourse to the fact that the first necessity of man is to survive, the upsurge of irregular migration of Africans has been linked to the underdeveloped condition of African states. Given the fact that the primary reason for migration is economic as explained by the push-pull theory, most Africans move out of their countries to other countries of the world in search of better opportunities to meet their economic needs given the harsh economic situation on the continent. Due to lack of economic opportunities in Africa, many Africans who had hitherto no dream of leaving Africa, do all they can to migrate to any country other than their country of origin. Some who migrate to other African countries use there as a stepping stone to get to Europe because of the kind of visa regime of the destination country. The stringent migration policies of developed countries have made their embassies the nightmare of young Africans who want to travel out. Some young Africans who have tried many times but were denied visa on flimsy excuses, have sworn not to set their foot at the embassy again, but are willing to take the odd way. For instance, a young African who wants to travel to the Europe is asked to show evidence that he has about N20 million in his account, which is as impossible as going to hell and returning unhurt. Therefore, whenever opportunity shows itself, the young African jumps at it. Therefore, a critical look at the stringent migration laws and embassy difficulties will put irregular migration of Africans in check.

C. The African Union Policy responses to Irregular Migration of Africans is poor:

It will seem that the African Union has been resolute in initiating measures to stem irregular migration of Africans, yet many African youths still aspire to embark on the ultra-risky adventure of crossing over to Europe. This is an indication of the hopeless conditions in some African countries. Indeed, some repatriated migrants or 'returnees' have expressed willingness to try the route again given the existing socio-economic conditions in their home countries (Gumisai, 2006). Between November and December 2017, many governments in sub-Saharan Africa have had to repatriate their citizens trapped in Libya. This collective action saw the African Union in December 2017 repatriate 20,000 of the stranded migrants from Libya over a six week period (AFP, 2017). This effort came a year after the AU's migration policy framework that was birthed during the inaugural African Development Week ministerial meeting held in Addis Ababa between 31 March and 5 April 2016. During that meeting, African governments agreed to the speedy implementation of a number of social and economic empowerment programmes to improve migration policies and halt irregular migration, particularly amongst the continent's youth (Ligami, 2016).

Recall that in 2001, the then, Organization of African Unity (OAU) Council of Ministers met in Lusaka, Zambia for the 74th Ordinary Session and adopted Decision CM/Dec 614 (LXXIV) which called for the development of a Migration Policy Framework, and mandated the member states to, among others:

- develop a strategic framework for migration policy in Africa that could contribute to addressing the challenges posed by migration and to ensure the integration of migration and related issues into the national and regional agenda for security, stability, development and cooperation;
- work towards the free movement of people and to strengthen intra-regional and inter-regional cooperation in matters concerning migration, on the basis of the established processes of migration at the regional and sub-regional levels; and
- create an environment conducive to facilitating the participation of migrants, in particular those in the Diaspora, in the development of their own countries (UNDESA, 2016).

This wonderful mandate culminated in the African Union Migration Policy Framework that provided policy guidelines to all the African states in the areas of labour migration, border management, irregular migration, forced displacement, human rights of migrants, internal migration, migration data management, migration and development, and inter-state co-operation and partnerships (AU, 2016).

Today, irregular migration issues in African have escalated. This informed the position of Geoffrey Onyeama, the Nigerian foreign minister, that it is his government's responsibility to "obviate the need for our citizens to make such a perilous journey", hence the call by Nana Akufo-Addo, the Ghanaian President on his fellow African leaders to show more commitment themselves. In his words, "if we Africans are to transform our stagnant, jobless economies, built on the export of raw materials and unrefined goods, to value-added economies that provide jobs, to build strong middle-class societies and lift the mass of our people out of dire poverty, then we must take our destinies into our own hands and assume responsibility for this". He further stated that too many young Africans are risking their lives in the hope of a better life in Europe - but Africa needs her youths. Thus if we provide them with the right environment in Africa, which enables them to enhance their skills, receive appropriate vocational training and have access to digital technology, they will make our continent great (Pelz, 2017). This admonition captures the 2006 African Union mandate to member states on the control of irregular migration stated above.

Recommendations

This study has the following recommendations:

1. The African leaders, under the aegis of Africa Union, should take cognizance of the push and pull factors and use them to their advantage by creating enabling environments for young Africans to live and work in Africa. This will have massive and widespread developmental effects on the continent.

2. The Africa Union should work with the E.U on their stringent visa requirement policies that have created the upsurge of irregular migration. With less stringent visa policies, Africans will have no need for the Mediterranean and wasteland routes.
3. Apart from propagating the reinvention of Africa by leading the campaign against corruption in Africa which has seen the wealth of Africa stashed in foreign counties, the African Union should take drastic measures on any African state that fails to implement their (AU) policy agreements to tame irregular migration of Africans.

Conclusion

Migration of Africans has begun to fall into the irregular category, perhaps because of unfavourable migration policies (Brennan, 1984) of the western nations that have been exploiting migrants such that they take the lowest niche in the countries working society. By implication, migrant workers are paid the lowest wages, have unregulated working hours and conditions, and are subjected to the highest level of exploitation and often, inhuman treatments by their employers. Unfortunately, for the greater number of these immigrants, the wages paid for their slave-like labour are still higher than the ones they would have obtained in their home countries (if at all they found employment).

As it is common in most communities in Nigeria today, watching a neighbour's family become rich, due to the remittances of a migrated son or father, makes one decides to migrate. He or she raises the money required, which often involves borrowing; pays for false documents to enter the country or for the inhumane smuggling through the border, and at the end of the voyage, he or she becomes enslaved in a labour camp, or sweatshop, to work for 12 hours in order to send the much needed remittances home. Someone else in the home-country will watch the newly migrated person's family receive money from remittances, build a house, and send their kids to school; and will be encouraged to migrate. This chain has no end, and unfortunately, an immigrant's dream of freedom and welfare which await him or her in the destination country, often become a nightmare of slavery, where some of them end up marrying women twice their age for green card and monetary gains (Ekaterian, 2011).

The above picture of an average Nigerian home may have prompted the discourse of the political economy of migration in Africa. Therefore, the African Union should intensify their campaign of halting irregular migration and encouraging regular migration that will boost the African image and economy. Halting irregular migration need not be achieved by tightening borders and stringent migration policies; but it can be realized by creating an Africa where the average African will be proud to stay, live

and work happily; where those who migrated either for education or medical reasons will be nostalgic. Literature has revealed why African youths engage in irregularly migration as well as things that can make them voluntarily want to stay and develop Africa. African leaders under the aegis of African Union should take advantage of the information and change Africa for good. If not, xenophobia, exploitation and violence against migrant Africans will continue unabated alongside the exodus of Africa energetic and educated youths.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Global Migration Policy and Environmental Conflicts in Nigeria: Interrogating the Nexus

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Introduction

According to Cohen, Youssef, Brown and Organski (1981), the role of colonial and post-colonial African states in shaping migration processes could be poorly understood. There are trickles of migration policy at the continental level. African Union's draft paper on 'Refugees and Asylum Seekers', handles the issue of resettlement. It tried to provide solutions to ethnic conflicts that may lead to repatriation of migrant citizens who contribute nothing to economic development, hence, constituting environmental nuisance. While there has been an attempt on drafting a migration policy at the continental level, the same has not been possible within national or domestic level. Nigeria has failed to contribute to the formation of or opted for domestication the global migration policy to integrate issues that are totally under its spheres of influence, as regards 'migrant citizens' (African Union, 2018:34). Like is observable with regard to other international policies, member states of international organisations often have weak institutional capacity to implement either their global or regional migration policies. The global migration policy also lacks adequate domestic instruments (either of laws or agencies) to enable its implementation in Nigeria. As a result, the move to assuage this inadequacy crystalizes the flaws of the existent environmental policies of the government, which have not been framed appropriately to integrate several aspects of Nigeria's flora and fauna.

Environmental policies have been a salient aspect of Nigeria's development plans. These have gone through the liberal-based, to socially inclusive approaches of colonial administrations, to the politically independent Nigeria. Hence, there was the laying out of urban growth-centres for human settlement, sites for agricultural raw materials, and some others for natural resources exploitation. However, in all these, little or no attention was placed on the how either the immigrants or settlers' dissatisfactions lead to conflicts based on their method of economic integration in the environment. Instead, weights of prices and taxes were fixed on environmental usages through the instrument environmental policies.

Historically, the incursion of colonial administration on Nigeria's policy making processes has been noted by scholars of Nigeria's political past to have brought systems - in law, administration, economics, and culture - that were alien to her indigenous people. They dislocated the environmental policies and developments such

that the locals could not find their immediate environment directly useful economically. There was also economic-based segregation of urban settlements in forms of Government Reserved Areas. They made water tax policies, factory laws, and resource exploitation policies, which did not help Nigerians economically but resulted in aggression and conflict in several areas till date.

With regard to this issue, many scholars have noted a relationship between population dynamics, environment, and conflict, with peace or development, but there has been no specific research on their connections on the level of policy. Therefore, this study tries to interrogate the relationship within the variables at policy level, and how in particular they could relate to conflict. Thus, this study tries to investigate the general question – ‘How has low level of mainstreaming of migration policy on environmental policies influenced environmental conflicts in Nigeria? The specific questions to guide the study are:

1. What is the character of ‘migration’ and ‘conflict’ interplay as regards the ‘environment’?
2. How does the silence of Global Migration policy on ‘environment’ aid environmental conflicts?
3. How has poor economic articulation of ‘migration concerns’ in domestic environmental policy led to environmental conflicts?

Arising from above, the study will discuss in great detail the nexus between migration policy and environmental conflicts in Nigeria. This is very apt as appropriate migration policies can contribute to inclusive sustainable economic growth and development.

Literature Review

Spatial inequality denotes irregular spreading of income or other variables across different spatial positions (Kanbur, Venables and Wan, 2006). It is an element of overall inequality between individuals. This could determine conflict situations most often when it has to do with the distribution of socio-economic groups such as between migrants and indigenes, and between different religious, ethnic, or interest groups. It could also evolve into such differences to a catastrophic magnitude that have severe impacts like country or region wide conflict situations.

Malthus (1978) noted some relationships between population, the environment, and conflict situations, when he argued that human population growth would outrun the growth of food production, and advocated the need to control population increase as this may lead to adverse effects. Choucri (1983) asserted that population factors could create stress and demands in the society and that, if such demands are not met, social dislocation, violence, and conflicts may occur. However, he made no direct reference to the impact of environment on economic demands of the society. Notwithstanding, his argument showed that there could be ‘scarce’ and ‘needs’ which are all functions of human existence, best expressed in man’s economic involvement with each other and the environment.

Flahaux and De Haas (2016) observed that during the period of colonial liberation, millions of people fled conflicts where colonial powers were reluctant to relinquish control, or where white settler groups were determined to cling to their privileges. Within this historical experience lies the relationship between indigenous-settlers' migration and conflicts. However, Flahaux and De Haas (2016) study did not establish the role of the environment which describes how 'settlement' irritation of the 'natives' or 'settlement' objectives of the colonial powers was an influencing factor for conflict instigation and consequent migration. Without this in mind, the scenario would show no economic objective behind the conflicts. Also, it would seem as if the colonial powers only sought to maim or kill people who were peacefully settled before their coming.

Gallup *et al* (2003), in the same manner asserted, that evidences abound that geographic characteristics such as location, climate, and terrain, have impacts on development. However, it was a general view that places importance on the determinant character of the environment amongst many other factors that could engender social activities and economic developments in a country. The African Union Draft Policy Paper on African Migration, on the theme 'Refugees and Asylum Seekers', handles the issue of 'resettlement'. In particular, the draft policy paper on migration hints that differences in ethnic settlements may arise conflicts. Still, without considering such differences in a settlement plan or policy, there will be great chances of conflict arising in the area (African Union, 2018). Again, a direct relationship between migrant issues and environmental conflicts appear when addressing how the environment enlivens economic utility of migrants.

Rockefeller Foundation (1977) drew attention to Homer-Dixon's project on 'environment, population and security', which focused how environmental insufficiency, population activities, and inter-group tensions result to conflict. They highlighted how class relations in control and ownership of scarce environmental resources are tantamount to class conflicts between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots'. Kaplan (1994) emphasized that the scarcity-conflict model is gradually gaining grounds in issues concerning foreign policy, population, and environment. This implies that scarcity, which is tied to economy, is a factor capable of leading to conflicts among different categories in a population distribution in competition for the environment. For Diehl (1991), three frameworks exist for appreciating and analyzing the effect of geography on conflicts, namely, geography as influence, facilitator, or source of conflict. Geography here refers to 'environment'. Although environment in a broader sense captures 'geography,' the latter has to do with the systematic ordering of the environment and the study of the same.

Apart from drawing attention to the interrelationship between population, migration, environmental stress, and conflict, there is inadequacy of national policies to help bring evidence-based and practical solutions to the problem of migration. It stated that migration is a necessary evil that has come to confront the different countries of the world, it becomes necessary that a multi-sectoral approach in accommodating the challenges for a positive future should be in place. Lack of adequate resources, and

obstructive national policies, may considerably limit the ability of cities to implement practical solutions. While national leaders cannot change laws themselves or reverse budget cuts, they can engage in drives for better policies and funding support from higher levels of government in order to create an environment within which they can effectively operate. In the absence of national frameworks, local leaders can also leverage the control they do have in a number of policy areas — from housing and land-use planning to police services and local economic development — to support the needs of their migrant population. Through public-private partnerships and improved coordination with humanitarian aid agencies, NGOs, businesses, and local organizations, cities can maximize impact and avoid duplicative efforts. As mass migration poses many challenges on our cities in unprecedented ways, we must work to incorporate it into our visions for a resilient future (Rockefeller Foundation, 2016).

In some quarters, it was noted that territory has great influence on conflicts because of its resources (Goertz and Diehl, 1992 cited in Hensel, 2000). ‘Territories’ here connotes environment which harbors agricultural land, strategic minerals, and strategic positions which are essential ingredients for migration and ‘mobility’ of the military (and probably militias-in the conflict parlance). The environment plays a great role in determining and helping mobility and conflict. The problem here is in determining whether such military conflicts could suffice as environmental conflicts. Also considering the environment in terms of ‘geography’, Deichmann (1999) stated that it influences development through its interaction with space and society (probably referring to spatial differences in settlements or migratory dimensions of the society). He asserted that from these interactions, inequality arises. However, he did not clearly explore how these unequal interactions, as environmental as they may be, lead to underdevelopment, crisis and or conflict situations.

Oyefusi (2007) noted that Nigeria has not been exempt from the torments of frequent violent conflicts, some of which result from disagreements on issues concerning the distribution and management of resources generated from the exploitation of the Niger Delta environment. Although environmental usage may lead to situations of conflict, there is need to understand the social aspects of these conflicts one of which is migration.

Ibeanu (2000) expounded that the various manifestations of neglect of the people of Niger Delta and their environments by governing authorities and oil multinational companies, in addition to influences of unemployment, military rule, the minority question, and a badly structured Nigerian fiscal federalism, were causes of conflicts in the region of Niger Delta. Although, not systematically establishing the relationship between the three concepts under study, this assertion captured how economic vicissitudes and social permutations on the environment could lead to continued conflict situations in the country. To this end, it could be seen that these concepts are interrelated and reinforcing in character. However, while migration stress could lead to conflicts, it happens with the inadequate economic integration of migrants within the environment, usually discussed under urbanization (and crime). The environment for this study becomes a basis for understanding how migration could lead to conflict

in the level of conceptualization, and when advanced a little further, to a level of policy that enhances practical experiences and solutions. There is therefore the need for evidence-based policy inputs on the issue of migration.

Global Migration Policy Silence on Environment and Environmental Conflicts

Although the United Nations publications do not specify a particular policy as migration policy, there is a summary of global migration policies contained in policy instruments of different countries of the world. The challenge therefore is that there are no specific treatments for curbing the challenges of internal migration, since most already established instruments, were initially more focused on immigration and emigration rather than the challenges of irregular migration. However, from the available global policies, some features of a Global Migration Policy could be gleaned as follows:

- Governments should by existent appropriate policies support migration, [so that] migration can contribute to inclusive and sustainable economic growth and development;
- Governments [should] seek to maintain their levels of immigration;
- meeting labour demands [should be] is the primary reason for immigration policy;
- [While Governments] make policies to attract highly skilled workers, they should seek to train unskilled immigrants and resettle them appropriately;
- Governments [should] have policies to promote integration of immigrants;
- Governments [should] have policy measures to encourage investments by diasporas;
- Governments [should] have policies to encourage return-migration of their citizens living abroad;
- Governments [should] adopt measures to address irregular immigration (Developed from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2016).

As a corollary to the above, it would be observed that irregular migrants are those migrants that found themselves in irregular conditions some of whom experience vulnerabilities with respect to discrimination, exploitation, abuse, human trafficking, and smuggling. In response to this, governments of different countries react by fining the migrants, deporting them and imposing penalties on their employers, while a few percentage of governments have actually accommodated them by regularizing their status. However, these policies have not reflected any yardstick on which the migrants are regularized. Perhaps issues such as conflict and environment reasons have been dominant factors in ascertaining the ‘regularization of immigrants’ but not so evidenced for migrant citizens.

Various countries of the world have been able to domesticate the migration policy. For example, the Native Title Act 1993, of Australia recognizes the occupation of Australia by indigenous peoples prior to European settlement. A word in the policy, 'occupation', implies an environmental preoccupation/regard of the policy for the natives, as part of the Australian communities' development alongside the 'European immigrants' at a time. This could be the reason for peace and development in Australia (National Native Title Tribunal, 2017). The same way, an African Union (AU) Convention defined refugees as people 'in flight due to occupation and claiming asylum'. It also talked about 'settlement of those unwilling or unable to return to their country of origin'. It defined the conditions for granting temporary residence. This policy also admits the environmental dimension of conflicts, when it defined refugees as people in flight 'due to occupation.' Refugees are also immigrants who could use both regular and irregular means to traverse defined boundaries. Whatever the case may be, such people required economic integration in the new geography, territory - or in a common sense of the word - environment (Abebe, 2017).

Again, the African Treaty 1991 discussed development in terms of mobilizing human and material resources with free movement of persons and capital as key focus. Although this has been seen as a build up to a future African migration policy, it was broad in denotation of human and material resources. It did not problematize these factors as posing or suffering certain challenges. However, these crucial in making a better policy on development in contemporary times. AU Convention in Kampala highlighted the issue of displacement and protection to internally displaced persons, as well as the issue of handling the consequences that ensue from them. However, it did not specify on environmental and economic implications, because it did not consider the settlement of internally displaced persons, instead, it looked at their assistance (Abebe, 2017).

Poor Economic Articulation of Migration Concerns in Domestic Environmental Policy and Conflicts in Nigeria

Although environmental legislation commenced after the discovery of petroleum, public awareness of the areas of the environment that required development remained limited. Neither the general public nor the government understood technical issues like effluent limitations, pollution abatement, and the overall modalities for sustainable development of Nigeria's environmental resources. Most laws that were not petroleum-related had only a minor bearing on the environment. Environmental policies and legislations were classified into four epochs: the colonial period (1900–1956); petroleum-focused environmental legislation period (1956—early 1970s); the rudimentary and perfunctory environmental legislation period (1970- pre 1987 crisis), and the contemporary period (Post- 1987 Koko Crisis to the present) (Ogunba, 2016).

For the colonial period, Ogunba noted that environmental law was nearly non-existence and was littered with issues concerning environmental and town organization. This covered issues such as brief provisions in public health legislation and in torts and nuisance law. This goes to explain that Town Planning Ordinances

had issue concerning taxes on water at that time. It was concerned more with adequate settlement of Europeans in residences and companies. There were conflicts during these periods on water taxes and development taxes. Some of the crises were: the Coal miner's revolt in Enugu in 1949, and the 1900s water rate crisis which made Dr. Randle and Dr. Orisadipe Obasa (who founded the People's Union at a mass meeting in Enu-Owa) to oppose expropriation, changes in land tenure, and the water rate in 1908 (Sherwood, 2014).

Together with the 'petroleum-focused environmental legislation period' which was the second period, the third phase of environmental policies in Nigeria - the rudimentary and perfunctory environmental legislation period (1970- pre 1987 crisis) - was described as a resource-based environmental policy making which followed the commercialization of crude oil available in commercial quantity. Issues of indigenous settlement and working condition were not given proper attention.

In addition to the profile of environmental policies, in 1975, Nigeria created an Urban Development and Environment Division within its Federal Ministry of Economic Development, which equally solidified the dynamism of environmental policy in Nigeria and its possible relationship with development. This had social and economic implications. The social aspect was evidenced in the Third National Development Plan (1975- 1980). It tried to reverse the preceding environmental insensitivity by integrating a considerate policy to improve the quality of life for all citizens, making it essentially different from both the first and second national development plans that were solely resource-based approaches, as well as the colonial environmental plans (Elenwo & Akankali, 2014; and Ogunba, 2016).

Other policies followed suit during this third period of environmental policies in Nigeria were. These are: the 1978 Land Use Act; the 1979 Energy Commission of Nigeria Act; the 1985 Endangered Species (Control of International Trade and Traffic) Act (which controlled and regulated hunting and trade in wild animals); the Sea Fisheries Act (later repealed by Sea Fisheries Decree 1992) for the regulation and protection of Nigeria's sea fisheries and licensing of motor-fishing boats; the 1986 River Basins Development Authorities Act (which enabled governments in Nigeria to engage in development using their surface and groundwater resources); and the Factories Act in 1987 (which was made to cover the registration of factories and safety of workers who are exposed to occupational hazards). Within the Factories Act of 1987 were stipulations on cleanliness, overcrowding, ventilation, lighting, drainage of floors, and gender specific sanitary conveniences. Other provisions relate to staff welfare, first aid, and supply of drinking water (Ogunba, 2016).

The next is contemporary period (Post-1987 Koko Crisis to the present). This was when environmental hazards put policy makers on a 'red alert' and therefore generated many environmentally protectionist policies. In any case, little attention has been paid to the social aspects of the environment, except through the later creation of the Ministry of Niger Delta on 10th September, 2008 by President Umaru Musa Yar' Adua, which had a minister in charge of Niger-Delta environmental development and

another minister for youth empowerment. Also the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) became a parastatal under the ministry. However, a report by Ikpen showed that only little achievements had been made during the first four years of the Niger-Delta Ministry as projects to improve roads, build skills acquisition centers, and improve water and electricity supplies, were far behind schedule. There were challenges of a large gap between federal promises and amounts released, and project duplication (Ikpen, 2012). This, of course, could be explained on the fact that post-2008 militia–Nigerian army conflicts were related to issues concerning the economic integration of the indigenous settlers with the immigrants’ oil multinationals, as the environmental policies were not given adequate attention. The social integration of the policies on the indigenous people was not given a community-development perspective. Below is a list of oil-resource policies in Nigeria which focused on the environmental concerns.

Legislations and Regulations in Oil and Gas Industry in Nigeria;

- The Oil pipelines Act 1956 (oil Pipelines Act), as amended in 1965,
- The Petroleum Profits Tax Act 1958 (PPTA) with amendments in 1967, 1970, 1973 and 1979.
- The Mineral Oils (Safety) Regulations 1963
- The Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1968.
- The petroleum Act 1969 (PA) and all amendments like the Petroleum (Amendment) Decree 1996, subsidiary legislation, regulations and instruments enacted under it.
- Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations, 1969 with amendments in 1973,1979,1995,1996 and Petroleum (Amendment) Decree 1996.
- Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Decree 1977.
- Associated Gas Re-injection Decree 1979, as amended in 1985.
- The Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1992 (EIAA) (Post-1987 policies).
- Production Sharing Decree 1999.
- The Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN) 2002.
- The Nigerian Oil and gas Industry Content Development Act 2010. (Makinde and Adeyoke, 2007; Amnesty International, 2009; Ajayi and Owolabi 2013; and Mbendi, 2013).

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical approach for this study is the community development approach. It could be defined as an approach of engendering development where community members by collective actions mobilize themselves to generate solutions to their

common problems. With the infusion of externalities economics in environmental policy, development and planning followed the resource-based and growth-centre approaches, which did not emphasize interactivity of social constituents in policy-making. Issues such as siting of oil-waste dumps by multinational oil companies were to be punished by fines; and government's construction of dual carriage highways could be in urban highways with request for tolls were to be born in mind by the environmental policy maker or development planner. The criticism holds that such projects were to be done without looking at the interplay of such projects with the inclusion or exclusion of the transit or domiciled populations. The externalities approach to environmental policies for development frame the environment from the angle of exploitation and control of public resources whereby harms meted out on it would be punished by fiscal instruments such as fines and taxes. Thus, the social value of the environment has been neglected, thereby exacerbating the massive plunder of the environment. Though human labour and productive activities formed part of the basis of these classical liberal theories on environmental policy, the social ingredient in these policies have been relegated. Anchoring the study on the community development approach helps in perceiving the environment as having the potentials of engendering economic development, especially when migrants and settlers work together for well-articulated fiscal and spatial development.

Practically, the community development approach supports environmental policy that is first of all social, with the notion that these social elements of the environment work to sustain the environment and make best uses of the same. On the fair side, it discusses the human population as either the victor or victims to whom pecuniary settlements and compensations are made to. Meanwhile, community development approach is proposed as the panacea approach for environmental policy making in this study. It has a more social orientation, with a focus on involvement of the passive and active aspects of the society for their total economic benefits in the environment they find themselves. In the past four decades, the concept of development has been construed through the use of 'community development approach', whereby the people living in the society are empowered and are actively involved in issues bordering on their own development (Ismail, 2009).

Inadequacy of global migration policies have reflected in the nature of environmental and other development policies in countries. There is need for policies to arrest conflict situations and harness development through an economic integration of migrants and settlers as a community. This becomes important as environmental conflicts exhibit class relations of 'haves' and 'have-nots' toward environmental resources simply addressed as immigrants and indigene dichotomy. There is need to harness lessons from states that had been operating any form of environmental policy that carefully integrate these classes as a community (such as handling alien migrants and local-settler considerations in exploitation of environmental resources) as a key to solving internal migration and attendant conflicts. There would not have been the re-currence of environmental conflicts such as experienced in Niger Delta, or in South Africa-whereby apartheid economic and physical (environmental) divisions prior to conflicts

initially presented 'settlement' patterns. In cases where missionaries lived in the villages, it is observable that they were part of the community development.

Arising from the above, it can be deduced that the community development approach can be used to justify the following hypotheses that:

- migration, environment, and conflict, are inter-related and reinforcing concepts;
- the silence of the global migration policy on environment aided global environmental conflicts; and
- poor economic articulation of migration concerns in domestic environmental policy led to environmental conflicts.

Global Environmental Conflicts: Africa in Perspective

The complexity of evidences of environmental conflicts all over the world relate to the dilemma of the environment as either the source, means, or receiver of conflict. Certain examples prove this issue. For instance, an argument has been put forward that the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and other countries affected by several types of civil unrest had caused rise of migrants who abandon their settlements in search of safety (Rockefeller Foundation, 2016). This is a clear analysis of how the economy of countries surge from conflicts and lead to population increase due to migration to better countries. However, this analysis did not specify the environmental dimension of conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Nevertheless, with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) territorial objective consists the establishment of Islamic socio-political and economic settlements which has led to emigration, poverty and further exacerbation of the conflict to surrounding countries.

Other instances of the nexus between migration, environment, and conflict exist. State development officials have also alleged that political conflict in Haiti, Rwanda, and Chiapas, Mexico mostly stem from population and environmental stresses (Wirth, 1994). These countries, laden with environmental stress and population issues which are also known to be have more serious economic challenges, have been described to face 'political conflict' and not 'environmental conflict', though the sources are largely environmental.

For Flahaux and De Haas (2016), the paradox of declining intra-African migration might partly be explained that decolonization and concomitant antagonism between newly created states may have increased intra-continental barriers to movement. One could describe the banning of immigrants by countries of West Africa, Ghana and Nigeria respectively, were abrupt and direct 'conflict in policies on immigration (migration)' as regards the population trajectory and economic development of each of these countries. However, the policy direction of these countries may not be directly explained as conflicts as they are environmental.

It could also be posited that what is evident in the conflict in the Lake Chad Basin Area was a result of increased migration possibilities and low performing economy of the

‘region.’ The events in central Africa also proves that uniqueness in geo-economic status of states is environmental, proving that such shared economic status may be due to the possibilities of migration in peaceful or conflict situations. Apart from the Chad region, a broad-spectrum of the states in Central Africa have overabundance of unpleasant elements for chaos: unbalanced spread of oil wealth, unresolved social problems, and fixed democracy. There was conversion of the Great Lakes Region into a major conflict zone connecting Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Congo Brazzaville (Republic of Congo). This shows a case where military migration exacerbated conflict situations traversing territories without proper system checking for irregular migrants. This, with economic dysfunctions in these regions, contributed greatly to the exportation of conflict by sit-tight regimes to neighbouring countries. Below is a table showing the state of the economies of African states by their nominal GDPs.

Table 1: Rank of African Countries by their Nominal GDPs (2018)

31	Guinea	9.721	41	Swaziland	4.491
32	Benin	9.238	42	Sierra Leone	3.641
33	Rwanda	9.137	43	Burundi	3.396
34	Congo	8.513	44	Liberia	3.285
35	Niger	8.253	45	South Sudan	2.870
36	Somalia	7.382	46	Lesotho	2.768
37	Malawi	6.206	47	Djibouti	2.029
38	Eritrea	5.813	48	Central African Republic	1.928
39	Mauritania	5.116	49	Cape Verde	1.741
40	Togo	4.767	50	Seychelles	1.482

Source: Adopted from, International Monetary Fund [IMF] (2018). “World Economic Outlook (WEO), April

With the exception of Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo, other countries fell greatly behind in GDP nominal ranking (in Table 1 above). These countries did not make the first 29 countries out of 51 countries with higher nominal GDP. The economic and geographic nexus is demonstrated as environmental conflict shown by 60 % (per cent) of countries mentioned (i.e. Chad, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo Brazzaville).

Against all odds, Sao Tome and Principe may prove to be an African exception: a stable democratic state...managing its wealth transparently and responsibly for the benefit

of its citizens' (Okolie, 2013: 18 citing Mbembe, 2010). Governments which feel threatened and seek to hang on to power and ensure their political survival by any means, have developed a strategy regarded as 'voluntary conflict exportation', which has been frequently used in Central Africa. This is a strategy which tends to involve several possible parties to an internal conflict, but rather encourages collective chaos and widespread regional disorder (Chouala, 2008). As aptly remarked by Pourtier (1997), in 1996, Rwanda transferred its civil war to the eastern DRC through the Banyamulenge settlement in South of the Kivu region. After taking hold of the capital city of Kigali and fiercely resisting the loyal forces to the country's border with former Zaire, the newly constituted Rwandan leaders had to be on the lookout against military and political reinforcement of the overwhelmed forces by initiating a major offensive on the Kivu region, in search of dissents (migrants) who allegedly had sought refuge in the Kivu Mountains.

Environmental Conflicts in Nigeria Caused by Migration-Environmental Stress

Many scholars have looked at environmental conflicts in Nigeria but have not discussed it as it relates to migration issues. However, while migration has commonly been seen as an effect of internal environmental and economic crises of states, the same has not been seen in scholarship. Violence over grazing land had occurred between the Tivs and the Fulani nomads in the middle-belt of Nigeria. The quest for ownership by the two groups developed into violent conflicts. These instances of violent conflicts led to the displacement of people from their homes to seek refuge in a refugee camp in Makurdi (Phil-Eze, 2009). In the south-south zone, which generally harbor the Niger-Delta of Nigeria, Leo-Nnoli (2014) highlighted that there has been continued environmental degradation as well of conflict of interests between the communities and the oil Transnational Corporations (TNCs) in the Niger Delta. The poor treatment of the environmental degradation in Niger-delta by the federal government of Nigeria and the oil multinational companies could be treated as environmental conflict in the form of poor community development between the locals and the invaders (the federal government and the oil multinational corporations - who perceive the Niger-delta as its industrial site).

Nwilo and Badejo (2006) noted that available records for the period of 1976 to 1996 indicate that approximately 6%, 25%, and 69% respectively, of total oil spilled in the Niger Delta area, were in land, swamp, and offshore environments. Also, between 1997 and 2001, Nigeria recorded a total number of 2,097 oil spill incidents. Thousands of barrels of oil have been spilt into the environment through oil pipelines and tanks in the country. This spillage is a result of lack of regular maintenance of the pipelines and storage tanks. Some of these facilities have been in use for decades without replacement. About 40,000 barrels of oil spilled into the environment through the offshore pipeline in Idoho. Sabotage is another major cause of oil spillage in the country. Some of the citizens, in collaboration with people from other countries engage in oil bunkering.

In south-east and south-west zones of Nigeria, conflicts arise on the problem of direct use of environmental resources due to their physical scarcity. The Umuleri-Aguleri communal conflict in 2001 is an instance of the effect of scarce natural resources mismanagement in the region (Phil-Eze, 2009). According to Global Internal Displacement Profile of the Norwegian Refugee Council on Nigeria (2008), between 1990 and 2008, 4 out of 31 communities where inter-communal conflicts were very prominent are in southwestern Nigeria.

Abegunde (2011) from his findings revealed that conflicts in southwestern Nigeria are traceable to land-related issues. There were attempts by the residents to claim their communities' rights over certain pieces of land from others, and this resulted in conflicts between them and other discrete communities, probably immigrants in this regard. This was basically shown by Ife and Modakeke communities that have engaged in war against each other. To support this, Abegunde (2011) also demonstrated that 60.5 % respondents in Ife and 77.3 % respondents in Itaogbolu, and more than half of those in Ise and Iju were of the opinion that strangers should not have full right to any piece of land in their settlements. Any effort against this supposition could be a source of internecine strife and conflict. Meanwhile, for a community that has experienced land conflict like Modakeke, 38.6% of their population acquiesced with the other communities' choice of non-allocation of 'settlements' to immigrants. The import of this is that most of the sampled respondents were of the opinion that strangers have no equal right to land with the indigenous residents as spelt in the 1978 land use act of Nigeria. These sentiments would describe the assertion by Phil-Eze (2009: 402) that these 'conflicts rage over the unfair apportioning of wealth from extractive resources, such as minerals, stones, hydrocarbons and timber'. Below is a table showing ranks of environmental problems in Nigeria and the relations with social aspects of the environment.

Table 2: Ranking of Major Environmental Problems, Social Issues and Priorities

Problem Type	Problem Subset	Priority Ranking
Natural Environment	Coastal/River bank erosion	Moderately High
	Flooding	Moderate
	Sedimentation/Silt	Low
	Substance	Low
	Exotic (Water Hyacinth)	High
Development Related	Land Degradation/Soil Fertility Loss	High
	Agricultural Decline/Shortened Fallow	High
	Delta Forest (Mangroves)	High
	Biodiversity Depletion	High
	Fisheries Decline	High
	Oil Spillage	Moderate
	Gas Flaring	Moderate
	Sewage and Wastewater	High
	Other Chemicals	Moderate
Socio-Economic Problems	Poverty	High
	Unemployment	High
	Communities-Oil Company Conflict	High
	Inter-Community Conflicts	High
	Intra-Community Conflicts	Moderate
	Conflicts over Land	High
	Inadequate Compensation	High

	Displacements	Moderate
	Decay in Societal Values	High
	Poor Transportation/High cost of Fuel	High
	Housing Pressure/Infrastructure Decay/Crime	High

Source: Maduka (1998) cited in Offiong (2011,p.424).

From the table above, most socio-economic problems rank high and are identified as aspects of the environment. Among them are inter- and intra-community conflicts, equally displacement, poverty, and other economic related issues

Summary of Findings and conclusion

This study demonstrated how environmental conflicts stem from inadequacies of global migration policies. The lack of economic and physical integration ‘settlement’ of different populations in states or countries is one of the major consequences of the inadequacy in question. Thus, there have been issues involving immigrant and indigenous populations in different countries in the world, and Nigeria in particular. Some of these issues are the roots of such conflicts as transnational corporation and Niger-delta militant conflicts, herdsman /farmers conflicts, settlers’ inter-communal conflicts in the south-west and south-east, insurgency in the Niger-Delta, Boko haram conflict in the north-eastern regions of Nigeria, and so on.

The world is in dire need to tackle the increasing economic inequalities which affect the movement of people who do not find their environments useful to them as before due to harsh environmental conditions threatening their existence. Following the saying that “the grass is greener on the other side,” it is recommended that the Nigerian government should not just deny entry to irregular migrants who pose environmental threats in the polity, but should find ways to integrated or settle them. According to a Rockefeller report:

Rather than resist this new reality, cities must embrace it. As many migrants cannot, or do not intend to, return to their place of origin, municipal authorities must start seeing their role as long-term, or even permanent, hosts. If this is acknowledged and plans are made to anticipate and respond to the potential pressures of mass migration on urban systems, the arrival and presence of newcomers will be less likely to be perceived as a threat. Mass migration can instead be seen as an opportunity to improve a city’s infrastructure, services, and governance systems, as well as the response capacity of its local communities (Rockefeller Foundation, 2016:17).

From the foregoing, this study recommends that migration policies should be mainstreamed into environmental policies to control environmental conflicts. Specifically, for governing authorities, the following are necessary:

- There should be research think-tanks to revisit environmental conflicts in order to study their nexus with migration. Where such connections exist and are proved to be strongly driven by economic factors affecting the environmental or physical settlements, legal instruments should be drafted with retrospective implementation and enforcement to mitigate conflict exacerbation.
- Global migration policy should be drafted considering economic development differences in the world to control the occurrences of environmental conflicts.
- There should be a definitive policy draft on migration with regard to coherent economic integration of migrants in domestic environmental policies using ministries of environment as lead agents for tackling domestic migration.

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CHAPTER FIVE

Migration Crisis in the Post-Military Era in Nigeria: Trends, Challenges and Policy Options

Samuel Onuoha Udeala

Introduction

Migration is the process of temporary or permanent relocation of a person from his place of primary abode to another place, in search of better living, family reunification, further studies, or other reasons. Migration is a fundamental part of human nature. People move from one place to another for various reasons, including poverty, unemployment, famine, political and religious crises, natural disasters and so on (NMP, 2015). Driven by economic desperation and sometimes laziness, thousands of able-bodied young men and women are, almost on a daily basis, embarking on suicide missions in the bid to migrate towards the northern hemisphere in search of employment opportunities that not readily available in those very societies (Tolawinjobi, 2010).

The growing number of irregular migrants from Nigeria is fuelled by a large pool of unemployed youth, poverty, and distorted information on labour market conditions in rich countries. This trend is reinforced by the increasing professionalism of traffickers and bogus travel intermediaries, with scams and promises of passage to greener pastures. For those youths who migrate when conditions fall below a critical threshold of tolerance at home, migration is a response to both the pull of opportunity and the push of abject poverty. Socio-economic insecurity has transformed migration that would otherwise have taken place internally into irregular migration to rich countries (Thisday, 2017).

Faced with strict immigration control measures and tightened barriers to legal entry, a growing number of young people are involved in daredevil ventures and have increasingly adopted more sophisticated, daring and different methods in their attempts to enter Europe. Many perish in the process. Those who are apprehended are deported, sometimes in inhumane conditions (Thomas, 2014). Others live in vulnerable situations, mainly because of their irregular status or the kind of work they do, and many others face discrimination. Many are deskilled, frustrated and have little or no access to opportunities for skills training or career advancement (NMP, 2015).

While only a small fraction eventually reach their destinations where they face disappointments and frustration, majority of them usually perish on the way. From the accounts of some of the returnees, many who made it to Europe or the Middle East were usually forced into prostitution, used as mercenaries, deployed as household

servants, factory workers, drug couriers and even as organ donors. They would be beaten, starved and subjected to other forms of torture if they tried to resist. Within the past years, many Nigerian newspapers have recycled tales of horror, including slavery in Libya, experienced by many Africans, mostly Nigerians. These are tales about desperate youths engaged in the journey across the Sahara Desert to Libya, mainly on their way to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea. Majority of these migrants are often trapped in Libya, a country notorious for exporting sub-Saharan labour to Europe during the Ottoman era. Libya's current embrace of slave labour was aided by the collapse of law and order after the death of the country's strongman and dictator, Muammar Gaddafi (Stokhom, 2015, Olajide, 2017).

According to the International Organisation of Migration (IOM), nationals of Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Cote D'Ivoire and Gambia after being detained by human smugglers or militant groups, were taken to town squares or car parks to be sold like commodities. Some of the migrants are refugees running away from civil wars or terrorist activities at home, but many of them are economic migrants running away from economic blights at home. They use Libya mainly as a transit country because of its proximity to Europe: Only 167 kilometres of the Mediterranean Sea separate the northern shores of Libya in North Africa from the southern shores of Italy in Western Europe (IOM, 2014)..

At the last count, almost 4000 Nigerians have been rescued from the vicious slave enclaves where reports said large numbers were still being kept in inhuman conditions. They, along with other sub-Saharan migrants were humiliated, abused, oppressed, sexually exploited or killed. Between 400,000 and 700,000 African migrants were reportedly conscripted in these detention cells (Thisday, 2017). Ironically, the current migration crisis is a cruel twist of the logic of the transatlantic slave trade. In the old trade, African agents of European slave traders hunted men and women and forcibly sold them off to be transported across the Atlantic to the new world. In the new 'trade', Africans are willingly subjecting and submitting themselves as fodder and merchandise for enslavement across the Mediterranean (Thisday, 2017).

Evidence gathered by some scholars, as well as non-governmental organisations, supported by international and regional organisations including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and IOM indicates that the large majority of potential undocumented migrants take the decision to undertake the migration process because of negligible or inadequate information about the risks involved (Stokhom, 2015). The very decision to cross the barren Sahara and the dangerous Mediterranean Sea is indicative of the desperation of African youths to leave their own countries. That in itself speaks volumes about the social, political, and economic decadence in African countries. The failure of African leaders even to intervene early enough in the plight of their citizens migrating to Europe through the Sahara is a clear illustration of their failure to govern (Tolawinjobi, 2010).

Akinnaso (2017) argues that desperate African youths have been engaging in this risky journey for decades. It only escalated within the last decade owing to two key

factors. First and foremost, the high rate of unemployment and poverty among African youths has turned many of them into vulnerable groups ready to risk their lives in order to make a living. For those among them who do not take to crime, an escape into purported greener pastures abroad has become an allure. This is especially true of Nigerian youths among whom poverty and unemployment rate has risen within the past 10 years due to increased production of unskilled and poorly trained secondary school and university graduates, dissonance between the education system and the job market; and economic recession caused by unbridled corruption, the slump in oil prices, and governance failures.

Second, the spread of social media and various online platforms has given rise to the escalation of fake advertisement of jobs in Europe, North America, and the Middle East by human traffickers, mostly Nigerians. Desperate youths are cajoled and deceived by these smugglers, who promise them brighter opportunities abroad. Sometimes, the smugglers use third parties in the youths' backyard, including pastors and local radio stations (Akinaso, 2017).

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

(a) Migration: The geographic movement of people across a specified boundary for the purpose of establishing a new permanent or semi-permanent residence,

(b) Migration Crisis: The reasons Nigerian nationals choose to leave their country of origin are complex and cannot be generalized. Existing literature ascertains that it is a mix of economic, political, and social factors that make Nigerian nationals to leave their country. Crawley, Düvell et al.(2016) recorded several reasons mentioned by survey respondents along the Central Mediterranean route. These amongst others:- escalating tensions due to differences, resource sharing between Muslims and Christians, especially in the northern parts of Nigeria, intergenerational conflicts related to family and marriage,- religious obligations,- lack of livelihood opportunities as well as tensions around religious and fraternity affiliations leading to physical violence.

The IOM profile on Nigeria in 2014 also stressed that the enduring outbreaks of intrastate violence in the forms of ethno-religious, political, criminal, and resource struggles, are key drivers in the decision to leave Nigeria. The most challenging, however, has been the rise of influence and power of the Boko Haram, causing problems that Nigeria has not faced before, particularly in the North-eastern region of the country (Isiugo-Abanihe & IOM 2014). Many migrants cannot name one specific trigger but it seems there is an overlap among reasons, especially since drivers also changed along the routes. Crawley, Düvell et al (2016) cited the example of migrants who have left Nigeria due to economic reasons, but the conflict and violence in Libya forced them to flee further.

(c) Migrant: A person undergoing a (semi-)permanent change of residence which involves a change of his or her social, economic, and/or cultural environment. The

terms emigrant and immigrant refer respectively to migrants from the country of origin/departure, and those in the country of destination/settlement.

(d) Post-Military Era: Post- military era is the period Nigeria returned to democratic rule after several years of military dictatorship. Nigeria has been under military rule since independence (1 October 1960), except for the periods between 1 October 1960 and 15 January 1966; and 1 October 1979 and 31 December 1983. In its 58 years as an independent state, Nigeria has had seven military rulers, six military inspired changes of government (five of which have been successful military coups), four constitutions (including one that was never used), four constitution drafting processes, at least four programmes of transition from military to civilian government, at least three unsuccessful coup attempts, three national censuses, two civilian regimes, two constituent assemblies, one civil war and one successful transition programme. As these facts suggest, successive military regimes have launched their own programmes of transition with different degrees of sincerity. Successive programmes of transition to civil rule in Nigeria since 1975, have been substantially repetitive. Today Nigeria is under democratic rule (Udeala, 2018). This paper examined the migration crisis in Nigeria since 1999 when Nigeria returned to democratic rule.

(e)Feminization of Migration: The term ‘feminization of migration’ puts emphasis on the fact that women are increasingly becoming active participants in the process of migration. Nowadays, women make up almost half of all international migrants. Women’s reasons for migration have changed over time, as it is now recognized that more and more women are independently deciding to become active in the global labour market. Unfortunately, even though the trend is going towards more independence for women in the migration process, long-established and exploitative female-specific forms of migration persist, including trafficking of women for sexual exploitation, commercialization of domestic workers, as well as the organization of women for marriage (Carling, 2005, IOM, 2017).

Past and Contemporary Migration Trends

a. *Pre-Colonial and Colonial Era*

Prior to the colonial era migration was mainly linked to slave trade, inter-ethnic conflicts, and warfare. The largest of these trades took place during the 15th century when 12 million people were “exported” as slaves from west, west-central, and eastern Africa to European colonies in the Americas. During the colonial era (1891 – 1960) , most movements were in relation to labour migration, especially to the United Kingdom (UK), as the British needed a large labour force for their mines, plantations, and public administration (Mberu & Pongou, 2010).

During the 1970s, Nigeria experienced a substantial influx of immigrants which was caused by Nigeria’s oil wealth after 1973 and many West-Africans seeking employment there. However, in the early 1980s, oil prices and the economy faced a downturn. This was complicated by political repression and violence during that era. With the stagnating economy, many Nigerians chose to emigrate, especially the better

educated and wealthier ones. Mberu & Pongou (2010) called it the “culture of professional migration”, which was particular present in the early 1980s, caused by the austerity measures of the Structural Adjustment Programme.

As a result, the national currency was devalued, wages for professionals decreased, and working conditions deteriorated. As conditions worsened and desperation grew, the low-skilled youth started to leave Nigeria as well. In the early 2000s, an increasing number of Nigerians could be found in countries such as the Gulf States as well as throughout Europe, particularly Spain, Italy, Ireland, Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium working in the agricultural, informal service, and trade sector (Isiugo-Abanihe, & IOM-Nigeria, 2014).

Nigeria’s international and internal migration history has been linked to conflicts. The mass killings of Igbo residents by the Hausa-Fulani group in Northern Nigeria as a result of power struggle between the North and the South in 1966, and the subsequent civil war between the proclaimed Republic of Biafra and the rest of Nigeria led to one of the major displacements of the Igbo people within and outside Nigeria during the 1960s and 1970s (Olajide, 2017).

Another major ethnic conflict developed between Hausa-Fulani herdsmen and Mambila farmers in the early 2000s, prompting the Hausa-Fulani to flee in large numbers. Conflicts in Nigeria were fuelled by the various military dictatorships leading to the establishment of several groups, all perusing their own interest. In the southern region, the most commonly known groups are the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MAS-SOB) demanding the South’s rights to more oil-resource control, and self-determination (Mberu & Pongou, 2010). In the North, there are the Islamic groups, Izala, and the Boko Haram, aiming to eradicate Western civilization and establish an Islamic theocracy in Nigeria. As a result of those ongoing conflicts in the northern part as well as the persistent clashes between the forces of the government and the youth militias in the South-Eastern region and the Niger Delta, the livelihood of thousands were destroyed, leaving many displaced, injured or even killed (Mberu & Pongou, 2010).

With increased degradation of living standards due to a combination of economic and security issues in Nigeria, applications for asylum in other African states as well as in Europe and North Africa increased from the late 1990s onwards. Out-migration of Nigerians is often associated with criminal activities and victimization due to many detected cases of trafficking in persons, forced prostitution, money laundering as well as fake documents for cross-border movements (IOM, 2017). Yaro (2012), argues that the drivers of contemporary migration encapsulate both old tendencies and new aspirations and constraints. While in the past push-pull conceptions of the migration process provided a framework for understanding the motives for movements, today we need to understand the dynamics of globalisation and read different meanings into our old conceptualisations.

Problems, Challenges and Implications

The following are some of problems facing irregular migrants.

(a) The Risks in Irregular Migration

Irregular migration from Nigeria to Europe is of great concern to Nigeria, countries in Europe and advocates of migrants' rights. The Mediterranean is now considered the world's most hazardous sea route in use by migrants and refugees. Recent years have been marked by a number of various incidents, where boats capsized and sunk, tragically claiming the lives of hundreds of so-called boat migrants. In 2014, some 219,000 migrants and refugees attempted to make their way across the Mediterranean, with more than 3,500 lives lost en route (UNHCR, 2015, Stokhom, 2015).

Some were victims of deception by smugglers, while others were persuaded by one isolated success story of a friend or relative who succeeded overseas as a migrant and remitted money home afterwards. The height of the issue of irregular migration in the country came to the fore when many Nigerians were reportedly sold for \$400 in Libya in what could be termed modern day slavery. The news broke on CNN in November 2017 when the news channel aired a footage that appeared to show men being auctioned like farm products after being smuggled across the Sahara. This made the Nigerian government, to address the matter by repatriating Nigerians trapped in Libya in order to forestall any further in-human treatment being meted to her citizens (UNHCR, 2017, De Haas & Flahaux, 2017).

(b) Loss of Potentials

Massive migration of Nigerians to Europe brings about loss of potentials since communities and the nation fail to benefit from the contributions of these migrants to national development. The arable lands for agriculture lays fallow, and ministries and agencies are left in the hands of the aged workforce. For some of the home countries, a high rate of youth migration leads to a scarcity of skilled workers thus affecting the quality of the nation's work force and of course the level of development that takes place within a certain period. It is important to note that skilled migration is largely a symptom and not a cause, of underdevelopment. This is because there is a distinction between countries that export skilled labour from a large pool of supply, and those losing high proportions of scarce and critical human resources to migration (Nwabugwu 2014, Thomas, 2014).

(c) Migration in the Era of Globalisation

Recent migration patterns and their underlying motives are modelled along the new forces of globalisation which are transforming economies all over the world (Yaro, 2011). The deteriorating socio-economic conditions and deepening poverty in the late sixties and early seventies propelled a wide variety of migration configurations. Macroeconomic adjustment measures and a huge increase in the number of entrants into the labour market have fuelled a job crisis, creating a sustained pressure for emigration. A significant amount of brain circulation takes place between Ghana, Gambia and Nigeria; Togo and Cote d'Ivoire; Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Cote d'Ivoire. Since the

1970's, highly skilled migrants, including doctors, paramedical personnel, nurses, teachers, lecturers, engineers, scientists and technologists moved from Ghana, first to Nigeria and later to other African countries, Europe, and North America, attracted by relatively higher salaries and better prospects of living conditions. Many students also remained behind at the end of their training as political, economic and social conditions at home deteriorated (Schiller, 2009).

(d) Symptoms of Underdevelopment

Research by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in 2015 revealed that about 30 million Africans live outside the continent, and the number continues to grow daily. This has led to an acute shortage of skills on the continent. Despite Nigeria's numerous human and material resources, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has consistently painted a gloomy picture of Nigeria's human development Index. A cursory look at the indices highlighted show that Nigeria is sliding progressively in human development matters. Several economic reforms have contributed to the reproduction of capitalism and its exploitative tendencies through western defined measures. The pro-poor measures implemented to cushion the harsh effects of the economic reforms barely tackles the pervasive problems of hunger, poverty, malnutrition, disease and homelessness .In Nigeria today, economic reforms and its correlates, globalization, liberalization, privatization, deregulation etc have imposed joblessness on the citizenry and hardship on Nigerians, and forcing many to migrate abroad for greener pastures (Udeala, 2009)

(e) Exacerbation of Nigeria's External Image Crisis

Activities of irregular migrants have no doubt contributed to Nigeria's foreign image crisis. Nigeria has been portrayed in bad light in the past decades, largely due to bad image and reputation as a corrupt nation. It is not deniable the fact that a lot of vices have continuously bedevilled the level of our progress. These include endemic corruption, insecurity, Advance Fee Fraud (also known as 419) ,human and drug trafficking, money laundering, degeneration of moral and ethical values, indiscipline, violent crime, politically motivated assassinations, ethnic crisis, shameful judicial pronouncements, disrespect to the rule of law and most recently terrorism and the menace of Fulani herdsmen (Udeala, 2016).

Nigeria's image is battered when almost in all countries of the world, incidences of arrest of those involved in human and drug trafficking, prostitution, violent crimes, economic crimes and other anti-social behaviors are consistently higher among Nigerians than among other nationals. Nigeria's external image is battered when young Nigerian men and women, frustrated in their own country and eager to travel abroad become a recurring nuisance at embassies of foreign countries, ready to bear any insult or endure any humiliation simply to obtain visas to escape the torture and hardship inflicted on them by their leaders. In fact, the present reputation of Nigeria as a dynamically chaotic country is not a good for the nation .Nigeria's reputation a country of many as fraudsters, drug peddlers and pushers,

asylum seekers, and travel document and passport forgers have done irreparable damage to the country 's image (Udeala, 2008, Osuntokun, 1998).

(f) Victims of Harsh Legal Framework

Legal instruments are being established in some countries to punish those guilty of organising and participating in irregular migration. One example of such laws is the passing of a law by Morocco in 2003, to regulate the entry and residence of foreigners, imposing heavy sanctions against undocumented immigration and human smuggling. Critics argue that the law ignores migrants' rights and accuse Morocco of bowing to pressure from the EU to play the role of Europe's 'policeman' in North Africa. Irregular migrants, lacking legal status, and probably carrying false travel documents, are vulnerable to social and economic marginalisation and rarely have access to or enjoy decent work. Migrants who fall outside of immigration laws often suffer exploitation, destitution, and abuse while abroad, and many of them on return struggle to re-establish themselves in their countries of origin. ((Belguendouz,2006, Musari, 2015).

(g) Discrimination by Host Countries

Another challenge that youth migrants face is discrimination by their 'hosts'. Most international migrants face at least one kind of discrimination or the other. It could be based on racism, religion, gender, language or simply because they are foreigners and the locals may be xenophobic (as is mostly the case in Europe and Southern Africa). Young people and indeed African youths represent a vulnerable group subject to a multitude of consequences of underdevelopment such as blackmailing, trafficking, and exploitation (Olajide, 2017). Xenophobia is on the rise in most places, with migrants being targets of attacks and abuse during minor disturbances such as during international football matches, election periods, and general economic hardships. This unwholesome development is rooted in economic downturn, increasing unemployment among young nationals, conflicts and political instability Yaro, 2011).

(h) Human Rights Abuses

Most migrants are subjected to various human rights abuses. The protection of the human rights of migrants is an essential component of a comprehensive migration management system, and is a means of ensuring equitable distribution of the benefits of migration. Migrants have often been subjected to discriminatory, xenophobic, and racist policies that have resulted in the denial of their basic human rights. Some of these policies include exploitation, mass expulsion, persecution and lack of access to justice for the enforcement of their rights in the country of destination. In order to safeguard the human rights of migrants, the norms enshrined in the various human rights instruments should be invoked, implemented and applied, while all human rights instruments should be ratified and domesticated. Nigeria has consistently called for a review and implementation of legislations on the principle of non discrimination of migrants as well as ensure strict adherence to migrant rights as stipulated in various conventions to which Nigeria is a signatory. In addition, all countries should take steps to protect and respect the rights of migrants, and the rights of members of their families. The governments of origin, transit, and destination countries are expected to

extend to migrants human rights that guarantee equal treatment of all, and ensure that irregular migrants are not criminalized (UN, 2012, NMP, 2015) .

(i) No Reliable Data

One of the challenges facing migration in Nigeria is the increasing number of irregular migration within and outside the country. Since irregular immigrants tend to avoid being registered, there are no available data about them only estimates. As encapsulated in Nigeria's National Policy on Migration (2015) , the Federal Government has not been able to collect, collate, analyse, and publish the results of data-gathering on different types of internal and international migration. Lack of reliable data is responsible for inability of Governments to reach out to policymakers, diverse development-based organizations, and development partners. In order to strengthen the efficiency of all efforts at the national level to systematically collect and disseminate data, it is necessary for the collection, analysis, and exchange of data to take place at the regional level. This is the basis for developing effective regional migration management policies and strengthening regional cooperation over these migration issues.

(j) Problems of Remittances of Money

Inter-country restrictions on money transfer, costly transactions, and risky informal transactions, are some of the major challenges facing most migrants in Nigeria. Charges on domestic and international cash transfers need to be reduced and eventually eliminated for sums below some minimum thresholds. Banks need to change their traditional practices in tune with modern realities or else smaller financial organisations some of whose operations can be harmful to migrants are taking up a substantial portion of the market.

The effort of the Federal Government to ensure inflows of remittances and to promote the use of remittances for viable investments is yet to achieve the desired result. In addition, the design and implementation of financial sector policies and regulatory frameworks that would facilitate the creation of cheaper and more efficient multiple financial institutions and packages, through which persons in Nigeria could receive funds transferred by migrants have not received the desired attention from European countries.

Policy Options in tackling Migration Crisis in Nigeria

The Federal Government has come up with the following policy options to tackle the migration crisis in the country.

Nigeria's National Policy on Migration (NMP)

The Federal Government of Nigeria formulated a comprehensive, home-grown policy in 2015 that addresses the multifaceted issues of migration, and creates a win-win situation for migrants and countries of origin, transit, and destination. This document was published for the Federal Government of Nigeria by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) with funding provided by the European Union

under the 10th European Development Fund programme on “Promoting Better Management of Migration in Nigeria”. The Policy was produced through the joint technical support of the ILO and IOM in collaboration with national partners in Nigeria. This policy recognizes the challenges of migration in Nigeria but focuses more on the opportunities and its benefits for national development (NMP,2015)..

Policy Goals

The Federal Government, in pursuance of its obligation to establish and strengthen the structures that protect the human, civil and economic rights of its citizens at home and abroad, as well as the rights of aliens residing in Nigeria, affirms its commitment to all existing international and national instruments, principles and standards related to migrants.

Policy objectives

The objectives of the National Policy on Migration are to:

- Provide a platform for the uniform administration of migration in Nigeria with the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI) as the Coordinating Agency of all stakeholders in the field of migration notwithstanding that the contents of this policy shall be implemented by the relevant stakeholders.
- Serve as a guide to all government and nongovernmental agencies, and for nations with whom Nigeria has foreign relations, as well as for international organizations that are involved in migration activities in the country;
- Provide strategic direction for efficient and effective migration management both at home and abroad as well as serve as a blueprint for engaging governments, institutions, and all entities on migration and related issues that concern or affect Nigerians in the interest of the Government of Nigeria and the people of Nigeria;
- Ensure that the human, economic, labour and civil rights of Nigerians resident abroad are well protected in their host countries, including those rights guaranteed by existing international conventions, customary international law, humanitarian law, general principles, and other such agreements concluded on bilateral and multilateral bases;
- Encourage orderly and regular migration of Nigerians, through the provision of timely and adequate information to the public at large, at migration information centres where prospective migrants may be counselled in collaboration with state and local council areas as well as other sources of migration information;
- Eliminate irregular migration through more effective migration and border management controls;
- Promote regular sensitization of Nigerians on the dangers and hardships encountered by irregular migrants, and facilitate liaisons between government agencies and NGOs involved in the promotion of job opportunities and self-employment;

- Eradicate trafficking in persons, migrant smuggling and other migration-related abuses and crimes, and advocate for the elimination of all forms of exploitation of Nigerian migrants at home and abroad;
- Help stem the haphazard migration of Nigerian professionals ,reduce the impact of brain drain through the development of organized labour migration schemes and bilateral labour migration agreements within the framework of a National Labour Migration Policy;
- Encourage the participation of Nigerians abroad in economic activities at home, through foreign direct investments and social remittances.
- Develop alternative efficient and cost-effective methods of official remittances through the designation of specific Nigerian banks as remittance channels.
- Encourage bilateral agreements to ensure that Nigerians being repatriated from abroad are treated humanely and fairly, in safety and with dignity, and that their basic human rights are respected, and to foster capacity-building and skills acquisition training programmes by relevant agencies to ensure that such persons will be gainfully engaged upon return;
- Facilitate the negotiated and voluntary repatriation of Nigerian irregular migrants. Design and implement the streamlining of migration issues into national and state development programmes and poverty reduction strategies, especially Vision 20:2020 and its state and local offshoots.
- Address management of all border issues that may threaten peace, security and development in Nigeria.
- Make the principle of gender equality a central core value in all issues and activities within the migration policy (NMP, 2015).

Existing Legal and Policy Frameworks in Nigeria

The existing legal and policy framework as contained in Nigeria's Migration Policy (2015) are as follows:

- **Immigration Laws**

The law regulating immigration issues in Nigeria is the Immigration Act of 1963. Other subsidiary legislations are the Immigration Regulations of 1963; the Immigration (Control of Aliens) Regulations of 1963, and the Passport (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1990.

- **Laws Against Trafficking of Human Beings and Migrant Smuggling**

The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (the Palermo Protocol) has been incorporated into Nigeria's national legislation through the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law, Enforcement and Administration Act of 14 July 2003. Amendments to the Act, promulgated on 7 December 2005, extended the powers of the National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons (NAPTIP) to cover internal trafficking and exploitative child domestic labour, and provided for the forfeiture of the assets and proceeds of crime of convicted traffickers. A Victims Trust Fund was also

created, through which forfeited assets are collected for the rehabilitation and restitution of victims (NMP, 2015)

- **Child Labour Law/Child Rights/Child Trafficking**

The Child Rights Act of 2003 is a comprehensive document of 278 sections, providing in particular for the prohibition of the worst forms of child labour, child marriage, the exploitation of children for begging, their recruitment into the Armed Forces, and child trafficking. Section 274 states that the provisions of the Act supersede all other laws. However, the Child Rights Act has not come into force in all states – with northern states reportedly having difficulties domesticating it – thus making the provisions of the Act not applicable in all Nigerian courts (NMP, 2015).

- **The Labour Act of 1974/ 2004**

The Labour Act of 1974, now Labour Act CAP L1, LFN, 2004, prohibits the employment of children under the age of 15 in commerce and industry, and restricts labour performed by children to home-based agricultural or domestic work. The Act prohibits forced labour and stipulates that children may not be employed in agricultural or domestic work for more than eight hours per day, and that children under age 12 cannot be required to lift or carry loads that are likely to harm their physical development. The Act regulates the recruitment of persons within and outside Nigeria, and the movement of persons for employment within and outside Nigeria. It also provides for the protection of all persons in employment (NMP, 2015).

National Frameworks of Cooperation

Nigeria has ratified a series of pertinent conventions and treaties which include

- a) The 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Inhuman, Cruel, Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ratified on 28 June 2001);
- b) The 1981 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Right (22 June 1983);
- c) The 1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (23 July 2001);
- d) The 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (28 June 2001);
- e) The 2000 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (27 September 2001)
- f) The UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1 November 1989)
- g) The 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, was ratified on 28 June 2001

- h) In addition Nigeria has ratified all eight core conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO), especially noting the Convention 97 on Migration for Employment ((NMP, 2015)

International Legal Instruments Relevant to Migration and Human Rights

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)

The core international human rights treaties that equally protect migrants are as follows:

1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)
2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)
3. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965)
4. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979)
5. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984)
6. Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)
7. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990)
8. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006)
9. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2006)
10. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (1967)
11. Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954)
12. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961)
13. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000); Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
14. Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children;
15. Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (UN, 2012)

Relevant ILO Conventions

- a) Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29)
- b) Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81)
- c) Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87)

- d) Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98)
- e) Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100)
- f) Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105)
- g) Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111)
- h) Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138)
- i) Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181)
- j) Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182)
- k) Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189)
- l) Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97) Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers, 1975 (No. 143)

Return, Readmission and Reintegration of Nigerian Migrants

The Federal Government recognizes the importance of return, readmission and reintegration of Nigerian migrants, and the need to facilitate their adaptation to a new life in the country. Consequently, the Federal Government has evolved bilateral and multilateral arrangements with the main destination countries of Nigerian emigrants and instituted training programmes for the reintegration of returned migrants. As a policy response, the Federal Government has equally created standards and procedures based on law and policy, for the return, readmission, and reintegration of forced returnees, in line with relevant international legal instruments. In addition, Nigerian missions abroad have been charged to provide nationals with the appropriate identity documents for the purposes of repatriation. Included, in her bilateral agreements on voluntary return, is a provision for training and education of the returnees for self-employment to enhance the likelihood of sustainable return.

Conclusion

This paper attempted to analyse the movement of Nigerians to Europe in search of better life. It also discussed some of the challenges resulting from immigration and the Federal Government's policy responses aimed at reducing illegal and irregular movements from Nigeria to Europe. Nigeria has a long history of population mobility, both locally and internationally. From our findings, it is obvious that the Nigerian Government has consistently been involved in various national and international policy efforts to control irregular migration as well as ensure the well-being of migrants.

The mobility of people across international borders dates back to the creation of borders themselves, and the vulnerability of non-nationals is not a new phenomenon. While many migrants move to take advantage of increased opportunities out of genuine, free and informed choice, many others are compelled to move as a result of poverty, lack of decent work, social exclusion, generalized violence, persecution,

human rights violations, armed conflict, xenophobia and environmental degradation. In the absence of sufficient regular migration opportunities, migrants can be forced to resort to irregular migration channels including seeking out the services of smugglers or even falling prey to traffickers.

It is important to interrogate the conditions that create the desperation to leave the country for unknown destinations. Today, we live in a country where many are not only poor but cannot find jobs. Factories are closing down and selling their warehouses to promoters of religious organisations, while several businesses are shut down or move out of the country due to lack of favourable business climate. In the circumstance, vibrant young men and women are leaving the country to embark on journeys which for many of them tragically end at sea.

Nigeria needs authentic economic development that can guarantee political and social security of the people. Migration can be a source of economic transformation, innovation and development; therefore, genuine migration should be separated from illegal and criminally prone migration such as smuggling and trafficking in their different forms. The Nigerian Government should promote international and regional cooperation and seek to monitor and effectively implement relevant agreements and Memoranda of Understanding .

For now, public education of the youths is necessary to alert them about the dangers of seeking greener pastures overseas. This could be done in schools, churches, mosques, palaces, village squares, shopping malls, local markets, bus stops, and other gatherings. Social media, television, and radio should also be employed in educating the public about the dangers of illegal migration. Even some returnee migrants could be employed by federal and state governments to function for this purpose.

Recommendations

Arising from the study are the following recommendations

1. Majority of migrants into Nigeria are labour migrants. This calls for an effective labour migration policy to assist the country in managing its excess manpower – whether skilled, middle-level or unskilled workers– in order to reduce irregular migration, while ensuring that migrant workers are not subjected to any form of discrimination. Such a policy would promote the respect and protection of the human rights of migrants.
2. Conflict is a major cause of internal and external displacement in Nigeria; therefore, sufficient attention must be paid to the root causes of conflict, and the best preventive and management practices must be developed. Conflict not only destabilizes the nation; it also has a negative impacts on the security of regions and the world at large
3. Conflict leads to major migratory movements or displacements, which in turn lead to more conflicts, thus generating a vicious cycle that must be broken for peace and development to thrive. Therefore, it behooves on the Government, through agencies such as the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR),

the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI), the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs, as well as State security agencies, to devise strategies to prevent the breakdown of law and order, sustain peace, and manage and resolve disagreements that may lead to crises.

4. To ensure that the challenges posed by migration crisis in Nigeria are effectively addressed, it is necessary to establish a common strategy for the management of migration which associates countries of origin, transit and destination, in order to find balanced solutions that take into account the interests of all the continents involved.
5. The Federal Government should create standards and procedures based on law and policy, for the return, readmission and reintegration of forced returnees, in line with relevant international legal instruments as well as to ensure that Nigerian missions abroad provide nationals with the appropriate identity documents for the purposes of repatriation;
6. The Nigerian Government should promote international and regional cooperations and seek to monitor and effectively implement relevant agreements and Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs).
7. The Federal Government shall make adequate provisions for the funding of all policies and programmes related to migration through the annual appropriation of monies. In addition, the Federal Government needs to encourage Local and State Governments to make provisions for migration-related activities in their respective annual budgets,
8. There is the need for a comprehensive, integrated, concerted, and balanced efforts towards the migration problems. Such integrated efforts should include, among other things focus on the Mediterranean, the South Atlantic (Canary Islands) and the Black Sea
9. In order to safeguard the human rights of migrants, the norms enshrined in the various human rights instruments should be invoked, implemented, and applied, while all human rights instruments should be ratified and domesticated by all the countries with very high interaction with migrants.
10. The Governments of origin, transit, and destination countries are expected to extend to migrants human rights that guarantee equal treatment of all and ensure that irregular migrants are not criminalized.
11. The feminization of migration has become a very critical issue that should be included in any national migration policy, especially since women now account for about half of all international migrants – as a result of increasing demand for services provided mostly by women, for example domestic work, nursing, teaching and sex work..

12. In order to strengthen the efficiency of all efforts at the national level to systematically collect and disseminate data, it is also necessary for the collection, analysis and exchange of data to take place at regional levels.

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Part Two

Migration-Induced Crisis and Crisis-Induced Migration in Africa

CHAPTER SIX

Legal Trans-Border Crime of Chadian Immigrants in N'gaoundere, Garoua and Maroua (Cameroon): Factors, Typology and Consequences

Samuel Dawai

Introduction

The history of formation of state entities around the Lake Chad Basin is largely dependent on a preponderant geographical element: water. As we often say, water is life. However, even though this source of life is a natural product, some states are more privileged than others in terms of additional assets that they have. In that case, water becomes a major factor of immigration. It is for that reason that Fernand Braudel, together with the second generation of the School of the Annals, so rightly introduced geography as an element capable of transforming history and impacting the lives of individuals.

This geographical aspect has caused important migrations, which today are still visible through some of their salient features, namely the presence on both sides of the two state borders of various nationalities, cultural and linguistic similarities. The northern part of Cameroon, which shares the same borders with Chad has been an excellent bastion to welcome Chadian nationals before and after Western colonization. If migration of individuals aim to search for better living conditions, it is also true that sometimes, because of the very difficult living conditions in the host country, it degenerates and leads the people towards a search for survival means sometimes at the cost of their lives. It is certainly in this perspective that chief towns of North Cameroon register a significant number of foreigners among which are Chadians in their detention centers. This research paper therefore raises the issue of how disordered migration and trans-border criminality by Chadian migrants in North Cameroon in general influence relationship and development in Cameroon and Chad. The work also focuses on some of the factors that influence criminal conducts of Chadian immigrants in North Cameroon in general and in Ngaoundere, Garoua and Maroua in particular as well as the typology and consequences of the criminal acts of this category of detainees.

The methodology used in this study follows two main sequences: the first is to explore written materials among which are primary sources such as penitentiary registers and then secondary sources. Apart from written literature, the study also made use of oral sources.

The second phase was the interpretation of written and oral data in a diachronic and systemic way. This study made recourse to multidisciplinary sources such as

important geographical, sociological, criminological and legal materials. In order to keep the identities of detainees anonymous, numbers were assigned to them for each period considered.

This work will follow three major paths: first, it will discuss the factors behind Chadian immigrants' criminal conducts through a sociological study and an inventory of recorded crimes. Second, it will make use of diagrams to illustrate the typologies and patterns of these crimes and third, it will show the different levels of consequences of crimes in the society.

From Immigration to Criminal Opportunities in North Cameroon

In most cases, the decision by a foreigner to settle down in one country is fundamentally dependent on an environment that can satisfy the immigrant's expectations.

North Cameroon, a relatively privileged area for migration and immigration around the Chad Basin

Cameroon as a whole is praised in the world as a country proud of its political stability as compared to other states around the lake Chad Basin. It is because of that stability that, at a given moment, the socio-political crises and instabilities in Chad led to vast movements of the civilian population, first towards peripheral localities and later to city centers. This means that it is because of the political stability of Cameroon and instability in this bordering country that there is a massive presence of Chadians in Cameroon. Its northern part has hosted a large number of immigrants for decades. Honore Mimche (2006) estimates that "there are 40,000 Chadian refugees in Cameroon out of a total number of 60,000 of them living in North Cameroon in the year 2005¹". This massive presence is also justified by a highly significant sociological factor. In fact, North Cameroon shares ethnic groups² that are found in both countries.

Many studies conducted on Chadian migration in Cameroon show a total of three factors that fueled the massive migration from Chad to Cameroon : successive political crises that began in 1966, economic precariousness and the sociological element mentioned above. Gonne Bernard adds "The lack of cash, the imbalance between population and resources and then poverty"³.

When the above-mentioned factors and many more are combined to operate in a hostile north Cameroon environment, Elisabeth Murlock's theory of pre-disposing and motivating causes easily finds a favorable ground to prosper.

⁸²Honore Mimche, "When immigrants become indigene populations. Immigration and land ownership by Chadian refugees in north Cameroon"; international colloquium on asylum in sub saharan Africa and the Mediterranean; Ouagadougou, 05-07 june 2006.

²Case of Kotoko, Toupouri, Moundang and Massa, that: Mokam David, (2005), calls "unifying people".

⁸⁵Bernard Gonne, Seasonal transborder movements of Chadian farm workers in the far-north of Cameroon; Second Research Days in social sciences, INRA SFER CIRAD, 2008. <http://sfer-12-2008.cirad.fr/content/download/2429/21222/file/A6%20-%20GONNE.pdf>.

From Criminal opportunities to legal cross-border crime in Ngaoundere, Garoua and Maroua

From the data obtained from penitentiary registers, several factors explain the antisocial behavior of Chadian immigrants in North Cameroon. Among these, three are explained below: -poverty, and under-education and illiteracy.

Poverty

The *Growth and Employment Document Strategy* states that, “in 2007 in Cameroon, a household was considered poor if, on average, one adult from this household lived with less than 269 443 FCFA per year”⁴. This “amount corresponds to a bare minimum necessary to satisfy the essential needs of an individual”⁵.

The fact that Chadian immigrants are considered as poor is acquired from the country of departure because, the sample from which this study was conducted⁶ reveals that, more than half of them come from rural areas of their country of origin; making up a total of 21 for a percentage of 61.76%. Because life in the countryside is sometimes characterized by lack of cash and the existence of precariousness, many take adventure hoping to find a better life. In this part of Cameroon where the poverty rate is very high as compared to that of the rest of the country, it is very difficult for these immigrants to secure decent job.

This poverty is also felt when one observes the motive for which the great majority is incarcerated: theft. Of the total number of 5862 (from 1960 to 2015) prisoners in the three prisons, 2950 are convicted of theft, with a percentage of about 50,32%. Unlike Souad Laroussi (1994, 178) for whom, “Theft did not seem to be the main means towards satisfaction of essential, vital and basic needs, put aside to feed or to dress”⁷.

Theft in this case shows a material dissatisfaction for one’s survival. Moreover, compared to the other regions of Cameroon, the three northern regions studied in this paper are, according to the *Growth and Employment Strategy Document* (2009, 35), considered as, “rural areas where the incidence of poverty is aggravated by almost 3 points”⁸.

Under-schooling and illiteracy

Education as a key to a professional opportunity and to open-mindedness in front of certain phenomena, is essential to have a certain standard of living. The table below shows the educational levels of Chadians incarcerated in the three prisons in relation to the Cameroonian education system.

⁸⁶(or 738 FCFA per day or 22 454FCFA per month).

⁵ D.S.C.E, reference document of the government action from 2010 to 2020, august 2009

⁶ 34 Chadian prisoners met in all three prisons during the investigation

⁸⁹Souad Laroussi,Zahar, Women criminality and social transformations in the Tunisian society. In: Cahiers de la Méditerranée, N°49, 1994,https://www.persee.fr/doc/camed_0395-9317_1994_num_49_1_1131.

⁹⁰Growth and employment strategy document

Effectifs	6	/	7	5	/	9	5	2
Classes	Illiterates	Sil	CP	CE1	CE2	CM1	CM2	6 ^{ème}


Table 1: Number of Chadian prisoners per school level

This table clearly shows the low level of education by Chadian inmates in these detention centers. Because most of them come from poor families in rural areas, access to education was not easy. With this very low level of education, Marie-Andrée Proulx (2005) says that “the corresponding jobs are lowly paid”. Apart from employment, education opens the individual to a certain apprehension of social behavior. All in all, the factors listed below are a perfect illustration of Murlock's theory of pre-disposing and motivating causes. A thorough analyses of this theory, shows that under-education and illiteracy are predisposing causes and poverty a motivating factor to committing crimes.

Chronological inventory and sequential trend analysis

Inventory

Chart 1: Number of Chadians incarcerated in Ngaoundéré from 1960 to 2015



⁹¹Marie-Andrée Proulx, “Official increase in women criminality. Are they more delinquent now than before?”, http://www.asrsq.ca/fr/salle/porte-ouverte/0601/salle_por_060103.php.

Chart 2: Number of Chadians incarcerated in Garoua from 1960 to 2015





Chart 3: Number of Chadians incarcerated in Maroua from 1960 to 2015



Sequential Trend Analysis

In most cases, the criminal conduct of foreigners in a host country is determined by local factors; even if other factors reflect the country of departure.

From 1960 to 1980

Because the three cities of our study share nearly identical characteristics with slight differences in the city of Ngaoundéré, we decided to consider the three as one entity throughout our analysis. However, some isolated cases will be individually and particularly studied.

It would have been more judicious to limit this first section of the study to the year 1983, but in view of what our graphs show, we will limit ourselves to the year 1980. In fact, from the independence to the present day, Cameroon has lived a political life

marked by what Pierre Ela (2002, 27) called “constitutional dictatorship”¹⁰ under Ahmadou Ahidjo. During that period, Ngaoundere and Maroua were administrative units of the Grand North province with Garoua as its headquarters. These were later on balkanized in 1983 into three provinces. In view of the crises that the country was going through, Ahidjo decided, in a spirit of solidarity, to open the borders to the victims of war who were relocated in the cities of northern Cameroon, particularly the city of Garoua¹¹. Here, the district named Roudé Adjia reputed to be one with a large number of Chadian immigrants from the south of Chad. In Ahidjo's mind, the repatriation of these refugees had to be scheduled after the return to calm¹². Unfortunately, with the persistence of the crisis and accommodation to the new environment, many infiltrated the local population and gradually settled in other cities of Cameroon. For more security and guarantee, others developed a sense of citizenship in the host country.

In Chad, during the first years after independence, candidates for cross-border migration were limited because of the political stability that prevailed there. The limited number of incarcerated people on these charts during that period of time sufficiently supports the statements made. The start of a movement of discontentment against the regime of François NGARTHA TOMBALBAYE and the outbreak of civil war between Muslim northerners and Christian southerners from 1979 lays the foundation for a long and painful period marked by migrations of Chadian populations to northern Cameroon. For Roger Charles Evina (2009, 27),

”Under the Ahidjo regime, economic policy was highly interventionist so as to lay the foundation for the development of the country. There were favorable production potentials in the fields of livestock and agriculture, supported by oil exploitation which benefited Cameroon. That period was characterized by a long-term economic growth”¹³.

The years during this relatively calm political and economic climate did not record a large number of Chadians incarcerated in these prisons, as shown in the above graphs. After all, it should also be noted that in addition to the fact that Ahidjo was a son of this part of the country, the dictatorship that was prevalent could not provide a platform for an antisocial behavior by the Chadians. Nevertheless, if this first period did not experience, the incarceration of Chadians from the early 1980s to the end of the 20th century, the situation changed because new political actors arrived and a major turning point took place in the history of Cameroon.

¹⁰ Pierre Ela, *Negative files about Cameroon*, Paris, Pyramide Papyrus Presse, 2002

¹¹ Conversations with Dala-Ilou, Head prison warden and Chief of Bureau for administrative affairs and court registry in the Garoua central prison, in Garoua on 18 July 2016.

¹² Conversations with Dala-Ilou, Head prison warden and Chief of Bureau for administrative affairs and court registry in the Garoua central prison, in Garoua on 18 July 2016.

¹³ Roger Charles Evina, “Migrations in Cameroon: situation in 2009”; document prepared for the international organization of migrations. http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/cameroun_profile_2009.pdf.

From 1980 to 2000

On the political level, Ahidjo, who resigned from the presidency on November 4, 1982, was replaced by his constitutional successor Paul Biya two days later. The number of provinces increased to 10 in 1983, with the Northern Province being divided into three, the north, Adamawa and the far north. The Center-south province was divided into two: the center and the south. The year 1990 was marked for Africa and Cameroon by the advent and establishment of democracy adopted by African states after the speech delivered by François Mitterrand at La Baule.

At the economic level, Cameroon experienced in the mid-eighties an economic crisis that led to an enormous debt, the fall in prices of commodity and the devaluation of the CFA Franc. At the social level, Evina held that, “There was a rapid population growth, increased poverty, poorly controlled urbanization”¹⁴, the privatization of public and parastatal enterprises, and so on.

Faced with this rather chaotic situation, a search for survival became essential for all. It was also in that same time range that there has been a rise in rural and urban crime in northern Cameroon with gangs of thugs causing unrests in villages. That was when high-way robbers whom, Claude Abe (2003, 3)¹⁵ and Saibou Issa (2001, 137) call respectively “Zargina” and “Songoobe”¹⁶ made their appearance.

Saibou Issa (2004) notes that “The resurgence of serious crimes very often coincides with difficult economic conditions and with the weakening of the authority of the State”¹⁷.

Considering these assertions, it seems plausible to hold that the number of Chadians shown in the graphs above is a perfect illustration of the phenomenon studied. It is worth noting that thefts which, during the first 20 years after independence, were carried out using knives have now been modernized, using modern weapons, thus becoming armed robberies. Of the three prisons, 16 cases of armed robbery were reported for that period, as against two for the first. Part of the reason for this modernization of armed robbery is the crises in Chad, which facilitated the circulation, use and trafficking of weapons of war.

The large number of Chadians in Garoua Central Prison and to some extent in Maroua is, in Dala-Ilou's opinion, due to the numerous raids organized by gendarme and police units in the city and in surrounding localities. Their outings sometimes follow information from the population about an activity deemed dangerous, or the presence

¹⁶Ibid, pp : 17-29.

¹⁷Claude Abé, “Practice and how transborder crime is produced in central Africa: case study of the Zarguina”, APAD'S Bulletin, 2003. <https://journals.openedition.org/apad/201>

¹⁸Saibou Issa, “Songoobe, unlawful bandits in northern Cameroon under the French administration”, Social Sciences Review Ngaoundere-Anthropos, vol 6, 2001.

¹⁹Saibou Issa, “Ambush on the roads around the southern shores of Lac Chad”; African politics 2/2004 (N° 94), p. 82-104. URL. <https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2004-2-page-82.htm>.

of a network of traffickers. During these outings, those nationals who did not have their national identity cards or foreigners without their residence permits, were kept under custody. Their release was then on the condition of payment of a bail fee. Failure to do so, they were remanded in custody or finally jailed.

From 2000 to 2015

The deployment of security forces against violent threats was realized on the field in 2002 with the creation of the Rapid Intervention Battalion (RIB), the increase of defense units, the supply of defense forces with transportation facilities. It was in this light that the primary mission of the RIB was the eradication of insecurity along the roads. Cameroon government's response has made it possible to significantly reduce criminality by Chadian immigrants both in cities and in the hinterland. The three graphs above provide information in this regard compared to the first two periods, the period from 2000 to 2015 recorded 82 cases of armed robbery; that is 5 times more than the previous period.

While the trend was clearly decreasing in the prisons of Ngaoundéré and Maroua up to the year 2000, that of Garoua on the other hand experienced a relatively significant increase. In addition, for all the three prisons, the last period is marked by an increase in Chadian criminality. As a matter of fact, since the beginning of 2010, Cameroon and precisely its northern part, is under a terrorist threat by the boko haram Islamic sect based in the states of Yobe, Adamawa and Bornu in Nigeria. The most dangerous threat in the far north was carried out on the Cameroonian territory by several Chadians. As a result, 10 Chadians were arrested by the Cameroon Defense Forces for financing terrorism and for actively taking part in the Islamic sect's acts.

A sociological study of Chadians incarcerated in the three prisons

Their profession

The fact that Chadians lived in a country where their arrival and settlement took place in an almost irregular situation did not allow them to engage in formal activities. This is the reason why most of them are engaged in informal jobs. Gigla in a study about Chadian women in the Far North of Cameroon concluded that, "These women are involved in non-formal activities such as preparing and selling of a local drink known as "bil bil".¹⁸

The occupants are grouped into 4 categories: farmers, unemployed, the nothing to report (RAS), and wage earners. For each prison, we obtained the following statistics: N'Gaoundéré: (Agriculture = 7.59%); (RAS = 3.42%); (SP = 6.64%), and Wage Earners = 82.34%); Garoua (Agriculture = 29, 24%); (RAS = 47.72%); (SP = 17.46%) and Wage

¹⁰⁰Gigla Garakchème, "Chadian owners of pubs and « dada bil bil's shops » in the far north province of Cameroon: adaptation strategies and building up of a transborder recognized citizenship" ; international colloquium on asylum in sub-saharan Africa and the Mediterranean; Ouagadougou, 06-08 June 2006. . https://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/GIGLA_GARAKCHEME.pdf.

Earners = 5.57%) and Maroua (Agriculture = 28.73%, (SAR = 13.33%); (SP = 9.61%); Wage Earners = 48.32%). In total, the statistics are as shown in this graph.




Chart 4: Occupational status of Chadians incarcerated in the three prisons.

In the Wage Earners' category, we are concerned with those who do one job or the other with a monthly income, as well as those who manage with a temporary income activity. In that group are masons, carpenters, butchers, mechanics, tailors, welders, motor boys, drivers, motorcycle riders, painters, and so on.

The sociological composition of these Chadians gives the majority to men, with however a few women and minors. A total of 87 women are imprisoned, 36 in Garoua, 45 in Maroua and 6 in Ngaoundéré; against 500 minors in all three prisons.

The Age

The chart below shows the number of different age groups.




Chart 5: Total number of Chadian immigrants per age group in the three prisons

The information on the chart above reveals the imbalance in the number for the age groups. Nevertheless, there is a common factor about the resemblance which exists for all the trends and in all the prisons considered. The age group from 20 to 30 is the most numerical group among the incarcerated, followed by 0 to 20 years. This is a clear indication about how young those Chadians are when they set out to migrate, and how many of them get involved in cross border criminality.


Beyond these aspects, the majority of Chadians incarcerated at the time of our survey were from the south of the Republic of Chad. The sociological composition of this country, reveals that the southern part of the country is mostly Christians and, despite the fact that the soil is fertile, poverty is commonplace. More of them come from Lere, Baybokoum, Moundou, Kelo, Pala, Bongor.

Number of Chadian immigrants incarcerated for illegal immigration

Cameroon is among the countries that do not have strict means of measuring and controlling migratory flows. According to the data obtained in all the prison registers, almost all Chadians who live in Cameroon are on an illegal basis. The reasons for this include the porosity of the borders, the hospitality of Cameroonians, and the corruption of the officials. As a result, there were 1036 illegal immigrants in Garoua, 657 in Maroua and 553 in Ngaoundéré. In all, 2,245 Chadian immigrants have committed various criminal acts.

Typology of antisocial activities by Chadian in NGAoundéré, Garoua and Maroua

Chart 6: The various criminal acts carried out by the Chadian immigrants in the three cities.



The pie chart above reveals that theft is the most common offence in the prison considered in the chart. In the case of Maroua and Garoua, theft, illegal immigration, injuries and fraud, are common offences. However, for the three prisons, theft and clandestine immigration take first and second positions.

Altogether, the antisocial acts carried out by Chadian immigrants in North Cameroon and in Cameroon in general are of several types, while theft has highest record among them. Thus, the statistics of the offences is as follows: Theft 2950 (50.32%),

Clandestine immigration 667 (11.37%), injuries 262 (4.46%), frauds 241 (4.11%), concealment 212 (3.61%), assassination, murder and homicide 171 (2.91%), illegal possession of weapons and ammunition 150 (2.55%), vagrancy 167 (2.84%), possession, sale and consumption of narcotics 126 (2.14%), swindle 83 (1.41%), fatal blows 45 (0.76%), insults 65 (1.10%), burglary 45 (0.76%), destruction 56 (0.95%), forgery and use of false documents 58 (0.98%), rebellion 21 (0.35%), threats 37 (0.62%), hunting in protected area 31 (0.52%), rape 25 (0.42%), lack of residence permit 33 (0.56%), false declarations 30 (0.51%), possession and / or re-use of counterfeit money 37 (0.63%), dangerous activities 26 (0.44%), armed robberies 13 (0.22%), arsons 19 (0.32%), violence 38 (0.64%), witchcraft 36 (0.61%), illegal detention of other people's properties 19 (0.32%), abduction 21 (0.35%), spying 2 (0.03%), escape 13 (0.22%), group looting 31 (0.52%), imposture 9 (0.15%), torture 1 (0.01%), pollution 2 (0.03%), smuggling 7 (0.11%), corruption 5 (0.08%), disorder 2 (0.03%), amercement 15 (0.25%), manufacture and sale of arki 6 (0.10%), smuggling and counterfeiting 10 (0.17%), charging high bride price 1 (0.01%), assault on vehicles and organized crime 8 (0.13%), hit and run driving 1 (0.01%), expiry of consular card 1 (0.01%), illegal practice of medicine 2 (0.03%), gambling 15 (0.25%), failure to assist 1 (0.01%), obstruction to the use of public roads 2 (0.03%), misappropriation of public funds 14 (0.23%), lack of assistance to disabled persons 1 (0.01%), negligence during night watch 5 (0.08%), escape 6 (0.10%), arrest and sequestration 4 (0.06%), abandonment of marital home 1 (0.01%), lack of insurance 1 (0.01%), homosexuality 4 (0.06%), blackmail and slander 2 (0.03%), poaching 1 (0.01%), drunkenness and pu 3 (0.05%), act of terrorism 9 (0.15%), hostility towards fatherland 1 (0.01%), forced appropriation of hunting games 2 (0.03%), the nothing to report 19 (0.29%).

In all, 5862 offences were committed by the immigrants that we studied, and these offences have caused a great deal of damage to individuals and to the Cameroonian society.

Negative consequences of Cross-border Crimes and Incarceration

Cross-border crimes and incarceration influence the society at various levels: the individual level, the country of departure level and the host country level.

Negative consequences at the individual level

The incarcerated in the prison is the first to suffer the sad experience of incarceration. The incarcerated or imprisoned Chadian jeopardizes his chances of finding a certain type of employment in his environment. Moreover, the people in the areas where this study was conducted have a discriminatory attitude towards prisoners in general. That situation, to a certain extent, stigmatizes the immigrant and leads him either to recidivism or integration into a large network of criminals during the post-prison phase. The possible occurrence of these phenomena takes place at the end of an immigrant's prison terms.

Negative consequences at the level of the country of departure

In order to understand the effectiveness of the situation, we deemed it necessary to collect a sample of free Chadians living in the city of Ngaoundéré and who were involved in various activities, to demonstrate how the criminality and the incarceration of Chadian immigrants considerably influences development and contributes to Chad's GDP (Growth Development Product).

Table 2: Chadians living in Cameroon

Anonymous	Age	Profession	Sectors covered by transferred funds
Anonymous 1	27 years old	Tea sellers	Financing the construction of houses
Anonymous 2	30 years old	Tea sellers	Financing the construction of houses
Anonymous 3	43 years old	Wheel repairers	Food for parents and grandparents
Anonymous 4	27 years old	Self employed	/
Anonymous 5	32 years old	Self employed	/
Anonymous 6	29 years old	Hawkers	Paying younger brothers' school fees
Anonymous 7	41 years old	Drivers	Increase and diversification of business
Anonymous 8	32 years old	Drivers	Satisfying wedding expenditure
Anonymous 9	28 years old	Tea sellers	Tea Supply (âhдар)
Anonymous 10	29 years old	Tea sellers	Tea Supply (âhдар)
Anonymous 11	24 years old	Polishers	Minor family needs
Anonymous 12	20 years old	Caretakers	/
Anonymous 13	37 years old	Shopkeepers	Minor family needs
Anonymous 14	33 years old	Farmers	/

Illustrations from this sample are a clear proof of the contributions by Chadian immigrants living in Ngaoundéré to their country of origin. The interruption of these transfers of funds following incarceration certainly influences Chad's economy and society. The influence exerted by this situation on the country of departure is similar to the one felt at the level of the host country.

Negative consequences at the host country level

In the social field, incarceration reduces availability of manpower for certain activities such as agriculture, even if this activity is carried out illegally. But, this phenomenon has more obvious impacts on the economy. As already indicated, Chadians who are not incarcerated transfer funds to their country of origin. These transfers, which are effected by money transfer companies in Cameroon, bring much valuable foreign currency, through taxes levied. Moreover, their stay in North Cameroon, contributes to the economic development of the various cities through cash expenditures to meet every day needs such as food, health care, education and logistics.

Conclusion

The alarming findings of this study are that (1) inmate out of ten (10) is of Chadian nationality, especially after the 1980s. There are many reasons why there is a large number of Chadian inmates in northern Cameroon: its political stability, its hospitality towards foreigners, porosity of Cameroonians' borders' porosity, and the absence of effective and efficient management policy.

Faced with the challenges of sub-regional integration, which is strongly encouraged by the Central African States, is it necessary to remove all the countries' barriers and encourage living together, thus ignoring the notion of sovereignty and citizenship for an easy mobility of goods and people, to the detriment of national identity? Faced with the evils of illegal immigration in France, Nicolas Sarkozy introduced during his five-year mandate a concept that he called "chosen immigration". This measure has been criticized by many as being a means for closing its borders to foreigners, but on the other hand, it could be a measure to preserve national interests. In 1990, faced with a growing insecurity in the Chadian Basin, the Nigerian Senate asked President Olusegun Obasanjo to close the Nigerian borders with its neighbors, Cameroon and Chad. The main reason was to limit cross-border crime. Cameroon is surely called upon to play its major role as the main driving force for central African countries. But it is worth emphasizing that integration and threats to territorial integrity do not go together.

In this study, we have shown how many Chadian immigrants have contributed and are still contributing to insecurity in Cameroon in general.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

Local Migrants, Insurgency and Herdsmen-Farmers’ Clashes in Benue State, Nigeria 2015 – 2017

Onyema Marcel Eze

Introduction

Insecurity, virulent internal conflicts accompanied by unprecedented civilian casualties and gross violations of human rights, seems to be the characterizing feature of the present Nigerian society. Since the early 1980s there have been communal conflicts between ethnic groups in North Central Nigerian States. This involved such groups as Jukun-Tiv and others in Wukari, Taraba, and Sardauna local governments in Taraba States. Others described as intra-ethnic conflicts occurred, as among the Ebira of Kogi ethno-religious conflicts – occurred in Zangon-Kataf and Kafanchan in Kaduna State, and several parts of Plateau States. In some cases, these conflicts spread into neighboring urban areas (Kpoghul and Ityonzughul, 2016).

Although, pastoralists and farmers’ conflicts have been age long, “because of exchange relations between the groups, these conflicts were managed without degenerating into violent confrontations” (Blench, 2010). In the early 1980s violent conflicts between pastoralists and farming communities were reported to be more prevalent in the Northern States of Kebbi, Zamfara, Katsina, Borno, Bauchi, and Gombe States (Bonat, 2014). According to TaiwoToluyemi, by the end of the 1990s, there had occurred definite changes in the character of pastoral production in Nigeria, with increasing dissertation in the Northern States, livestock passing more and more into the hands of more wealthy people, and the shrinking of grazing areas, pushing more pastoralists toward the North Central Nigeria area (Toluyemi, 1998).

Bonat,(2017) demonstrates that by the turn of the 21st century, pastoralists-farmers conflicts are becoming more violent, with the increasing use of modern sophisticated weapons by the pastoralists, leading to some farming communities organizing to defend themselves. Today, violent conflicts between pastoralist and farmers have become widespread in North Central Nigeria, especially Benue State.

A local migrant is any person who has moved across any border outside his ethnic enclave away from his or her habitual place of residence, for a voluntary or involuntary reason. Some of the reasons includes but are not limited to profit-making, passage and protection. A migrant can be someone who has [changed] cities, provinces, countries or continents. It can be someone gone for good or away only for a season (Peberdy, 2016). The blurry nature of Nigerian borders has made it possible for migrants to forcefully establish themselves in any new site where there are opportunities. This is a common phenomenon in Benue state where Fulani nomads/herdsmen engage in

indiscriminate trespass on farmlands, deliberate destruction of farm produce, deliberate contamination of drinking water, and sexual assault. This paper examined the menace of local migrants' [insurgency] and herdsmen-farmers' conflict in Nigeria with a focus on Benue State from 2015-2017.

Theoretical Compass of Analysis

A "class is a group with intrinsic tendencies and interests that differ from those of other groups within a society. The tendencies and interests are basis of a fundamental antagonism between such groups" (Dahrendorf, 1959). A class is defined by the ownership of property. Such ownership vests a person with the power to exclude others from the property and to use it for personal purposes. These are determined by distribution and consumption, which itself ultimately reflects the production and power relations of classes. According to Buzuev and Gorrodov (1987:92) "the question of what classes are and how they have emerged has been on the minds of men for a long time; exploiters preach that class inequality has always existed and will never cease to exist, that God has created rich and poor for all time".

The force transforming latent class membership into a struggle of classes is class interest. Out of similar *class situations*, individuals come to act similarly. They develop a mutual dependence, a community; a shared interest interrelated with a common income of profit or of wages. From this common interest classes are formed. For Marx, individuals form classes to the extent that their interests engage them in a struggle with the opposite class" (Marx and Engels, 1998).

Class conflict is manifested at the societal level. Class consciousness is increased, common interests and policies are organized, and the use of and struggle for political power occurs. Classes become political forces. Marxian class theory asserts that an individual's position within a class hierarchy is determined by his or her role in the production process, and argues that political and ideological consciousness is determined by class position. A "class is those who share common economic interests, are conscious of those interests, and engage in collective action which advances those interests" (McLellan, 1977). The utility of this theory in this study is that it provides a framework for a theoretical understanding of conflict of interest between Fulani herdsmen and farmers in Benue state in the struggle between the two classes over ownership and use of land.

Historical Account of Local Migration of Fulani Herdsmen to Benue State

Fulani herdsmen began to migrate and settle in the Benue province at about 1950. The movement was quite massive that the indigenes became bewildered. It was based on this that the veterinary officer in charge of Makurdi stated that in order to control the movement of herdsmen, it is essential to renew the licenses under the Tiv control of Grazing Act of 1950 (Ivom, 2015). This indicates that the presence of Fulani herders within Tiv Division can be dated to about 1950. Perhaps, the earliest Fulani contact with Tiv dates back to Tiv migration from their ancestral home, Swam of Southern Cameroun after pre-colonial contact. Another contact between the Tiv and the Fulani

occurred during the Jihad war (Holy war) by Usman Dan Fodio(1804-1809). The contact was a mission to Islamize and conquer territories for Islamic faith, which the Tiv resisted (Saa, 2012). Sylvanus Sea, an elder in Mbawa who settled in Rukubi for more than forty years noted that Fulani herdsmen began to embark on periodic migratory process and settlement within Guma around the 1930s when the colonial administrators in Benue valley had established infrastructures such as railway, bridges and roads. The migration of the Fulani herdsmen with their cows was seasonal because they came to the area during dry season and returned to their base during rainy (Saa, 2012). He further explained that the periodic migration were from northern states of Sokoto and the Chad Republic or Niger through Uikpam cutting across Anchelgbah, through Camp Garba. The original settlers in Uikpam according to Slyvanus Sea were the Hausa traders who were stationed to assist the Fulani herdsmen in carrying out research on a suitable grazing fields, non-violent and refreshment during their migration movements. The herdsmen migration to Guma with their cattle, sheep, donkeys, etc. started at about 1955. However, it was carried out for a period of ten to fifteen years before they began engaging in partial settlements in the area (Ivom, 2015:2).

According to K.D. Ivom (2012), an elder in Mbagwen community the actual year that the Fulani herdsmen started carrying out periodic migrations into Guma cannot be ascertained, but the era is tagged as the era of “IgbuduAgundu” (cattle route). It is called the era of “IgbuduAgundu” because during the Fulani herdsmen carried out their migratory activities using a particular route..

According to His Royal Highness Chief Ivokor Unongo, TerGuma 1, the Fulani herdsmen began to migrate to North-Central area of Nigeria when the British colonial government constructed railway system across River Benue and the subsequent opening of River Benue old bridge in 1932. It was however, not a migratory activity to Guma area, but only a practice of bringing their cows to a station located very close to the Railway bridge in Makurdi, which served mostly as livestock lifting station. During that time, all the herdsmen did was to bring their cows, horses, donkeys, sheep and goats to the railway station to be transported to southern parts of Nigeria by train.

Another account by Mr. Peter Oralu, an elder in Nyiev, pointed out that, the early traces of Fulani herdsmen into Guma dates back to the colonial era before the Tiv political uprising of “Atemtyough” Tiv Riots of 1964). Fulani herdsmen were usually seen around villages, but they were not part of the political challenges faced by the Tiv.

Confirming the above assertion, a Fulani herdsman, Ahmed Musa, whose origin is from Katsina State, stated that that our fathers migrated to the Benue area at about 1950s and settled for pastoral reasons. They came through the states in the North from Chad, Niger, Maiduguri, down to this place, to graze on the vast arable land and utilize the waters in the stream around Benue valley.

The testimonies referred to so far point to the position that the migration of Fulani herdsmen into Benue area began during British colonial contact and establishment of

infrastructures by the British colonial government in the Benue valley. A letter addressed to the Permanent Secretary Ministry of Animal Health and Forestry, Kaduna, in 1958, by the Resident Benue Province, on the risk of introducing new disease to cattle, shows that herdsmen entered Benue province possibly through the bridge. In part, the letter reads:

New Fulani Settlement: if we are not to introduce new diseases I consider it absolutely vital that all new cattle entering Tiv Division South of the Benue should pass a veterinary inspection before crossing the “bridge”.

It is worthy of note that Fulani migration and the movement to the Benue area were also “facilitated by the visit of Second Republic President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, President Shehu Shagari and Sultan of Sokoto in 1981 to commiserate with the State Governor, His Excellency Aper Aku and the chairman Benue State traditional rulers council, His Royal Majesty Chief (Dr) James Akperam Orshi, on the death of Senator J.S. Takar. The President and Sultan of Sokoto, during the visit, made a formal request to the state governor and traditional rulers to offer the Fulani herdsmen a grazing field. The request was granted and the Fulani herdsmen began to settle in the rural areas of Benue State in large numbers. They usually setup their camps very close to the village of their hosts, in other to limit fears from other life threatening animals. “In most cases members of the host community ask the Fulani herdsmen to settle on their farm lands in other to add fertility to the soil.

Factors Inducing Local Herdsmen Migrants to Benue State

The rate at which Fulani herdsmen migrated with their cattle and settled within Benue province in the last six to seven decades is unprecedented. Records from archival sources show that approximately, 1,700 cattle entered Benue province from Cameron, while well over 6000 came from Bauchi, Plateau, Zaria, and Niger province between 1958 to 1961. The Tiv Division alone had about 2,500 cattles, Keffi division had about 2000 cattle, Lafia emirate had 1500 cattle, Wukari federation had approximately 1500 cattle, 1700 cattle were approximately grazing in Takum (Ivom,2015). In support of Ivom, Bellow,(2013:1) “maintains that the Fulani extraction constitutes major breeders of cattle, the main source of meat, the most available and cheap source of animal proteins consumed by Nigerians”. The number of cattle of Fulani herdsmen kept increasing after the declaration of independence in Nigeria. Hence, from about 1961 to 1980, there was also high influx of herdsmen and cattle into the Benue region; the number of cattle was about 17,000, herdsmen numbered about 200 with children, wives and labourers.

Despite the fact that the Benue valley provided market for the cattle, the thick forage and stream in the valley also motivated the herdsmen to settle in the region. The effects of climate change in the Sahelian northern states of Borno, Sokoto, Kano and Katsina have forced Fulani herdsmen to migrate and settle in the Benue valley in the past years (Ivom, 2015). They need forage, water, and a favourable atmosphere for their cattle and themselves. Variability in climate has altered the environment to significant

increase in cases of drought, spread of disease, food shortage, and animal-forage shortage and massive migration of herdsmen from the affected areas of northern Nigeria. Two factors are responsible for this migration.

Trade is one of the factors that motivate Fulani herdsmen to come down to the Benue valley. This is because the early Hausa/Fulani that made contact with Tiv farmers were horse traders who after colonial government had established infrastructures, began to come into the area with their horses (Ikyogh,2013). It is important to note that horse trade was relatively profitable throughout the Benue region and it was not affected during the conquest of Songhai (Sergeant, 1999). The horse trade as a matter of fact played pivotal role in the settlement of the Fulani herdsmen. This is because after the Hausa/Fulani traders established a good trade contact with the Tiv community, they felt the friendliness of the farmers and began settlement in the area with their cows, horses, sheep, goats and donkeys. It was however, during the periodic migration that they started setting up some partial settlements around the area. Their settlement usually comprised an elderly male (as the head of the camp) with his wives, children, relatives, and followers.

Another factor that motivated the Fulani herdsmen to settle in the area is atmospheric condition of the Benue area .According to a Fulani herdsmen in the area “we came here to sell our cattle, on getting here we realized the atmospheric condition around the area is better than that of far northern Nigeria, as a result, we decided to stay here permanently”(Isa, 2012). For instance, factors that attracted the Fulani herdsmen to settle in Guma community include the terrain which is suitable for human habitation and also has sufficient forage for cow grazing; the shallow hills, streams, suitable forage for cattle consumption and so on.

It is also observed that among the ethnic groups around Benue valley, one of the most accommodating is the Tiv in Benue State and others located in Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba States. The early Fulani traders that made contact with the farmers through trading in horse took into consideration the accommodating nature of Tiv farmers during their trading activities. After they have made this observation, they chose to settle in the area not only because of the above reasons but also because of the accommodating nature of the people during their trading in horse. When the period of trading in horse was over, the Fulani herdsmen began to embark on periodic migration and settlement with their horses, cows, sheep, goats and donkeys to the area. Their beehive huts, camps were located very close to the village of Tiv farmers in Guma and other communities.

In this regard, Sani Musa noted that “they moved with his cattle to this part of the country because drought and desert storm have seriously affected their lives” (Musa, 2013). Garba Abu noted that his reasons for migrating down to Guma area was a result of the strange disease that killed most of his animals before he initiated the move to the area which posed less threats to the health of his cows. Ardo Danladi’s reason for migrating out of Maiduguri was harsh weather condition in Maiduguri. Climate change had affected his cattle and family encroachment made daily provision for cows

and family difficult. This was the situation when he started animal-rearing with his father until a friend who had been living in the Middle Belt advised him to come here from far-north (Danladi, 2012). Reasons for the Present Fulani Herdsmen and Farmers' Clashes in Benue State

From 1980 till date, the relationship between Fulani herdsmen and Benue communities has been characterized by various forms of conflict in several places. According to Ukase and Ityonzughul, (2016:66) "hardly did any year pass without experiencing violent conflict in the area, even though the conflicts differed either in prevalence and intensity, it still had negative effects on the cordially of their relations which was established from about 1950".

The Fulani herdsmen and Tiv farmers' relationship began to deteriorate around 1980. By 2013 the two groups had already reached high levels of mutual mistrust following the suspicious activities of the herdsmen and farmers. Tiv farmers hold that their farms were been vandalized by the Fulani cattle without the usual compensations. Sebastine Orbiam, opined that the Fulani herdsmen after leading their cattle to the farms of the people also lay claims of ownership to whole land by arguing that the land their cattle graze on belong to Allah; and therefore they have every right to graze on any land they wish. The Fulani herdsmen on the other hand accuse the Tiv farmers of rustling their cows for consumption and refusing to pay if caught.

By 1980 when the disagreement between Fulani herdsmen and Tiv farmers in Guma surfaced, the two groups were no longer ready to cooperate in food production and defense of each other's interests. This situation seriously affected food production in the area. Matthew Ikyough pointed out that Fulani herdsmen began intentional encroachment on the farms of Tiv farmers with negative consequences on crop production in the area. In reaction to this, the Tiv farmers began to rustle cows belonging to Fulani herdsmen in compensation of their vandalized farms. As their relations became sour, Fulani herdsmen settling within Guma stopped inviting Tiv farmers to the naming ceremonies of their children (bikinsuna) in line with the traditions already established when they had cordial relations with Tiv farmers. They also stopped giving Tiv farmers their dead or sick livestock. Igbo Thomas observed in this regard that "the Fulani herdsmen in the area from 1950 – 1980 give out their cows free to farmers whenever their cow, sheep, goats, fowl etc die or get sick and if eventually they go out to herd their cattle and they kill any bush animal they give it to us freely, but in recent time all these kind gesture by the Fulani herdsmen have stopped. They have also stopped inviting us to their children's naming ceremonies" (Igbo, 2013.) Permission to graze in the area became necessary and money became involved. Individuals and Chiefs within Benue communities began to demand for money from the Fulani herdsmen before they were allowed to graze on the vast hinterlands in the area, thereby, making the Fulani herdsmen to claim rightful ownership of the land. These actions of the Chiefs and their subjects towards the Fulani herdsmen affected their relationship with them. On the part of Fulani

herdsmen, they believe that once they pay a certain amount of money on a particular thing, it automatically become theirs.

As money took eminence as a means of exchange in the economy of the area, the Fulani herdsmen stopped the trade by barter they were known for. They resolved to sell their products for money rather than exchange them with farmer's farm products. The Tiv farmers also stopped trading by barter with the herdsmen. Thomas Obiam noted that even the common farm products like yam, corn, millet, that the farmers gave them free, they have recently declined from giving them (Orbam, 2013). The above indicate how money economy shattered the trade by barter that the Fulani herdsmen and Tiv farmers enjoyed over a long period of time.

Besides, the Fulani herdsmen withdrew their women and children from the area, because of the abnormalities that usually occur in the area. These have seriously affected the nono trade (the sale of cow milk) in the area. According to Sambo Maimeto, the Fulani herdsmen within the area used to send their wives and female children to nearby locations such as Rukubi, Doma, Akpanaja, Ekye, Awe, Keana etc. to sell cow milk (Sambo, 2013). But, this has stopped too. Evidences abound on how Fulani herdsmen unleash terror on Benue people particularly between 1980 and 2013, when the Fulani herdsmen introduced rape and robbery of money and items.

In the case of rape, it was mostly carried out on the farms of the host, when the herdsmen are on their usual grazing mission. They often times demand for water and roasted yams from Tiv women they meet on the farms. Sometimes after they have eaten the yam and drank the water given to them, they rape the women and run away. When such complaints get to the leaders of the Fulani herdsmen, they usually deny responsibility for such acts. Robbery also became very common among the Fulani herdsmen in the area, although most robbery activities were carried out on market days.

A village Head, Chief B. Tyonagh, of Mbayegh/Yandev Council Ward, declared that "the Fulani herdsmen are inhumane; they kill, maim, and rape our women at will. We have therefore, been pushed to the wall that is the reason why we have in recent times resolved to no longer accommodate them within us"(interview with village Head,2017) Bonat, in agreement with the above, asserts that, by the turn of the 21st century, pastoralists-farmers' conflicts were becoming more violent, with the increasing use of modern sophisticated weapons by the pastoralists, leading to some farming communities also organizing to defend themselves (Bonat, 2017).

Based on the above frustration, the farmers began to attack Fulani herdsmen camps killing and maiming them as well and also rustling their cattle. The Fulani herdsmen on their part also began to employ measures towards ally, invite officers of the Nigeria Police Force rather than follow the old tradition of addressing the attacks on their camps by the farmers, Amedu Jurbo, pointed out that they usually settle conflicts through community Chiefs and Council of Elders. The inability of the Nigeria Police to

effectively resolve these conflicts led the Fulani herdsmen to introduce fire-arms and mercenaries in reprisal attacks on the farmers.

Impact of Local Migrants' Insurgency and Herdsmen-Farmers Clash in Benue State

Farmers and Fulani herdsmen clashes have various implications on the two groups. In the course of clashes, a lot of people are displaced as they seek safety of their lives. Contributing to the discourse, Varvar argues that: The period from 2010 to present has witnessed sustained brutal attacks on the rural farming communities of the Benue Valley area, leading to loss of lives and displacement of populations. Central Nigerian farmers have seriously been affected as agricultural and socio-economic activities have been crippled in some of the affected area. Many of the Tiv farming communities have been displaced and forcefully taken over by herdsmen (Varvar, (2017)

In analyzing the menace, Idyorough, (2017), with emphasis on Benue situation, noted that during the invasion and occupation of some local government areas in Benue State, the killings, displacement, and loss of valued property, were the order of the day. Several bodies were also maimed, some displaced as contained by the tables below:

Table 1: Killings, displacement and loss of valued property in 2014

S/No	LGA	Numbers of Persons Killed	Number of persons displaced	Value of property (NGN)
1.	Guma	142	6544	128,246,220.00
2.	Gwer-East	15	253	53,226,541.00
3.	Gwer-West	168	4543	592,043,493.00
4.	Katsina-Ala	20	1679	4,066,003,560.00
5.	Kwande	-	3199	132,523,130.00
6.	Logo	54	4088	9,631,291,525.00
7.	Makurdi	484	3018	16,884, 800,000.00
	Total	883	23324	31,488,134,469.00

Source: Mzough U Tiv (MUT), May 2016.

Table 2: Killings, Displacement and Loss of Valued Property in 2015 and 2017

S/No	LGA	Numbers of Persons Killed	Number of persons displaced	Value of property (NGN)
1.	Buruku	28	6650	8,335,664,000.00
2.	Logo	58	+	+
3.	Tarka	15	+	+
4.	Ukum	+	+	+
	Total	101+	6650	8,335,664,000.00

Source: Mzough U. Tiv (MUT), May 2017

Tables 1 and 2 above shows that within the period of three years (2014-2017) the Tiv extraction of Benue state have lost about 1,070 persons killed by herdsmen, over (53,298) persons were internally displaced (excluding figures for Logo, Tarka and Ukum LGAs, and N39,823,789,469 (again excluding estimated losses from Logo, Tarka and Ukum LGAs). Some districts in these LGAs were occupied by the marauding herdsmen. The local crop farmers have been displaced from their farmlands and are helpless. Food crop production in some of these areas has stopped and the local communities made to become dependent on others.

Table 3: Fulani Herdsmen/Farmers Clashes in Central Nigeria (2015/2016)

S/No	Date	Nature and Place of Incident	Number of Deaths	Other Effects
1.	7-04-2015	Fulani herdsmen attack community in Benue State, injured many, sacked three (3) communities	28	
2.	27-04-2015	Suspected Fulani herdsmen attacked Benue Community; Adeke, Mbadiwan; in Gurua District of the Local Government. Injured many	21	
3.	10-04-2016	Fulani herdsmen attacked Dori and Maisuma villages	1	
4.	31-03-2016	Herdsmen attacked Agasha community in Guma L.G.A	7	
5.	24-01-2016	Fulani herdsmen ambushed police officers including Division Police Officer, as a revenge over the feud between the local farmers and herdsmen	31	
6.	21-04-2016	Ten communities were razed by herdsmen in Agatu, Benue State	Not fewer than 500	
7.	13-12-2015	Fulani herdsmen attacked Kwata Community in Southern Benue	22	
8.	08-02-2016	Fulani herdsmen attacked Benue Village at [TOM-Anyi in and Tom Ataan Communities of Mbaya, Tombu in Buruku L.G.A]	10	Over 300 people were displaced
9.	24-04-2016	Fulani herdsmen killed many in Benue State.	35	Many displaced
10.	24-04-2016	Kwata, Zawanara of Benue South, fewer kilometres from NIPPS, at about 8:30pm Sunday night, was attacked killing mainly women and children	14	Burnt houses
11.	14-03-2016	Fulani herdsmen invade Agatu	300	Burnt houses, many were slaughtered and displaced

10.	07-05-2016	Gunmen attacked Fulani camp at Enjema Community in a reprisal attack.	41 Cows killed	300 cows missing
		Total	1,010	

Source: Author compilation from *Daily Trust*, April 15, 19,24, May 31, January4, 2015, Punch April 21, Sunday Trust December 13, Vanguard February 8, Today Online Media April 24,2016, Sahara Reporters January 24, the Guardian May 3, Daily Trust May 7, Vanguard May 8, 2017.

Table 3 presented casualties that resulted from some of attacks. It can be seen that a total of 1,010 civilian (many women and children), Nigeria Police Force personnel killed, and numbers of cattle killed in the act of conflicts in the affected areas. Aside the death toll, properties worth millions of naira was destroyed. Analyzing the killings and displacement, Weigh (2017) argues that:

“The Central Nigerian farmers – Fulani nomads conflict led to the destruction of crops by the herds, affected food crop production and supply, the main occupation of Benue people, and it led to food insecurity. Crops such as yams, cassava, rice, guinea corn, millet, ginger, water melon, oranges, mangoes, tomatoes, spinach, pumpkin, and pepper that are produced in commercial quantity are destroyed”.

Though, statistics are scanty, it should be noted that the sufferings imposed on the Central Nigerian farmers are worrisome. However, the Fulani herdsmen also suffered from the attack. For instance, the nomads also lost their cattle and relatives in some of the conflicts. These have actually given them a psychological trauma. Commenting on effects of farmers-nomadic conflicts in Gwer-West Local Government in Benue State and elsewhere in the country, Igbahenah (2016) discloses that: On the side of the nomadic cattle herders, they have gained additional land for grazing, but they are not free from the psychological torture, as they also live in fear and carry large arms to scare the people in case of any eventuality. Previously, the nomads would come with their wives and children, but after the February 2011, crisis they have stopped bringing their families, instead, they come more in groups, armed with guns and swords. They also suffer losses especially, where they have to flee their settlement (s) and abandoned some of their animals after igniting crisis (interview with Igbahenah, 2016).

The citation above depicts that both farmers and nomads in central Nigeria suffer from the conflicts, in terms of demographic and economic devastation.

Local Migrants, Insurgency and Nigeria’s Internal Security

In simple terms, security has to do with self and group preservation, first from physical danger, and then from other forms of danger which may be economic, psychological, political, etc. It entails the prevention of damage or threat of damage to those things which one holds dear and which are seen as constituting values and/or sources of. Nnoli (2005:5) opines that the concept has been so mystified that it has “given rise to intellectual uncertainty, analytical confusion, paradigmatic disorder and theoretical

impotence”. For instance, Ojo (1991) cited in Ajayi (2007:438) defines security as “the preservation of the safety, freedom, values and welfare of the people as individuals and groups”. This is in tandem with the views of Nnoli (2006:4), that security covers many aspects of life of man, including human security, global security, environmental security and various other forms of security. Sen (1999) attempts to capture economics, environmental and societal security with the concept of protective, security as freedom that is instrumental to the attainment of development in its various ramifications.

Buzan (1991) and Buzan, (1998) identified five forms of security, namely: military, political, economic, environmental and societal security. According to Almond, etal (2004:4) security is bifurcated into internal and external security.

External security is conceived in terms of threat perceptions from outside a country that may be directed at attacking or destabilizing a state. To control such threats, national defense forces like the army, the air force, and the navy, are often created, funded, trained and deployed to protect the state and its people against external aggression on land, air and sea. Internal security, on the other hand, implies protecting a state from threats to its peace, stability and progress of its people, mainly from within. It includes protection against theft, aggression, and violence from members of one’s own society (Almond, etal, (2004:4). The need for internal security reinforces the truism of the biblical statement that “a man’s enemies are those of his own household”. Therefore, it is very crucial, not only to the survival of the people, but also to the challenge of Nigeria’s internal security demands serious intervention from Federal Government of Nigeria under the leadership of Muhammed Buhari. This is because migration has become a necessary of modern life as people migrate in search of economic wellbeing and the output from it should not result to warfare as witnessed today in Nigeria.

The picture below demonstrate random samples of mass burial sites of those killed in Benue state which is a negation of the realities, demands of internal security which Nigeria owes her citizens.

Mass burial site 4



Source: By the Author, Eze, M.O 2018

Migrants should not assume superiority over their host communities to avoid conflict; wars and other unrests. The inauguration of President Muhammed Buhari in 2015 has given birth to unprecedented herdsmen insurgency in the history of Nigeria. The herdsmen have intensified their onslaught on host communities with an assumption that with a Fulani Man in power, the political and military machine will be used in their favour to intimidate and if possible displace their host communities. This assumption seems to hold water in view of the lackadaisical attitude of Nigerian law enforcement officers who have left the menace of these herdsmen unchecked by legalizing their use of sophisticated weapons against Nigerian farmers.

The implication is that their host communities is at the mercy of Fulani herdsmen who burn, kill, rape, these farmers as well as destroy some of their properties. The activities of the Fulani herdsmen remains unchecked, unpunished, uninvestigated and unprosecuted by the Nigerian Army, Police and other law officers. This seems to attest that they have been licensed to act pursuant to their assumption that once a Fulani Man is in power, they can act contrary to the law of the land.

The present lapses in Nigeria's internal security apparatus have made Fulani herdsmen to engage in continuous insurgent acts like arson, murder, homicide, rape and other inhuman acts and atrocities on farmers and citizens of Benue state. This has undermined Nigeria's internal security system to the extent that today, Nigeria's internal security is an illusion since the Nigerian military and other security outfits have failed to address the present internal source of threats to lives and properties. Insurgency today remains the principal form of conflict in Nigeria as ethnic interest attracts insurgency and makes its success inevitable.

Conclusion

The study examined the menace of local migrants, insurgency, and herdsmen-farmers' conflict in Nigeria, with a focus on Benue state. The study observed among others that the conflict between Fulani herdsmen and farmers in Benue state and the atrocities arising there-from undermine Nigeria's internal security, hence, internal security in Nigeria today has become an illusion.

We recommend that:

- (i) Nigeria needs legislation on local migration which will guide the conducts of migrants and host communities. This law will curtail the excesses of local migrants and host communities in Nigeria. This legislation should also specify that migrants should not assume superiority over their host communities to avoid conflict; wars and other unrests
- (ii) Nigeria should embark on bio-data registration of both local Fulani herdsmen migrants and farmers in each community in other to identify the international migrants, the local migrants, and farmers, for possible investigation, prosecution, and punishment, whenever there is outbreak of conflicts.
- (iii) There is need for a proactive combatant security network that will curb the spread of herdsmen-farmers' conflicts.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

Conflict-Induced Migration in Nigeria: An Analysis of Impacts on Women

Queeneth O. Ekeocha and Francis Chijioke Onyebukwa

Introduction

Forced migration, according to the International Association for the Study of Forced Migration (IASFM), is a universal term used to describe the movement of refugees and those displaced by wars and conflicts also referred to as internally displaced people/persons (IDPs). It is also used to describe people displaced by other causes including environmental or natural disasters, famine and developmental projects, as well as nuclear and chemical disasters (Moser and Clark, 2001). Often times, conflicts caused by socio-political, religious, cultural, ethnic, and economic differences, forcefully displace people from their homes. Forced migration, according to Moser and Clark (2001), is a violation of human, socio-political and economic rights. Irrespective of the cause, human rights of people are violated once they are forcefully displaced.

Conflict-induced migration, for instance, occur when people are compelled to flee their homes and the government has either failed or is unwilling to protect them (Zard, 2006). Zard asserts that conflict-induced migration includes civil wars, armed conflicts, and generalized violence, as well as all forms of persecution arising on account of race, religion, nationality, social group, and political opinion. According to Kurekova (2011), forced migration induced by development arises from policies and project implementation presumed to be for the advancement of development. Some examples of large scale developmental projects capable of inducing forced migration include dams, seaports, roads, airports, as well as urban clearance initiatives such as deforestation and mining. Others include introduction of biosphere projects, and conservation parks and reserves (Kurekova, 2011). Aproximately, 90-100 million people were displaced globally in the 1990s due to infrastructural development projects (Global Report on Internal Displacement, 2018). Also, an estimated 10 million people, on average, are forcefully displaced around the globe yearly on account of dam construction alone (Kurekova, 2011).

Disaster-Induced Displacement (DID) is another form of forced displacement which occurs when dislodgment of people are caused by natural disasters such as flood, volcanic eruption, landslide, and earthquake (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2016). Zard (2006) further indicated that the impacts of landslides and flood are greatly exacerbated by deforestation and agricultural activities. Land degradation, desertification, and global warming, can also cause DID. Other causes of DID are man-made disasters such as industrial accidents and radioactivity (ICG, 2016).

The various categories of forced migrants include IDPs, refugees, asylum seekers, smuggled/trafficked persons, environmental displaced persons, etc (GRID, 2018). Unfortunately, according to United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) report, IDPs do not have clear legal and institutional support unlike the refugees and asylum seekers who have managed to cross an international border (UNHRC, 2014). Thus, there is no specific body to provide assistance to IDPs, as is the case with refugees (GRID, 2018). According to the 1992 report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, IDPs are identified as “persons who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers, as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human rights, natural and man-made disasters, within the territory of their own countries” (Silverman, 2015: 1).

According to the UN Population Fund, women make up half of all migrants globally. Women migrate involuntarily due to war, poverty, political strife, climate change and government’s inability to protect its citizens. Loss of livelihood for a woman may increase the chances of the woman being trafficked for sex, begging, forced labour, or organ trafficking (MOAS, 2018). According to this source also, 80% of casualties by small arms are women and children. They are vulnerable during conflict, and tend to be poorer, have less education and employment opportunities. In the North-Eastern part of Nigeria, women are the majority of the 1.8million internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to Boko Haram insurgency. These women, who most times were kidnapped, experience forced marriage, rape, suicide attacks (MOAS, 2018).

Displacement immensely affect women because its consequences drastically reduce access to resources that are required to cope with household needs and this increases physical and emotional stress especially in women (El Jack, 2002). According to Rohwerder (2016), women (and girls in particular) face increased risk of sexual and gender-based violence like sexual abuse, transactional sex, rape, human trafficking by armed personnel or officials.

Conflict-induced migration has continuously challenged the global society on issues about international politics, international law, human rights, humanitarian aid, social and population policies (Zard, 2006). In this study, conflict-induced migration is also referred to as internally forced migration, internal displacement or external migration and these terms are used interchangeably. According to Turton (2003) forced migrants have distinctive experiences and needs; thus, it is risky seeing them as a homogeneous mass of needy and passive victims. Therefore, policy interventions should be based on the unique and different needs of each refugee especially the female ones.

Statement of Problem

The UNHRC 2014 report shows that more than 50 million people are displaced globally as a result of armed conflict and this is the largest number since World War II. Out of this figure, Africa has a population of about 3.3 million conflict- and violence-induced displaced persons, with Nigeria having the highest number of IDPs in the continent (GRID, 2018). Nigeria is also ranked behind Syria and Colombia with 6.5

and 5.7 million IDPs respectively, among countries with the highest number of IDPs at the global level (UNHRC, 2014). Within the country, the statistics provided by the National Population Commission (NPC) in January 2018 indicated an increase in the number of displaced persons across the country. The report indicated an increase by 4.5 percent in 2017 when compared to 1,702,680 identified in 2016. There is an estimated 1.7 million IDPs in over 321,580 households across the six states that make up the North-Eastern part of the country alone (NPC, January, 2018).

Between 2013 and 2018, the number of forcefully displaced females within the Middle Belt area of Nigeria has risen. For instance, the 11 April 2018 Sahara Reporters news report has it that more than 1 million women and girls have been forcefully displaced by the persistent attacks of the Boko Haram group across the Middle Belt. The International Crisis Group (2016) also reported that among an estimated 1.8 million IDPs in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria, women are an overwhelming majority. Unfortunately, they bear huge part of the brunt associated with insurgents, which in some cases, prevent them from reintroduction into their communities and society. Hundreds of thousands of women found in most of the government camps live in inhuman conditions of food insufficiency and dismal healthcare and sanitary services (ICG, 2016). The impact of forced displacement has huge implications on the women as many are now fully responsible for their families' protection and economic wellbeing, suffer sexual abuse and assault from both the insurgents and government officials, and are discriminated and rejected, and above all suffer poverty. The female gender is the most vulnerable of conflict-induced migration due to their disadvantaged position in most African societies. Thus, interrogating the legal and institutional support given to female IDPs in Nigeria is a policy concern and necessary for addressing gender violence and discrimination.

Objectives of the Study

- To identify various impacts of conflict-induced migration on women.
- To ascertain the extent of these impacts on the female gender.
- To ascertain various efforts towards mitigating the effects of these impacts on women.

Methodology

This study is a desk research. All information and statistical data presented and analyzed in this study are secondary data. The sources of information are journals, newspapers, and so on Data obtained were analysed using content analysis.

Conceptualizing Migration and Conflict Theories

Theories on migration are very multifaceted. The first of them is traced to E.G Ravenstein who in 1885 attempted to spell out the law of migration based on some set of generalised assumptions. He held that migration is triggered by economics - a situation in which "the deficiency of hands in one part of the country is supplied from other parts where population is redundant" (Ravenstein, 1885: 168). This postulation

suggests that migration is primarily stimulated by lucid attention around economic issues such as costs and financial benefits (Kurekova, 2011, Todaro and Smith 2006). It represents a cost-benefit analysis model which views drivers of migration only along economic lines, choice and rationality.

Neoclassical scholars suggested further that migration is an inexorable process driven by enormously prevailing economic, demographic and social forces. However, migration theories in general at the time, did not discuss the gender aspect of international migration or internal displacement, partly because of the assumption that most migrants are men and the women are their dependants. Their argument measures migration from a divergent perspective which linked the causes of migration to environmental dynamics. The term ‘environmental refugees’ was introduced by El Hinnawi to “denote people forced to leave their homes temporarily or permanently due to environmental factors – natural disasters, climate change, that risk their lives or quality of life” (Reuveny, 2005). While El Hinnawi’s argument suggests that environmental stress force people to migrate, other authors (Kurekova, 2011; Clark, 2007), argue that environmental factors represent one dimensional perspective, which exclude migration induced by non-environmental factors – wars, and ethnic and political conflict.

The conception regarding non-environmental migration arises from push factors including unemployment, poverty, political conflicts, and religious upheavals; and pull factors such as jobs and security (Kurekova, 2011; Reuveny, 2005). This paper adopts El Hinnawi’s suggestion as cited in Reuveny (2005) that migration promoting factors should comprise of environmental and non-environmental factors. Invariably, non-environmental factors relating to social and political causes generate conditions that promote migration. No doubt, women and children are the most vulnerable migrant group affected by these factors (Reuveny, 2005).

Analysis of Impacts of Conflict-Induced Migration on Women

Women as one of the most vulnerable groups, are deeply affected by conflict-induced migration in several ways. Women caught up in internal displacement face various barriers to their enjoyment of rights and limitless challenges of migrating, and these may threaten their immediate safety. Some of them are exposed. This section discusses some of the impacts of migration on women in Nigeria.

a. *Displacement and Physical Security Challenges*

One of the daunting challenges faced by women during conflict is displacement. Often times, houses are destroyed during conflicts and women are sacked from their homes if they are not killed. In other words, women are forced to migrate either to a safer environment for protection or to start a new living to sustain their families (Sahara Reporters, 11 April, 2018). In recent times, Nigeria has recorded an increase in cases of conflicts across the nation. Ranging from ethnic conflicts, inter- and intra- tribal and communal conflicts, to farmers-herdsmen conflict, and to Boko Haram terrorism (Amnesty International, 24 May 2018). These have contributed immensely to colossal

rise in the number of displaced persons including women across the country. This condition exacerbates the level of exposure and vulnerability of displaced women and girls in Nigeria (Sahara Reporters, 11 April 2018). The implication thereafter is that the general security of this vulnerable group is not guaranteed under such circumstances.

Unfortunately, privileged people (including care-givers in IDPs camps and shelters) have been accused of taking advantage of these lapses to unleash various degrees of sexual violence and abuse against this group. Regarding this, the Amnesty International (24 May 2018), the New York Times (8 December 2017), Centre for Population and Reproductive Health, University of Ibadan (September 2016), have reports of violent and sexual abuses of women, particularly of child-bearing age, and adolescent girls, by security agents and care-givers. The inadequacy of security at IDPs camps across Nigeria have also increased the vulnerability of women to reported cases of terrorist attacks and armed robbery. In Madagali and Yola IDPs camps, for instance, 12 persons were killed by Boko Haram terrorists during a suicide attack in September 2015 (UNHCR 08 March 2016; Yusuf & Ojeme in Vanguard Newspaper, 18 February 2015). Also, on 11 September 2015, seven people were killed at Mlkohi camp; 86 persons were also killed at Dalori camp on 31 January 2016; and another 80 killed at Dikwa camp in Borno state on 10 February 2016 (UNHCR 08 March, 2016). All these attacks were perpetrated by Boko Haram terrorist group, and women and children were majority among the dead. In fact, more than 58% of the dead were women.

These suggest that the level of insecurity in camps in Nigeria is alarming. Women face double jeopardy and a situation of running from insecurity to insecurity. As a result, the chances of women's quick recovery from the psychological trauma of rape, loss of families, friends and properties, become almost impossible.

b. Human Rights and Sexual Abuses

Women's human rights are violated once they become victims of either kidnap or detention in the hands of Boko Haram. In many cases, women are sent into long incarceration where they are raped and abused. Unfortunately, many women were raped by the Nigerian security forces whose primary responsibility it was to protect them. Incidences of rape have been reported by various media outfits and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (Amnesty International 24 May 2018; Daily Post Newspaper 24 May 2018; This Day Newspaper 24 May 2018, and New York Times 08 December, 2017).

When conflicts compel women to migrate, most of them resort to IDPs for temporary shelter and some sort of protection. In most cases, these IDPs are inadequate, dilapidated, overcrowded, and provide limited access to safe, sanitary and health conditions (Amnesty International 24, May 2018), thus, compelling thousands of women to live in squalid and uninhabitable conditions. A United Nation Refugee Agency (UNHCR) 2017 report on the "*Nigeria Situation*" shows that more than 700,000 women and children displaced in north east Nigeria alone, live in congested

shelter and inhospitable conditions which makes them vulnerable to abuses and exploitation.

Migrant women fleeing from human rights violence often become victims of untold pain and deplorable conditions in the hands of criminals and traffickers. Under the displaced condition, women are thus exploited and violated sexually (This Day Newspaper 24 May 2018). Even in IDPs camps, reports of violation of women have been on the increase. It was documented by the Human Rights Watch (31 October 2016) that 43 women and girls were raped by Nigeria's security officials. According to the New York Times (08 December 2017), "more than 7,000 women and girls have endured Boko Haram's sexual violence" while others became victims of rape carried out by guards, camp officials, security officers, and members of civilian vigilante groups (Human Rights Watch 31 October, 2016). Regrettably, some of the victims of this heinous acts became pregnant while others delivered their babies (Human Rights Watch 31 October, 2016).

c. Humanitarian and Health Challenges

Humanitarian services are not commendable across many IDPs camps in the country. While some women receive inadequate food, others are provided food for sex. This is because of shortage of food supply and other basic humanitarian services. Amnesty International report 24 May 2018 shows that women were violated in return for food supply by some of their givers. The situation worsened with reports of irregular supply of food, medicine and other necessities to the camp particularly, in Maduguri (Human Rights Watch 31 October, 2016). As unpleasant as this report is, the federal government of Nigeria exacerbated the situation by consistent denial that such things never happened instead of launching full-scale investigations to unravel the truth. The rate of HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases rose sharply from 200 recorded cases in Dalori camps in 2014 when the camp was set up, to more than 500 reported cases in 2016.

In almost all the IDPs camps in Nigeria, inadequate or complete absence of basic health facilities and services remain a huge challenge to women. Most of the women suffer from one form disease or the other. Some of the most commonly recorded cases are malaria, cough, rashes, and diarrhoea. There is also an increase in the number of women with sexually transmitted diseases. Many pregnant women do not have to assess proper antenatal care and this increased the rate of maternal mortality. Others include varying degrees of post-traumatic stress and disorder (Punch Newspaper 03 December 2017).

d. Discrimination, Rejection and Poverty

Many victims of rape in IDPs camps across Nigeria suffer from discrimination and rejection when they share their experiences with others (Mohammed 2017). Many other women are so poor that they resort to selling their bodies to feed the family. Some who do not sell their bodies, end up in wrong relationships that got them pregnant and abandoned by the men who impregnated them. It was reported, for instance, that some women sell parts of their food supply to raise money to buy other

daily requirements to sustain their families (Mohammed, 2017). Yacob-Haliso (2011) argues that women need special consideration on issues emanating from personal and structural factors such as the loss of traditional gender roles, psychosocial trauma of return when faced with perpetrators and a lack of adequate resources to support a household.

Reducing the effects of migration on women: Successes and Failures

Nigeria, through the state and federal government, has made efforts at reducing the plight of forced migration on women. However, the country is finding it extremely difficult to manage its plethora of IDPs in such a manner that will alleviate the sufferings of displaced women. The Nigerian government has tried some mitigation strides such as establishing IDPs camps management agencies, establishment of IDPs camps in the worst hit areas, and donation of certain emergency relief materials, including food, water, clothes, and medication (Eweka and Olusegun, 2016). Some examples of IDPs camps management agencies are the National Commission for Refugees (NCR) which transformed into the current National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCRMI), the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), as well as the State Emergency Management Agencies, the Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (MRRR), Borno State. There are also a number of emergency management policies such as the National Policy on Internal Displacement in Nigeria, and the National Migration Policy (NMP) (Eweka and Olusegun, 2016). These reflections clearly show that there are frameworks and relevant institutional arrangements in Nigeria to manage IDPs.

Although these are laudable strides, the concern, however, remains in the effective implementation of the duties and mandates of these arrangements. It is most unfortunate that these policies remain on papers. In most cases, these efforts are impeded by conventional variables which retard their success. Scholars (Mohammed 2017; Eweka and Olusegun, 2016), observed that issues of inadequate funding, corruption, policy and poor policy implementation, hamper optimal execution of government's mitigation efforts. Paradoxically, the challenges of quality living conditions in camps of IDPs continue to increase.

Negative reports (Jelili & Olanrewaju, 2016) on the level of decay in IDP camps are eloquent confirmation that government's mitigation efforts have failed. In the same vein, women are highly disadvantaged during forced migration. Even though women with children are the majority of the displaced in conflict situations, their needs and concerns are usually ignored when planning and implementing humanitarian aids (Byrne, 1996).

Findings

Some fundamental challenges were identified by the research. First, the research found that there is no existing policy framework for female IDPs. As such, the plight of the female IDPs continues on the increase across the country.

Second, often times, gender issues are not properly integrated and/ or completely lacking in policy formulation processes. Although the national migration regulations and policies identified women silently as part of displaced persons, gender issues are not clearly spelt out considering the fact that they are among the most vulnerable group.

Third, the research further found out that there is a dysfunctional management of IDPs in Nigeria. The safety and livelihood of women and girls in IDPs camps are not taken seriously by care-givers. Women are continually subjected to horrible living conditions and increased vulnerability to violent abuses. These are resultant effects of inefficient and ineffective camp management. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that most camps are operational in dilapidated structures and in some cases, no structure at all.

Conclusion

Conflict-induced migration of women has severe implications for female poverty, discrimination, physical security, human rights, and healthcare. In all these challenges, displaced women in various IDPs camps across Nigeria are treated as passive recipients of aid. Their plight are not taken seriously by the government of Nigeria. It has resulted in reported cases of various forms of abuse carried out on this vulnerable group. Paradoxically, poor management of the IDPs camps and facilities, government's lack of interest on what should be done to address the plight of displaced women and corruption, exacerbate their woes. Regrettably, government's ineptitude has continued to impede effective policy implementation to preclude or minimise the negative effects of ineffective IDPs camps mismanagement on women.

Policy Recommendations

- Monitoring teams should be established to ensure proper and effective management and implementation of gender issues articulated in government policies and frameworks regarding IDPs camps. It will be the responsibility of such a body to ensure that women are not treated as passive beneficiaries of aid but with equal respect and dignity. This strategy will ensure increased security and protection of women against sexual abuses in IDPs camps.
- Government should increase its efforts towards the arrest, prosecution and punishment of sexual abusers. Laws that will criminalise any form of sexual abuse against displaced women in camps or elsewhere should be enacted. In addition, special courts dealing with sexual abuse cases against displaced women should be established.
- Addressing the root causes of conflict rather than reacting to conflict, will go a long way in preventing conflict, thereby, ending or reducing forced displacement and migration, and their impacts. Government should therefore scale-up conflict preclusion by holistically reinforcing mechanisms against the causes of conflict. Mechanisms such as early warning and action against proximate causes of conflict, promotion of culture of peace in communities, and engagement of traditional and religious leaders to counter extreme violence, are

necessary steps towards effective conflict prevention as opposed to reaction strategy prevalent in the country today.

- Government should develop a policy framework that will mainstream women and children and factor them into legislations that should reflect, represent and protect their status. This framework and legislation will articulate and prioritise the perspectives of displaced women to ensure all their needs are adequately addressed. Such framework and legislation should be aligned with international best practices including the UNSC Resolution 1325. Displaced women should be specifically targeted with efforts to ensure that gender issues are not only mainstreamed but also incorporated into all aspects of policies and programs.

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CHAPTER NINE

Nomadic Pastoralism and Human Security: Towards a Collective Action against Herders-Farmers Crisis in Nigeria

Chikodiri Nwangwu and Chukwuemeka Enyiazu

Introduction

This paper investigates the link between nomadic pastoralism and human security in Nigeria. It argues that the pastoral crisis has increasingly become a regional contagion in West Africa and requires collective, interlocking, and transnational approach. Human security in Nigeria has come under severe threat by a combination of both natural and anthropogenic forces. While these factors, which are not mutually exclusive, vary based on contexts, others like extreme poverty, social exclusion, human rights violations, failure of governance, proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), food insecurity, environmental degradation, illiteracy, endemic diseases, climate change, terrorism as well as transhumant pastoralism¹⁹, are cross-cutting. Although some of these drivers of insecurity are very endemic in West Africa, threats of transhumant pastoralism appear to have burgeoned and gained currency mainly because of weak politico-security environment. This herding tradition is commonly associated with the nomads of Central, East, North, and West Africa, particularly in countries like Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Sudan. With about 20 million Fulani living across West Africa (Levinson, 1996; Okoli, 2017), nomadic pastoralism in the region is almost exclusively associated with the Fulani ethnic nationality. This presupposes that they constitute the largest pastoral community in West Africa.

Transhumant pastoralism is as old as recorded history. Although significant cultural and technological variations exist across the globe, the underlying practices of taking advantage of remote seasonal pastures are largely similar. The primacy of livestock rearing (both nomadic and sedentary pastoralism) to economic sustainability and food security in West Africa cannot be over-emphasised. It provides about 44% of the region's agricultural production and also boasts of 60 million heads of cattle, 160 small ruminants, and 400 million poultry (SWAC-OECD/ECOWAS, 2008). In sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, West Africa contains 25% of the cattle, 33% of the sheep, and 40% of the goats.

West African transhumant pastoralists and sedentary peasant farmers have long coexisted in mutually supportive relationships that have also witnessed contentious

¹⁹ It is noteworthy that transhumant and nomadic pastoralism are not exactly the same but they are used interchangeably in this discourse.

encounters. They have had established practices of mutual trade and production relations that allow herders' cattle to fertilise the farmers' land in exchange for usufructuary over land and related resources. However, both population growth and increasing commodity production have led to the expansion of agriculture by peasant farmers and other investors on formerly shared grazing lands. Contrary to the existential realities in the relationship between these land users in other jurisdictions outside Africa,²⁰ transhumant pastoralism in West Africa has become extremely conflictive and tension-soaked.

Academic literature and newspapers are awash with reports of violent and frequently fatal clashes between herders and farmers (Agyemang, 2017; Bello, 2013; International Crisis Group, 2017; Moritz, 2006, 2010). Although widely regarded as resource-use conflicts in the intellectual tradition of neo-Malthusianism (Homer Dixon, 1994; Hussein, Sumberg & Seddon, 1999; Moritz, 2010; Percival & Homer-Dixon, 1998), clashes between nomadic herders and peasant farmers (or what many refer to as coordinated attacks on farming communities by transhumant pastoralists) in Nigeria have not only become very frequent, sophisticated, and well-coordinated since 2015; it has also continued to acquire ethno-regional, religious, and political tinge. In Kaduna, Taraba, Plateau, and Nasarawa States, attacks by nomadic Fulani pastoralists have been focused rather selectively on non-Muslim communities. In other places like Zamfara and Kebbi States, the attacks have targeted non-Fulani villages (Okoli, 2017). Thus, most of the attacks would seem as if people are targeted and victimised on religious or ethnic grounds.

Scholarly discourses of the causes of nomadic pastoralists-peasant farmers' conflicts can be broadly segmented into three. First, recurring violent conflicts between these two groups of land users have been attributed to climate change and environmental security (Cabot, 2017; Odoh & Chilaka, 2012; Onuoha, 2008, 2010; Onuoha & Ezirim, 2010). The security implications of climate change in Africa gained currency since 2007 following debates by the African Union (AU), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and the Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. Scholars in the field of environmental security see causal links between environmental scarcity and violence (Bachler, 1999; Homer-Dixon, 1999). However, some political ecologists have rejected this simplistic argument that environmental scarcity precipitates violent conflicts, because of inadequate reference to complex empirical realities (Peluso & Watts, 2001). Rather than being the source of conflict, they conceptualised the environment as “a theater in which conflicts or claims over property, assets, labor, and the politics of recognition play themselves out” (Peluso & Watts, 2001: 25).

Second and closely allied with the above is the Malthusian perspective that urbanisation and the explosive growth in population relative to available resources in

²⁰In other jurisdictions outside West Africa, there is no widespread conflict between these two groups of land users. For more, see: Gentle, P. & Thwaites, R. (2016). “Transhumant Pastoralism in the Context of Socioeconomic and Climate Change in the Mountains of Nepal”, *Mountain Research and Development*, 36 (2), 173-182.

Africa can explain the clashes between sedentary farmers and nomadic pastoralists (Cilliers, 2009; Fabiyi & Otunuga, 2016; Fratkin, 1997; International Crisis Group, 2017; Neupert, 1999; Onuoha, 2010; Oyama, 2014). There has been an unprecedented expansion of public infrastructure and the acquisition of land by large-scale farmers and other private commercial interests. Accordingly, both population growth and increasing commodity production have led to the extension of farmlands to grazing reserves, thereby increasing the tension and conflicts between these land users in many parts of the world (Fratkin, 1997).

Third, other studies focus on the contributions of insecurity within the Lake Chad Basin to the worsening relationship between transhumant herders and their host communities in the savannah belt of Nigeria (Fabiyi & Otunuga, 2016; International Crisis Group, 2017). For instance, the members of Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) reportedly lost over one million cattle and other livestock to Boko Haram insurgency and cattle rustling in the North-East (Okogba, 2017). The prevalence of insurgency and cattle rustling in Lake Chad (see Figure 1) has forced nomadic herders into the savannah belt where high population growth has already heightened pressure on farmland, thereby increasing the frequency of disputes over crop damage, water pollution, and cattle theft.

While extant studies on this subject are very instructive, they have paid scant attention to the transnational character of the conflict. These studies are yet to give sufficient attention to the place of regional conventions in the conflict between nomadic pastoralists and sedentary peasant farmers. Some of such conventions/frameworks by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are: the ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol of 1998, the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Goods and Persons in West Africa, the Regulations of Transhumance between ECOWAS Member-States of 2003, and the ECOWAS Strategic Plan for the Development and Transformation of the Livestock Sector. These frameworks tend to allow herders to move across borders in search of pasture upon fulfilling the conditions laid down in the protocols. The tendency to exploit the loopholes in these protocols by these pastoralists has led to the progressive deterioration of human security in the region. Hence, promoting security cooperation and networking of relevant regional bodies with the civil society could be a panacea for the tension-soaked relationship between the herders and peasant farmers.

Transhumant Pastoral Crisis: Insight from Regional Security Complex Theory

In analysing the transnational character of the threats posed by transhumant pastoralism, this paper employs the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). This is informed by the fact that analyses in extant scholarly discourses have revolved mainly around resource-use and environmental scarcity within the intellectual tradition of neo-Malthusianism (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Hussein, Sumberg & Seddon, 1999; Moritz, 2010; Percival & Homer-Dixon, 1998). However, the reductionist character of this analytic perspective has posed serious theoretical and methodological problems in certain formations where the conflict has become a regional contagion.

The RSCT is a relatively new approach in international relations. It was originally introduced by Barry Buzan in 1983 in his work: *People, States and Fear* but later presented as a grand systematic theory in Buzan & Waever (2003). Other studies that have contributed to the advancement of the theory include Buzan (1991), Buzan (1998), Buzan (2008), Buzan, Waever & Wilde (1998), Nnoli (2006), Wolfers (1962), among others.

RSCT was developed to reflect the complex nature of international security in post-Cold War era. It questions the primacy of the military elements alone in the conceptualisation of security. According to Buzan, et al. (1998), this questioning has come from diverse sources rarely coordinated with each other. Some have come from the policy side, representing organisations (including the state) trying either to achieve recognition of their concerns or adapt themselves to circumstances. Other questions have come from the academia: peace research, feminist scholarships, international political economy, and security and strategic studies. RSCT balances the realist and the constructivist views of security. The theory maintains that the realist view of security as a derivative of power reduces the complex nature of security to a mere synonym for state power (Buzan, 1991). The realist scholarship, which has dominated the international system, evolved from the Westphalia state system after 1648. This view is mostly relevant during the World Wars where states were in constant struggle for power. In the post-Cold War era, however, the concept of security became much more multifaceted and complex (Buzan, 2008; Buzan & Waever, 2003; Nnoli, 2006; Nwangwu & Ononogbu, 2014; Stone, 2009; and Wolfers, 1962). Thus, RSCT is a counterpoise to the overwhelming influence and dominance of the orthodox state-centric conceptualisation of security (Nwangwu, Ononogbu & Okoye, 2016; Ononogbu & Nwangwu, 2018). It surveys the debate between the traditional and dynamic approaches to security studies, with emphasis on people-centred security, also known as human security (Ugwueze, 2017). It therefore follows that the theory emphasises human empowerment, promotion of the entire gamut of human rights (including economic, social and cultural rights), equal opportunities, and good governance.

The complex nature of security stems from looking at various sectors of the security architecture so as to identify specific types of interaction that guarantee effectiveness in security management. According to Nnoli (2006:17), “security demands military power sufficient to dissuade or defeat an attack; but so many non-military elements are required to generate effective military power that a concern for security can never be restricted solely to the final military end product”. In this view, the military sector is about relationships of forceful coercion; the political sector is about relationships of authority, governing status and recognition; the economic sector is about relationships of trade, production, and finance; the societal sector is about relationships of collective identity; and the environmental sector is about relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere (Buzan, et al., 1998).

There are three components of essential structure in a security complex analysis. The first is the arrangement of the units and differentiation among them. The second is the

patterns of amity and enmity; and the third is the distribution of power among the principal units. According to Buzan, et al. (1998), major shift in any of these components would normally require a redefinition of the complex. This approach allows one to analyse national, regional, or international security in both static and dynamic terms. RSCT contains elements of neo-realism and globalism, but gives priority to a lower level of analysis (Buzan & Waever, 2003). In this theory, the logic of territoriality continues to operate strongly. However, non-territorial connections are also possible and permissible. RSCT is particularly useful because theory-based scenarios can be established on the basis of the known possible form of, and alternatives to, regional security complexes. This opens the space for theoretical application of regional security complex in line with the following basic assumptions of the theory:

- Security is both a national, regional, and global phenomenon, and it will be very difficult to comprehend the security dynamics of one country without inserting it into a broader context and without grasping the conflicting or cooperative patterns that define the foreign policy of that country with its neighbours. By implication, therefore, the theory assumes that security is a complex phenomenon and must be addressed as such, if solutions are to be found.
- The theory assumes that the best way of approaching security problems is through cooperation and integration of various security architectures, including the civil society.
- It also assumes that approaching security problems holistically entails taking both the traditional military and non-military strategies into consideration. This presupposes that security problems will remain in an environment where only military strategies are prioritised in fighting violent crimes.
- The theory assumes that modern security approach to terrorism goes beyond direct military bombardment of the terrorist and their base to include addressing all the conditions that give rise to terrorism including poverty, poor governance, human rights violations, political exclusion, religious intolerance, and a host of others.
- Finally, the theory assumes that security is no longer the business of the state alone. It therefore follows that where the state is the only institution responsible for managing regional security, insecurity will continue to assume prominence.

The RSCT is significant for the analysis of the nexus between nomadic pastoralism and human security in Nigeria for many reasons. It identifies some basic units of analysis like the state, security agencies, and other critical stakeholders within the security architecture (including the civil society), as well as the treatment of regional security as a complex phenomenon that is not only far-reaching in impact and geography but requires the collaborative participation of different transnational stakeholders. No doubt, the threats of transhumant pastoralism in the country can hardly be addressed conclusively without the organic integration of both military and non-military strategies. This involves the effective integration of forces in managing regional

security concerns as well as cooperation of groups within and beyond territorial boundaries given the contagious nature of the security situation.

ECOWAS Protocols, Nomadic Pastoralism, and Human Security in Nigeria

Nomadic pastoralism is a very important livestock production strategy in West Africa where the practice has spanned several centuries. It is also a veritable source of food security in the region. Transhumant pastoralists have remained an integrating factor in a culturally diffused and disparate region like West Africa. Despite this integrative role and centrality of pastoralism to food security in the region, many African states have favoured the development of crop growing over agro-pastoralism as reflected in their policies/programmes and legal systems (Bennett, 1991; Moritz, Scholte & Kari, 2002). According to Moritz (2006), pastoral usufructs over grazing land have generally not been recognised in state laws as legitimate forms of land use because what are usually described as “vacant and ownerless” lands were considered public lands to be administered by the colonial government during the heyday of colonialism. For instance, the implementation of the *Land Use Act of 1978* in Nigeria allows the state the right to lease land, and also gives indigenes the right to apply and be given a Certificate of Occupancy to claim ownership of their ancestral lands. This places the pastoral Fulani in a difficult position because recurring transhumant movements will inadvertently lead to encroachment on the properties of others. Although the Nigerian government designated some areas as grazing routes, it has not reduced clashes between nomadic pastoralists and peasant farmers in places like Adamawa, Benue, Enugu, Kaduna, Kogi, Nasarawa, Plateau, and Taraba States. It is noteworthy that this bias in favour of crop farmers does not presuppose that states have always supported them in their conflicts with herders. Instead, this predisposition has become a colonial hangover in many West African states. With the exception of Mauritania and Chad (where pastoralists are represented in government), Côte d’Ivoire (where the government has been supportive of pastoralists by creating a livestock development agency), and Niger (where the government created pastoral and agricultural zones by drawing a cultivation limit at latitude 15°10'), state policies have generally been detrimental to pastoral rights over land (Moritz, 2006).

The vast majority of countries in West Africa are experiencing cross-border transhumance either as countries of origin, or as host or transit countries. Depending on the season, two types of routes can be distinguished: (a) the north-south routes (more numerous) which indicate the transhumant movements of the dry season in the starting zones, and (b) the south-north route (less numerous) which materialise during the wet season transhumant movements (FAO/ECOWAS, 2012). As hinted earlier, the prevalence of Boko Haram insurgency and cattle rustling in Lake Chad (see Figure 1) has forced nomadic herders into the savannah belt where high population growth has already heightened pressure on farmland. This has correspondingly increased the frequency of disputes over crop damage, water pollution, and cattle theft.

Figure 1: States with highest incidence of Boko Haram insurgency and cattle rustling in Nigeria



Source: International Crisis Group (2017)

As part of its recognition of the pre-eminent place of livestock production in food security and economic sustainability in West Africa, ECOWAS has created the enabling environment for livestock breeding through the formulation of harmonious regulations on transhumance within the Community. Among others, the *ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol* of 1998, the *ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Goods and Persons in West Africa*, the *Regulations of Transhumance between ECOWAS-Member States* of 2003, the *ECOWAS Strategic Plan for the Development and Transformation of the Livestock Sector*, and the 2005 *ECOWAS Agricultural Policy* (ECOWAP), have been ratified by the member-states of the Community. According to Article 3 of the *ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol*, “all animals of the bovine, caprine, cameline, equine plus asinine species shall be allowed free passage across the borders of all member-states, under the conditions set out in this Decision” (ECOWAS, 1998:4). Article 5 of the Protocol further states that “all transhumance livestock shall be allowed free passage across points of entry into and departure from each country on the condition that they have the ECOWAS International Transhumance Certificate”.²¹ Similarly, the *ECOWAS Strategic Plan for the Development and Transformation of the Livestock Sector in West Africa* also harps on the creation of a favourable environment for the development of the livestock sector. This includes the


⁷⁷The certificate is issued by the livestock department through the local administrative authorities in the country of origin. The certificate contains details on the composition of the herd, the vaccinations given, the itinerary of the herds, the border posts to be crossed, and the final destination. The aim of the certificate is to enable authorities to monitor the herds before they leave the country of origin; to protect the health of local herds; and to make it possible to inform the host communities of the arrival of transhumance animals.

promotion of intra-regional trade in animal products, provision of security, and facilitation of trans-border movement of livestock.

The foregoing provisions of *ECOWAS Transhumance Protocols* notwithstanding, the complexity of pastoralism in West Africa is such that nomadic pastoralists have leveraged the general ineffective enforcement of these protocols to perpetrate acts of criminality in the sub-region. The transnational and regional character of this conflict, and indeed, the spatial and geographical spread of the Fulani ethnic stock who have predominated herding business in the region, have further exacerbated the situation. Commonly found across many West and Central African states, the spread of the Fulani presupposes that any major confrontation between them and other groups could have regional repercussions, drawing in fighters from adjoining states. Thus, the protracted attacks often launched by armed herdsmen on various communities have endangered human security in the sub-region. The attacks, which often assume a scorched earth approach, have engendered an unprecedented humanitarian crisis; thereby making the area a leading storehouse of one of the worst humanitarian conditions in Africa. The increase in frequency, intensity and geographical spread of the attacks, often with illicit firearms,²² has exacerbated existing humanitarian and economic conditions in West Africa. An estimated 10,000 pastoralists-related deaths have been recorded since 2005 in different farming communities within the sub-region. While West African states of Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal have had their fair share of the onslaughts, Nigeria has remained the hotbed of the attacks. According to the Global Terrorism Index (2017), between 2010 and 2016, Fulani extremists were responsible for 466 terrorist attacks and 3,068 fatalities in four countries, with 92% of fatalities taking place in Nigeria (see Figure 2).

⁷⁸Most of these arms are either produced locally or smuggled in from other countries, especially Mali and Libya, because of porosity of borders and complicity of state security forces.

Figure 2: Total incidents and fatalities from Fulani extremists in four countries



Source: Global Terrorism Index (2017).

Most regional bodies established to tackle insecurity in West Africa, as well as treaties and/or memorandum of understandings signed by ECOWAS countries, have adopted or emphasised the strategy of regional trans-border cooperation. As argued by Ifesinachi & Nwangwu (2015), the transnational character of most security challenges has made trans-border cooperation a necessity for the mitigation of such criminal activities the world over. However, the political will by ECOWAS member-states and other adjoining countries to commit to effective regional trans-border cooperation is poor. This has exacerbated the vulnerability of the countries concerned. Thus, Adibe, Nwangwu, Ezirim & Egonu (2018) posit that this non-committal stance of some member-states can be attributed to the imbalance in the effect of insecurity on their various domestic economies. The capacity of the regional bodies to effectively coordinate strategies aimed at promoting human security is severely undermined. While insecurity in West Africa affects economic activities and development in the short term, no country in the region is completely immune from the long-term effects of undermining the national security of their respective states. While various regional protocols and bodies that emphasise free movement of persons and goods as well as commitment to trans-border cooperation have been signed and formed in the region, lack of cooperation and the absence of serious involvement by the member-states of regional institutions, especially ECOWAS, have made peace and security too difficult to achieve.

The longstanding clashes between herders and farmers in Nigeria have increased exponentially since 2015. The lethality and scale of the offensives by armed herders accounted for the ranking of Fulani militant herdsman as the fourth most dangerous terror group in the world, after Boko Haram, ISIS, and al-Shabaab (Global Terrorism Index, 2015). Report by the International Crisis Group (2017) suggests that fatalities

reached an annual average of more than 2,000 between 2011 and 2016, often exceeding the toll from Boko Haram insurgency. By the same token, Assessment Capacities Project (2017) reports that about 2,500 persons were killed nationwide in 2016 in various coordinated attacks on farming communities by armed herdsmen. It also notes that tens of thousands have been forcibly displaced, with property, crops and livestock worth billions of naira destroyed, at great cost to local and state economies. These attacks are very pronounced in about 22 states of the federation drawn mainly from Southern Nigeria and the Middle Belt.²³ Figure 3 shows the states in the Middle Belt that are most adversely affected by these attacks. Particularly in 2016, no fewer than 800 people were killed in Southern Kaduna, and 1,269 in Benue State, where at least 14 of the 23 Local Government Areas (LGAs), including Agatu LGA, were invaded (Egbejule, 2017).

Figure 3: States in the Middle Belt with high incidence of herder-farmer casualties



Source: International Crisis Group (2017)

The offensives by these militant pastoralists are characterised by large-scale destruction of farmlands and property, rape, robbery, abduction, and internal population displacement of peasant farmers. As reported by Soriwei, Adetayo & Egwu (2016), the pastoralists are often found with pump action gun, cartridge dane guns, cartridge ammo, cutlasses, jack knives, sticks, torch lights, certificate of occupancy, assorted charms, and hard drugs. Although herdsmen argue that they carry weapons to defend themselves and their herds against heavily armed rustlers and other criminal gangs in farming communities (International Crisis Group, 2017), the increasing prevalence of unlicensed weapons has amplified the threats to human security. One of the landmark attacks by the militant herdsmen took place on 21 September 2015, with the kidnapping of Chief Olu Falae, former Minister of Finance and a chieftain of

⁷⁹ Middle Belt region of Nigeria mainly comprises Adamawa, Bauchi, Benue, Borno, Gombe, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau, Southern Kaduna, Taraba and Yobe States as well as the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. According to Harnischfeger as cited in Umoh (2017), this region is indeterminate because the presence of numerous minority groups gives it a heterogeneous multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-linguistic colouration that warrants clear distinction between it and the principally Islamic North.

Afenifere (a pan-Yoruba socio-cultural organisation) by seven herdsmen from his farmland in Ondo State. Other major incidents perpetrated by armed pastoralists include: the February 2016 attack on 10 villages in Agatu LGA of Benue State; the Ukpabi Nimbo Massacre in Enugu State on 25 April 2016; the August 2017 gang-raping of a 72-year old grandmother, Victoria Akinseye, on her farm in Ore, Odigbo LGA of Ondo State; attacks in the Numan District of Adamawa State on 20 November 2017; 1 January 2018 New Year killings in Benue State; killings in Lau LGA of Taraba State on 5 January 2018; and attacks of 24 June 2018 on no fewer than 11 villages in Plateau State.

The economic toll of the protracted attacks has been very overwhelming. According to Mercy Corps (2015), Nigeria was losing US\$13.7 billion in revenue annually because of herder-farmer conflicts in Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, and Plateau States. The study found that the average annual loss in internally generated revenue of these states stands at 47%. Corroborating the above report, the Federal Government states that Nigeria loses about US\$14 billion annually to the herders-farmers conflict in the country (Adeyemo, 2018). In March 2017, Governor Samuel Ortom of Benue State asserted that attacks by herdsmen coming from more northerly states as well as other adjoining countries like Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, had cost his state about US\$634 million between 2012 and 2014 (Agabi, 2017; Uja & Ehikioya, 2017). The loss of large cattle herds and crops (due to population displacements and damage to irrigation facilities), as well as increase in transport and labour costs in post-conflict environments, tend to increase poverty and undermine food security in the country.

Beyond the State: Towards a Collective Action against Herders-Farmers Crisis in Nigeria

Although herders-farmers crisis in Nigeria has been an age-long problem, the responses from relevant federal authorities have been uncoordinated and tokenistic. Under the administration of former President Goodluck Jonathan, the Federal Government inaugurated an Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee on Grazing Reserves, with the mandate of ending the conflicts. Concurrently, the government set up a Committee on Grazing Reserves which recommended ranch construction and the recovery and improvement of all grazing routes encroached upon by farmers. However, the defeat of Goodluck Jonathan in the 2015 Presidential Election interrupted their implementation.

Since May 2015 when President Muhammadu Buhari's government was inaugurated, attacks by armed herdsmen have become more frequent, coordinated and sophisticated, and comparable only to the conflicts in Western Sudanese region of Darfur in which the Sudanese government-supported Janjaweed militia murder, rape, mutilate, plunder, and displace local populations. Beyond intermittent words of condemnation, the government has failed to formulate effective strategies to address the attendant dangers of nomadic pastoralism in the country. Soon after assuming office in 2015, President Buhari directed the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development to formulate a comprehensive livestock development plan, including

measures to curb farmer-herder clashes. In August 2015, the ministry recommended short-, medium- and long-term strategies, including the development of grazing reserves and stock routes (International Crisis Group, 2017). On 25 January 2016, the president announced his government's intention to present a plan to the Nigerian Governors Forum to map grazing areas in all states as a temporary solution for cattle owners until they could be persuaded to embrace ranching (*Premium Times*, 2016). No doubt, persuading herdsman to embrace ranching is an undisguised avowal that the president has a soft spot for the nomadic pastoralists. Little wonder most states in the Middle Belt and Southern Nigeria vehemently opposed the plan because of its bias in favour of Fulani herders.

The federally-controlled Nigeria Police Force, the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps, and the Nigerian Armed Forces, are thinly deployed in rural areas and often lack early-warning mechanisms. Even when community and civil society groups get involved, the response to distress calls is often late. The more typical response has been to deploy the police, and sometimes the army, after clashes had taken place. For instance, President Buhari ordered the Inspector General of Police, Ibrahim Idris,²⁴ to relocate to Benue State following the gruesome New Year Day attacks and killings of 73 persons in Logo and Guma LGAs of Benue State by armed herdsman (Channels Television, 2018; Gesinde, 2018). By the same token, the military reluctantly deployed its still-birth special force code-named *Exercise Ayem A Kpatuma (Operation Cat Race)* in February 2018 in affected communities in the Middle Belt who had already resorted to self-protection and the formation of ethnic militia (Ojewale & Appiah-Nyamekye, 2018). Unlike other sectarian uprisings and movements like Boko Haram insurgency, Islamic Movement of Nigeria, and the Indigenous People of Biafra, Nigerian government's responses to coordinated attacks by armed herdsman have been lacklustre and uninspiring. Accordingly, President Buhari is often accused of deliberately failing to stop herder aggression because of his pastoral Fulani background and his position as the life patron of MACBAN (Igata, 2016). While the incidents of attack in other West African social formations are not totally dissimilar from Nigeria's situation, they have been largely proactive by strengthening their relevant security and early-warning apparatuses to confront the clashes between these two groups of land users. A typical case in point is Ghana under President Nana Akufo-Addo. Although largely based on ad-hoc security arrangement, the deployment and reinforcement of *Operation Cow Leg*²⁵ has significantly addressed the 'pastoralist question' in the Asante Akyem North District of Ashanti Region by reducing the frequency/lethality of attacks by armed herdsman.

⁸¹An order the IGP flagrantly disregarded. This was acknowledged by no lesser a personality than President Buhari himself during a belated visit to the herdsman-ravaged Benue State on 12 March 2018.

⁸²The operation is part of government's attempt to implement the 2012 Kumasi High court order for the eviction herdsman in the Ashanti Region. A full operation was launched after that order in 2012 to drive the animals from nine villages mentioned in the court order. They were moved to an area beyond the villages to an area on the Afram plains border between the Ashanti and Eastern region called Asomasu.

Beyond the responses by relevant state authorities, the transnational character of the clashes between these land users has attracted varied responses from relevant civil society organisations. For instance, ethnic- and community-based groups defending farmers' interests typically have organised press conferences and protests, seeking to draw global attention to their plight. Thus, the Movement Against Fulani Occupation (MAFO) has instituted legal actions at the ECOWAS Court in Abuja, demanding a compensation of US\$1.6 billion from the federal government because of its failure to protect its citizens (International Crisis Group, 2017). Others, such as Afenifere, have set up arrangements to monitor both herders and cattle thieves (Dada, 2017; Makinde & Dada, 2017). Conversely, livestock producers' groups and pastoralists' organisations vigorously defend herders' interests and are of the view that media reports of incidents are often lopsided and politically motivated (Kayode-Adedeji, 2016; Leme, 2017). Pastoralists' umbrella groups such as the Confederation of Traditional Herder Organisations in Africa (CORET), MACBAN, and Miyetti Allah Kautal Hore, also tend to downplay herders' involvement in the violence.

Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and international development partners have been more conciliatory and constructive in their response to the clashes between these land users. The leading ones among these partners and NGOs are the British Council, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the German Embassy, Nigeria Reconciliation and Stability Project (NRSP), Interfaith Mediation Centre (IMC), Mercy Corps, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and so on. They have focused on post-conflict reconciliation and peace building, improving early-warning, and strengthening relations between communities and security agencies. Some of these bodies have encouraged herders-farmers dialogues through various local initiatives. In June 2016, for instance, the British Council-sponsored NRSP supported the Bayelsa State Peace and Conflict Management Alliance in organising a dialogue between farmers and herders (Odiegwu, 2016; Punch, 18 June 2016). Similarly, on 27 April 2017, the USAID sponsored and hosted a conference on herder-farmer dialogue, involving the All Farmers Association of Nigeria (AFAN), MACBAN, the IMC, Mercy Corps, and Research for Common Ground (Ujah, 2017; US Embassy and Consulate in Nigeria, 2017). The conference, among others, recommended that the Government of Nigeria should curb illegal weapons, modernise agricultural practices, enforce demarcation of farmland and grazing reserves, utilise new technology to reduce cattle rustling, improve systems of conflict resolution, and above all implement new policies acceptable to both groups.

Concluding Remarks

This paper investigated the link between nomadic pastoralism and human security in Nigeria. It argued that the nomadic pastoral crisis in the country is mainly propelled by the imperatives of transnational cum regional socio-cultural and economic integration in West Africa. This argument differs from existing explanations of the conflict in academic literature which hold that climate change, population growth, and insecurity are implicated in the origin and escalation of the conflict. Overall, the increase in the spate of these attacks and the scale of human and material casualties

underscore the urgency of coming to a better understanding of how they escalate and combine with religious, ethnic, and political conflicts to undermine human security in the country and beyond. Relying on Buzan and Waever's RSCT, the study found that the dangers of nomadic pastoralism in Nigeria have festered because of a prevailing climate of weak state-centric enforcement of relevant provisions of ECOWAS conventions. The state authorities enforce these protocols without recourse to the complexity of the crisis which is often muddled in ethnicity, religion, and politics.

In the light of the foregoing, this study puts forward the following recommendations for policy formulation and implementation:

1. The complexity of transhumant pastoral crisis in Nigeria should be tackled from a holistic and multi-sectoral standpoint. In other words, the transnational character of this conflict presupposes that a regional approach be adopted towards redressing the menace. Relevant regional platforms such as the ECOWAS, Lake Chad Basin Authority, and the Mano River Union should synergise and step up action in the interest of regional security. This is because the promotion of human security should not be left to national governments alone, especially following revelations that foreign herders were involved in some of the attacks on farming communities in Nigeria.
2. As a corollary, the Nigerian government should engage the governments of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, as well as the ECOWAS Commission, to strengthen existing relations and to agree on how to collectively monitor and regulate international transhumant pastoralism, in accordance with relevant conventions, including ECOWAS protocols.
3. The member-states of ECOWAS should work together, taking immediate steps to shore up security for both peasant farmers and herders, strengthening conflict-resolution mechanisms, and initiating longer-term efforts to reform livestock management practices, address negative environmental trends, and curb trans-border movements of both cattle rustlers and armed herders.
4. The movement for promoting human security should not be limited to government-based organisations alone as it requires the collective and interlocking participation of the civil society. Hence, the civil society should increase public enlightenment, peace building initiatives, early-warning mechanisms, and remain a virile watchdog of human security.

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CHAPTER TEN

Terrorism and Migration Dynamics in Africa: Focus on Nigeria

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Introduction

Terrorism has turned into a cancer that is eating-up development in many African States. From Nigeria to Niger, Chad and Cameroon, the Boko Haram sect is forcing people out of their ancestral houses. In Somalia and Mali, Al Shabab and Tuareg insurgents took over the machinery of the state at different times and caused massive labour mobility as well as threat to their national economy. Libya has also received the negative touch of terrorism as the citizens continue to risk their lives, as some die, trying to escape the horrible dominance of al-Qaeda-related groups, in the affairs of the state. The collapse of the Libyan government in 2011 led to massive spread of small arms and light weapons across the Sahel, which threatens the security of lives and properties thereby intensifying the migrant quest for self-protection. At a time, the movement of vessels through the Gulf of Guinea was crippled by the activities of sea pirates who are closely aligned with terrorist groups in the Horn of Africa. Many of the terrorist groups that are ravaging Africa have very strong religious foundations. They attack individuals, groups, as well as the machinery of state, under the guise of preserving and spreading the doctrine of their religious faith (Berman, 2011).

Nacos (2003:1) maintains that “terrorists commit lethal acts of violence in order to realize their goals and advance their causes”. When they attack a given environment, they force people to migrate. Paradoxically, migrants can be terrorists and terrorists can be migrants. The role of migrants in terror attacks within France in 2015 cannot be over-emphasized. Similarly, jihad fighters from Niger, Cameroon and Chad easily penetrated Nigeria’s porous borders and ensured that the political economy of North-eastern Nigeria was heavily threatened. The armies of fighters that are found amongst the Islamic State as well as Libya and Somalia are often populated by migrants popularly referred to as foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs).

Nigeria also has had its own share of foreign terrorist fighters penetrating the country from Chad, Cameroon and Niger (Ani, 2013). This study focuses on the dynamics of terrorism in Nigeria and its implications on the patterns of migration across the country. Nigeria is central in this study sequel to the fact that the 2017 Global Terrorism Index has Nigeria as third most endemic terror state in the world as the most populous black nation is behind Afghanistan (second) and Iraq (first).

Methodology

This study is a qualitative investigation into the dynamics of terrorism in Nigeria. It made use of random sampling of opinions across the different regions of Nigeria on the things that constitute terrorism as well as how they have influenced the peoples' patterns of migration culture of migration. A sample size of ten persons, who lived or migrated out of terror-endemic states, was got from each of the six geo-political zones. Many adult men and women were interrogated. One of the two researchers lived in Maiduguri between 2006-2013, which gave the researcher a firsthand opportunity to gather original information through five focus groups of six to ten persons conducted in Custom Area, New Jerusalem, University of Maiduguri, Brigadier Maimalari Barracks of Borno State, and Jimeta of Adamawa State. The researcher also observed directly from the theatre of terror how the Boko Haram sect activities led to mass migration out of the North-eastern states. The evidence collected from the field was integrated and analyzed using historical method of trend analysis.

Theoretical Framework

The study is anchored on the New War theory. Kaldor (2013) posits that new wars are those wars that evolved with globalization. The 'new war' theory finds its origin in the context of global trends since 1980s and 1990s. The class of wars depicted in the theory are those that are spread through the new media and other forces of globalization. While the 'old wars' defined enemies in defined locations, the protagonists of the 'new war' are often diffused into civilian population (like terrorists), thereby making it difficult for precise counter-operation to be carried out against them. The new wars are fought by network of state and non-state actors like terrorists, warlords and jihadists. It is a form of war that is fought to promote ethno-religious and other identities. In the old wars, battles were decisive confrontations, but in the new wars, strategic advantages are gained through population control. The old wars were often financed by state, and derived largely through taxation, but the new wars are driven by the informal economy through hostage taking, ransom, informal sale of mineral resources, drug businesses, and smuggling (Kaldor, 2013).

Malantowicz (2013) maintains that new wars create the crisis and need for regional and international assistance in the form of military forces that are assigned to help in the fight against insurgency. Hall, Melander and Oberg (2016) posit that the 'new wars' go with different methods of financing battles, innovations, technologies, as well as philosophies; and declining state are often weak in managing these, thereby intensifying the ferocity of their impacts. In the 'new wars', jihadists in many cases target non-combatants with the aim of increasing murder and population dispersal (Hall, Melander & Oberg, 2016). There is no gainsaying that all the terrorist groups that have operated in Nigeria target non-combatant civilian population more than they do security institutions.

Consequently, the socio-political, economic and security dynamics of Boko Haram and Niger Delta militant activities, as well as the Fulani herdsmen, can be explained based

on the new war strategies. In their earliest phases, they easily formed alliances with other terror groups across the globe and gradually began to threaten the internal sovereignty of the Nigerian State. In Borno, for instance, the Boko Haram established a 'sovereign enclave'; and in parts of Niger Delta, the militants used advanced technological tools to unleash mayhem and ensured that access to oil became limited. Slowly, the activities of the Boko Haram sect was spread to other neighbouring countries (Chad, Cameroon and Niger) using all tools of globalization and identity politics, thereby leading to the rise of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) to tackle the sect. While the United States donated \$5 million to the MJTF, Nigeria donated \$21 million to MJTF (Uloho, 2017:46). The formation of the MJTF resulted in the recruitment of soldiers from different countries, especially Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon, who migrated to their border zones in order to check the excesses of the sect. The war against the Boko Haram sect and the Niger Delta militants remains difficult to be conquered because they are faceless and do not occupy a specific location, in line with the new war strategies; thus making it difficult for the security agencies to confront them in a face to face battle. It is the guerrilla strategies in the 'new war', as well as the global alliances from other terror sects like them, that make them 'near invisible'; thereby making the counter-terror operation difficult to be won by military forces.

Conceptualizing Terrorism

Hoffman (1999) noted that the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation defined terrorism as the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or properties aimed to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political and social objectives. The British law states that "terrorism is the use of violence for political ends and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear" (Schmid, 1992:9). The Nigerian *Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011* has it in Part 1, Section 2 (c) that 'act of terrorism' involves as the cases may be - (i) an attack upon a person's life, which may cause serious bodily harm or death, and (ii) kidnapping of a person. Part 1, Section 11, sub-section 1, presented a person taking hostage as one who knowingly (a) seizes, detains or attempts to seize or detain; or (b) threatens to kill, injure or continue to detain another person in order to compel a third party to do, abstain from doing, any act or gives an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage.

Based on the multi-dimensional definition of terrorism, this paper conceptualizes terrorism as a planned and systematic manipulation of violence, fear, threat and force in order to intimidate, extort, demand and induce psychological trauma on victims, civilians, non-combatant groups or third parties, as a means of attaining political, economic, social and/ or criminal goals of an individual or group.

Lacqueur (1996) has argued that there has been a radical transformation, if not a revolution in the character of terrorism. The new terrorist represents a very different and potentially far more lethal threat than the familiar traditional terrorist groups

(Hoffman, 1998). While a number of scholars present terrorists as men and women that are irrational in their decision (Livingston, 1978), the reality is that terrorists are radicalized to rationally manipulate fear and violence in order to achieve certain goals that are set out by the protagonists of the terror onslaught.

The Nexus between Terrorism and Migration

Mckeever and Fink (2017) opine that mobility is at the heart of current debates on terrorism. The place of xenophobia, migration control, and activities of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), have made the debate more intense in both national politics of nations and international relations amongst states. Terrorism induces both regular and irregular migration. Schmid (2016:5) maintains that “the interface between terrorism and migration is a rich field for research that deserves all the attention it can get so that well and ill-founded concerns can be separated and policies can be built on solid evidence”. The conditions of armed conflict, militia attacks, wars and *jihād* activities of Islamic State, which adopt terrorist strategies, drive migration. Again, radicalization and exportation of those radicalized to special targets have peculiar migration implications. When men and women live in dominantly terror settings, they are either influenced by terror activities or forced to migrate.

When terrorist groups like Boko Haram or Al Shabab launch their attacks, they force large members of the population to migrate willingly or unwillingly. The concept of *hijra* (migration to prepare and launch an Islamic attack) has been central in the process of migration to terror cells by Islamic fundamentalists. For instance, the Boko Haram sect did not just gather its members into their acclaimed sovereign enclave in the railway quarters, Maiduguri, but abducted thousands of Nigerian citizens that they forced to convert to their brand of Islam. Such abductions to terror cells were also suffered by hundreds of Chibok and Dapchi school girls that were taken to unknown terror enclaves where they were progressively radicalized. The recruited and radicalized members of the sect were brainwashed in the terror cells to attack the infidels (unbelievers) and ensure that the large population of the masses are forced into the Islamist brand of religious terrorism and tenets.

The activities of Boko Haram have caused internal migration of thousands of people to refugee camps. These internally displaced persons are generally found across terror-endemic parts of Nigeria, Kenya, Somalia and Central African Republic. Countries like Libya, Somalia and Nigeria have witnessed the growing push of thousands of their population into neighbouring states, where they are to live under inhuman conditions and settlements due to the activities of terrorists. When there is wartime terrorism as found in contemporary Libya or during the Nigerian Civil War, the state or actors in the war like warlords or jihadists in Libya use the manipulation of excessive force to unleash terror on the population, thereby forcing them to migrate.

It should be noted that while terrorism drives internal migration and leads to both internally displaced persons and refugees across the borders of a state, counter-terror

operations drive more members of the population of a society to migrate. This is because in many cases of counter-terror operation, for instance, some of the experiences in Nigeria, the military tends to unleash unlimited level of violence and excessive force on the population, both as a counter-terrorism strategy and as a means of protecting themselves from unexpected attacks of the terrorists. They kill suspects and dehumanize the masses in large proportions causing wide range of civilian migration. That has been the experience in Yobe and Borno States of Nigeria, especially from 2010 to 2014, which led to massive migrations from these states.

Causes of Terrorism and Migration

Some of the causes of terrorism in Nigeria include: illiteracy, poverty, quest for power, negative environmental impacts of activities of multinational oil companies in the Niger Delta, get-rich quick syndrome especially in Igbo land, ravaging herdsmen attacks on Benue communities, and Boko Haram onslaught due to radicalization. Throughout the formative stages of Boko Haram group, the manipulation of illiteracy to win membership was central. The height of that manipulation was the invitation of those who attended formal education to tear their certificates into shreds. The quest for power and how to desperately retain it, also laid the foundation for the formation of the Senator Ali Modu Sherif Super Youth or 'ECOMOG force', which later grew into the monstrous Boko Haram sect. The negative effects of environmental degradation on the Niger Delta area, President Sani Abacha's killing of Ken Saro Wiwa, and the death of thousands of other men and women in the Niger Delta due to the negative effects of resource exploration on their environment, make manipulation of terror, a means to communicate their anger to the Nigerian state. The recent quest by the herdsmen to take over villages across Nigeria, from Benue to Plateau, Enugu to Ebonyi and Delta to the end of Niger Delta as well as some Yoruba states, led to massive communal resistances, which the herdsmen responded to by burning down villages and wiping away church congregations.

The causes of migration in Nigeria include search for improved source of livelihood, desire to safeguard one's life and properties, negative ethnic and religious influences, as well as family and workplace demands. Domestic migration in Nigeria is also driven by political and ethnic violence. During the eve of the 2015 general election, there was widespread migration across the country. The dominant pattern was the movement of Igbo and Southern Christians out of northern states, and the minimal migration of Northerners hitherto settling in the South-eastern city of Aba, Abia State, back to the north.

The pre-civil war years and the 1980's upwards recorded massive migration of Igbo people back to other southern Nigerian States due to the orgy of violent attacks that were often unleashed on them during the recurrent ethno-religious conflicts in Northern Nigeria. Similarly, when kidnappers took over the Eastern city of Aba and their surrounding environment, their activities triggered sustained irregular migrations out of Aba until the wave of kidnapping waned. A fundamental factor that

drives widespread migration is the challenge of terror attacks on civilian settings. From 2009 till date, the continuous cases of suicide bombing in Northern Nigerian States, especially those targeted at densely populated civilian settlements and Christian clusters, have resulted in forced migration due to widespread panic and fear.

Patterns of Terrorism-Induced Migration in Nigeria

Terrorism has remained a strategy for inducing forced migration. During the pre-colonial era in Nigeria, the slave raiders used mass abduction (a terror strategy) to capture and run down different societies in the Bight of Biafra. The slave merchants would even engage in total destruction of weak communities, thereby forcing them into new settlements. Many of the Aro merchants that found their way into many communities/ parts of Igbo land worked directly with the slave raiders to abduct able-bodied men and sale them to the Aro merchants, who then sold the Europeans.

The Nigerian Civil War years of 1967-1970 witnessed the greatest number of mass migration in Nigerian history. The greater percentage of the communities that made up Igboland was on the run from one place to another. They were trying to flee from the horrific killings and terror-styled destruction of lives, properties and communities in the length and breadth of what was known as the Biafran State. The 'eve' of the Nigerian Civil War years was symbolic due to the massive killing of Igbo people across the nooks and crannies of Northern Nigerian states (Ani, 2016). As the orgy of violence continued, those who were able to escape ran down to their ancestral homes in Eastern Nigeria, where the war-driven terror attacks soon began to overtake them, thereby pushing them into another wave of migration as they searched for safer areas.

At the end of the Nigerian Civil War, many multinational companies entered the country and their migrant managers settled in Nigeria to institutionalize resource exploitation with the full support of the Nigerian power elite. The environmental destruction that followed, laid the foundation for the rise of militant groups in the Niger Delta. The militant groups in a bid send their message of resistance to the government and the foreign multinational companies that had overtaken their land, took to hostage-taking as a major strategy of resistance. Many scholars have argued that the use of violence in the Niger Delta was an act of militancy or freedom fighting. Uloho (2017:6), for instance, maintained that "research has however shown that most of their attacks were against the Nigerian State and the international community because these militants kidnapped and killed both local and foreign workers. The militants also breached international laws through the hijacking of vessels, which belonged to international shipping companies". The activities of the militants as well as the counter-operation by the Nigerian government like the Odi bombardment, soon made both indigenous people and settlers to flee from different parts of the Niger Delta.

Similarly, the numerous cases of hostage-taking in Aba and many Igbo cities, generated a quasi-form of migration. It would be recalled that the Nigerian Terrorism Act captures kidnapping as central in terror activities. From the year 2006 to 2011 when kidnapping was at its peak, many of the cities in Igboland did not know peace as kidnappers turned many forests, farmlands, and uncompleted buildings, into their prisons for as many people as they could hold hostage. Aba and its neighbouring environments were the most notorious centres of abduction. As hostage-taking lasted, the citizens in these areas began to migrate from one unsafe city in Igboland to another, to protect their lives. It took the intervention of a special unit of the Nigerian army to check the wave of kidnapping in Igboland, especially in Aba.

Similarly, the rise of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and their high influence on the politics of restructuring Nigeria also resulted in mass migration. Members of IPOB continued to move in their hundreds of thousands from one city to another to hold rallies in support of the Biafran State. During each rally, they called for a referendum. The Nigerian government baptized the unarmed IPOB group, a terror organization and unleashed Operation Crocodile Dance (*Egwu Eke*) not only on the sect but on the wider population of Igbo people. This meant the use of excessive force and terror strategies to kill many IPOB members, leading to the disappearance of the leader of the group. The results were human rights abuses, spread of fear, and forced migration.

The Fulani herdsmen led terrorism is another 'force' that have led to massive migratory push across many Nigerian communities. Benue State communities were the most affected by the continuous attacks from the herdsmen and mass displacement of people into camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs). Benue State has lost thousands of lives to the horrific killings championed by the Fulani herdsmen. The herdsmen have wiped out communities, killed Catholic Church congregations in their large numbers, which lead to the nationwide demonstrations by both the Catholic Church laity and leadership, where they called for the resignation of President Muhammad Buhari due to the inability of his government to secure lives and properties of Nigerians. In Enugu State, indigenous settlers left their Nibo and Atakwu communities while many of the inhabitants of Nike and Nsukka communities lived in the fear of herdsmen attacks. In Ebonyi State, the people of Izzi, Isu, and Obeagu in Ishielu Local Government, have continually tried to contain the negative activities of the herdsmen. In Ekiti State, it was full battle between the hunters (of Ekiti State) and herdsmen. There was also clashes between youths of different Delta State communities and the herdsmen, before the herdsmen could surrender. The Anambra and Ebonyi State governments continually summoned high-powered peace meetings between the state executive council and the leadership of the herdsmen in the state to manage their growing cases of confrontations and conflict-driven migrations. It should be noted that in all these communities where herdsmen and community members confronted each other, townsmen in the bid to save their lives migrated to places they deemed safer.

In North-eastern Nigeria, terrorists migrated from Borno State to other parts of the country in order to unleash attacks on the people. Other foreign jihadi fighters moved into Nigeria in irregular directions to and from Chad to Nigeria, Niger to Nigeria, and Cameroon to Nigeria. Again, the activities of the Boko Haram sect grew through the support of migrants from different parts of Africa, especially the neighbouring states, which made it difficult for the Nigerian security forces to curtail the activities of the sect in its earliest stage. Ani (2013) reveals how many of the arrested members of the Boko Haram sect were found to be of foreign identities. Chad, Cameroon and Niger Republic topped the list of countries where the jihadists came from. On the other hand, there are scholarly evidence that Yusuf, the then leader of the sect, sent his members to Somalia, Afghanistan, etc., to learn bomb-making and other terror strategies, which enhanced their international linkages and influx of foreign jihadists that came to support the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria (Ani, 2013).

According to Schmid (2016) some economic migrants were abducted and forced by terrorists to join their ranks, a practice the Boko Haram sect also used to capture children and women in Northern Nigeria. This process of abduction and forceful integration of economic migrants is another dimension of terrorism in Nigeria today. Many of the young men who travelled to Borno State for genuine economic quests, were abducted in 2009 by the sect into their sovereign enclave in Railway quarters. While a number of them converted and joined the sect, many others who refused their brand of Islamic ideology were killed, and their bodies buried in shallow graves. The quest by terrorists in North-eastern Nigeria to create a sovereign enclave, especially within Borno State, led to mass migration and deployment of security forces from different parts of the country to the region to enforce counter-insurgency.

Implications of Terrorism

Ironically, most terrorist groups prefer to descend heavily on civilian populations as a way to instil fear and drive mass migration. This creates opportunity for the terrorist group to dominate the immediate environment that majority of the civilians left. Schmid (2016) maintains that Boko Haram terrorism has caused the forced migration of as many as 2,600,000 people from their homes.

In many cases, the Boko Haram practice of killing people led to loss of human resources and forceful acceptance of the sect's belief as a way to preserve one's life. For instance, Ani (2014) maintains that the horrendous waste of lives in Baga and Bama of Borno State that was allegedly masterminded by the Boko Haram sect, led to the loss of hundreds of lives (*The Nation*, 2013). In the early hours of Saturday 10th July 2013, gunmen suspected to be members of the *Boko Haram* attacked and killed 29 students and a teacher in Government Secondary School, Mamudo, along Damaturu-Potiskum Highway in Yobe State (Olanrewaju, 2013). On Wednesday, September 18, 2013, the sect attacked Benishiekh, a community located along Maiduguri-Damaturu road, resulting in a death toll of about 150 persons including two soldiers and three police men, as well as destroyed more than 280 houses, 15 trucks, 18 cars and 8

motorcycles (Njadvara, 2013). On the evening of Saturday, 28th September 2013, at Makintafamari village, Kaga Local Government of Borno State, some members of the Boko Haram sect cut the throats of four men returning from Maiduguri.. Similarly, on 29th September, 2013, they beheaded seven travelers in Makintafamari village and placed their lifeless bodies on the main road. Yobe State Governor, Ibrahim Gaidam acknowledged that “on our way from Maiduguri to Damaturu this afternoon, we saw a trailer and bus that were burnt, with the occupant slaughtered and their corpses littering the highway” (Duku, 2013: 5).

The Boko Haram sect have, in several cases, focused their senseless attacks on journalists in the bid to stop their investigation into the negative dynamics of their terror activities. The killing of Zakaria Isa of NTA and 31 year old Eneche Akogwu, a reporter with Channels television who travelled from Lagos to Kano to cover/ record the multiple bombings of Kano by Boko Haram sect, generated widespread reactions in the Nigerian media circles in 2017.

The Police High Command revealed that 602 police officers were killed by dare devil armed robbers and Boko Haram members in the last five months of 2011. The police recorded 156 deaths in May 2011, 143 officers in June, 122 in August, 119 in September, and 62 in November of the same 2011 (Ganagana, 2011).

One aspect of the migration implication of Boko Haram activities that is often neglected is the declaration of state of emergency as well as the dusk to dawn curfew. The years 2009, 2013 and 2014, witnessed a number of declarations of state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, and Adamawa States in Nigeria, which negatively hampered the movement of persons, goods and services in and out of the region. While some of the declarations of state of emergency lasted for weeks and months, the dusk to dawn curfew impacted negatively on the productivity and business life of those trade that were dominantly carried out in the night within the affected states.

The population of internally displaced persons (IDAPs) due to Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen attacks remains progressive in both the North-eastern part of Nigeria and Middle East. Uloho (2017) revealed that Nigeria has recorded one of the highest numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) as over 5 million people were displaced as a result of Boko Haram activities. What is more disturbing is not just the reality that the citizens have become IDPs but that the Boko Haram sect still penetrates the IDPs, radicalize people there-in, and use them to unleash unimaginable harms on the inhabitants of the camps. On 9th February, 2016, two female suicide bombers killed 58 and wounded 78 others in the Dikwa refugee camp that had over 53,000 people (Schmid, 2016). It was even stated that the camp would have received more casualties if not for the sudden change of mind by the third suicide bomber, who maintained that if she had detonated her bomb, her parents that she loved so much, who were in the camp would have died (Schmid, 2016).

Furthermore, high levels of terrorism are associated to low levels of gross domestic products (GDP) or negative growth rates. In many cases as found in North-eastern Nigeria, terrorism has led to the forceful overtaking of businesses of settlers or small scale enterprises of economic migrants in different parts of Borno and Yobe states. Many of the original owners of those businesses either abandoned them to flee for their lives or were killed by the Boko Haram sect. Thus, the fear of forceful abduction and conversion of economic migrants into the Boko Haram sect in North-eastern part of Nigeria were factors that helped in pushing many Christian and liberal Muslim businessmen and women away from Borno and Yobe states. The implication was the heavy blow on the economic sector of the affected state.

One of the negative impacts of terrorism on migration in Nigeria is that it is threatening inter-group integration and hospitality. In many parts of Southern Nigeria, there is high level group suspicion against bands of Muslim migrants from Northern Nigeria. The suspicion is driven by the fear that some terror apologists could be found amongst them. The implication is that the people's culture of hospitality remains threatened. Furthermore, it hunts the fundamental human rights of bona fide migrants and denies many Southern Nigerian cities the positive contributions of genuine liberal Muslims to nation building process.

Holidays and tourism have also been affected by terrorism. For instance, a dark cloud of mourning enveloped the Ezihe-Umueze kindred in Uga community, Aguata Local Government Area of Anambra State, following the killing of three children of their kinsmen, Mr. Nnamdi Ezebuala. Ezebuala and his children (Chinemerem, a 14 year old boy, and his younger sisters - Chiamaka, 12 and Nmesomachukwu, 10), were going home after attending a worship service at the Christ Salvation Pentecostal Church, when several bombs, believed to be improvised explosive devices planted by suspected members of the Boko Haram sect, exploded simultaneously at various points on two busy roads in the Sabongari areas of Kano City. When the smoke cleared, 39 people laid dead and many others sustained various degrees of injury, ranging from burns to extensive lacerations. One of those who died was on a holiday trip to Kano (Uzor, 2013:12).

The list of the implications of terrorism on Nigeria's nation building generally, and migration in particular, cannot be exhausted. There is need for policy frameworks and strategic approaches that would lead to sustainable management of terrorism-related attacks and the negative implications it is having on Nigeria's gross domestic product.

Policy Framework/ Recommendations

- There is need for the sustenance of civilian-security counter-terror activities through improved access to registered arms by civilians. This is very necessary because the civilians in many of the North-eastern Nigerian communities know their brothers and could easily identify those been progressively radicalized in behaviour. Consequently, the state government through the traditional rulers'

council as well as alliance with the Divisional Police Posts, should ensure that all arms given to such individuals are registered and accounted for.

- Liberal Fulani settlers in every state should form alliance with community leaders to promote sustainable peace and counter Fulani herdsmen terrorism. This is very necessary as a way of managing terror stereotypes on all Fulani people. It will also create inter-group proactive surveillance against the activities of herdsmen terrorism.
- The Federal Government of Nigeria should empower NGOs/ CBOs to monitor the development of the Niger Delta area. The Niger Delta area remains the environmental source of Nigerian national oil wealth. Unfortunately, many of the state and federal government developmental initiatives towards the transformation of the Niger Delta suffer from poor implementation. Consequently, the NGOs and CBOs would ensure that implementation leakages are revealed and reported to appropriate authorities.
- There is need to transform counter-terror management strategies in Nigeria by increasing civil-security intelligence gathering and sharing strategies.
- There is need for government to fund small- and medium-scale enterprises in terror affected cities. This is necessary to help those interested in such enterprises to raise some money to return to their businesses. It will involve the commitment of Federal, State, and Local Governments to identify previously vibrant business outfits and hubs in these areas, and provide funds to revive them.

Conclusion

This study identified patterns of terrorism in Nigeria from the pre-colonial era of slavery to the post-independence era. It revealed that irrespective of the era during which terrorists carried out their activities, their strategies focused on spreading fear among innocent civilians and causing various forms of migration and displacement of persons. The study therefore recommends the sustenance of civilian-security counter-terror activities through improved access to registered arms by civilians, Fulani settlers' alliance with community leaders as well as the monitoring of government developmental initiatives by NGOs and CBOs.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

Suicide Tendency as an Aftermath of Internal Displacement in Nigeria: The Need for Psychosocial Support and Education

Chika Eze and Rosemary Okoli

Introduction

Despite the growing attention and support offered to internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Nigeria in terms of feeding and shelter, not much effort has been devoted to the psychosocial effects such displacement has on the victim's mental health and wellbeing. A need assessment report conducted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2015) in Yola, Adamawa State of Nigeria, identified the neglect of psychosocial needs as one of the weak points in the assistance offered to IDPs. The report revealed that there is a huge neglect in the areas of attending to the IDPs' mental health needs including resources for meaningful livelihood. In the same vein, a study conducted in Jos by Musa (2014) exploring the experiences of children and adults exposed to violence reported that little or no attention is being given to the emotional concerns of these children and adults who are exposed to violence and internal displacement. What this means is that many of the IDPs, in spite of enjoying the provisions of food and shelter, to a large extent, are left on their own to grapple with the effects such experiences have on their psychosocial and mental health. In this regard, one can easily think of some of the mental health conditions such as helplessness, hopelessness, distress, anxiety, frustration, dejection, etc., that IDPs may encounter. Experiences of helplessness, hopelessness, distress, anxiety, frustration, depression, etc., are linked to post-traumatic syndromes disorder (PTSD) representing risk factors that are known to activate suicide, be it in the form of ideation and/or tendency (Bottoin et al, 2015; Rudd, 1990; WHO, 2018).

In this context, some IDPs may be duly exposed to instances of suicide ideation depending on the leverage of their experience including the availability of social support. And the greater risk is that once suicide tendency is felt, its accomplishment could happen if it is not adequately managed (Owoaji et al, 2016; WHO, 2018). It becomes important that IDPs are afforded professional assistance in the form of psychosocial support and education to enable them wrestle with their experiences of displacement.

The two major concerns of this paper are to (a) explore the daunting experiences internal displacement presents, and (b) highlight the urgent need to provide in-depth psychosocial support and education to all IDPs (including those who live in refugee

camps and/or in uncompleted buildings and shacks, and those who may even co-habit with relations), in order to equip them with the necessary skills for proper adjustment to life. Internal displacement and its attendant problems have severe psychosocial consequences on the victims and their communities. The psychological/emotional wounds may not be as easily discernible as the destruction and loss of their homes and property, but it often takes far longer to recover from emotional impact than to overcome material losses.

Incontestably, the IDPs ought to be helped to manage their experiences, particularly those among them who may be prone to entertain suicide as an option. Therefore, it is the responsibility of each community through services rendered by trained counsellors/social workers, faith-based groups, NGOs and government to equip IDPs with life skills needed to grapple with their experiences more positively. To continue to ignore the urgent need to provide psychosocial education for the IDPs is risky for human progression particularly in view of national and sustainable development.

Conceptual Clarification

Internally Displaced Persons are persons who, in the face of violence or disaster, are forced to flee their homes, but who remain within their country's borders (Adamu and Rasheed, 2016). There are various forms of violence that internally displaced persons may encounter. These range from communal clashes, terrorism, riots, religious conflicts, to natural disasters. Such violence also includes experiences of demolition of houses as happened in Abuja Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja, some years ago. There have been other occurrences of demolitions in several other states in Nigeria: notably in Lagos, Oyo, Osun, Ogun, Ondo, Kwara, etc., (Agbola and Jinadu, 1997). Also, there are some displaced persons whose experiences were due to flood disasters of 2012, which affected Bayelsa, Lagos, Oyo, Kogi, Kwara, Benue states etc. (National Emergency Management Agency, 2012). There are also persons who become internally displaced as a result of tribal conflicts and terrorism. The commonest experiences found in present day Nigeria are those displaced as a result of the frequent Fulani herdsmen clashes with the locals. This paper focuses on those who experienced displacement as a result of religious conflicts cum ethnic clashes that occurred in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria, which spanned between 2001 and 2010 (Iwakdok, 2011). These crises of almost a decade or more have led some persons to flee Jos to different parts of Nigeria seeking ways to subsist the frustration of their displacement.

Suicide Tendency refers to the slightest inclination of one wishing to take his/her life through self-harm such as starving, poisoning, drugging, stabbing, drowning, hanging, etc. The World Health Organisation (WHO, 2018) stated that suicidal behaviour (in this case, tendency or ideation, as this paper would rather prefer) is a public health concern worldwide, affecting high, middle, and low-income countries. In the perspective of this paper, it could also be referred to as suicide ideation representing one's craving thought to end his/her life and yet not taking any active action towards accomplishing the thought. In general, it means thinking and/or planning suicide. There are speculations pointing to the fact that PTSD experiences are one of the major

causes of suicide ideation/tendency (Bottoin et al. 2015; Owoaji et al, 2016; Rudd, 1990; WHO, 2014; 2018).

Psychosocial support/education refers to the process of providing psychological and social support in the form of education and information to those seeking or receiving mental health services (Shah et al, 2014). In this case, those who are grappling with experiences of being internally displaced could serve as examples of persons needing mental health support and services; they qualify to receive psychosocial support/education. Psychosocial support/education as used in this paper involves the range of direct interventions that focus on providing space and support in order to meet the emotional, social, mental, and spiritual needs of IDPs. This includes all forms of counselling offered to them in order to explore their feelings, anxieties, fears, and frustrations, with the aim of helping them to meet their basic needs, teaching them coping skills to enhance their self-worth and confidence, feel worthwhile, valued, loved and secure and able to engage in meaningful relationships with others and family. In particular, family psychosocial support/education model may have to be adopted in order to apply family synergy in dealing with the experiences of being internally displaced. In this way, it is anticipated that the IDPs would not only access family support but also communal affirmation leading them to better positive management of their life situations.

Jos Crises (riots) are clashes between Muslim and Christian ethnic groups in the central Plateau State in/near the city of Jos (Nossiter, 2010). Since 2001, the area has been plagued by violence motivated by multiple factors. The violence is sometimes characterised as religious violence (Geneva Declaration, 2011), although economic differences have also been identified as part of the root causes (Nossiter, 2010; Muhammed, 2010). Long-standing tensions and violence have plagued Jos for over a decade including 2004, 2008, and 2010. The human cost of such violence is immense as thousands of people have lost their lives, farm lands, churches, mosques, markets and homes, which have led them to experiences of internal displacement, loss of lives and livelihoods, relationships and continual struggle to survive. Therefore, there is no doubt that Jos crises survivors have been exposed to huge experiences of PTSD as they struggle to make ends meet (Musa, 2014; Nwoga, Audu, and Obembe, 2016; Tagurum et al, 2015). This paper focuses on exploring the narratives of internally displaced persons in the Jos area and some of the psychosocial/life-coping skills they may require.

Literature Review: Internally Displaced Persons and Suicide Tendency

Although suicide ideation is not an everyday experience, research findings indicate that majority of the internally displaced persons are likely victims based on their experiences of post traumatic symptom disorder (Rudd, 1990; WHO, 2014), which predisposes them to the risk of wishing to terminate their lives. Several commissioned WHO reports also show that people who experience displacement either as migrants, asylum seekers or refugees experience mental health disorders, which are generally

characterized by “a combination of abnormal thoughts, perceptions, emotions, behaviours, and relationships with others” (Priebe, Domenico, and El-Nagib, 2016).

The argument is that there is a relationship between PTSD and suicide tendency whereby feelings of PTSD syndromes such as anger, fear, helplessness, hopelessness, anxiety, stress, depression etc., are antecedents of suicide ideation (Knapp et al, 2014; Musa, 2014). Hence, anyone that experiences PTSD on the average and/or slightly above the average may be prone to consider suicide as a way out if no timely interventions are offered. Consequently, suicide that is not a common daily experience in the face of PTSD would rather become a threat. On this basis, it is imperative that anyone who encounters the challenges of being internally displaced should be offered adequate assistance to enable him/her manage the experiences more positively.

A study carried out by Tagurum et al (2015) among Jos residents some months after the first major ethno-religious riot of 2001 among other things, reported that there is prevalence of PTSD. The findings revealed that two-third of the total population of 204 respondents have experienced crude violence: 36.8% of them have witnessed someone being killed; 16.7% have seen people being stabbed; 20.6% saw people being shot; 31.4% witnessed loss of property, and 26% experienced instances of relocation. The study reported that experiences of PTSD among the respondents reflect 68.1% of shock, 67.6% of living in denial and avoidance of thoughts regarding the crisis, 52.9% expressed feelings of numbness and detachment from the surroundings, and 42.2% were prone to nightmares of various kinds. Analyzing the report of Tagurum et al's study (2015) one cannot but wonder if appropriate assistance has been offered to these respondents to deal with the psychosocial effects these experiences might have on their mental well-being. However, the researchers did not deliberate on what kind of help that was offered the respondents, though they rightly recommended that psychosocial adjustment skills be provided to aid them manage life's situational demands.

Furthermore, a study designed to investigate the prevalence and correlates of posttraumatic stress disorder among 200 medical students in the University of Jos, Nigeria, reported high prevalence rate of PTSD among them. The researchers interpreted that finding to mean that the prevalence of PTSD is an indicator of psychological consequences of the recurring crises on the inhabitants' wellbeing (Nwoga et al, 2016). Although the presence of PTSD does not mean direct indication of suicide tendency, the argument is that PTSD could have direct/indirect link to suicide ideation, and therefore, should not be allowed to linger for long in order not to have its full bloom effect on the victims. Accordingly, counseling and related follow-up services, including trauma healing, are needed for any identified victim of PTSD. Such services make up what this paper has proposed as psychosocial support/education.

In addition, the findings of a research conducted by Getanda, Papadopoulos and Evans (2015), and designed to explore the mental life of internally displaced persons living in Nakuru County of Kenya, reported that IDPs are among the most vulnerable people

in the world today. This is based on the fact that majority of them reflect statements indicating suicidal thoughts, and lack of support - including fear of the future for themselves and their children. Similarly, Siriwardhana et al (2013) in their study analyzing the effects of prolonged internal displacement and common mental disorders in a population of 450 adults aged 18–65 years, selected from 141 settlements in Sri Lanka, reported that the risk of mental disorder is high. In their discussion of the findings, they linked the high prevalence of mental disorder to instances of PTSD that could be associated with suicide ideation among many other mental health issues.

A related study by Mugisha et al (2016) was carried out in Northern Uganda, sampling 2400 youth, and aimed at exploring the prevalence of suicide ideation and attempt. Among other things, the study reported that the prevalence rate of suicide ideation was 12.1%, whilst suicide attempt was 6.2%. Based on these results, the researchers argued that suicide ideation and attempt constitute a major health problem in post-conflict Northern Uganda. The study recommended that effective public health programmes be inaugurated and targeted towards addressing suicidality. Although this study explored post-conflict context not necessarily internal displacement, it provides meaningful insights to issues of conflict and its emerging stress in relation to suicide tendency/ideation.

There is no doubt that IDPs who have experienced various kinds of violence prior to their displacement, need continuous assistance to enable them manage the distresses, from which arises multiple health issues including the tendency to take one's life. The ugly experiences of being internally displaced could produce ripple effects leading some of the victims to contemplate and/or attempt terminating their lives, which in the long-run impacts on meaningful adjustment to life, including national development and sustainability.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical concept underpinning this paper is narrative based on the fact that people's act of sense making emerges from the story they tell of themselves and the world they live in (Riessman, 2008; Kim, 2016). This paper focused on understanding/interpreting the narratives from the three families selected as case studies for this study. The paper explored the narratives they constructed around the world they live in, with particular reference to their experiences of internal displacement and their impacts on their lives. Particular attention was paid to the stories they constructed regarding their post-internal displacement experiences and the meaning they are making out of them. There was also a focus on whether these narratives present instances of suicide tendencies, to ascertain what kind of assistance their families need.

Methodology

This paper employed a qualitative research design in the sense that it presents the subjective experiences of some internally displaced persons, according to their own

point of view. This approach afforded the IDPs involved opportunities to tell their stories and express what meanings they are making out of their experiences of life (Babbie and Mouton, 2005; Bailyn, 2002; Terre Blanche and Durrheim, 2006). The experiences of three persons (two women and a man) from three families provided information used for this study. Although three narratives might be considered small, based on the qualitative nature of the research such a number is permissible since one case study could even suffice (Creswell, 2007; Patton, 2002). The participants were recruited through snowball sampling technique in which case, one known case led to the identification of other cases (Cohen and Arieli, 2011).

Data Collection

The narratives used for data collection for this study emerged from personal interactions with some internally displaced persons who were neither confined in displaced persons' refugee camps, nor housed by a relation and/or friend. These were displaced persons who found solace living in shacks and uncompleted buildings. The initial contact with them was as a result of community service that the authors engaged in around Abuja satellite cities. Data were collected using semi-structured questions, allowing them enough time and space to freely tell their stories. The interviews were conducted at various times and so were not one-off encounters. A lot of emotions were involved and so the participants were allowed as much time and space as they wanted to tell their stories, which gave them and the authors ample time to explore details of the processes of psychosocial support/education as a means of managing their lives.

Data Analysis

Data collected from the interviews were transcribed verbatim and coded for themes, while considering the I-positions that the IDPs employed in narrating their experiences (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Hermans and Hermans-Konopka, 2010). The study employed the participants' I-positions to enable us capture the in-depth meanings the participants were making out of their lived experiences with regard to suicide tendency and/or ideation.

Ethical Considerations

One of the major ethical issues upheld in this paper is confidentiality. This required that the participants' names were strictly withheld. Pseudonym identifications such as 'woman A', 'woman B', and 'the man', were used for the narrators. Secondly, the participants' verbal consents were obtained in order to present their narratives for academic purpose and knowledge creation. Thus, no harm or risk of identification was involved during the period of data collection. Small food parcels, gift items for personal use and small amount of money were given afterwards as incentives in appreciation for their time and participation, including the constant psychosocial education that is aimed at helping bounce back to normal life.

Findings and Discussion

The respondents employed the discourse of loss of livelihood to describe their living conditions. In this regard, they deliberated on the fact that they are vulnerable,

particularly as they are no longer able to feed their children, pay school fees, and provide basic needs like shelter and clothing for themselves and their children. They also explained that they no longer wanted to depend on the members of their families-of-origin nor continue living in the refugee camps. Hence, they have sourced for shelter in the shacks and/or uncompleted buildings.

Reading through the story scripts of these three families, one could pick up instances of hopelessness, helplessness, despair, anger, and frustration, leading them to aspire to end their lives. However, they maintained that one of the factors that has restrained them from terminating their lives was the after effect such trauma would have on their children. They all reported that they frequently entertained the thoughts of terminating their lives in order to end the ugly and 'miserable' experiences of loss and hopelessness. For example, one of the IDPs identified as woman (A) narrated her experiences as follows:

I often sit and wonder why I should be going through what I am going through at the moment. My husband has no job and neither do I. We left Jos when our shop in the market was burnt down. The government promised to compensate all those who were affected and nothing came and as if that was not enough, soon after, in one of those Jos crises the house that we have worked so hard to build was raised to the ground. This means we lost everything we worked for; no house, no shop. Since then we are trying to make ends meet but it seems we keep hitting on the hard surface. Our families have been helpful in sustaining us but we need to regain our financial strength but that seems far-fetched. We had to leave Jos for Abuja for many reasons but our hope to find greener pasture in Abuja is turning sour. We live in an uncompleted building with no electricity and every day we go out trying to find some job to do and it has not yielded much result. At the moment I don't think there is anything to live for. Frequently, I feel I should be dead and gone, why continue this miserable existence. Our two children are out of school; and the question is when/how would this end? Often times what becloud my thought is whether I should not decide if I need to continue to live this life. It is quite easy; take something and go to bed and sleep unto eternity!

This woman was totally fed-up with life. Although people from time to time may exhibit similar experiences of being vulnerable, her storyline captures a risk behaviour of one who has the capacity for self-harm. Her main discourse focused on 'why continue this miserable existence', indicating signs of suicide ideation (Getanda et al, 2015). She thought that she had nothing more to live for; and her narratives depict one who thinks she has lost everything. Therefore, she needs to be helped to find meaning in life in spite of the ugly reality of being homeless, jobless, penniless and unable to provide for her children's needs.

Based on her story, she was a hair stylist whilst her husband was a trader. The Jos crises of 2001 to 2010 have led them to become internally displaced as they lost

everything they had earned. One after the other, in the face of the crises, they lost their trade, which was the main source of livelihood. This was followed by the burning of their house, forcing them to relocate to one of those Abuja satellite cities. This movement from Jos was debasing as they arrived with nothing to start a new settlement. When asked why they did not move to their village, at least there would be free shelter and a little comfort returning to familiar grounds, the woman responded “returning to the village empty-handed was never an option”. She went further to stress that if they had gone to the village in that manner, then, it would have been worse than signing a death sentence, which in itself is another death discourse still pointing to indication of suicide thought. However, she maintained that their families-of-origin have been helpful in assisting them manage their predicament, but they did not want to be completely dependent on the assistance of these relatives. Therefore, the best option they had was to find solace in this uncompleted building where they pay no bills but at least have a shelter over their heads. If one wishes to sum up her narrative’s I-positions, then, the count is multiple including ‘I, as internally displaced due to Jos crises’, ‘I, as not able to return to the village after I lost everything’, ‘I was not able to provide basic needs for my children’, ‘I, as wishing to end this miserable life’, and so on.

Another woman (B) who narrated her plight focused more on her concern for her husband whom she worried might terminate his life as soon as she is out of sight. As a result, she shuttled between engaging in any meaningful and rewarding economic gesture, and watching over her husband. She narrated:

The biggest problem I have at the moment is not the fact that we have nothing including a house to live since we fled from Jos crisis of 2011 but how to manage my husband. He feels so dejected that he sleeps very little if at all, he refuses to eat and appears so unkempt as he goes for days without bathing including doing all those mundane things for himself. And any time we talk about accepting the situation we find ourselves in; he sighs and says that he is just waiting to go back to his creator. And he would add that one day he might have to speed up the process of returning to his ancestors. On several occasions when I have gone out to do some menial jobs in order to put food on the table our children have reported to me that he seats and soliloquies about killing himself in order to end all these problems. In fact, one day our daughter who is 13 years old said that she saw him playing with a rope around his neck, trying to tie himself unto a tree outside the shack where we live. She believes that maybe he did not harm himself because he saw her watching him. So I am really afraid to leave him all by himself these days and yet I need to do the menial jobs in order to ensure that we do not starve ourselves to death, at least for the sake of our children. At the same time I am full of fear what if my husband kills himself, what would I do? I am living with the shock that he might one day kill himself if our situation does not improve yet the possibility of any improvement is so bleak. Our children have been out of school for years,

at the moment they are their own teachers in every sense of it as we their parents are bored to death with the worries of how to make ends meet.

For this woman, the suicide ideation she has is from her husband's response to their predicament. It cannot be ruled out that she shared similar sentiment of self-harm as her husband, but what was so obvious was her husband's suicidal tendency. In her account, their daughter had witnessed the dad play the game of tying himself with rope to a tree, indicating a near attempt to take one's own life. This is worrisome for her to say the least. Of course, it worsens the experiences of being internally displaced, and it is associated with PTSD syndromes of stress, anxiety, and fear (Nwoga et al, 2016; Tagurum et al, 2015). She was battling with multiple dimensions of vulnerability such as, 'I, as internally displaced', 'I, as anxious about the possible reality that my husband may kill himself', 'I, as going out to do menial jobs', 'I, as not able to cater for the needs of my children', etc. These I-positions are daunting. She needs professional assistance in order to arrest the side effects of such experiences on her emotional and mental health. Equally, her husband and young children all need help.

Another disturbing thought is: What sense are the children making out of these experiences? What sense can a 13-year-old girl make of observing the father contemplating suicide? Children who have found themselves in the midst of these helpless situations equally need support to cope and adjust properly to life.

The narrative from the third family contains some signs of disenchantment with life as well as indications of willingness to end one's life in order to stop the distress brought upon them by their loss and displacement. This time the narrative is from a man, a husband, and a father. Here is what he said:

I often sit and wonder what the true meaning of life is; day by day you labour and make progress in life and one fine day you lose all you have acquired from hard work due to some foolish persons' behaviour. I have lived in Jos for over 30 years and in those good days Jos was a very peaceful city to live in. In fact, I went home to marry my wife and I brought her to Jos where we both lived and our marriage was blessed with four children, two boys and two girls. Our dream was to give them the best of education any average Nigerian would afford but today I live with the reality that they can barely finish senior secondary school. Our first son finished SS3 two years ago but no resources to pay for further education; instead of sitting idle at home, that's if what we have is a home in the strict sense of it; we have sent him off to learn electrical. Though there is nothing wrong in learning to become an electrician but that is not our dream for him. I feel so frustrated that I wish I were dead since I cannot fulfil my obligation as a father. What my children would become in the future is a big source of worry for me. I lost everything to Jos crises; I am sojourning here at this village, not even sure from where the next meal will come. Our families have tried to support us as much as they can but what can you make out of the help offered by others when you have not even got a decent

shelter over your head and six mouths to feed eh, not to think of clothing etc. It is like a dead end and whenever I reflect on my situation I always wish I were dead instead of living this way. My pride as a human person is eroding away! Is it not better to be dead instead of a good for nothing, who cannot provide for himself and his dependants?

In narrating his experiences, this man made it clear that he felt so frustrated to the point of wishing that he should be dead rather than alive. With such a feeling, it will be correct to argue that further frustrations would lead him to think more seriously about terminating his own life. He describes his life as ‘a good for nothing’, reflecting the dominant I-position of ‘I, as living a good-for-nothing life’ and ‘I, as losing my human dignity’. Such feelings are risk factors for suicide ideation (Bottoin et al. 2015; Owoaji et al, 2016; Rudd, 1990; WHO, 2014; 2018). Therefore, there is need for urgent attention towards providing intensive psychosocial support and education to IDPs in order to fortify them with the necessary mind-set and skills for facing the frustration, anxiety, hopelessness, and helplessness of their lived realities. Otherwise, some of them might be compelled to self-harm themselves, which would in various ways cause more problems for the children they leave behind and in the long-run impact negatively on national and sustainable development. No doubt, the human cost would be overwhelming for Nigeria as a nation. All of these narratives reflect the fact that the IDPs’ emotional needs call for urgent attention. The human cost is huge, as the experiences affect not only adults but also emerging adults - the future generation, reflecting high premium cost in terms of human diminution and sustainable development. Both parents and the young adults (children) need a lot of physical, social and psychological support through the services of skilled counsellors, social workers, NGOs including faith-based groups and government.

Recommendation

This paper makes a single recommendation, namely, that there is an urgent need to provide psychosocial support/education to all the IDPs wherever they may be found, whether in formal IDP camps or in temporary shacks around the cities. The onus lies on trained professionals, communities (including faith-based groups), NGOs, and the government, to be proactive in identifying IDPs in the country and providing them the much needed psychosocial support/education that would help them cope with their situation and manage their needs for adjustment to life. In order to facilitate the psychosocial support/education process, trained professionals such as counsellors, social workers, faith-based pastoral workers, NGOs, etc., need to be proactive in identifying mental health disorders and creating the awareness of such among IDPs which will help to reduce the risk of developing more severe health conditions that might lead to high suicidal rates and deaths especially among children who are caught up in these miserable, nasty experiences. Civil society activists also have roles to play in getting the government to commit to providing support to internally displaced persons and encouraging greater collaborations between government, aid agencies and charitable individuals/organisations that are already in the country.

Conclusion

The paper deliberated on the notion that the experiences of internal displacement for some of the victims of what is known as Jos crises have been traumatic leading to varying instances of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and facilitating suicide tendency/ideation. These victims, particularly those who are found in the FCT satellite cities (including others who might be scattered across the country), need to be provided with early psychosocial support/education that would enhance their coping capacity and skills to heal their psychological wounds, rebuild their lives and adjust positively and actively to the changes in their life circumstances. However, it is important to note that the provision of such psychosocial support/education would not be easy to achieve because of a number of challenges. One of such challenges would be the difficulty involved in identifying the IDPs considering the different locations where they are scattered. Another challenge could arise from the lack of professional counsellors, social workers, psychiatrists and skilled medical personnel who would be able to identify early onset of mental health issues, provide mental health services and attend to their other physical and emotional needs. These challenges notwithstanding, a lot could be achieved when support is provided early and timely and snowball techniques are employed whereby known cases would lead to identification of further cases as a form of referral (Cohen and Arieli, 2011). This technique can be used to manage the difficulties involved in the early identification of IDPs. Regarding the paucity of skilled personnel, a more concrete effort should be made to involve all stakeholders of the helping profession such as social workers, pastoral counsellors, faith-based community workers, and voluntary agencies etc. With such move, a lot would be achieved towards minimising and addressing the adverse impact of internal displacement on individual victims and communities and its consequences on human resources and sustainable development.

The little and big adjustments and contributions internally displaced persons in Nigeria would make, counts a lot towards sustaining national development and Nigeria cannot afford to lose some of its viable human capital/ resources.

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Part Three

Irregular Migration, Armed Conflicts and Insecurity in Africa

CHAPTER TWELVE

Proliferation of Armed Militias and Complicity of European States in the Migration Crisis in Libya, 2011 – 2017

Rowland Chukwuma Okoli and Adaora Chukwurah

Introduction/Problematique

The Libyan state emerged from a merger of three former provinces of the Ottoman Empire – Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan, and achieved independence in 1951 from the United Nations (UN) trusteeship (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018). The overthrow of King Idris by Colonel Muammar Gadhafi in 1969 changed the history of Libya as Gadhafi transformed the state into a radical state with leftist ideology. Since then, its relations with the West has oscillated from belligerence to rapprochement, depending on the swing in the ideology adopted at any given time by the Libyan state. Libya has gained notoriety as a transit state for migrants seeking to irregularly migrate to Europe particularly Italy through the Mediterranean Sea. Hence, over the years, the business of smuggling has flourished in Libya especially in coastal towns that provide access to the Mediterranean.

Since the late 1990s European countries especially Italy, have pursued various strategies including deepening bilateral cooperation with Libya in the field of migration in order to address the flow of irregular migrants to Europe through Libya (Paoletti & Pastore, 2010). For instance, in 2007 the Treaty of Friendship was established between Italy and Libya in which Italy committed to provide 5 billion US dollars to Libya for basic infrastructure (Ronzitti, 2009). Essentially, the Treaty served as a “pushback” strategy which enabled the transfer of irregular migrants intercepted at the Mediterranean Sea back to Libya such that between May and November 2009 alone, about 834 irregular migrants who had departed from Libya were returned to Libya (Amnesty International, 2017; Paoletti & Pastore, 2010).

The collapse of Gadhafi regime in 2011 changed the tide of irregular migration taking place through Libya and the associated migrant smuggling business in the country. Generally, the post-Gadhafi Libyan state is remarkable in three ways with regard to the problem of irregular migration in Africa. First, the collapse of state security agencies created interstices exploited by militia groups to profit from smuggling and extortion of migrants. Secondly, European states renewed efforts to reverse the surge in the number of irregular migrants flowing to Europe following the fall of Gadhafi. Thirdly, post-Gadhafi Libya saw eruption of migration crisis characterized by commoditisation, extortion/abuse of migrants by militia groups in connivance with members of the weakened state security agencies. Thus, by September 2017, the

number of migrants trapped in Libya was estimated to stand at over 416,556 (Amnesty International, 2017). Some of the trapped migrants were extorted and sold as slaves by the local militia groups in connivance with some officials of the state security apparatus.

Recent studies contend that the collapse of the Gadhafi regime has created a number of domestic, regional, and international problems including creating a power vacuum, widespread violence, human rights abuses, refugee crises, exacerbated racism and tribalism, economic instability, and the collapse of social welfare systems in Libya (Siebens & Case, 2012). There is also a consensus among writers that post-Gadhafi Libya is characterized by proliferation of militia groups numbering about 1,600 across the country (Amnesty International, 2017; Kamouni-Janssen & Bruijne, 2017). The implication of these analyses is that the collapse of Gadhafi regime, the proliferation of armed militia groups, and the migration crisis in Libya, are treated *sui generis* in extant literature without establishing the organic relationship between these phenomena. There is therefore need to examine the connection between the activities of militia groups and the eruption of the widely reported migration crisis in post-Gadhafi Libya. Hence, this study intervenes by examining this linkage within the context of the following two questions:

- How did proliferation of armed militia groups contribute to the migration crisis experienced in post-Gadhafi Libya?
- Did the prioritization of counter smuggling of migrants over rescue operations by European countries bolster the migrant-trading activities of militia groups in Libya?

Across Libya, some major cities (Zuwara, Sabratha and Zawiya) have gained infamy for flourishing in the business of migrant smuggling and extortion. Of these three cities, Zawiya presents an interesting case study that can be used to underpin the migration crisis in the wider Libyan state since the collapse of Gadhafi's regime. The case of Zawiya is interesting because it presents a context for understanding how the established state security apparatus and oil refinery in the coastal city were appropriated by the dominant local militia group to perpetrate their illicit business of migrant smuggling and extortion. Drawing largely from experience in Zawiya in post-Gadhafi Libya, this study pursues the thesis that the emergent armed militia groups serve as agents of local political elites to wrestle and maintain state power and also serve as agents of European countries to trap irregular migrants in Libya, thereby creating migration crisis from which the militia groups further profits. Hence, the post-Gadhafi Libyan state is problematized as a 'gate' maintained by two groups - the political elites (state actors) and armed militia (non-state actors) - who filled the power vacuum created in post-Gadhafi Libya but serve as agents of European countries on migration issues. The gate-keeper role played by these state and non-state actors underpins the recurring crisis of the post-Gadhafi Libyan state including the current migration crisis in which hundreds of thousands of irregular migrants were trapped, exploited, abused, and (re)sold as slaves in Libya.

Data and Methods

This study employed case study design. The case study research design enables the researcher to carry out in-depth study of a small number of cases in their real-life context and understand how the isolated cases influence and/or are influenced by the contexts in which they exist (Yin, 2009). Thus, we isolated and focused our analysis on migration crisis as experienced in the city of Zawiya between 2011 and 2017 because of the notoriety Zawiya has in the migrant smuggling business and its geostrategic significance in the political economy of Libya.

Documentary method was adopted for data collection. In line with this, the study relied on secondary data drawn largely from published articles contained in journals and textbooks, reports of United Nations panel of experts on Libya, periodicals, newspapers and articles published by reputable organisations like Amnesty International, which provide insight into the collapse of the Gadhafi regime in 2011, the emergence of militia groups, and the migration crisis that erupted in Libya.

Theoretical Framework

This study explained the post-Gadhafi migration crisis in Libya from the perspective of the gate-keeper state theory. Hence, the study problematizes Libya as a gatekeeper state by appropriating the basic propositions of the gatekeeper state theory to explain the migration crisis that engulfed post-Gadhafi Libya. The concept of ‘gatekeeper state’ was coined and expounded by an African historian Frederick Cooper in his seminal work titled *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present*. Cooper (2002) attempted to explain the character of African states which depend on recognition, direction, and support from external agents to be able to extend their powers internally and command the respect of the people. In this regard, after the collapse of Gadhafi in 2011, various centres of power emerged in Libya, all depending on various external supports to remain in power. Currently, there are three rival governments in Libya competing for power, namely General National Congress (GNC), House of Representatives (HoR), and Government of National Accord (GNA) (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018). The GNA, which emerged from an attempt by the United Nations to form a government of national unity in 2015, is recognised by the international community as the legitimate government in Libya but not recognised by other local competing factions (Arraf, 2017). Legitimized by the international community, the GNA have continued to depend largely on external support and legitimacy while being unable to provide basic needs including security for the people of Libya.

Cooper (2002) traced the gatekeeper character of contemporary African states to their colonial history and experiences. The theory contends that the legitimacy of the colonial state was undermined owing to its emphasis on extraction of resources from the colonial territories without attempt to lay foundations/ structures for sustainable development. As a gatekeeper state, a post-colonial state is concerned mainly with collection of revenue from taxes on imports and exports and deciding who could engage in what business and how (Cooper, 2002). Being a postcolonial state, Libya

remains a mosaic made up of rival groups struggling to profit from material resources including appropriation of coastal borders in order to facilitate and profit from various illicit businesses including smuggling and extortion of irregular migrants.

Hence, the struggle and capture of various lucrative centers of smuggling, and the insertion of militia groups into state security agencies [such as the General Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM), and the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG)] by political elites, for selfish interests, as exemplified in the Zawiya city of Libya, reflect the gate-keeper character of the post-Gadhafi Libyan state, which supports the contention of Metsola, (2015, p.59) that: Many, perhaps most, postcolonial African states have relied on continuous external recognition and its associated benefits, such as juridical sovereignty, resource rents and strategic rents that can be (sufficiently) transformed into local dominance through patronage and co-option. Their elites have acted as gatekeepers in a longstanding pattern of extraversion that has enabled them to forge local networks of centralization based on patronage instead of bureaucratic unification.

In the light of the above, Cooper (2002) held that the states of Africa are not deemed to be states based on their ability to provide the services that a state should provide, nor based on their capacity to extract power within their territory, but rather based on international recognition. As noted by Metsola (2015), African rulers found themselves in charge of 'gatekeeper' states, with legitimacy mainly emanating from external recognition of their custodianship of the 'gate'. Faced with developmental crisis, these leaders searched for ideologies to help them govern their unstable societies, thereby becoming receptive to those agents that provide recognition and support to enable them keep the 'gate'. Thus, the gate-keeper state is characterized by recurring crisis of volatile gatekeeper politics based on political patronage which produces a weak state vulnerable to political upheavals (Anderson & Beresford, 2016). This quest for legitimacy and custodianship of the Libyan state by various state and non-state actors is implicated in the migration crisis that erupted in post-Gadhafi Libya.

Sunset at Libya: The rise and fall of Gadhafi regime

Muammar Gadhafi assumed power in Libya in 1969 following a military coup in which King Mohammed Idris was deposed. Gaddafi was celebrated as leftist who would build a new and better life for all Libyans. Gaddafi and his co-revolutionaries, who formed the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), set about modernizing and reforming the country during the 1970s in line with their leftist ideology (Blundy, David & Andrew, 1987).

The oil industry in Libya was nationalised in 1973, and this brought about rapid increase in the country's GDP from \$3.8 billion in 1969 to \$13.7 billion by 1974 and \$24.5 billion in 1979 (Blundy, David & Andrew, 1987). According to the Totman & Hardy (2015), despite the progressive and revolutionary ideologies, by the end of the

1970s, Gadhafi's rule became increasingly autocratic, and he established structures that made it difficult for any individual to challenge the regime. The 12-member RCC was disbanded in 1977, with five of its members then forming the General Secretariat of the new General People's Congress. This latter body was formed by delegates elected by hundreds of municipal Basic People's Committees, as well as members of the Arab Socialist Union, the sole legal political party in Libya. Regional and ethnic identities were also exacerbated by Gadhafi to deepen distrust amongst the citizenry and thwart any form of unity that would threaten the regime (Totman & Hardy, 2015). Ethnic/regional division contributed to the emergence of tribal and regional militia groups contesting for power in post-Gadhafi Libya.

The autocratic leadership style and the reforms anchored on the leftist ideology of Gadhafi set the stage for the collapse of the regime. For instance, private establishments and several hundred companies were seized and transformed into cooperatives. In 1978, housing was socialised with the aim of ensuring that every Libyan lived in his own home and was not at the mercy of a landlord. To this end, families were banned from owning more than the house they lived in. All rental properties were seized and sold to their current tenants at heavily-subsidised prices. While this made many Libyans instant homeowners, it greatly made the nation's middle class angry (Totman & Hardy, 2015). In line with the regime's ideological leaning, Gadhafi provided support for liberation movements and terrorist organisations. This led to military action from the United States and further sanctions which lasted for 16 years and cost the country an estimated \$900 million in financial losses from the curtailed oil trade. The sanctions paralyzed the oil and transportation sectors of Libya's economy and isolated the state economically, diplomatically, and physically from the international community. Previous achievements in the areas such as the country's health system were undermined as the government was unable to maintain the previous high-level of spending on technology and equipment (Totman & Hardy, 2015). Such regression in the standard of living, coupled with a consistent crackdown on dissents, meant that Libyans were ripe for a regime change.

According to Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism [INSCT] (2012), armed conflict in Libya began in Benghazi in February 2011, when a series of nationwide peaceful protests in support of reform movements in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere, known as the "Arab Awakening," were met by the Libyan government with force. As the Libyan government escalated its response to regional riots in Benghazi, Baida, and Derna, with the use of indiscriminate force, resulting in the death of dozens of rioters, popular rebellion increased throughout northern Libya. These events brought about rebellion throughout northern Libya; and by February 2011, an organized political body known as the Transitional National Council (TNC) was formed in Benghazi. The purpose of the TNC was to act as the political face of the revolution and to serve as the legitimate body representing the people of Libya and the Libya state (INSCT, 2012). A full-scale civil war broke out in February 2011, and the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1973 on 17th March, 2011

authorizing the North Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO) to intervene in Libya. After months of evading capture, Gadhafi was captured and killed while hiding in a drain in his hometown of Sirte.

Proliferation of armed militia groups and migration crisis in post-Gadhafi Libya

After the collapse of Gadhafi's regime in 2011, various groups which participated in the protests leading to the ouster of Gadhafi and the Libyan civil war of 2014 congealed into armed militia groups. Most of these militia groups sought to gain control of strategic locations on land, airports, and sea, so as to profit from the business of smuggling of persons, drugs, fuel, and other illicit businesses (Amnesty International, 2017).

To achieve their objectives, the militia groups also aligned with various political groups and power blocs that emerged in post-Gadhafi Libya where they served as armed groups. For instance, the Justice and Construction Party, which controlled the General National Congress (GNC) that came to power after the July 2012 general election, was supported by the Tripoli-based Islamist militias, the Misrata-based militias, the Berber armed militias, and the Knights of Janzour militia, all of which combined to form a military coalition known as the Libya Dawn. The House of Representatives (HoR), which is another major power bloc in post-Gadhafi Libya, had an alliance with the Zintani brigades militia group (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018). The conflict between these political power blocs resulted in violent clashes between various armed militia groups providing support for them.

Due to the political affiliations of these militia groups, they were integrated as coherent groups into various state security agencies, with military power allocated to them. This not only bolstered their strength, but also translated to legitimisation of the militia groups (Arraf, 2017). For example, the Libya Shield Force (LSF), which was established in 2012, came to be comprised of various Islamist militia groups based in Benghazi, Khums, and Misrata and others from other parts of Libya. More so, power was shared within the LSF to the various intact militia units within the Force. Similarly, armed groups were integrated into the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG), which has the mandate of countering trafficking and smuggling, including carrying out surveillance in Libya's territorial and international waters. The General Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM), tasked with detention and deportation of illegal migrants, was not spared from this organized militia infiltration. Having been inserted into state security agencies, the militia groups legitimised the illicit smuggling businesses including smuggling/extortion of irregular migrants, from which they profited to sustain their operations while serving as agents of the political elites they support.

As a result of the weakened security network, the gains associated with smuggling/extortion of migrants snowballed. As at 2016, revenue from human

smuggling was estimated to be around \$978 million, which is about 3.4 per cent of Libya's 2015 GDP of \$29.1 billion. The estimate consists of: (a) fees generated from overland travel – \$726.3 million; and (b) fees generated from crossings of the Mediterranean – estimated at \$251.4 million (Eaton, 2018). Another estimate puts the profit of smuggling organisations at around 253 million euros per year in Libya (Bertolotti, 2017).

Militia groups and commoditisation of irregular migrants in Zawiya

The city of Zawiya exemplifies the migration crisis which erupted in post-Gadhafi Libya especially as it concerns the role of militia groups, and the complicity of the compromised state security agencies. Zawiya is one of the most geostrategic towns in Libya. It is located in north-western part of the country with a shoreline bordering the Mediterranean Sea, and borders Tripoli in the east (see Figure 1). The town also controls the vital route between the national capital Tripoli and the Tunisian border making it strategic in the migration and smuggling business in Libya.

Figure 1: Map of Libya showing the town of Zawiya



Source: <https://www.google.com.ng/search?q=zawia+libya+map&biw> accessed 30 May, 2018

This geostrategic position of Zawiya makes it significant in the political economy of Libya because, in addition to its proximity to the Mediterranean, the town is a home to one of the two most important oil refineries in Libya which makes it economically important. The economic and geostrategic significance of Zawiya makes it strategic in the business of migration, smuggling, and other illicit trades in Libya. For instance, the city is notorious as one of the primary points of departure for migrants from Libya to Europe, and the first major smuggling city that reaches from the capital (Amnesty International, 2017; Eaton, 2018). This underscores the contest for Zawiya, and why

Zawiya was the scene of some of the fiercest fights in the anti-Gadhafi civil war as different state and non-state actors struggled to control the town.

The weakened security architecture in post-Gadhafi Libya is also reflected in the security structure in Zawiya. Two important state security formations central to management of migration in Libya are also situated in Zawiya due to its political economy and geostrategic significance. These state security formations are the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM) and the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG). Established in 2012, under the Ministry of Interior, the DCIM is saddled with the task of managing illegal migration flows into Libya by acting as quasi-law enforcement body, organising the deportation of irregular migrants, and managing the detention centres where illegal immigrants were held. The LCG operates under the Ministry of Defence in co-ordination with the General Administration for Coastal Security with the mandate of counter-trafficking, counter-smuggling, and surveillance of Libyan territorial waters including international waters. The LCG station in Zawiya is in charge of patrolling the entire western coast of Libya which covers the areas notorious for migrant smuggling, namely, Zawiya, Sabratha, and Zuwara (Amnesty International, 2017).

The militia groups that emerged in Zawiya after the fall of Gadhafi combined the business smuggling in oil, arms, and drugs, with migrant smuggling/extortion. Given the power vacuum in Libya immediately after the fall of Gadhafi, the struggle for control of these businesses deepened along tribal lines and exacerbated the historic tribal divisions between the two major tribes in the town - *Awlad Bu Hmeira* and *Awlad Saqr* - leading to fierce contests for control of Zawiya by these tribes and their allied militia group (United Nations, 2017). This further led to the emergence of two major blocs of tribal armed militia groups in Zawiya. Hence, the al-Nasr Brigade armed militia emerged from the *Awlad Bu Hmeira* tribe under the command of the notorious Mohammad Koshlaf and took control of the Zawiya refinery. Koshlaf also became the head of the Zawiya Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), the arm of the NOC charged with securing assets (Eaton, 2018). On the other hand, the Othman al-Lahab and al-Khadrawi armed groups allied with the *Awlad Saqr* tribe (United Nations, 2017).

It is pertinent to note that the al-Nasr Brigade of Zawiya participated actively in the 2014 Operation Dawn which supported the GNC and dislodged the HoR from Tripoli in August 2014 (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2018). This alliance and support for the GNC may have paved the way for the Nasr Brigade to gain upper hand in Zawiya through appointment of its members to sensitive security and other government positions. This political connection of al-Nasr Brigade militia gave it superiority in Zawiya over other rival militia groups and paved way for Nasr Brigade members to control government security agencies especially the DCIM centre and the LCG in the city. For instance, the DCIM detention centre in Zawiya was opened and managed in the refinery controlled by Kohleaf – the leader of Nasr Brigade militia

group. Again, the Zawiya LCG station Zawiya is headed by Abd al-Rahman Milad (alias Bija) a tribesman of Kohleaf, the influential head of the notorious al-Nassr militia group in Zawiya city involved in migrant smuggling.

The al-Nassr militia group also runs a humanitarian organization, the al-Nassr International Organization for Development and Relief, which was founded on 14 December 2015 and is headed by Fathi al-Far, an army colonel notorious for smuggling and selling of migrants (Amnesty International, 2017; United Nations Panel of Experts Report on Libya, 2017). The strong connection of the militia groups with security agencies enabled the former to intercept migrants on Libyan coasts and make profits from them through extortion and sale to other smuggling networks. For instance, in 2015, The Zawiya coast guard's patrol boat operated by Abd al-Rahman Milad (alias al-Bija) was reported to be involved in intercepting migrants and transferring them to the al-Nasr detention centre operated by his crony Koshlaf, the leader of Nasr Brigade (United Nations Panel of Experts Report on Libya, 2017).

The control over government security apparatus and the refinery in Zawiya facilitated the illicit business from which the Nasr Brigade militia group profited. For instance, by controlling the refinery, the group was able to smuggle fuel and supply to ships smuggling irregular migrants. By controlling the LCG, the group was able to intercept migrants at the sea and return them to the Zawiya DCIM detention centre. Through its control over the DCIM detention centre, the group was able to extort, sale, and smuggle irregular migrants intercepted and detained in Zawiya. What emerged in Zawiya after the fall of Gadhafi was a complex web of alliance among militia groups, security agencies, and smugglers.

Post-Gadhafi anti-migration strategies of Europe, and migration crisis in Libya


Post-Gadhafi Libya saw renewed collaboration between European, countries especially Italy, and Libyan government, in the area of controlling irregular migration. First, in 2012, the Tripoli Declaration was signed between the Italian government and the Libyan government. The declaration simply reaffirmed the need for collaboration between the two countries in the area of curtailing migration to Europe as already agreed by both parties in the widely criticized Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation signed in Benghazi on August 30th 2008. Following the astronomical increase in migrants flowing to Italy since the Libyan civil war of 2014, in February 2017, the Italian government and the Libyan Presidential Council signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on co-operation in the fields of development, the fight against illegal immigration, human trafficking, and fuel smuggling, and on reinforcing the security of borders. Based on the MoU, the Europeans were committed to providing the LCG with training, equipment, and technical and other assistance. Article 1B & C of the 2017 MoU holds that Italy will provide funding and technical support to the Libyan institutions in charge of the fight against illegal immigration to build their capacity to reduce flow of migrants through Libya to Italy. Hence, through

the 2017 MoU which also strengthened other existing agreements between Italy and Libya in the area of managing irregular immigration, Italy was able to build the capacity of the LCG and DCIM in trapping and detaining migrants in Libya. For instance, under the 2017 MoU and previous other agreements, hundreds of the Libya coast guards received training from Italy on coast patrol. Similarly, Italy has provided the LCG with patrolling equipment such as patrol boats. In 2017, a 2.5 million Euro grant was set aside for the maintenance of Libyan boats and the training of Libyan crews from the 200 million Euro “Africa fund” created in the 2017 (Amnesty International, 2017). In July 2017, a 46.3 million Euro programme was approved by the EU Trust Fund for Africa for increasing the operational capacity of the LCG through the provision of training, equipment, repair, and maintenance of existing fleet; the setting up of operational rooms to enable the agency co-ordinate operations aimed at trapping migrants (Amnesty International, 2017).

Arising from the assistance and support from Europe, between 2016 and 2017, the Libyan state security agencies, influenced by militia groups especially the LCG, heavily increased their capacity to operate at sea. The result was that the number of migrants arriving in Italy fell by 67% between July and November 2017, compared with the same period in the previous year when 102,786 arrived Italy (Amnesty International, 2017). Similarly, about 19,452 migrants were intercepted by LCG and taken back to DCIM centres in Zawiya or handed over to smugglers in Libya (Amnesty International, 2017). The implication of this is that the assistance received from European countries under the 2017 MoU enabled the LCG to intercept irregular migrants at sea, and return or/and detain them in Libya. Secondly, by acting as agents of European countries in reducing the number of migrants flowing into Europe, the LCG and DCIM, themselves controlled by militia groups, increased the number of irregular migrants trapped under the custody of the Libyan militia groups who profit by extorting these irregular migrants and selling them into slavery. As a result, by the end of September 2017, the estimated number of migrants trapped in Libya was in excess of 416,556 with most of them scattered across various detention centres operated by the security agencies and militia groups (Amnesty International, 2017).

It is within this context that we can understand the eruption of the migration crisis in Libya and how most migrants became trapped, abused, injured, and lost in Libya. Figure 2 illustrates the complex web of coordination of various state agencies controlled by the militia groups and with supports from Europe.

Figure 2: Complex Web of Coordination of Militia Controlled State Agencies



Source: Authors' Design

Conclusion

The post-Gadhafi Libya is a 'gate' largely manned by two groups - the political elites (state actors) and armed militia (non-state actors) - who filled the power vacuum created in Libya after the ousting of Gadhafi, but serve as agents of European countries on migration issues. The political alliance and agency role of militia groups in the city of Zawiya facilitated their insertion into state security agencies under which they carried out their smuggling business 'legitimately' and through which they acquired capacity (through support from European countries) to function in the business of migrant smuggling and extortion. The activities of militia groups in Zawiya and the migration crisis in the city exemplifies the place of militia groups in shaping power relations and reconfiguring the dynamics of migration in the wider Libyan society following the collapse of Gadhafi's regime.

The findings of the study, based on evidence from Zawiya, demonstrate that the factors that jointly created the migration crisis in which irregular migrants were trapped and commoditised in Libya include: (i) 'legitimization' of militia groups through their politicization, (ii) the compromise of state security apparatus arising from insertion of militia groups in those apparatus, (iii) support provided to the compromised state security agencies by European countries. .

Recommendations

Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations are put forward:

For the Libyan State:

- There is need to overhaul the state security agencies in Libya especially the DCIM and LCG involved in the management of irregular migrants by carrying out a background check on key officers and ensuring their periodic transfer from one duty/location to another. This will ensure that officers found to be members/connected to militia groups or migrants' smuggling networks are removed from security agencies, and properly sanctioned.

For the International Community:

- European and African countries should deepen collaboration in surveillance of the vast porous borders of African countries by strengthening capacity of African security agencies in border control. This can be achieved through strengthening existing sub-regional security architecture such as Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) for effective joint regional border surveillance and control.
- Early warning system must be established within the security frameworks of the sub-regions to ensure that violent conflicts and instability brewing in member countries are adequately managed to avert complete breakdown of law and order, and large scale displacement as happened in Libya in 2011.
- Intelligence capacity of national security agencies of African countries should be built to enhance apprehension of local human traffickers and migrants' smuggling networks in African countries.
- The challenges of unemployment and poverty, which are major push-factors for irregular migration, must be addressed through strong collaboration between the global North and South. This can be achieved through adequate utilisation of the 200 million Euro 'Africa Fund' set up in 2017 and other similar funds to support local industries and organise skill acquisition programmes for the poor youth.

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Insecurity, Forced Migration, and Internally Displaced Persons along the Cameroon-Nigeria Border, 2003 – 2018

Primus Fonkeng

Introduction

Border problems are of great significance to modern states in the world and particularly to the African continent. The significance is derived from the fact that borders limit political, economic, social-cultural, and strategic influences. The defect of any border usually creates conflicts between tribes, villages, and nations. In Africa, border insecurity is recurrent because most of the borders were defined by the colonial masters who neither mastered the territories nor took into consideration the cultural identities of the natives (Fonkeng, 2014). The Cameroon-Nigeria border stretches from Lake Chad in the north, to the Bight of Biafra in the Atlantic Ocean, covering a distance of almost 1800 kilometres. The border has witnessed recurrent insecurity threats which forced the population to migrate to other areas as refugees while others were displaced internally to other communities. The armed insurrection of Boko Haram in north east Nigeria, offers a grid for analysis from triple angles, notably: forced migration, refugee crises, and internally displaced persons (Mbarkoutou, 2014).

Since 2011, the shared borders between north east Nigeria and the Extreme North of Cameroon have become the object of repeated Boko Haram assaults and the violent counter offensives of the Nigerian army, provoking forced displacement and refugee crises. Furthermore, since the end of 2016, Cameroon has been facing a sociopolitical crisis in its Anglophone Regions of North West and South West all situated along the Cameroon-Nigeria border zone. The crisis originated in protests initiated by lawyers and teachers who demanded several reforms from the government of Cameroon. When the government delayed to initiate reforms, violence erupted in the two Anglophone regions leading to the death of several people, others were forced to migrate to neighboring Nigeria as refugees, while others were displaced into other communities and some into bushes and forests (*NewAfrican Magazine*, 2018).

This paper therefore seeks to analyze how Boko Haram's violent attacks and the reprisals of the Nigerian army together, with the Anglophone Crisis against the government of Cameroon, engendered the depopulation of the frontier zones, the influx of refugees to Cameroon and Nigeria and internally displaced persons to other communities beyond the border zone. The recurrent waves of displacements

negatively affected the socio-cultural cohesion as well as economic and political systems of the various communities along the border.

Conceptualizing Insecurity and Forced Migration

Many political analysts argue that most of the post-independence insecurity crises along the Cameroon-Nigeria border are results of colonial legacy, the introduction of new socio-economic and political structures, and the changing nature of the States (Kraler 2005). Most African Governments practice a system of differential and preferential treatment of Africans based on regional, tribal, status, and ethnic differences. Recurrent insecurity challenges experienced along the Cameroon-Nigeria border are thus often the direct results of exclusionary policies pursued by newly independent regimes that in important ways can be seen as a continuation of similar colonial policies. The insecurity often opposed ruling groups trying to maintain the status quo on the one hand, and excluded group(s) demanding for change, on the other. Thus, in general, struggles over the control of political and economic power, and concomitant massive human rights abuses, including widespread violence, result to forced migration and internally displaced persons along the border zone. Moreover, cases of insecurity that cause population displacement are, in many instances, results of failure or unwillingness of certain governments to resolve long-standing ethnic tensions (Chazan et al., 1999) or the tendency of certain governments to oppress particular population groups as observed in the current Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon.

The phenomenon of forced migration is fraught with controversial and, sometimes, contradictory interpretations and connotations. We talk of forced migration in opposition to voluntary migration. In this way, displacement is viewed from its causes and/or from its purpose. Thus, we may talk of economic migration as opposed to socio-political migration (Turton, 2003). Whereas the former refers to migrants who leave their respective residence and settle elsewhere in search of economic opportunities such as employment, business opportunities, education, etc. (Berger, 1987; Adepoju, 1989), the latter refers to migrations caused by social and political problems such as armed conflicts, insecurity, human rights violations, natural disasters, etc. (Berger, 1987; Bolzman, 1996; Anthony, 1999). In the latter cases, forced migrants, commonly referred to as refugees, flee their places of residence for their physical security and protection from imminent threats to their physical well-being. Thus, Nick Van Hear (1998, 44) talks of voluntary as opposed to involuntary nature of the forces that lead to migration. Anthony Richmond (1994, 59) distinguishes between 'proactive' and 'reactive' migration. He classifies migrants in two main categories of those with agency (choice) and those without agency; forced migrants being those with little or no agency. In migration discourse, the debate revolves around voluntary migration as opposed to forced migration. Forced migrations are also divided into two categories depending on the causes of displacement. We can distinguish between forced migration caused by natural disasters on the one hand, and on the other hand, forced migration caused by violence and/or armed conflict and insecurity (also known as

man-made displacement) and repressive state policies and persecution (that is, refugee migration in a narrow sense, as defined by international humanitarian law) (Sen, 1981).

The realities along the Cameroon-Nigeria border show many instances where the delimitation between these types of migration occurs. Their causes also present socio-political and economic factors as observed in the Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon with consequences being the influx of high waves of refugees in both Cameroon and Nigeria.

According to Kunz (1973), refugees are different from voluntary migrants in that they have to leave their homeland against their will, with no positive motivation to settle anywhere else. Olson (1979) points out that refugees differ from other migrants in that refugees are forced to leave their homes because of a change in their environment which makes it impossible to continue life as they have known it. They are coerced by an external force to leave their homes and go elsewhere. In Kunz's theoretical framework, immigrants are seen as pulled and attracted to the new land by opportunities and better living conditions obtainable there. Refugees on the other hand are not pulled out but rather they are pushed out of their homelands. However, in African migration reality, the push-pull factor as conceived in Kunz's theoretical framework is not easily demarcated with regard to the distinction between economic migrants and refugees. This study argues that the majority of migrants along the Cameroon-Nigeria border currently experienced forced migration and are displaced internally as a result of recurrent insecurity exacerbated by the Boko Haram Terrorist Group and the Anglophone Crisis.

Boko Haram and Insecurity

Cameroon and Nigeria today stand at the center of several threats from radical movements that crop up in neighboring countries especially from the Boko Haram sect of Nigeria. Boko Haram controls about 20,000sq km of land in the three northern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. In early 2013, its area of operation stretched from the Mandara Mountains on the eastern border with Cameroon, to Lake Chad in the north, and the Yedseram River in the west. It is estimated that by the end of 2014, the extremist group controlled about twenty of the twenty-seven Local Government Area (LGA) in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, with a population of over one million, seven hundred thousand inhabitants (Fonkeng, 2016). It was in this vast area in north-eastern Nigeria that the Islamist group declared an Islamic Caliphate in August 2014. Boko Haram is not only a threat to Nigeria but across its borders and its international dimension makes it a real threat to Chad, Niger, Benin and Cameroon. The sect made major incursions along the Cameroon-Nigeria border in recent years and has been involved in deadly attacks and kidnappings. The first attack of Boko Haram along the Cameroon-Nigeria border was the kidnap of a French national, Moulin-Fournier, his family, and friend, in the far north of Cameroon on February 19 2013. They were released by the Islamist sect after the payment of a ransom by the Cameroon

Government on April 13, 2013 and were handed to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. Next was the kidnap of Reverend Father George Vanden Beuch, a French priest who was taken to Nigeria before being released to the Cameroon Government. The third attack was the kidnapping of Reverend Father Antonio Giovanni Allegri and Paolo Giovanni both Italians and a Canadian Sister, Rev. Gilberte Bisserie, from a Cameroonian village along the border with northern Nigeria (Nghah, 2014). This was followed by the kidnapping of ten Chinese engineers in the town of Waza, northern Cameroon in May 2014. Boko Haram's activities along the Cameroon-Nigeria border influenced the summoning of a Security Conference in Paris, France.

After the Summit of May 2014 in Paris, France, on security concerns in West and Central Africa as a result of Boko Haram activities, several attacks were launched in northern Cameroon by the Boko Haram sect as a result of President Paul Biya's declaration of war. From May 17 to November 10 2014, there were eighteen Boko Haram attacks against Cameroonian troops resulting to the death of thirty-three soldiers and over 1000 Boko Haram fighters who were estimated to number about 20,000, along the Cameroon-Nigeria border. The most violent Boko Haram attacks along the border occurred in December 2014. According to Fonkeng (2016), on December 12, close to 600 Boko Haram fighters crossed Lake Chad and launched simultaneous attacks on the villages of Ngouma, Sagme, Ardebo, Dambore, and Soueram, but were repelled by Cameroonian forces. At the same period, another group from Borno attacked the towns of Bankim, Amchide, and Limani, all along the border area. On December 26-28 2014, about 1000 Boko Haram fighters launched simultaneous attacks on the towns of Makary, Amchide, Limani, and Mbaljuel. The sect also temporarily took control of the Cameroon Army base in Achigachia in early 2014 and was later dislodged through airstrikes by the Cameroonian Air force (Tande 2015).

When insecurity persisted along the Cameroon-Nigeria border due to the unrelenting attacks by the Boko Haram fighters, the Cameroon Government reorganized its border security in March 2014, by deploying close to 700 troops to patrol the borders of northern Cameroon. In August 2014, Cameroon's military command structure was reorganized in cognizance of the Boko Haram extremist. A Presidential Decree created a new military region with headquarters in Maroua in the Far North region, and the 41st motorized Infantry with headquarters in Kousseri in the Far North (*Cameroon Tribune*, 2014). The Cameroon soldiers of the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) patrolling the northern border with Nigeria have put a stiff resistance and successfully reduced the Boko Haram attacks. Currently, the Cameroon-Nigeria Border is plagued with severe insecurity crisis as a result of the Anglophone Crisis between separatists from Anglophone Cameroon fighting to secede from the Republic of Cameroon.

Anglophone Crisis and Insecurity

The Anglophone Crisis originated from a series of grievances in the two English Speaking Regions of Cameroon. Some of these grievances are:

- The failure of successive Governments of Cameroon, since 1961, to respect and implement the articles of the constitution that uphold and safeguard what British Southern Cameroons brought along to the union in 1961;
- The flagrant disregard for the constitution, demonstrated by the dissolution of political parties and the formation of one political party in 1966, and other such acts judged by the West Cameroonians to be unconstitutional and undemocratic;
- The cavalier management of the 1972 referendum which took out the foundational elements (federalism) of the 1961 constitution;
- The 1984 law amending the constitution, which gave the country the original East Cameroon name (the Republic of Cameroon) and thereby erased the identity of the West Cameroonians from the original union. West Cameroon, which had entered the union as an equal partner effectively ceased to exist. It involved a deliberate and systematic erosion of the West Cameroon cultural identity which the 1961 constitution sought to preserve and protect by providing for a bi-cultural federation (Bishops Letter to the President, 2017).

These grievances culminated to protest in the Anglophone region by October 2016. Since October 2006, Cameroon has been facing socio-political crises in the two Anglophone regions of the country. One of the first events of the crisis was a strike held by Lawyers from the two regions, which occurred from 10th to 21st October 2016. The Lawyers were protesting against the government's failure to produce the English version of the OHADA Law and its interference to destroy the Common Law System inherited from the British which was practiced in the English Speaking Zones (*NewAfrican Magazine*, 2018). The Lawyers subsequently sought support from traditional rulers, trade unions, and the entire population of the two regions to abandon their duties and functions in the government of the Republic of Cameroon. The Lawyers held meetings in Bamenda and Buea, and came out with the following proposals: A call for the return of a two-states Federation that existed before 1972, and on the government to cease from sending Francophone Magistrates to Anglophone Courts. By late November, armed security forces pursued Common Law Lawyers who embarked on a peaceful protest in Bamenda and Buea. Lawyers were severely tortured, their gowns and wigs ceased, while some sustained injuries from rubber bullets.

On November 21 2016, Anglophone Teachers who had written to the Prime Minister Philemon Yang about their grievances but without any response also decided to embark on a strike action. The "Coffin Revolution", a strike action by a Private Radio Animator, Mancho Bibixy, was also observed in Bamenda the capital city of North West Region concurrently with the Teachers strike. Mancho's Bibixy peaceful march against the poor state of roads in Bamenda town and the inefficiency of the city council authorities to develop Bamenda town, turned violent when security forces attacked the peaceful crowd. Hundreds of protesters wielding peace plants clashed with armed troops, and many people were arrested. Later in that same month, a student protest on the campus of the University of Buea in the South West Region met with violent

repression from security forces. Hundreds of students were arrested and detained, some were forced into stagnant water and mud, while the security forces moved into the students' residential areas and arrested students in their rooms (*The Scoop People Magazine*, 2018).

The crisis in the Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon intensified on 22nd September and 1st October 2017. On 22 September 2017, close to 80,000 people protested across thirty Anglophone towns and communities (Bamenda, Buea, Kumba, Kumbo, Limbe, etc.) to demand the release of Anglophone political prisoners, the departure of President Biya, the implementation of federalism, and secession (*NewAfrican Magazine*, 2018). The demonstrations were organized to coincide with President Biya's speech to the UN General Assembly. Initially peaceful, these protest marches turned violent in some areas. In Buea, some protesters vandalized the home of the town's mayor (an Anglophone but a fierce opponent and a staunch supporter of the regime). In Mamfe, a police station was set on fire. Overreaction on the part of the defense and security forces in Santa, Bamenda, Ekona, and Limbe resulted to the death of four protesters, with dozens more injured. The scale of the demonstrations on 22 September, the largest in Cameroon since February 2008, seemed to have surprised authorities, who had until then underestimated Anglophone discontent and the weight of the secessionist movement. This was probably what prompted the government to deploy more 1,000 soldiers and imposed a de facto state of emergency and martial law, and the military arrested civilians who were transported to the capital city Yaounde, judged in military courts, and sentence passed on them following the Terrorism Law.

On October 1, tens of thousands of people began a peaceful march (holding tree branches symbolizing peace, and chanting "no violence") to proclaim the independence of Ambazonia (the name given by secessionists to their future state). In Bamenda, Buea, and across dozens of towns and communities, people marched and hoisted Ambazonian flags at intersections and at the residences of traditional chiefs as well as at a police station and a gendarmerie post. Independence was symbolically proclaimed in chiefs' compounds. Defense and security forces responded with disproportionate force, leading to at least 40 deaths and over 100 injured protesters between September and October. This death toll is the result of live ammunitions and excessive use of tear gas, including in homes and against the faithful as they left church. Defense and security forces arrested hundreds of people along the streets and in their houses without warrant (International Crisis Group, 2017). They made use of torture and inhuman and degrading treatments. Sexual abuse, destruction of property, and looting of homes by soldiers and police, as well as shooting from helicopters at protesters in Kumba, Bamenda, and near Buea, were reported by a dozen residents, local politicians, senior officials, the press, human rights organizations, and the Catholic Bishops of the two regions.

The villages of secessionist leaders such as Ewele, Akwaya, Eyumodjock, and Ekona were targeted by the defense and security forces, forcing thousands of young men to flee to the bush for fear of being killed, or arrested and tortured. According to eye witness statements from locals, a policeman and a soldier deployed in the zone, “soldiers are murdering some people in their homes and shooting at the feet of others”. On his Facebook page, the former Supreme Court judge, Ayah Paul Abine, claimed to have escaped assassination at his home in Akwaya, a border town with Nigeria. It was also reported that his house was looted by soldiers. Violence, arrests, and looting, by the military and police continued throughout the month of October, notably in the border town of Ekok in Manyu Division. Suspected for promoting secessionist ideas, Deputy Mayor of Ndu was killed at his residence by the military (International Crisis Group, 2017). This widespread violence took place during a de facto state of emergency and martial law, imposed by the two regional governors from 29 September to 3 October: they enforced curfews, banned demonstrations and gatherings of more than four people, closed regional land and sea borders, brought in military reinforcements, banned all movements from one Division to another, banned motorcycling, and cut off social networks, followed by the internet, and electricity.

On October 1 2017, people were also forbidden from leaving their homes. Some senior officials and high-ranking officers explained the need for these excessive measures by a lack of police officers, which had to be compensated through military reinforcements, untrained in crowd control. They also pointed to insufficient police equipment, the lack of blank cartridges, and inadequate stock or misuse of tear gas. Their claim was that gendarmes and police officers mismanaged their stock of tear gas, which were insufficient by using it in homes, and ran out of stocks when faced with protesters. These high-ranking officers also accused protesters of inciting unrest by burning vehicles that belonged to the Divisional Officer and Senior Divisional Officer in Boyo and Fundong in the Northwest Region. Protesters also snatched weapons from gendarmes in Kumba in the Southwest Region, ransacked the police stations of Ikiliwindi, Mabanda, Teke, and Kongle, and stoned at police and military in Buea and Bamenda. Finally, they pointed out that some police officers and military personnel refused to participate in the violence, which meant that the security apparatus was understaffed (Reuters, 2017). The conflagration of the crisis and the massacre of 1 October were predictable, especially since the declaration of independence and demonstrations were announced beforehand. The violence was an intensification of the crisis which had grown throughout the month of August.

Since January 2018, the situation in the Anglophone region unfortunately transformed into a guerrilla war fare with armed men, under the banner of Ambazonia Defense Force (ADF) fighting in support of the Anglophones, carrying out sporadic attacks against government forces. This situation further intensified insecurity along the border zone and even further into the interior as hundreds of civilians were killed, with government forces registering several casualties from the secessionist fighters. Government forces were reinforced and they continued with intense attacks on

villages, set some on fire, looted the homes of, and killed several unarmed, civilians, with the intention to neutralize the Ambazonian fighters (*The Summit Magazine*, 2018). Recently, the Ambazonian fighters resorted to kidnapping government officials in the Anglophone zone. In February 2018, the Divisional Officer for Batibo, Marcel Namata Diteng, and the Regional Delegate for Social Affairs for North West Region, Animbom Aaron, were kidnapped by unidentified men. In April, the Chairman of the General Certificate of Education Board (GCE), Prof. Ivo Leke Tambo, was kidnapped but later released after the payment of ransom to the ADF fighters. The trend of kidnappings continued with several Municipal Councilors and traditional rulers who sympathized with the government abducted.

The latest kidnappings were those of former vice president of the South West Court of Appeal, Justice Martin Mbeng; the Principal of Government High School Bolifamba in Mile 16 Buea, Mrs. Georgiana Enanga Sanga; and the Principal of Cameroon Baptist Academy in Muyuka Sub Division, Erick Ngumba. Throughout the month of May, there were severe battles between the Ambazonian fighters and government forces in several towns and villages to destabilize the celebration of May 20th Cameroon's National Day in the Anglophone zone (*The Scoop People Magazine*, 2018). Since the beginning of the crisis in October 2016, at least 150 persons have been killed in the Anglophone Zone; several hundreds injured; hundreds more arrested in the Anglophone regions and deported to prison cells in Yaounde; thousands forced to migrate to neighboring Nigeria as refugees, while thousands have become internally displaced persons living in other towns, villages, bushes and forests in the country.

Forced Migration

Few studies have attempted to identify roaming refugees suffering from a high sense of insecurity and forced displacement due to ethno-religious causes. However, by adopting a descriptive approach, it is possible to analyze the migratory itinerary, refugee influx, and the internally displaced. In late 2013, the Boko Haram insurgence forced millions of people to migrate towards the Cameroon-Nigeria border in successive waves. The first set of migrants entered Madagali, (Nigeria) via Tourou and Mogode (Cameroon) at the border of Adamawa and the South West region. They temporally settled in the villages of Zhelevet in the sub-divisions of Moyo-Mosoka, Gawar, and Minawaou in the Moko sub-division. The second entry route was through the Kerewa locality from where the refugees proceeded to settle in Assighassic, Kolofata, and Mora in the Moyo Sava division. The first massive wave of refugees estimated at 20,000 people, arrived from Bama in Nigeria in August 2013 and sought refuge in Amchide, Kolofata, and Mora in Cameroon (*Strategic Prospective Analysis Bulletin*, EIFORCES 2014). According to the UNHCR, several people were forced to migrate and settle along the border region as refugees exceeded the Minawaou capacity of 39,000. The UN Organ maintained that in 2014, new arrivals fled recurrent attacks over a three week period in the region of Gwoza in the Borno state of Nigeria before settling in Cameroon as refugees.

Other waves of refugees found shelter in Cameroon through highly insecure routes. In March 2014, several waves, 7500 refugees, who fled prolonged fighting in the Borno and Yobe states in particular, were said to be in an “emergency situation” in the Moyo Sava division. Faced with the escalation of violence, 4.200 refugees migrated and regrouped in Kolofata and Amchide, and 600 in Waza, were registered in 2013 (Mbarkoutou, 2014). According to administrative authorities, 5.500 refugees arrived Kolofata, 3.000 in Kerawa, and 370 in Mora, and certain localities in Moyo–Sava of Logone, and Chari. About 90% of the population of Kerawa in Nigeria and other small villages, for instance, took refuge in Cameroon. In Fotokol in Logone and Chari, a temporary camp welcomed approximately 5.000 Nigerian refugees from Gambaburu-Ngala, following its capture by Boko Haram (Fonkeng, 2016). Furthermore, several waves of refugees migrated and settled in temporary camps, after which they were transferred to the Minawaou camp near Mokolo. In total, since the beginning of the crisis, the Cameroonian localities reported the arrival of 43.720 Nigerian refugees; 26.720 were registered by the UNHCR.

Following the recent Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon, several indigenes along the Cameroon-Nigeria border were forced to migrate to neighboring Nigeria as refugees. The border towns and villages that experienced forced migration to Nigeria were Ekok, Kembong, Eyumojock, Akwaya, Egbekaw, Mamfe Central, and other localities in Manyu Division (*The Summit Magazine*, 2018). The population that was forced to migrate to Nigeria as refugees increased to over 21.000 persons, composed mostly of women and children. With the deplorable insecurity situation in the Anglophone zone, latest statistics show that there are 22.291 refugees in Cross River State, 17.003 in Benue State, 3.525 in Akwa Ibom State, and 584 in Taraba State in neighboring Nigeria. These form a basis to hold the view that the Cameroon-Nigeria border towns and villages are witnessing the worst refugee crisis as a result of recurrent insecurity in the area (United Nations Refugee Agency, 2018).

Internally Displaced Persons

The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) reported that, in June 2014 the number of internally displaced persons stood at 250.000 as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency. The first effects were felt at the internal level with 17.000 internally displaced persons cramped in six camps along the Cameroon-Nigeria border. The crisis in North Eastern Nigeria displaced about 70.000 persons towards neighboring Niger, and about 1.600 others towards Chad. Approximately 650.000 persons were internally displaced in North Eastern Nigeria due to the Boko Haram insurgency (*Strategic and Prospective Analysis Bulletin*, 2014). The immediate consequence for Cameroon was the increase in internally displaced persons as a result of constant attacks by Boko Haram terrorists on the various refugee camps on its territory. The border towns of Doumo and Mayo Oulo in the division of Moyo Louti in the Northern region welcomed thousands of internally displaced people.

Authorities of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in Cameroon reported that some Nigerian displaced population along the border settled at border localities in Cameroon such as Guider, Figuil, Baurha, and Koza. In the month of November, the Bourho sub-division of the division of Moyo Sava registered several numbers of displaced people from refugee camps and the border fleeing Boko Haram insurgency. Approximately 11.000 people, including 250 Nigerian soldiers and police officers, occupied schools, garages, and other public private buildings in areas such as Garoua, Guider, and Figuil along the border (*The Median News Paper*, 2016). The general phenomenon of internal displacement of populations paralyzed the Nigerian villages of Belel and Sarow, 50km away from Gashiga, and divisions of Benue and Mayo Louti as the villages were completely deserted.

The Anglophone Crisis in the North West and South West Regions of Cameroon generated significant internal displacements along the Cameroon-Nigeria border and further into the interior of the country. The number of people internally displaced from towns to villages and from villages to bushes and forests increased tremendously since November 2017. Recent findings revealed that over 160.000 people were internally displaced in the two affected regions of Cameroon. The South West Region contains 90 percent of the over 160.000 people with 135.000 located in Meme Division, 15.000 in Manyu Division, and about 10.000 in the North West Region (*The Horizon Newspaper*, 2018). Several inhabitants of Meme Division were forced to abandon their homes and escaped into neighboring communities as a result of constant gun shots, burning, and looting of their localities for close to one month. Several inhabitants of the villages of Kake 1, Kake 11, and Diffa in Kumba 1 Sub-Division; Mukonje, Malende, Etam, and Ekiliwindi in Kumba 111 Sub-Division; and Small Ekumbe, Kwa Kwa, Bole, Kombone in Mbonge Sub-Division, were internally displaced into different towns and villages while some moved into the forests for safety.

Policy Options and Recommendations

Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Benin, Central African Republic, and other countries affected by the Boko Haram terrorist group should strengthen coordination and cooperation in combating crimes that are connected with terrorism, including drug trafficking in all its forms, illicit arms trade, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, money laundering, and smuggling of nuclear weapons and other deadly materials. They should ensure the apprehension and prosecution or extradition of perpetrators of terrorist acts, in accordance with provisions of national and international laws, including human rights laws, refugees laws, and international humanitarian laws. In this regard, they should ensure that their territories are not used for terrorist installations or training camps, or for the preparation or organization of acts intended to be committed against other states or their citizens.

Recruitments for terrorist activities tend to be most successful in regions that lack developmental projects and are plagued with high rates of unemployment. The situation aggravates when these areas are safe havens for terrorists like in Northern

Nigeria. The high rates of unemployment and illiteracy that exist in the Northern parts of Cameroon and Nigeria worked to the advantage of the Boko Haram terrorists as desperate youths who needed employment easily found jobs as soldiers, suicide bombers, and intelligence agents in the terrorist group. The Governments of Cameroon and Nigeria need to carry out massive socio-economic development along their common border which stretches from Lake Chad to the Atlantic Ocean, with developmental projects geared towards job creation for the youths.

Following the recurrent insecurity situations along the Cameroon-Nigeria Border, the governments of the two countries are more involved in military activities to diffuse tensions. But, this is not a sustainable solution to the crisis. Such military activities should be accorded less attention, while more attention should be diverted to health, education, and infrastructure, which are issues of more vital concern to the indigenes. In most cases of peacebuilding (reconstruction efforts after conflict termination), it is the integrity of the state that is often given security priority. Insecurity is, in other words, synonymous with an attack on the integrity of the state. As a result of this unidimensional, state-centric view of security, many states confronted with civil strife have been unable to resolve their difficulties. Besides, many peacebuilding efforts undermine the emphasis on human security because people are viewed as the "means" to political stability as opposed to being the "end" of all peacebuilding efforts. People are also viewed as the means to a stable state conducive to the infiltration of globalization trends (Morgan, 2005). Therefore, reforms to prevent insecurity along the Cameroon-Nigeria Border should be people-centered, including local participation from indigenes in the area.

Local knowledge is a critical factor for sustainable development and as such the empowerment of local communities is a prerequisite for a sustainable development process. The integration of appropriate local knowledge into development programs for the local communities along the Cameroon-Nigeria border will contribute to efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainable development. Local Knowledge needs to be constantly used, challenged, and further adapted to the rich economic potentials in the area. Supporting local initiatives can help disseminate useful and relevant knowledge which could enable communities participate more actively in the development process.

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CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Irregular Migration and Insecurity in Nigeria

Ogbonnaya N. Udoh, Dick O. Uduma, and Hilary N. Obike

Introduction

In sub-Saharan Africa, it was a feature of the region long before colonization. In West Africa, migration is a normal process of interaction even with the forceful partitioning and colonization (Adeola and Oluyemi, 2012). Styan (2007) had noted that the economic security of an increasing number of Africans is connected to migration for employment, educational opportunities, wealth, and economic security.

According to a United Nations Report(2017), there has been an upsurge in the number of migrants moving from 173 million in 2000 to 220 million in 2010 and to 258 million in 2017. The largest number of migrants lives in the United States of America, with Saudi Arabia, Germany, and Russian Federation, respectively hosting the second, third, and fourth largest number of global migrants (around 12 million each), followed by the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, each hosting around 9 million. A World Bank Report (2014) maintains that international migration in Nigeria is driven by endemic poverty, harmful economic and political systems, national conflicts and violence, human rights abuses, weak government, weak respect for rule of law, weak control of corruption, environmental conditions and changes, and population growth and changes.

As Adepoju and Van Der Wiel, (2007) put it, the quest by Nigerians to migrate to other countries largely commenced when the Nigerian economy began to witness a downturn in 1982. This downturn resulted in unemployment and increased poverty, with many skilled Nigerian professionals leaving the country in search of better fortunes in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Arab countries. Therefore, the current trends in migration in Nigeria is one of increase both in geographic scope, numerical frequency and intensity- perhaps also in ingenuity and subtlety. According to a United Nations Report (2017), the number of Nigerian migrants moved from 488,000 in 2000 to 1,235 million in 2017. This implies that 0.4 per cent and 0.6 per cent of Nigeria's population migrated respectively in 2000 and 2017. Hence, international migration has therefore created room for positive economic increase reflected in the form of remittances.

The International Office for Migration Report (2017) noted that the movement of people across international boundaries is still having huge implications for development and poverty alleviation in both origin and destination countries. Destination states largely benefit from migrants 'contributions to science and

technology, enrichment through cultural diversity, filling critical labour gaps, creation of jobs as entrepreneurs, paying taxes, and contribution to social welfare schemes. For instance, a large number of highly skilled Nigerian immigrant populations is engaged especially in medical profession work in the United States and Europe. The Report also noted that one of the positive links between migration and consolidation of development is the transfer of remittances by Nigerians in the diaspora, with inflows increasing dramatically from 2.3 billion US dollars in 2004 to 17.9 billion US dollars in 2017, accounting for 6.7 percent of her GDP.

On the other hand, it has been discovered that the greatest challenge irregular migration has placed on Nigeria is that it has threatened her national security by increasing the rate of criminality along her borders, which comes in forms such as smuggling, human trafficking, drug trafficking, religious carnage fuelled by imported extremism, and so on. These national security threats are attributable to bad governance, inability to police the borders, and extremely porous nature of Nigeria's borders manifested in the massive proliferation of small arms and light weapons (Adeola and Oluyemi, 2012; Akowe, 2017).

As no fewer than 10,000 Nigerians have died between January and May 2017 while trying to irregularly migrate through the Mediterranean Sea and the deserts. 4,900 Nigerians had died in the Mediterranean Sea, while the rest died going through the deserts in their bid to cross to Europe. Irregular migrants and traffickers (from Nigeria) go through Niger Republic, Mali, Libya and Morocco. In some circumstances, irregular immigrants have their organs (kidney and livers) sold on black markets to sick people in China and other countries (Adelani, 2017).

The motivation of a typical Nigerian migrant is not only for employment, educational opportunities, wealth, and economic security, but also as a response to security challenges such as the indigene/settler crisis, the activities of the Boko-Haram terrorist group, and the farmers-herdsmen crisis. This complex mixture of national security challenges has not only necessitated the need to migrate, but has also generated other reinforcing problems such as food scarcity, internally displaced persons (IDPs), proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Trans-National Organized Crimes (drug trafficking, human trafficking, modern-day slavery), and such knock-on effects as intrastate conflict, complex emergencies, and near state collapse.

Theoretical Framework

For an in-depth examination, explanation, and understanding of the nature, pattern, character, dynamics, and motivating forces of irregular migration and threats to national security in Nigeria between 2007 and 2017, this study will situate its analysis within the context of relative deprivation theory as espoused by the Dollard (1939). This theory was propounded as part of efforts to link socio-political and economic problems in the society to real and imagined inequalities. As an individual and group-based theory of aggression, the relative deprivation theory argues that when expectation outstrips achievement regardless of the absolute levels of economic

consumption or the provision of political rights, frustration is generated. Thus, the collective frustration turns to anger and violence (Davies, 1962).

Aku, Ibrahim, and Bulus cited in Kehinde (2015:5) described relative deprivation in a five-dimension poverty matrix, namely:

- Personal and physical deprivation experienced as a result of health, nutritional, literacy and educational disability and lack of self-confidence;
- Economic deprivation drawn from the lack of access to property, income, assets, factors of production, and finance;
- Social deprivation as a result of denial from full participation in social, political, and economic activities;
- Cultural deprivation in terms of access to values, beliefs, knowledge, information, and attitudes which deprive the people of control of their own destinies;
- Political deprivation in terms of lack of political voice to participate in decision making that affects their lives.

Basically, what feeds into broader narratives for understanding the quest for irregular migration and threats to Nigeria's national security is attributable to decades of poor economic policy, bandaged in part by the oil-resource curse, corruption, and bad leadership. Politico-economic trends suggest that fraudulent practices, improper legal and regulatory framework, public-sector driven corruption, have in various scales contributed to the problems of insecurity, mass poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy (Udoh, Ekwuribe and Ukuku, 2017). What also feeds into broader narratives for understanding irregular migration and insecurity is that Nigeria is weak. Globally, Nigeria's institutions are ranked (129th), with insufficiently protected property rights, high corruption, and undue influence. Security situation remains dire (139th), infrastructure (134th), health and primary education (143rd). Nigeria has consistently ranked low in the Global Peace Index (GPI, 2012), signifying a worsened state of insecurity in the country attributable to deterioration of state governance and democratic accountability manifested in the incapacity of government to deliver public services and to provide basic needs for the masses. Hence, in a 'paradox of plenty', a pool of frustrated people, pervasive material inequalities, and unfairness is created (Nigeria-South Africa Chamber of Commerce Report, 2016).

The theory, therefore, suggests that political leaders in Nigeria walk development paths that foster frustration, deprivation, and dependence, worsen conditions of material existence, and above all alienate the people. Successive governments have shown their inability to develop the economy and adequately deliver on their promises.

Our choice of the relative deprivation theory to explain irregular migration and threats to Nigeria's national security is guided by scholarly works by social scientists such as Smith and Pettigrew. Smith and Pettigrew (2015) assert that relative deprivation

theory is predicated on emotions, cognitions, and behaviours, which lead to a wide range of outcomes such as violence and engagement in deviant activities in order to meet individual targets which may lead to collective or individual actions against the state. Political science research on relative deprivation focuses on a people's comparison with past, future desired, and deserved self.

The relevance of this framework of analysis to our study is in its suitability in explaining how successive governments' lack of accountability, lack of political will to implement far-reaching policies, manipulation of primordial loyalties and sentiments, scandalous levels of corruption, among others, have deepened Nigeria's political and economic woes. As noted by Badawale (2007), Nigeria's political and economic woes are attributable to the client list nature of the state. The client list Nigerian state merely serves as an instrument in the hands of the local elites in different collaborations with foreign capital to dictate the political and economic circumstances. In applying this framework to the analysis of irregular migration and threats to Nigeria's national security, this theory assists us to understand that a large number of Nigerians live below the poverty line, and a large number of Nigerian youths are unemployed. According to a World Bank Report (2014), over 70% of Nigeria's population lives on \$1.25 (N200) or even less per day. The report revealed that two-third of the world's extreme poor are concentrated in just five countries: India, China, Nigeria, Bangladesh, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It added that less than 10% of Nigeria's population amasses and controls over 90% of the country's wealth and resources, causing so much poverty, and leaving so many citizens dying of hunger and disease. This situation has resulted to a mix of high rate of irregular migration, crime, and insecurity in the country.

Understanding Irregular Migration and Insecurity Mix in Nigeria, 2007-2017

This study views irregular migration as the organized or unorganized movement of people within or across borders either forced or voluntarily, with the intention of seeking refugee from oppression, deprivation, poverty, hunger, disease, violence, war, with also the intention of returning to the place of origin when conditions improve. This study accepts the definition of insecurity by the Nigeria-South Africa Chamber of Commerce Report (2016) as the state of fear or anxiety, stemming from a concrete or alleged lack of protection. It refers to lack or inadequate freedom from danger. This definition reflects physical insecurity which is the most visible form of insecurity, and it feeds into many other forms of insecurity such as economic security and social security.

As for Alli (2010:73), Security is a contested concept that is generally accepted as the condition or feeling of safety from fear, anxiety, danger, poverty and oppression; the defense, protection and preservation of core values and the absence of threats to these core values. Security concerns the individuals and groups that are not just states alone, hence when individuals are not secured, and then the state is not secure. The broadening of the concept of security has gone beyond individual, societal, state,

regional and global levels. As it affects peace, the broadening of the concept of security in non-military dimensions encompasses social, economic, and political factors such as environment, migration, ethno-religious crisis, identity, health/diseases (HIV/AIDS, bird flu, malaria), poverty, human rights abuse, political disputes, political succession, bad governance, and so on.

Migration and threats to Nigeria's national security can be attributed to several factors such as abject poverty, unemployment, and lack of government presence at the border areas. The last factor is considered to have created a fertile ground for unscrupulous elements around borders. The border communities complain of Nigerian government's inability to provide basic socio-economic infrastructure such as access to roads, clinics, schools, water facilities, among others. In fact, the North-Eastern part of the Nigerian border which has the highest concentration of border communities can be listed as the most backward due to difficult terrains, lowest literacy level, and highest poverty and unemployment rate. A combination of these factors explains why the region has the highest number of border-related crimes including the Boko-Haram insurgency (Odu, 2015).

Security is particularly threatened by irregular migration. It is this type of migration that is spreading in Nigerian thanks to the frustration and deprivation being experienced by most Nigerians. In our journeyed research experience to the Nigeria-Cameroun border (Ikom-Effraya-Mfun-Ekok borderline up to Dschang) on 13th-16th May, 2018, we discovered that migration:

1. Exposes the lack of social cohesion, and political and economic failures in the migrants' home-countries. The push factor to migrate is conceived out of life being unbearably disorganized largely out of war, conflict, diseases, hunger, starvation, poverty, injustice, deprivation, and unemployment. Hence, the need for potential migrants to work towards improving their living conditions for self and loved ones.
2. In comparison with the origin country, migration elevates the standards and conditions living of the migrants' home countries.
3. Migration (mostly irregular) largely exposes the porosity of the borders of both the origin and destination countries.

Beyond the factor of abject poverty, unemployment, and other socio-economic forces, the factor of migrating to send remittances to country of origin is motivating migration. In 2017, Nigeria tops remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa with \$22bn, the highest in the Sub-Saharan region, and the fifth highest in the world. This represents 10 percent increase when compared to the \$19.64 billion sent home in 2016. The amount sent home by Nigerians in diaspora represents the highest in the Sub-Saharan Africa region, followed by Senegal and Ghana, with \$2.2 billion each for the year. However, the quest for irregular migration from Nigeria emanates from the need to escape different security situations; remit funds and thereby increase standard of

living and alleviate poverty. This trend continues to open up varied security threats to Nigeria (Adegbesan, 2018).

The porous borders contribute and continue to encourage cross border crimes and instability in the region. For instance, Nigeria Immigration Service reports that there are 1,497 irregular and 84 regular routes in Nigeria. The United States Ambassador to Nigeria has lamented the worsening crime rate in coastal areas and the free movement of Islamic extremists between Mali and Nigeria through the North-East of Nigeria. The Ambassador noted that officials have seen reports for years about fighters from the radical Islamic extremist network, Boko Haram, travelling to Mali to receive training there (Zik, 2016).

According to Odu(2015), one of the security threats is the conscription of individuals and groups by Boko-Haram insurgents, including attacks on police stations, army barracks and schools, armed banditry, bunkering, drug pushing, weapon trafficking, human and drug trafficking, among others. These and other security threats have resulted in large-scale destruction of lives, property, and economy of the already impoverished border communities., These threats are also complicated by the ease of access to weapons, which is made possible by the porous borders.


Addressing Migration and National Security Threats in Nigeria: Some Concluding Remarks and Recommendations

This paper established that the quest to migrate is enhanced by relative deprivation, oppression, and elites amassing public resources. The quest to migrate originates from the inability of more developed governments to positively respond to the needs of people in less developed and irregular migration-prone countries. Responding to the needs of these countries could dissuade potential irregular migrants from migrating out of their countries.

Therefore, the following recommendations, will contribute in addressing Nigeria's increasing security threats, which partly result from irregular migration:

1. The Nigeria government needs to adopt a strategic approach to the problem of irregular migration through the implementation of the Counter Immigration and Security (COISEC) Strategy depicted in the figure below:

Figure 1: Counter Immigration and Security (COISEC) Strategy for Nigeria



Source: Researchers’ Own (May, 2018).

This strategy provides a process of adjustment for reducing vulnerabilities and enhancing resilience to observed or expected changes in international migration and threats to Nigeria’s national security. The COISEC strategy calls for an institutionalized and practical approach that involves an adjustment in perceptions, processes, functions and even practice. The support-base of the COISEC strategy revolves around an adjustment to a variety of security scales-domestic and international; moderating institutionally-driven policies, programmes, and partnerships, at the national, regional and global levels.

In strengthening the institutionalization of the COISEC strategy, the advocacy is for improved state-society relations geared towards stemming the tide of threats posed by irregular migration to state institutions, potential migration, and the people in origin and destination countries. Also, in origin and destination countries, the advocacy is for the moderation of migration to serve national, regional, and global development. It is the submission of this strategy that the interactions between origin and destination/receiving countries are capable of delivering and rendering more inclusive and protective security network. The COISEC strategy calls for the Nigerian government in collaboration with border communities. This form of collaboration will help to identify routes constantly used by international migrants

The COISEC strategy suggests that a COISEC Unit can be created within the presidency. It will have the objective to monitor inter-agency security collaborations, irregular migration, and thus forestall real and imagined inter-agency conflicts. The COISEC Unit will help to improve the Presidents' security consciousness by giving real-time updates. The COISEC unit will help to tackle emerging and perceived threats generated by irregular migration. In all, the COISEC Unit through her strategic research and intelligence calculations will help reduce the increasing influence of human traffickers and terrorists, and in the process help reduce security threats.

2. In furtherance to our recommendation, this study agrees with Odu (2015) that government should adopt policies that will transform border areas from their deplorable conditions, and put in place effective machinery that would speed up human development along the borders. This would also ensure patriotism by the inhabitants and deter their youth from being exploited by criminals. More so, this study recommends that Nigeria's security agencies should be configured to be proactively-driven rather than reactionary-driven, in gathering intelligence on irregular migration. The country needs to configure its security apparatus to be intelligence-driven, and as such, governments should establish centers to collect information about migrants to enable the challenges posed by irregular movements to be forestalled. Intelligence is required to identify potential routes, victims, financiers, and/or groups and target destinations, so that security measures can be taken.

3. This research work accepts that migration from less developed countries to developed countries is an irreversible issue, and can be better managed than stopped. Therefore, it is the position of this study that balance between restrictive safety and civil liberties to be struck. To achieve this objective, collaborative efforts on the part of the media and the civil society are required to inform and educate irregular migrants on negative impacts of embarking on such perilous journey.

4. The United Nations on its part also need to pass a resolution that deal particularly with the irregular migrant issue with an established international legal system to try them. Nations should consider applying drastic sanctions against states harbouring or supporting migrant's movements. This will include severing all communication, including those by air and sea, ceasing all commercial contacts, and withholding any aids, goods and foods.

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CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Armed Conflicts and Forced Migration in the Lake Chad Area: Implication for Nigeria's Security

Chinyere Ibeh and Miriam Adah

Introduction

Throughout recorded history, oppression, disaster and armed conflict have been major causes of Forced Migration (FM), whereby people flee their homelands in search of safe and secured locations (Redmond, 2006,). For instance, in AD 70, the Romans destroyed the City of Jerusalem, sending many Jews into forced exile in search of a safe and secured environment (Wheaton, 2004). Also, during the Spanish Inquisition of the 15th Century, the Moors and the Jews were banished from Spain to take refuge elsewhere (World Refugee Survey). Furthermore, the Second World War resulted to over 7 million Jews fleeing their ancestral homes due to Nazi threats, intimidations, and massacre. Additionally, the Arabs of Palestine were displaced from their homeland because of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948–1949. In Africa, the origin of forced migration could be traced to the pre-colonial slave trade era of 1442-1800 (Paul 2000), specifically between 1680 and 1700, when the British were reported to be responsible for the forced migration of about 30 million under-aged Africans under bonded slave conditions to Europe. This pattern of forced displacement of people from their homelands is still in existence even in the present times. For instance, after her independence in 1960, Nigeria experienced another round of mass forced migration of about 4.5 million people during the 30 months Civil War from 1967 to 1970, with adverse effects on her National Security (Wale, 2014). Also, in 1994, political and ethnic fighting in Rwanda, resulted in the displacement of more than 2 million people, out of which over half-a- million became refugees in neighbouring countries. (The State of World Refugee Today, 1994).

According to the World Refugees Survey 1964, 'Forced Migration' could be conceptualized as the movement of people from their ancestral settlements, places of origin and natural environments because of natural disasters, armed conflicts, political harassments, racial discrimination, and religious oppression, among others (World Refugee Survey 1964). According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Africa, which constitutes about 17 per cent of the World's population, provides over 30 per cent of the world's refugees. These people were displaced by any or combination of food shortages and starvation, quest for socio-cultural and territorial autonomy, racial oppressions, economic hardships, climate change, armed conflict, among others (The State of World Refugee Today, 1994). The foregoing suggests that people are generally forced to flee turmoil in their home countries and become refugees in neighbouring countries, with attendant socio-

economic and political implications on both the refugees and the national security of the host countries in which they seek refuge.

Since the end of the 20th century, countries of the Lake Chad area namely, Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Niger, Nigeria, Libya, Egypt and Sudan have been involved in a cycle of political violence, resulting in forced migration and mass movement of their people as refugees. For instance, Sudan has witnessed only 10 years of peace between 1972 and 1983 since she gained independence in 1956 as she was constantly at war with her Southern Sudanese neighbours before and after that period. The Libyan civil wars, which began with the Arab Spring of 2011, resulted in thousands of casualties, small arms and light weapon proliferation, as well as forced migration and refugee crisis. The Central African Republic (CAR), Cameroun and Nigeria are also involved in the armed conflicts and forced migration of their citizens as refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) These conflicts have resulted in displacement of millions of people from their homelands, especially women and children, with adverse implications on the national security of Nigeria. It is against this backdrop this paper seeks to interrogate the nature and dynamics of forced migrations arising from armed conflicts in the Lake Chad area and their implications on Nigeria's national security with emphasis on human security and border control including political, social, and economic realities. The paper further seeks to examine existing policies and strategies at national and regional levels targeted at addressing the scourge of armed conflicts and forced migration with a view to proffering credible recommendations that would mitigate the twin tragedies. This study utilizes primary and secondary sources through field survey and document analysis. Quantitative and qualitative methods were used to analyse the data obtained.

Conceptual Clarification

Forced Migration

The UNHCR views forced migration as displacement or involuntary movement of persons across international borders or inside a single country (The UN Refugee Agency 2016). This definition is, however, silent on the causes of forced migration and, therefore, does not meet the objectives of this study. The International Association for the Study of Forced Migration explains forced migration to mean “a general term that refers to compulsive and involuntary movement of refugees and internally displaced people as well as people displaced by natural or man-made disasters, such as environmental, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine and development projects, armed conflict or civil wars” (Forced Migration, 2011). This definition highlights the salient causes of forced migration and is therefore assessed as sufficient for this research.

Armed Conflict

Armed conflict could be conceptualized “as a political conflict in which armed combat involves the armed forces of at least one state or one or more-armed factions seeking to gain control of all or part of the state, and in which at least 1,000 people have been killed by the fighting during the course of the conflict” (The Ploughshares, 2010). This

definition is silent on the areas of armed conflict whether within national or international boundaries; it therefore does not meet the objective of this study. The International Humanitarian Law (IHL) distinguishes two types of armed conflicts – International Armed Conflicts (IACs), which involve two or more conflicting states, and Non-International Armed Conflicts (NACs), which take place mainly between governmental forces and non-governmental armed groups. IACs are those that “occur when one or more States have recourse to armed force against another state, regardless of the reasons or the intensity of this confrontation and no formal declaration of war or recognition of the situation is required” (ICRC Opinion paper, March 2008). For example, for an issue about whether belligerent states recognize each other’s government or not, there may be an IAC. Apart from regular, inter-state armed conflicts, IAC could also mean a situation in which people fight against colonial occupation, alien domination or racist regimes in pursuit of their quest for socio-cultural and territorial autonomy and self-determination (wars of national liberation).

NACs on the other hand apply to armed conflicts that are not of international nature, and which involve at least one non-governmental armed group. NACs do not include internal disturbances and tensions, riots, or acts of banditry. The state of upheavals must reach a certain threshold and the resulting hostilities must attain a certain level of intensity, before such situations could be assessed as NACs. This may be the case, for example, when the hostilities are of a collective character or when the government is obliged to use military force against the insurgents, instead of mere police forces. Second, non-governmental groups involved in the conflict must be considered as "parties to the conflict", meaning that they possess organized armed forces (ICRC Opinion paper, March 2008). This means for example that these forces have to be under a certain command structure and have the capacity to sustain military operations. This definition establishes a distinction between international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts in the meaning of common Art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and non-international armed conflicts falling within the definition provided in Art. 1 of Additional Protocol II and is therefore assessed to be sufficient for this study

National Security

Several definitions and interpretations of security abound, which has made it difficult to arrive at a simple and common definition of the concept. This is mainly due to ideological differences, varying perceptions and opinion, as well as disparate and diverse understandings of the concept among security experts. According to Schelling, security could be viewed broadly as “freedom from hunger, fear, anxiety, and uncertainty” (Schelling 1988) However, this definition is not explicit on what constitutes the kind of hunger, fear, or anxiety an individual or nation needs to be exonerated from to be secure. During the Cold War Era, there was a paradigm shift in the concept of security from security of individual states to national security. During that era, national security was conceived, defined and projected as mainly physical security of safeguarding the territorial integrity of nations and therefore a strict concern of the armed forces. Accordingly, Korany demonstrated that: “national

security is military defence against external threat, perceived or real, potential or immediate” (Korany, 1993). Korany pointed out that the insecurity during the Cold War era was due to over concentration of efforts on military matters at the expense of other equally important issues.

Manem observed that “nations became concerned about their security from being dominated, attacked or annihilated by nations or groups” (Manem et al 1985). The view resulted in wide spread fear of insecurity and accumulation of weapons by nations. This was what Korany referred to as the traditional and militaristic perspective to national security, where national security means “the defence against military or external threat, perceived or real, potential or immediate.” After the Cold War, emerging security challenges altered the perception of national security from the traditional perspective to the modern viewpoint. Before then, however, Eisenhower had already projected modern approach of U.S national security. He saw national security as that which should transcend the nation’s military and foreign policy concerns, to include its domestic and economic stability (Dockrill, 1996).

According to Irekpita, “National security is government providing for national unity, territorial integrity, security of the individual with respect to food sufficiency, shelter adequacy, health, equality of opportunity, self-actualization, promotion of national ethics of discipline, self-reliance and patriotism and the national mobilization of all citizens and their participation in defence and security matters” (Irekpita, 1998). This view clearly suggests that it is the responsibility of government to safeguard the sovereignty of the country as well as cater for the welfare of the citizenry. Similarly, the Canadian National Defence College describes national security as “the preservation of a way of life acceptable to the people and compatible with the needs and legitimate aspirations of others” (Microsoft Corporation, Encarta 2004). It includes freedom from attacks, internal subversion, coercion, and erosion of the ethno-cultural, social, economic and political values that are essential to emplacing the quality of life desired by people. The study accepts this definition because it considers national security from both military and non-military perspectives.

Nexus between Forced Migration and National Security

The attributes of forced migration are unplanned movement of people, displacement by disaster, and avoidance of hazards of life. The attributes of National Security include overcoming multi-dimensional threats to well-being of people and balancing all instruments of state policy/power. Therefore, the unplanned movement of people displaced by disaster affect their well-being by exposing them to multi-dimensional threats which require a nation to balance its instrument of state power to ensure its survival. Thus, when there is forced migration of people, it impinges National Security of both the migrant countries and the host countries; and when forced migration is prevented National Security is enhanced. Consequently, there exists an inverse relationship between forced migration and National Security. This brings to the fore the need to examine the trends and dynamics of armed conflict and forced migration, and the implications of these on National Security in Nigeria.

Trends and Dynamics of the Conflicts in the Lake Chad Area

Since the 1960s, countries in the Lake Chad Area namely, Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Niger, Nigeria, Libya, Egypt, and Sudan, have experienced various forms of armed conflicts occasioned by struggle for political power, ethnic and religious bigotry, agitation for resource control, and identity issues, amongst others. This has created instability and further deteriorated the poverty situation in the region. The crisis has also triggered significant displacement and forced migration of people within and across national boundaries with its related implications (Forced Displacement: A Growing Global Crisis 2015). Before now, international borders were not perceived as a barrier but rather a point of exchange. Cross-border movements among the Lake Chad countries were traditionally undertaken for either economic and education purposes, to find grazing land or spouses, and visit or settle with family, or communities of the same ethnic group. (BBC Focus on Africa 1994). This migration pattern began to change with the increase in violence occasioned by armed conflict, which has disproportionately affected borderlands, resulting to over 2.5 million people becoming refugees or IDPs. The crisis alone accounts for 70 per cent of the total number of people displaced within the region. Forced migration has had a profound impact in the Lake Chad region, such as destruction of private and public infrastructure. (UNHCR and The World Bank Group Geneva and Washington 2016)

The level of violence has also taken a social and psychological toll by spreading fear and apprehension among the population in the region and exacerbating social divisions and distrust among displaced persons and members of their host communities. These perceptions have influenced approaches to forced displacement by countries in the region, where displacement is approached from a security angle. As a result, either in camp or in other settlement types such as host communities, displaced population have limited flexibility as well as find it difficult to integrate themselves into local communities. This constrains their potential to find sustainable solutions to their challenges, which negatively affect their well-being over the long term and wider development outcomes.

Central African Republic, since her independence from France in 1960, has experienced series of armed conflicts resulting from fights for political power. However, since the 2000s, the confrontation has taken another dimension between two different religious groups and the government. This has led to an environment of constant violence, forcing many people to leave their homes in search of safety. The Central African Republic conflict has displaced about 466,000 people, who are now refugees in neighbouring countries; and 935,000 people have been internally displaced out of which about 60 per cent of them are children and widows (Perez, 2015). It is estimated that 3,000 to 6000 people have been killed in the conflict. According to the U.N., nearly 2.5 million people are facing hunger in the country. Also, reports by the United Nations suggest that crime rate has increased (UN SC/124702 August 2016). There are also allegations of sexual abuse made by the United Nations, which have worsened the conflict. Several organizations, principally the United Nations, are working in the country in order to end the conflict. However, the conflict

is still ongoing, creating a wave of violence that has resulted in thousands of refugees, deaths, and political uncertainty.

Cameroun, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria are not left out in armed conflicts. Since 2009, over 2 million people have been forced to flee their homes as a result of violent acts by the Boko Haram terrorist group and the associated military operations by government forces. Over 1.9 million of these people are Nigerians, which placed the country as having the seventh largest internally displaced population in the world (International Crisis Group 2017). Furthermore, about 427,000 people are forcefully displaced in the Lake Chad area including 155,000 Nigerian refugees (UNHCR and The World Bank Group Geneva 2016). The conflicts have wiped out years of investments in vital infrastructure such as health care centers, schools, water pipelines, and roads, leaving several children trapped behind conflict lines and leading to a dramatic increase in malnutrition. Most of the children caught in the conflict have lost their families, their homes, and years of education, and are exposed and subjected to violence and abuse (www.unicef.org). Abducted women and girls are subjected to physical and psychological abuse, trauma, torture, sexual slavery, forced marriage and forced labour, among other horrendous experiences. Also, under-aged children are forced to become combatants as well as tools for suicide bombing (www.unicef.org). The entire region is characterized by people forced to migrate from their natural environments in search of safety and protection of their lives and property.

Implication of Armed Conflicts and Forced Migration on Nigeria National Security

The implication of armed conflicts and forced migration on National Security of Nigeria are in the areas of transnational crimes, insecurity, and limited access to health care and education facilities, amongst several others. These effects are discussed subsequently.

Transnational Crimes: Armed conflict is a major cause of forced migration in the Lake Chad Area with implications to Nigeria's national security, particularly in the area of transnational crimes such as proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapon (SALW), human and drug trafficking, and so on. In April 2014, Chadian soldiers displayed different types of arms and ammunition intercepted in Malam Fatori from a truck purportedly conveying some displaced refugees from CAR enroute Boko Haram strongholds in northeast Nigeria (Niam 2017). It was noted that refugees displaced by conflict in CAR are sources of arm supply for the Boko Haram sects (Niam 2017). This underscores the increasing ties between Boko Haram and other militant groups in the region. Of concern is that about 90 per cent of estimated 8-10 million illicit weapons in West Africa are in Nigeria resulting in increased militia groups and communal clashes in the country(Niam 2017).

The nexus between forced migration and weapon proliferation is critical as it engenders terrorist groups like the Boko Haram Terrorist (BHT) group. Forced migration also contributes to terrorism in Nigeria as some of the migrants have links

with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), ISIS, and Al-Shabaab. Also, the BHT group exploits the vulnerability of some forced migrants to recruit them as members of the sect.

Insecurity: Another fundamental implication of forced migration is the propensity of affected victims to indulge in crime, which has undermined public safety. Part of the over 367,000 refugees from the CAR who fled to Cameroon have disappeared through the common border into Nigeria. In Nigeria, a significant number of them moved to Adamawa, Taraba and Cross River states, which are contiguous with the Republic of Cameroon (UNHCR, 2016). Recently, several nationals from CAR, Cameroon and other conflict-ridden countries were arrested for different offences, which range from armed robbery, sexual offence, petty stealing, and illegal possession of firearms. In total, about 406 nationals of CAR and Chad were arrested from 2014 to 2015 (UNHCR, 2016). However, some of the refugees indulge in these crimes because of the dehumanizing conditions they find themselves in foreign lands, which leave them with no choice but to commit crimes to survive.

Since the 2002 ceding of Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon, about 3,200 Nigerians have been displaced (Lubomyr 2016). The victims were forcefully evacuated after Cameroonian gendarmes invaded their community. After 14 years of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling, the refugees/IDPs are still accommodated in open camps under severe inhuman conditions. This situation resulted to the emergence of the Bakassi Strike Force (BSF) in October 2016, a militant group in defence of the refugees/IDPs (Lubomyr, 2016). The group comprising about 600 militants, criticized the Federal and Cross River State governments of neglecting the Bakassi Aborigines, demanding a return to their ancestral land. They threatened to blow up oil facilities if these demands were not met (International Office on Migration Report 2015). The activities of BSF, thus, undermine security with potentials to become a major threat to public safety, if the group's activity is not checked.

The number of migrants through the northern Nigerian border from Central Africa is put at 1.7 million people according to the International Organisation on Migration (IOM Report 2015). In 2015, the number of refugees who migrated into Sokoto State of Nigeria was put at about 835,560, many of who were of the Central African origin. These migrations are basically due to conflict in the Lake Chad area, forcing migrants to seek shelter, water and food in distant communities. This puts significant pressure on the limited resources in host communities, a potential source of insecurity.

Limited Access to Health Care Facilities and Education: Outbreak of infectious diseases is another implication of forced migration in Lake Chad. These have caused health hazards to some Nigerians. This is as a result of the porous nature of the borders and free movements protocol in the region. For instance, Nigeria is currently hosting about 15,000 refugees from the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon (Ngere, 2016). These victims of forced migration are accommodated in various camps in Cross River, Akwa Ibom, Benue, and Adamawa states of Nigeria. Major disease concerns at the camps include cholera and tuberculosis. Most pregnant women are

malnourished in the camp, while several cases of tuberculosis are also reported (Ngere 2016). These infectious diseases undermine human security, which is a critical component of national security. The prevalence of infectious diseases among refugees in the Lake Chad countries remains a source of concern considering the porous border security which allow free movement of forced migrants with communicable diseases to enter the country.

Furthermore, forced migration truncates the education of migrants, especially children. On the other hand, in the receiving locations where forced migrants are kept, schools are normally used as IDP /refugee camps resulting to the closure of these schools, and thereby undermining the education of the children of the host communities. This means that the pupils in the host communities are also displaced out of school.

Government Responses to Forced Migration in the Lake Chad Area

As a response to the insecurity in the Lake Chad region, the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was formed as an internal security apparatus against attacks in the North-East in 1998; although this was not the first MNJTF to be formed between countries. This first one was formed in 1994 by the administration of Late Gen Sani Abacha to police the North-East against bandits from the Chadian war. However, in 2015, the AU approved a new concept of operation under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) which comprised forces from all the four conflict-hit Lake Chad Basin countries: Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The Nigerian military, with the support of the MNJTF and the commitment of the Federal Government of Nigeria, has reclaimed much of the territories previously occupied by the terrorists.

In June 2016, the governments of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria met in Abuja, Nigeria, to deliberate on burning issues concerning the Lake Chad Area after which what came to be known as the Abuja Action Statement was adopted. The Statement pointed out key actions that could be taken to protect persons affected by the crisis. It aimed to support the affected countries by establishing a regional protection strategic framework to guide the humanitarian response on key protection issues relating to refugees, IDPs, and other issues related to armed conflict and forced migration (Regional Protection Dialogue on the Lake Chad Basin) The Framework provides a robust overview of key protection concerns and risks, with a focus on cross-border and shared protection issues. These include ensuring: that all refugees, IDPs, and returning nationals, have enhanced access to protection; that civil-military coordination is strengthened to maintain the civilian character of refugee and IDP hosting areas; and that persons with specific protection risks are safe and receive appropriate, preventive, responsive, and restorative services (Nigeria Regional Refugee Response Plan 2018–2020).

In Nigeria, an Inter-Ministerial Task Force (IMTF) and Humanitarian Coordination working group was constituted. This was with the aim of co-developing Nigeria's Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) of outlining the needs of those affected by the crisis. The HRP was developed with extensive consultations between the highest levels

of government, the donor community, UN humanitarian organizations, as well as international and local NGOs. It is one of the frameworks currently being utilized by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) in collaboration with other partners to build a nexus between immediate and short-term humanitarian responses as well as longer-term development activities. In 2016, the FGN and the six North Eastern State Governments committed budgetary resources worth \$2.77 billion to the humanitarian needs, rehabilitation, and reconstruction of the North East to various services from Education, Health, Nutrition, Security and reconstruction of critical basic infrastructure. Other government responses to the issues of Armed Conflict and forced migration include: Victim Support Fund (VSF), the Presidential Committee for North East Initiatives (PCNI), and the proposed North East Development Commission (NEDC). These are discussed subsequently.

Victim Support Fund

The Victims Support Fund (VSF) is one of government's responses to the issues of armed conflict and forced migration in Nigeria. This was established in 2014 to provide interventions in support of victims of insurgency in Nigeria (Federal Government of Nigeria Report 2016). The VSFC programmes are targeted mainly at schools, vulnerable groups of women and children, as well as agriculture. The mandate of VSF is to assess, manage, and disburse support to all vulnerable groups to promote their well-being thereby enhancing national security (NS) in Nigeria. As at October 2015, the VSF had received contributions from the FGN and the private sector totalling N53 billion to alleviate the sufferings of IDPs (FGN Report 2016). The VSF has amongst other initiatives contributed about N2 billion to the Safe School Initiative (SSI) to improve access of victims of forced migration to education (Patrick 2015). The contribution of the VSF has significantly improved the conditions of forced migrants.

The VSF presents sufficient opportunities for the provision of timely funds to initiate and implement critical interventions to alleviate the sufferings of victims of forced migration towards enhancing NS in Nigeria. For instance, the VSF sponsored a Needs Assessment Mission to the North East zone in August 2015 to identify the critical challenges facing persons displaced as a result of forced migration in the region (Patrick 2015). On completion of the verification exercise, an intervention pilot phase of the project kicked off in Maiduguri, capital of Borno State, with the release of N20 million to about 1,000 women, to improve their means of livelihood. It was reported that a total of 7,000 female IDPs received a cash grant of N20,000 each to assist in income-generating activities (Federal Government of Nigeria 2016). The VSF also provides a platform for private sector involvement in providing intervention and supporting humanitarian activities. The VSF, if well-funded, and the objectives adequately implemented, presents a good vision of improving the conditions of victims of forced migration towards enhancing National Security in Nigeria.

Presidential Committee on North East Initiatives

The Presidential Committee on North-East Initiatives (PCNI) is another Federal Government response to victims of forced migration in Nigeria. It was established in

September 2015 to coordinate the resettlement and reconstruction of the North East region ravaged by Boko Haram insurgency, and was estimated to cost about N2 trillion. Also, the PCNI under the Chairmanship of General TY Danjuma (Rtd), was to serve as an interface between state governments and international development partners to streamline efforts and to achieve consistency in the provision of interventions for victims of forced migration. The initiative has three components which include: the short-, intermediate and long-terms. The short-term, which focuses on immediate comprehensive relief, is to be achieved within 6 to 12 months. The intermediate component focuses on relocation, rehabilitation, and resettlement; and it aimed at supporting voluntary resettlement of 2.4 million IDPs. The intermediate component is expected to be achieved within 12-24 months. The last phase, which is the long-term phase, would be achieved within 24-60 months. It is focused on economic and development strategies of the North East towards providing sustainable growth for 21.4 million citizens. The PCNI, if well executed and replicated in other parts of Nigeria, presents a good vision for improving the conditions of victims of forced migration towards enhancing NS in Nigeria.

Proposed North- East Development Commission

The Federal Government of Nigeria has forwarded an executive bill to the National Assembly proposing the establishment of North-East Development Commission (NEDC). The proposed commission is expected to pool together resources from all and sundry sources including the government for sustainable reconstruction, complete rehabilitation and total recovery of the region when fully established and operationalized. The NEDC would be a long-term, a more permanent body, and would likely subsume the PCNI. The proposed NEDC is another prospect that could facilitate improvements in the intervention for victims of forced migration towards enhancing NS in Nigeria (Bola 2015). The need for the proposed NEDC became imperative owing to the devastating state of the zone due to the activities of the Boko Haram group. The NEDC is set among others to coordinate all efforts towards achieving sustainable peace and socio-economic empowerment in the North-East Zone of Nigeria. It is to provide interventions in four strategic areas, namely, security, infrastructure, education, and agriculture. It would also be responsible for interfacing with the Directorate of Civil-Military Cooperation at the Defence Headquarters as well as other security efforts to synchronize civil and military initiatives in an integrated manner (Nyako 2015).

On sources of fund for the commission, the Senate approved 3 per cent VAT of the nation's annual revenue, and further recommended 15 per cent of Ecological Fund due to states in the region, and 15 per cent of statutory allocations due to the six states in the region for the commission. Thus, if the NEDC is eventually established and well-funded, it would alleviate the sufferings of victims of forced migration especially those in North-East Nigeria.

Effort to Strengthen Inter-Agency Cooperation: Government efforts at strengthening inter-agency corporation, through collaboration and information sharing, have also contributed to the enhance responses to the problem of armed

conflict and forced migration in the Lake Chad Area. The joint efforts with government actors have enhanced capacity building on project implementation and monitoring, as well as financial and resource support. These have assisted, in no small measure, to the empowerment of the most vulnerable victims, women and children; and strengthened their roles as key stakeholders in the rebuilding of the North-East region, through economic empowerment, child protection, psychosocial support, health and education. Indeed, 81% of the total amount budgeted for the North-East in 2016 was dedicated to programme implementation (Nyako, 2015)

Conclusion

The paper examined the nature and dynamics of forced migration arising from armed conflicts in the Lake Chad Basin area and their implications to Nigeria's national security with emphasis on human security and border control. The paper further examined existing policy measures and strategies at national and regional levels targeted at addressing the tragedies of armed conflict and forced migration in the study area. Currently, inadequate healthcare services, truncated education, high crime rate, food insecurity, and starvation amongst others, were identified as some of the impacts of armed conflict and forced migration in Nigeria. The paper further identified some of the national and regional responses to the issues of armed conflict and forced migration in the Lake Chad Basin Area, namely: The Victim Support Fund, Presidential Committee on the North-East Initiative, and proposed North-East Development Commission, amongst others. It is against this background that the followings were recommended

Recommendation

It is recommended that:

- The countries in the Lake Chad Area should strengthen democratic institutions by promoting the culture of all-inclusive governance, transparency, rule of law and accountability within its member states. This would mitigate the scourge of Armed conflict and forced migration in the Lake Chad Area.
- There is the need to establish a regulatory body on deforestation in order to address the issues of environmental causes of armed conflict forced migration. The establishment of regional regulatory body on deforestation will further mitigate the challenge of uncontrolled deforestation induced migration and insecurity in lake chad basin area. To achieve this, meetings of representatives of Ministries of agriculture and other relevant stakeholders of various countries in the Lake Chad Basin Area could be inaugurated to brainstorm and come up with deforestation regulatory framework. Subsequently, conferences, town hall meetings could be organized to sensitize all stakeholders on the need for such regulations.
- Countries of the lake chad area should also establish a monitoring body to compliment United Nations efforts at eradication of poverty which has been identified as one of the causes of armed conflict and forced migration in the

area. This will require that the enforcement of SDGs should be ensured by member countries. This body could be engaged in identifying the most vulnerable in the society. To achieve this, the member countries could partner with International Non-Government Organisations (INGOs), AU and UN towards addressing the SDGs. This would be best achieved through a robust focus on domestic resource mobilization. Domestic resource mobilization will combat illicit financial flows, strengthen tax administration, harness remittances for economic growth and sustainable development in the region.

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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Climate Variation-Induced Migration, Land Conflicts, and Security Situation in Nigeria

Dickson Ogbonnaya Igwe

Introduction

Most recently, conflicts in Africa has generated recurrent conflicts that encouraged increased wave of migration both within and outside of the continent. Among these are the protracted Somali insurrection, civil war in southern Sudan, Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon, and the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Darfur crisis, Somalia crisis and a series of boundary clashes among many others. Several other natural occurrences particularly famine and drought have occasioned mass displacement of people. Alongside these, is the problems of climate change-induced migration particularly herder/farmers contact and clash, as well as poverty have combined with bad leadership to further accelerate the rate at which Africans migrate in crowds to different parts of the continent and to other parts of the world while at the same time increasing the frequency and potency of political, ethnic and religious conflicts in the continent. As it were, Africa seems to account for the majority of the total global conflicts. Kofi Annan, in his report to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) titled: 'The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa,' noted that, "... 14 of the continent's 53 countries were afflicted by mostly climate change-induced migration and armed conflicts in 1996 alone, and over 30 wars have occurred...since 1970, mostly within states. These accounted for more than half of all the war-related deaths worldwide..."

In Nigerian context, climate change-induced migration generates land conflict posing global, regional, and national security challenges. Nigeria's economy is largely oil based. She always has to face issues about degradation and pollution, which are associated with oil exploration. The consequent carbon emission, gas flaring, and the pollution-induced threat to marine life, significantly contribute to climate change and migration. The movement of both nomadic and sedentary farmers in search of better life and arable land to graze and farm constitutes climate change-induced migration. The contact among these farmers, and their disagreements over arable land spaces, generate conflicts.

These situations have led to violent death of persons and destruction of properties, in both rural and urban communities. Land conflict issues vary from region to region and community to community but of major concern to this paper, are the recurring conflicts in both the northern and southern regions of Nigeria between sedentary and nomadic farmers. The seasonal disparity in rainfall rate between these two regions is

responsible for the variation in climate and vegetation. These seasonal variances bring to contact sedentary farmers in the south and herders from the north who move southward in search of water and vegetation to feed their livestock. Farmers-herders clashes are also evident in northern parts where integrated farming system is in operation, with the use of irrigation to ensure all year-round farming intensification between and within communities. The result is usually struggles by herders and farmers over land spaces for grazing and agricultural intensification, respectively. Studies in this direction are imperative because these clashes constitute threats to agricultural production, security of lives and properties, and food security.

This paper examined conflict and security effects of climate variation and migration in Nigeria. The paper is divided into nine sections: Theoretical Conceptualisation of Forced Migration, Effects of Climate Variation and Migration, Agrarian Production and Security Challenges, Forced Migration, Land Conflict and Security, Some Major Land Conflict in Nigeria, Migration-induced Recurrent Intermittent Intractable Conflict and Insecurity between Ezillo and Ezza, Seasonal Migration and the Security Questions in Nigeria, conclusion and recommendations.

Theoretical Conceptualisation of Forced Migration

The challenge of meeting the ever-increasing demand for food and raw materials for industries has led to the intensification of agricultural production and extensive use of land. The struggle for access and use of land has led to hostility between landed and landless farmers. These social frictions often result in forced migration, most times to avert or avoid conflicts and security threats. Prolonged conflict and tenure insecurity retard agricultural development and worsen food crisis, particularly in rural communities. Conflict and security challenges arising from farmers contact (sedentary and herders from the southern and northern parts of Nigeria) is articulated within the critical school of thought. The threats it poses cannot be dissociated from the process of social differentiation and class formation characterised by enforce material dialectics that reveal the dichotomy between group social placement and the clash of their material interests. This clash is embedded in the trajectory of climate variation and the consequent migration and contact with host communities.

In the context of Ezillo-Ezillo in Ezillo community, Ebonyi State, South-East Nigeria, land conflicts, - result from climate change, and induce migration. Migrants from mainstream Ezza communities seasonally migrate to neighbouring communities and beyond in search of fertile land to farm; they also sell their farm labours to their host. Similarly, the seasonal nature of farming crops like yam, cassava, rice and vegetable, intensify migration from one location to another in search of suitable land or water supply by farmers and those willing to work in the farms of their hosts for wages. This induced labour migration is typical of the Ezza people who are considered by others not only as labourers, but also as farmers who activate land relations that seemingly limit local access and use of land.

Perceived as expansionist by other contacting groups, the Ezza in Northeast Igboland overtly reify and assert shared ancestral kinship authority over other group in the area considered as junior kindred by the Ezza group as eldest. This historic influence on other group extends to land access and use in the area. This attitude in many occasions have been interpreted to mean expansionist/domination tendency of the Ezza people against others interests. The vast social support networks existing among the Ezza in their colonies reinforce a superior numerical strength; and their history of warfare capability, add to their number to support their chances of successful territorial expansion.

Effects of Climate Variation and Migration

Two main causal factors explain climate variation and migration: natural and human activities. Increasing population, industrialisation, and agricultural intensification, are major human factors that aggravate the impacts of natural process of climate variations on people`s livelihood and survival needs. Before now, changes in the earth`s orbit, solar activities, and volcanic eruptions had no significant impacts on humans as they do today. Various human activities including deforestation, burning of fossil fuels for industries and transport, gas flaring, water and air pollution, urbanization, infrastructural development that are associated with industrialisation, account for about 80% of climate variation. Consequently, more than ever before, there are recurrent cases of severe heat waves, drought, flood, increased health risks, rising sea levels, and other negative impacts. The components of greenhouse gas are water vapour, carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide and methane that obstruct the loss of heat from the earth keeping it warmer and hot. The trapping of heat and obstruction of its escape from the earth increase the stress and vulnerability, of human population, environment and economy.

While the carbon dioxide from volcanic eruptions, human respiration and ocean atmosphere exchanges largely heat the earth naturally, humanly produced carbon dioxide are mainly from burning of fossil fuel and other land use actions for physical development to secure basic and social amenities. Since GHG concentration is the direct result of our productive, economic and social activities, agriculture is a major contributor. Increased temperatures and rainfall variability significantly affect food production, water supply and resources, biodiversity, and human and animal populations. So long as migration pattern and decision reflect climate variation and human activities continue to accelerate the debilitating impacts of climate variation on human population, environment and economy, conflict and security pattern and threat.

Agrarian Production and Security Challenges

Provision of the basic need for food/feed, fibre, and energy is the primary purpose of agriculture. Agrarian life is a support to subsistent agricultural production. Research shows that nearly 70% of people in developing countries are agrarian and are largely involved in agricultural activities for livelihood and survival. The implication is that climatic variation should not be an isolated discussion but a global one since it affects

majority of the people and puts at stake the livelihood security and survival of most people in rural communities.

Temperature, radiation, precipitation, and humidity, among others, have direct impacts on agricultural production including forestry, vegetation and fishery systems, as the atmospheric conditions determine vegetative growth and animal production. For instance, given a projected agricultural production decrease for small temperature increase of about 1-6°C in an area: on the other hand, changes in cool regions has the potential to increase food production even when local average temperature rises over an range of 1-7° C. This is a clear indication of regional differentials in climatic temperature and agricultural production. It influences the migration decision people take for survival- since they move in response to weather/seasonal variations, to places with favourable climatic conditions for agricultural production.

To avert poor yields or crop failure, investment plans are not done without climate variation impact assessment. Unfortunately, sometimes, possible conflicts and security implications of investment and migration decisions are not taken into proper account.

Forced Migration, Land Conflict and Security

There is an entwined relationship between climate variation, forced migration, land conflict, and security. Before now, the Chad basin was home to many Nigerian and Chadian fish farmers. But with the shrinking of the lake, many fish farmers lost their jobs to pastoral or sedentary farming involving vegetation and land cultivation. The migration from Lake Chad coast to the hinterland confronted the nomadic and sedentary farmers who were first settlers in those areas. Hence, the struggle for access to land, its use and territorial authority to own land. The speed at which desertification is encroaching the Sahel and Savanna Regions of Northern Africa is exacerbating regional, national and local tensions in these 'hot-zones'

There is escalation of violent conflicts in Nigeria and Somalia in recent years, the Boko Haram and Ishabab groups. A common factor driving these groups' agenda is violent occupation and exercise of territorial authority. The inhabitants of the occupied territories are forced to either leave or be assimilated. This is done recognising neither landowners nor the seating government of the territory. Their activities suggest that their original abode is no more conducive and so they need a new abode to call their own. The influx of these rebel groups and the proliferation of small arms among them show desperation to survive the intense desertification and pressure to migrate, to own a new place and become not strangers but owners.

Given that Islam is a state religion in Somalia and the people from most northern parts of Nigeria practice Islam, these insurgents collapse their expansionist agenda to the Islamic Jihadist Ideology. This mix-up has often led to labeling the true Muslims as extremists.

The effects of climate variation have been interpreted from various dimensions. For instance, climate variation indirectly has drawn a parallel line of conflict in Nigeria

between the Boko Haram and the Christian inhabitants of northern Nigeria just as it has sown the seed of animosity and fear between nomadic pastoralists and sedentary farmers both in northern and southern Nigeria. In almost all cases, the issue of contention is green vegetation and farmland for farming and grazing. Beyond the activities of these insurgents migrating from hostile desert to displace people in Sahel, Savannah and Mangrove areas, is the issue of population. Demographic pressure created by mass movement human and animal from the northern part of Nigeria to the southern part lead to displacement and humanitarian issues that trigger up conflict between the migrants and their host communities. As access to farmland for farming become scarce, too many hands contest access and use of land for livelihood and economic survival, but given the limited land access and the need for food and survival, actors resort to violent search for land.

Some Major Land-related Conflicts in Nigeria

Discussion of conflicts in Nigeria is not complete without reference to pre-colonial struggles for land spaces between ethnic groups. However, to a large extent, most modern issues of access to, use and ownership of land have direct bearing on the British colonial establishment and the creation of administrative boundaries that did not reflect cultural and ethnic divisions. In 1914, northern and southern Nigeria was amalgamated. Each region carved out had a dominant ethnic group receiving the influx of people from minority groups. By the British design, the Emirs persuaded Igbo and Yoruba people to live in separate parts of northern cities in a reserved area known as *sabon-gari*, or stranger's quarters, just to avoid clash of culture. The British stimulated inter-group relations and competition, and mobilised people in a manner that consolidated their hold on political power and land resources. This last component of their later set the stage for decades of conflicts in Nigeria.

Generally, in Africa and Nigeria in particular, land is communally owned. Communal ownership of land was short-lived with the advent of the colonial masters. The British introduced land reforms that almost wiped away the communal content of the indigenous land tenure system. Consequently, land issues became a leading cause of conflicts in Nigeria. The migrant peasant land investors were no less different from the indigenous land owners. Identity and authority over land became issues of contestation for both first settlers and subsequent settlers in communities. Access to land is important to poverty reduction, economic growth, and the empowerment of the poor. This underscores territorial expansion as a solution to climatic variations. It does also justifies perhaps why land conflicts are so prevalent, and why they are more difficult to solve than other conflict issues. Nigeria has experienced many decades of land conflicts, and the number of people dying as a result continues to grow each year. Some of these conflicts include the Ife/Modakeke, the Agulere/Umulere, the Tiv/Jukun, and the Ezillo and Ezza land conflicts.

Seasonal Conflict and Insecurity from Migration between Ezillo and Ezza in Ezillo Community

The search for farm land and territorial space to exert power and authority are factors central to the understanding of the conflict and security threat associated with migration within and around Ezillo community. The conflicts usually involve indigenous Ezillo people and Ezza migrants. Majority of Ezza migrants are farmers who are known for the cultivation and trade in yam, cassava, and rice. Unlike rice which is cultivated at the pick of the rainy season, yam and cassava are cultivated at the beginning of the rainy season. The hoeing skills of most Ezza people are widely acclaimed. They migrate from place to place in search of land to farm and farmers to buy their farm labour. The seasonal influx of Ezza migrant labourers into Ezillo community usually overwhelms available space for farming and habitation. Ezillo and Ezza land conflicts date back to 1930s during the colonial regime whose interventions could not stop the conflicts. While the indigenous land owners (Ezillos) exercise authority over their land, the land investors and settlers (Ezza) insist on their right to land both as compensation for assisting Ezillos to prosecute war of recovery from invasion, and as a property purchase from Ezillos. An interviewee from Ezillo says: Ezillo people reject domination based on shared kinship arising from reinvention by Ezza people the exercise of their ancient ancestral authority in Ezillo community. The Ezzas in Ezillo are migrant settlers in this community and has no authority to exercise outside Ezillo traditional authority. To allow the exercise of parallel authority by anybody amount to confusion, anarchy and internal enslavement and colonisation. So, it is not acceptable to us despite exchange we have had together

An interviewee from Ezza says: The entire northeast Igboland (NEI) was a territory that discovered by a progenitor Ekumaenyi Ezkuna who according to custom, exited passing on his authority over the region to his first son Ezza Ezekuna. While other two younger brothers of Ezza multiplied into places like Ezillo community, Ezza also increased in population and power to conquer and bring together his kindred including those from his other brothers Izzi and Ikwo. It is our birth right it is not given but inherited. We will resist any opposition to this order. Ezza ancestral mandate is to unit, secure and develop the culture and people of the ancient northeast Igboland.

Data above show that Ezillo people reject being subject to any other authority than the Ezillo traditional authority as part of NEI territory. It suggests that Ezza prefers in Ezillo community existence of parallel exercise of authority that will enable them exercise ancestral authority alongside indigenous traditional Ezillo authority. The aggressive migration and occupation of land by Ezza within this area seem to affirm their preference. Also, the continuous contestation over land between Ezza and other groups in the area seem to mean their outright opposition to Ezza rulership over NEI. Despite this opposition, Ezza people still migrate to and reside freely in Ezillo.

Ezillos suspicion of Ezza is anchored on the perceived offensive tendencies of Ezza people such as expansionist and colonisation tendencies, domineering and oppressive tendencies among others as described by (Brayne-Baker`s Intelligence Report, 1936:6-7). The colonial administration attests to this migration, exchange and

interaction. An archival record of Ogoja Provincial Annual Report, 1911:551 says: ...during the past ten years preceding the arrival of colonial authority in Ezillo area, there has been considerable influx of the virile and land hungry Ezza tribe into Ezillo. Based on good will and in return for appropriate presents and labour, these immigrants are allotted specific portions of Ezillo land for farming and residence. On the other hand, other villages of Ezillo area are as follows: Nkalagu, Iyono, Amezu, Umuhuale, Nkalaha, Obeagu and Obeagu Ezza.

While Ezza migrant farmers were used by Ezillo farmers on their farms, the labourers were also interested in exploring new areas to settle down for farming. These were the target and needs that characterised the first contact of Ezillo and Ezza. In order to meet the target of farm settlement, the needs for farm labour by their host Ezillo had to be satisfied. There was the emergence of a platform for reciprocal exchange of farmland and farm labour. The platform evolved into a very strong goodwill and mutual trust that metamorphosed into inter-marriage relations between Ezillo and Ezza. As their population increased, Ezza-Ezillo identity gained relevance, leading to self-consciousness. Request for land allocation became legitimate based on inheritance by birth. Several conflicts that fed from authority contentions are referred by an interviewee from Ezillo thus: The Ezza people forcefully exercise authority they do not have as strangers in Ezillo as demonstration of their expansionist tendency. The offsprings of the invited and uninvited Ezza who settled earlier in Ezillo (identified as Ezza-Ezillo people) are presently claiming indigenous rights to land and other aboriginal entitlement which was not part of the original understanding reach before settlements were given to their forefathers. It won't come as a surprise if we lose our Ezillo identity to Ezza people whose population increase is already a threat. Example, in 1990, after the creation of Ishielu LGA with Ezillo as headquarters and land was allocated for secretariat office buildings; Ezza people went and occupied the entire land claiming ownership and compensation. In 1992, conflict resulted from contention over the seizure and renaming of Nwafor Isimkpuma Ezillo market to 'Eke Ezza' by the Ezza people. In 2006, refusal of Ezillo people to support the creation of Izzo autonomous community from Ezillo ignited serious contentions and conflict. Animosity over this led to Ezza assaulting the traditional ruler of Ezillo in the market square. In May 2008, collection of rent from users of motor park market in Isimkpuma led to disagreement as the Ezillo people refuse to pay the rent to the Ezza tax collector. These are instances of Ezza threat to rights to indigeneity as Ezillo people

A KII from Ezza says: Ezza is no stranger anywhere in the entire NEI. The attempt by Ezillo to reconstruct history is unfortunate. Particularly the protest against our given authority over land acquired and allocated to Ezza by both the government of Ebonyi State and the people of Ezillo as permanent compensation for the mercenary service we rendered to Ezillo people. Our ancient ancestral kinship traditional authority encouraged inter-group interaction in NEI including Ezillo. In Ezillo, we got land right from Ezillo as compensation for military service we rendered to them. Also, we have worked hard and acquired land in Ezillo in addition to the additional portion of land the state gave us right to own. Our taking charge and exercising authority over Ezza

legitimately owned land in Ezillo is not misplacement. As citizens of Nigeria we are also permitted by law to own land and live anywhere in Nigeria. Ezillo is looking for trouble.

Data above reveals Ezza in Ezillo community violation of indigenous authority with impunity and incessant claim of rights to land at the displeasure of Ezillo people. Deconstruction of Ezillo indigenous authority by Ezza starts with several violation of land treaty that infringe on Ezillo rights to land and identity. The data show that Ezza already have offspring in Ezillo community with distinct Ezza-Ezillo identity. They are offspring from uninvited Ezza who settled earlier in Ezillo and the invited ones. Worrysome to Ezillo is the cloning of its identity by strangers otherwise known as Ezza settlers earlier presently constitute indigenes claiming indigenous rights to land and other aboriginal entitlement. On the other hand, the Ezza aside the ancestral right to land in NEI, is confidence that they have got rights to land allocated to her as compensation for the mercenary service they (Ezza) rendered to Ezillo and subsequent protection their presence in Ezillo portends to Ezillo community and people. Also, Ezza further argued that her members have at different time purchased land from Ezillo land owners that cannot be denied nor taken away from them. The Ezza, therefore wondered what it is that Ezza is doing that is not part of the original understanding reach before settlements were given to the Ezza people in Ezillo. Apart from the various ways these authority sources have been reconstructed within intergenerational space, questions around statutory/citizenship rights, indigeneity rights, and settlers' rights, remain major issues of contestations. Incidentally, the Nigerian constitution is silent on these rights except that of citizenship. Thus, this has created space for ambiguity, contestations and conflict.

Unlike the citizenship rights and entitlements, the ambiguity of indigene/settler rights and entitlements in the Nigerian constitution has left many groups fighting over the absence of definition of who is indigene and who is a settler. This has deepened rivalry and discrimination among groups in Nigeria. Drawing from this situation is the issue of land question that has remained unanswered in postcolonial Nigeria bedeviling our collective sensibility as a nation. However, the battle over indigenous authority and land rights in South-East Nigeria, particularly Ezillo, are mostly centered on indigene/settler entitlement question. Conflicts usually trigger when investors, otherwise called settlers, try to exercise control/authority over portions of land they had legitimately purchased, by enforcing tenancy-charges on indigenes using their land. The Isimkpuma motor park market allegedly owned by Ezza people are used by the Ezillo people for business but decline payment of tenancy-charges to Ezza who insist that they must pay. A phone booth entrepreneur in the market from Ezillo refuse to pay market toll to the Ezza toll collector and that led to the identity/authority struggle that escalated into a full blown intra-communal war protracting for over two years starting from 10th May, 2008. The intervention of local and state authorities did not stop the war until the federal force came in to enforce order. The disputed portions of land have remained cordoned off from public access. This constitutes challenges to general economic activities and development.

Despite the promise of equitable distribution of land to all in the Land Use Act of 1978, the Act only succeeded in concentrating community land into private hands of the privileged few against the majority in need of land. That land ownership rights belonging to the state and few privileged individuals is never acceptable to the people. The indigenous communal land ownership structure was weakened by land reforms beginning from the colonial time with post-colonial reforms merely retaining the colonial structuring. The fact that this structure does not recognise indigenous authority particularly regarding land ownership speaks to the recurrent conflicts that characterise indigene/settler relations in most Nigerian communities.

Generally, land-related violent conflicts in most southern parts of Nigeria are either caused by identity-politics or authority/supremacy between indigenes and settlers. The climatic variation between the north and the south remains a major trigger of some of the conflicts. The perspective to conflict in Nigeria can be explained in the context of herders/farmers clash over land space, water, and vegetation, needed to farm and/or graze. As desertification, drought, and industrialisation intensify, there is influx of nomadic cattle herders to the south in search of water and grassland to feed their livestock. This migration interrupts agricultural intensification in the south as it results in several security problems.

Seasonal Migration and Security Questions in Nigeria

Climate variation and its associated events such as migration, land scarcity, competition, dispossession, displacement and conflict are seasonal occurrences that are unpredictably debilitating to society and its security. While climatic variation is a natural occurrence, the events that accompany it are unfavourably human. These activities unfold with phenomenal impact on economic and social security and development. Failed attempts in the past to mitigate and constitutionally resolve these human factors have not succeeded because Nigerian constitution did not address them comprehensively. Consequent to constitutional lapses in solving these problems is the coinage of migration and security question in Nigeria. However, while many of the outcomes of this seasonal variation favour one part of Nigeria, other locations are unfavoured. For instance, while rainfall is heavy in the south, the north mostly experience draught. This implies that conflicts generated are interest based that need dialogue, understanding and compromise in the absence of constitutional prescriptions.

Considering the demographic strength of the Fulani people involved in nomadic pastoral farming will no doubt shade light on why their southward movement is phenomenally significant. Since the Fulani moved east into Nigeria in the 14th century, they have increased to an estimated population of 18.7 million. Remarkably, the people have vigorously protected their culture to avoid adulteration. They have never given up on the one Nigeria project they consider as a big market for their huge animal production skill. To them, its only under one Nigeria that they can move with their livestock from place to place without restriction. With the increasing clamour by other federating units in Nigeria for an equitable restructuring of Nigeria to favour all and

not just some, the Fulani is becoming more assertive than ever in the quest to hold on to political power as a tool for self-perpetuation.

The overwhelming rejection by states of the federal government request for donation of land for cattle colony and ranches is suggestive of the intrigues associated with Nigerian politics and the Fulani interest. Considering the political support network available to herders more than their counterpart farmers, it is becoming increasingly difficult or nearly impossible for pastoralist not to intensify their invasion of southern grassland for seasonal cattle grazing. According to one pastoralist from Plateau State:

The pastoralist invades our farms with such impunity that suggest deliberate intension to test our strength. Any attempt by our farmers to chase the cattle away leads to clandestine display of sophisticated weapons and ammunitions. This makes us believe that there are more to herders' invasion that meet the eyes. The extent of rampage chasing away cattle result to is incredible. It show how much value the herdsmen place on their cattle.

An interviewee says: Investment in agriculture is increasingly declining because of the activities of herdsmen and their cattle destroying farmland. Our youthful farmers who cannot stand the provocation have resorted to fight to chase cattle and their headers away from farmland. In fact, livelihood in Yobe State dominated by agrarian production is near zero as people are mostly fighting instead of farming to defend their farm produce and farmland from Fulani invaders.

Also, another farmer from Enugu State says: Cost of farm labour and food price has gone up here because of the risks involved in the regular Fulani herder's invasion of our farms regularly with their cow to destroy our farm produce. People are discouraged from going to farm to avoid the attack of herdsmen. Despite government and traditional interventions, the pastoralists have not stopped attacking farmers and their farm right inside the farm.

The data above show that some pastoralists' social thought and cosmology reside the state of nature. This depicts him as a natural man who has no static home but makes everywhere his home. Contrasting this thought is their eagerness to protect their traditional culture and identity as pastoralists. However, the pastoralists strive to safeguard their economic interest in cattle rearing, the sedentary farmers are counting loses in farm input and output many of which are lost to cattle invasion of farmland. The implication of this is a shortfall in food production and food security across the country Nigeria. The government clamour for diversification from oil-based economy to agro-based economy is facing challenge of not only climate change but human challenges such as herders/farmers clash and it resultant restriction of agricultural production and productivity. Youths and rural peasants are discouraged from going to farm or investing in farming for fear of crop destruction by herder's cattle and conflict. Since there is limited government subsidise on food product or its production with its inequitable distribution, only the privileged few access inputs such as seedlings and manure fertilizer for farming. Consequently, the cost of product and production is forced up.

Conclusion

Climate change-induced migration is traceable to natural and human activities. Migration exposes groups to healthy and unhealthy (rivalry) interactions. The clash of identity and interests worsen conflicts and insecurity in Nigeria as manifests in the activities of the Boko Haram group, herdsmen/farmers clash, and other sects. These issues generate rivalry, result in ethnic chauvinism, and ultimately threaten coexistence and sustainable livelihood in Nigeria.

Recommendations

- The Fulani herdsmen crisis presents a basis to bring climate change-induced migration into discussion about Nigeria`s economic growth and development.
- There has to be a conscious cultural adaptation strategy for the nomadic pastoralists as a people. Although it is difficult to accept, the truth is that their age-long lifestyle is no longer sustainable in today`s world. This should be an agenda purposefully pushed by the whole Fulani nation.
- Policy on climate change needs to consider Fulani pastoralists as reflecting emergency local pressure worth giving attention in any climate variation adaptation programme in Nigeria.

CONCLUSION

Migration Challenges in Africa: Quest for Leadership with Political Will

Ufo Okeke-Uzodike, Hakeem Onapajo, and Chinonso Ihuoma

Inside a room... [in one of President Donald Trump's shelters along the Texas border with Mexico] dedicated to toddlers was a little girl no older than 2, screaming and pounding her fists on a mat. One woman tried to give her toys and books to calm her down, but even that shelter worker seemed frustrated... because as much as she wanted to console the little girl, she couldn't touch, hold or pick her up to let her know everything would be all right. That was the rule... They're not allowed to touch the children... The little girl is among the multitude of immigrant children who have been separated from their family as part of the Trump administration's "zero-tolerance" policy, meaning any adult who crosses the border illegally will face criminal prosecution. That also means parents were taken to federal jails while their children were sent to shelters (Phillips, 2018).

The plight of migrant children in Donald Trump's America is especially surprising when one considers that the United States is a nation of migrants – albeit one where the immigrants flipped the historical narrative by tormenting and almost decimating completely the native population whom they designated as “Indians”. In fact, Trump's grandfather, an illegal migrant into the United States, made a fortune in the US and Canada from assorted business activities that included profiteering alcohol and prostitution at a time when those were frowned upon or seriously contested as acceptable forms of business pursuits (Manz, 2016). Still, President Trump has reserved some of his most racist rhetoric and hostilities for immigrants generally, especially illegal ones (Korte and Gomez, 2018); and those from non-European countries. For instance, Trump wondered openly why the US was taking immigrants from “shithole countries” such as Haiti and Africa when those from more acceptable countries such as Norway could be brought in (Silva, 2018). Still, Trump's most hateful comments seem reserved for illegal immigrants from nearby countries: “They aren't people. These are animals” -- rejects from other countries. Trump asserts that Mexico is not sending their best people: ‘They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists’.

Trump's hostilities and draconian policies towards immigrants illustrate the relevance and importance of politics in how and why governments engage with migrant issues. When things are going well or migrant contributions are needed or philosophically approved, they are often welcomed with open arms (albeit, typically, without any of the credits). This is clearly demonstrated, for instance, by the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu's robust and personal of 316 new Ethiopian Falasha Mura immigrant arrivals at the Tel Aviv airport in December 2020: 'Dear brothers and sisters of ours, immigrants from Ethiopia, we are so moved to welcome you here' (AFP, 2020). However, when conditions are bad (economic stagnation, high unemployment, high crime rates, etc.) or scapegoats are needed, migrants are branded, censured and blamed for nearly all social ills and governance challenges. Thus, despite President Trump's open hostility to non-European migrants, he had no qualms about reaching out to Moncef Slaoui, a talented Moroccan-born scientist -- to help him salvage his COVID-19-induced and administratively mangled second term political ambitions by leading his efforts to urgently develop highly effective vaccines. As Stephen Collinson and Roya Wolverson underscore in CNN's "Meanwhile in America" Newsletter: "... the development of several highly effective vaccines, which Slaoui says could get the US toward herd immunity by next May [2021], will stand as one of the Trump administration's clearest legacy wins, even if the President's claims of all the credit are not fair to scientists and companies that did the hard work." One example of such scientists is Onyema Ogbuagu, a Nigerian-born researcher and medical doctor, whose leadership and innovative research in modified genetic code helped to position the vaccine from Pfizer Inc. into the world's first approved highly effective coronavirus vaccine.

In essence, it is ironic that despite spending much of his presidential tenure trumpeting anti-immigrant rhetoric, one of Trump's most important and positive legacies appears likely to be his Operation Warp Speed-Developed vaccines -- driven (amongst others) by migrants that his immigration policies would have rejected. Clearly, President Trump's politically motivated and prejudiced approach to migrant policies involving non-Europeans belie established and ample historical context. Slaoui buttressed that view firmly when he stressed the value of migrants in American history: "Immigration is a source of talent, innovation, diversity, energy, and renewal to all societies, and has been a key element underpinning the successes that the United States has enjoyed over the past decades -- if not centuries" (Carnegie Corporation, 2020)

Key Challenges and Opportunities

As societies become more diverse, there are both opportunities and challenges for effective immigration policies. Not surprisingly, different communities and states often respond differently to similar pressures. While some might respond by introducing different policies that embed differential levels of discriminatory practices against some of their members on the basis of one's socio-economic, cultural or religious background, others could opt to work toward shared interests in social justice, human security and peace. For the latter, a priority could be placed on

promoting intercultural dialogue and the inclusion of migrants in the economic, social and cultural activities and lives of the societies in which they live. It is also crucial to mention the growing feminization of migration. As women now comprise 48 percent of all international migrants, efforts to promote the inclusion of migrants must also address adequately the particular experiences of female migrants all over the world.

There are key ways in which the international community is addressing these challenges. The October 2013 High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development recognized migration as a central part of the international development agenda. Under the heading of 'Making Migration Work', discussions revolved around how migration contributes to global development and to poverty alleviation. They also considered how migration could benefit individuals, families, communities and states. However, migration will only work for all if greater commitment is shown about the need to eliminate all forms of exploitation and discrimination which migrants experience, and to ensure that their fundamental human rights are actively upheld and protected.

While the role of migrants in economic development through remittances and knowledge transfers has been acknowledged, recent debates in civil society have emphasized the need to understand migration in human development terms. As the synergies between states, policymakers, researchers and civil society organizations gain momentum, it is imperative not only to remember the human face of migration, but also to keep migrants themselves at the centre of discussions. As demonstrated in the preceding chapters of this book, migration has become increasingly a topical issue around the world. A deeply embedded phenomenon in human history, the salience of migration as a topical issue in global interstate relations stems from the huge security and humanitarian challenges, which have continued to accompany recent migration events. Indeed, contemporary migration trends have intensified the problems of terrorism, xenophobia, human trafficking, modern slavery, brain drain, sexual violence and extreme nationalism. Africa has been at the centre of the growing problem of the negativities surrounding migration given not only the growing political and economic instabilities, but also the environmental challenges bedevilling the continent. Africans constitute some of the largest populations of individuals who engage in irregular migration to Europe or the Americas for greener pastures. Since the 2000s, there have been troubling numbers of deaths of African migrants aiming to use illegal routes and dangerous means to cross into Europe either through the Saharan Desert or the Mediterranean Sea. For example, the United Nations reported that an estimated 33,761 died or were declared missing on the route between 2000 and 2017 (UN News Center, 2017). Although it is often easy to forget that despite the negative attitudes and narratives about desperate African migrants who are prepared to risk everything in the quest to leave their countries, most Africans arrive legally in their host countries.

Also, it is important to underscore that despite the importance of annual remittances as one of the largest sources of external financing for many African countries, the bulk of such monies are sent to only two countries -- Egypt and Nigeria -- which in 2019 accounted for about 72% of total remittance inflows into Africa (Alagbe, 2020). That notwithstanding, the migration phenomenon often favours host countries, which frequently receive qualified African professionals and motivated workers. With the exits of well-educated and highly needed and scarce professionals such as medical doctors and engineers, the continent's losses from the trend of inter-continental migration seem far more significant than the gains it achieves through remittances. Africa is one of the major casualties of the brain drain losses arising from mass exodus of well-educated and skilled people to other parts of the World, especially Europe and the Americas (Karpilo, 2020). This is often due to factors such as the availability of superior job opportunities, political instability, conflict or war.

The African Union (AU) laments that an estimated 70,000 African professionals leave the continent yearly. In this regard, it is estimated that more Africans are becoming visible in OECD countries, with a projection that the population could soar from 7 million (in 2013) to 34 million in 2050 (Kweitsu, 2018). Clearly, this suggests the growing desperation to migrate to the Western countries by Africans. In this process, women and girls have been severely exploited. It was reported that 90% of African women who arrived Italy through illegal routes, especially from Libya, showed signs of subjection to physical and emotional violence (<http://pathfindersji.org/nigeria-human-trafficking-factsheet/>). The desperation to migrate to the Western countries has further intensified human trafficking on the continent. Increasingly, Africans who are overwhelmed with false hopes of better paying jobs and quality lives abroad have continued to fall victims to human traffickers. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) discovered that traffickers who engage in smuggling (West)Africans to Europe make USD 150 million annually (UNODC, n.d). Libya, which is the illegal route the migrants pass through, has been more dangerous for the fleeing migrants because of the conflict ravaging the state after the collapse of the Gadhafi regime. A net outcome is that Libya is now notorious for kidnaping, sexual violence, forced labour, illegal detention, and slavery. In 2017, worrying images of deformed humans, stranded and kidnapped migrants, in highly inhuman conditions in the detention camps of Libyan rebels attracted a global outcry following media reports that revealed a slavery market thriving in the conflict-ridden country.

Nevertheless, it must be underscored that the rising numbers of calamities emerging from the migration processes do not entirely indicate that the phenomenon has totally been a bad experience for Africa. For instance, recent reports for the period immediately before COVID-19 suggest that African economies have been recording appreciable growth in remittances from the Diaspora, contributing significantly to the GDP. According to the World Bank, remittances to sub-Saharan Africa grew to USD 37.8 billion in 2017, and projected to soar to USD 39.2 billion and USD 39.6 billion. Nigeria recorded the highest with USD 22.3 billion (Adegoke, 2018). Africa has also

benefitted from “brain gain” as the continent is increasingly experiencing a return of highly qualified personnel who are being compelled to return to Africa following rising levels of hostility against migrants as economic uncertainties increase in Western countries. In light of American President Donald Trump’s anti-immigration policies and the BREXIT referendum, a study revealed that about 70% of African students in top U.S. and European universities have indicated interest in returning to the continent to work after completing their MBA programmes. Similarly, it was discovered that 9 of 10 African PhD students studying abroad are interested in returning to their countries after their degrees (Nwoye, 2017).

The “brain gains” notwithstanding, Africa cannot afford to ignore the net negative impacts of migration in stunting or even negating medium and long term transformative change and development of the region. While the exact impact of brain drain is difficult to measure, there is a general agreement that developing countries which experience substantial losses of skilled people suffer significant development setbacks. This is because their ability to plan generally for economic growth and development often rests significantly on the availability of professionals and skilled people who can drive or provide necessary technical and administrative support needed for industrial development and growth, and for maintaining research facilities and activities. Although migration could give individuals greater opportunities for career advancement, salary increases and potential capital for individual investments, their departure from their home country imposes huge collective losses of the contributions that the professionals would have made to national advancement and development resulting from the critical mass of well-educated individuals using their collective knowledge and expertise to benefit their country. As such, it is crucial that African governments should work conscientiously to arrest the key factors that force highly educated and skilled people into migrating to other countries for a better life and opportunities such as conflict and social injustice, and more professional environments and competitive salaries.

Conflict and Social Injustice -- Practical Solutions

It cannot be de-emphasised that conflict represents a major source of migration in Africa, and migration has further contributed to insecurity. So while conflict is stoked by serious disputes and perceptions of justice/injustice, it often triggers human insecurity and its associated outcome – migration. The continent has been battling with various forms of conflict ranging from terrorism to insurgency and ethno-religious conflict to large-scale civil wars. Despite the fact that Africa constitutes only 16% of the world’s population, the continent often accounts for some of the largest numbers of conflicts and casualties in the world (Aucoin, 2017). These conflicts have created an unsuitable environment for human security. Hence, they are often associated with significant movements of people out of the continent. Consequently, sub-Saharan Africa is considered the second largest contributor to the world’s refugee crisis, with 37% of the global 19.6 million refugees and 39.1 million internally displaced people (IDPs), according to UN reports (Mohamed and Chughtai, 2019). Indeed,

adopting practical ways to end the orgy of violence in the continent is a necessary step to reduce human insecurity and the concomitant migration crisis. A conflict-free Africa not only ensures a safe continent for its people, but also provides a reason for them to stay, live and work to strengthen its capacity to sustain them generously. African states must develop useful mechanisms to tackle the root causes of the conflicts ravaging them. Stakeholders may need to reconsider the predominant militarist approach and give room for some practical long-lasting solutions that aim to transform the conflict environment. Given that conflicts are often caused by multi-dimensional factors, the choice of conflict resolution strategies should be anchored on pertinent multi-dimensional features. Specifically, the approaches should focus on building or strengthening state capacity to respond effectively to rising threats from non-state actors, ensuring political inclusion and participatory governance, and building the criminal justice system with the view to entrench both constitutionalism and law and order.

Professional Environment and Competitive Salaries

There is no denial that migration crisis has close connection with the poor state of economies in Africa. For many well educated individuals, there is also the added concern about struggling to stay professionally fit while operating in environments that are retrogressive professionally. Obviously, many Africans are fleeing the continent for economic and professional reasons. Issues of poverty, unemployment, infrastructural deficiencies, and socio-economic inequality are increasingly dashing the hopes of young Africans and pushing them out of the continent. Gradually, this has become the case since the 1980s following the economic crisis that bedevilled the continent with the advent of broad introduction of economic rationalization projects of the Bretton Woods institutions, which demanded structural reforms of economic policy frameworks with the view to facilitate international competitiveness and ensure balance of payments equilibrium

In consequence, many Africans (skilled and unskilled) exited the continent in search of greener pastures. As the effects of globalization worsened their impact on under-developed countries, migration phenomenon deepened as economies deteriorated further and to the extent that almost every African household had at least one person that migrated to a Western country, and whom they depended for financial support. Despite the reality of limited opportunities and worsening treatments of migrants overseas, many economic migrants prefer to endure the poor treatments and woes in their host countries than immediate return to Africa. In essence, for a considerable number of African migrants, the hopelessness of life in Africa was belied by the objective reality of hope that conditions in the West appeared to still provide despite some negative personal experiences. For example, a shocking but factual report by Pew Research has revealed that almost half of Nigerian adults hope to leave the country in the next five years (Oyewole, 2019). Clearly then, for this problem to be meaningfully addressed, African leaders must expand opportunities for their citizens. Regrettably, in country-after-country, this has proven to be far more complex than it seems despite

their general inability to develop initiatives that create jobs. For instance, most Nigerian leaders seem committed to doing the direct opposite as they push to control business activities with regulatory policies that choke initiatives and destroy nascent and struggling businesses (BECANS IV Report, 2021). Clearly, there is a need to put in place well thought out policies for job creation and poverty eradication. Indeed, the widening of economic opportunities requires prudent management of national resources. Two major problems typically experienced by African economies are that of mismanagement of resources and high levels of corruption; combined, they have kept the continent poor and underdeveloped. To stop the inordinate drive for migration to Western countries, African governments must be focussed and resolute in their fight against corruption and the imperative of blocking avenues that promote resource waste and public malfeasance.

Values Re-orientation/Attitudinal Change

A neglected issue about migration concerns the effects of colonialism on the mentality of Africans. Given the profound impact of colonialism and the existing structures of neo-colonialism, Africans have developed a debasing value for anything African; hence, their belief that living in the West heralds the attainment of the peak of human achievement. In some cases, the popular argument that migration is caused by economic factors may not entirely hold true if one considers that the intercontinental journey of a typical legal or illegal African migrant often involves parting with huge sums of money. Most of the migrants, ostensibly running from poverty, end up spending heavily in the effort to travel overseas. Clearly, this suggests that money or poverty may not have been their primary problem, per se; rather, that it is more about the ideas they have cultivated about Western societies or the opportunities that they represent. The thinking is based on the idea that travelling to Western societies is an automatic answer to success in life whereas a continued stay in Africa represents backwardness. This phenomenon has also extended to daily existence in Africa. For instance, Africans often accord special respect to education certificates acquired from Western universities while degrees acquired from local universities are perceived as less worthy by many employers. Thus, African parents are ready to commit a huge amount of foreign currencies for their children to acquire foreign education and certificates. Clearly, this problem is psychological in nature. Sadly, it has continued to defy economic or political solutions. Thus, a meaningful effort to rectify the problem requires early and profound values re-orientation of young people across different social platforms with a view to change the perception and attitude of Africans about their continent and what it does represent for them. Africans should begin to appreciate the potential within the continent. State and non-state agencies have a role to play in sensitising Africans about giving preference to the continent, exploring local opportunities and appreciating themselves more. A review of the school curricula by duly qualified persons across all levels is fundamental in achieving that objective.

Multilateral Cooperation

When President Trump made his “shithole countries” comment many Africans openly agreed with the undiplomatic and insulting reference as “honest”. Sadly, it failed to engender any visible form of practical response in the way most African leaders tackle the issue of good governance. In Nigeria, for instance, it made no impact on the way ministers were approved for the national and many state governments following the 2019 elections. In fact, as though to confirm Trump’s dismissive view of them, Nigerian legislators actually abandoned their constitutional responsibility of ensuring that those given ministerial tasks were duly fit or qualified for their positions. The screening process was immorally reduced to the request that many of those who were tabled for vetting were merely asked to “bow and go”. Clearly, although there is a clear link between good governance and migration, many African states lack the national will to address the problem fully. Thus, there is a need for more collaborative efforts by states to manage jointly recent migration trends. In recent years, especially since the 2nd decade of the 21st century and the growing economic challenges facing European Union (EU) governments, destination and host countries have mounted increased pressures on African governments to address urgently the underlying conditions that promote irregular migration. Given this, the EU has established some partnerships with the African Union (AU) on measures to manage the challenges associated with migration. The partnerships border on assisting African states on issues of development and provision of funding assistance to repatriate African migrants stuck in European countries back to their home countries. On their own, there has not been a substantial effort on a collective approach for addressing the problem of migration. At the level of the AU, there is a document produced on “African Common Position on Migration and Development,” which was the outcome of a meeting held in 2006 by member states. Seemingly, the positive angles to migration were more emphasized but less attention was paid to the debilitating impact migration has imposed on Africa. In this regard, African governments need to push the issue of migration as a major agenda. It is now vital that they adopt a common strategy on how best to address collectively the problems that drive migration and those that impel and sustain them to the detriment of Africa and its people.

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African Heritage Institution, a not-for-profit, non-partisan and independent organization devoted to economic research, capacity building, and networking. Our history dates back to 2001 when we began operations as the African Institute for Applied Economics (AIAE). Until 2012, our activities were focused mostly on social and economic issues. Then the need for expanded scope became obvious to better account for the range of issues that impact significantly on society. Thus, the new name change in 2013 to African Heritage Institution (AfriHeritage) was unveiled with broader programme areas. We are based in Enugu in the South Eastern part of Nigeria.

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