

South Africa in the World

Navigating a Changing Global Order



Proceedings report of symposiums hosted by the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD),
associated with UNISA, in
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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

| | |
|----------|---|
| AfCFTA | Africa Continental Free Trade Area |
| AGOA | African Growth and Opportunity Act |
| AMEC | Afro-Middle East Centre |
| ANC | African National Congress |
| APRM | African Peer Review Mechanism |
| ATT | International Arms Trade Treaty |
| AU | African Union |
| AUPSC | African Union Peace and Security Council |
| BAPA | Bueno Aires Plan of Action |
| BREXIT | Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union |
| BRICS | Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa |
| COMESA | Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa |
| DA | Democratic Alliance |
| DIRCO | Department of International Relations and Cooperation |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| DTI | Department of Trade and Industry |
| DWG | Development Working Group |
| E10 | Elected 10 non-permanent members of the UNSC |
| EAC | East African Community |
| EFF | Economic Freedom Fighters |
| EPRDF | Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front |
| EU | European Union |
| FIFA | Fédération Internationale de Football Association |
| G20 | Group of 20 |
| IBSA | India, Brazil and South Africa |
| ICC | International Criminal Court |
| IEC | Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa |
| IFFs | Illicit Financial Flows |
| IGD | Institute for Global Dialogue |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| IORA | Indian Ocean Rim Association |
| MERCOSUR | Mercado Común del Sur or Southern Common Market |
| NDB | New Development Bank |
| NDP | National Development Plan |
| OAU | Organisation for African Unity |
| P5 | Permanent five members of the UNSC, P3 reference to USA, UK and France, P2 reference to China and Russia. |
| REC | Regional Economic Community |
| SADC | Southern African Development Community |
| SADR | Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic |
| SDGs | Sustainable Development Goals |
| SOEs | State Owned Enterprises |
| SONA | State of the Nation Address |
| T20 | Think Thanks 20, associated with the G20 process |
| TICAD | Tokyo International Conference of African Development |
| UAE | United Arab Emirates |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| UNGA | United Nations General Assembly |
| UNHRC | United Nations Human Rights Council |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| US/USA | United States of America |
| WCO | World Customs Organization |
| WTO | World Trade Organisation |

Introduction

This report was compiled from Institute for Global Dialogue's (IGD) flagship symposium **South Africa in the World**, held in November 2018 and February 2019 and engaged government, academia, business, non-governmental and civil society actors. The symposiums covered the change in leadership and what this meant for South African foreign policy. Central in this regard was the discussion on the lead up to the 2019 national elections, the African agenda and strategic developments related to Western Sahara, Morocco, and the Horn of Africa, and key themes like continental integration and associated challenges as well as the return of old partners like Russia. In addition other highlights included discussions on South Africa's engagements with Latin America and the Caribbean, other platforms where it held the chairship of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) partnership, as well as the annual Group of 20 (G20) meeting and re-election as non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for 2019 – 2020.

These symposiums explored South Africa's role as a bridge-builder, which is a key objective of its post-apartheid foreign policy agenda, as well as a pragmatic outlook, which provided a retrospective look into the implementation of South African foreign policy and broader alignment with key priorities and national objectives. With a global pandemic currently underway and much of the world already in lockdown, South Africa's ability

to navigate a changing global political and economic order will be tested. What will also be tested is the country's ability to define its national interests in a manner that cuts across political, racial, and class divides, and its ability to build a diplomatic infrastructure capable of channelling and coordinating the states resources in a strategic and coordinated manner that delivers material and non-material gains for South Africa in the world.

Changes in leadership dynamics, South African foreign policy reset button?

Ms. Sanusha Naidu

Following Jacob Zuma's resignation in February 2018, Cyril Ramaphosa was inaugurated as interim president. This was followed by an immediate cabinet reshuffle which saw Lindiwe Sisulu appointed as Minister of International Relations and Cooperation. This period in the country's post-Zuma administration provided domestic and international foreign policy stakeholders with an opportunity to revisit the country's orientation in international relations and during 2018, South Africa engaged in 33 bi-lateral and 71 multi-lateral official meetings. Ramaphosa's first bi-lateral visit was to Luanda, Angola. In May 2018, Minister Sisulu announced the establishment of a Foreign Policy Review Panel to reflect on South Africa's global, continental and regional engagements in respect of its foreign policy values and

objectives.¹ Minister Sisulu emphasised that the foreign policy engagement should be an inclusive process that is owned by South Africans. This pointed to a realignment in the way that Pretoria's foreign policy priorities were structured, as detailed in the National Development Plan (NDP) 2011² and, regardless of the change in leadership, what needed to remain consistent is South Africa's commitment to its development agenda and cooperation for a Better Africa and a Better World.

The appointment of the Review Panel and in terms of how Minister Sisulu interpreted South Africa's global identity, a reset button was needed for the way South Africa positioned its foreign policy. The latter could be construed to South Africa entering a period in which, for the better part of a decade, it seemed to have been grappling with its foreign policy strategic vision that was primarily overwhelmed by the domestic setting. In this regard, the key issue would be to reverse some of the credibility damages that were suffered in what even President Ramphosa characterised as the 'lost nine years' and for Pretoria to regain its value add in global affairs. And, indeed, with President Ramaphosa promising a 'New Dawn' during his term as interim Head of State, the overarching question that lurked in the shadows of Ramaphosa becoming the next President of the 6th Democratic Republic of South Africa would be to what extent can the incumbent government overcome the debilitating effect that the country's domestic conditions has had on its international footprint. This was evident when German president, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who during a visit to the country in November 2018,

told President Ramaphosa that the world is also watching the Zondo Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture.³

With Ramaphosa voted in as the 6th President of the Republic of South Africa and Naledi Pandor taking over the position as Foreign Minister from Sisulu this became a significant starting point in anticipating South Africa's foreign policy roadmap in 2019 and beyond. This was because of the context where our political body interspersed with the social and economic landscape could not be ignored, nor reflected upon in a bi-partisan manner. Hence, if the world was watching what was happening domestically, then the recommendations from the Review Panel would certainly provide the framework for how a Ramaphosa led Presidency will revitalise the country's foreign policy trajectory after the 2019 national elections.

As interim president in 2018, it was unclear if there will be a continuity to Zuma's foreign policy or a continuity and change.

One of the key issues and consensus to emerge in the President's February 2018 State of the Nation Address (SONA) was that commercial and economic diplomacy became a centric feature to Ramaphosa's presidency; specifically, his drive to kick start investment specifically for infrastructure and State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). In this regard the President launched a R1 trillion investment vehicle, which he identified as the basis through which by revitalising South Africa's domestic economy, he could inadvertently reset the contours of its foreign policy.

¹ The Ministerial Review panel was established by the Minister of International Relations and cooperation, Ms. Lindiwe Sisulu, Member of Parliament, and introduced to the House of assembly on the occasion of the Budget Vote of the same Ministry on the 15th May 2018 in parliament. The findings were published in the Foreign Policy Review Report 17 April 2019.

² The NDP offers a long-term perspective. It defines a desired destination and identifies the role different sectors of society need to play in reaching that goal. It was published by the National Planning Commission, located within The Presidency.

³ The judicial commission of inquiry into allegations of corruption and fraud in the public sector, including organs of state.

Drive to kick start investment specifically for infrastructure and SOEs through economic diplomacy

From a strategic perspective, it would seem that it is all about the trade and investment of what a nation needs to do to not only re-start an ailing economy but also re-invoke confidence in a country that was systematically losing its strategic relevance in an evolving global architecture. By returning South Africa to a growth path that meets domestic expectations of an economic recovery and socio-economic aspirations of employment, reducing inequality and alleviating poverty, then Ramaphosa's 'New Dawn' could not only steer the country clear of the horrors of a complete credit rating downgrade and its ramifications, but also re-instil South Africa's ability to become attractive to the world again. Of course such a project is dependent on domestic political stability and policy certainty for investors to invest in South Africa. And even with the dynamic change in leadership and focus on economic diplomacy, political will to implement reforms will be a significant factor.

Based on the above set of issues, this proceedings report examines South Africa's

position in the World based on reflections by a diverse range of commentators looking at where the country's foreign policy is coming from and where it is going. Considering the interim Presidency of Ramaphosa and unpacking the dynamics that surrounded the policy positioning of South Africa's behaviour, and positioning on the global stage, discussions also forecasted how Pretoria will manage its international relations by evaluating what systematic changes need to be undertaken to reset the policy and structural framework of the country's foreign policy making. From discussing the way domestic conditions shape the foreign policy landscape and international perceptions on South Africa's identity in global affairs to strengthening its role in global governance and multilateral diplomacy, this proceedings report provides insights into the rhetoric and realities surrounding the nature and future trajectory regarding Pretoria's foreign policy.





South Africa in the World: Retrospectively Anticipating 2019, HSRC, Pretoria, 22 November 2018

Left to Right: Ms. Jesuloba Ilesanmi and Mr. Simphiwe Mongwe



Left to Right: Ms. Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, Dr. Philani Mthembu



Left to Right: Prof. Cheryl Hendricks, Ms. Sanusha Naidu, Mr. Francis Kornegay Jnr., Ms. Faith Mabera and Prof. Narnia Narnia Bohler-Muller

**South Africa in the
World: The Road to
2019 Elections, Unisa,
Pretoria,
28 February 2019**

**Left to Right: Dr. Philani
Mthembu, Mr. Peter Fabricius,
Ms. Shannon Ebrahim and Mr.
Jean-Jacques Cornish**



**Left to Right: Dr. Garth lePere,
Prof. Gilbert Khadiagala, Ms.
Sanusha Naidu and Amb. Prof.
Gerrit Olivier**



**Left to Right: Dr. Sithembile
Mbete, Ms. Faith Mabera, Mr.
Gustavo de Carvalho, Hon.
Consul. Mrs. Susana Caputi and
Ms. Arina Muresan**



The road to the 2019 elections and foreign policy

Ms. Shannon Ebrahim

In addressing the topic, Ms. Ebrahim focused her remarks around the following question: Are political parties in South Africa developing a consensus around foreign policy issues? Based on the way media approached the 2019 elections with more of a domestic lens, the aforementioned question had remained muted and often neglected in the sector's purview. Given this gap in the analysis, the African National Congress (ANC), Democratic Alliance (DA) and Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) were interviewed on foreign policy and it is possible to note consensus and divergence when it comes to the foreign policy factor in the election manifestoes and rallies. Unlike in the United States of America (USA) where the Republicans and Democrats tend to be on the same page when it comes to foreign policy, it is not the case in South Africa; there are discrepancies between parties on foreign policy issues. However, there is a growing consensus on foreign policy, which had not always been the case previously. In her view, Ebrahim attributed this to the political orientation of the three major parties being ideologically divergent when it comes to the issues and their stances on them. The DA seems to be more closely aligned with the West particularly with the USA, the United Kingdom (UK), Israel and the European countries. While the ANC and EFF do maintain good relations with traditional partners such as the UK, they seem to be more closely aligned with the east, China, India, Russia, those being the BRICS partners. Ebrahim thought it would be valuable to look at some of the key foreign policy positions of the three major political parties, and their stance on the African Union (AU), the International Criminal Court (ICC),

BRICS, Zimbabwe, Venezuela and Israel and Palestine relations.

Firstly, in terms of the AU, the ANC led government sees it as the core of its foreign policy priorities. It is clear from the public discourse that the ANC and the EFF strongly support the AU regional integration, the continental free trade, AU peace and security efforts as well as strengthening good relations on the continent especially using the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). This is where she found the most convergence between the political parties. The DA surprisingly informed her that the AU is a toothless and pointless organisation that has not dealt decisively with Zimbabwe on human rights or any other country for that matter. In fact according to her, the DA felt that none of the despotic governments have been called into question by the AU and, therefore renders it an ineffective institution unlike the European Union (EU) on issues of governance. With that said, the DA does support regional integration, a free trade area and the development of regional infrastructure. In this regard it seemed that there are elements that the AU pushes that the DA agrees with but the Party would generally give the AU an F on its scorecard.

In terms of South Africa's proposed withdrawal from the ICC, which has been a highly debated issue;

There is much convergence on various positions regarding the ICC.

The ANC government is now reviewing the wisdom of the previous administration's decision to withdraw from the ICC given that South Africa was instrumental in mobilising support for the court and there is no current viable alternative to prosecuting gross human rights violations. South Africa would also like to see the ICC reformed so that it cannot be manipulated by certain European powers to pursue their own agendas. This together with the fact that the ICC seems to only be

addressing African issues are factors that impede its effectiveness and fairness.

The EFF goes further than the ANC on the ICC but more or less on the same page, it wants a completely transformed ICC and it does not want South Africa to withdraw from the ICC, as it is not in our interests. The EFF goes a step further, the membership of the ICC should be compulsory and not voluntary which would mean that countries like the USA and Israel and others that are not signatories to the Rome Statute should be obliged to join. Ebrahim explained that although this is a bit idealistic, this would improve human rights internationally. The DA finds it to be a very important institution and it actually referred Zimbabwe to the ICC prosecutor and asked for a preliminary investigations into the human rights abuses in Zimbabwe recently, making them the most active in trying to bring the ICC to deal with issues in the SADC region.

Regarding BRICS, which happens to be very important to South Africa's foreign policy, we know that the ANC is wedded to the partnership as is our government to increase trade and investment between South Africa and the BRICS countries, to promote South-South cooperation and to generate development finance that does not have the conditionalities of the Western institutions. They also like the fact that the BRICS seems to present a counter to US hegemony. For many in the ANC, China offers the new hope and a potential world order. The EFF does not say much about BRICS but their orientation is largely the same as the ANC, they have not pronounced much on BRICS.

The DA finds it to be a very useful partnership to promote trade and their head of policy told me that any investment is beneficial for South Africa if it is correctly used and governed correctly. They claim to not be anti-China, they would like however

for South Africa to strengthen ties with its traditional partners particularly the USA and the UK, which is where much of our trade comes from. The one thing they were not sure of is the utility of the NDB, which the ANC believes in. The DA is asking what benefit the New Development Bank (NDB) is to South Africa. The DA leader said although China has taken over as South Africa's largest trade partner in volume but the USA is still very important to South Africa's future growth and development and it is not in South Africa's best interests to turn its back on the West. It does not appear that the current president wants to turn his back on the West in any shape or form.

There is a lot of convergence on the ANC and EFF's position on Zimbabwe and less so with the DA.

The ANC has repeatedly said that it wants all sanctions on Zimbabwe lifted; it wants to offer as much financial support as it can afford and is also concerned about human rights violations. It has said that it wants to send non-lethal methods of control to Zimbabwe. The ANC would also like to support a national dialogue in Zimbabwe if asked to. The EFF has the same position but goes a little further; they want sanctions to be lifted, for South Africa to support Zimbabwe financially and a conditional grant to that money. The EFF has also been very vocal in condemning the Zimbabwean president's shut down of the internet, the violence used by police and the military in the 2019 protests in Zimbabwe. This position was unexpected as the EFF has always been a supporter of Robert Mugabe; Julius Malema came out strongly against the military being involved in civilian protests. The EFF taking such a strong stand against human rights

violations is a welcome surprise as the EFF used to blame USA and the UK for Zimbabwe's woes. Malema also warned Zanu PF not to rig the elections or intimidate voters during the Zimbabwean elections. The DA is quite juxtaposed to these two positions; it does also want South Africa to intervene. It has formally approached the ICC to investigate Zimbabwe's human rights abuses. Maimane went to the Zimbabwean embassy to deliver a letter that he would like to meet with Ernest Mngagwa in February, he would like to meet with opposition parties, civil society and have a fact-finding mission.

Former DA leader, Mmusi Maimane was the chairperson of the Southern Africa Partnership for Democratic Change which is a gathering of opposition parties in Southern African region and they support the opposition leader in Zambia. The Zimbabwean government did not respond to him but did prevent him from coming into the country while the South African ambassador chastised Maimane for interfering in Zimbabwe's internal affairs. The DA now even wants to involve the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). In terms of human rights, all parties seem to have a similar position.

Regarding Venezuela, the ANC is fervently against any regime change through unconstitutional means, they believe it will create a much more dangerous world order and lead to chaos. The only viable option is for Venezuelans to determine their own destiny through apolitical solutions, negotiations, mediations and they do tend to believe that Maduro is the victim of a regime change campaign by the West. I do believe that there is a media war, where you read a media briefing from

AP and it reads as a press briefing from the White House. Perhaps this was the case in 2003 when the Western media was the one championing that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction and would never engage in any type of critical thinking. The ANC and the ANC led government realises that there is a very serious humanitarian crisis in Venezuela which has to be addressed. What they are in favour of is humanitarian aid being delivered by the UN as it would do so impartially without any regime change agenda.

The EFF goes just a bit further than the ANC, they completely support Maduro and say that they are against imperialists. Malema took a group of youth from the EFF in 2010 to visit Venezuela in order to study their economic model. He came back saying that Venezuela is the successful example of nationalisation, they were looking at the nationalisation of mines, cement, steel, supermarkets and rice. The EFF said that the message they received from Venezuela was that the appropriation of business and investment was not a bad thing. Venezuela had price controls and subsidized the price of basic commodities. One can understand that at that time, Venezuela was a successful model due to the high price of oil and in the 1980s, Venezuela was the richest country in Latin America. However, the plunge of the oil price led to Venezuela's inability to pay its debt and inability to subsidize basic commodities and maintain low prices. Shortages of basic goods emerged and we are currently at about 100 per cent inflation rate and there is real hunger. The EFF then needs to be asked about any reconsideration regarding Venezuela being a successful example of nationalisation or is it not the

oil price that enabled Venezuela to do all the great things for its citizens.

The DA believe that what is happening in Venezuela is an example of what happens when you have populist rhetoric.

They do believe that military intervention is not required unless it is in line with the UN practices. The most debated issue is Israel and Palestine, the approaches to this position are well known. The ANC still says it strongly believes in a two-state solution, however, more senior ANC officials are talking about the fact of whether this is really possible, given the fact that the land of the occupied territories has dwindled to almost nothing.

Is the idea of a two-state solution reasonable to expect given the situation on the ground, which is something that the review policy on foreign policy and the ANC international relations committee will need to look into. The ANC took the decision to downgrade our relations with Israel by downgrading our embassy to a representative office, there is some concern within the ANC that the Zionist community in the USA may lobby to have African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) terminated if we go ahead with downgrading relations. Our position and support of the Palestinians has never been stronger, with the ANC continuously condemning the apartheid policies of the Israeli regime and there are some ANC members who support the BDS campaign.

The EFF has a more radical position on Palestine. Malema said the Palestinians are going through what we went through, Israel wants to wipe Palestine off the map. They believe that we need to fight Israel to give Palestinians back their land and self-

determination because Israel is an apartheid state. They also see a two-state solution as no longer possible and that we should not have any diplomatic relations with Israel and South Africa should be boycotting Israeli products. This is the most divergent position we have regarding political party position on foreign policy.

The DA supports a two-state solution along the 1967 borders. When I asked their head of policy what about the illegal settlement building because we have not heard the DA pronounce on that to which he replied that if the DA supports a two-state solution there is no way they would support an illegal settlement building in an occupied territory. I found this point to be very interesting.

When I asked if the DA believe that South Africa should be importing products that emanate from the occupied territory and they said they would need to determine exactly where the products came from and that might be something that Afro-Middle East Centre (AMEC) wants to address with the DA because they do not seem to know how the issue works. The DA does not believe that our embassy should be downgraded as they feel it is important for South Africa to play a role in peacekeeping and we should negotiate between Israel and Hamas. On the issue of sanctions, they will never tell South Africa what to buy or not buy. On his twitter account, Maimane has condemned the violations against the Palestinians.

However, many in the ANC point out that when he visited Israel, he had no clear programme to visit the occupied territories and when he did visit them, it was as a guest of the occupier. In closing, we should explore further where our political parties

are getting their money from and the fact that none of them will own up to who is backing them. What I found interesting was that when Mmusi Maimane visited the USA, it was the US Chamber of Commerce that heaped praise on him and that as we know is the main arm of USA soft power projections, particularly soft power and it does seem that the more right wing think tanks see the DA as South Africa's future. When looking at right wing USA think tanks, I noticed that they were indeed in favour of the DA and it is particularly those that are anti Russia, China and BRICS altogether. It might be a backlash against the ANC government's decisions. These are very powerful forces that are supporting the DA and these are the forces that are backing regime change in many countries.

Mr. Peter Fabricius

President Cyril Ramaphosa's 2019 SONA speech only made explicit reference to foreign policy in the establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCTA) and South Africa's return to the UNSC. This reminder placed into context the primacy and direness of the domestic situation. Former minister Sisulu waxed lyrical of the Ramaphosa administration's return to the glorious Mandela years of foreign policy on chariots of fire, specifically on human rights in foreign policy and the ANC's unwavering commitment to them. However, she raised hopes of a foreign policy that would be significantly different from that of the Zuma administration, which is more assertive about human rights and more focused on economic diplomacy to boost trade and investment.

The best example was Sisulu's announcement in October 2018 on what she called new foreign policy

on human rights, she instructed her diplomats in New York to support a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) condemning Myanmar for gross human rights violations against the Rohingya people that reversed an abstention on the resolution in committee. It was a small gesture but symbolic.

After commencing its first tenure as a non-permanent member of the UNSC in 2007, South Africa's first substantive vote was a very controversial one against a similar resolution condemning the Myanmar government for its human rights abuses. Sisulu presented that as part of her wider policy which I refer to as das Capital, of returning the important decisions on human rights to Pretoria and not to allow embassies to make their own decisions on these matters as in the past. Despite the policy shift, there has not been any other important changes in votes or decisions whether at the UN or elsewhere. There have been quite a few hints in that direction, with Sisulu having reiterated that her government was reconsidering the decision made by the Zuma administration and later endorsed by the ANC at its December 2017 conference to withdraw from the ICC.

Two of the decisions with human rights implications also remain pending, the first is the 2017 December ANC conference instruction for government to downgrade South Africa's embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel, to a liaison office and the other is whether to upgrade diplomatic relations with Morocco to full ambassador status. There has been an acting ambassador level since 2004 when the ANC recognised Western Sahara as an independent state and

Morocco withdrew its ambassador in protest. Morocco regards Western Sahara as a province. One year into the new administration, Sisulu was still giving rather vague and ambiguous answers to questions on both matters. She said her government would downgrade relations with Israel but only after they figured out how to avoid damaging economic and other relations with Israel. Meanwhile in the real world, South Africa's ambassador, Sisa Ngombane, quietly returned to South Africa officially because the term ended and is yet to be replaced.

On Morocco, South Africa had taken months not to respond to requests from Rabat to appoint a new ambassador to Pretoria. Pretoria hid behind technicalities and protocol and even Sisulu insists rather implausibly that the ANC's ideology on Western Sahara will not influence the decision. However, these may all be cases not so much of the indecision as the Ramaphosa administration deliberately postponing contentious issues until after the May 8 elections. It may be concerned that whatever decisions it takes may alienate one of the ANC's precarious counter balance factions. With no such clashes at present, the Ramaphosa administration is pursuing economic diplomacy quite vigorously such as the enthusiastic support for the AfCTA, which was mentioned in the SONA.

On other contested issues especially in Africa, the administration, despite some promises indicating to the contrary is seemingly a slide back to the old default positions we are all too familiar with. For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where South Africa along with SADC has quietly accepted the highly contentious victory of Felix Tshisekedi in

the December 2018 elections. A senior diplomat expressed outrage that France, a former colonial power should have second-guessed the DRC Constitutional Court for saying that Martin Fayulu had won the elections. In the same breath, he told me that of course Tshisekedi's win was a ruse by Joseph Kabila to remain in power. It is remarkable how he and by implication Pretoria can hold seemingly contradictory positions at the same time.

The South African government surely needs to discover some tactical and nuance ways of resolving these contradicting issues rather than simply slumping back into ideologically comfortable positions. Immediately after the elections, Sisulu seemed to support a call for a vote recount in DRC and then she backed off. Ramaphosa meanwhile attended an ad hoc meeting in the AU called by Kagame, which decided to visit Kinshasa to seemingly call for a recount, and Ramaphosa apparently felt railroaded. The DRC Constitutional Court pre-empted the decision by announcing Tshisekedi's victory, which SADC went along with. We have to ask if South Africa backed Tshisekedi simply because it did not like either France or Kagame's motives, is South Africa's foreign policy determined by others or do we automatically take the opposite position to that of our perceived rivals even when they may be right or is it simply about African solidarity at all costs?

Similarly, somewhere beyond the continent, our ambassador to the UN in New York, told the Security Council to let the people of Venezuela decide their future and all we can do is help them but the decision remains theirs. South Africa recognises the democratic processes followed by the Venezuelan people in

choosing a president as well as the humanitarian challenges.

South Africa draws from its experience of overcoming one of the most oppressive, insidious racist regimes through dialogue and believes internal and inclusive dialogue remains the only viable and sustainable option to ending the political crisis in Venezuela.

Superficially that seems unquestionable however on closer inspection it does raise some serious questions. Firstly, in Venezuela as in other autocratic countries on this continent and elsewhere, it is naïve and disingenuous to simply suggest that the people should decide for themselves. If the people could decide they would have probably chosen someone other than Maduro. Secondly, it is also historically disingenuous to suggest that the ANC overcame apartheid entirely through dialogue, what about the 30 year armed struggle, the financial, cultural, economic sanctions plus the belated change of heart that helped to bring the apartheid regime to the negotiation table? Does that mean that Trump is right in trying to force a violent confrontation with the Maduro regime? Probably not, many commentators suggest that he should be leaving it to the Lima group, the twelve Latin American countries plus Canada that have recognised Guaido as the true president. The Ramaphosa administration does not seem up for intervening in Venezuela even after the elections.

The AU and the UN could do good to join Africa's campaign to silence the guns by 2020, however, in the AU's peace and Security Council that is the most obvious link between the AU and the UN in

addressing these issues. Yet in the same summit, South Africa stood back so that Lesotho of all countries could take Southern Africa's seat on the Peace and Security Council. Perhaps South Africa considered this a wonderful gesture, but most would consider it an abdication of responsibility by South Africa.

Mr. Jean-Jacques Cornish

In speaking to diplomats over many years wondering over Africa and to many colleagues in foreign affairs, Cornish can agree on one thing: in the days of yore, the hunters went for the big five; elephants, leopards, rhinos, lions and buffalo. The big five in this context is the way diplomats approach foreign policy with African powers; Algeria, Nigeria, DRC, Angola and South Africa. Noting the controversy, Cornish acknowledged that there are indeed other African countries' representatives asking why they are excluded.

The three (Algeria, Nigeria and Angola) are oil producers and South Africa is hoping to become the fourth, while the DRC is the most fertile and could feed the continent if all was well there, while South Africa is the most industrialised.

In 2019, a total of 23 elections (national, provincial and local) took place in Africa. The question we have to ask is whether the leaders have their people's interests at heart over their own, which of course is a major problem on the continent. Algeria has overcome the Islamist insurrection. It has a history from the war on independence, which was a very terrible

war between 1954 and 1962. This successful fight against insurgency has made it the go to country in Africa and many parts of the world when coming to fighting terrorism. The truth is that the corruption following its independence was used by the insurgents as ammunition to say that Algeria was not working because women were allowed to wear Western clothes and work. Most of them were however saying this coming from fighting for the USA in Afghanistan. The determination for the former Algerian president to stay for a fifth term is something that South Africa had looked at with concern as the ties between the two countries are growing stronger.

The thing about South Africa is that we admire the principled stance that Algeria has taken and the part they played against apartheid. They are also taking a principled stance against Western Sahara and South Africa has fallen into place with it.

Algeria and South Africa are at the forefront of the struggle of the Sahrawi people for self-determination and this is a struggle we are determined to see through. As for Morocco re-joining the AU, journalists will be watching what they plan to do. Morocco stormed out of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) when Western Sahara was recognised as an independent country and pushed propaganda to the effect that they were disregarded by the AU. Algeria is a power to the north and a very important partner.

With regard to Nigeria, it was an interesting moment when South Africa offered Nigeria the assistance of the Independent Electoral Commission of

South Africa (IEC) when Nigeria had to postpone their elections due to technical issues given our adversarial relationship with Nigeria. Nigeria is now proof of the African saying that if you win elections in the village by 52%, your troubles only begin. African democracy is not democracy as it is seen in the rest of the world, 52% means you have 48% of the people down your throat for the rest of your term which is why South Africa always insists on being inclusive. If the Nigerian economy behaves according to projections, it will remain the biggest oil producer on the continent. Buhari has his work cut out with South Africa looking at how he fights Boko Haram, as well as the corruption that Nigeria has become known for. South Africa is also looking at the distribution of Nigeria's oil money. However, South Africa does not have a good record of wealth trickling down either.

The DRC, a member of SADC, raises the question of why South Africa would bring on a country with so many problems. Cornish expressed that the South African position on Tshisekedi's win is rather embarrassing and should have not supported that decision. South Africa played a leading role from Mobutu's kleptocracy to Kabila. Perhaps, South Africa felt some resentment regarding not being actively involved in the DRC elections but Kabila did not want any external parties, he was even trying to get rid of the UN. Kabila realised that his chosen candidate Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary would not win, so he then roped Tshisekedi in and Kabila has shown intentions to run for elections again in 2023. DRC has had the worst Ebola outbreak with Doctors without borders closing its treatment centre in North Kivu bringing threats of

becoming the worst Ebola outbreak in history. There are risks of it spreading into Uganda and Rwanda.

The relationship between Angola and South Africa is a very interesting one given the days of the fighting during the apartheid regime. The two countries compete for the position of military power and supremacy in this part of Africa. Angola has begun to undo the corruption that previously reigned in Angola, and has gotten rid of those at the helm of the sovereign wealth fund of Angola as well as those in oil companies. The relationship is growing with Angola since Zuma and Ramaphosa is also spending time an effort on it. The important ties between these two countries are something that should be encouraged.

An African Agenda

While the DRC and southern African countries hold an ardent focus of South Africa's agenda, specific focus on Morocco, Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, and regional integration have featured strongly in foreign policy discussions.

Prof. Garth le Pere

Morocco's re-emergence

The history of the Western Sahara conflict is a complex conflict ecosystem, it represents one of Africa's intractable conflicts that has lasted over 40 years. President Mbeki said that the situation there is a great shame and regret for the continent, drawing on the sentiment of South Africa's history of association with the Western Sahara. The ANC, as a political party, has been very close to the liberation

movement in the Western Sahara. As an ANC led government, the ANC has been almost unequivocal of its support of the self-determination and independence of Western Sahara.

Since the 1975 "Green March" of 350,000 Moroccans to the territory and since then interestingly, Morocco has claimed possession of the territory following Mauritania also giving up its claim, and Morocco had taken possession and controls 90% of the territory. The Berm wall represents the African equivalent of the Trump wall at the American border with Mexico, it is fortified and it really is symbolic of its sovereign possession. Refugee camps have become entrenched. On the other side in the Palm of Tindouf in south-west Algeria, Sahrawi refugee camps concentrated in six districts, shelter approximately 165,000 refugees; and in Morocco you have around 60,000 refugees. Sahrawi refugees continue to live in abject conditions, in a desert environment where temperatures reach 50 degrees Celsius, little vegetation is found, frequent sand storms occur, water access is a continued problem, and women and children suffer from protein and iron deficiencies among other illnesses.

Sahrawi refugees continue to live in abject conditions

Morocco has engaged in a form of demographic engineering and it has tried to convince its citizens to relocate to Western Sahara based on providing subsidies and tax exemptions; it has spent US \$800,000,000 on that project. From a regional geopolitical perspective, Western Sahara is the catalyst in the competition for regional power between Morocco and Algeria so much so that the regional

community in all intents and purposes is dysfunctional in reaching a resolution. At the core of Morocco's position is that it will not succumb or surrender to any attempt that challenges its control of the Western Sahara. This stalemate is further intensified by Algeria's refusal to negotiate with Morocco since from the Algerian perspective it is not a party to the dispute and cannot be a substitute for the Western Sahara people. Five recent developments on the issue:

1. Morocco's readmission to the AU as its 55th member in January 2017.

2. Former president of Mozambique has been appointed as the AU's Special Envoy for Western Sahara, although his appointment does not sit very well with Morocco, who has constantly contested the African Union's legal and diplomatic standing to intervene in the dispute. This state of affairs displays the sharp division within member states in regards to the dispute.

3. At the 31st AU Summit, held in Mauritania in June and July of 2018, the AU Commission Chair delivered a report on the Western Sahara and that marked the first time that the AU has become directly involved in the dispute. Prior to this, the OAU and AU rarely pronounced on the occupation of the Western Sahara. The Summit was further significant in two respects:

- a. An AU infrastructure in support of the UN efforts in the Western Sahara was set up, and
- b. An AU mechanism on Western Sahara (a Troika) consisting of the current president of the AU, the previous

president (Rwanda) and the next president (South Africa) was established.

4. The appointment of the general president and the managing director as the UN Secretary General Special Envoy, Mr. Horst Koehler, convened a round-table meeting on the Western Sahara in Geneva in December 2017, attended by the foreign ministers of Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania.

5. The SADC summit of August 2017, and the decision to organize a solidarity conference as a means of expressing SADC member states support for the self-determination of the Western Sahara was important, with due regard to the values that have guided the quest for independence on the African continent. South Africa hosted the conference on the 25th and 26th March 2019.

In the UN-AU interface, the Western Sahara has been a very divisive issue at the level of the UN. The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) is not a UN member since it is not the administering power. In the past various UN members recognized the SADR, although the number of recognitions has declined tremendously and more are abstaining. The AU has been quite resolute in the support of Western Sahara's right to self-determination, and that support is vital to signalling the end of the colonization process. South Africa has been a strategic ally and supporter of the SADR throughout its two terms as a non-permanent member of the UNSC and in terms of its third term that started in January 2019, South Africa will hopefully communicate the outcomes of the solidarity conference as a strategic contribution to the matter at the UNSC.

It is also very important to recognize some of the instrumental economic interest in Western Sahara.

This is a region that is very rich in resources especially in Phosphates, fisheries and gas, which has become a very integral part of the Moroccan economy. Morocco's phosphate industry is one of the largest in the world, with 72% of all phosphate products. What is controversial here, is that Morocco's fishing industry has laid claim to Western Sahara's coastal fishing resources. This claim has defied the fisheries agreement between Morocco and European countries and continued occupation guarantees access to Western Sahara's resources. In February 2010, a legal opinion from the British legal service stated that fishing on the Western Sahara waters was in violation of International Law. Reference to a recent case in South Africa, and which adds further substance to the EU legal opinion.

Continued occupation guarantees access to Western Sahara's resources

This follows the Western Sahara Resource Watch case, an international conglomerate of non-governmental organizations, which called for the detention of a vessel called the "Green Glazier" in the port of Cape Town in January 2019. It alleged that the vessel was carrying five and a half thousand tonnes of fish caught on the exclusive zonal waters of the Western Sahara. Resource Watch requested that the vessel be examined in terms of its content, origins and final destination. That really follows a precedent in the High Court when another vessel "The Cherry Blossom" was detained with phosphate rocks from

Western Sahara that was destined for New Zealand. The court ruled that the Moroccan sellers to the New Zealand Company did not legally own the phosphate; in its judgement, it concluded that the SADR is the legal owner of the phosphate on the Cherry Blossom.

In conclusion, it seems that support for the Sahrawi struggle for independence and the participation of civil society in such efforts has been really evident from Algeria to South Africa and that includes the efforts of the Western Sahara Resource Watch. Although the EU has rejected the recognition of the SADR, thus legitimising Morocco's behaviour and giving it further momentum in pursuing an aggressive economic agenda, South Africa should insist that the UN focus on resolving the Western Sahara issue with much greater energy and determination than is presently being placed. There is an overwhelming imperative to achieve the self-determination of the Sahrawi people and the independence of the Western Sahara.

Prof. Gilbert Khadiagala, Faith Mabera and Francis Kornegay

All eyes on the Horn of Africa

The world's imagination was captured by the reformist agenda that has been undertaken by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Ethiopia starting in February. Abiy represents the kind of political messiah that Africa is in need of; he's the youngest head of government in Africa at the age of 41, and he's the first Oromo to take up the position of Prime Minister because the Oromo is the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia but have been side-lined historically from political engagement. Abiy thus came at the right time in what

could be seen as a bid to allay the ethnic federal rifts that were starting to spill over. The only way that the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) could navigate the tensions was to thus have an Oromo representative in charge. Abiy is aware of the need to maintain a coalition of unity within the EPRDF and balance any fears, while thinking strategically on the Ethiopian and Eritrean peace deal that essentially accepts the Algiers Peace Agreement of 2000. However, the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict does not just involve disputes around the border issue, but rather tensions that stem from the 1993 referendum for Eritrean independence from Ethiopia.

Even with the realization of the peace deal, it is important to mention what is so significant about the Eritrean and Ethiopian peace deal and why it is a game changer in the region. This represents a very different kind of peace in the Horn of Africa region, given that the region has been depicted as having internecine conflicts that would keep resurfacing in a conflict hot spot on the African continent. But the mechanics or the dynamics of the peace deal did not involve the intervention of a third party, and its momentum came from a very home-grown and locally different driven initiative. The peace deal comes at an opportune time for the Horn of Africa, which is emerging as a key hub for the geopolitics in the Red Sea region and peace and security arrangements that are happening on the continent.

The peace deal places the Horn of Africa favourably as an emerging geopolitical hub in the Red Sea region and peace and security arrangements for the African continent.

The peace deal could shed some important light on what holds for the realization of peace in Somalia, and how peace prospects will impact the prospect of security, collective security arrangements in the region but also regional integration from the perspective of economic relations. This would promote the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and further realisation of a Regional Economic Community (REC) (involving the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa [COMESA] and the tripartite area) in the Horn of Africa, which would become the largest free trade area in the entire continent. The potential for trade and investment would become a phenomenal driver of African economies in that regard.

Regional peace and security will promote the realisation of the AfCFTA on a continental scale and further realisation of a REC in north and east Africa.

Going forward, Ethiopia should begin to build a national constituency to resolve the latent ethnic violence and the ethnic tensions that are coming to the fore. There is a distinctive anti-reformist agenda that is still going to frustrate Prime Minister Abiy's agenda, so it's important for them to tackle that. For Eritrea, it will be important for them to re-join the table, to begin the national building and the strengthening of democratic and viable institutions. This would allow both countries to manage the geopolitical tensions together. We have begun to see this through a liberalized Ethiopian economy and maintaining relations with the Qatar-Turkey axis while also maintaining strong diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This is a very delicate, but vital, foreign policy act for Abiy to balance.

South Africa's move in inviting Ethiopia and Eritrea to the BRICS parliamentary and political parties meeting in December 2018, fit into South Africa's African agenda and the BRICS-Africa outreach programme. However, much support is still needed in the area of institutional capacity and confidence building measures to ensure the success of the peace deal that does not revert to another period of tension with latent ethnic federalism and ethnic violence.

Prof. Gilbert Khadiagala, Faith Mabera and Francis Kornegay

Steps to continental integration

The magnitude of the changes that took place in Ethiopia have major implications for regional cooperation and integration in Africa in the northern tier of the continent from the Maghreb to the Horn of Africa. Because of the unstable political dynamics in these two regions there has been little possibility of regional cooperation or regional integration.

But the revolutionary changes that have been taking place in Ethiopian politics have immense implications for South Africa's economic diplomacy through the AfCFTA as a major segment of that fledgling continental free trade area is what is known as the Cape to Cairo.

The tripartite Free Trade Area combines SADC, COMESA, and the East African Community (EAC). Now given the fact that the Horn of Africa is nestled within that fledgling architecture, how can a dynamic free trade area for the continent or for Eastern and Southern Africa be developed

if you do not have a stable or a stabilization process occurring in the Horn of Africa? This is also linked to the demographic momentum in much of Africa and the Greater Eastern Africa, which holds immense strategic value.

The population covering the Cape to Cairo TFTA alone is approximately 600 to 800 million. If the potential market in Ethiopia is considered, by 2050 Ethiopia is going to have somewhere between 187 to 200 million people. Ethiopia right now is the second most populous country on the continent, so much of the economic dynamism of the African continental free trade area and its Cape to Cairo segment is going to be in north-east Africa. However, north-east Africa in the greater eastern African region is very much in flux. The RECs, specifically the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) trade bloc and the EAC, have had a discussion on what kind of dynamics can be generated in terms of kick-starting cooperation.

The solution extends to the Horn of Africa, which is in close proximity to the Middle East and brings in other dynamics, specifically considering investment potential with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

If these actors bring investment into this region, what are the political geopolitical implications for South Africa? Given the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf and the dynamics, the bitter Sectarian Shia-Sunni geopolitical tug of war going on between the Saudis and Iran and that South Africa has generally been more of within the ambit of Iran. In addition, the possibility of Saudi Arabia looking to invest in India can also have a bearing on South Africa's foreign policy. South Africa may become

rather ambivalent in some of these issues, particularly when considering the Saudi Arabian and UAE influences on the continent through investments in the Horn of Africa and how they may impact South Africa and the rest of Africa which may be used to leverage their own regional positioning. For example, the Saudi led coalition in a bid to isolate Qatar and intervene in Yemen are benefitted by military bases that had been set up in the Horn of Africa. In addition, Turkey has a base in Sudan and China has a base in Djibouti. Although South Africa has a number of defense attaches in the region, and national defense forces are dispatched for peacekeeping missions, it is still unclear if South Africa has the strategic capacity to navigate those dynamics. In North Africa, Morocco plays a very disruptive role in the AU and its relationship with the EU, especially since it has decided to join the anti-Iran coalition, which consists of Saudi Arabia, UAE and Egypt. With South Africa on the UNSC and as AU Chair, the issue of Western Sahara becomes more pressing, especially as the recent president of the AU, Egypt (and still member of the Troika), supports Morocco. This presents a symbolic issue of liberation in Africa, which does not allow for a functioning REC in North Africa; moreover, this does not allow for a fully coherent AU organized on the basis of regional pillars. However, the resolution of the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict holds potential hope for dynamic change in north Africa.

Russia's rediscovery of Africa

Amb. Prof. Gerrit Olivier

After a decade of neglect, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia re-entered Africa, joining what had become known as the 'African stampede'. In the West this move by the Kremlin was regarded as a major foreign policy event. Provoked by President Vladimir Putin's revisionist foreign policy track record, it engendered much concern about Russia's real intentions. At the same time, the West does not welcome any foreign policy success to befall the Kremlin, regarding it as a threat to its interests, a failure to contain the Russian bear.

This is clearly a case of over-reaction. The anticipated harmful impact of Russia's role in Africa is probably more apparent than real. Russia's presence, role and capacity are simply too insignificant to have a meaningful impact on Africa. It concentrates only on a dozen or so African states out of a total of 54, cherry-picking as it were.

In comparison to the main players [in Africa], Russia is still a minnow.

In a matter of a decade, China for example, moved to becoming a major trade and investment partner in Africa. Russia still languishes at the bottom of the pile. Presently, no African state features among Russia's top 15 international trading partners, with the country only responsible for 2.2 % of the total global exports estimated at US \$16 trillion. The competition Russia faces in Africa is formidable, involving big players like the US, the EU, China, the UK, France and

Germany, India, Turkey and Japan, lagging far behind most of them in terms of trade, investment, development aid, and cultural recognition.

Another setback to Russian expectations is that the 'rising Africa' phenomenon has all but dissipated after 2015 when economies stalled due to falling demand for commodities and the failure of many states to diversify their economies. Initially, Russia's new entry into Africa was mainly aimed at making money, taking advantage of the new 'rising Africa' phenomenon.

As the relations between Russia and the West deteriorated and competition increased, Russian geo-strategic goals became part of the scenario.

What it amounts to is that the Russian present pivot to Africa translates into maximising influence and enhancing its role as a global role player. This is the point Putin wants to drive home. It follows on his military successes in Georgia, Crimea, Ukraine and Syria, and hosting the Winter Olympic games and Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup in 2018, significantly enhancing its enhanced international standing. Putin obviously wishes to consolidate, even expand, these successes. As he proclaimed at the Winter Olympics: "At last Russia has returned to the world arena as a strong state—a country that others heed and can stand up to itself".

Taking note of the amount of global reaction to Russia's new Africa agenda, this move, undoubtedly, had substantial propaganda value for the Kremlin. However, in Africa itself, the reaction was muted, if not ignored. One reason for this tepid reaction is that Africans no longer see

Russia as the Cold War hero fighting colonialism, or as a public benefactor helping to liberate them from underdevelopment, destitution and poverty.

This conclusion is underlined by the fact that Russia mostly deals in Africa with instruments of conflict rather than development and peace, while also propping up authoritarian rulers against democratic resistance. Most of Russia's Africa trade comes from arms sales, (being the second largest arms seller in Sub-Saharan Africa after China), and activities of a small group of powerful mega companies investing mainly in nuclear energy, technology, and mining.

Ironically, what does count in Russia's favour, although mainly among authoritarian African leaders, is that unlike the West, and like China, it eschews structural conditionalities such as respect for human rights and good governance. Notably, Russia is not a signatory of the UN's International Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) of 2014.

Former US Security Advisor, John Bolton, regards Russia as a 'foreign policy problem in Africa.' He called Russia's military engagement with Africa 'predatory practices', building 'Cold-War-era alliances... Selling arms and energy in exchange for votes in the UN, helps to keep strong men in power, and undermines peace and security and running counter to the best interests of the African people.

Bolton may have had a point here as a key Kremlin focus is the UNSC where Africa enjoys three rotating non-permanent seats and invariably supports the Kremlin and China's position against the West even when they break international law.

Of course, external involvement in Africa is not a monopoly game. Russia is a legitimate role player there, fully entitled to advance its interests there as long as it is law-abiding, respecting the rules of non-intervention. At the same time, a plurality of role players, as against a few dominant ones, can only benefit Africa, depending on how wisely it deals with it.

But even for Vladimir Putin, all the good things do not always go together. The dwindling oil price, debilitating Western sanctions, domestic economic decline, mounting internal political opposition (with his poll ratings declining), forced him to look at fresh options like African involvement, offering 'low hanging fruit' as it were: low-risk, accessible and affordable ways to relieve domestic economic threats, and off-setting the high price of Russian foreign policy adventurism.

Of course, in spite of the decline of the 'Africa rising' phenomenon at the turn of the century, Africa's future potential is undeniable, and present competitors in the 'Africa game' are keenly aware of this. Its abundant raw materials, impressive demographic profile, vast future consumer market potential, and the demands for investing in new infrastructure and electricity, renders it one of the most promising future markets. Russia, no doubt, is aware of this potential and wants to share in the benefits. However, as noted above, it must come to Africa not as a dour latter-day Cold War warrior, as an opponent with an anti-West agenda, but in a spirit of cooperation and peace.

In the bilateral sphere, South Africa is aware of the importance of good relations with Russia.

But unfortunately, they fall far short, being hamstrung by incompetent diplomacy such as failure of the US \$75 billion nuclear deal. South Africa, on its part, should regard Russia's new discovery of Africa as an opportunity to advance the relationship, engaging it on various bilateral and multilateral issues affecting itself and Africa, such as reforming the UNSC and the global financial and legal institutions to becoming more democratic.

South Africa's BRICS membership was once seen as a gate-way to Africa, but not much has come from it. Moreover, Russia's summit engagement with Africa at the first Russia-Africa Summit in September 2019 displayed this. And with growing Russian support, South Africa's flagging status and role in Africa, Southern Africa in particular, could be remedied, provided of course the country has the diplomatic nous to do the job.

Latin America and the Caribbean, opportunities for renewed leverage

Hon. Consul Susana Caputi

Most Latin American countries have adopted market reforms and trade liberalisation, which has allowed the region to become an important player in global trade. Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Mexico are considered the economic powerhouses and present new opportunities for trade with South Africa.

The market recovery was also boosted by higher consumer demands and higher revenues from stronger commodity prices making

Latin America a desirable export destination, exports to Latin America from the rest of the world raised by 34%.

Argentina reversed several Trade Policies due to the macroeconomic crises faced by the country, while countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay formed the Mercado Común del Sur (or the Southern Common Market) (MERCOSUR) Trade Bloc. Chile reduced and simplified its external tariff structure; following its trade promotion strategy and signed free trade agreements with Colombia, Peru, Panama, Mexico, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras as well as with Mercosur countries.

Countries like Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Mexico account for 77% of South Africa's exports to Latin America; exports are predominantly resources such as minerals and base metals.

When including countries like Panama, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela and the British Virgin Islands they account for 90% of South Africa's total exports to Latin America and the Caribbean. The Intra-Mercosur exports as a share of total exports rose significantly; although the evident strong growth in world exports to Latin America, and establishing Mercosur as an important trading bloc, leading to the signing of a SACU-MERCOSUR Free Trade Agreement. South African exporters have however made little progress in this market, as it remains a minor trading partner of the Latin American region; similarly, South Africa's exports to Latin American countries represent a relatively small proportion of South Africa's total export volumes. South African exports to

Latin American and Caribbean countries accounted for only 1.7% of total South African exports.

Although South Africa's exports to Latin America and the Caribbean have been disappointing, it is important to note that exports from a number of comparative countries like Australia, Malaysia, Turkey, Hungary, Russian Federation and Thailand have risen significantly.

SACU-MERCOSUR FTA

1. South Africa has significant opportunities to extend its market share in certain high-value-added products, specifically those products related to the mining industry and those where the SACU-Mercosur FTA provides preferential access.

Trade patterns between South Africa and Latin America

About 60% of South Africa's world exports are made of minerals, base metals and precious stones. Therefore, South Africa's exports to Latin America are concentrated in the resources sector with mineral products leading the way.

South Africa's trade pattern with Latin America reflects South Africa's overall structure of the trade with the rest of the world.

South Africa's trade basket is dominated by resource exports (mineral products, chemical products and base metals); paper products experienced the greatest decline while machinery, arms and ammunition increased in the last decade. High value items such as machinery and transport equipment account for 60% of the export basket.

Very few product lines are exported consistently over an extended period of time. The majority of products are exported only once in a single year so exports are sporadic. Countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Mexico, which are most similar to South Africa's size and level of development, can also be considered competitors as they supply the rest of the Latin American region with the same kind of products which South Africa normally exports.

What can an export promotion strategy for the Latin American market look like?

South African trade patterns are erratic and slow in market penetration and therefore South Africa should focus on the following:

1. Prioritise certain commodity groups for export to Latin America.
2. Select and support firms for participation in Latin American trade promotion activities on the basis of their "export-readiness".
3. Improve access and quality of information provided to exporters.
4. Reinforce capacity within the DTI to carry out export facilitation activities and provide advisory services equipped with the required trade facilitation and language skills.
5. Monitor and evaluate the results of export promotion activities.
6. Identify some of the main non-tariff barriers that exist in key Latin American markets and sectors.
7. Educational components that are targeted at training exporters or potential exporters around trading in global markets.

8. Trade missions and related instruments focused on providing an 'entry' point as well as exposure to exporters in international markets.

9. Financial assistance schemes that are targeted at assisting exporters with marketing their products in foreign countries.

Opportunities and Challenges faced by South African Exporters in Latin American markets

Exporters to Latin America are generally larger, older, and more capital intensive and more productive, making it difficult for Micro, Small and Medium enterprises to gain experience in export and engage Latin America. In addition, volatility of the exchange rate, costs of transport, marketing the product, and customs factor in immensely.

Making contact with potential buyers and language barriers are the two most frequently mentioned and perceived constraints by firms not exporting to Latin America.

Firms that did not export to Latin America perceived making contact with potential buyers and language barriers as the two main challenges to trading with Latin American countries and the barriers can make exporting a high-risk activity for businesses, and prohibitive for small to medium size companies.

Given the relatively low occurrence of exporting to Latin America, there is little information on the constraints to exporting to this market. Exporters should be more productive, larger and more capital intensive than non-exporters are able to contribute to economies more effectively. If one compares, exporters are

more than five times more productive in terms of labour productivity than non-exporters, they use almost double the amount of capital per worker and are almost five times larger.

For example, Strategically, South Africa has the opportunity to boost the following exports: Textiles and clothing specifically trousers and shorts for men/boys; machinery in heat exchange units, printers and copiers, hot roll iron/steel, sorting, screening, separating and washing of stones; reception, conversion and transmission, cellular phones and other mobile devices; electrical applications for switching and protection of electrical circuits, electrical boards and circuits; logistic and transport equipment; mineral products and base metals; exploration machinery; chemicals; resource commodities; and arms and ammunition.

South Africa should focus its efforts on: seeking to increase the number of firms that have the capacity to become exporters; increase the volumes exported by companies that already export to Latin America; increase exports from companies that export to the rest of the world but not to Latin America or adopt a combination of these policy options.

The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and opportunities for developing an African Maritime culture

Prof. Narnia Bohler-Muller

IORA holds a different kind of strategic value to its members, especially South Africa, as various exciting developments have taken place since India took the chairship from 2011-2012. The association was established informally in 1995 and formally in 1997 and was not a very effective association for a number of years until the Indian chairship, expanding into Australia then Indonesia and now South Africa. The difference between the Oceans Economy and the Blue Economy is really that the oceans are more about the exploitation of the resource, while the Blue economy looks at the issue of sustainability within the framework. The oceans are the new frontier for exploitation of oil and gas and deep-sea fishing; however, the climate change crisis has impacted oceans to the extent that the levels of pollution and warmth in the oceans cannot be reversed.

IORA operates through a number of diplomatic tracks; track 1, ministerial level and government to government relations, track 1.5, academic and government actors, and track 2, academic to academic groups. The national group in South Africa has a steering committee and a number of key stakeholders that sit on the steering committee and the chair, vice-chair and a secretariat that is funded by the NRF as well as team leaders for each of the priority

areas. There are new working groups that the academic group can support; a working group from the Blue Economy, Maritime Safety and Security, and the Women's Economic Empowerment. The three working groups have been pushed by South Africa as part of the implementation plan, which shows that IORA is becoming more active in reaching outside and within the region.

The association attracted more funding and the Indian chairship hosted a leadership summit and adopted a plan of action that meant South Africa had the responsibility of starting to implement it. This has been taken up with a large degree of interest, particularly because of the Blue Economy Trust within IORA and its direct link to South Africa's Operation Phakisa and the Oceans Economy of South Africa which should evolve in an explorative manner from an Ocean's Economy to a Blue Economy. The priority areas include the role of academia, peace and development, sustainable development and economic development. Part of South Africa's priority of IORA draws relevance to its regional cooperation agenda. India began to focus on peace and security, and still take strong ownership over this dialogue, which may clash with different countries' approaches to peace and security. And while the interaction and positive volleying between South Africa and India also builds on the close diplomatic engagements from the India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) partnership and BRICS. The strength of India within the association is something to take note of. IORA ultimately contributes to unity, peace and sustainable development in the region.

The role of academia is very important to the IORA dialogue process because of track

1.5 diplomacy where policy makers engage academics. South Africa's significant contribution has been around the reform of the academic group and that ties in with the Indian Ocean dialogue, which specifically launched a pilot outreach program. The outreach program was for the nine member African states of IORA that encouraged them to form national academic groups that coordinated research within the region and form true evidence whenever policies are developed within the region. The established national group for South Africa cooperated with Tanzania and launched an IORA working group in Tanzania; South Africa wanted to strengthen the African caucus in IORA, but the big-brother image that other African countries have come to resent impact on its ability to further and promote this work.

The big-brother image that other African countries have of South Africa do not impact positively on its ability to further and promote IORA in Africa.

In terms of peace and development, there was a proposal to dedicate a specific regional focus dealing with maritime safety and security and the various issues related to that because the Indian Ocean is becoming a place of interest when it comes to peace and security. In trying to revive the predecessor, the 1972 resolution on the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace is virtually impossible. However, it is important to work towards these paradigms in a sustainable and technology driven manner facilitating the regional aims. Economic development then looked at aspects related to economic development such as liberalizing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and undertaking trade promotion within the region because there

isn't much trade movement in the region, we are still trading outside of the region in many respects.

The other declaration that was had was the role of dialogue partners and this is contentious. IORA had seven dialogue partners, the prominent being the US and China; these two provided far more money than the member states pay for their fees which is \$25,000. There are a number of member states that do not pay the membership fee and China and the US pay far more than the membership fee. Some of the member states who are richer and powerful will pay more to cover the fees. The other dialogue partners have been relatively inactive and in particular Egypt and Japan. IORA is however reconsidering the way in which it interacts with dialogue partners. The UK has really stepped up now because of BREXIT and its need to look outside of Europe and become a lot more involved in IORA.

It is important to attract more advantaged dialogue partners, and given the global geopolitical flux, this is an opportune time.

We have a secretary-general who is South African who took over from an Indonesia and this is someone who has come in with a bang. She has definitely pushed the agenda of Nelson Mandela for South Africa's chairship. The reason being is that Nelson Mandela in early 1995 went to India and he spoke with the Indians about the region and its importance. The one thing the countries in IORA have in common is the Indian Ocean and that's why it is easier to reach consensus because there is a common interest and they are all dependent on the Ocean for food and job creation. Nelson Mandela played a very

important role. The biggest thing since South Africa has come to the Council of Ministers was announcing the Nelson Mandela legacy internship fund which will be funded by South Africa, every year 5 interns will be chosen to work at the secretariat for a period of 1-3 years. This is something that has never been done before and that is the sign of South Africa committing especially to the youth in the region.

BRICS under pressure

Sanusha Naidu

In the context of BRICS, it is important to understand where South Africa fits, and not only in the African landscape but in the broader global political economy. While elected to the UNSC for a third term, membership of the G20, election of Tito Mboweni as one of the members of the African Peace Fund, and signing the AfCFTA are prestigious to South African foreign policy, it does not tell us whether we are going to create the kind of trajectory that will bring in investments. That is why we need to look at the potential of the BRICS partnership and the dynamics pre and post-Summit. BRICS is not an alliance, but rather a partnership, if we look at it as an alliance and we look at the contradictions in BRICS we may misunderstand what BRICS is about. It is important to discuss the various meetings in their separate capacities and take note of the substantive outcomes for the South African economy during the 2018 chairship. The big question was how South Africa will negotiate the space with China and the deals that we signed before hand, these deals do not

necessarily mean that they are accessible at will but rather they have been announced at the summit and are still in the pipeline to be taken forward. If the domestic political situation does or does not correct itself then we have to deal with the repercussions of that and what kind of implications it has on South Africa's investment environment.

If the domestic political situation does or does not correct itself then we have to deal with the repercussions of that and what kind of implications it has on South Africa's investment environment.

The second point regarding BRICS in 2019 and 2020, is the degree of continuity South Africa will have in foreign policy. There is much South Africa has to do; it has to reconnect with the world, with its investors, and the Africa outreach programme in BRICS. Therefore, while BRICS may be a strategic vehicle, South Africa will still need to re-create its identity as the bridge towards Africa because China, India and Russia have their own bridges; Brazil has its Lusophone links but bigger and more substantial bridges remain to be seen. It is vital to re-connect with Africa through a clear strategy as other countries that are utilising the space at the multilateral and bilateral level. While the BRICS outreach has remained bi-lateral, the New Development Bank has presented itself as the first multilateral and institutionalised platform. However, it has not welcomed any new members in spite of rising expectations and the opening of the African Regional Centre in 2017.

The BRICS still need to work out how they would engage the regional outreach programmes as a group; while India has

proposed further institutionalisation, as a point of innovation, South Africa can look to ways that the BRICS partnership can contribute in other multilateral ways.

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The third point on BRICS looks to innovation. While South Africa has proposed a number of innovative programmes like the outreach partnership programme in 2013 (then seeing it being renovated by the Chinese to the BRICS plus) this is going to be interesting to look at and see whether it brings any traction going forward. When Brazil took the chairship in 2019, it remained a question whether there would be a strategic shift in the BRICS with the domestic setting in Brazil. There was a concern that the current Brazilian president, Jair Bolsonaro, does not have the same attraction to BRICS and IBSA as his predecessors so this will be a big issue for BRICS going forward.

Will all the work that South Africa does under president Ramaphosa and its BRICS chairship find traction with Brazil and is it possible that BRICS becomes something else going forward, will Brazil's role in BRICS change going forward and will this affect the dynamics within BRICS?

We had two BRICS countries going to election in 2019, South Africa and India, creating interest in BRICS on the implications of those elections. However, to what extent and will China continue to play a dominant role or will BRICS continue to retain a separate identity of a global South collective? This has always been the

debate, the element of IBSA in BRICS will be further muted because Brazil will not be the kind of actor needed or does not want to play the role needed.

If South Africa moves on scenarios and the status quo remains for the South African political landscape, the challenge for South Africa is how much of momentum would it be able to get if our domestic situation does not self-correct.

India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) in BRICS will be further muted because Brazil will not be the kind of actor needed or does not want to play the role needed.

In respect of how South Africa will navigate the dynamics between Russia and China in the UNSC, it will be a situation of South Africa playing the same game as previous terms. On the African side, South Africa needs to move the talk on a reform of the UNSC because it is not conducive to just talk about a rhetorical reform of the UNSC. South Africa is caught in a space where it has to follow the African Ezulwini consensus agenda versus Germany who follows the G4 agenda, where strategically South Africa does not need the veto. In conclusion, on a lighter note, for South Africa, how the internal dynamics of BRICS countries shift will impact on the country's vision of trade and investments.

Looking to the second year of South Africa's third UNSC term

Gustavo de Carvalho

We entered into a third term in the UNSC in 2019, during which there was a divided if not hostile environment in the P5 due to the Trump regime's continued attempts to act unilaterally and we have seen an increase in global conflict and the atrocities associated with it. No reform has taken place within the UNSC and the peace agreements are no longer able to respond to the kind of conflicts that Africa, and the world, is experiencing. For South Africa, it is a question of priorities and challenges taking up that UNSC seat, and must be done in order to get our own house in order before the task. If the first two terms were about elevating the African agenda then the third term should be about reforming that peace agenda itself. South Africa dedicated the current term to the legacy of Nelson Mandela and his commitment to dialogue and negotiations, and towards silencing the guns by 2020. In dovetailing with the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), a focus on prevention, mediation and peacebuilding seems to be the strategy South Africa is advocating for. In addition, gender perspectives and gender mainstreaming into the AUPSC is also part of the agenda. Much needs to be done in terms of getting an African and South African driven plan going as well as continued cooperation between the AU and UNSC and reforming global governance structures.

But what will South Africa do differently this time around?

The agenda has been largely similar for much time and has not yielded a different result, and doing more of the same thing will not lead to a different result. What is needed is for South Africa to be more disruptive and innovative in its third term at the UNSC.

The AU announced that South Africa will be the sole candidate for Southern Africa to replace Ethiopia in the Security Council. Interviews and engagements with actors in New York, Addis Ababa, and Pretoria expressed that the key questions were to understand some of the expectations for South Africa; what do different actors feel South Africa could realistically achieve; and what does it mean in a very contentious environment for the UNSC?

A few months into the non-permanent position at the UNSC, it was still very soon to know what South Africa's position would be, and how alliances will play out.

Partially because the UNSC is a very complicated forum to engage with. A number of challenges that persist are the technical capacity of team South Africa and the workings of UNSC systems. A number of non-permanent members (Elected or E10 members) have requisite resources and are able to plan out their missions months before they join the security council, but most developing countries struggle a bit more in this regard, and South Africa is one of those countries. For South Africa, the first steps were to complete the staffing process by March 2019 and identify what kinds of systems work in a security council where the workload has increased considerably.

South Africa can make a considerable input in the following three key areas: firstly, the confusing dynamics of the UN Security Council; secondly, what areas can South Africa be strategically influential; and thirdly, what are some views and ideas that can be shared around how to navigate an organization paralyzed by so many issues?

The dynamics of the Security Council are based on the division of the Security Council member states and the way the issues are discussed, which is also based on a clear division amongst member states. Historically, there was a large divide during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, and their allies. In the last 20 years we've seen what is called the P3 or France, UK and the US on the one side; and the P2, Russia and China on the other side.

In recent years, that divide became a bit larger for a few reasons: 1) we have a new US administration that often questions the role of the UN and the multilateral system, the UNSC being one of the key recipients of such distrust; and 2) China's increasingly growing its power and popularity in the international system, and being more vocal within the UNSC, not necessarily attached to positions that Russia would have. There is an increasing divide within the P3 itself, we have seen very tense discussions between the United States and France a number of years ago in discussing the financing of peacekeeping operations in Africa.

In more recent years, the divide has widened with the rise of the E10 or non-permanent members, which is the concerted effort of non-permanent members to increase cooperation, dialogue, and their

own ways of putting pressure on the UNSC that seems to have an unfair way of dividing the labour in a more equitable way and sharing the burden of the workload.

A key place for such a discussion to happen talks about procedures and working methods of the UNSC. This impacts the way in which a permanent mission in New York responds to the challenges of the UNSC. Non-permanent members have been tasked largely to manage the subsidiary organs of the UNSC including the very time consuming sanctions committees, which means that a lot of the capacity that could have been utilized to better prepare speeches and country positions are often dealing with administrative measures. But there is also an increase in the demand of E10 members to chair the sanctions committee on North Korea, implement a languages policy that translates resolutions in the languages of countries impacted, and look at the way that negotiations are done for resolutions. One of the few issues where the P5 seems to be very united, is not dividing labour equitably in sharing the role of "pen holders".

Going forward, South Africa can make strategic inputs on the following. Firstly, by comparison, South Africa does not have a lot of leverage but it is very important for South Africa to be aware of how its positions are perceived and received by other members. The discussions in the UNSC were largely lengthy about different African issues, and it was mentioned that Africa constitutes about 60% of the Security Council time. Certainly, the three African members tend to have their voices amplified when African issues are discussed. And particularly in the

formation of the Security Council right now, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea and South Africa, in a way provides South Africa with its own stature and the ability of being a regional power and also having a global stature to be able to have its voice heard. South Africa has been seen to start its security council term in a "trial by fire", with regard to the DRC as it was not an easy situation for South Africa to deal with and for many it was quite an underwhelming response; not just in terms of what position South Africa had but also how active it was beyond its own interactions with the speeches and the sessions.

There is a sense and an expectation that South Africa is not only an informed expect when it comes to DRC matters, but South Africa has a historical role that increases the pressure for the country to be reactive.

In 2019 intense discussions around Somalia, South Sudan and how South Africa would react to those and respond to the "pen holders" were expected. For example, in the case of Somalia the pen holder is the United Kingdom, who has the opportunity to codify documents and resolutions in its own language and voice which is important. An opportunity arises for South Africa when it comes to African issues; for Mali and the Sahel the permanent members have a strategic stake in those regions; but some of the countries that are very important for South Africa, including Burundi and Western Sahara, tends to receive less attention. For South Africa the Western Sahara issue is very important on its foreign policy agenda; there is an expectation that South Africa will raise the profile of the Western Sahara in UNSC discussions. Despite its very own

performance, South Africa has the potential to use its own leverage towards more effective discussions and bringing linkages to some of the recent developments in the AU.

Secondly, the area that South Africa can be quite influential in is thematic discussions. As thematic discussions do not have much tangible impact it may be used as a technique to reinforce the status quo in UNSC reform, where the non-permanent members greater responsibility in thematic discussions further focuses resources on the tasks and prevents the E10 from building up more effective institutional memory and inputs.

Although Namibia had a positive experience with resolution SCR1325 in 2000 (the first resolution on Women Peace and Security), it is not easy to replicate the theme and context. However, the key idea is to make use of those thematic discussions in a strategic and targeted way that move toward bringing concrete ideas on how to really implement them. This strategy is valuable for every single discussion in the Security Council in that it is not enough to only have a principle based foreign policy or principle-based speeches. Rather the UNSC needs to be able to have concrete and implementable ideas that can break divides.

South Africa could provide solid contributions on the following issues: the first area is UN-AU relations, South Africa is largely credited for being the country that brought the issue to the agenda of the Security Council in 2007. South Africa is in charge of the AD-HOC working group on conflict prevention resolution in Africa. This is one of the subsidiary organs of the Security Council and effectively deals with

the interactions between the peace and security and the UNSC. By chairing that subcommittee, the discussion and the preparations for the visits and so on will very much fall on South Africa. South Africa will need to move away from certain deadlocks, and right now the deadlock within the UN Security Council is financing. Ethiopia attempted to put a resolution forward to discuss the issue of financing, but it was not considered for voting because there was a sense that the resolution would be particularly vetoed.

Some of the actionable things South Africa can do in the Security Council to ensure there is increased cooperation between the two organs.

This is specifically linked to what type of feedback is received from bi-annual meetings between the AU and the UNSC. The resolutions and communiques are often really substantial but the implementation of the joint communique between the UN and the AU are often very weak. South Africa needs to build greater capacity to deal with interactions beyond peace support operations, peacekeeping and the peace operations environment; which include peace building or post conflict reconstruction development (in the case of the AU), conflict prevention and information sharing. The AU has a number of frameworks including the 2017 UN-AU framework on peace and security partnership that has the potential to be formalised with the UNSC.

The third area is South Africa's potential contributions to Women Peace and Security, Children in Armed Conflicts and Youth Peace and Security.

Women, children and youth in conflict or peace and security are separate items in the UNSC, but there is an increasing understanding that these three are interlinked.

South Africa has a historical and contemporary role in terms of advocating for the role of women, and increasing women's participation in peace and security matters. This gives South Africa the legitimacy and to some extent the authority to discuss those issues. Considering that Sweden is largely pushing this agenda, and the Netherlands to an extent, which are out of the UNSC this year; this gap can be filled by different member states like Germany and South Africa. One potential area for South Africa is Youth in Peace & Security, and the link between youth, jobs and stability. In 2018, the Security Council approved for the first time a resolution regarding youth peace and security. South Africa could be engaging more on those matters and really trying to provide implementable and practical approaches to youth peace and security.

Lastly, South Africa's biggest challenge may be to navigate a divided UNSC. The first entry point is the A3 (three African members of the UNSC), but it is clear that united regions are not always possible. For example, the Europeans are not always united on every single issue, but there is an increasing understanding that when regions come together with common positions with the UNSC their voices tend to be better heard. In the Venezuelan case, the African group is vastly divided; a similar divide on the DRC matter was also evident.

Beyond the A3, there is an opportunity around E10 coordination, which has gained

great momentum through increased interaction in sharing experiences and building institutional memory, especially in discussions surrounding equitable distribution of labour within the UNSC. South Africa so far has been very active on that matter, for the first time there was an E10 coordination meeting amongst outgoing and incoming E10 members at a capital level in Pretoria, in November 2018, and South Africa is bringing E10 members on monthly bases to try to increase the E10 coordination from a New York perspective.

But it is important to identify what real role South Africa wants to have around E10 members.

The P5 raise a big question of how do we avoid an 'us' versus 'them' approach, which is relevant not only in the context of E10 members but particularly on individual members engagements. South Africa can identify where there are differences of positions between them and permanent members and in particularly identifying common areas in which they can work. One of the biggest mistakes for non-permanent members is when they immediately identify common areas on one side versus the other. When considering South Africa in the way it has voted in the first months of 2019, one could say that South Africa was somehow more aligned with Russia and China; it does not necessarily mean that would always be the case and how South Africa interacts with all the members is very important. Particularly, when it comes to complex issues for South Africa like human rights and what are the case by case aspects.

In conclusion, it is critical that South Africa does its research right and it is important that the mission in New York and Head

Quarters in Pretoria are able to align their foreign policy priorities to when issues are being discussed in the UNSC. The idea of an unpredictable council member is one of the most problematic issues for the rest of the memberships, not because you want to have certainty on how a certain country will vote; but South Africa or any of the other countries would want to understand where they stand and what direction the council is actually going. Some countries within the UNSC right now are not taken seriously, partially because they seem to be unpredictable in their own positions. The South African elections in May 2019 certainly had a bearing on how South Africa is perceived, especially in its ability to provide more clarity and predictability, balancing a principle-based approach with pragmatic objectives. Lastly, there is always a risk that a country goes to the Security Council as a tourist; that it is in the UNSC for two years, aiming to gain visibility and also understanding that visibility comes with a lot of scrutiny on national positions. South Africa's position on Venezuela would not have been so controversial if South Africa was not in the UNSC. While it is critical for countries like South Africa to be able to stand up to the P5 and E10 members, it also needs to collaborate, partner and leverage its own approaches in ensuring that the UNSC becomes a more effective organ.

An Evolving Africa-G20 Partnership

Ms. Faith Mabera

South Africa is the sole African member of the G20. The G20 was significant in 2018 because it was the first held in South America, and linked with the 40 year anniversary of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action for South-South cooperation. The G20 would also become a neutral meeting ground for the USA and China in an attempt to diffuse tensions surrounding the trade war. Argentina's presidency of the G20 aimed to pursue the G20 with a Southern perspective and its main objectives were infrastructure for development, a sustainable food future and a future of health and education in the digital age. Focus was also given to other groups in the G20 such as Women20, Business 20, Think Thanks 20 (T20) (which the IGD is a part of as well as South Africa's participation in the development working group). Focusing on resource mobilization, the critical issues of financial international flows and the calling for information on illicit financial flows, South Africa ensured that this featured on the agenda of the G20. South Africa was keen to maintain that there should be follow-up and accountability.

More importantly for the development working group, it was important to see the outcomes of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) in 2019, the G20 action plan, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Early Childhood initiative. As the sole African member, South Africa's multilateral dealings within the G20, as well as being the co-chair in the Africa Advisory group, links back to the a strategic

direction in President Ramaphosa's undertakings; the buzz-word being investment and the main focus being economic diplomacy. This also related to the Compact with Africa that happened in Berlin, at the end of October 2017.

Ramaphosa emphasised the linkages of the compact with Africa not only the scope that it presents to fit within the already existing blueprint of the socio-economic development of agenda 2063 and continental and regional plans for development on the African continent.

He emphasised the need not to reinvent the wheel when it comes to G20's partnership with Africa but to work around the existing frameworks, to treat Africa as an equal partner, and to take stock of the priorities and the needs of the continent. 2018 marked the 10 year anniversary of the G20 in technical terms, as history shows that its cooperation started from the 1990s. However, its formalised initiation came at the height of the global financial crisis in 2008/2009. It is important to look back at what this means for the legitimacy and representativeness that the G20 has, particularly in the context of the African continent. After 10 years of the G20, the agenda has become more diluted and it has broadened its agenda to move beyond regulating the framework and the economic stimuli. It has increased its agenda to include solutions or projected solutions to political crisis and socio-economic crisis, even fitting in the global agenda on sustainable development.

What do we see going forward for the G20-Africa partnership? It is something that the T20 Africa standing group has been

tracking, and questions have been asked as to what we want to see. Does Africa want to peg its priorities on each revolving presidency and try and fit in with the changing thematic priorities or stated taskforces? Or does it want to centre its own development priorities and say 'come and meet us on our terms and fit your agenda with ours'?

These aforementioned questions, need to be asked by Africa, collectively.

2019 saw the G20 Presidency moving to Japan in June under eight broad themes to Ensure Global Sustainable Development; global economy, trade and investment, innovation, environment and energy, employment, women's empowerment, development and health. Some of the taskforces and groups that Argentina put forward such as the SDG group and climate action were kept on, but demographics which relates specifically to Japan's sectorial planning around an aging population was a key focus beyond the G20 Summit and how this merges with the idea of society 5.0, (either the fourth or fifth industrial revolution) the impact of digitalization on the future of work and education, the merger of these two key lessons from Japanese ergonomics also featured strongly in the G20 forum.

Taking stock of G20 history and its broadening of its agenda to take on much more than it was conceived for, it is important to consider its legitimacy in having 20 core members with 140 non-member observers. This draws a sharp critique to the G20s functioning as a highly elitist and hierarchical club. This is contrasted with a brand of internationalism that it brings into the

structures. Ultimately, the structure of the G20 is a running commentary on the status of club diplomacy, legitimacy and representativeness for global and international governance.

South Africa has promoted the multilateral space, and with the conclusion to the Argentinian G20 summit President Ramaphosa highlighted South Africa's continued emphasis on support for the global multilateral architecture.

In addition, a few selected issues to note on South Africa's participation were in the Development Working Group and its priorities as co-chair on issues of tax and domestic resource mobilization, sustainable development financing, reforming international financial Institutions, international financial flows and illicit financial flows (IFFs), its continued support for the World Customs Organization (WCO) and accountability with respect to the recommendations of this report.

In the G20, South Africa is also committed to carrying forward the work that was started under former president Thabo Mbeki on the key issues, and continues to support key recommendations of IFFs. Education was another major issue from the G20 programme of work, and for the first time in Argentina's G20 presidency a ministerial level meeting focused on education, which is closely associated with the idea of the "Future for Work", lifelong learning and the Early Childhood Development Initiative was also introduced.

The 2018 summit theme on consensus for sustainable development, showed how elusive consensus in conceptual

understanding is in a multilateral forum like the G20; Argentina was no exception because of internal Argentinian domestic political reform related to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) bail-out received and regional Latin American dynamics coming into play. All these factors impacted on the statement of the Leader's Declaration. As a result, South Africa had reservations around the proposals of trade which came in three elements. Firstly, the agreement around trade did not reference prevailing trade tensions that were visible at that time, and another reservation for South Africa was that the text was negotiated by a rather small group of countries and then passed forward as presenting a balanced view. Another point of apprehension by South Africa was the idea that there was no mention of protectionism, which led to South Africa issuing a statement as the BRICS chair for 2018 and illustrating a very strongly worded BRICS position against protectionism. In terms of the trade elements we saw consensual language on the trade issue and the idea for a rules based trading system and continued support for the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

The Buenos Aires G20 wanted to articulate a Global South point of view and advance the interests of the Global South, while recognizing the challenges that the rest of the developing world faces. However, did Argentina live up to its expectations to delivering a G20 presidency with a Southern point view? In addition, was consensus improved upon since the German presidency when the discussion focused on climate change, and how were discussions moved forward in view of the G19 versus the US as far as climate change agreement is concerned. On the question

of health and energy transitions, two key areas are important to mention with regard to South Africa's position. South Africa continued its support for the countermeasures to antimicrobial resistance through national and regional plans, and in energy transitions reiterated its support for mixed energy solutions and innovative approaches moving towards cleaner energy and renewable sources of energy.

In 2019 Japan's presidency wanted to send a strong message around economic growth that was resilient and balanced. The other two issue areas that were carried forward are; firstly, the idea of digitalization of the economy and the role that innovation plays; and the question of an aging population and the kind of policies that will begin to tackle this problem. The Osaka G20 summit was hosted in June 2019 and in August 2019 Japan hosted the seventh Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in Yokohama (presented as the Japanese city closest to Africa). The key areas were the three pillars of Japan's cooperation with Africa: Economic Diversification and Industrialization, a Resilient Health System, and Social Stabilization for Shared Prosperity. The following are some of the countries and organisations invited to the G20 2019: Spain, Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Egypt, Chile, Senegal, the Asian Development Bank, IMF and Financial Stability Board to name a few. This shows a sense of continuity from the Argentine presidency, and now the Troika within the G20 has shifted, previously it was Germany; China and Argentina, and now we see China falling away and in 2020 it is Saudi Arabia.

It is important to ask whether the various engagement groups add value to the build up to the G20 summit and if they are the forums that provide middle ground solutions to some of the complex and interrelated challenges that the G20 is increasingly facing from a global governance and economic global governance perspective.

The various engagement groups are the T20 (Think Tanks group), Women 20 Group, Civil 20 Group, and the Business 20 Group. What happens to the lead up of the final document that is presented to the leaders and how are the key policy proposals condensed into a document that is presented? This is where think tanks have a role to play, because not only do think tanks bring to the table more evidence based informed research to some of the policy challenges that continue to face the G20 and G20 constituent countries but it is also important to begin to question issues surrounding governance in the international order and the kind of change and continuity that has been seen. Questions that will remain pertinent regarding the themes of the work of the G20 are that of legitimacy and representativeness.

Quo Vadis for South African foreign policy

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos

The context of leadership in Africa highlights a leaning to a messiah complex. In reflecting on Africa, often the 'big man' or 'strong man' syndrome means that people are placing their fate in leadership

or individuals, which should have a finite impact on governance, rather than established institutions, which should have a long-standing impact on governance. Are we doing that here in South Africa?

The discourse of early 2019 looking to Ramaphosa depicted him as a saviour.

Discourse depicting the importance and functioning of our institutions is important because it safe guards against authoritarianism. What does South Africa's situation look like in a bigger context?

For example, two years after Trump's inauguration, the experience of the US highlights for us that institutions are absolutely critical, but they actually require people to respect them as well and that if people don't respect them you can see an erosion unless others fight back. The role of personal leadership is important and we shouldn't underestimate how that can actually shift, we've seen that in South Africa and we've seen that in Ethiopia in very positive terms, not only for those countries but also for the regions. We cannot take our foot off the accelerator in terms of focusing, which is one of the things that South Africans have done over the last 25 years, highlighting the importance of building institutions both regional and globally.

We cannot take our foot off the accelerator in terms of focusing, which is one of the things that South Africans have done over the last 25 years, highlighting the importance of building institutions both regional and globally.

Our domestic environment critically influences our regional and global standing, but that's not sufficient because South Africa should recognize that it is a big player in Africa but we're a small player in the world. We are not China who can swing things over the US without having to be careful about how you build partnerships and alliances. A country like South Africa is very important in the continent and remains highly regarded. But, South Africa still needs to put a lot more thinking into the policy inputs we make; into the decisions; the partnerships we craft; how we can come up with solutions; with innovations to break deadlocks, because we are facing significant deadlocks globally in the area of global governance.

South Africa needs to show its value globally by being hard working and creative, in the global realm we need to recapture some of the middle power definitions while being a regional power in our own immediate region, which unfortunately we can't get away from.

Going forward, given that the world has changed so much not only from 2009 or rather not only from 1994 but also certainly in the last 10 years, South Africa needs to reconsider its strategic vision and how do we want to execute it or make a contribution to the world that we want to shape. We need to think about new alliances; new partnerships; reconfigurations, we need to accelerate our own continental integration and South Africa has to play a key role there and one of the first steps in that regard is being one of the first big countries to ratify the AfCFTA. South Africa needs to constantly be appraising the continent in the context

around geopolitics, it's the dynamics of the Middle East conflict; which is also African conflict (certainly in North Africa), one of the geopolitical implications is that we need to be aware of the changing interests of players in Africa, both African players but also new players into the continent.

It has been alluded the increasing interests of players like Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the UAE being increasingly interested and playing a role in different regions of the continent. The geopolitical chessboard is changing and South Africa's foreign policy review would actually have some reflection of geopolitics changing. Looking at IORA it is not a surprise that China is interested, the US is interested and that India also recognizes and sees the Indian Ocean as a prime security opportunity. South Africa as a country must not forget its geographical positioning over two oceans; while for many years post 1994 our predominant focus has actually been into the hinterland and re-establishing, and reconnecting with Africa, the maritime economy is a peak strategic consideration point. This needs to be considered from a pragmatic, strategic, military perspective incorporating realpolitik, incorporating geopolitical implications on issues of sustainability and the prospect of new security challenges.

This needs to be considered from a pragmatic, strategic, military perspective incorporating realpolitik.

South Africa had a very busy diplomatic year in 2018, with BRICS as part of South Africa's major geopolitical events, something that has been reflected on within the department but also in the foreign policy reviews; but how is success

evaluated? How is the success of the BRICS summit evaluated?

One of the fundamental indicators when looking at President Ramaphosa's priorities is that of investment, which takes time to see long term results; so pledges can be made but these also need to be followed through and tracked. Policy is not only about investment; it's not only about economic diplomacy, it is also very much about politics and security. South Africa has had important engagements behind the scenes in the DRC, South Africa has also been working with Lesotho, and the Sudan; these conflict spaces still remain a challenge that South Africa will need to work on within the UNSC and the AU. Fundamentally South Africa needs to think hard about its peace template as a country, and the requisite resources around that.

Fundamentally South Africa needs to think hard about its peace template as a country, and the requisite resources around that.

Multilateralism has been a long standing challenge for South Africa, and South Africa has always identified multilateralism and global governance as key dimensions of its foreign policy. The multilateral challenges that have been created in the last couple of years have forced South Africa to act on things it was equipped to handle, but also instances where there was no impetus to act upon it.

The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) need to put some consideration into how an agenda can be created and partnerships can be built in terms of making constructive contribution to the reform of the WTO. On the other hand the

bilateralization of trade globally would mean that Africa needs to make its regional communities work much more effectively; which is what could have been done with SADC over the last several years. The other big challenge in the peace and security domain in the UN, is the decline in peacekeeping budgets that speak directly to some South African priorities and concerns, which contribute to mechanisms critical for rolling out work in Africa.

The greater challenge of the G20 is fracturing. However, other challenges like the IMF and the general review of quotas remains of great concern for South Africa as it has an interest in preserving what Africa has in the IMF in terms of voice and quota and not losing that. Lastly looking at trade as AGOA ends in 2025, which means by post 2025 South Africa will need to have a free trade agreement of sorts with the US. It is important to negotiate that timeously as the US is an important partner as a manufacturing destination. Going into the UNSC places pressure on South Africa to be ready to have effective responses to the DRC, Yemen, Syria, and Myanmar; all of which are both political but also fundamentally humanitarian.

Dr Sithembile Mbethe

The growing expectations to reform South Africa's diplomacy and economy and taking it back to the height of its foreign policy between the period 2004 – 2008 are featuring strongly in contemporary foreign policy discussions. South African foreign policy is already experiencing a regression, even though there are growing expectations from Ramaphosa's administration.

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South Africa's foreign policy limitations are manifested through economic and financial factors; for example, the xenophobic violence that partly erupted as a result of socio-economic conditions, and the approach to the AfCFTA and ideas around the protection of borders. While there may not be a substantial change in the principles and guiding values of South African foreign policy, the ways in which it will be carried out may find more innovation. Navigating the African environment is still complex for South Africa. There is a need for more differentiated approaches to different countries. All three leading political parties have in their manifestos, positions on protecting the South African borders. This protection has to do with other African countries, and at times stokes Xenophobia and resistance towards regional integration and the Continental Free Trade Area. It should be realised that this is not only a Home Affairs concern but rather a foreign policy one too.

The President seems to be exercising his discretion on which audiences to talk about foreign policy. For instance, the SONA deliberately focussed on enhancing foreign investment to boost the economy and increase employment. He also seems to be drawing a balance in the tension between the normative drivers of foreign policy and the other economic and practical imperatives. There is a need for South Africa to build its foreign policy machinery. There needs to be an institutionalised coordination between the

Presidency, DIRCO and the ANC international relations committee. The lack of foreign policy capacity partly explains South Africa's relatively slow start in the UNSC and its underperformance during the DRC elections.

There needs to be an institutionalised coordination between the Presidency, DIRCO and the ANC international relations committee.

Achieving its agenda through economic diplomacy and strengthening its capacity in global governance has been a South African priority under the new

administration. However, much more work needs to be done in its African agenda. It is possible to understand the objective points and tools, and observers of South African Foreign Policy are still trying to see the ultimate strategy where national priorities meet the international vision. However, in reflecting on previous years, it is evident that much damage was done to South African Foreign Policy credibility during the previous administration, and efforts to rebuild that image and influence in a changing African and global landscape will continue to preoccupy the efforts of the current administration.



Appendix 1: Special thanks to and contributions from

Mrs. Susana Caputi, Honorary Consul of the Plurinational State of Bolivia

Mr. Gustavo de Carvalho, Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies

Mr. Jean Jacques Cornish, Foreign affairs journalist, Eyewitness News

Ms. Shannon Ebrahim, Foreign affairs journalist, Independent Media

Mr. Peter Fabricius, Foreign affairs journalist, African News Agency and Independent Newspapers

Ms. Jesuloba Ilesanmi, NRF-DST Intern, IGD

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Mr. Francis Kornegay, Senior Research Fellow, IGD

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Mr. Simphiwe Mongwe, NRF-DST Intern, IGD

Dr. Philani Mthembu, Executive Director, IGD

Ms. Sanusha Naidu, Senior Research Fellow, IGD

Prof. Gerrit Olivier, former representative to the Soviet Union and former Ambassador to the Russian Federation

Ms. Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, Chief Executive, South African Institute of International Affairs

Appendix 2: List of Bi-lateral and Multi-lateral Foreign Policy Engagements in 2018

Bi-lateral meetings

1. 11 Jan: Working Visit by President Uhuru Kenyatta, of Kenya to Durban, South Africa
2. 18 Jan: South Africa - India Joint Ministerial Commission (JMC) and the Foreign Office Consultations (FOC), New Delhi, India
3. 2 Mar: Consultative meeting with President João Lourenço in his capacity as chair of the SADC, Luanda, Angola
4. 3 Mar: Met with President Ian Khama on a consultative meeting as head of the SADC, Gaborone, Botswana
5. 9 Mar: Second Session of the Joint Commission of Cooperation (JCC) between South Africa and Seychelles, Pretoria, South Africa
6. 13 Mar: Meeting between Minister Lindiwe Sisulu and Minister Joseph Malanji of Zambia, Pretoria, South Africa
7. 17 Mar: Met with the President of Mozambique Filipe Nyusi a consultative meeting, Maputo, Mozambique
8. 17 Mar: Paid a courtesy visit to President Emmerson Mnangagwa, Harare, Zimbabwe
9. 23 Mar: South Africa - Norway High Level Consultation Meeting, Pretoria, South Africa
10. 29 Mar: South Africa - Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Technical Assistance and the Exchange of Notes on Humanitarian Assistance to the Western Saharawi refugee camps, Pretoria, South Africa
11. 15 May: Visit by Deputy President David Mabuza as Special Envoy, to Moscow, Russia
12. 5 Jun: Working Visit by President Brahim Ghali of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, to Pretoria, South Africa
13. 5 Jul: State Visit by President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo of the Republic of Ghana, to Pretoria, South Africa
14. 6 Jul: Visit by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Mr Jorge Arreaza, to Pretoria, South Africa
15. 10-11 Jul: Working Visit by President Cyril Ramaphosa to Abuja, Federal Republic of Nigeria
16. 12-13 Jul: State Visit by President Cyril Ramaphosa to Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
17. 24 Jul: State Visit by President Xi Jinping of the People's Republic of China, to Pretoria, South Africa
18. 9-10 Aug: Working Visits by President Cyril Ramaphosa to Lusaka, Zambia and Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo
19. 16 Aug: Deputy Minister Landers addresses the African Regional Conference on Nuclear Disarmament and Lethal Autonomous Weapons, Pretoria, South Africa
20. 28 Aug: Working Visit by Prime Minister Theresa May of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to Pretoria, South Africa
21. 29 Aug: Working Visit by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, Mr Abdelkader Messahel, to Cape Town, South Africa
22. 31 Aug-2 Sep: State Visit by President Cyril Ramaphosa to Beijing, People's Republic of China (PRC)

23. 10 Sep: Minister Lindiwe Sisulu hosts the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs of the Kingdom of Belgium, Mr Didier Reynders, in Pretoria, South Africa
24. 17 Sep: Meeting between Minister Lindiwe Sisulu and the Minister of State for African Affairs of Saudi Arabia, Mr Ahmed bin Abdulaziz Kattan, Johannesburg, South Africa
25. 25-27 Sep: Working Visit by President Cyril Ramaphosa to New York, USA
26. 4 Oct: Minister Lindiwe Sisulu hosts a Workshop on the Review of SA's Foreign Policy, Pretoria, South Africa
27. 12-15 Oct: Working Visit by Deputy Minister Luwellyn Landers to the Saharawi Refugee Camps, Tindouf, South West Algeria
28. 14-15 Oct: Ministerial Meeting between South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kinshasa, DRC
29. 16 Oct: 11th Session of the Bi-National Commission (BNC) between South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kinshasa, DRC
30. 21-22 Oct: Second Joint Commission between South Africa and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Pretoria, South Africa
31. 9 Nov: 2018 Political Consultations between South Africa and the Czech Republic, Pretoria, South Africa
32. 12 Nov: 12th South Africa – Spain Annual Consultations, Madrid, Spain
33. 16 Nov: Ninth South Africa – Swiss High Level Consultations (HLC), Geneva, Switzerland
34. 19-21 Nov: 15th Session of the Annual South Africa – Russia Intergovernmental Committee on Trade and Economic Co-operation (ITEC), Moscow, Russian Federation
35. 20 Nov: State Visit by President Frank-Walter Steinmeier of Germany, to Cape Town, South Africa
36. 23 Nov: Sixth South Africa – Kazakhstan Bilateral Political Consultations, Pretoria, South Africa
37. 12 Dec: Consultative Meeting between Deputy President David Mabuza and President Salva Kiir Mayardit of the Republic of South Sudan, Pretoria, South Africa

Multi-lateral meetings

1. 9 Jan: African Union (AU) Ministerial Conference on Migration, Rabat, Kingdom of Morocco
2. 23-26 Jan: World Economic Forum (WEF) Annual Meeting, Davos, Switzerland
3. 28-29 Jan: 30th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU), Addis Ababa, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
4. 4 Feb: First Meeting of the BRICS Sherpas and Sous Sherpas, Cape Town, South Africa
5. 6 Feb: Closing Remarks by Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane at the First Meeting of the BRICS Sherpas and Sous Sherpas, Cape Town, South Africa
6. 26-28 Feb: High-Level Segment of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) Meetings, Geneva, Switzerland
7. 19-21 Mar: Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU) Summit, Kigali, Rwanda
8. 20 Mar: African Continental Free Trade Area Business Forum, Rwanda, Kigali
9. 20 Mar: SADC Council of Ministers Consultation Meeting, Kigali, Rwanda
10. 26-27 Mar: SADC Council of Ministers Meeting, Pretoria, South Africa
11. 28 Mar: SADC - European Union (EU) Political Dialogue, Pretoria, South Africa
12. 5-6 Apr: 18th Mid-term Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Baku, Republic of Azerbaijan

13. 19-20 Apr: Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM 2018), London, United Kingdom
14. 24 Apr: SADC Double Troika Summit of Heads of State and Government, Luanda, Republic of Angola
15. 20-21 May: G20 Foreign Ministers Meeting, Buenos Aires, Argentina
16. 25 May: President Cyril Ramaphosa hosts the Diplomatic Corps in Celebration of Africa Day, Pretoria, South Africa
17. 1 Jun: 107th Session of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group (ACP) Council of Ministers and the 43rd Session of the ACP-European Union (EU) Joint Council of Ministers, Lomé, Togo
18. 4 Jun: Second Formal Meeting of the BRICS Foreign Affairs/International Relations Ministers, Pretoria, South Africa
19. 4 Jun: IBSA Declaration on South-South Cooperation, Pretoria, South Africa
20. 8 Jun: United Nations Security Council (UNSC) elections, New York, USA
21. 9 Jun: G7 Leaders' Summit Outreach, Quebec, Canada
22. 18 Jun: BRICS Roundtable Discussion, Durban, South Africa
23. 19 Jun: Accreditation for the Fourth Meeting of the BRICS Deputy Ministers on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Pretoria, South Africa
24. 20 Jun: Fourth Meeting of the BRICS Deputy Ministers on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Pretoria, South Africa
25. 22 Jun: 20th Meeting of the SADC Ministerial Committee of the Organ (MCO) on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, Luanda, Republic of Angola
26. 22 Jun: Closure for the Accreditation for the 10th BRICS Summit, Johannesburg, South Africa
27. 22 Jun: Deputy Minister Reginah Mhaule addresses a BRICS Business Stakeholders, Johannesburg, South Africa
28. 26 Jun: Fourth BRICS Young Diplomats Forum (YDF), Pretoria, South Africa
29. 27 Jun: BRICS stakeholder engagement, Pretoria, South Africa
30. 28 Jun: Special Official Funeral for Ambassador Billy Modise, Emmarentia, Johannesburg
31. 29 Jun: Sixth SACU (Southern African Customs Union) Summit, Gaborone, Botswana
32. 29 Jun: Deputy Minister Reginah Mhaule addresses youth on the upcoming 10th BRICS Summit, Hazyview, South Africa
33. 1-2 Jul: 31st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of African Union (AU) Heads of State and Government Nouakchott, Islamic Republic of Mauritania
34. 17 Jul: BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) Round Table Discussion, Industrial Development Zone, Richards Bay, South Africa
35. 22-23 Jul: BRICS Business Council Meeting, Durban, South Africa
36. 23 Jul: BRICS IMC addresses the press on the state of readiness for the hosting of the 10th BRICS Summit, Sandton, Johannesburg, South Africa
37. 25-27 Jul: 10th BRICS Summit 2018, Sandton, Johannesburg, South Africa
38. 13-14 Aug: SADC Council of Ministers Meeting, Windhoek, Namibia
39. 16 Aug: SADC Organ Troika Summit, Windhoek, Namibia
40. 17-18 Aug: 38th Ordinary SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government, Windhoek, Namibia
41. 21-22 Aug: Indaba on a Legally Binding Instrument To Regulate The Activities Of Transnational Corporations, Johannesburg, South Africa
42. 23 Aug: Keynote Address by Minister Lindiwe Zulu at a conference on "BRICS and African Development: Development Finance a Catalyst for the BRICS Economic Partnerships in Africa, Port Elizabeth, South Africa

43. 23-24 Aug: Conference on Development Finance: "BRICS and African Development: Development Finance a Catalyst for the BRICS Economic Partnerships in Africa, Port Elizabeth, South Africa
44. 27-28 Aug: Third Indian Ocean Conference, Hanoi, Vietnam
45. 27-28 Aug: Singapore-Sub-Saharan High Level Ministerial Exchange, in Singapore, Singapore
46. 2 Sep: Seventh Ministerial Meeting of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Beijing, People's Republic of China (PRC)
47. 3-4 Sep: Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Beijing, People's Republic of China (PRC)
48. 4-7 Sep: 18th edition of the Annual Regional Seminar on the implementation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) for Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Island States, in Pretoria, South Africa
49. 12-13 Sep: Sixth Retreat of the Executive Council of the African Union Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
50. 12-14 Sep: Ninth Extraordinary Session of the African Union (AU) Executive Council (including Ministers in charge of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) and/or Ministers in charge of Negotiations with the European Union (EU), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
51. 14 Sep: President Ramaphosa meets members of the Diplomatic Corps, Pretoria, South Africa
52. 18 Sep: Official Visit by Dr Tshepo Motsepe to New York, United States of America
53. 18-30 Sep: 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), New York, USA
54. 1-4 Oct: United Nations (UN) Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), Geneva, Switzerland
55. 6-7 Oct: Ministerial Meeting of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), Tokyo, Japan
56. 21-26 Oct: 2018 Heads of Missions (HOM) Conference, Pretoria, South Africa
22 Oct: Minister Lindiwe Sisulu addresses the 2018 Heads of Missions (HOM) Conference, Pretoria, South Africa
23 Oct: President Cyril Ramaphosa addresses the 2018 Heads of Mission Conference, Pretoria, South Africa
57. 25 Oct: South Africa Investment Conference 2018, Sandton Convention Centre, Johannesburg, South Africa
58. 29-30 Oct: G20 Africa Conference, Berlin, Federal Republic of Germany
59. 30 Oct: Media Briefing on the 18th IORA Council of Ministers Meeting, Durban, South Africa
60. 31 Oct-2 Nov: 18th Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) Council of Ministers Meetings, Durban, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
61. 2 Nov: 18th Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) Council of Ministers Meeting, Durban, South Africa
62. 13-14 Nov: Workshop of the E10 Members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Pretoria, South Africa
63. 13-14 Nov: Workshop of the E10 Members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Pretoria, South Africa
64. 14-15 Nov: Working Visit by President Cyril Ramaphosa to the European Union, Strasbourg, France and Brussels in Belgium
65. 15-16 Nov: Fourth Meeting of the Global Commission on the Future of Work of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), Geneva, Switzerland

66. 17-18 Nov: 11th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
67. 19 Nov: 25th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations with four South East Asian nations, Pretoria, South Africa
68. 30 Nov: BRICS Leaders' Summit, Buenos Aires, Argentina
69. 30 Nov-1 Dec: G20 Summit, Buenos Aires, Argentina
70. 6 Dec: Regional Consultative Working Visit by Deputy President David Mabuza to Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states – Nairobi, Republic of Kenya, Kampala, Republic of Uganda and Khartoum, Republic of Sudan
71. 12-14 Dec: 108th Session of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group (ACP) Council of Ministers, Brussels, Belgium



Appendix 3.1 Programme 22 November 2018



IGD - HSRC Roundtable

Programme, 22 November 2018

Forum 150, Ground Floor, HSRC Building, 134 Pretorius Street, Pretoria

- 9:00 – 9:30 **Arrival and registration**
- 9:30 – 9:40 **Welcome and opening remarks** by Dr. Philani Mthembu - Executive Director, IGD associated with UNISA
- 9:40 – 10:00 **Reviewing South Africa's 2018 Diplomatic Calendar**
Jesuloba Ilesanmi & Simphiwe Mongwe, Research Assistants, IGD associated with UNISA
- 10:00 – 11:15 **Panel 1**
Ms. Sanusha Naidu, Senior Research Fellow, IGD associated with UNISA
Ms. Faith Mabera, Senior Researcher, IGD associated with UNISA
Mr. Francis Kornegay, Senior Research Fellow, IGD associated with UNISA
- 11:15 – 13:00 **Panel 2**
Bongane Gasela, Researcher, University of Johannesburg Confucius Institute (UJCI)
Ms. Faith Mabera, Senior Researcher, IGD associated with UNISA
Prof. Narnia Bohler-Muller, Executive Director, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery Programme, HSRC
- Discussant**
Ms. Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, Chief Executive, South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)
- 13:00 – 13:10 **Vote of thanks, close and lunch**

Appendix 3.2 Programme 28 February 2019



associated with



South Africa in the World 2019

Programme, 28 February 2019

Function Hall, Kgorong Building, Unisa Main Campus, Preller Street, Muckleneuk, Pretoria

- 8:30 - 9:00 **Arrival and registration**
- 9:00 – 9:15 **Welcome and opening remarks**
Philani Mthembu, Executive Director at the IGD
- 9:15 – 10:45 **Panel discussion I – The road to the 2019 elections and foreign policy**
How will government navigate its foreign policy commitments on the road to the 2019 national elections, are political parties playing a greater role in building consensus for crafting foreign policy, and what are some of the challenges in reporting foreign policy?
Peter Fabricius, Foreign Affairs Journalist and Consultant at ISS
Shannon Ebrahim, Group Foreign Editor for Independent Media
Jean Jacques Cornish, Journalist, Broadcaster and Correspondent for EWN News
- 10:45 – 12:15 **Panel presentation and discussion II – Africa and Emerging Powers**
The actors have a unique geopolitical positioning and role, which continuously develops, how will South Africa maximize its participation in the African Agenda and South-South cooperation in order to have a strategic impact in the continent and the global South? This panel will explore some key areas for South African participation: SADC, the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes Region, Western Sahara, BRICS, other emerging powers and the upcoming Russia-Africa Summit.
Garth le Pere, Visiting Professor at the University of Pretoria
Gilbert Khadiagala, Director of ACSUS
Sanusha Naidu, Senior Research Fellow at IGD
Gerrit Olivier, Scholar and former Diplomatic Representative to the Soviet Union and Russian Federation
- 12:30 – 13:30 **Panel presentation and Discussion III – Multilateral affairs**
Larger fora document ongoing developments in the world, how is South Africa making use of these fora and what are some of the key developments? This panel will explore South Africa's participation in the G20 and the UNSC, as well as opportunities for economic diplomacy in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Faith Mabera, Senior Researcher at IGD
Gustavo de Carvalho, Senior Researcher at ISS
Susana Caputi, Senior Associate at IGD
- 13:30 – 13:45 **Discussant**
Sithembile Mbete, Lecturer at the Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria
- 13:45 **Vote of thanks, close and lunch**