



THE ROOTS OF CORRUPTION: THE GHANAIAN ENQUIRY REVISITED

The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), Ghana

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By

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SUMMARY

Corruption has engaged the attention of the international community, politicians and citizens because of its deleterious and corrosive consequences on politics, governance, security and socio-economic development. Several strategies including reform of the constitutional, legal and institutional framework have been implemented by all countries including Ghana to curb the scourge of corruption but they have remained largely unsuccessful. As a contribution to the debate over corruption, this paper revisits some of the causes of corruption especially social norms or socio-cultural practices and values in Ghana using data obtained from the Corruption Survey which was undertaken by the Institute of Economic Affairs, Ghana in 2015. After a review of the literature on corruption, the paper discusses the findings of the Corruption Survey of the IEA in the following areas (i) understanding of and awareness about corruption; (ii) opportunities for corruption; (iii) motives and causes of corruption; (iv) evidence and perception of extent of corruption; and (v) combating corruption. The paper found that traditional and cultural values and practices may not necessarily be the major cause of corruption in Ghana. Traditional practices in themselves do not support corruption; it is rather individuals who misinterpret some of these practices for their own selfish needs or ends. On the contrary, corruption is the result of a combination of factors. Some of the policy recommendations include a bipartisan approach to fighting corruption; improvement in the overall governance situation; development of a culture of integrity, transparency and accountability; use of some traditional values and practices; viewing the fight against corruption from a long term perspective; transformational leadership; training and education on ethics and ethical behaviour; use of smart technology and e-governance; and additional pressure from civil society and development partners on the government.

1.0 Introduction

The May 11-12, 2016 anti-corruption summit, which was held in London by the British Prime Minister, David Cameron and attended by 40 participating countries (see Table 1) has yet again reinforced the fact that corruption still remains a global issue and concern that needs the concerted efforts of all to curb. The summit, the first of its kind, which brought together leaders, business and civil society, was intended to come up with ways to combat global corruption which costs the world £2.5 trillion. According to Cameron “The battle against corruption will not be won overnight. It will take time, courage and determination to deliver the reforms that are necessary. But we cannot hope to solve the major global challenges we face without tackling the exploitation, fraud and dishonesty at their heart. For too long there has been a taboo about tackling this issue head on. The summit will change that. Together we will push the fight against corruption to the top of the international agenda where it belongs.”³

The global collaborative effort to fight corruption has become more important than ever before because of the continued debilitating and corrosive effects of corruption on governance, security and development. In the words of Cameron (2016):

Corruption is one of the greatest enemies of progress in our time. It is the cancer at the heart of so many of the world's problems. It affects everything – from a family's ability to send their child to school, to the credibility of the world's favourite sport, football... It is an enemy of progress and the root of so many of the world's problems. It destroys jobs and holds back economic growth, traps the poorest in desperate poverty, and undermines our security by pushing people towards extremist groups.⁴

In a communiqué, the participating countries which attended the summit agreed to take the following four specific pro-transparency measures to fight corruption:

- (I) Gather more information on the true beneficial owners of companies (and possibly other legal entities, like trusts), perhaps through a central public registry—which might be available only to law enforcement, or which might be made available to the general public (see Communiqué paragraph 4).

³“About the Anti-Corruption Summit in London” May 31, 2016 accessed at <http://www.cafebabel.co.uk/cafebabel-aarhus/article/about-the-anti-corruption-summit-in-london.html> and “Anti-Corruption Summit: London 2016 – GOV.UK” May 31, 2016 accessed at <https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/anti-corruption-summit-london-2016>

⁴“Explained: David Cameron's global anti - corruption summit” May 31, 2016 at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/12/explained-david-camerons-global-anti-corruption-summit>

- (ii) Increase transparency in public contracting, including making public procurement open by default, and providing usable and timely open data on public contracting activities (see Communiqué paragraph 9).
- (iii) Increase budget transparency through the strengthening of genuinely independent supreme audit institutions, and the publication of these institutions' findings (see Communiqué paragraph 10).
- (iv) Strengthen protections for whistleblowers and doing more to ensure that credible whistleblower reports prompt follow-up action from law enforcement (see Communiqué paragraph 13).

Corruption has been identified as one of the “most important problems facing the world today.” Major corruption scandals are currently front-page news around the globe. For example, the April 2016 Panama Papers underscore how opaque corporate vehicles can be used to hide the profits of illicit behaviour, including tax evasion, corruption and sanctions evasion. At a time of rising inequality in income and wealth, there is moral outrage that the rich and powerful are abusing the system to their own advantage. In several countries, citizens have taken to the streets and are sending a powerful signal to their leaders that they can no longer tolerate corruption. For example, according to press reports, public dissatisfaction with widespread corruption was an important factor that motivated the Arab Spring and the fall of the regime in Ukraine in 2014 (IMF 2016).

It is against this backdrop that this paper revisits some of the causes of corruption especially social norms or social and cultural practices and values in Ghana using data obtained from the Corruption Survey undertaken by the Institute of Economic Affairs, Ghana in 2015. In other words, is there a link or connection between social norms that

⁵ See “[Anti-Corruption Summit: London 2016 - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/anti-corruption-summit-london-2016)” May 31, 2016 accessed at <https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/anti-corruption-summit-london-2016>.

⁶ 2013 World Independent Network/Gallup International annual survey covering 65 countries. Broadly similar results have been found in other surveys (BBC 2010, and Pew Research Center 2014, which covered between 26 and 34 countries, respectively). The World Economic Forum's 2016 Global Risks Report ranks “Failure of national government (e.g., failure of rule of law, corruption, political deadlock, etc.)” as the sixth-highest global risk in terms of likelihood.

⁷ The Panama Papers refer to unprecedented 11.5 million leaked documents on 214,488 offshore companies set up through the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca. Some of the leaked documents date back to the 1970s. The leaked documents illustrate how wealthy individuals and public officials are able to keep financial information private. See “Giant Leak of Offshore Financial Records Exposes Global Array of Crime and Corruption”, accessed July 1, 2016 at www.occrp.org

tolerate corruption (“corruption norms”) and the prevalence of corruption in Ghana? Is there any evidence to suggest that there are corruption norms as a result of society and culture in Ghana? The paper tries to answer these questions in an effort to contribute to the debate over the incidence and perception of corruption. Answering these questions are important in understanding the causes of corruption and strategies to combat it because of the view that:

Some of our otherwise good societal practices may promote or can be misapplied to support corruption. As a people, Ghanaians like to say Thank You for services rendered especially when unexpected. The Thank You is conveyed or expressed after the service. ... These days many professionals and officials expect the Thank You before they do their duty. There are occasions when custom or practice requires a token or gift to open the door for consultation or discussion. Thus one carries a bottle of drink or other token for the privilege of meeting a chief or an elder in society.⁸

The paper is divided into four parts. Part 1 deals with the methodology. Part 2 is devoted to a review of the state-of-the-art on corruption. This is important in understanding the issues to be addressed as it deals concisely with what one might call “the value of chain” of corruption (definition, causes, consequences, combating strategies and case studies). Part 3 discusses the findings of the Corruption Survey undertaken by the Institute of Economic Affairs in 2015. The discussion focuses on the following five issues about corruption: (i) understanding and awareness; (ii) opportunities; (iii) motives and causes; (iv) evidence and perception of extent; and (v) combating. Part 4 is devoted to summarizing the findings and highlighting some key policy recommendations.

⁸ K.B. Asante, “Corruption must be curbed worldwide” *Daily Graphic* Monday, May 16, 2016, p. 7. June 1, 2016 at <http://www.graphic.com.gh>

Table 1: 40 Countries which Attended the May 2016 London Summit on Anti-Corruption

1. Afghanistan	11. Germany	21. Mexico	31. Sri Lanka
2. Argentina	12. Ghana	22. Netherlands	32. Switzerland
3. Australia	13. India	23. New Zealand	33. Tanzania
4. Brazil	14. Indonesia	24. Nigeria	34. Trinidad and Tobago
5. Bulgaria	15. Ireland	25. Norway	35. Tunisia
6. Canada	16. Italy	26. Romania	36. Turkey
7. China	17. Japan	27. Russia	37. Ukraine
8. Colombia	18. Jordan	28. Singapore	38. United Arab Emirates
9. France	19. Kenya	29. South Africa	39. United Kingdom
10. Georgia	20. Malta	30. Spain	40. United States

Source: Compiled by the author. See “Anti-Corruption Summit: London 2016 - GOV.UK” May 31, 2016 accessed at <https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/anti-corruption-summit-london-2016>

2. METHODOLOGY

A combination of primary source and desk study (literature review) was used. The primary source is derived from data analyzed from the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) Corruption Survey of Ghana, which dealt with public perception and assessment of corruption situation in Ghana and undertaken in November/December 2015. The Corruption Survey focused mainly on five issues including (i) understanding of and awareness about corruption; (ii) opportunities for corruption; (iii) motives and causes of corruption; (iv) evidence and perception of extent of corruption; and (v) combating corruption.

The Corruption Survey used a probability sample design where each person aged 18 years and above in Ghana has a known non-zero chance of being included in the sample. A regionally disaggregated representative sample of 1,500 respondents aged 18 years and above from the 10 regions of Ghana was selected.

The sample design was a three-stage stratified and clustered design that employed sampling with probability proportional to the size (PPS) of the population. Stratification was based on the 10 regions as domain of analysis while the rural and urban localities constituted the sub-domains. The United Nations (2005) strict sampling procedures were used to select households and individuals within the primary sampling units (PSUs) and households respectively. Table 2 shows the allocation of the PSUs and secondary sampling units (SSUs) for each region and implied number of households.

Table 2: The Distribution of Enumeration Areas (PSUs) across the 10 Regions of Ghana

Region	Estimated Population 18 years and above*	Percent of population (18 years and above) *	Number of PSUs per PPS	Required number of households per PPS	Adjusted No. of PSUs	Adjusted No. of households for field work
Western	1,449,497	9.8	10	147	9	135
Central	1,242,547	8.4	8	126	8	120
Greater Accra	2,483,709	16.8	17	252	15	225
Volta	1,270,417	8.6	9	129	8	120
Eastern	1,591,877	10.8	11	161	10	150
Ashanti	2,951,044	19.9	20	299	18	270
Brong Ahafo	1,409,076	9.5	10	143	9	135
Northern	1,420,110	9.6	10	144	9	135
Upper East	598,414	4.0	4	61	7	105
Upper West	388,144	2.6	3	39	7	105
Total	14,804,835	100.0	100	1,500	100	1,500

Source:2015 Socio-economic and Governance Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

Table 3 contains the regional distribution of respondents which closely mirrors the 2010 Population and Housing Census conducted by the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS). The region with the highest proportion of respondents is Ashanti with 270 (18.0%) and Upper East and Upper West Regions have the least, that is, 105 each (7%).

Table 3: Regional Distribution of Respondents vis-à-vis 2010 Population and Housing Census

2015 IEA Survey			2010 Ghana Statistical Service: Population and Housing Census Figures	
Region	Number	Percent	Region	% of Population (18+)
Western	135	9.0	Western	9.5
Central	120	8.0	Central	8.7
Greater Accra	225	15.0	Greater Accra	18.6
Volta	120	8.0	Volta	8.6
Eastern	150	10.0	Eastern	10.6
Ashanti	270	18.0	Ashanti	19.5
BrongAhafo	135	9.0	BrongAhafo	9.0
Northern	135	9.0	Northern	8.9
Upper East	105	7.0	Upper East	4.0
Upper West	105	7.0	Upper West	2.6
Total	1,500	100.0	Total	100.0

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

Table 4 shows the type of location and sex distribution of respondents; 60% of the respondents are females while the remaining 40% are males.

Table 4: Percentage Distribution of Respondents by Type of Locality and Sex

Sex	Locality		Total country
	Urban	Rural	
Male	37.9	41.8	39.9
Female	62.1	58.2	60.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

Some quality control measures were put in place to strengthen the methodology. They include: (i) the use of probability sampling to ensure that each person 18 years and above had a known non-zero chance of being included in the sample; (ii) the use of a structured questionnaire; (iii) strict data processing procedures; and (iv) incorporation of feedback from stakeholders into the questionnaire and methodology (Institute of Economic Affairs, Ghana 2016).

These strengths notwithstanding, a number of weaknesses can be identified in the methodology. They include the (i) conditioning effect on the respondents thus compromising the quality of the responses; (ii) reluctance of some respondents to cooperate thereby increasing non-response in later survey rounds; (iii) some respondents learnt that some responses mean additional questions, so they avoided giving certain answers; (iv) some respondents changed their behaviour because of the survey; (v) utilizing perception indices raise concerns about biases. These weaknesses do not, however, affect the scientific basis of the survey, the data analysis, findings and conclusions as they are common to almost all surveys undertaken elsewhere. These weaknesses, as already pointed out, have been addressed by the methodological control measures (Institute of Economic Affairs, Ghana 2016).

The survey method, which was used by the 2015 IEA Corruption Survey on Ghana from which this paper derived its data, is one of the anti-corruption strategies used globally. According to Reinikka and Svensson (2003: 2) “anti-corruption surveys and workshops can provide useful information regarding corruption and citizens' attitudes about corruption, and can help to mobilize public opinion against corruption”. In these efforts, Transparency International (TI), a non-governmental organization (NGO) headquartered in Berlin, Germany has been especially important. Its flagship is the annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Equally important are the corruption specific or related surveys undertaken by the World Bank, African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), Afrobarometer and Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG).

3.0 Corruption: A State-of-the-Art

Much ink has been used on the subject of the canker of corruption (IMF 2016; World Bank 2015; UNECA 2011; Lambsdorff 2007; Rose-Ackerman and Soreide 2011; Soreide 2014; Hope 2016, among others). The publications are in the form of books, journal articles, instruments and conventions, which are devoted to the definitions, forms, types, causes, determinants, consequences and measurement of corruption. Other publications have also covered the strategies to combat corruption and their efficacy as well country and sector specific case studies.

It is said that corruption is not a new phenomenon. It has been in place for as long as there has been a willingness to accept different kinds of favours in exchange for conducting private affairs, business or carrying out government policy, in the interests of certain individuals. The first documented cases of bribery date back to the year 3000 B.C. Seven centuries ago, *Dante* placed bribers at the bottom of Hell, demonstrating thereby the negative attitude to corrupt behaviour (AfDB/AfDF 2014). This view has been reinforced by the claim of former President John Kufuor in an address at the annual national congress of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) at Cape Coast in 2002 that “corruption is part of human kind since it started in the days of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden and that it was as old as creation itself”, implying that his government did not start corruption, that it is also not a new phenomenon and that there are several temptations that are faced by politicians in public office.

Etymologically, corruption stems from the Latin verb *corrumpere* (to destroy; spoil), which in turn is a form derived from *rumpere* (to break). Consequently, corruption occurs when something is being destroyed, spoiled or broken (UNDP 2008). Corruption has been described as “*a prism with many surfaces*” (Caiden and Caiden 1977; 1994; Heidenheimer 1970). As such, the element of “something” said to be “broken” (in the etymology) depends on the angle from which the occurrence is viewed. For example, it could be from either a political, economic, social, criminal, civil and administrative law angle or perspective or a combination of any of these angles or perspectives. Accordingly, to comprehend the whole picture and, in order not to see just one side of the prism by presenting corruption, for instance, as a criminal behaviour, it is necessary to take a broader view thereof (AFDB/AfDF 2014 Harsch 1993).

3.1 Definitions and Forms of Corruption

Corruption is a term of many meanings. Indeed, there are different meanings of corruption in different societies. One person's bribe is another person's gift. A political leader or public official who aids friends, family members, and supporters may seem praiseworthy in some societies and corrupt in others (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).

Although it has been defined in many different ways, there is no generally accepted definition that applies to all forms, types and degrees of corruption. In most cases, observers need to agree on whether a certain behaviour constitutes corruption. Unfortunately, the behaviour is often difficult to observe because acts of corruption do not typically take place in broad daylight (Nye 1967; Heywood 1997; Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002).

Difficulties in arriving at a common definition of corruption are rooted in legal and political considerations, as well as in varying attitudes and customs in different cultures. For example, gift-giving in many village traditions is not considered as corruption, since the transaction is not made “under the table”. It is open and transparent; the scale is not life-changing; the benefits are usually shared within the community; and no public rights are violated. In fact, corruption should not be about “...putting one's fingers in the till but more about the abuse of power or improbability in the decision-making process...” (Klitgaard 1988: 1997).

This issue of definition is amplified and compounded by the fact that, in many circles, corruption is so ingrained in daily exchanges that it is tolerated, and accepted to be normal behaviour, for example: “...greasing the wheels of business...” Given the insidious nature of corruption, people have become inured thereto, and this culminates in the existence of “agents” that serve as liaison with decision-makers. Thus, it is the need to modify attitudes that could present the most difficulty in the combat against corruption, especially, in poor countries, which, at any rate, possess a low forensic capacity to detect corruption (Rose-Ackerman 1999; Rose-Ackerman and Soreide 2011; UNECA 2011).

Because of the discrepancy in notions of corruption in different societies, this presents some challenges for concerting international efforts to combat the phenomenon. For example, during the negotiations of the *United Nations Convention Against Corruption* (UNCAC) of 2003, it was decided not to define corruption at all, but to establish a wide range of acts constituting corruption. The Convention included not only basic forms of

corruption, such as bribery and the embezzlement of public funds, but also trading in influence, concealment, and laundering of the proceeds of corruption, as well as offences committed in support of corruption such as money-laundering and obstruction of justice (UN 2003).

At the broadest level, corruption is the misuse of office for unofficial ends (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Werlin, 1994; Soreide and Williams 2014). Corruption involves behaviour on the part of office holders or employees in the public and private sectors, in which they improperly and unlawfully advance their private interests of any kind and/or those of others contrary to the interests of the office or position they occupy or otherwise enrich themselves and/or others, or induce others to do so, by misusing the position in which they are placed (Hope 2015).

Heidenheimer et. al. (1989) classify definitions of corruption into three often overlapping categories: (i) misuse of public office for private gain; (ii) inappropriate exchanges of money or favours for undue influence or power; and (iii) violations of public interest or norms of behaviour for special advantages or self-serving purposes. In short, corruption is the abuse of public or private office for personal gain or how individuals entrusted with authority to make decisions on behalf of the organization misuse their position for personal gain (Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002; DfID 2013; Soreide 2014). In other words, corruption comprises the misuse of entrusted power or responsibility for any private benefit of self or others (Hope 1985; 2000).

From these definitions, it is possible to identify seven features associated with corruption:

- It is an illegal and illegitimate action;
- It is a secret activity;
- It is a crime;
- The purpose is for personal or political gain;
- It is a deviation from commonly accepted standards of rectitude and integrity expected of persons placed in authority;
- It does not promote the public interest; and
- It is a state-society relationship because public sector corruption is believed to be a more fundamental problem than private sector corruption, and because controlling public sector corruption is a prerequisite for controlling private sector corruption (Klitgaard 1988; Ayee 2002; 2016; Soreide 2014).

The catalogue of corrupt acts includes bribery, extortion, kickbacks, influence-peddling, nepotism, clientelism, patronage, fraud, money laundering, kleptocracy, embezzlement, extortion, state capture, rent-seeking, retainers and political parties campaign contributions from corporations, misapplication and misappropriation of funds, conflict of interest, vote-buying and election rigging (Heidenheimer, 1970; Harsch, 1993; Heywood, 1997; Soreide 2014).

3.2 Types of Corruption

Several types of corruption have emerged. Hope (2000); Hutchinson (2005); and Soreide (2014) have divided corruption into the following three categories:

- (i) **Petty Corruption:** It involves small cash or favours which are given in exchange for speeding up (private or state) transactions. It refers to everyday forms of corruption when citizens, businesses, and officials make exchanges. It is usually practised by public servants who may be grossly underpaid, and depend on small rents from the public to feed their families and pay school fees.
- (ii) **Grand Corruption:** It refers to large scale corruption that takes place at the highest levels of government, usually at the policy formulation level. Grand corruption is often used synonymously with political corruption. Similarly, the term “state capture” refers to acts of grand corruption by which actors influence public decision making in order to change the rules of the game in their favor (for example, laws benefitting a certain group). Grand corruption relates to irregularities that occur in public procurement contracts, or in revenue-collection rebates, or write-offs (that could amount to several hundreds of thousands of dollars), with some political cover; and
- (iii) **Looting:** It involves acts that may be sanctioned or created for political purposes; e.g., government would place contracts with non-existent organizations, or goods are never delivered. Looting is damaging to the national economy, and, usually, proceeds are externalized quickly (e.g., into Swiss or other tax haven accounts).

It has been pointed out that more often than not, both petty and grand corruption take place in the process of delivering public services of various types— an appropriate observation as far as Sub-Saharan African countries are concerned (UNDP 2008; UNECA 2011).

Caiden and Caiden (1977; 1994); Mbaku (2007); and UNDP (2008) have also categorized corruption into political, administrative/bureaucratic, individual and systemic.

- (i) ***Political corruption*** is enacted by politicians in their official capacity, not in their personal or, where applicable, administrative/bureaucratic capacity. It refers to the misuse of political power for private gain. This misuse can be for the preservation or strengthening of power, personal enrichment, or both. Political corruption can take place while entering public office, during the policy making process, or in the allocation of state resources. Common forms of political corruption include: vote-buying, election-rigging, non-transparent or illegal political campaign financing, abuse of public property, or simply biased decision-making for personal interest.
- (ii) ***Administrative/bureaucratic corruption*** is enacted by administrators in their official capacity, not in their personal or, where applicable, political capacity. It refers to corruption that takes place in public administration or at the implementation end of the policies. In most countries, the two forms of corruption (political and bureaucratic) go hand-in-hand and reinforce one another. In most systems of one-party rule, the two typologies of corruption are intertwined as there is no clear separation between elected politicians and bureaucratic officials.
- (iii) ***Individual corruption*** refers to the individual who strays from a prevailing norm of official public behaviour, for example, informal organizational short-cuts, personal accommodations and mutual understandings. Individual corruption is more isolated and sporadic than political and bureaucratic corruption.
- (iv) ***Systemic corruption*** (sometimes referred to as ingrained or endemic corruption) occurs where corruption has become an integral part of the system. It refers to a situation in which corruption is an integrated aspect of the economic, social, and political system. The major institutions and processes of the state are routinely dominated and used by corrupt individuals and groups. Systemic corruption is a situation where wrongdoing has become the norm, and the standard accepted behaviour necessary to accomplish organizational goals according to notions of public responsibility and trust has become the exception not the rule. In this situation, corruption has become so regularized and institutionalized that

organizational supports back wrong-doing and actually penalize those who live up to the old norms. Corruption can be so endemic that people do not know how to contain it.

Bureaucratic corruption, administrative corruption and petty corruption are often being used synonymously in the anti-corruption literature (UNDP 2008; UNECA 2011).

Similarly, Werlin (1994) has drawn a distinction between primary corruption and secondary corruption.

- (i) **Primary corruption** refers to partisan behaviour that challenges statesmanship (respect for legal or normative requirements) but still respects it. Those who engaged in primary corruption try to get away with what they can but expect to be punished if caught. There is fear and regret associated with it.
- (ii) **Secondary corruption**, on the other hand, is partisan behaviour that is carried out in the absence of viable statesmanship (respect for legal or normative requirements). There is little concern about punishment or feelings of guilt and disgrace inasmuch as the political system facilitates or condones corruption.

Soreide and Rose-Ackerman (2015) distinguish between **capture or collusive corruption** (where the civil servant and client secretly collude for their common benefit) and **extortive corruption** (where the client feels compelled to make a bribe payment). In practice, it is difficult to draw the line between cases of collusive corruption and extortive corruption, especially because most bribe-payers prefer to portray themselves as victims of corruption (regardless of the benefits they have obtained). A more neutral perspective considers the allocation of bargaining powers between the parties involved in the corrupt deal.

In a nutshell, the various types of corruption cover abuses of public authority, unprincipled conduct and use of public power for exploitation, intentional mis-performance, transgression and neglect of recognized official duties that damage the public and harm public interests (Gould 2001).

It is instructive to note that all these concepts are not mutually exclusive – they are but different aspects that should help understand the complex phenomenon of corruption. For example, an act of grand corruption (e.g. rigging the formulation of a public tender) can involve acts of political corruption (e.g. a local politician abusing his mandate to help

change the tender) as well as acts of bureaucratic (petty) corruption (e.g. the building company paying off some public servants to get access to the tender documents or inspectors to disregard the low quality of the construction).

3.3 The Private Sector and Corruption

Although one tends to think of corruption as a sin of the public sector, of course, it also exists in the private sector, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international organizations. Indeed, as has been rightly pointed out by Rose-Ackerman (1999: 113) “corruption describes a relationship between the state and the private sector. Sometimes state officials are the dominant actors; in other cases, private actors are the most powerful forces”.

Private sector companies, be they domestic or international, feel the pressure to bribe (Soreide and Williams 2014; Rose-Ackerman and Soreide 2011). These firms provide two main justifications for their actions, which may not necessarily be convincing:

- i. In certain countries, it is often perceived to be very difficult for anyone to win a major government contract or parastatal contract without paying a large bribe;
- ii. Although any form of bribery may be thought to be legally wrong, offshore bribery is generally condoned “because everybody does it”. Illegal payments made by companies in order to obtain foreign contracts are often tolerated, if not actively encouraged, in many industrialized countries because winning export orders creates employment opportunities (Stapenhurst and Langseth, 1997).

Similarly, an enterprise survey⁹ conducted by the World Bank (2007) revealed that 39% of firms made informal payments to public officials to get things done, 23% to get an operating license, 18% in gifts for meetings with tax officials and 61% to secure government contracts (World Bank 2007).

⁹ An enterprise survey is a firm-level survey of a representative sample of an economy's private sector. The surveys cover a broad range of business environment topics including access to finance, corruption, infrastructure, crime, competition and performance measures. Since 2002, the World Bank has collected this data from face-to-face interviews with top managers and business owners in over 130,000 companies in 135 economies. The surveys are conducted using the Global Methodology. See <http://www.worldbank.org>

The studies of Rose-Ackerman (1999) and Staphenurst and Langseth (1997) and the World Bank (2007) have been reinforced by Ishmael Yamson (a private sector guru in Ghana) in a speech delivered at the Graphic Communications Group 1st Accra Governance Conference:

... the private sector must fight corruption. Often when people speak of corruption it is as if it prevails only in the public sector. Those who corrupt are largely persons from the private sector involved in public sector procurement and they are as guilty as the takers of the bribes. Those private sector persons whose only understanding of business is cutting corners only thrive on bribery and corruption (Yamson, 2006: 12).

Furthermore, the Constitution Review Commission (CRC) found that:

Corruption in Ghana is not restricted to the public sector. Private businesses are also involved in corruption; they bribe customs, police, drug enforcement, tax, judicial and procurement officers in order to avoid tax payments, secure lucrative public contracts, access emerging markets and smuggle illegal commodities (Republic of Ghana 2011: 750).

3.4 Causes of Corruption

The literature has identified several domestic and external mechanisms underlying the emergence and development of corruption. They include: level of economic development and poverty; unintended consequences of economic liberalisation; unintended consequences of state intervention; weak institutions; political parties finance; lack of accountability and transparency; unintended consequences of international corporations and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); offshore banking, tax havens and money laundering; and international organized crime (European Commission 2011; Nye 1967; Lambsdorff 2002a;b; 2006; 2007; Mauro 1996; Mbaku 2007).

Corruption is persistent, and represents a systemic failure of governance where the principal institutions responsible for ensuring public accountability, the observance of ethics and integrity standards, and enforcing the rule of law are compromised and may themselves be infested with corrupt individuals and syndicates. The result is that a chain environment of personal and collective impunity prevails and corruption is, therefore, both perceived and real as running rampant (Hope 1985; Gould 2001; Sung 2004).

The causes of corruption in Ghana mirror the global picture (see Box 1). They show that the causes of corruption are a combination of global and country-specific factors.

No.	Box 1: Causes of Corruption in Ghana
(i)	the piecemeal approach of the previous initiatives and lack of action plan to deal with corruption comprehensively and holistically;
(ii)	politicization of corruption by successive governments;
(iii)	failure to name, share and punish persons accused of corruption;
(iv)	failure to implement pieces of legislation, including the Assets Declaration Act to combat corruption largely because of political reasons and therefore corruption has not been made a high risk activity;
(v)	insufficient or selective enforcement of laws within a patrimonial social and political context;
(vi)	loss of national values and and low levels of integrity;
(vii)	selective application of sanctions, if there are any to corruption offenders;
(viii)	absence of a comprehensive legislation on corruption, with corruption dealt with in different pieces of legislation;
(ix)	various institutions combating corruption with no mechanism to harmonize their activities leading to institutional dualism in the fight against corruption;
(x)	lack of political and bureaucratic will and commitment;
(xi)	resource constraints on the part of institutions and therefore making them weak to fight corruption;
(xii)	lack of effective corruption reporting system;
(xiii)	inadequate public cooperation due to lack of an anti-corruption culture;
(xiv)	absence of good record-keeping and poor management practices in public institutions;
(xv)	low or inadequate salaries;
(xvi)	culture of gift-giving;
(xvii)	nepotism and neopatrimonialism; and
(xviii)	lack of effective incentive mechanism.

Sources: Republic of Ghana 2005; Republic of Ghana 2011; Aye 2000 a;b;c; Aye 2006; Agbele 2011; Richmond & Alpin 2013; Agbodohu & Churchill 2014.

Perhaps one of the major causes of corruption which needs some attention here is party and campaign financing. There has been scholarly attention to the linkages between political finance and corruption (Heidenheimer 1970a; 1970b; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Pinto-Duschinsky 2002). Political corruption in the electoral arena is related to the need for party financing in the current age of declining party membership and the growing costs of political campaigns. In the governmental arena, the access to state resources available to the ruling party may create incentives for party corruption. Similarly, access to the policy-making process may be conducive to party corruption in the legislative arena (Della Porta 2004; Nassmacher 2009; Bertoa et.al. 2014).

The debate around political finance in the scholarly literature has focused on the following three points: (i) how political parties should be funded; either privately, publicly or both; (ii) which kind of limitations, if any, should be introduced; and (iii) how the financial activities of political parties should be controlled (and by whom): permissively (internally), restrictively (externally), or not at all (Bertoa et.al. 2014; Booth and Robbins 2010; Johnston 2002).

In Ghana, the Political Parties Act, Act 574, 2000 leaves political party financing completely unregulated with the exception of banning non-citizens, foreign donations, in cash or in-kind, to parties. There are no limits to donations from citizens including corporate citizens; there are no disclosure laws, detailing who gives what, beyond a threshold amount. In addition to these, there are no limits to a candidate or a party spending on election campaigns even though there is a requirement for annual submissions of audited accounts, including assets and liabilities, and the Electoral Commission can appoint and pay for auditors to examine party accounts. In short, regulating private and corporate funding of political parties and campaigns is very weak and therefore a key opportunity for corruption. In other words, party and campaign financing has been abused and fraught with corrupt activities. This has in turn undermined internal democracy in the political parties because of the lack of equality of voice and access (Saffu, 2005).

The relationship between pay and levels of corruption has also engaged the attention of some scholars even though the findings have been inconclusive. A burgeoning literature suggests that raising the salaries of government officials could reduce their propensity to solicit and accept bribes. At the aggregate country level, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) show that countries with higher civil service wages have lower levels of corruption. Recent work on political corruption by Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013)

and Ferraz and Finan (2009) suggests that higher salaries for politicians reduce their levels of corruption. A growing number of laboratory and field experiments have also shown that raising wages or payments to subjects reduces corrupt behaviour (Armantier and Boly (2011) and Van Veldhuizen (2013) among others). These findings have, however, been disputed by Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang (2015). According to them, the doubling of salaries of police officers in 2010 as part of the Single Spine Pay Policy (SSPP) in Ghana did not mitigate petty corruption by police officers on the roads.

Given that this paper is largely devoted to socio-cultural factors that have been the underlying causes of corruption, more attention will be paid to the review of the literature on societal norms and practices. “Social norms” are typically understood as shared understandings about actions that are obligatory, permitted, or forbidden within a society (Ostrom 2000). Social norms are shared by other people and sustained by their approval and disapproval (Budge et al. 2009). The guilt caused by failing to adhere to a social norm can be a powerful determinant of behaviour. Corruption in the social sense is a shared belief that using public office to benefit oneself and one's family and friends is widespread, expected, and tolerated. In other words, corruption can be a social norm. Moreover, it has been the default social norm throughout much of history. Only gradually has the principle of equal treatment for all before the law emerged, and in most states it is still a work in progress (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013).

In the anti-corruption context, many studies have been carried out to explore the extent to which social norms have an impact on shaping behaviours and attitudes around corruption. Some even attempt to extrapolate specific societal characteristics that can influence individual behaviour on corruption, such as the degree to which interpersonal trust and informality are common in a society (Rose-Ackermann 1999; Riley 1998). However, most studies focus on attempting to prove whether there is in fact any verifiable link between norms and corruption. The literature remains somewhat inconclusive on the correlation between social norms and corruption (Lindner 2014). Some studies do provide evidence of a link between social norms that tolerate corruption (“corruption norms”) and the prevalence of corruption. For instance, in two studies on India conducted by Wade (1982; 1985), he found that pressure to engage in corruption often came from within the bureaucracy. Officials who did not participate risked punishment: supervisors developed a code language to use in reports to the authorities in charge of promotions to indicate officers who were not willing to extract side payments, identifying them as “tactless,” “having no grip over the people,” or “unable to manage” (Wade 1985, 483). Those who resisted might be coaxed into compliance with stories about how the bribes

received were “gifts” from farmers grateful for how hard they were working on their behalf (Wade 1982). Ironically, officials who resisted the system might be threatened with bogus public charges of corruption to encourage them to fall into line (Bayley 1966).

These types of social expectations can become internalized, as demonstrated in a study that found that when diplomatic immunity meant they had no legal obligation to pay for parking violations in New York City, diplomats from countries where corruption is high had significantly more unpaid fines than those from countries where corruption is low (Fisman and Miguel 2007). The finding that country of origin can predict corrupt actions has been replicated (Barr and Serra 2010) and suggests that corruption is at least in part associated with social norms. However, other studies demonstrate that the correlation is not clear, or that other factors, such as weak governance, may be stronger determinants of corrupt behaviour (Lindner 2014).

The World Bank (2015: 60-61) *World Development Report (WDR)* has *Spotlight 1* on “When Corruption Becomes the Norm” under which it emphasizes that “social expectations and mental models perpetuate corruption”. According to the Report, it is important to understand how the decision to engage in corruption takes place in the mind of a public official. **Using examples from some countries across the world, the Report shows that** if people believe that the purpose of obtaining office is to provide one's family and friends with money, goods, favours, or appointments, then social networks can perpetuate the norm of corruption. Social networks can even serve as a source of punishment for public servants who violate that norm. The 2015 WDR reported that in Uganda, for instance, reciprocal obligations of kinship and community loyalty may have contributed to a governance outcome in which public officials needed to use their position to benefit their network in order to be regarded as good people (Fjeldstad 2005). Holders of public positions who did not use their influence to assist friends and relatives risked derision and disrespect (Fjeldstad, Kolstad, and Lange 2003).

The 2015 *WDR* noted that even people who privately deplore a norm of corruption might go along with it publicly because of perceived social pressure in support of the system. Since people who express different opinions may find themselves treated as outsiders, they will often choose to express support for the status quo simply to avoid the costs of being different (Kuran 1997). Thus, societies can get stuck in an equilibrium in which corruption is the norm, even though privately, much of the population would prefer a clean public service.

One of the disturbing aspects of the 2015 *WDR Spotlight 1* on corruption is that “social pressures can force even clean officials to capitulate” (World Bank 2015: 61). In China, for instance, a local official was hounded by villagers who pressured him to accept gifts every time he went home. The official capitulated after he was told that he would be unable to get anything accomplished politically by refusing. He was later arrested on charges of corruption (McGregor 2010). Similarly, a study of India between 1976 and 1982 by Wade (1985) found that refusing to grant favours could subject a public official to complaints filed by constituents. The norm of corruption was so entrenched that the social meaning of an honest official was someone who demanded no more than the going rate as a bribe for providing a public service (Wade 1985; Quah 2007).

Some studies have shown that, in most societies, culture influences institutions and social norms, dictates the interactions of agents within a society, and affects the type of corruption that becomes prevalent (Banuri & Eckel, 2012). In these studies, culture sometimes is used to refer to concrete factors, such as trust, religiosity, or institutional arrangements, and sometimes to less tangible elements, such as a system of values, norms, and techniques, that a society has developed and that link it to future generations (Banuri & Eckel 2012; Hooker 2009; Seleim & Bontis 2009; Sylla 2014). The relationship between culture and corruption can therefore be regarded as country specific. As noted by Hooker (2009, p. 251), “because cultures operate in very different ways, different activities are corrupting in different parts of the world.” Consequently, practices, such as bribery, that are often corrupting across cultures are nonetheless corrupting for very different reasons. For many societies in Africa, for example, gift-giving is not corruption, and it never leads to bribery or embezzlement. It is simply a way to maintain peace and harmony in the society (Sylla 2014). Therefore, and as observed by Husted (1999), effective approaches for fighting corruption depend on societal culture. As Egbue (2006) has rightly noted, corruption in society does not reside only with governments. It is not just the outcome of uncontrolled greed among government officials and others. Society, as a whole, shares in the responsibility for corruption. In other words, the collective actions that can complement the principal–agent approach, that is, the cause and remedy for corruption (Marquette & Peiffer 2015; Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell 2013).

In the Ghanaian context, three publications (Werlin 1972; LeVine 1975; Price 1975), which were all published almost immediately after the overthrow of Dr Kwame Nkrumah in 1966, have dealt with the link between corruption and social norms and practices in Ghana.

Werlin (1972: 254) analyzed the root causes of corruption in Ghana and strongly argued that rising corruption in Ghana is not only a result of “fundamental political disorder”, but of “the persistence of traditional values which conflict with the requirements for a secular way of life”. The study focused on the Justice P. D. Anin five-man Presidential Commission into Bribery and Corruption of March 1970. Not only was it authorized “to study the area, prevalence, and methods of bribery and corruption in Ghanaian society”, but also to determine whether there were factors in the society which contributed to this. At the first meeting of the Commission of Enquiry on 29 June 1970, Justice Anin asked, “As a people, do we frown upon and resist bribery and corruption or do we tend to regard them as natural and inevitable?” ... “Do we draw a line between the 'customary drink' under our traditional practices, and bribery and corruption of public officers and others holding positions of trust?” The answers to these questions, it was hoped, would lead to recommendations for the eradication of these “social evils”.

Price's study (1975) is based on data collected in three related samples drawn in southern urbanite areas of Ghana in 1968-1969. One sample consisted of 434 civil servants of all ranks from 31 administrative units, while the second sample, called clientele survey, was composed of 385 university students. A comparison clientele survey of 81 average Ghanaians picked by an accidental sampling technique near lorry parks and taxi stations provide the third source of information. Reputational techniques are used to explore behavioural norms. In this perceptive analysis of the social costs of corruption in an African bureaucracy, Price took a look at the discordance between the performance requirements of the Ghanaian civil service and the traditional values which still largely determine the behaviour of incumbents.

Using the concept of role theory, Price proposed that the Ghanaian bureaucracy was institutionalized more in status than in aspects of role performance. The basic reason for little dependability on role performance is seen in the largely intact set of traditional values, generating a structure of social exchange that is determined by solidarity norms of the extended family system. The primary mode of social organization via kinship groups is viewed as conflicting with requirements essential to the effectiveness of modern bureaucratic organizations. The corporate definition of the individual's existence does not sufficiently allow for a compartmentalization of roles, which is the prerequisite for applying universalistic behavioural standards. Social pressure supporting the family role is highly uniform and strong at all levels of the administration. The bureaucrat cannot ignore his primary social obligations in the name of a public that does not exist in social reality. The co-existence of modern formal organizations and kinship type of social

organization brings about a social system in Ghana that appears to be mal-integrated at the institutional not at the individual level. The consequence is administrative weakness reflected in the slowness of the bureaucratic process, little enforcement of discipline, little service orientation of administrators and susceptibility to a variety of corruptive practices.

LeVine's (1975) study is an examination of the causes and consequences of political corruption defined as “unscheduled and unsanctioned use of public political resources and/or good for private ends” in Ghana since independence in 1957 (p.xi). It is based on the findings of numerous commissions of enquiry into the functioning of state institutions/agencies and the assets of public officials, held both during the colonial and post-1966 periods; on the reports of the Auditor General's Office on government accounts between 1958 and 1966; and on interactions with 12 prominent public officials in the Nkrumah regime. His most important conclusions are: (i) the general spread of corruption developed in the 1950s with the rapid localization of officialdom and the acquisition by the state of enlarged economic role; (ii) in the period 1957-1966, the Convention People's Party (CPP) institutionalized corruption through its control of private business, state corporations, public offices and voluntary associations and by integration of their activities; (iii) by the mid-1960s, political competition in the form of bribery, graft, nepotism and favouritism. Accordingly, LeVine (1975) concluded that bribery, theft and embezzlement arose from reversion to a traditional winner-takes-all attitude in which power and family relationships prevailed over the rule of law.

As social norms can play an important role in influencing behaviour, they can also potentially play an important role in shaping anti-corruption campaigns (World Bank 2015). Many studies note the importance of adopting a holistic approach to anti-corruption – one that goes beyond the legalistic and takes into account the strong role played by society and normalised behaviour. This is especially true in situations in which social norms do not necessarily align with the legal and institutional framework. Social marketing strategies can be useful in prompting people to act in accordance with existing norms that denounce corruption or, in turn, help establish new norms of behaviour that are more averse to corruption. Therefore, campaigns that focus on raising awareness, changing attitudes and promoting anti-corruption education can be more effective in reducing corruption. However, it must be noted that changing social norm stakes time and is a long-term endeavour (Lindner 2014).

Dissenting views have been expressed by some scholars on the link between traditional values and corruption in Ghana (Ninsin 1984; Ayee 2000 a;b;c; 2016 a; b). Ninsin

(1984:7), for instance, noted that “the fact that corruption occurs within modern bureaucratic, industrial, commercial and financial structures which are regulated by non-traditional or modern norms is not systematically investigated. Rather much fetish is made of traditional values, expectations and loyalties. In the literature on politics and administration in the new states, almost every failure or irregularity is blamed on these, while modern social structures and processes and norms are celebrated, and their innocence similarly assumed”. Similarly, Ayee (2016 a;b) emphasized that cultural values do not *per se* promote corruption but rather corruption is the result of a plethora or combination of several factors and forces.

3.5 Consequences of Corruption

There are political, economic and social consequences of corruption, which are considered grave, debilitating and inimical. Corruption has had considerable negative impacts on development and socio-economic progress (Dimant, 2014; Hope, 1985, 1996; IMF 2016). Corruption undermines the rule of law, weakens governance, leads to violations of human rights, inhibits political stability, hinders economic development, reduces social policies, diverts investments in infrastructure and public services, and erodes the quality of life. Moreover, it fosters an antidemocratic environment characterized by uncertainty, unpredictability, and declining moral values and disrespect for constitutional institutions and authority. It reduces public trust and confidence in institutions, their legitimacy, leading to instability (Werlin 1973; Bayley 1966; Hope 2015). It also destroys the internal democracy of political parties as “money bags” take control of the party and form a patron-client network. It therefore reflects a democracy, human rights, and governance deficit that negatively impacts human development and human security (Hope 2008; Mbaku 2007; Stapenhurst and Langseth 1997; Heywood 2007; Hanna et.al. 2011).

The consequences of corruption have been aptly and concisely captured by a communiqué of the 2016 London anti-corruption summit:

Corruption is at the heart of so many of the world's problems. It erodes public trust in government, undermines the rule of law, and may give rise to political and economic grievances that may, in conjunction with other factors, fuel violent extremism.¹⁰

¹⁰ See First Communiqué of the “Anti-Corruption Summit: London 2016 - GOV.UK” May 31, 2016 accessed at <https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/anti-corruption-summit-london-2016>

Notwithstanding these debilitating consequences, some functionalist scholars have tended to conceptualize corruption in terms of the actual function that it plays in socio-economic development (Nye 1967; Myrdal 1968). They conceive of the potential positive effect that corruption could have on business transactions. Manzetti and Wilson (2007: 50) observe that functionalists conceptualize corruption as a “necessary evil to cut bureaucratic red tape, redistribute resources, and sustain socio-economic development.” This point has further been advanced by Leff (1979) who alludes to the functionalist conception of corruption by suggesting that “bloated, inequitable and statist bureaucracy blocks private investment, therefore, corruption sets up a crude kind of economic efficiency.

3.6 Measuring Corruption

How do we measure something that is, by its very nature, largely hidden? This is the conundrum that faces all who have attempted to develop a means of measuring corruption (Rose-Ackerman 1999). There are significant challenges to measuring corruption and the success of anti-corruption strategies. Most of these come down to a number of points widely identified in the literature: the hidden nature of corruption (UNDP 2008) which results in definitional variances even in heavily used indices (Hawken and Munck 2009; Heywood and Rose 2014), and consequently a heavy reliance on perceptions (Galtung 2006; Urra 2007; Apaza 2009). Given the seemingly intractable nature of this problem, the obvious question is why we should want to measure a phenomenon that is not only covert, but notoriously difficult even to define (Reinikka and Svensson, 2003). There are, in fact, several reasons for doing so: first, it is important to assess the scale of the issue, in terms of its extent, location and trends, so that we know what we are dealing with. Second, we want to see whether there are any clear patterns in order, third, to help identify explanatory variables that will aid our understanding of why and where corruption develops. In short, measuring corruption will help us see better where we need to take action, as well as helping us decide both what that action should be and assessing whether it has worked. However, attempts at measuring corruption can lead to unintended consequences. The dominant mode of measurement since the mid-1990s has been perception-based, via cross-national indices drawn from a range of surveys and “expert assessments” (Hanna et.al 2011).

Indices such as the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the Bribe Payers Index (BPI), the Global Corruption Barometer (all produced by Transparency International), the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS) or other aggregate

indicators such as the Control of Corruption element in the World Bank Group's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), have undoubtedly proved immensely important in raising awareness of the issue of corruption, as well as allowing for detailed cross country comparisons (TI 2009). However, it is now widely acknowledged that such measures are inherently prone to bias and serve as imperfect proxies for actual levels of corruption (Kurtz and Shrank 2007; Razafindrakoto and Roubaud 2006; Heywood and Rose 2014). Indeed, measuring corruption has been described as “more of an art form than a precisely defined empirical process” (UNDP 2008: 8). Moreover, the lack of an authoritatively agreed upon definition of what counts as corruption remains a serious obstacle to measurement, as in practice specific indicators inevitably (even if implicitly) reflect particular definitions which can be used to support different findings (Hawken and Munck 2009).

3.7 Strategies to Combat Corruption¹¹

Corruption remains one of the most popular problems-to-fix in the open government community. Government transparency is widely considered to be one of the most important means for combating public corruption. The use of information transparency as an anti-corruption measure has become popular, based on the intuitive logic that secrecy breeds corruption and “sunlight is the best disinfectant”. In the words of Brandeis (1914: 92):

Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.

In an effort to come to grips with the nature of corruption, much of the early anti-corruption activity produced research data, model laws, frameworks and strategies for prevention, ultimately producing international agreements for cooperation and enforcement. Accordingly, a number of international instruments and processes have been developed at the international, regional and national levels to deal with the scourge of corruption. They are as follows:

¹¹ The section draws heavily from Joseph R.A. Ayee, “Anti-Corruption Measures in Ghana: An Analysis of the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan”, Ghana Policy Dialogue Series, African Development Bank, 2016 (forthcoming).

3.8 Key International Instruments and Processes

The key international instruments and processes are as follows:

- United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2003);
- UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime;
- UN Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in the International Commercial Transactions;
- International Code of Conduct for Public Officials;
- OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (1997);
- Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40+9 Recommendations;
- Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (EITI), which Ghana implemented in 2010;
- Kimberly Certification Process (KPC);
- Forest Law Enforcement Governance Trade; and
- OECD Anti-Bribery Convention/Working Group of which South Africa is the only African country to be a party (OECD 2014c: 28). Phase 3 Report on South Africa by the OECD Working Group on Bribery evaluates and makes recommendations on South Africa's implementation of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 2009 Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD 2014c).

3.9 Regional and Sub-Regional Instruments and Processes

The key regional and sub-regional instruments and processes include the following:

- Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (1996);
- European Union Instruments on Corruption;
- Council of Europe Conventions on Corruption (1997-1999);
- The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003);
- New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (2000);
- African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) (2003);
- The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol Against Corruption (2005);
- ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight Against Corruption (2001);
- The East African Community (EAC) draft Protocol on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2010);

- ECOWAS Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money-Laundering in West Africa (GIABA); and
- Regional Anti-Corruption Programme for Africa. This is an initiative of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), being undertaken in collaboration with the African Union Advisory Board on Corruption aimed at up scaling the fight against corruption on the continent with a view to ensuring a corruption free, better governed and economically prosperous continent. The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) (2003) and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC) (2003) constitute the main policy and political frameworks for the formulation of this programme, and its main objective is to facilitate the elaboration and implementation of these two frameworks on the African continent (UNECA 2011).

3.10 National or Governmental Instruments and Processes

The main national or governmental instruments and processes include the following:

- The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US;
- National constitutional provisions on corruption;
- Code of ethics or conduct for public officials; and
- Anti-money laundering laws.

These instruments and processes share three things in common. First, fighting corruption is a collective effort that involves governments in both developed and developing countries, the private sector, organizations and individuals. Second, corruption is detrimental to political and socio-economic development and must therefore be prevented or combatted through reforms, improved systems and processes and the application of sanctions. Third, they raise the fight against corruption high at both national and international levels and encourage anti-corruption dialogue and implement all the anti-corruption legal frameworks,

Apart from these instruments and processes in dealing with the scourge of corruption, countries have implemented model anti-corruption laws and strengthened investigation and prosecution efforts (Rose-Ackermann and Carrington 2013; Soreide 2014). The IMF (2016) has also suggested four key measures to deal with corruption. They are transparency, rule of law, economic reform policies designed to eliminate excessive regulation and effective institutions, which includes the development of a competent

public service that takes pride in being independent of both private influence and public interference.

Several approaches have been adopted to control corruption in Ghana. They include constitutional, legal, institutional, administrative reform, politically motivated, societal, international community and survey approaches (see Table 5). Anti-corruption rhetoric and programmes exist in name rather than in reality. Anti-corruption bodies (both state and non-state) such as the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) (1993), Serious Fraud Office (1993) renamed Economic and Organized Crime Office (EOCO) (2010), Financial Intelligence Centre (2010), Ghana Integrity Initiative, (the local chapter of Transparency International) and the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition have led the crusade against corruption; however, they have largely not succeeded because of the monumental, pervasive and systemic nature of corruption which requires a multi-dimensional, multi-pronged and multi-agency response (Ayee 2016a).

The high incidence and perception of corruption led to the formulation of the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP), 2015-2024 (Republic of Ghana 2014). The vision of the NACAP is to create a “sustainable democratic society founded on good governance and imbued with high ethics and integrity” (p. 36). Its mission is to “contextualize and mobilize efforts and resources of stakeholders, including Government, individuals, civil society, private sector and the media, to prevent and fight corruption through the promotion of high ethics and integrity and the vigorous enforcement of applicable laws” (p. 36).

The realization of the vision and mission is embodied in its the four strategic objectives, which are: (i) build public capacity to condemn and fight corruption and make its practice a high-risk, low-gain activity; (ii) institutionalize efficiency, accountability and transparency in the public, private and not-for profit sectors; (iii) engage individuals, media and civil society organizations (CSOs) in reporting and combating corruption;¹² and (iv) conduct effective investigations and prosecution of corrupt conduct (p. 36).

¹² It is this recognition by the NACAP that the fight against corruption is a collaborative venture through harmonious stakeholders' engagement and interactions that goaded the Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII) – the local chapter of Transparency International, to organize its first annual National Anti-Corruption Forum on 28th June 2016 under the theme “Consolidating Ghana's Anti-Corruption Efforts: Building a Consensus to Address Existing Gaps”. It brought together participants from state institutions, government, civil society, private sector, political parties, media, academic and development partners

The vision, mission and strategic objectives of the NACAP reinforce a number of things. First, they show sensitivity to the political objectives of the Directive Principles of State Policy especially those referring to the building of a democratic state to promote freedom, justice and fundamental human rights and freedoms and the taking of steps to eradicate corrupt practices and the abuse of power. Second, the scope of NACAP goes beyond controlling corruption in the public sector to the private, state and non-state actors irrespective of gender, age, local and international status and therefore does not point accusing fingers at any particular sector for corruption in Ghana. Third is the desire to develop a long-term anti-corruption culture among Ghanaians through prevention, proactive, sustained and coordinated education and investigation and enforcement/sanctions. Fourth is the emphasis on improved investigation and prosecution of offenders and by extension adequate resourcing of anti-corruption agencies.¹³

3.11 Case Studies on Corruption

There are countless case studies on corruption, which are difficult to recount in this publication. They, however, can be broadly divided into the following four areas:

- (i) Regional case studies—Africa, Asia and Latin America (UNECA 2011; Hope 2000; World Bank 2015; Gyimah-Boadi 2002; Ayee 2002 a;b; Leys 1965; Theobald 1999);
- (ii) Country-specific case studies- Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania (Ayee 2000b; 2016a; 2016; Agbodohu and Churchill 2014; Yeboah-Assiamah et.al. 2014);
- (iii) Sectoral case studies- health, police, social norms, procurement, decentralization, role of international actors (Hope 2015; 2016; Ofori-

¹³ A one-year progress report (January-September 2015) on the implementation of the NACAP published by CHRAJ detailed some of the activities undertaken. They include public awareness and education programmes, measures to enforce the Political Parties Act and coordinating activities of law enforcement and anti-corruption agencies. Some of the challenges are the low participation of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) in the NACAP given that only 19 out of the 43 institutions reported on the use of a reporting tool designed for tracking progress made with the NACAP; limited data collection by MDAs and MMDAs and inadequate funding for both the MDAs, MMDAs and CHRAJ. The lack of funding undermined the capacity of CHRAJ to achieve set targets including a baseline study on the state of corruption at the beginning of the implementation of the NACAP. See CHRAJ, National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP) Progress Report (January-September 2015).

Mensah 2011; Ayee1999; 2016b; Rose-Ackerman and Carrington 2013; Egbue 2006); and

- (I) Comparative case studies (Quah 2007; Abdul-Gafaru 2009; Mungiu-Pippidi 2006).

The case studies have the following three common features:

- (i) based on cross-country analyses;
- (ii) exploit data on corruption derived from perception indices; and
- (iii) explain corruption as a function of countries' policy, institutional, socio-cultural environment.

Three things are worthy of note from this state-of-the-art on corruption. First, it shows what one might call the “value chain” of corruption, namely, definition, causes, consequences and strategies for curbing corruption. Second, corruption in Ghana is the result of a combination of factors and not necessarily limited to traditional and cultural values. They include monetization of politics leading to vote-buying, greed, avarice, patronage, weaknesses in institutional structures leading to the failure to implement and enforce policies and laws to promote transparency and accountability, low remuneration, poor management practices in public organizations, immense opportunities for corruption with minimal chances for being caught and punished, low levels of integrity, discretion of public officials and absence of good record keeping. Third, the literature shows sensitivity to the political economy of corruption, that is, the actors, their motives, interests, incentives and benefits derived from engaging in corrupt practices.

Table 5: Approaches/Interventions to Combat Corruption in Ghana

Approach(es)		Intervention(s)
1.	Constitutional	Article 35 (8) of the 1992 Constitution stipulates that "The State shall take steps to eradicate corrupt practices and abuse of power".
2.	Legal/Legislative	22 laws from 1960-2010 (see Table 2); Code of Conduct for Public Officers of Ghana (2013); Anti-Corruption Manual of the Ministry of Justice (2009); Guidelines on Conflict of Interest developed by CHRAJ.
3.	Institutional	People's Defence Committees and Workers Defence Committees (WDCs) under the PNDC government and renamed Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs), Citizens Vetting Committee established in 1982 and renamed Office of Revenue Commissioners in 1984, National Investigation Committee established in 1982, Bureau of National Investigations (BNI), Economic Crime Unit of the Police Service; Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), Auditor-General and Serious Fraud Office (SFO), all created in 1993; SFO is renamed Economic and Organized Crime Office (2010); Auditor General; Public Accounts Committee of Parliament; Financial Intelligence Centre.
4.	Administrative Reform	Public sector reforms; Civil Service Reform Programme, 1987-1993, National Institutional Renewal Programme, 1994 the Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme, 1995 to date, privatization of state enterprises, Public Sector Management Reform Programme from 1997 to date, legal sector reform, Public Financial Management Reform Programme (PUFMARP) and decentralization and local government; National Governance Programme; and Ghana Integrated Financial Management Information Systems (GIFMIS).
5.	Politically-motivated	Commissions of enquiry such as the ones established after the overthrow of the Nkrumah government in 1966 and the Anin Commission established by the Busia government in 1970; Deterrence and judicial actions which insisted on the need for death and jail sentences. The execution of the three former heads of state and some top military officers in 1979 under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the incarceration of officials and businessmen for corruption by AFRC Special Courts in 1979 and the public tribunals in 1982 under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government; Office of Accountability, which was created in 2003 by Kufuor's NPP government as an internal corrective body under the Presidency; Governance Advisor, Office of the President under Mahama; National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP)

6.	Societal	Civil society organizations such as Ghana Integrity Initiative, Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC) acting as advocacy groups against corruption; the media through investigative journalism; public education on corruption.
7.	International Community	Ratification of relevant international, regional and sub-regional conventions such as the United Nations Anti-Corruption (2003), African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2005); ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight Against Corruption (2003); ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance; African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM); development partners programmes on governance and corruption; AfDB and the OECD's Joint Initiative to Support Business Integrity and Anti-Bribery Efforts in Africa (2008); Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
8.	Survey	Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International (TI); Barometer Survey of the TI; Afrobarometer conducted by CDD-Ghana; Global Integrity investigative report on tracking corruption, openness and accountability; surveys conducted by the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition and other CSOs.

Source: Compiled by the author

4.0 Findings on Corruption from the 2015 Institute of Economic Affairs Survey

4.1 Understanding of and Awareness about Corruption

Understanding of and awareness about corruption by citizens are considered key to building integrity and preventing corruption. All parts of society share the responsibility for containing corruption because all are willing or unwilling participants. Each corrupt transaction requires a “buyer” and a “seller”.

From the IEA data, the level of understanding, knowledge and awareness about corruption in Ghana seems high, taking into account the responses to questions on actions constituting corruption, the common form of corruption, institutions to contact to report a corrupt act by a public official, process of corruption reporting and feedback received from reporting (see Tables 6.1-6.7).

Respondents were able to identify actions that constitute corruption since understanding corruption and being aware of it are important building blocks for curbing corruption. The respondents were able to rate fairly well the 14 actions which can constitute corruption, which is a crime. This shows some knowledge and awareness about corruption. The highly rated actions that constitute corruption to the respondents are: “giving cash to a security officer to cover your violations” (95.6%); “paying a judge to achieve favourable judgement” (92.8%); “using connections to exempt someone close to you from prosecution” (88.9%); “abuse of official position for private business purposes” (82%); and “using official vehicles for private purposes” (80%). On the other hand, the least actions that constitute corruption are a “public official helping a relative get accepted into the university” (66.4%) and “picking flowers or fruits from a neighbour's garden without permission” (see Table 6.1).

Table 6.1 Actions Constituting Corruption

No.	Action	Yes	No	Refus to answer	Do not know
1.	Giving cash to a security officer to cover your violations	95.6	1.9	0.6	1.9
2.	Giving a gift to a doctor to grant you special care over others	77.0	16.4	1.0	5.7
3.	A public official helping a relative get accepted into a university	66.4	26.9	1.0	5.7
4.	Picking flowers or fruits from a neighbour's garden without permission	44.7	45.3	1.1	9.0
5.	Using connections to exempt someone close to you from prosecution	88.9	6.9	.7	3.5
6.	Paying a judge to achieve favourable judgment	92.8	4.0	.7	2.5
7.	A student or parents giving gifts to teachers for favours	75.2	18.9	.9	5.1
8.	Making small unofficial payments for delivery of pensions	78.2	13.9	.9	7.0
9.	A public official recommending a relative for a position in the public sector	68.3	24.8	.9	6.0
10.	Using official vehicles for private purposes	80.0	13.1	1.1	5.8
11.	Abuse of official position for private business purposes	82.0	11.9	.9	5.2
12.	High officials receiving gifts from companies their institutions do business with	68.2	23.8	1.1	7.0
13.	Accepting or taking gifts for performing official functions	68.6	24.6	1.1	5.7
14.	Abuse of official time for private purpose	81.0	12.7	1.1	5.2

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

The most common form of corruption in Ghana is money (96.7%), while materials (cars and houses) and favours recorded insignificant figures of 1% and 0.5% respectively (see Table 6.2). This shows the monetization of not only the economy but also of politics and therefore a disturbing trend in further fueling corrupt practices. Money largely in the form of cash is considered the easiest and most convenient way of engaging in corruption because of the economy's inability to move away from cash to other forms of transactions such as the use of credit and debit cards, cheques and bank transfers. The use of cash as a

form of inducement for politicians and party supporters is considered the safest way of transaction. Accordingly, money is the major means of vote-buying by political parties as evidenced in the sacks of money either openly or secretly displayed at party primaries and to some extent, general elections. In addition, money has sometimes influenced swing voting experienced in the Greater Accra, Central and Western regions in the elections held since 1992 (Ayee 2011).

Table 6.2: Most Common Form of Corruption in Ghana

Form of Corruption	Frequency	Percent
Money	1295	96.7
Material (cars, houses, etc.)	14	1.0
Favours	7	0.5
Others(specify)	23	1.7
Total	1339	100

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

The main institution which would be contacted by the majority of respondents to report a corrupt act is the Ghana Police Service (GPS) (87.4%), followed by community leaders (27.4%), the courts (11%) and Metropolitan/Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) (8.9%) (see Table 6.3). This is largely due to the proximity of these institutions to most of the respondents. One significant point to note is that as many as 99.6% of respondents indicated that they would contact an institution to report corruption while only 0.4% responded that they will not. This response shows that the greater majority of Ghanaians believe that corruption is detrimental to society and therefore worth reporting.

Table 6.3: Institutions to Contact to Report a Corrupt Act by a Public Official

No	Public Institution	No	Yes
1.	Community Leaders	72.6	27.4
2.	District Chief Executives/ MMDCE's	91.1	8.9
3.	Police	12.6	87.4
4.	EOCO	93.1	6.9
5.	Attorney General	98.4	1.6
6.	Courts	89.0	11.0
7.	CHRAJ	94.3	5.7
8.	Office of the President	99.5	0.5
9.	National Parliament/your Member of Parliament	98.2	1.8
10.	Political party leaders	99.1	0.9
11.	Independent NGO working on anticorruption (eg Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition)	96.9	3.1
12.	Would not contact any institution	99.6	0.4

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

Having the courage to report an act of corruption (that is, whistleblowing) is one of the hallmarks for reducing or combating corruption. Accordingly, respondents were asked if during the past twelve months, either they themselves or someone from their household had reported a corrupt act of a public official. The findings show that 3.3% of respondents had reported the corrupt act of a public official while as many as 93.4% responded in the negative (see Table 6.4). Even though the figure for reporting might be considered insignificant, the fact that it was reported is in itself commendable and with more awareness creation, the figure might go up and thereby encourage more whistleblowers.

Table 6.4: Report of a Corrupt Act by Respondents or anyone in the Household of a Public Official

Report of a Corrupt Act	Frequency	Percent
Yes	49	3.3
No	1396	93.4
Refused	2	0.1
Don't know	48	3.2
Total	1495	100.0

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

The act of whistleblowing will be attractive if there are no challenges to serve as a disincentive to potential whistleblowers. In this regard, three questions were asked the respondents to determine the facilitation or otherwise of reporting corruption. Sixty-six percent (66%) of respondents (38% - “very easy”; and 28% - “somewhat easy”) gave thumb up to the process of reporting corruption while 28% (14% “somewhat hard” and 14% “hard”) disagreed (see Table 6.5).

Table 6.5: The Process of Corruption Reporting: Hard or Easy?

How easy or hard was the process of corruption reporting?	Frequency	Percent
Very easy	19	38.0
Somewhat Easy	14	28.0
Somewhat hard	7	14.0
Very hard	7	14.0
Refused	1	2.0
Don't know	2	4.0
Total	50	100.0

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

The protection of whistleblowers is very important as it is one of the ways of incentivizing whistleblowers to report cases of corruption. In Table 6.6, 68.8% of respondents (“strongly agree” – 56.3; “somewhat agree”–12.5%) felt that they were protected from potential harassment or victimization for reporting corruption while 29.1% (“somewhat disagree” – 8.3% and “strongly disagree” -20.8%) felt otherwise. Considering the relatively high number 29.1% of those who felt that they were not protected, there is the need to do more to protect whistleblowers as any doubt or evidence of being harassed or victimized would be counterproductive in the fight against corruption.

Table 6.6: Protection from Potential Harassment and Victimization after Reporting Corruption

Do you agree or disagree that as a reporter of corruption, you felt protected from potential harassment/victimization	Frequency	Percent
Strongly agree	27	56.3
Somewhat agree	6	12.5
Somewhat disagree	4	8.3
Strongly disagree	10	20.8
Refused	1	2.1
Total	48	100.0

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

Rating the level of satisfaction with the feedback received as a result of reporting corruption is relatively high (68.6) made of up of “very satisfied” (43.1%); and “somewhat satisfied” (25.5%). However, the figure for those who were dissatisfied stands at 27.5% (“somewhat dissatisfied” – 5.9%; and “very dissatisfied” – 21.6%) (see Table 6.7). Like the point made for respondents who felt unprotected from potential harassment and victimization, there is the need to work on the feedback received from reporting corruption because this can be a form of disincentive as well as create a perception that whistleblowing will not result in any action taken by the authorities who are bent on shielding people who engage in corrupt practices; so why engage in whistleblowing at all!

Table 6.7: Rating for Level of Satisfaction with Feedback as a Result of Corruption Report

How would you rate your level of satisfaction with the feedback you received as a result of your corruption report?	Frequency	Percent
Very satisfied	22	43.1
Somewhat satisfied	13	25.5
Somewhat dissatisfied	3	5.9
Very dissatisfied	11	21.6
Refused	1	2.0
Don't know	1	2.0
Total	51	100

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

Reporting the incidence of corruption is in itself a whistleblowing act. Luckily, Ghana has passed a Whistleblowers Act, Act 720 of 2006 as an important anti-corruption tool. However, its implementation has been hampered by limited knowledge about the Act, inadequate education and awareness creation, lack of clearly outlined processes and procedures for receiving complaints on whistleblowing, lack of transparency and monitoring of the regime of assets and liabilities declaration and delay in the passage of the Right to Information Bill which is currently before Parliament.¹⁴

Overall, the survey shows that Ghanaians are aware of corruption and that there is a marked and continued improvement in attitude and behaviour among Ghanaians regarding corruption.

¹⁴ “Challenges of Enforcing the Whistleblowers' Act” retrieved July 1, 2016 at <http://ghananewsagency.org>. See also Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition and British High Commission, (2010) A Guide to Whistleblowing in Ghana. Accra: GACC.

4.2 Opportunities for Corruption

Opportunities for corruption involves a breakdown of systems and processes that fails to limit the temptation to be corrupt. Table 7 presents responses on how often respondents have experienced opportunities for unethical conduct when interacting with public officials for the delivery of public service. The additional payment made was in connection with the provision of eight (8) public services which range from “getting a document or a permit”; “getting water or sanitation services”; “getting electricity connection”; “getting treatment at a local health clinic or hospital”; “avoiding a problem with the police, like passing a check point or avoiding a fine or arrest”; “avoiding a problem with the local tax officers”, to “getting a place in a public senior high school for a child and getting a place in a public tertiary institution for a child”. It is good to learn from the table that a majority of the respondents never paid additional money beyond the approved fee to enable them access the service. However, there were some respondents who paid money once or twice for electricity to be connected (4.7%); for getting treatment at a local health clinic or hospital (4.6%) and getting a document or permit (4.2%). The figures for respondents who paid additional money a “few times” and “often” for getting treatment at a local health clinic or hospital are 3.5% and 1.7% respectively which are higher than the other seven services probably because of the frequency of accessing the delivery of health by respondents – which may sometimes be either on daily, weekly or monthly basis.

Table 7: Additional Payment made beyond Approved Fee to Access Public Service

No.	In the past 6 months, how often, if ever, have you had to pay additional money beyond the approved fee, give a gift, or do a favour to government officials in order to:	Never	Once or twice	A few times	Often	No contact with this in past 6 months
1.	Get a document or a permit?	30.4	4.2	0.9	0.7	61.0
2.	Get water or sanitation services?	36.1	3.0	1.5	0.7	55.9
3.	Get electricity connection?	33.9	4.7	1.6	1.3	56.2
4.	Get treatment at a local health clinic or hospital?	45.6	4.6	3.5	1.7	43.3
5.	Avoid a problem with the police, like passing a check point or avoiding a fine or arrest?	29.8	2.8	1.8	1.3	61.2
6.	Avoid a problem with the local tax officer(s)?	34.3	1.0	0.7	0.7	60.4
7.	Get a place in a public Senior High School for a child?	34.8	2.7	1.1	0.9	57.9
8.	Get a place in a public tertiary institution for a child?	32.2	1.4	0.9	0.6	61.7

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

To reduce opportunities for corruption, some public sector reforms programmes have been undertaken in Ghana. They include civil service reforms, decentralization, constitutional review, single spine pay policy, public financial management system, control of leakage of public resources through the introduction of the Ghana Integrated Financial Management Information System (GIFMIS) and capacity building for CHRAJ, Economic and Organized Crime Office (EOCO), Public Accounts Committee of Parliament, Ghana Audit Service and Internal Audit Agency (Republic of Ghana 2015). The reforms are meant to: improve work methods and procedures to reduce delay; for computerization and e-governance; develop internal financial management systems that ensure adequate and effective controls over the use of resources; revise systems and processes and making them more transparent for staff rationalization; raise public sector wages; merit-based recruitment; provide channels for complaints; and improve service delivery (Ohemeng and Ayee 2016).

In addition to the public sector reforms, civil society has played an active role in raising the public's awareness about the dangers of corruption and their rights and responsibilities as citizens in combatting corruption even though there is more room for improvement especially when civil society itself is expected to uphold strict principles of transparency and accountability in their own operations.

4.3 Motives for and Causes of Corruption

This section deals with the motives for and the causes of corruption in Ghana. Exploring the motives behind and the causes of corruption gives us a more nuanced and better understanding of the prevalence of corruption and possibly how to curb it.

Table 8.1 contains the responses on the motives for corruption. “Avoiding punishment/sanctions” constitutes the highest motive behind corrupt practices (23.7 %). This is followed by “avoiding higher official payments” (20.8%), “to be treated (served) appropriately” (19.3%); and “the practice of obligatory (illegal) payments to supervisors” (12.2%). Taken together, these four responses seem to reinforce a number of issues about Ghanaian society. First, Ghanaian society generally does not want to apply sanctions. Where punishment and sanctions are applied at all, they are selective. Second, there is a patronage system where informal practices supplant formal structures. Personal ties more than formal rules more often than not drive public administration and political competition. The result is the creation of an environment characterized by inadequate commitment to tackle the underlying causes of corruption. Third, status and privileges are part of Ghanaian society, which most people, particularly those who are benefitting from the status quo, are not prepared to give up freely.

Table 8.1: Main Motives Behind Corrupt Practices

In your opinion, which of the following are the main motives behind corrupt practices?		Frequency	Percent
a.	There is no other way to get things done	23	1.6
b.	To avoid punishment/sanctions	343	23.7
c.	To avoid higher official payments	302	20.8
d.	To speed up the processes/procedures	100	6.9
e.	To be treated (served) appropriately	279	19.3
f.	To get preferential treatment/privileges	71	4.9
g.	To have alternative source of income	94	6.5
h.	The practice of obligatory (illegal) “payments” to supervisors	177	12.2
i.	Other	38	2.6
j.	Don’t know	19	1.3
k.	Refused to answer	3	0.2
Total		1449	100.0

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

Table 8.2 has responses on factors causing corruption. Taking the average of the three responses when respondents were asked to list the factors causing corruption in Ghana, “get rich quick” (23.9%) is the leading cause of corruption in Ghana. This is followed by “greed and selfishness” (21.9%;) and low salaries (20.4%). For the first rating, “greed and selfishness” were cited as the leading causes of corruption in Ghana by 27.9% of the respondents surveyed. This is followed by “get rich quick” (24%) and “low salaries” (23.4). In the second rating, “get rich quick” (23.2%) was the leading cause followed by “greed and selfishness” (21.1%) and “low salaries” (19.1%). The third rating still ranks “get rich quick” as the most important factor (24.6%) followed by “low salaries” (18.6%) and “greed and selfishness” (16.8%). This means that 45% of respondents believe that “get rich quick” and “greed and selfishness” which may be regarded as two sides of the same coin are the leading causes of corruption in Ghana. This is also a mark of creeping materialism in Ghanaian society.

8.2: Factors Causing Corruption in Ghana

No.	What do you think are the factors causing corruption in Ghana	First	Second	Third
1.	Low salaries	23.4	19.1	18.6
2.	Lack of ethics	5.9	12.3	8.8
3.	Get rich quick	24.0	23.2	24.6
4.	Socio-cultural demands	1.6	2.2	2.5
5.	Lack of clear rules and laws	4.1	7.5	9.3
6.	Lack of punitive and deterrent sanctions	5.2	4.9	7.2
7.	Abuse or mal-use of power in the public sector	3.6	4.4	6.4
8.	Excessive bureaucracy	1.9	4.1	4.6
9.	Greed and selfishness	27.9	21.1	16.8
10.	Other	2.4	1.2	1.2
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

Interestingly, “socio-cultural demands” (1.6%, 2.2% and 2.5%) scored an average of 2.1%, which is the least of the factors causing corruption and therefore insignificant. This is particularly interesting given that some scholars and others have largely linked corruption to socio-cultural values and demands. The level of tolerance for corruption has risen to alarming levels and it has been argued that this could stem from societal values and belief systems.

The findings here, however, do not convincingly support the point in linking corruption to traditions and customs. Traditional values and practices may therefore be seen as contributory factors to corruption but they are by no means the leading ones if compared to the figures of “get rich quick” and “greed and selfishness”.

Do traditional values influence corruption? Some traditional practices are used as a cover up for corrupt activities of certain individuals. These include the giving of gifts, which are sometimes sanctioned under traditional practices. Traditional practices in themselves do not support corruption; it is rather individuals who misinterpret some of these practices for their own selfish needs.

The “low salaries” which ranks as the third cause of corruption in Ghana equally deserves some comments. We have already pointed out that a burgeoning literature suggests that raising the salaries of government officials could reduce their propensity to solicit and accept bribes. The responses show that the implementation of the Single Spine Pay Policy (SSPP) in 2010 does not

seem to increase salaries and therefore may have accounted for the 20.4% of respondents rating “low salaries” as the third cause of corruption. This response seems incorrect as far as the evidence suggests. It has been noted that since the introduction of the SSPP, between 2010 and 2014, the base-pay increased (nominally) by 71% (GHS 1108.08 in 2010 to GHS1898.55 in 2014) (Ayee 2016c). But in real terms the base-pay increased by only 12% (using average CPI for 2010 to 2014 as basis for analysis). There were real gains between 2010 and 2012 (19%). The real gains are declining since 2012 (a decline of about 6% between 2012 and 2014) (see Tables 8.3; 8.4).¹⁵ The decline seems sharper in 2015 because of inflation and depreciation of the Ghanaian cedi.

Table 8.3: Single Spine Salaries, 2010-2014

Year	Base Pay (GHS) GHS3.4/USD	Increase (%)	CPI Average	Real Wages Index
2010	1108.08 (USD 33)	-	336.5	3.29
2011	1329.7 (USD 39)	20	365.8	3.63
2012	1569.04 (USD 46)	18	399.3	3.92
2013	1725.95 (USD 51)	10	445.9	3.87
2014	1895.55 (USD 58)	10	515.0	3.68

Source: Yaw Baah, Deputy Secretary General of the TUC, powerpoint presentation on “Role and Expectations of the Unions in the implementation of the Single Spine Salary Structure” at a forum on the SSPP in Accra, August, 2015.

Table 8.4: Single Spine Salaries, 2015

Type of Pay	GHS Annual GHS3.4/USD	GHS Monthly GHS3.4/USD	USD Monthly at GHS3.4/USD
Minimum Pay	2269.83 (USD 68)	189	55.58
Maximum Pay	47,180 (USD 1388)	3,932	1156

Source: Yaw Baah, Deputy Secretary General of the TUC, powerpoint presentation on “Role and Expectations of the Unions in the implementation of the Single Spine Salary Structure” at a forum on the SSPP in Accra, August, 2015.

The rate of inflation in 2012 was 8.1% rising to 13.5%, 17% and 17.5% in 2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively (see Table 8.5). This is the highest since August 2009, mainly due to a jump in the price of transport.¹⁶ The Ghanaian currency, the cedi also depreciated by 40% against the US dollar in 2014 making it the worst performing currency in the world 2014 (Bloomberg, 2 August

¹⁵ Yaw Baah, Deputy Secretary General of the TUC, powerpoint presentation on “Role and Expectations of the Unions in the implementation of the Single Spine Salary Structure” at a forum on the SSPP in Accra, August, 2015.

¹⁶ Inflation rate in Ghana averaged 17.15% in 1998 until 2016, reaching an all time high of 63% in 2001 and a record low of 0.40% in May of 1999. Inflation rate is reported by the Ghana Statistical Service. See “Ghana Inflation Rate, 1998-2016” Retrieved May 7, 2016 at www.tradingeconomics.com/ghana/inflation-cpi

2014).¹⁷ It however, depreciated in 2015 with 18.75% and 15% in 2015 and 2016 respectively.¹⁸ In spite of the decline in wages as a result of inflation and the depreciation of the cedi, the fact still remains that the SSPP has increased salaries of public sector workers and therefore one does not expect “low salaries” to be the third most important factor contributing to corruption.

Table 8.5: Turn Around Indicators of the Ghanaian Economy, 2012-2016

Indicator	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP)	-11.5	-10.1	-10.2	-7.0	-5.3
Primary Balance (% of GDP)	- 8.2	-5.4	-3.9	-0.2	1.3
Wage/Tax Revenue (%)	55.3	57.6	49.1	44.2	40.6
Current Account Balance (% of GDP)	-11.7	-11.9	-9.6	-8.2	-7.2
Interest Rate (91-day T-bill)	23.1	19.2	25.8	22.9	-
Inflation (%)	8.1	13.5	17.0	17.7	10.0
Real GDP Growth (%)	8.0	7.3	4.0	4.1	5.4

Source: Republic of Ghana (2015) The Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana for the 2016 Financial Year presented to Parliament on Friday, 13th September 2015. 2016* figures are estimates

Ghana has witnessed an increased wage bill (70% of revenues spent on wages and reduced to 57%) – a trend largely attributable to the implementation of the SSPP (IMF 2015; Ayee 2016c). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) noted that wages and salaries, as a percentage of GDP, have doubled since 2000 and concluded that:

... the wage bill has been a major source of expenditure pressure in Ghana. The introduction of the “Single Spine (SS)” pay structure in 2010 led to a substantial increase in employees' compensation as almost all public servants' salaries were increased for several years in a row, while delays in moving staff to the SS resulted in large arrears as well (International Monetary Fund 2015: 5).

On paper, the government seemed concerned about reforming and reducing the wage bill because of its deleterious effects on the economy. In his 2016 state of the nation address to parliament by the President, he bemoaned that:

The rate of growth of the wage bill has reached a point where it is squeezing out critical investments in the budgetary allocation of goods and services and capital

¹⁷ Quoted in Sam Mensah “By How Much has the Cedi Depreciated?”. Retrieved May 7, 2016 at www.semcapitalgh.com/downloads/research/By_how_Much_has_the_Cedi

¹⁸ “Cedi to depreciate by 15% in 2016–InvestCorp”. Retrieved May 7, 2015 at www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Cedi-to-dep

expenditures. Unless we tackle this issue decisively, we may soon reach a point where not much will be left to provide the much needed road, bridges, schools, clinics and water infrastructure we need to develop our economy. The issue is even more significant because as we struggle to settle the wage bill, thousands of public workers continue to make demands for wage increases and threaten work stoppage if we do not meet these demands. ... The meat is now down to the bones, and it is time for serious rethinking about the level of wages in relation to our national competitiveness and the related productivity issues. It is said that to whom much is given, much is expected. The people of Ghana demand better service from our public sector employees commensurate to the investment made in their remuneration.¹⁹

The link between increased salaries and reduced corruption has also been disputed by Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang (2015). According to them, the doubling of salaries of police officers in 2010 as part of the SSPP did not mitigate petty corruption on the roads. Using unique data on bribes paid from over 2,100 truck trips in West Africa and representing over 45,000 bribe opportunities, they evaluated impacts of higher police salaries on petty corruption using a difference-in-difference method that exploits the exogenous policy experiment. By following bribes paid by the same lorry trucks in different countries as well as to different civil servants in Ghana, they identified whether salaries affect the effort to seek bribes, their value and the total amount paid by truck drivers. Rather than decrease petty corruption, the salary policy significantly increased the police efforts to collect bribes, the value of bribes and the amounts given by truck drivers to policemen in total. Robustness checks show the higher bribe efforts and amounts are stable across alternative specifications (Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang 2015).

4.4 Evidence/Perception of the Extent of Corruption

There is a relatively high evidence and perception of corruption in Ghana. Corruption has also been politicized and remains an election issues since the return of constitutional rule in 1993. The Constitution Review Commission (CRC) found that “corruption is not in any way a new development in Ghana and observes that the issue of corruption is very rife in national life and has been the subject of many interventions by past and present governments” (Republic of Ghana 2011: 777). As a result, the CRC observes that “there is

¹⁹ Republic of Ghana, 2016 State of the Nation Address to Parliament by President John Mahama”, accessed June 20, 2016 at www.presidency.gov.gh

ample provision in the 1992 Constitution on the issue of corruption” (Republic of Ghana 2011: 781). For instance, Article 35(8) enjoins the State to take steps to eradicate corrupt practices; Article 37(1) directs the State to endeavour to secure and protect a social order founded on the ideals and principles of... probity and accountability; while Article 218(e) gives the power to the CHRAJ to investigate all instances of alleged or suspected corruption and the misappropriation of public monies by public officials and to take appropriate steps... resulting from such investigations.

The prevalence of corruption in almost all spheres in Ghana is demonstrated by the country's performance on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International (TI) which remains below average. Ghana has constantly scored below the average score of 50 with its highest score to date being 48 points out of 100 in 2014, which further dropped to 47 points in 2015. Notwithstanding this, it should be conceded that there has been marginal improvement in Ghana's CPI score in the last four years, that is, 45 points, 46 points, 48 points and 47 points in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively.²⁰

Table 9.1 contains the overall assessment of corruption in Ghana by respondents. As many as 72.1% of respondents rated corruption as “very high” and a further 19.5% as “high”. In contrast, only 4.1% of respondents rated corruption as “low”. This finding is consistent with the evidence and perception of corruption in the country. It also complements the findings of Afrobarometer that 64% of Ghanaians thought that corruption had increased.²¹

Table 9.1: Overall Assessment of Corruption in Ghana

What is your overall assessment of corruption in Ghana?	Frequency	Percent
Very High	1082	72.3
High	292	19.5
Low	61	4.1
Don't know	62	4.1
Total	1497	100.0

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

²⁰ “Ghana CPI rating” accessed June 30, 2016 at <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015>

²¹ Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues in more than 35 countries in Africa. Between 1,200 and 2,400 respondents were interviewed in the language of the respondent's choice between 2014 and 2015. See “Afrobarometer: Ghana Headed In Wrong Direction – 82% Of Citizens Say”, accessed July 1, 2016 at <http://sankofafm.com/6853-2/>

The 2012 Auditor General's Report shows that GH¢2 billion was lost to the state due to financial irregularities by public and statutory organizations which occurred in 2012 alone. They resulted from irregularities in cash and payroll management, tax and procurement, stores and contract irregularities and outstanding debtors, loans and recoverable charges. The state lost more than GH¢116.3 million to cash irregularities arising out of the misapplication of funds, overestimation of funds needed, outstanding imprest, payments not authenticated and cash shortages. Some of the losses have occurred as a result of poor supervision, lack of control, management's failure to review approved budgets and failure to demand receipts for payments made (Republic of Ghana 2012).

The country has also recorded a number of high profile corruption cases some of which have either been in court or under investigation by the CHRAJ. They include unaccounted huge sums of monies on the Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA); and the Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Authority (GYEEDA); Subah; the National Service Secretariat where the then head is believed to have paid GH¢98 million to non-existent beneficiaries, and dubious judgment debts which prompted the President to set up the Justice Apau Commission of Enquiry into Judgment Debts, which submitted its report in May 2015. In 2016, the President of Ghana dismissed the Commissioner for Human Rights and Administrative Justice – the anti-graft agency when she was found guilty by a five-member committee set up the Chief Justice to investigate allegations of spending USD180,000 on rent and GHC182,000 to renovate her official residence. In the last quarter of 2015, the then Minister of Transport, resigned after her ministry and the government came under criticism for spending a total of GH¢3.5 million of Ghana's oil money on the rebranding of some Metro Mass Transit buses.

The judicial corruption scandal which was exposed by Tiger Eye has led to the dismissal by the President of some justices of the High Court and the lower courts with or without benefits depending on the gravity of their offences.

In the face of the accusation of corruption in his government, the President challenged Ghanaians to mention the persons in his cabinet who were allegedly corrupt so that he can sanction them. According to him “All the time people keep expressing that 'your ministers are robbers'. Then I question them, 'which one? Tell me so I can sanction them'. Then their reply will be, 'put your ears down, are you not taking note?’”²² Even though he

²² “Mahama; Name corrupt persons in my cabinet” accessed July 1, 2016 at <http://www.ghanalive.tv/2016/05/14/mahama-name-corrupt-persons-in-my-cabinet/>

admitted that fighting corruption is an uphill task he at the same time blamed the liberalized environment for heightened perception of corruption:

One of the things about countries like Ghana is that creating the environment where people are able to speak freely about corruption, heightens the perception of corruption. So it might be that because of the environment in which corruption is discussed, people have the perception that there is an increase in the perception of corruption.²³

On the institutions involved in corruption, the Ghana Police Service (GPS) has been ranked as the most corrupt institution (28.6%), followed by judges and magistrates (18.4%), tax officials (14%); Office of the President (12.9%); and Immigration Service (12.8%) (see Table 9.2). The rating of the GPS as the most corrupt institution is not surprising as it has featured in similar surveys conducted by Afrobarometer and other think tanks. Police corruption in Ghana may be classified into three forms, namely, (i) street-level bribery and extortion; (ii) bureaucratic corruption; and (iii) criminal corruption (Chene 2010; Ayee 2016(b)). Street-level bribery and extortion, for instance, is the result of interactions with the public on a daily basis and may have created the perception of the GPS as the most corrupt public sector institution.

Table 9.2: Institutions Involved in Corruption

No.	How many of the following institutions do you think are involved in corruption?	None	Some of them	Most of them	All of them	Don't know/
1.	Office of the President	7.4	46.3	22.8	12.9	10.6
2.	Members of Parliament	4.3	49.4	25.9	11.4	9.1
3.	Government officials	3.2	47.9	31.3	11.4	6.2
4.	Assemblymen and women	10.1	53.8	19.7	8.4	7.9
5.	District Chief Executives	5.0	51.3	24.1	10.3	9.3
6.	Police	2.8	30.3	34.0	28.6	4.2
7.	Army	30.6	41.1	10.4	7.0	11.0
8.	Immigration	4.5	42.9	28.3	12.8	11.5
9.	Tax Officials (i.e. GRA CEPS, IRS, VAT)	3.5	42.7	31.2	14.0	8.7
10.	Judges and Magistrates	2.4	39.3	34.5	18.4	5.4

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

²³ “Fighting corruption in Ghana is an uphill task – Mahama” speaking on the sidelines of the London Anti-Corruption Summit held in May 2016 accessed July 2, 2016 at <http://www.xliveafrica.com>

Furthermore, as we pointed out earlier, increase in salary does not necessarily result in decline in corruption. The GPS was the first institution to have been migrated onto the SSPP in 2010, with huge salary increases and yet there is still the perception that it is still the most corrupt institution in the country. Perhaps a more fundamental point to make is the contradiction between the GPS as the most corrupt institution on one hand and the institution to which most respondents (87.4%) would contact in reporting corruption (only 12.6% dissented) on the other hand (see Table 6.3). It seems paradoxical that the mandates of the GPS affect citizens on a daily basis and yet, at the same time, the frequency of those interactions with the public as a result of the mandates creates the opportunities for corrupt practices.

The least corrupt institution is the army (7%), which by its operations does not have daily contact with the public unlike the police, and therefore the opportunities for corruption are largely minimized.

Given the proliferation and vibrancy of the media since the return to constitutional rule in 1993 which created political space, it is not surprising that 52.4% of the respondents got information on their level of assessment of corruption from the media, which together with civil society have led the fight in exposing corruption especially through investigative journalism and advocacy. This is followed by “personal experience” (20.8%) and “talk with relatives and family” (14.5%), the figures of which are intriguing given the fact that individuals have a key role to play in fighting corruption (see Table 9.3).

Table 9.3: Information Source from which Assessment of the Level of Corruption was Based

On which information source do you base your assessment of the level corruption in the country?		Frequency	Percent
1.	Personal experience (you have had to provide cash, gift or favour)	295	20.8
2.	Talk with relatives	206	14.5
3.	Talk with friends and acquaintances	133	9.4
4.	Information on corruption given by NGOs (corruption awareness)	30	2.1
5.	Information provided by the media (TV, radio, newspaper, internet, etc.)	744	52.4
6.	Other (Please specify)	13	.9
Total		1421	100.0

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

4.5 Combating Corruption

The philosophy behind efforts to combat corruption is one of eliminating the opportunities for corruption by changing incentives, closing off loopholes and eliminating misconceived rules that encourage corrupt behaviour. However, an approach that focuses solely on changing the rules and the incentives, accompanied by appropriately harsh punishment for violation of the rules, is likely to be far more effective if it is also supported by efforts to buttress the moral and ethical foundation of human behaviour. This is where the role of the individual in fighting corruption is spot on. Even though it has been acknowledged that fighting corruption should be a collaborative venture, the commitment of the individual to combat corruption is key because corruption starts from the individual.

Accordingly, respondents were given an opportunity to state what role they can play in the fight against corruption. On their reaction if they were offered a bribe such as money and gift, majority of the respondents over 77% (male 77.6%; female 77.1%) responded that they would not take a bribe while 19.3% (19.1% male; 19.4 female) said that they would take it (see Table 10.1). The majority response is not surprising as most people will not easily admit that they would take a bribe. The 19.3% of respondents who said they “would take a bribe” seems to portray a two-edged sword situation, that is, by admitting, they have displayed courage and candour while, at the same time, they may be viewed as people who either have the potential to be corrupt or are corrupt and will therefore continue to engage in it.

Table 10.1 Attitude of Respondents Towards Taking a Bribe

	Background Characteristics	I would take	I would not take it	Other	Don't know	Refused	Total	Number
Sex	Male	19.1	77.6	0.8	2.0	0.5	100.0	598
	Female	19.4	77.1	0.1	3.1	0.2	100.0	901
Age group	18-24	21.4	76.4	0.3	1.9	0.0	100.0	369
	25-59	19.4	77.0	0.4	2.7	0.4	100.0	936
	60+	14.4	80.4	0.5	4.1	0.5	100.0	194
	Total	19.3	77.3	0.4	2.7	0.3	100.0	1499

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

A majority of respondents (80.4%), who are 60 years and above said that they will not take a bribe. However, 21.4% of respondents in the age group 18-24 (constituting the youth age) and 19.4% in the age group 25-59 – a total of about 41%, are prepared to take a bribe. This picture makes fighting corruption in Ghana a bit gloomy as the future leaders are prepared to take bribes instead of saying no to it.

The response of those youth who would take bribes may be attributable to the level of deprivation and unemployment in Ghana. A World Bank report on “The Landscape of Jobs in Ghana” published in 2016 has indicated that 48% of Ghanaian youth between the ages of 15-24 are jobless.²⁴ It estimates that the youth between 15-24 will peak in the coming decade thereby raising concerns about the preparedness of the country's economy to deal with the youth bulge. Even though the country has had a National Youth Policy since 2010, it was only in early 2015 that an action plan was designed to implement it, but progress has been slow. Matters have not been helped by the rapid turnover of ministers of the Ministry of Youth and Sports. Since the NDC came to power in 2009, there have been seven ministers – making it an average of one minister per year. This has affected negatively the policy thrust and direction of the Ministry of Youth and Sports in dealing with youth empowerment.

There was a follow up question on why respondents will take a bribe. Majority of the respondents (61.9%) indicated that they will take a bribe “because they need money” while 26.2% said “because everybody takes it”. It is instructive to note that only 4.1% said that they will “refuse it” (see Table 10.2). It is instructive to once again flag money as the major reason for taking a bribe, a response similar to Table 6.2 under which money was mentioned as the most common form of corruption in Ghana. It once again reinforces the growing materialism of Ghanaian society.

Table 10.2: Reasons for Taking a Bribe

No.	Why would you take it?	Frequency	Percent
1.	Because everybody takes it	77	26.2
2.	Because I need money	182	61.9
3.	Because I need gifts	10	3.4
4.	Because I have to "share" it with my supervisor	2	.7
5.	Other (specify)	5	1.7
6.	Refused	12	4.1
7.	Don't know	6	2.0
	Total	296	100

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

²⁴ “48% of Ghanaian Youth Jobless – World Bank report”, retrieved July 2, 2016 at <http://www.pulse.com.gh>

Corruption is a transaction between a giver and receiver. Accordingly, the study wants to find out from respondents their attitude towards giving a bribe. Two thirds of the male and female respondents together (65.0%) (male – 64.5%; female 65%) stated that they will not give a bribe. This is also the same with both the youth and the aged (67.4%) and (65.5%) respectively who responded that they will not give a bribe. On the other hand, one third of the respondents - 31.1% male and 30.5% female responded that “they will give a bribe” (see Table 10.3).

Table 10.3: Attitude Towards Giving a Bribe

	Background Characteristics	I would give it	I would not give it	Other	Refused	Don't know	Total	Number
Sex	Male	31.1	64.5	0.7	0.5	3.2	100.0	598
	Female	30.5	65.0	0.3	0.4	3.7	100.0	894
Age group	18-24	30.4	67.4	0.5	0.5	1.1	100.0	368
	25-59	31.7	63.7	0.4	0.3	3.9	100.0	930
	60+	26.8	65.5	0.5	1.0	6.2	100.0	194
	Total	30.9	64.0	0.4	0.4	4.3	100.0	1492

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

The survey probed why respondents would not give a bribe. The majority response (65.8%) is that “bribery is not acceptable to them”, which brings in the moral and ethical question. This is followed by “the high risk of being punished” (12%) and “no money or means” (10.7%) (see Table 10.4). If the majority response of people not accepting bribe because it is unethical and immoral is stretched, then it will be possible to build a credible national integrity system based on individual morals and ethics through training and public education.

Table 10.4 Reasons for not Giving a Bribe

No.	Why would you not give it?	Frequency	Percent
1.	Because there is a high risk to be punished	116	12.0
2.	Because it is an acceptable for me	646	66.6
3.	Because I will try to resolve the issue through legal means	68	7.0
4.	Because i have no money/means	104	10.7
5.	Other	27	2.8
6.	Refused	2	.2
7.	Don't know	7	.7
	Total	982	100.0

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

What underlies respondents' perceptions of corruption? Is it respondents' personal experiences with individuals and institutions? Or are their views perhaps formed in response to other factors such as popular rumour, media coverage or family or friends? To explore whether the perceptions are inflated, we asked respondents about their own personal experiences of corrupt practices as they go about their daily lives. They were asked whether if they encountered a corrupt act, they would report it. A majority of respondents (66.9%) said that “they will report it” while 29.3 replied in the negative (see Table 10.5). They were also asked if they would report a close friend or relative, who had engaged in corruption. It is encouraging to note that a majority of the respondents (59.9%) responded that they will report either a close friend or relative who had engaged in corruption.

Table 10.5: Report a Corrupt Encounter

If you encounter a corrupt act will you report?	Frequency	Percent
Yes	1000	66.9
No	438	29.3
Refused	6	0.4
Don't Know	50	3.3
Total	1494	100

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

However, 35.3% of respondents replied that they will not report a close friend or relative (see Table 10.6). This is disturbing particularly when viewed against the relatively high percentage of respondents who would like to shield their friends and relatives who had engaged in corrupt activities. This is also an indication of protection of friends and relatives as a result of the extended family system and the fact that some Ghanaians do not want to do the right thing and thereby perpetuate the culture of doing things which are acceptable to society but unfortunately not necessarily the right things to be done.

Table 10.6: Report a Close Friend or Relative who had Engaged in Corruption

If your close friend or relative engages in corruption, will you report?	Frequency	Percent
Yes	896	59.9
No	528	35.3
Refused	14	.9
Don't know	57	3.8
Total	1495	100.0

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

The majority of respondents (73.0%) were aware of the institution(s) to report a corrupt act to while 25.6% did not know (Table 10.7). The majority response might be due to the existence of a multiplicity of institutions established to fight corruption. They include the CHRAJ, EOCO, Parliament, Judiciary, Auditor General and Ghana Police Service. The live telecasts of the sittings of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) seems to have boosted public awareness about some institutions which fight corruption in addition to the public education campaigns conducted by the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) and the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ). The remaining 25.6% who were unable to contact institutions to report a corrupt act shows that more work needs to be done to create the public awareness and education because “the fight against corruption will bear little fruit without raising the awareness of public officials and the general public to the dangers of corruption and the duty of every citizen to combat corruption” (Republic of Ghana 2014: 40). In this connection, the CHRAJ in collaboration with the NCCE are expected to develop a comprehensive strategy for educating the general public about the negative effects of corruption by working in concert with other stakeholders (civil society, media, Ministries/Departments/Agencies and Metropolitan/Municipal/District Assemblies).

Table 10.7: Institution(s) to Contact to Report a Corrupt Act

Do you know any institution(s) to contact in order to report a corrupt act by a public official?	Frequency	Percent
Yes	1059	73.0
No	371	25.6
Refused	20	1.4
Total	1950	100.0

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

To combat corruption, respondents were asked to indicate how they will personally reduce corruption. A majority of respondents (64.3%) indicated “abstention from paying bribes for public services” is the most important step. This is followed by “report corrupt officials' behaviour to authorities” (27.3%), “report corruption in the press” (21.7%), “participate in awareness campaigns against corruption” (15.1%), and “refuse to make favours to officials or to their relatives related with my job” (13.2%) (see Table 10.8). The majority response once again falls within the domain of morals and ethics. Abstention from paying bribes is good; however, the heart of the matter is that one wonders if it can really be practiced in a tempting environment or context such as Ghana where there are numerous opportunities for engaging in corrupt practices.

Table 10.8: Personally Reducing Corruption in Ghana

No.	In your opinion, what can you personally do to reduce corruption in Ghana?	No	Yes
1.	Abstain from paying bribes for public services	35.7	64.3
2.	Report corruption in the press	78.3	21.7
3.	Refuse to make favours to officials or to their relatives related with my job	86.8	13.2
4.	Report corrupt behaviour of public officials to NGO anticorruption centre	92.7	7.3
5.	Report corrupt officials behaviour to complete authorities	72.7	27.3
6.	File lawsuit against the corrupt official	92.7	7.3
7.	Participate in awareness campaigns against corruption	84.9	15.1
8.	Participate and supporting an anticorruption educational campaign	87.1	12.9
9.	There is nothing I can do	93.9	6.1

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

To what extent can corruption be reduced in Ghana? This is the question put to the respondents to gauge either their optimism or pessimism about corruption. The majority response is that “corruption can be reduced to a limited degree” (44.9%), while 24.7% responded that “corruption cannot be reduced at all”, followed by “corruption can be substantially reduced” (19.9%). However, a paltry 4.8% responded that “corruption can be completely eradicated” (see Table 10.9).

The majority view reflects some pessimism about reducing corruption largely because of the pervasive and systemic nature of corruption in Ghana. There is therefore a feeling of fatalism on combating and reducing corruption. Perhaps this fatalism may be mitigated by the NACAP's three-prong approach to the fight against corruption, namely, (i) prevention; (ii) education; and (iii) investigation and enforcement. The approach should be backed by sustained commitment to, and ownership of, the NACAP by each Ghanaian and all other stakeholders in Ghana's development process (Republic of Ghana 2014).

Table 10.9: The Extent of Reducing Corruption in Ghana

No.	To what extent do you think corruption can be reduced in Ghana?	Frequency	Percent
1.	Corruption cannot be reduced at all	363	24.7
2.	Corruption can be reduced to a limited degree	660	44.9
3.	Corruption can be substantially reduced	292	19.9
4.	Corruption can be completely eradicated	70	4.8
5.	Refused	3	0.2
6.	Don't know	81	5.5
7.	Total	1469	100.0

Source: 2015 Corruption Survey by the Institute of Economic Affairs.

5.0 Conclusion: Policy Recommendations

Is the Ghanaian concept and perception of corruption different from certain internationally accepted notions of corruption”? How widespread are such concepts and how do they perpetuate the abuse of public office for personal gain?

In addressing these questions, the paper captures the data on views of respondents on the understanding, knowledge of and awareness about corruption, opportunities, causes, level or extent of corruption and combating corruption. There is some evidence to show that traditional and cultural values and practices may not necessarily be the major cause of corruption in Ghana. This seems to have contradicted the view that societal expectations of largesse and patronage from those in public office combined with a culture of impunity are deeply rooted in Ghanaian society and political culture and therefore one of the causes of corruption (Republic of Ghana 2014). The paper has rather found that there is a plethora of factors that have contributed to the prevalence and upsurge of corruption. They include monetization of politics leading to vote-buying, greed, avarice, weaknesses in institutional structures leading to the failure to implement and enforce policies and laws to promote transparency and accountability, low remuneration, poor management practices in public organizations, immense opportunities for corruption with minimal chances for being caught and punished, low levels of integrity, discretion of public officials and absence of good record keeping.

The findings show that most Ghanaians are reasonably willing to report incidents of corruption whenever they encounter them. There is no doubt that increased awareness and change in attitude is stoking up levels of intolerance to corruption and steadily converting into readiness and empowerment to act against corruption. Thus, the efforts by the media, civil society, CHRAJ and NCCE and other stakeholders need to be sustained, and, where necessary, escalated in order to reach the desired levels sooner.

This progress notwithstanding, there are still lingering challenges of ignorance, lack of proper facilitation, fear of victimization and fear of the authorities. Seeking services from law enforcement agencies is low. In particular, there is general apathy as a result of the perceived ineffectiveness of these institutions. People cite none response to complaints, poor services, time consuming and deliberate misinformation of clients as to why they do not take their tribulations to the agencies.

5.1 Policy Recommendations

From the above observations, the following policy recommendations can be made:

i. Information is Power: It has been pointed out that information dissemination to citizens enables them to monitor public service delivery and expenditure which influences the attitudes and behaviour of public officials. Even though there is a public officer's asset declaration regime, it does not work because the procedure is confidential as the declaration is concealed in an envelope and submitted to the Auditor General, who is legally debarred from opening it. This raises questions over monitoring and publication. The lack of information on both assets declaration has undermined efforts to promote transparency and accountability and thereby created opportunities for rent-seeking activities by public officials as well as contributing to the ineffectiveness of the public service.

ii. Bipartisan Approach to Fight Corruption: The challenges of insulating national issues from partisan considerations is a big challenge in Ghana. Extreme politicization and partisanship have been the bane of Ghanaian politics since the return to constitutional rule in 1993. In the words of former President, Mr J.A. Kufuor:

... Every action of government is put under constant scrutiny for questioning while a spin is put on almost every policy decision. This attitude tends to ignore the need for gestation periods for programmes, and thereby promotes a negative culture of instant gratification and unrealistic expectations, which is often exploited for undue political gain. If politicians across the board continue to criticize programmes and policies of incumbent governments just to score political points, they may in the long run breed cynicism, undermine the whole political system and weaken democracy to everybody's disadvantage.²⁵

Similarly, the Coordinated Programme of Economic and Social Development Policies, 2010-2016, which former President Mills submitted to Parliament in December 2010 also pointed out that:

Ghana appears to be polarized and every issue of national importance is viewed from the partisan political perspectives of individuals and groups rather than the

²⁵ Kufuor, J.A. 2009. State of the Nation Address to Parliament at Parliament House, Accra on January 5, 2009: 2.

collective national interest. The impact of this polarization of issues is the diversion of attention from pertinent social and economic issues. The challenge is to make the national interest the accepted objective of all groups and sections of society by forging a common understanding and a united front to address pressing national development issues and challenges²⁶.

Fighting corruption has been politicized in the country and has as well become an election issue since the return to constitutional rule in 1993. In the words of the current President: “It is easy to say that there is more corruption in this system than that regime; but where will contrast of regimes take us? It won't take us anywhere. The essential thing is to put in the systems that avoid corruption from taking place and then have the political will to expose it, explore it, and sanction it.”²⁷ Combating corruption entails the adoption of a bipartisan approach to confront the scourge. The executive and parliament should take the lead in this matter.

iii. Develop a Culture and Ethos of Integrity, Transparency and Accountability:

There should be the development and cultivation of a culture and ethos of integrity, transparency and accountability. This entails a re-engineering of some negative traditional values and norms. Certain traditional values and norms (such as deference to authority) impede the expression of citizens' voice and the exercise of citizens' rights. The traditional system is strongly ingrained with respect for authority, leadership, and elders. Ordinary citizens (and especially women, the youth, and poor people) are not accustomed to requesting information or questioning authority. The cultivation of this culture should be done through a coordinated public education programme.

iv. Training and Education on Ethics and Ethical Behaviour, in the wider context of good governance, now needs to be a compulsory part of the learning curricula in all schools and centers of learning and training, from primary through to university, teacher colleges, and vocational and other training institutes. Unethical practices have become a

²⁶ Republic of Ghana 2010a. *The Coordinated Programme of Economic and Social Development Policies, 2010-2016: An Agenda for Shared Growth and Accelerated Development for a Better Ghana*. Presented by HE Professor JEA Mills, President of the Republic of Ghana to the Fifth Parliament of the Fourth Republic, December 2010: xiv.

²⁷ Fight against corruption. It's partnership of the willing but I've never taken bribe — Mahama <http://www.graphiconlinenews.com/news/general-news/fight-against-corruption-it-s-partnership-of-the-willing-but-i-ve-never-taken-bribe-mahama.html>

way of life in Ghana and are tolerated by the communities. Consequently, influencing the hearts and minds of the young will probably do much more to change the socialization process that promotes corruption and unethical behavior, than all other measures combined. **Therefore, the fight against unethical behaviour and practices through sensitization of the young must be given priority.**

v. Improvement in the overall Governance Situation in Ghana: Bipartisanship and the development of a culture of integrity, transparency and accountability are also intended to contribute to an improvement in the overall governance situation in Ghana. An environment where, for example, ethical standards for public officials are enforced; where there is efficient public sector delivery; where there is public service transparency and accountability; where there is non-wasteful public resource management; where the media plays an effective role in demanding clean government and highlights cases of corruption with objectivity and evidence; where there is a robust civil society creating social revulsion and resistance to corruption and where these are regarded as a collective action problem.

vi. Fighting Corruption must be seen from a Long-term Perspective: This is because “fundamental change demands sustained effort, commitment and leadership over many generations. Mistakes and setbacks are a normal and inevitable part of the process. The big challenge is to seize upon mistakes as learning opportunities, rather than use them as excuses for squashing reform” in this case, combating corruption (Schacter 2000: 10).

vii. Transformational Leadership: What is required is leadership for change, or in other words, transformational leadership. Such leaders must also be regarded as champions of ideas—good ideas in this case for reducing the wage bill and the multiple pay regimes—who lead and maintain commitment to change ideas and transform toward a better governance environment, influencing others into accepting the changes, implementing the NACAP, building the capacity of institutions involved in combating corruption and coordinating with disparate actors to overcome resistance to change and transformation as far as corruption is concerned. These leadership actions are intended to ultimately enhance the acceptance and institutionalization of transformational change in anti-corruption for the better.

viii. Use of Some Traditional and Cultural Values to Fight Corruption: Policy makers can use the cultural aspects of corruption as a guide for adopting a strategic perspective to fight corruption, when implementing anticorruption policy reforms.

Hence, policy reforms advocated for tackling corruption must consider the cultural connection to corruption in their design even though we have argued that traditional values are used as a mask to cover the major causes of corruption. The media, education system, politicians, traditional leaders as well as civil society organizations therefore need to contribute their quota to the use of some traditional values and practices that are germane to fighting against corruption.

ix. Use of Smart Technology or E-Governance: Poor recording keeping and inadequate information create avenues or opportunities for corruption. Accordingly, there is the need to use smart technology or e-governance to reduce corruption. It has been noted that frequent, direct contact between government officials and citizens can open the way for illicit transactions. One way to address this problem is to use readily available technologies to encourage more of an arms-length relation between officials, citizens and civil society. In this connection, the Internet has proved to be an effective tool to reduce corruption (Andersen et. al. 2011). In some countries, the use of online platforms to facilitate the government's interactions with citizens, civil society and the business community has been successful in the areas of tax collection, public procurement and red tape. The purchasing activities of the state is regarded as one of the most fertile sources of corruption in the world. The fact that the award of contracts involves a measure of discretion, has made countries implement procedures that guarantee adequate levels of openness, competition, a level playing field for suppliers and fairly clear bidding procedures. The development and implementation of e-government is one of the most relevant and important evolutions for public administration. In recent years, governments in many countries have made efforts to increase their openness and transparency. E-governance is used, being considered an efficient and effective means to improve public transparency and reduce corruption (Mistry 2012).

x. Additional Pressure from Civil Society and Development Partners: Until the Right to Information Bill is passed by Parliament and assented to by the President, the public, civil society and media would remain frustrated in getting the necessary information on public service delivery, assets declaration of public officials and other transactions which generally lead to corruption. It is poignant to note that Parliament at its last meeting before it adjourned *sine die* in November 2016 failed to pass the Right to Information Bill because of multiplicity of amendments which cannot be harmonized. Accordingly, development partners (DPs) and civil society have an important role to play in putting pressure on the government of Ghana (GoG) to ensure that corruption is minimized and contained. In addition, the advocacy of civil society is important in goading Parliament to

expedite action on the passage of the Right to Information Bill in the next session of Parliament in 2017.

xi. Implement recommendations of the Auditor General and the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament on sanctioning public officials who have been found to have engaged in corrupt practices. The Auditor General and the PAC have over the years lamented the pervasive nature of corruption in the public service. The Auditor General, for instance, has repeatedly expressed frustration in his annual report at the inability of the executive to punish officials who were found to be corrupt. In a speech read in October 2015 at the 6th Annual Audit Service Accountability Lectures, the Auditor General charged the judiciary to ensure that public officers who engage in corruption and waste state resources should be punished without fear or favour. This will end the impunity with which government officials plunder state resources usually seen in the Auditor General's reports (Auditor General 2015).

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