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THREE MONTHS OF U. D. I.

by

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R H O D E S I A

I.

It may seem almost incredible that U.D.I. is only three months old, because in those three months so much has happened that some, at least, of the changes already seem permanent. If I use the word 'permanent', it is for lack of a better word, for in the African context, permanency has come to mean perhaps one year. Few would attempt to forecast the probable situation in any African country for a longer period ahead. The last three months have, throughout Africa, been indeed a period of fantastic change, even compared with the course of the previous eight years since Ghana became the first independent Negro state to be established for a century. In Nigeria, what appeared to be the most securely-established Negro government - that of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa - was not merely overthrown, but overthrown on the morrow of the first meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers to be held in Africa, and the overthrow was a particularly bloody affair, with over 500 ministers, officials and Members of Parliament of the Central and Regional governments being brutally murdered. In Ghana itself, the last ten days have seen the overthrow of Dr. Nkrumah, whose position as the Elder Statesman of Negro Africa, with a one-party system of government, a highly organised palace guard, special police, and so on, all supposedly fanatically devoted to the Osagyefo, the Redeemer, had seemed almost impregnable. His own confidence was such that while he himself, with his Foreign Minister, was on a state visit to Peking, he had sent his Chief of Staff to represent Ghana at a meeting of the Organisation for African Unity at Addis Ababa. But he too has proved not to be immune to an army coup which, surprisingly, appears to far to have been bloodless. Still within the group of former British Colonies, the Prime Minister of Uganda, Milton Obote, has suspended the Constitution and, in effect, made himself dictator in order to prevent his own overthrow by a group of dissident ministers. In Kenya, Mr. Kenyatta has had to prosecute some of his own ministers for corruption, in an attempt to take the heat off the Government. Moving to the former French colonies, governments have been overthrown in Dahomey, Upper Volta and the Central African Republic; the civil war between the Negroes and Arabs in the Southern Sudan continues, and there have been the first circumstantial series of reports from Egypt of growing weakness in the position of Colonel Nasser. There are a number of other candidates for ejection at any time in the near or distant future: in Libya, in Congo-Brazzaville, in Tanzania, in Ethiopia, and last but not least, in Zambia. It may not be generally known that a Mr. Taylor of Salisbury (observing the resignation of Mr. Mayhew and the First Sea Lord) telegraphed to the Admiralty in February suggesting that Mr. Wilson's absence in Moscow afforded a very convenient opportunity for a naval coup in London.

I have stressed these coups because I am inclined to think that they may, in the end, prove to have been the most

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important development during these months affecting the position in Rhodesia. Their effect has been, perhaps finally and completely, to discredit the last pretence of the newly-independent African countries to be upholders of democracy, of the parliamentary system of government, and of human rights. A second effect seems to me to have been to increase the seriousness of the threat to the United Nations, resulting from the fact that these countries now constitute a larger proportion of the membership than the United States, the White Commonwealth, Western Europe, Japan, India and Pakistan, Brazil and Mexico. This means that at the United Nations there is a steadily increasing unreality between voting power and the reality of world power, which, sooner or later, is bound to produce a flat refusal, by those countries possessing genuine power, to accept decisions taken against their wishes by states whose instability is for the most part only equalled by the paucity of their economic resources, and the insignificant population of many of them. While there is no reason to expect that the pressure of the African states for military sanctions against Rhodesia will not steadily increase at New York, the attention which must be paid to these demands by other countries may possibly not be as serious as it might have been in the circumstances of two years or even a year ago.

The possibility must, however, be qualified by the likelihood that the foreign policy of the United States will, in what I may perhaps call the semi-permanent future, tend to be increasingly influenced by the importance, from the point of view of the internal policy of the U.S. Administration, of avoiding action which might give the Negro states the opportunity of fomenting, by denunciation of U.S. policy at U.N., riots in the Negro sections of the major United States cities. It must also be qualified by the prospect that the General Election in Britain at the end of this month may see the Labour Government returned with a sufficient majority to enable Mr. Wilson to avoid proposing, but nonetheless to accept, proposals at the United Nations for action against Rhodesia, which would have been likely to have led to his defeat in Parliament, so long as he possessed only a majority of three. Both these qualifications, the growing preoccupation of the U.S. Administration with Harlem, and the British General Election, would however have been operative in any event. The loss of moral influence by the African states is a factor which can only operate to the advantage of Rhodesia, and it will be noticed from quotations which I will make later that it has indeed already been emphasised by critics of Mr. Wilson's policy.

II.

The second major development of the past three months has, I think, been the increasing precision which Mr. Wilson has given to his policy towards Rhodesia. On the 16th December he demanded at the U.N. the backing of the organisation for the measures already taken by his government. His request was met by the comment of an African representative that "we have been waiting for something more than words since the 11th November", and the representatives of 24 African states left the Assembly when Mr. Wilson walked to the rostrum. On the 12th January, at Lagos, Mr. Wilson "after re-asserting the British refusal to use force in Rhodesia", repeated the British Government's view that this did not "mean that troops might not be sent to Rhodesia to maintain law and order once a provisional government had been set up."

On the 25th January, in Parliament, Mr. Wilson set out his programme in much greater detail: "There must" he said, "be a multi-racial government once Mr. Smith had abandoned his seizure of independence." Such a government would be formed at once - "perhaps within minutes" - and would be representative of Rhodesian opinion of all races. It would be responsible to him as Prime Minister, but directly to the Governor. The first responsibility of the new government would be the maintenance of law and order "with guarantees to prevent a repetition of the rebellion and for the protection of human rights. British troops might have to move in for this purpose -- "he had" he said, "never thought of direct rule by officials from Westminster, but there would have to be immediate unqualified return to constitutional rule by helping the advance, education and training of Africans." Political prisoners would be released at once, there would be a referendum on the amendments necessary to the 1961 Constitution, including guarantees of the rights of both the black majority and white minority. The preliminary negotiations for bringing the rebellion to an end could not be with representatives of the Rhodesian Front only, nor could the existing Parliament "which had been elected but was not representative" continue, as it was a "fascist body." Subsequently, guarantees of human rights would be either by the British Parliament or in some other way. Amendments to the 1961 Constitution would be made on five principles: (1) a guarantee of unimpeded progress to majority rule, (2) no retrogressive amendments of the 1961 Constitution to be allowed, (3) an immediate improvement of the political situation of Africans, (4) progress to the elimination of racial discrimination, and (5) the basis of subsequent independence must be acceptable to the Rhodesian population as a whole. The effect of this statement was to make it quite clear that there could be no reversion to the status quo ante-U.D.I., and that White Rhodesia must accept rapid progress towards majority rule by Africans even though this might not occur at once. The New York Herald Tribune commented accurately that "Mr. Wilson has moved from a relatively moderate position to a radical one, which leaves Mr. Smith with no choice but to surrender unconditionally or to fight it out."

/Mr. Wilson ...

Mr. Wilson has also tightened up the operation of economic and financial sanctions by Britain and has exerted the maximum pressure on other members of the United Nations to support Britain by imposing similar prohibitions on imports to and exports from Rhodesia. So far as imports are concerned, the prohibition on the purchase of Rhodesian exports, except those already in transit, was made complete and on 30th January, all exports to Rhodesia (already 95% restricted) were also prohibited, except those for the Railways and Power Stations operated jointly for Rhodesia and Zambia, or required for humanitarian purposes. A new Board was appointed to the Bank of Rhodesia, in order to assert a claim to control the reserves of that Bank, i.e. the sterling and foreign reserves of Rhodesia. No payments were to be made for services, no loans granted, no pensions or salaries paid. Within four days the U.S. also imposed a total prohibition of exports to Rhodesia (R14 m.), and imports from Rhodesia (R7 m.), specifically adding chrome to asbestos and lithium, the import of which had already been prohibited. West Germany imposed a ban on armament shipments, and on imports from Rhodesia, and France and Italy indicated that they would comply with the request of the U.N. to support the British action. Japan ended the import of Rhodesian pig iron, and Canada and New Zealand followed the United States with almost complete prohibitions, as did many other countries. On 6th February it was reported that a confidential British survey had concluded that Rhodesia had lost 90% of her markets for tobacco, 70% of those for asbestos, 60% of those for iron and steel, 57% of those for sugar and 40% of those for chrome. In all, £59 m., or 58% of Rhodesia's normal exports had been cut off unless they could find alternative markets. Zambia, the most important market for Rhodesia, other than the U.K., had cut off £10 m. of imports, and in all 50 countries were co-operating in sanctions. It has recently been reported that the U.K. has called upon Zambia to cut off the remaining £25 m. of her imports from Rhodesia within ten days.

Mr. Bottomley, the Commonwealth Secretary, has specifically claimed that the oil sanction has been more effective than anyone had imagined it could be. The aircraft carrier 'Eagle' was kept cruising off Beira, not, as first reported, to turn back tankers coming to Rhodesia, although this story has been revived yesterday, but as an indication to Portugal of the seriousness with which Britain would regard any flagrant breach of the oil embargo. The Moslem oil-exporting countries of the Persian Gulf, whence oil was normally obtained by Rhodesia, have been traditionally critical of South Africa because of her racial policies, and what they believed to be her support of Israel, and they have backed the British and American oil companies in preventing export of oil to Rhodesia, whose policies they equate with those of South Africa. The supplies in stock at Beira were exhausted in a few weeks, the pipeline was closed 'for overhaul', and rationing, of World War II severity, was imposed in Rhodesia.

British newspapers have generally stressed the serious effect which sanctions were having in Rhodesia. And although Mr.

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Wilson had (at the Lagos meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers) felt it necessary to explain that his original forecast, made in the embullience of the moment, that sanctions would be effective in a matter of weeks, rather than months, should be regarded as setting not a time-limit but a time-table, there is no doubt that early in February British ministers were optimistic about their effect. Perhaps the 10th February may be seen in retrospect to be the summit of achievement so far as economic and financial sanctions were concerned.

Even by this date there had, however, been warning notes from those British Members of Parliament who had visited Rhodesia during the parliamentary recess to see for themselves. Mr. R.T. Paget, a Labour Member, had as early as 10th January, gone so far as to say publicly that the idea that Rhodesia would capitulate by March "was unmitigated nonsense." Mr. Rowland, Mr. Ennals and Dr. Bray, three other Labour Members, had gone as a group. Mr. Rowland said that he believed that while Mr. Smith might be induced to negotiate for recognition of the independence of Rhodesia, he was not yet prepared to offer anything substantial in return. Mr. Julian Amery, a former Conservative Minister, stated in Parliament, on his return, that it was quite unrealistic to believe that the Prime Minister would find any responsible people in Rhodesia who would be prepared to negotiate with him on the principles and terms he had set out. Mr. O. Bessell, a Liberal M.P., said that "talks would have to be with Mr. Smith. This man is firmly in the saddle and if you are going to negotiate, you will have to do it with him."

In Parliament the Conservatives have taken an increasingly critical attitude towards Mr. Wilson's policy. Mr. Heath has said that the longer Mr. Wilson waits to negotiate, the more difficult his position will become, and that in his view Mr. Wilson should be prepared to talk to anyone in Rhodesia, to pledge an immediate reversion to constitutional government (which, however, he did not define), and to promise educational and economic aid at once. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd emphasised, on his return from Rhodesia, that there must be talks, and has explained that they must not be by Mr. Wilson himself. Mr. Sandys, the former Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, has said that Mr. Wilson was "gleefully promising a kind of holy war." The African countries which were pushing Britain on included "some which have virtually abolished freedom in their own countries and have carried the principle of one man, one vote to the point literally where one man exercises all authority. It was not for them to dictate that they are doing us a favour by being in the Commonwealth. They have much more to gain from it than we have. We should not allow their threats of resignation to influence us. White Rhodesians are unlikely to hoist the white flag until the whole economy is in ruins and law and order have collapsed." The Conservatives have submitted a motion signed by their leaders calling on the Government to recognise that refusal to negotiate with Mr. Smith has already proved abortive. Mr. Wilson thereupon said that a bi-partisan policy on Rhodesia no longer existed in Britain. It will be seen that so far there

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has not been criticism in Parliament, or by Members of Parliament, of the policy of opposing U.D.I. or of imposing sanctions, only of the undiplomatic announcement by Mr. Wilson that he would never negotiate with Mr. Smith.

It is not yet clear what part the Rhodesian question will play in the forthcoming general election in Britain, but it is likely that, provided the Conservatives are able to preserve a facade of unity, there will be a good deal of constituency criticism of the Government's policy in Rhodesia by their Parliamentary candidates.

Among the press, the Daily Mail and Daily Express have already come out flatly for negotiations with Mr. Smith. The Daily Telegraph has pointed to the widening gap between Conservatives and Labour. The Spectator and Punch have published articles emphasising the solidarity of Mr. Smith's support and the uselessness of continuing sanctions, in the hope of destroying him, but not specifically endorsing the views expressed in these articles. The Times has remained true to its earlier statement that it would "be fruitless to negotiate." The Guardian has criticised Mr. Wilson's proposals for erring on the side of generosity and the Sun has been solidly behind the British Government. On the whole, therefore, it is probably true that the British public have not been convinced that sanctions may not succeed and that, electionwise, Mr. Wilson, by showing a dynamism in obvious contrast with the reluctance of the previous Conservative Government to take drastic action of any sort, has probably gained rather than lost by his Rhodesia policy. From this point of view his timing of the election has been excellent, for in the past three weeks there have been increasing indications that all is not going well with it, and that he might even, in another two months, have found it more difficult to answer his critics. If he is returned to power, it would be possible for him to offer, magnanimously, to send one of his ministers to talk to Mr. Smith. The Russians have taught all politicians in the past twenty years to become indifferent to name-calling, and there is no reason to believe that Mr. Wilson or Mr. Smith are more thin-skinned than most.

III.

We now come to the question of how, so far, has Rhodesia, in fact, succeeded in resisting sanctions, and what effect has resistance had upon the people?

I have already mentioned the success obtained by the United Kingdom in cutting off the supply of oil to Beira, and the consequent necessity of severe rationing in Rhodesia. Beira is, however, only one route into Rhodesia. The routes from the north, through Zambia, are of course controlled by the latter, which has itself had to ask other countries to improvise air-lifts for the supply of oil to it (that supply having, before sanctions, come from Beira via Rhodesia itself). From the south-west is the railway from the Cape via the Bechuanaland Protectorate: in normal times little oil has come by this route and British control of the Bechuanaland Protectorate has meant that no attempt has been made to step up this supply, since to do so would only have meant its interruption. A trickle of special oil products has therefore continued to arrive by rail via the Bechuanaland Protectorate. To the south-east a line of railway links Rhodesia with Lourenço Marques. This is not, as the railway from Beira was, paralleled by a pipeline, but it appears to have been increasingly used for transport of oil in barrels, or by rail tankers; at the present time, if a total of 85,000 gallons is, as reported, arriving daily in Rhodesia, about 40-45,000 of this by road tanker, then the bulk of the remaining 40,000 gallons is probably arriving over the Lourenço Marques railway and the remainder possibly by rail or road from Beira. It has been reported that storage facilities are being increased at Lourenço Marques and that the new tanks will be ready in July. Sir Edgar Whitehead, in an article in the Spectator, on 27th January, wrote that "there seems to be a conspiracy of silence over the fact that there is a large oil refinery at Lourenço Marques, and that there is obviously nothing to prevent refined oil products being continuously railed to Rhodesia." During the last weekend there was a spate of reports about the arrival of Liberian or Panamanian tankers at Beira, with bulk oil from Venezuela for Rhodesia, which would permit of the pipeline being reopened, but it remains to be seen whether they are better-founded than the earlier reports of supplies being brought from Venezuela by one of Mr. Onassis' fleet of tankers. Sir Edgar Whitehead - and he was Prime Minister of Rhodesia for a considerable period - has said flatly that, although he was personally opposed to U.D.I., "sanctions never at any time had any chance of success," and has added why: "Mozambique could not survive a black government in Rhodesia."

Much more publicity has, however, been given to the supply of oil from South Africa to railhead at Messina, or to depots in other towns of the Northern Transvaal for delivery by road tanker across Beit Bridge. This started with gifts of petrol by individuals in South Africa, after Dr. Verwoerd's statement that such gifts could be made, when gift stamps were widely sold, and a variety of private groups organised the transport of petrol by road from as far off as Stellenbosch and

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Cape Town. I would call this the private supply period, and it was primarily a morale-booster at a time when one was badly needed in Rhodesia, but no more, for so far only a day's supply at rationed rate has been delivered. At the same time, however, a company to organise a regular supply was formed by a former private secretary to the Prime Minister, and recently (although the whole gift-system has been in operation for only a month) it would seem that some of the petroleum companies in South Africa, even the subsidiaries of British Companies like B.P. and Shell, have been organising bulk supply by road, controlled, according to the more sensational stories in the press, by a master-mind called the "Doctor." Whatever the system adopted, the success has been spectacular, and tankers whether grey or green, marked or unmarked, and driven by drivers receptive or unreceptive to enquiries by members of the British Embassy, have, it appears, been delivering about 45,000 gallons a day to Rhodesia, so that the country's supplies, under rationing, appear to be assured. If tankers do arrive soon at Beira, presumably supplies will increase until Rhodesia's own storage tanks, etc. are full, and rationing has to be relaxed or the supply from South Africa reduced at Rhodesia's request in order to conserve foreign currency.

Little or nothing has been reported about the method of payment for oil and all that can be said is that for the time being the supply of foreign currency appears to be adequate. Rhodesia probably secured control of £17 m. to £20 m. of her external reserves before the balance, of up to £10 m., was frozen as a result of those efforts by Britain which I have already outlined. Mr. Smith said on 17th January that it had been forgotten that there had ever been talk of devaluation of the Rhodesian £, (although such talk was common in November and early December), and on 3rd February the Rhodesian £ was linked with gold. On 27th February an all-out savings' campaign was launched, and it was said that 800,000 savings bonds had been bought in a month. A domestic loan of £5 m. was opened for subscription and said euphemistically to be to meet the needs of a new development plan. But both of these sources of revenue appear to be needed to meet internal expenditure rather than external, to compensate farmers and industry for the reduction of their external markets, and not in any direct way to increase the external funds available.

The most immediate danger of a serious drain on the external reserves would appear to be from a failure of the tobacco auctions now starting in Salisbury. The secrecy attaching to them is an indication of their vital importance for replenishing the reserves. The other danger is of Zambia prohibiting all imports from Rhodesia, but I will deal with this later. The proceeds from tourism, the most important source of external income after tobacco and asbestos (£6 m. in 1965), is unlikely to be reduced as most tourists come from South Africa.

So far as imports into Rhodesia are concerned, there are so many countries capable of supplying what Rhodesia has hitherto purchased from Britain, the U.S. and other countries applying sanctions strictly, and such competition among them that

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it is unlikely that Rhodesia will not be able to obtain her essential needs. South African newspapers have, for example, been pointing out the splendid opportunities open to South Africa to export not only to Rhodesia, but to Zambia. Britain, Rhodesia's chief source of manufactured goods in the past, is, if U.D.I. continues, likely to find it more difficult to recover the Rhodesian market, or to find substitutes for it, than Rhodesia is the British market for her exports of raw materials.

There remains the psychological war which has developed side by side with the economic and financial. Rhodesians were shocked and worried at being proclaimed to be rebels against the U.K., to which they had proved their loyalty by the services of two world wars. And the shock was made worse by the terror of the personal messages from Her Majesty the Queen. Sir Humphrey Gibbs has remained in Government House as the symbol of British authority and Sir Hugh Beadle has been in constant touch with him, a living threat that the Judges and the Courts might sooner or later pronounce against the legal validity of actions of the Rhodesian Government and Parliament since U.D.I. Mr. Wilson has, as I have mentioned, also denounced the Rhodesian Parliament as a fascist assembly. The British transmitter at Francistown was quickly put into operation to exert in Rhodesia something like the subversive effect achieved by the BBC during World War II in German-occupied Europe.

Psychological warfare, however, proves psychological counter-warfare. In reaction to the British Government's announcements and its proclamation of further sanctions, Mr. Smith stated on the 17th January that "we will never capitulate". But he appeared sweetly reasonable: so far as he was concerned he had no objection to Mr. Bottomley coming to Rhodesia. "We have no wish to stand in the way of anything that may lead to a constructive attempt to get on with negotiations which we believe should take place." If, however, Mr. Wilson was waiting to bring Rhodesia to her knees, "he will be in his grave before that day arrives." Mr. Harper, Minister of the Interior, went much further. He called on Rhodesians "to take the fight to the enemy; the name of the British Government must be made to stink the nostrils of the world. We are fighting our way out without giving away the game. We must bring the British Labour Government down." This was brave talk, but it was open to the suspicion that it might be whistling in the dark. It was backed by the imposition of censorship to counter the infinitely greater potential of mass communication enjoyed by Britain. Censorship of the press was to operate on five principles - against reports calculated to undermine the actions of the Government, or which would create alarm and despondency and lead to contravention of the law, or result in divulgence of the industrial and financial undertaking by the Government, or generally endanger the security of the State. The censorship has been opposed by the press in Rhodesia, and bitterly criticised outside and in some South African newspapers, but, if it is admitted, as it generally is, that Rhodesia is in a

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desperate fight for existence, then this censorship is no more to be criticised than the British Government's censorship during World War II, which was more complete and drastic. It has not been as necessary as at first seemed likely, to counter the broadcasts from Francistown. Against, it is said, the advice of the BBC, the medium wave chosen for broadcasting was so close to Rhodesia's own wave-length that the broadcasts were swamped by the Rhodesian ones, while the short-wave broadcasts have been easier to get directly from the BBC.

There is, I think, little doubt that Sir Humphrey Gibbs, the Queen's Representative, has steadily lost influence in Rhodesia during the past three months, while Sir Hugh Beadle paradoxically obtained credit for going to London to report to Mr. Wilson that sanctions were not weakening Mr. Smith's position. Indeed, his visit led, in turn, to that of Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Shadow Commonwealth Secretary in the Opposition Shadow Cabinet, who himself returned to plead for the opening of negotiations with Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith even scored a point or two over Mr. Bottomley's abortive plan to come out after the Lagos Conference and, on balance, has probably gained by his apparent readiness to admit anyone to Rhodesia who wants to come and see for himself.

Inevitably, as I forecast in November, the psychological war has reinforced the difficulties which sanctions have caused to many Rhodesians, and most White Rhodesians are now probably prepared to go much further than they would have approved at that time. A week ago there were reports that "a powerful group within the Smith government is actively thinking of making Rhodesia into a Republic." Mr. Smith has himself hinted that the time might come when a republican status would be forced on Rhodesia and many Rhodesians are reported to believe that Her Majesty has been a not unwilling tool of Mr. Wilson. If there could be in the near future a settlement on the basis of U.D.I., it is unlikely that Rhodesia would wish to remain a monarchy owing allegiance to the Queen, but should the struggle become more bitter, or merely go on from one weary month to another, it is possible that the terms acceptable to Rhodesians would not go beyond a republic in which the Queen's Headship of the Commonwealth was recognised but no more. I have mentioned on a previous occasion the speed with which His Blessed Majesty King George III, whom Americans distinguished to the last from his Prime Minister, Lord North, became, after the declaration of independence in 1776 "the Royal Brute of Britain." In such intangibles of loyalty there is no going back voluntarily once a certain point has been reached. The practical argument has already been put forward that it might prove easier for the Rhodesian judiciary to accept U.D.I. and the post-U.D.I. legislation if a republic were to be declared.

IV.

It remains to consider the effect of sanctions upon those countries other than Rhodesia which are most affected, or likely to be affected, directly or indirectly, by them.

1. BRITAIN So far as the U.K. is concerned, the economic and financial cost has escalated to the extent that they have definitely contributed towards a renewed uncertainty, particularly on the international exchanges, as to the future of sterling. It is difficult to correlate such few figures as have been published about losses of exports, additional payments for imports, and the cost of aid to Zambia, with what may turn out to be the effect over a longer period of the total interruption of trade with Rhodesia. But it has been estimated that over a long period the loss to the U.K. could be about £4 m. a month. The additional cost of buying tobacco from countries other than Rhodesia may be £6 m. in a full year, (although it is said that the U.K. manufacturers of cigarettes, etc. are well stocked for 1966). The loss of income on a total investment of between £40 m. and £50 m. is thought to amount to as much as £4-5 m. in a year. If Zambia stops all trade with Rhodesia, Zambia would have to dip into its existing sterling balances (£17 m.) to pay for the extra cost of imports from elsewhere, and the Zambian Government would certainly expect the U.K. to make the loss good: a further sum, varying between £1½ and £2½ m. per month is thought likely to be the possible cost to the U.K. A sum of £3½ m. is being spent on improving roads from Zambia to Tanzania and Malawi; the portion to be borne by the U.K. is not yet known, but it is bound to be substantial. Direct aid to Zambia up to the 9th February has been stated to have amounted to £2 m. but I have not been able to establish whether this sum included the cost of the U.K. share of the airlift of petroleum. From these figures it would appear that the total loss to the U.K. in 1966 might be between £50 m. and £100 m. This may seem a small sum for a country which has been lending £200 m. a year to under-developed countries, but it may be very important indeed to the U.K. at the end of this year. In 1965 the U.K. was only able to reduce its rate of cumulative deficit from about £750 m. to about £375 m. (i.e. the total deficit was increased by the latter amount), medium term borrowings from the I.M.F. and foreign banks, repayable by 1970, total about £990 m. and the remaining assets of the U.K., about £200 m., represent the once-for-all sales of dollar assets. It would, of course, be costly, over the short run, for the U.K. to mount a military operation, which even if successful, would involve the U.K. in providing the funds for the restoration of what would certainly be the shattered economy of Rhodesia, but it might, in the long run, be less costly than unsuccessful economic sanctions, and I should be surprised if some comparative estimates of costs have not been made, although I am not suggesting that they would be decisive in any future decision of U.K. policy.

/2. BRITAIN

(2) ZAMBIA is an unhappy victim of the measures taken by both the British and Rhodesian Governments. Its own aims have been politically to break the Smith Government and U.D.I., and economically to remove Zambia's dependence on Rhodesia. Because of the stranglehold of the Rhodesia Railways, six alternative routes have had to be used to bring essential supplies to Zambia and to cope with the export of copper from it: (i) the Lobito Bay (Benguela Railway); (ii) the railway from Beira to Salima in Malawi, and thence by road to Lusaka; (iii) the Route Nationale to the Congo; (iv) the route from Dar-es-Salaam by rail to Kigoma and thence across Lake Tanganyika, and by road to Abercorn; (v) the route from Dar-es-Salaam by road direct to Zambia, south of Lake Tanganyika; and (vi) the airlifts from Dar-es-Salaam and Leopoldville. The short air route from Beira to Lusaka can be disregarded, since Portugal demanded as her price for opening it, a diplomatic representative in Zambia, the closing down of the Frelimo, the rebel Moçambique headquarters, and the repatriation of several thousand refugees from Moçambique, who are now living in Zambia. The airlifts are immensely expensive, for each aircraft uses $1\frac{1}{2}$ times the amount of petrol carried, in order to complete a journey, and wear and tear on the aircraft is excessive at airfields built for much lighter loads and with improvised maintenance facilities. It has been reported that at different times three out of four aircraft operating a particular shuttle-service have been out of action for repair at the same time.

The cost of carrying coal by air, which was mooted, has not unnaturally proved almost completely prohibitive, and this plan appears to have been replaced by plans for the development of an open-cast coal mine at Nkon Dabwe, near Kariba. The latter has, in turn, run up against the difficulty that the coal is inferior to that of Wankie for smelting, and that trucks carrying the coal to railhead would have to use a route which is a mere track on which the wear and tear on the trucks would be so high as to be almost prohibitive. The amount of coal needed by Zambia is roughly 2 million tons and the necessity of imports from Rhodesia is the main reason why Zambia has only reduced its imports by approximately a third, instead of cutting them off altogether, as Britain has requested.

The wastage of transport and supplies on the other road routes which I have mentioned must also have been very heavy, if one can judge by what happened to the much shorter haulage by road involved in the disastrous Tanganyika groundnuts scheme sponsored by the last Labour Government.

Zambia's main asset during the three difficult months of sanctions has been the high price of copper, but exports of copper are liable to three threats: a fall in the price of other supplies, e.g. from Chile, where a new agreement between the U.S. companies (Braden) and the Chilean Government has been made, or in the U.S. where home supplies are being increased in every way to meet the needs of the Vietnam war, and possibly later from such new sources as Palaborwa. The revenue from copper could also be threatened by a crash plan of

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Zambianisation of the mines, which could result in a strike by the 7,000 White miners who are still essential to the working of the mines. The latter know that they have perhaps only three years further employment and are demanding guarantees of the transfer of their earnings and their pension funds outside Zambia, as well as higher wages, and have provoked a prohibition of strikes by President Kaunda, which has led in turn to the arrest of a strike leader, and to a partial go-slow by the miners. The South African press has reported that this could, if persisted in, reduce output this year by half. A probably greater risk is the possibility that any further deterioration of relations between Rhodesia and Zambia might result in the majority of the miners, who are Rhodesian or South African, deciding that, whatever the economic advantages to themselves, they would prefer to leave Zambia rather than put up with the political conditions.

President Kaunda's Government has not only to cope with this problem, but also with the increased cost of consumer goods, etc. imported from countries other than Rhodesia, with much higher transport costs, which affect directly the African voters upon whom they depend for their parliamentary support. Zambia has also obtained in the past an useful source of revenue from the remittances of Zambian workers in Rhodesia. No new Zambian workers are being allowed into Rhodesia and if relations between the two countries deteriorate further, the existing Zambians in Rhodesia may be sent back. Tom Stacey, the well known Commonwealth correspondent, wrote in the Evening Standard of the 27th January: "my latest reports from Zambia are extremely depressing. They all tell the same story - Sanctions vs. Rhodesia, coupled with the expectation fostered in London that Mr. Smith will shortly capitulate, have driven President Kaunda into a corner. In the view of one insider, who holds no brief for Salisbury, and shares my esteem for Kaunda, the indications are that Kaunda will collapse before Smith." Economically the export position for Zambia can probably only be improved in the near future if imports from Rhodesia are switched to South Africa. The pressure on President Kaunda to secure further action against Rhodesia in such circumstances is likely to steadily increase, and his may well be one of the next governments in Southern Africa to be overthrown. The consequences of disorder and of an army regime in Zambia would clearly increase the risk of escalating the whole crisis.

3. MOZAMBIQUE I have already quoted Sir Edgar Whitehead as saying that "Mocambique could not survive a black government in Rhodesia". It is only necessary to look at the landward boundaries of the colony to see that little north of Lourenço Marques could be held against determined attempts to infiltrate. Portugal, moreover, can scarcely be expected to co-operate in sanctions imposed by a Labour Government in Britain, members of which when in opposition, were bitterly critical of her administration of Mocambique, and endorsed by the U.N. in whose Assembly she has constantly been pilloried by the African states. She has not the financial resources to help Rhodesia by providing oil at her own cost, nor the military and other resources to

/defy ...

defy the U.S. and the U.K. too blatantly, but she may well assist by transporting Angolan oil to Beira and allowing Rhodesia to buy it there. If tankers do arrive with oil from other sources, she will allow it into the pipeline, and she would certainly react to the limit of diplomatic protest if any attempt were made by Britain to stop Portuguese tankers or tankers of other nationalities within Portuguese territorial waters.

4. SOUTH AFRICA It is unnecessary for me to inform this audience of the policy of the South African Government. Dr. Verwoerd has been extremely skilful in the attitude which he has adopted of non-interference in the dispute between Britain and Rhodesia. He said that South Africa was opposed to boycotts of any sort and would continue normal trade with both, and he has prevented so far the Rhodesian question from developing into an all-out attack on South Africa by the rest of Africa and a good many other countries. When it appeared to be necessary, early in February, to give some further encouragement to Rhodesia, he said that there would be no interference by the Government if individuals wished, for example, to make gifts of petrol to Rhodesia. When these escalated, and much greater supplies were reported to be crossing the border than could be accounted for by gifts, he explained that normal trade did not exclude better trade. At Durban on the 4th March he warned, however, that "South Africa could not afford to export certain products to Rhodesia. Impediments would be introduced, because it was the Government's duty to look after South Africa's interests first." I do not know what these products are - I thought at first that they might be certain armaments, but the wording is perhaps not that which would have been chosen if armaments were meant - and I had perhaps better leave it at that.

Sir de Villiers Graaff has said that "the United Party believes the situation to be so serious that we are justified in taking risks to prevent chaos across our northern border", and he suggested that Rhodesia might be accorded de facto recognition and that Dr. Verwoerd should "use his influence to see that the dialogue between the two countries (the U.K. and Rhodesia) is reopened." Dr. Verwoerd's caution has paid dividends, but Sir de Villiers may have drawn attention to the dilemma which may eventually face South Africa if it should appear that failure to give additional help to Rhodesia may result in the overthrow of Mr. Smith's Government and the establishment of an African Government in Rhodesia. Such a situation could arise if military sanctions are invoked against Rhodesia. In that event the question will have to be answered whether or not to assist Rhodesia to the extent needed to prevent military sanctions being successful, possibly by allowing volunteers to go to Rhodesia and to take with them, or be supplied somewhere, with the ironware needed. I would repeat that I believe that Dr. Verwoerd's caution has so far been abundantly justified from South Africa's point of view, but it may, at some point short of the imposition of military sanctions, become arguable whether a clear declaration of South Africa's intentions, whatever they may be, might not prevent resort to military sanctions. The actual outbreak of both World Wars I and II have been ascribed to failure on the part of the eventual participants to make their positions crystal clear. This is going very far in a review of the past three months, but the risk that

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after the British General Election at the end of this month there may be rapid developments over Rhodesia, and may not leave much time for thought.

I should, before concluding, just like to draw attention to the continuation of the refreshing commonsense which has characterised most of Dr. Banda's comments. On his way to Lagos on the 13th January, he said that "sending an army to Zambia would not solve anything. There were leaders who were shouting for the sending of troops to Rhodesia, but there was not a single African state with the economy to raise war against Rhodesia." On the following day he added: "I told the Conference that to compare Rhodesia with Kenya, British Guiana or even Malta, was wrong. The Rhodesian Government was not in the same position as those governments. Rhodesia has never been a colony in the strict sense of the word and the instruments of power, the army, the police, the Civil Service, in fact the whole administration, has never been in the hands of Britain. I also told them you also talk of using force in Rhodesia. But who are the Rhodesians? They are Englishmen, Scotsmen, and for that matter, Irishmen, too. Can you expect Britain to send an army of Englishmen, Scotsmen and Welshmen to go and kill English, Scotsmen and Welsh in Rhodesia? Is that reasonable, human or natural? As for African states sending armies to Rhodesia - we must not deceive ourselves. It takes money to recruit, equip and organise an army. What African state has the economy, or is strong enough to wage war on this basis? I know of none."

It is to be hoped that realism of this sort may extend beyond the borders of Malawi.

Johannesburg
11th March, 1966.