

Working Paper No. 188

Partisanship in a young democracy: Evidence from Ghana

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Abstract

While past studies have put forward many reasons why partisanship in young African democracies should be considered weak and meaningless, this paper casts doubt on this notion by presenting evidence of strong and stable patterns of partisanship among ordinary citizens. Based on survey data from Ghana, I exploit the variation introduced by the political turnovers of 2008 and 2016 to compare perceptions and attitudes of party supporters when their preferred party is in power and when it is not. The results indicate a pronounced partisan divide, suggesting that partisanship is meaningful and prompts motivated reasoning among citizens. On the one hand this can be seen as evidence for a stable party landscape and thus a more mature democracy, but on the other hand partisan polarization may also obstruct effective governance. Furthermore, the analysis of attitudes toward democratic principles uncovers a worrying double standard that could negatively affect the consolidation of democracy. A simple heterogeneity analysis reveals that while partisan identities seem to exist alongside ethnic identities, the latter still strongly determine the strength of party attachment in Ghana. Future research on political behaviour needs to acknowledge the presence of these partisan motives and continue to investigate the impact of partisanship on the further development of democratic institutions in African democracies.

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
1. Introduction

With the third wave of democratization, elections and multiparty politics appeared more regularly in Africa, and they now represent the new norm in most countries. Naturally, the importance of parties as key players in the political arena has grown, and nowadays African voters often eagerly display their party preferences, not only during campaign season. But how does this affiliation with political parties compare to partisanship in established democracies, where it is seen as a form of social identity (Green, Palmquist, & Schickler, 2004; Huddy & Bankert, 2017)? Given that parties in Africa tend to be both young and often lacking a distinct ideological foundation, our default assumption might be that they are not conducive to generating meaningful identities of the type we see in other contexts. Hence, until recently the literature on Africa mostly ignored partisanship, reducing it to a strategy to benefit from patronage or merely a proxy for other existing identities such as religion or ethnicity (Cho & Bratton, 2005; Bratton et al., 2011). The question remains: Do African citizens align their opinions consistently with their partisan affiliation, which would imply the existence of meaningful partisan identities? Or are any partisan attachments without substance and solely dependent on preferential treatment with resources?

In this paper, I provide evidence for the presence of stable partisan motives among Ghanaian citizens. Ghana represents an interesting case to study as it features a relatively stable electoral democracy in which the established parties still lack coherent policy platforms. Exploiting the variation from multiple political turnovers, I compare opinions of the two groups of self-proclaimed party supporters when either of their preferred party is in power to times when it is not in power, taking the opposing shifts in opinions across the different periods as an indication of the presence of partisan identities. I show that a large partisan divide exists, which runs through the analysis of a wide range of different performance assessments, trust, political and non-political perceptions, and even some attitudes toward democratic principles. The consistency of the partisan divide implies that partisan identities are meaningful and go along with motivated reasoning. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that partisan identities in Ghana are not merely one-to-one reflections of ethnicity, although ethnic identities do significantly impact partisan attachments. While some regard the establishment of partisan identities as a step toward a functional democracy, these findings can also be seen as a disconcerting sign, as the inherent partisan polarization can undermine the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms or, worse, place the social order in jeopardy.

This study makes three principal contributions to the understanding of the political behaviour of ordinary citizens in sub-Saharan Africa. First, it complements the recent contributions of works that recognize the genuine presence of partisan identities in young African democracies (Michelitch, 2015; Carlson, 2016; Aguilar, Moehler, & Conroy-Krutz, 2016; Harding & Michelitch, 2021), thus underlining the need to account for partisan motives when investigating political behaviour in Africa. Second, it suggests that the impact of partisanship on the consolidation process of democratic institutions needs to be critically assessed. And lastly, it adds to our understanding of the relationship between partisan and ethnic identities.

Before presenting more details on the design of the study in Section 3, the following section will provide an overview of the theoretical underpinnings of partisanship and how they relate to Africa. Section 4 will then reveal and discuss the paper's findings before I conclude.



2. Theory of partisanship

2.1 Partisan motivation and political behaviour

Partisanship has long been recognized as a major determinant of political perceptions, attitudes, and behaviour in many democracies. In *The American Voter* – the seminal study of political behaviour – Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes (1960) establish a model of voter behaviour that attributes to partisan loyalties a paramount and causal role in the shaping of political attitudes. In their words, party identification “raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favourable to his partisan orientation” (p. 133). In contrast, some scholars have argued that partisanship is based on retrospective evaluations of party performance, i.e. a “running tally” model (Fiorina, 1981; Gerber & Green, 1999). However, this view has very much fallen out of favour following more recent contributions that demonstrate the decisive role of partisan identities in perpetuating distinct differences in opinions among ordinary citizens (Bartels, 2002; Logan, Muwanga, Sentamu, & Bratton, 2003; Tverdova, 2011; Anduiza, Gallego, & Muñoz, 2013; Blais, Gidengil, & Kilibarda, 2015). This finding is further based on the observation that people prefer information congenial to their partisan predispositions and resist new information in contrast to them (Zaller, 1992; Taber & Lodge, 2006; Highton, 2012). Due to these partisan predispositions, such new information is seen as less credible and is adjusted accordingly, a process called motivated reasoning, which likely biases performance assessments and thus affects political behaviour. On the other hand, some scholars assign partisanship the more positive role of a simple heuristic to facilitate the processing of complex information, thereby aiding citizens to simplify their analysis (Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003).

2.2 Partisanship in Africa

As the literature on partisanship is mostly based on established democracies, the question arises how applicable its findings are to the decidedly different context of the new democracies in sub-Saharan Africa. Rather than thinking of partisanship as a type of well-established identity that individuals use to form groups and process information, much of the conventional wisdom on Africa treats it as something that individuals might use strategically to maximize their access to patronage (e.g. by aligning with a powerful politician or group) or as something that solely represents other identity-establishing characteristics such as ethnicity or religion (Cho & Bratton, 2005; Bratton et al., 2011). Adida, Gottlieb, Kramon, and McClendon (2017) provide clear indication that ethnicity serves as a highly salient social identity that affects citizens' likelihood of engaging in motivated reasoning. In these contexts, partisanship would have little independent effect on how individuals form political opinions.

The argument for such weak partisan identities relies on the specific circumstances of the new African democracies. Many scholars believe that voters develop partisan identities themselves at a relatively young age, implying that mass partisanship within society only develops gradually across multiple generations (Campbell et al., 1960; Bartels, 2002; Green et al., 2004). In the form of a stylized fact, the general pattern emerges that younger democracies tend to have a lower presence of partisanship among their citizens (Huber, Kernell, & Leoni, 2005; Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007; Dalton & Weldon, 2007). The relative youth of African democracies and their parties, in addition to the generally volatile political landscapes, should thus make it more difficult to establish strong partisan bases. Individuals also tend to form stronger partisan attachments to groups when these are based on profound social values or more elaborate ideologies (Downs, 1957; Lupu, 2013; Parker & Janoff-Bulman, 2013). Parties in Africa, however, generally do not appear to establish coherent policy programs based on explicit ideologies, making their proposed social or economic policies less distinguishable (Ferree, 2006; Conroy-Krutz & Lewis,

2011; Bleck & van de Walle, 2013). Considering that education is believed to lay the foundation for the manifestation of a partisan identity (Joslyn & Haider-Markel, 2014), the generally lower levels of formal education in most African countries might suggest that the average African citizen is less able to form such partisan identities in order to indulge in motivated reasoning.

While these factors would seem to suggest that partisan attachments in Africa are weak, more recent studies hint that partisanship does play a greater role in Africa and that partisan biases can be observed among its citizens. In this regard, the findings from Uganda in Aguilar et al. (2016) indicate that even when party systems are young, citizens are influenced by partisan cues in their electoral decisions. In her study on taxi prices, Michelitch (2015) shows that Ghanaians in general extend more favourable prices to co-ethnics, but during election time they give the same advantage also to co-partisans, suggesting that ethnic and partisan cleavages exist alongside each other. More closely related, Carlson (2016) provides compelling evidence from Uganda that partisanship in Africa indeed needs to be seen as equivalent to partisanship in the West, as it entails a meaningful social identity and is characterized by motivated reasoning. Harding and Michelitch (2021) already go one step further by analyzing potential determinants of partisanship and come to the conclusion that coethnicity is not a consistent determinant of partisanship, while there is a range of other characteristics that seem to be associated with partisan attachment.


Beyond the mere presence of partisan identities and their likely impact on attitude formation, their influence on opinions about the democratic system is another important aspect to consider. While there are signs of general support for democracy in Africa, a better understanding of the factors driving individual-level variation in this support is important. In their case-based and largely descriptive analysis of attitudes toward democracy, Bratton and Mattes (2001) try to provide insights into this debate and contend that there is widespread popular support for democracy in Africa, while satisfaction with its concrete achievements is more varied. Logan et al. (2003) are generally in line with these findings, further noting that while support for democracy seems to be strongly related to the partisan affiliation of respondents, there appears to be no considerable partisan divide on commitment to democratic principles or national identity.

Given the existing body of evidence, the empirical question remains whether partisan attachments in African citizens need to be understood as a meaningful social identity – as in more established democracies – and how they are related to existing ethnic identities.

2.3 The case of Ghana

Since most countries in sub-Saharan Africa have a relatively short and unstable democratic history, the party landscape has been described as fragmented and lacking stability and any meaningful form of ideology (van de Walle & Butler, 1999; Mozaffar & Scarritt, 2005). At first glance, Ghana is often seen as an exceptional case in this regard due to its unique political history since independence (Osei & Malang, 2018; Elischer, 2012). Since its return to democracy in the 1990s, Ghana has held regular elections, which have been touted as free and fair by most observers. Additionally, elections have been highly competitive at least since 2000, mainly due to the solidified two-party system that has already led to multiple transfers of power through the ballot box, thus underlining Ghana's standing as a stable semi-democratic country. As Whitfield (2009) has argued, the two-party system is a direct result of Ghana's decolonization process, which pitted two political traditions against each other: The Danquah/Busia and the Nkrumahist traditions.

The former refers to J.B. Danquah, who jump-started the struggle for independence, and K.A. Busia, Ghana's prime minister from 1969 to 1972. At its inception, the Danquah/Busia tradition set



out to represent the new educated elite, consisting of lawyers and other mostly foreign-educated academics with Akan ethnic backgrounds. Their political style is popularly described as elitist, more liberal, and business-friendly, thus leaning toward the right wing (Svanikier, 2007; Whitfield, 2009). The latter refers to the movement led by Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first president after independence. His political strategy can be described as a populist, people-centered, and more left-wing approach to politics while also remaining ethnically more broad-based.

While J.J. Rawlings came to power through military coups – first in 1979 and again in 1981 – he ultimately returned Ghana to democratic rule in 1992. Although the two main parties of today were formally founded in 1992, both find their approach to politics within the aforementioned political traditions. In this respect, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) is the latest reincarnation of the Danquah/Busia tradition. Obeng-Odoom (2013) assigns the party to the philosophy of property-owning democracy. With a liberal approach to economic policy, the party's main aim is to attain macro-economic stability through prudent fiscal spending and low inflation, and it has therefore gained a reputation for good economic and fiscal management (Ninsin, 2006). On the other hand, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), which Rawlings founded to participate in the 1992 elections, cannot trace its roots directly to the decolonization period. However, it has appropriated the Nkrumahist tradition (Whitfield, 2009; Jeffries & Thomas, 1993). As such, the NDC portrays itself as a non-elite movement and champion of the people. Accordingly, the party sees itself committed to the social-democratic philosophy, as proclaimed in its party constitution (Bob-Milliar, 2012).

Ghana's political landscape is characterized by relatively stable voting patterns. Whereas the NPP has its traditional strongholds in the Ashanti and Eastern Regions, populated by Akan groups, the NDC mainly relies on strong support from the Volta Region, populated by the Ewe. While these voting patterns suggest that party loyalties have ethnic roots, some scholars propose that party support has progressed to reflect other aspects of the respective political traditions (Whitfield, 2009). Lindberg and Morrison (2008) attest to this, as they find that party considerations far outweighed individual considerations, such as the ethnicity of a candidate, in the parliamentary elections of 2008.

These aspects seem to suggest that Ghana's main political parties and their respective support bases are characterized by meaningful ideological differentiation comparable to the situation in more mature Western democracies. Nevertheless, when analyzing both parties' track records during their terms in office, most scholars conclude that their policies are not predominantly driven by ideology, but rather by more pragmatic considerations (Ninsin, 2006; Bob-Milliar, 2012; Obeng-Odoom, 2013). Despite his progressively leftist rhetoric, it was Rawlings who authored Ghana's shift toward a neo-liberal state in 1983 with the pro-market Economic Recovery Program. The NDC's economic policy has since not broken with this stance, even after Rawlings' retirement. On the other hand, during its two terms in power between 2000 and 2008, the NPP put forward large state-sponsored programs to establish a welfare system, and in 2016 mainly ran on its promise of free secondary education, arguably not a decidedly neo-liberal policy. Obeng-Odoom's (2013) profound analysis of the parties' manifestos before the 2012 election comes to the conclusion that both parties exert a common neo-liberal policy platform, with the NDC deviating considerably from its proclaimed social-democratic core. This lack of a distinguishable ideology is also reflected in Van Gyampo's (2012) findings, which show that the vast majority of party supporters – even those with higher education – are unfamiliar with or disregard their party's ideology.

Thus, while Ghana seems to be a functioning electoral democracy, its party landscape and political competition are not inherently motivated by sophisticated political ideologies. The question arises whether partisan identities can still occur in this context without an ideological



basis. This paper tries to address this question by testing whether opinions of partisan citizens can be explained by shifts in political leadership along partisan lines.

3. Study design

3.1 Data

The main data source of this paper consists of surveys conducted by Afrobarometer, which measures public opinion on a wide range of governance issues in Africa. Ghana has been covered in all survey rounds, creating an extensive sample to analyze partisan identities over time and across different parts of the population. Afrobarometer uses national probability samples based on random selection to create representativeness across all citizens of voting age in a given country. For rounds 2-4, the sample size was 1,200 respondents,¹ while rounds 5-7 each had 2,400 respondents. More details on sampling techniques and other information on the Afrobarometer surveys can be found in the survey manual available online (Afrobarometer, 2014).²


The variables employed here measure individual perceptions and attitudes of the survey respondents with respect to a variety of political issues, their personal situations, and democratic values. The first set of variables includes a performance assessment and respondents' satisfaction with government on different issues. Then respondent trust toward public institutions is considered. Next are perceptions of living conditions and the economic condition of the country, followed by more political perceptions on corruption, crime, and treatment by the government. Lastly, respondent attitudes toward a range of important principles of a democratic society are included. I identify partisans based on their own declaration of "feeling close to" any political party, focusing on the two dominant parties, NPP and NDC. The analyses also include a standard set of available individual characteristics of the surveyed respondents that likely affect their opinions, namely an individual's gender, age, religion, living locality, level of education, employment status, and ethnic group. All variables except age are based on a categorical measurement scale, some of which are binary by nature. More details on the exact wording of the survey questions and the coding of answers can be found in Table A.1 in the Appendix, while Table A.2 contains simple descriptive statistics of the employed dependent variables.

3.2 Empirical strategy

Considering that the Afrobarometer surveys constitute a repeated cross-section, the statistical inference in this paper will be based on a pooled OLS model with unit- and time-fixed effects. As introduced before, the political turnovers following the elections in 2008 and 2016 will provide the necessary variation in the respondents' opinions. For surveys conducted in 2002, 2005, and 2008 (rounds 2-4), NPP supporters were co-partisans of the president, since those surveys took place under the government of John Kufuor; the same was the case for the Round 7 survey in 2017, which occurred under the presidency of the NPP's Nana Akufo-Addo. Naturally, for NDC partisans, the opposite holds true: NDC supporters were co-partisans of the president in rounds 5 (2012) and 6 (2014), during the administrations of John Atta Mills and John Mahama. The analysis

¹ Round 3 includes only 1,197, as three respondents are missing.

² The analysis does not use data from the Round 1 survey because it does not include many of the dependent variables or frames them in a much different way. Some of the control variables are also not included (e.g. employment, religion).



will thus try to identify the change of the different dependent variables for both partisan groups that will react to a loss and gain of power, respectively.

Further steps to produce reliable estimates need to address the likely presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, as has been acknowledged by Cameron and Miller (2015) and Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). Clustering the data will help to mitigate both of these problems; in line with the recommendation of Cameron and Miller (2015, p. 18), I cluster the data at the progressively higher level, which in this case is the regional level.³

Given that the two partisan groups will likely differ systematically with respect to important characteristics that might also influence their opinions, there is a need to control statistically for these factors. For instance, NDC partisans are more common in rural areas and exhibit on average a lower level of education. Individuals' gender and age are also likely to affect their responses. I also control for respondents' employment status, as again NDC partisans tend to have less stable employment. Lastly, given the importance of ethnicity in politics in Ghana and more generally in Africa, there is a need to control for this in order to capture a partisan and not an ethnic divide.

I will interact a measure that identifies the two partisan groups with a measure that depicts the changes in the political regime in order to compare changes in opinions of the partisan groups following the political turnovers.

Ultimately, I estimate the following equation:

$$\text{Depend}_{it} = c + \text{NPP_partisan}_i + \beta * (\text{NPP_partisan}_i * \text{time}_t) + \text{round}_t + \text{region}_i + X_{it} + e_{it}$$

where the subscript *i* represents the individual respondent and *t* the different time periods in the sample. The dummy variable **NPP_partisan_i** takes the value 1 for respondents identified as NPP partisans and 0 for those identified as NDC partisans, while the dummy variable **time_t** takes the value 1 for observations from survey rounds 5 and 6, when the NDC held power, and 0 otherwise. As mentioned, these two dummy variables are then interacted, producing an estimator for NPP partisans conditioned on the NDC holding power, with the coefficient β marking the main coefficient of interest, as it estimates the average difference in opinions of NPP partisans relative to NDC partisans when the former's party is in opposition. **X_{it}** comprises the individual-level controls discussed above, and round and region dummies are included to further control for unobserved factors specific to these units. **e_{it}** represents the error term.

4. Analysis and results

4.1. Descriptive analysis

The descriptive statistics in Table A.2 give a first indication that the opinions of party supporters are influenced by the political situation, as the performance and satisfaction variables are generally on average higher for both partisan groups when their preferred party is in power. On a scale of 1 to 5, with higher values indicating a better performance assessment, NPP partisans

³ The presented results are robust to the clustering at different levels, such as districts and the primary sampling unit (PSU).

rate the performance of an NPP president on average as 3.4, while their rating for an NDC president is only 1.7. On the other hand, NDC partisans assess the performance of an NPP president as 2.4 on average, while their assessment of an NDC president is 3.0. This pattern extends to measures of trust in the president and other political institutions, the perceived living conditions of the respondents, and their assessment of the economic condition of the country. Furthermore, we see similar partisan gaps regarding stated perceptions of corruption: Only 14% of NPP partisans perceive most or all of the members of the president's office to be corrupt during an NPP presidency, while this figure rises to 52% during an NDC presidency. The same difference for NDC partisans is 27% during an NDC presidency and 31% during an NPP presidency. In general, most of these perception gaps are larger for NPP partisans than for NDC partisans.


Since this simple comparison of averages does not consider possible general time trends, I will turn toward graphical depictions of the examined perceptions and attitudes across the different surveys. In this regard, Figure 1 in the Appendix illustrates the patterns of variables for both partisan groups across time in the form of margin plots, with the vertical lines indicating the two power shifts during the period of study. If the investigated opinions were entirely unaffected by partisan motives, we would not necessarily expect them to be identical, but to follow a parallel trend in both groups. On the other hand, in case of strong partisan motives, we would expect the opinions in both partisan groups to alternate in line with the power shifts.

Figures 1.1 to 1.7 deal with the set of performance measures, which reveal clear partisan divides on these measures that are strongly associated with the political situation in the country. The first figure indicates that, in the surveys conducted when the NPP held power, NPP partisans assessed the performance of the president as significantly better than NDC partisans did, as demonstrated by the non-overlapping 95% confidence intervals. When the NDC held power, the performance assessments of both partisan groups reversed, as now NDC partisans assessed "their" president more favourably while the assessments by NPP partisans plummeted. In the last survey, conducted shortly after the NPP regained power, this pattern once again turned on its head.

The next figures display the same partisan patterns for a set of measures assessing the government's performance in different policy fields, including the economy, providing jobs, education, health care, fighting crime, and corruption. Here again, NPP partisans provide much more favourable assessments during times of NPP governments and much worse assessments when the NDC holds power, with the assessments by NDC partisans following an opposite pattern. This presence of a partisan divide on performance assessments is not entirely surprising, as we would already expect it even with weak partisan identities.

Figures 1.8 to 1.13 illustrate the same margin plots for respondents' trust in political and public institutions. The figures again indicate a clear partisan pattern regarding trust in the president, Parliament, and both the ruling and opposition parties. A partisan divide on these measures is again not so surprising given their political nature and their replacement along party lines following power shifts. However, figures 1.12 and 1.13 assess the levels of trust in the police and courts, public institutions whose structure and behaviour should not change significantly along party lines. Still, while the partisan divides are not always significant across all periods, a similar partisan pattern can be observed. Such patterns are not consistent with weak partisan identities.

We next observe other political and non-political perceptions. To begin with, figures 1.14 and 1.15 depict the respondents' perceived living conditions, first in absolute terms and then relative to other Ghanaians. Once again, both measures appear to be driven by partisan-motivated reasoning, as both partisan groups are much more positive about their personal living conditions when their preferred party is in power. Figures 1.16 and 1.17 display how both partisan groups



perceive the present and future economic condition of the country. In both cases, the same partisan patterns emerge. The partisan divide is decidedly smaller for economic conditions of the future, which might partially be explained by the generally more favourable perceptions about the future.

Figures 1.18 to 1.21 examine corruption perceptions. Again there are partisan patterns, in particular for corruption involving the president and members of Parliament, but also with regard to police and judges, albeit without statistical significance in all periods.⁴ Figure 1.22 presents respondents' perceived fear of crime, and while the partisan gaps are not significant in this case, one can still observe the same shifts following the political turnovers after the 2008 and 2016 elections. Finally, Figure 1.23 shows how respondents perceive being treated by the government. Once more one can observe partisan patterns, with NDC partisans feeling they are treated more unfairly than NPP partisans by the NPP government in the early study periods, while this gap turns around after 2009 and again in 2017.

So far the analysis suggests that citizens' performance assessments and perceptions are substantially affected by partisan predispositions. Now I will turn to citizens' attitudes toward more general features of the democratic system to determine how deeply rooted the democratic culture is. In this regard, Figure 1.24 displays attitudes toward the freedom of association, as respondents were asked for their opinions on the government's authority to ban organizations that go against its policies. The plot reveals a partisan divide that shifts in line with the power shifts, although the gap seems to grow smaller over time and ceases to be statistically significant. This suggests a potentially problematic pattern in which partisans appear to be less insistent that their government follow democratic principles when their preferred party is in power. Next, Figure 1.25 examines attitudes toward press freedoms, another pillar of a functional democracy. In contrast to the previous figures, differences in attitudes toward a free press in both groups appear to be unaffected by the power shifts, as the linear predictions are remarkably parallel and not significantly different across the different surveys. While on average NDC partisans appear to be more in favour of the government's right to close down newspapers during the NDC's time in power, this trend is broken up by rising sentiments in favour of a free press in the last survey, when the NPP had taken back power. Nevertheless, the principle of a free press appears to be valued by both partisan groups equally, independent of the political situation.

Figure 1.26 displays respondents' attitudes toward the multiparty system. Here the familiar partisan pattern can again be observed, as NDC partisans are more approving of having multiple parties than NPP partisans when their favoured party is in opposition. This relationship is turned on its head after the NDC took power in 2009 and switches back again after the renewed power shift following the 2016 elections. However, these differences are not statistically significant, as the point estimates lack the necessary precision. Still, the observed pattern suggests that the partisans' attitudes toward democratic principles react to changes in political power, indicating a potentially hypocritical attitude toward democracy. Figure 1.27 provides further insight into this, plotting attitudes toward one-man rule, although the pattern here is not as concerning as in the previous figure.

Finally, Figure 1.28 examines partisans' attitudes toward elections as the best tool to determine political leaders. Similar to the case of media freedom, this attitude appears unaffected by

⁴ Furthermore, the partisan divide in all four cases is considerably larger in 2014 due to a particularly steep rise of corruption perceptions among NPP partisans. It appears the corruption scandals and their wide media coverage during the Mahama administration had a stronger influence on NPP partisans, which is again compatible with the presence of a partisan screening effect.

partisan motives, as the trends in both groups are remarkably parallel, withstanding any power shifts. This result is indicative of the high standing of democratic elections in the Ghanaian population, irrespective of their partisan motivation.


In concluding this section, a more general observation throughout this graphical analysis is that the responses of NPP partisans portray considerably stronger partisan patterns, as their opinions are much more volatile than those of NDC partisans. This could be suggestive of differences in the strength of party attachments, but also, as I will revisit later, it could be the result of biased responses.

4.2. Regression analysis

Table B.1 provides the first set of results for the estimation of the empirical model described above, employing the measures of government performance and satisfaction. The coefficients on the partisan-divide dummy are highly significant, while its negative signs indicate that NPP supporters assess government performance more negatively relative to NDC supporters when the NDC is in power. This finding is indicative of the presence of partisan-motivated reasoning, while these differences in performance assessments are in line with the hypotheses formulated above and can be expected even with weaker partisan identities. Whereas the magnitude of the coefficient is considerably larger for the performance assessment of the president, the coefficients of the satisfaction measures are fairly similar across the different issues. This indicates that partisan motives are not tied to certain political issues and provides some evidence for the steadfastness of partisan identities. The coefficient of the NPP partisan dummy is about half the size of the overall partisan-divide dummy, which suggests that the partisan gaps are roughly symmetrical when either party is in power. The results also show that in contrast to the partisan motives, the included individual-level controls appear to play a much smaller role in explaining responses, given their general lack of significance.

In the next step, I expand the analysis to examine measures of trust. Table B.2 presents the results. Columns (1) and (2) indicate a significant partisan divide on trust in the president and Parliament; the former effect is roughly double in size, suggesting stronger partisan-motivated reasoning. This is hardly surprising, considering the centrality of the president and the fact that even when one party holds executive power, Parliament still contains a considerable number of representatives from the other party. Columns (3) and (4) show findings regarding respondents' trust in the ruling and opposition parties. Again, the results demonstrate the importance of partisan identities. However, the partisan divide is much smaller for the opposition than for the ruling party. This can mainly be attributed to the stronger reaction of NPP partisans following the power shifts on the ruling-party measure compared to the opposition-party measure, as can be observed in the margin plots (figures 1.10 and 1.11). It suggests that when the NPP is in power, its partisans are much more enthusiastic about their own party than they are averse to the NDC, while when the NDC is in power, NPP partisans are much more negative toward the NDC than they are in favour of their own party. This could be suggestive of an asymmetric partisan screening effect among NPP partisans. While the presence of a partisan divide on the previous measures is still not very surprising, given their political nature, columns (5) and (6) now report the results on trust in the police and courts, both public institutions that are not immediately connected to a party. Nevertheless, the results show a partisan divide, as NPP partisans express lower levels of trust in both the police and the courts when their party is in the opposition. Since there is no large replacement of police or of judges following a power shift, this partisan divide suggests the presence of much stronger partisan identities.

To further examine the pervasiveness of partisanship, I investigate additional non-political perceptions in Table B.3. Columns (1) and (2) report the perceived personal living conditions of



partisans, in absolute terms and relative to other Ghanaians. The results again indicate a partisan pattern, as both NPP and NDC partisans appear to perceive their personal living conditions as significantly better when their favoured party is in power. Around the political turnovers in the sample, one can observe marked changes in these perceptions. The analysis continues in columns (3) and (4) with perceptions of the economic condition of the country, first at present and then looking into the future. Both measures are subject to a considerable partisan divide, as NPP supporters' assessment of the economy drops considerably when their party is not in power, which is very much in line with the results on perceived living conditions.

Table B.4 continues with further perception measures, examining perceived corruption among officials in the president's office, members of Parliament, the police force, and judges in columns (1) to (4), respectively. Once again, a significant partisan divide emerges for all measures, suggesting that NPP partisans perceive the country to be more corrupt when the NDC holds power at the national level. This partisan pattern on perceived corruption of the police force and judges again suggests elevated levels of partisan identification. Extending the analysis further, Column (5) reports results for perceptions of personal security. Here again, a significant partisan divide can be observed, as both partisan groups are more fearful of being the victim of a crime when their party is not in power. This finding matches the partisan divide on satisfaction with the government's performance in fighting crime and also suggests that partisans are consistent in applying their motivated reasoning, further substantiating the meaningfulness of partisan identities. Lastly, Column (6) shows a partisan pattern in respondents' perceptions of government treatment of their own ethnic group, implying that partisanship also has an ethnic dimension. This is hardly surprising given the ethnic background of both parties described in Section 2.

In summary, a partisan divide runs like a common thread through the analysis of all examined opinions and perceptions, indicating a persistent presence of partisan motivated reasoning.

Finally, as I did in figures 1.24 through 1.28, I analyze the presence of partisan motives in attitudes toward important democratic principles. In Table B.5, Column (1) once more indicates a profound partisan divide with regard to attitudes toward freedom of association, as both partisan groups are more insistent on the right to associate freely when their party is in opposition than when it holds power. On the other hand, Column (2) shows that attitudes toward a media freedom seem unaffected by partisan motives, as the different party supporters seem equally in favour of a free press independent of whether their own party is currently holding political power or not.

Columns (3) and (4) shed more light on how deeply rooted the democratic system is in partisan citizens by investigating their attitudes toward one-party and one-man rule. Partisan effects appear to be at play, as partisans are less approving of the democratic system when their party is in power. It would seem reasonable for partisan supporters to be *more* in favour of a political system when this system has put their party in power. However, empirical evidence suggests the opposite, as partisans of the party in power seem to be more in favour of curtailing democratic institutions, potentially in hopes of consolidating the status quo with their preferred party in power. Finally, as shown in Column (5), there appears to be no evidence that attitudes toward democratic elections in general are affected by the power shifts, indicating that they are not subject to motivated reasoning.

While the lack of partisan motives in attitudes toward a free press and democratic elections is encouraging, the partisan patterns with regard to the other democratic principles are disconcerting. It appears that some democratic principles do not receive unconditional support among partisan citizens. The evidence suggests a worrying double standard, as partisans seem to appreciate and demand more democracy when their preferred party is in opposition,



potentially protecting them from discrimination by their political rivals. However, when their party is in power, they seem more indifferent toward these democratic protections, as fewer democratic limits might benefit them in this situation.

4.3. *Robustness tests*

Obviously the above analysis is subject to concerns regarding the appropriate identification of the claimed effects and possible alternative explanations. Here I address some of these concerns to validate the interpretation and robustness of the results.

To begin, some of the reported changes in perceptions could be the result of actual changes in policy and distributional strategies; thus, the differences could reflect respondents' different experiences. Considering the well-established concept of pork-barrel politics, there is an extensive literature on distributive politics within the African context, from early contributions such as Morrison and Stevenson (1972) and Bates (1974) to more recent work that provides compelling evidence of political favouritism (Hodler & Raschky, 2014; Burgess, Jedwab, Miguel, Morjaria, & Padró i Miquel, 2015; Kramon & Posner, 2016; Dickens, 2018). Consequently, it appears plausible that the government uses its political power to funnel public resources toward its supporters, which could explain the large difference in perceived living conditions between the two groups. Investigating this possibility, I analyze changes in access to public utilities and in ownership of certain assets to control for political favouritism.⁵ In Table B.6, Column (1) indicates no evidence of any significant changes in access to public utilities depending on which party is in power. The same appears to be the case when I employ an index of asset ownership, as shown in Column (2).

Likewise, the observed changes in perceived corruption could also be the result of actual changes in experience with corruption. To test this, I use respondents' experience with bribing the police or bribing public officials to get a document or permit. The results, shown in columns (3) and (4), indicate no shift in the experience of paying bribes dependent on which party is in power. The patterns of corruption perceptions can therefore not be explained by actual changes in respondents' experience with bribery.

Lastly, the fear of being the victim of a crime could of course be affected by actually having direct experience with a crime. To control for this, I run the baseline regression using a measure of how often respondents or anyone in their families have been physically attacked in the year before the survey. The results in Column (5) again show no significant difference between the two partisan groups that would explain the observed partisan pattern for the fear of crime.

At least with the available measures used here, actual changes and experiences cannot serve as an explanation for the patterns of perceived living conditions, corruption perceptions, and fear of crime reported above. It seems, rather, that these perceptions are to a large extent driven by partisan identities and the associated motivated reasoning.

Another concern is that of simultaneity, meaning that it could be the respondents' opinions that determine their choice of partisanship, and not the other way around. This is particularly relevant for performance assessments, as respondents might have a positive assessment of the current government and therefore identify as a supporter of the ruling party. However, for reverse causality to be the case, there would need to be an explanation for the strong differences between the two groups in the first place (Carlson, 2016). This reverse direction of causation

⁵ This access is measured by a public utility index that combines access to electricity, piped water, schools, and health clinics in the respondents' neighbourhoods as reported by the survey interviewer. All measures of the index can also be tested separately, without producing any evidence of political favouritism.

would also be more in line with the “running tally” model of partisanship, which much recent literature leans against, following more credible evidence pointing toward partisanship having a more causal role in shaping political perceptions and attitudes (Bartels, 2002). And even if the results were a result of reverse causality, it would still indicate that partisanship in Africa is meaningful in that people feel obliged to align their political opinions and their proclaimed partisanship. While I am not able to categorically reject the possibility of reverse causality here, based on the mentioned arguments I identify pre-existing partisan identities as the more likely source of the observed changes in political perceptions and attitudes.

Furthermore, the analysis could be affected by a form of social desirability bias. As respondents self-declare their partisan affiliation, there is the possibility for bias due to strategic responses, meaning respondents hide or misreport their true affiliation. A closer look at the employed sample provides support for the possible presence of such strategic responses. In the surveys conducted during an NPP presidency, 69% of the sample report an affiliation with the NPP, while only 31% identify as NDC supporters. In contrast, with the NDC holding power at the national level, NPP partisans make up only 46% of the sample, with 54% indicating support for the NDC.⁶ This observation suggests that some respondents feel the need to hide their true party affiliation when their party is in opposition, potentially out of fear of harassment by the government. Considering that more than half of all respondents in the sample believe that Afrobarometer surveys are sponsored by the government or a related entity, this is hardly surprising. In this regard, NDC partisans seem to be slightly more suspicious than their NPP counterparts.

Exploiting Ghana's stable voting patterns might give some insight into this phenomenon. For this, I define party strongholds as those constituencies where either party receives more than 70% of the presidential vote. Accordingly, in NPP strongholds, where on average about 80% voted for the NPP no matter which party was in power, 56% of respondents in the samples analyzed here identified as NPP partisans during an NPP presidency, while only 47% did so during an NDC presidency. On the other hand, in NDC strongholds, where the NDC candidate receives on average about 84% of the presidential vote, only about 44% of respondents identified as NDC supporters while their party was in power and 35% when it was not. These numbers seem to suggest that the misreporting of party allegiance is more widespread among NDC supporters. While it is not immediately clear whether it is stronger or weaker supporters who misreport their affiliation, one might assume the former to be the case, as stronger partisans might be more fearful of discrimination against them. Under this assumption, the provided estimates for the partisan divide would represent lower bounds, and the suggestive evidence that misreporting is more widespread among NDC supporters would be able to explain the more muted response pattern for NDC partisans observed in the graphical analysis.

Accordingly, as an alternative I propose a different strategy to sample partisans based on geographical identification to verify the robustness of the results. According to this strategy, respondents are assigned to either partisan group if they are located in an electoral stronghold of that party. Strongholds are again defined by a vote share of more than 70% for the respective party in the closest presidential election. NPP partisans will thus be identified as such if they live in a constituency where the vote share of the NPP presidential candidate exceeded 70% in the corresponding national election. Likewise, respondents will be identified as NDC partisans if they are living in a constituency where the vote share of the NDC candidate exceeded 70%. To establish respondents' connection to their constituencies, I make use of the provided geocodes in the Afrobarometer samples. This strategy will most likely underestimate partisan gaps, as party

⁶ Here it needs to be stressed that partisanship is not measured by vote choice. While vote choice can be expected to vary significantly following a political turnover, as it also includes swing voters, such a notable change in the composition of the sample can most likely only be explained by the presence of strategic responses.

strongholds for either party naturally also include non-partisans and stated partisans of the other party. Indeed, in NPP strongholds, about 42% of respondents do not affiliate with either party, and 6% support the NDC. Similarly, in NDC strongholds, 43% of respondents identify as independents, while 18% state an affiliation with the NPP. The results of this analysis, presented in Tables B.7 and B.8, do not differ from those of the baseline regressions, either in terms of statistical significance or generally in the magnitude of the effects. While this strategy might have its flaws, the fact that it largely leads to the same results provides some confidence in the validity of the baseline results.

A final concern would be the presence of other unaccounted-for factors that might affect the analyzed perceptions and attitudes, and the possibility that the political turnovers themselves are determined by the changes in the respondents' opinions. Considering that the sample covers multiple points in time before and after one of the turnovers, it is possible to conduct an analysis of pre-turnover trends. Examining again the margin plots in Figure 1, we see that the trends for both partisan groups appear to be remarkably parallel across the three survey rounds before the first post-turnover survey in 2009. Trends also seem to be largely parallel in surveys conducted in the two subsequent surveys. The only exception concerns the measures on corruption perceptions, which display a much steeper increase between 2012 and 2014 among NPP partisans. However, this observation is actually quite compatible with the presence of partisan motivation, as it suggests that the increased media coverage of possible corrupt practices during the Mahama regime in 2014 left a greater impression on NPP partisans than on NDC partisans. Nevertheless, the generally parallel trends between turnovers suggest that other aspects play only a minor role. The lack of diverging pre-trends also provides no evidence that the turnovers are determined by the changes in respondents' opinions.

4.3 Partisan identities and ethnicity

As the final step in the analysis, I investigate the role of ethnicity in partisan identities. As has been stressed before, ethnicity plays an important role in virtually all African societies and hence also has a great influence on politics. Ghana is no exception to this observation, although some scholars have pointed to a fading of the ethnic dimension in Ghana's party landscape (Whitfield, 2009; Lindberg & Morrison, 2008). Considering that the previously analyzed measure of unfair government treatment refers to the respondents' ethnic groups, this already suggests that partisanship has an ethnic dimension. To investigate how ethnicity affects the observed partisan divide, I combine the two main ethnic groups that are connected to the two parties (i.e. the Akan, who are largely associated with the NPP, and the Ewe, who are largely associated with the NDC) in a dummy. This dummy is then interacted with the partisan-divide dummy to test whether partisans belonging to these two ethnic groups are farther apart in their opinions than partisans who don't belong to these ethnic groups. The results are reported in tables B.9 and B.10.

A first result of this analysis is that the coefficients on the partisan-divide dummy continue to be statistically significant across most of the dependent variables. This again supports the finding that the divide in opinions between the two groups is not solely an artifact of ethnicity, given that partisans from the other ethnic groups also exhibit significant differences in their opinions in connection with the political turnovers. Second, the coefficient of the added interaction term is highly significant in the majority of specifications, with the same sign as the partisan-divide coefficient. This indicates that the partisan divide between NPP and NDC supporters is more pronounced when they belong to the Akan or Ewe ethnicity. The measures of perceived corruption appear to be an exception, as here the partisan divide is not significantly moderated by the ethnic affiliation of the respondents. Furthermore, it seems that the partisan patterns on the political attitudes are mainly driven by ethnicity. In line with Michelitch (2015) and Carlson

(2016), these results suggest that partisan identity exists separately from ethnic identity, but ethnicity still is a strong predictor of the strength of party attachment in Ghana.

5. Conclusion

Exploring changes in opinions of partisan citizens in conjunction with political turnovers, this study provides evidence for the presence of strong and stable patterns of partisanship among African voters. In line with theories on motivated reasoning, the opinions and assessments of partisan citizens seem to be affected by their partisan dispositions, resulting in the well-known partisan screening effect. The fact that these partisan patterns can be observed consistently across many different measures of performance evaluations, trust, and political and non-political perceptions and attitudes suggests that they are part of a meaningful partisan identity. Further tests show that these partisan identities are not merely based on ethnicity, a long-held belief in the literature, specifically about sub-Saharan Africa. Rather, it seems as though partisan and ethnic identities coexist, while the latter still predicts how strongly partisans are attached to their preferred party.

These findings come with a number of implications. First, they suggest that stable partisan identities can evolve in new democratic systems, even if parties are young and lack sophisticated ideologies. On the one hand, this means that researchers cannot continue to ignore the importance of partisanship when studying the economic and political behaviour of ordinary citizens in Africa. On the other hand, it also reveals the need to update prevailing theories on the development of partisanship. Given what we know from the literature on social identity (Chen & Li, 2009; Kranton, Pease, Sanders, & Huettel, 2013), it seems that partisan identities have been able to evolve in the Ghanaian context by pitting the supporters of the two main parties against each other, thereby countering the other features that are often put forward for why partisan identities should be considered weak in the African context. While the presence of stable partisan identities can be seen as a necessary step toward a functional democracy, my findings may also suggest that the process of evaluating political parties and candidates – which is naturally very important in a democracy – could in large part be driven by partisan predispositions rather than by actual performance. This is clearly problematic for the effectiveness of democratic accountability, and it could provide an explanation for the puzzle of why voters so often fail to punish poorly performing leaders at the ballot box. While the evidence is not as straightforward, there is some indication that attitudes toward certain democratic principles are also affected by partisan motives, which may have implications for the consolidation of democracy.


In any case, further research is necessary to better understand the conditions for the development of partisan motives in young democracies, specifically in the African context. Another focus of future research could be to investigate how partisanship affects the deepening of democratic institutions and the political discourse. In this regard, one could focus on other issues besides ethnicity that potentially moderate partisanship, such as the provision of information through the media and alternative news sources that have gained importance with the spread of mobile devices and the Internet.



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
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Appendix



Table A.1: Definition of variables

<p>Performance president Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past 12 months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - President [name of current president]? 	<p>1=Strongly disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Approve, 4=Strongly approve</p>
<p>Government satisfaction How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Managing the economy? - Creating jobs? - Addressing educational needs? - Improving basic health services? - Reducing crime? - Fighting corruption? 	<p>1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well</p>
<p>Trust How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The president? - Parliament? - The ruling party? - Opposition political parties? - The police? - Courts of law? 	<p>0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot</p>
<p>Living conditions In general, how would you describe:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Your own present living conditions? - Your living conditions compared to those of other Ghanaians? 	<p>1=Very bad, 2=Fairly bad, 3=Neither good nor bad, 4=Fairly good, 5=Very good</p>
<p>Economic conditions (present) In general, how would you describe:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The present economic condition of this country? 	<p>1=Very bad, 2=Fairly bad, 3=Neither good nor bad, 4=Fairly good, 5=Very good</p>
<p>Economic conditions (future) Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic conditions in this country in 12 months' time? 	<p>1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better</p>



Corruption perceptions

How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say:

0=None/Some of them, 1=Most/All of them

- President?
- Members of Parliament?
- Police?
- Judges?

Security

Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family:

0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always

- Feared crime in your own home?

Unfair government treatment

How often, if ever, are _____s [R's ethnic group] treated unfairly by the government?


0=Never, 1=Sometimes, 2=Often, 3=Always

Democratic principles #1

Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2:

1=Agree very strongly with Statement 1, 2=Agree with Statement 1, 3=Agree with Statement 2, 4=Agree very strongly with Statement 2

- Freedom of association:
 - o Statement 1: Government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its policies.
 - o Statement 2: We should be able to join any organization, whether or not the government approves of it.
- Freedom of the press:
 - o Statement 1: Government should be able to close newspapers that print stories it does not like.
 - o Statement 2: The news media should be free to publish any story that they see fit without fear of being shut down.
 - o
- Electoral democracy:
 - o Statement 1: We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open, and honest elections.
 - o Statement 2: Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders.



<p>Democratic principles #2 There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office? - Elections and Parliament are abolished so that the president can decide everything? 	<p>1=Strongly disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Neither approve nor disapprove, 4=Approve, 5=Strongly approve</p>
<p>Utilities Are the following services/facilities present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Electricity grid? - Piped water system? - School? - Health clinic? 	<p>0=None, 1=At least one of them, 2=At least two of them, 3=At least three of them, 4=All four of them</p>
<p>Asset index Which of these things do you personally own:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Radio? - Television? - Motor vehicle, car? 	<p>0=None, 1=At least one of the three, 2=At least two of the three, 3=All three of them</p>
<p>Bribery In the past year, how often, if ever, have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor for government officials in order to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Avoid a problem with the police? - Get a document or a permit? 	<p>0=Never, 1=Once or twice, 2=A few times, 3=Often</p>
<p>Attacked Over the past year, how often (if ever) have you or anyone in your family: Been physically attacked?</p>	<p>0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always</p>
<p>Gender</p>	<p>0=Female, 1=Male</p>
<p>Location Is the PSU urban or rural?</p>	<p>0=Rural, 1=Urban</p>
<p>Education What is the highest level of education you have completed?</p>	<p>0=No formal or informal schooling only, 1=Some primary or primary completed, 2=Some secondary or secondary completed, 3=Post-secondary qualifications</p>
<p>Employment Do you have a job that pays a cash income? Is it full-time or part-time? And are you presently looking for a job (even if you are presently working)?</p>	<p>0=No (not looking), 1=No (looking), 2=Yes, part-time (looking and not looking), 3=Yes, full-time (looking and not looking)</p>
<p>Age</p>	<p>A numeric value between 18 and 110</p>
<p>Religion What is your religion, if any?</p>	<p>0=Christian, 1=Muslim, 2=Other</p>
<p>Ethnicity Which Ghanaian language is your home language?</p>	<p>1=Akan, 2= Ewe, 3=Ga, 4=Northern</p>




Table A.2: Descriptive statistics of main dependent variables

Variables	Full sample				NPP partisans		NDC partisans	
	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Mean (NPP pres)	Mean (NDC pres)	Mean (NPP pres)	Mean (NDC pres)
Performance president	2.798 (5778 obs)	1.065	1	4	3.449 (2296 obs)	1.737 (1340 obs)	2.417 (1010 obs)	3.075 (1132 obs)
Government satis. (economy)	2.476 (5749 obs)	1.024	1	4	3.083 (2265 obs)	1.587 (1340 obs)	2.169 (1004 obs)	2.582 (1140 obs)
Government satis. (jobs)	2.190 (5716 obs)	0.990	1	4	2.667 (2232 obs)	1.496 (1334 obs)	1.893 (1009 obs)	2.332 (1141 obs)
Government satis. (education)	2.737 (5836 obs)	1.010	1	4	3.227 (2302 obs)	1.941 (1342 obs)	2.627 (1048 obs)	2.783 (1144 obs)
Government satis. (health)	2.648 (5775 obs)	0.972	1	4	3.043 (2264 obs)	1.960 (1340 obs)	2.497 (1026 obs)	2.807 (1145 obs)
Government satis. (crime)	2.618 (5746 obs)	1.017	1	4	3.018 (2266 obs)	2.008 (1332 obs)	2.275 (1008 obs)	2.838 (1140 obs)
Government satis. (corruption)	2.451 (5561 obs)	1.051	1	4	3.009 (2175 obs)	1.620 (1329 obs)	2.249 (941 obs)	2.522 (1116 obs)
Trust (president)	1.894 (5836 obs)	1.165	0	3	2.552 (2317 obs)	0.848 (1339 obs)	1.459 (1030 obs)	2.177 (1150 obs)
Trust (Parliament)	1.646 (5758 obs)	1.070	0	3	2.019 (2268 obs)	1.034 (1335 obs)	1.512 (1015 obs)	1.739 (1140 obs)
Trust (ruling party)	1.706 (5822 obs)	1.158	0	3	2.327 (2303 obs)	0.745 (1339 obs)	1.214 (1034 obs)	2.024 (1146 obs)
Trust (opposition party)	1.480 (5730 obs)	1.091	0	3	1.194 (2259 obs)	1.829 (1329 obs)	1.763 (1016 obs)	1.388 (1126 obs)
Trust (police)	1.413 (5851 obs)	1.139	0	3	1.628 (2316 obs)	1.072 (1340 obs)	1.327 (1042 obs)	1.455 (1153 obs)
Trust (courts)	1.661 (5747 obs)	1.075	0	3	1.782 (2280 obs)	1.325 (1327 obs)	1.659 (1014 obs)	1.813 (1126 obs)
Living conditions (absolute)	2.404 (5901 obs)	1.345	1	5	2.685 (2339 obs)	1.947 (1343 obs)	2.191 (1065 obs)	2.564 (1154 obs)


Table A.2. Descriptive statistics of main dependent variables, continued

Variables	Full sample				NPP partisans		NDC partisans	
	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Mean (NPP pres)	Mean (NDC pres)	Mean (NPP pres)	Mean (NDC pres)
Living conditions (relative)	2.921 (5608 obs)	1.099	1	5	3.091 (2201 obs)	2.695 (1283 obs)	2.765 (1002 obs)	2.983 (1122 obs)
Economic cond. (present)	2.348 (5859 obs)	1.368	1	5	2.810 (2314 obs)	1.625 (1345 obs)	2.093 (1050 obs)	2.496 (1150 obs)
Economic cond. (future)	3.628 (5096 obs)	1.240	1	5	3.973 (2070 obs)	3.066 (1160 obs)	3.364 (850 obs)	3.789 (1016 obs)
Corruption (president)	0.285 (5929 obs)	0.451	0	1	0.142 (2345 obs)	0.525 (1351 obs)	0.312 (1070 obs)	0.270 (1163 obs)
Corruption (MPs)	0.297 (5929 obs)	0.457	0	1	0.178 (2345 obs)	0.494 (1351 obs)	0.291 (1070 obs)	0.313 (1163 obs)
Corruption (police)	0.404 (5929 obs)	0.491	0	1	0.365 (2345 obs)	0.497 (1351 obs)	0.409 (1070 obs)	0.369 (1163 obs)
Corruption (judges)	0.339 (5929 obs)	0.473	0	1	0.292 (2345 obs)	0.463 (1351 obs)	0.336 (1070 obs)	0.293 (1163 obs)
Fear of crime	0.482 (5913 obs)	0.986	0	4	0.533 (2343 obs)	0.386 (1349 obs)	0.650 (1066 obs)	0.337 (1155 obs)
Unfair govt. treatment	0.647 (5552 obs)	0.948	0	3	0.475 (2198 obs)	0.838 (1271 obs)	0.901 (984 obs)	0.541 (1099 obs)
Freedom of association	2.750 (4989 obs)	1.182	1	4	2.679 (1730 obs)	2.911 (1297 obs)	2.833 (836 obs)	2.614 (1126 obs)
Freedom of press	2.555 (5022 obs)	1.223	1	4	2.775 (1731 obs)	2.207 (1316 obs)	2.832 (834 obs)	2.421 (1141 obs)
One-party rule	1.734 (5867 obs)	1.222	1	5	1.833 (2319 obs)	1.516 (1348 obs)	1.706 (1046 obs)	1.814 (1154 obs)
One-man rule	1.559 (5821 obs)	0.994	1	5	1.577 (2292 obs)	1.414 (1346 obs)	1.590 (1037 obs)	1.663 (1146 obs)
Electoral democracy	1.467 (5835 obs)	0.836	1	4	1.479 (2303 obs)	1.336 (1342 obs)	1.609 (1041 obs)	1.466 (1149 obs)

Table B.1: Baseline regression: Government performance and satisfaction


Variables	(1) Performance president	(2) Satisfaction (economy)	(3) Satisfaction (jobs)	(4) Satisfaction (education)	(5) Satisfaction (health)	(6) Satisfaction (crime)	(7) Satisfaction (corruption)
NPP partisan	1.031*** (0.077)	0.914*** (0.062)	0.755*** (0.095)	0.628*** (0.096)	0.602*** (0.083)	0.723*** (0.068)	0.732*** (0.085)
Partisan divide	-2.365*** (0.130)	-1.899*** (0.108)	-1.603*** (0.132)	-1.499*** (0.147)	-1.425*** (0.139)	-1.578*** (0.115)	-1.660*** (0.109)
Gender	-0.023 (0.020)	-0.054 (0.038)	0.008 (0.035)	0.002 (0.028)	0.000 (0.031)	-0.041 (0.024)	-0.000 (0.015)
Location	0.032 (0.028)	-0.036* (0.018)	0.024 (0.021)	-0.047 (0.029)	-0.022 (0.028)	-0.035 (0.021)	0.049* (0.023)
Education	0.033** (0.012)	0.055* (0.025)	0.045 (0.026)	0.016 (0.017)	0.011 (0.018)	0.017 (0.015)	0.001 (0.020)
Employment	-0.016 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.019** (0.007)	-0.008 (0.019)	-0.021 (0.024)	-0.018 (0.017)	-0.008 (0.013)
Age	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Muslim	0.047 (0.036)	-0.022 (0.059)	-0.057 (0.077)	0.095* (0.047)	0.054 (0.031)	-0.053 (0.065)	0.024 (0.030)
Other religion	-0.011 (0.041)	-0.059 (0.065)	-0.050 (0.046)	-0.066 (0.058)	-0.034 (0.053)	-0.089 (0.050)	0.031 (0.036)
Ethnic Ewe	-0.034 (0.057)	-0.100 (0.084)	-0.105 (0.062)	-0.121 (0.070)	-0.076 (0.068)	-0.035 (0.068)	-0.183** (0.073)
Ethnic Ga	0.015 (0.049)	-0.073 (0.047)	-0.055 (0.039)	-0.090** (0.032)	-0.037 (0.024)	0.026 (0.070)	-0.060 (0.037)
Ethnic Northern	0.053 (0.054)	0.077 (0.088)	0.010 (0.075)	-0.090 (0.074)	0.027 (0.066)	0.080 (0.071)	0.002 (0.064)
Observations	5,128	5,109	5,067	5,169	5,113	5,096	4,958
R-squared	0.457	0.384	0.266	0.326	0.284	0.225	0.309

Notes: (a) The partisan divide variable is the interaction between the NPP partisan dummy and a dummy indicating which party is in power. (b) The estimations include an unreported constant and round- and region-specific dummies, and standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the regional level. (c) Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.2: Baseline regression: Trust



Variables	(1) Trust president	(2) Trust Parliament	(3) Trust ruling party	(4) Trust opp. party	(5) Trust police	(6) Trust courts
NPP partisan	1.099*** (0.082)	0.554*** (0.057)	1.125*** (0.086)	-0.523*** (0.085)	0.270*** (0.053)	0.172*** (0.030)
Partisan divide	-2.413*** (0.112)	-1.189*** (0.046)	-2.377*** (0.140)	1.055*** (0.120)	-0.614*** (0.072)	-0.534*** (0.045)
Gender	-0.052 (0.031)	-0.044 (0.031)	-0.054 (0.057)	-0.121*** (0.025)	-0.085** (0.034)	-0.037 (0.031)
Location	0.091** (0.039)	0.079* (0.043)	0.108* (0.057)	0.044 (0.037)	0.148** (0.059)	0.142*** (0.027)
Education	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.035 (0.019)	-0.007 (0.022)	-0.037** (0.014)	-0.077*** (0.021)	-0.042*** (0.009)
Employment	0.005 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.001 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.049*** (0.015)	0.001 (0.018)
Age	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Muslim	-0.093 (0.072)	-0.111 (0.078)	-0.077* (0.041)	0.063 (0.064)	-0.051 (0.094)	0.025 (0.090)
Other religion	-0.046 (0.051)	-0.044 (0.060)	0.007 (0.054)	0.004 (0.046)	0.029 (0.109)	0.012 (0.062)
Ethnic Ewe	0.042 (0.068)	-0.040 (0.062)	-0.074 (0.080)	-0.071 (0.045)	0.029 (0.061)	0.018 (0.035)
Ethnic Ga	-0.079 (0.066)	-0.081** (0.032)	-0.069** (0.026)	-0.191** (0.067)	-0.047* (0.025)	-0.051 (0.036)
Ethnic Northern	0.106*** (0.030)	0.013 (0.054)	0.039 (0.093)	0.002 (0.102)	0.056 (0.071)	-0.001 (0.067)
Observations	5,166	5,096	5,157	5,080	5,179	5,098
R-squared	0.400	0.184	0.366	0.110	0.105	0.100

Notes: (a) The partisan divide variable is the interaction between the NPP partisan dummy and a dummy indicating which party is in power. (b) The estimations include an unreported constant and round- and region-specific dummies, and standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the regional level. (c) Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

**Table B.3: Baseline regression: Perceived living and economic conditions**


Variables	(1) Living cond. (absolute)	(2) Living cond. (relative)	(3) Economic cond. (present)	(4) Economic cond. (future)
NPP partisan	0.568*** (0.076)	0.317*** (0.057)	0.828*** (0.087)	0.624*** (0.080)
Partisan divide	-1.161*** (0.141)	-0.650*** (0.101)	-1.622*** (0.169)	-1.317*** (0.146)
Gender	-0.018 (0.026)	-0.034 (0.026)	-0.040 (0.028)	-0.058** (0.023)
Location	-0.161** (0.065)	-0.155*** (0.043)	-0.034 (0.048)	0.000 (0.067)
Education	0.148*** (0.030)	0.160*** (0.029)	0.125*** (0.016)	0.061*** (0.015)
Employment	-0.034* (0.015)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.035* (0.018)	-0.001 (0.012)
Age	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)
Muslim	0.067 (0.063)	0.162*** (0.042)	-0.008 (0.048)	0.071 (0.041)
Other religion	-0.114 (0.089)	-0.115** (0.039)	-0.080 (0.081)	-0.050 (0.072)
Ethnic Ewe	-0.127 (0.086)	0.016 (0.069)	-0.097 (0.083)	-0.104 (0.059)
Ethnic Ga	-0.124 (0.111)	-0.052 (0.051)	-0.031 (0.082)	-0.142** (0.062)
Ethnic Northern	0.040 (0.076)	0.094 (0.069)	-0.024 (0.074)	-0.112 (0.069)
Observations	5,217	4,960	5,183	4,530
R-squared	0.137	0.093	0.206	0.284

Notes: (a) The partisan divide variable is the interaction between the NPP partisan dummy and a dummy indicating which party is in power. (b) The estimations include an unreported constant and round- and region-specific dummies, and standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the regional level. (c) Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.4: Baseline regression: Political perceptions



Variables	(1) Corruption president	(2) Corruption MPs	(3) Corruption police	(4) Corruption judges	(5) Fear of crime	(6) Unfair govt. treatment
NPP partisan	-0.171*** (0.020)	-0.124*** (0.013)	-0.048** (0.016)	-0.055*** (0.011)	-0.084* (0.045)	-0.358*** (0.050)
Partisan divide	0.417*** (0.034)	0.289*** (0.033)	0.187*** (0.019)	0.201*** (0.032)	0.168** (0.068)	0.706*** (0.141)
Gender	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.028* (0.013)	-0.001 (0.014)	-0.016 (0.014)	0.048** (0.020)	-0.043* (0.021)
Location	-0.028** (0.012)	-0.015 (0.011)	0.005 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.020)	-0.128** (0.047)	0.019 (0.030)
Education	0.006 (0.009)	-0.013 (0.011)	0.018* (0.008)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.017)	-0.001 (0.020)
Employment	0.016** (0.007)	0.014** (0.005)	0.012 (0.007)	0.009* (0.005)	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.013)
Age	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)
Muslim	0.005 (0.026)	0.042 (0.030)	0.007 (0.030)	-0.031 (0.024)	0.159** (0.056)	0.018 (0.040)
Other religion	0.001 (0.026)	0.011 (0.019)	-0.027 (0.034)	-0.036 (0.043)	0.054 (0.047)	0.117** (0.045)
Ethnic Ewe	-0.011 (0.024)	-0.014 (0.029)	0.019 (0.034)	-0.049 (0.039)	0.107** (0.040)	-0.083 (0.085)
Ethnic Ga	0.000 (0.024)	-0.000 (0.026)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.016 (0.029)	0.010 (0.039)	0.052 (0.091)
Ethnic Northern	-0.077*** (0.021)	-0.073*** (0.021)	-0.042 (0.032)	-0.017 (0.036)	-0.102 (0.072)	-0.010 (0.084)
Observations	5,240	5,240	5,240	5,240	5,229	4,927
R-squared	0.156	0.110	0.026	0.055	0.039	0.102

Notes: (a) The partisan divide variable is the interaction between the NPP partisan dummy and a dummy indicating which party is in power. (b) The estimations include an unreported constant and round- and region-specific dummies, and standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the regional level. (c) Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

**Table B.5: Baseline regression: Political attitudes**

Variables	(1) Freedom of association	(2) Freedom of press	(3) One-party rule	(4) One-man rule	(5) Electoral democracy
NPP partisan	-0.261*** (0.048)	-0.089** (0.035)	0.194** (0.068)	0.056 (0.044)	-0.099* (0.047)
Partisan divide	0.483*** (0.097)	-0.153 (0.093)	-0.433*** (0.115)	-0.254*** (0.063)	0.032 (0.054)
Gender	-0.057** (0.025)	-0.003 (0.031)	0.133*** (0.034)	0.071** (0.024)	0.055*** (0.015)
Location	-0.050 (0.035)	-0.031 (0.036)	0.074* (0.033)	0.075* (0.040)	-0.001 (0.022)
Education	0.093*** (0.011)	0.032 (0.023)	-0.158*** (0.031)	-0.072*** (0.015)	-0.056** (0.021)
Employment	-0.011 (0.025)	-0.004 (0.023)	-0.016 (0.016)	0.021 (0.015)	0.008 (0.018)
Age	0.003* (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)
Muslim	-0.036 (0.051)	0.100 (0.082)	0.001 (0.054)	0.016 (0.048)	0.042 (0.041)
Other religion	0.021 (0.096)	0.072 (0.110)	0.129 (0.074)	0.110* (0.053)	0.098 (0.070)
Ethnic Ewe	-0.162** (0.058)	0.022 (0.037)	0.017 (0.063)	-0.040 (0.075)	0.025 (0.049)
Ethnic Ga	0.067 (0.071)	-0.069 (0.049)	0.002 (0.057)	0.031 (0.029)	-0.060 (0.039)
Ethnic Northern	0.075 (0.068)	0.018 (0.052)	-0.052 (0.089)	0.007 (0.096)	-0.006 (0.061)
Observations	4,477	4,517	5,196	5,161	5,166
R-squared	0.037	0.076	0.039	0.039	0.033

Notes: (a) The partisan divide variable is the interaction between the NPP partisan dummy and a dummy indicating which party is in power. (b) The estimations include an unreported constant and round- and region-specific dummies, and standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the regional level. (c) Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

**Table B.6: Robustness tests**

Variables	(1) Public utility index	(2) Asset index	(3) Bribe police	(4) Bribe document	(5) Attacked
NPP partisan	0.112** (0.042)	0.110 (0.108)	0.119* (0.055)	0.025 (0.041)	-0.013 (0.016)
Partisan divide	-0.025 (0.065)	-0.066 (0.100)	-0.025 (0.107)	0.031 (0.040)	0.046 (0.033)
Gender	0.048* (0.024)	-0.298*** (0.035)	-0.113** (0.036)	-0.142*** (0.034)	-0.013 (0.011)
Location	-1.195*** (0.124)	-0.381*** (0.047)	-0.056 (0.046)	-0.100** (0.036)	-0.003 (0.018)
Education	0.138*** (0.031)	0.292*** (0.016)	0.049** (0.018)	0.066*** (0.014)	0.011 (0.013)
Employment	-0.022 (0.019)	0.138*** (0.020)	0.032** (0.014)	0.039** (0.012)	-0.007 (0.006)
Age	-0.000 (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Muslim	0.152 (0.108)	0.129*** (0.038)	0.068 (0.099)	0.012 (0.057)	0.034 (0.023)
Other religion	-0.130 (0.088)	-0.269*** (0.042)	-0.012 (0.065)	-0.108** (0.034)	0.052 (0.034)
Ethnic Ewe	-0.226 (0.186)	0.047 (0.098)	0.055 (0.093)	0.095 (0.081)	0.032 (0.024)
Ethnic Ga	-0.185 (0.129)	-0.056 (0.073)	0.000 (0.103)	0.014 (0.049)	0.036 (0.020)
Ethnic Northern	-0.383** (0.155)	0.028 (0.077)	0.095 (0.089)	0.013 (0.057)	-0.007 (0.029)
Observations	5,129	4,658	2,676	2,381	5,237
R-squared	0.395	0.527	0.111	0.090	0.023

Notes: (a) The partisan divide variable is the interaction between the NPP partisan dummy and a dummy indicating which party is in power. (b) The estimations include an unreported constant and round- and region-specific dummies, and standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the regional level. (c) Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.7: Robustness tests: Geographic identification

Variables	(1) Performance president	(2) Satisfaction (economy)	(3) Satisfaction (jobs)	(4) Satisfaction (education)	(5) Satisfaction (health)	(6) Satisfaction (crime)	(7) Satisfaction (corruption)
NPP partisan	0.633*** (0.166)	0.517** (0.221)	0.538*** (0.099)	0.382*** (0.062)	0.189 (0.144)	0.323*** (0.024)	0.418*** (0.024)
Partisan divide	-2.165*** (0.187)	-1.916*** (0.202)	-1.735*** (0.215)	-1.601*** (0.184)	-1.575*** (0.156)	-1.579*** (0.144)	-1.733*** (0.148)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	2,543	2,555	2,500	2,579	2,559	2,543	2,455
R-squared	0.415	0.375	0.273	0.361	0.302	0.209	0.334
Variables	(8) Trust president	(9) Trust Parliament	(10) Trust ruling party	(11) Trust opposition party	(12) Trust police	(13) Trust courts	(14) Living conditions (absolute)
NPP partisan	0.306* (0.149)	0.230** (0.095)	0.359*** (0.075)	-0.098 (0.104)	0.159 (0.131)	0.026 (0.113)	0.470* (0.207)
Partisan divide	-1.850*** (0.157)	-0.786*** (0.084)	-1.726*** (0.152)	0.993*** (0.186)	-0.349*** (0.064)	-0.378*** (0.059)	-1.045*** (0.046)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	2,569	2,528	2,540	2,511	2,583	2,543	2,614
R-squared	0.296	0.137	0.269	0.108	0.074	0.073	0.133

Notes: (a) The partisan divide variable is the interaction between the NPP partisan dummy and a dummy indicating which party is in power. (b) The estimations include the same set of individual-level controls as the baseline regressions, an unreported constant, and round- and region-specific dummies, and standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the regional level. (c) Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.8: Robustness tests: Geographic identification

Variables	(1) Living conditions (relative)	(2) Economic conditions (present)	(3) Economic conditions (future)	(4) Corruption president	(5) Corruption MPs	(6) Corruption police	(7) Corruption judges
NPP partisan	0.376** (0.136)	0.706*** (0.154)	0.448 (0.261)	-0.056 (0.061)	-0.089** (0.036)	0.034* (0.016)	0.037 (0.034)
Partisan divide	-0.818*** (0.074)	-1.450*** (0.097)	-1.372*** (0.183)	0.267*** (0.028)	0.182*** (0.022)	0.125*** (0.020)	0.121*** (0.025)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	2,462	2,580	2,232	2,629	2,629	2,629	2,629
R-squared	0.114	0.196	0.257	0.111	0.094	0.023	0.047
Variables	(8) Fear of crime	(9) Unfair govt. treatment	(10) Freedom of association	(11) Freedom of press	(12) One-party rule	(13) One-man rule	(14) Electoral democracy
NPP partisan	-0.117 (0.081)	-0.028 (0.050)	-0.533*** (0.068)	-0.150 (0.133)	0.030 (0.140)	0.271*** (0.033)	-0.055 (0.055)
Partisan divide	0.308*** (0.063)	0.924*** (0.090)	0.652*** (0.059)	-0.207** (0.074)	-0.753*** (0.103)	-0.559*** (0.142)	0.055 (0.039)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	2,626	2,452	2,225	2,261	2,599	2,570	2,584
R-squared	0.039	0.125	0.061	0.059	0.070	0.064	0.041

Notes: (a) The partisan divide variable is the interaction between the NPP partisan dummy and a dummy indicating which party is in power. (b) The estimations include the same set of individual-level controls as the baseline regressions, an unreported constant, round- and region-specific dummies and standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the regional level. (c) Significance levels are indicated by stars *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.9: Partisan identities and ethnicity

Variables	(1) Performance president	(2) Satisfaction (economy)	(3) Satisfaction (jobs)	(4) Satisfaction (education)	(5) Satisfaction (health)	(6) Satisfaction (crime)	(7) Satisfaction (corruption)
NPP partisan	0.987*** (0.070)	0.883*** (0.061)	0.719*** (0.092)	0.593*** (0.089)	0.573*** (0.074)	0.686*** (0.066)	0.698*** (0.079)
Partisan divide (PD)	-1.824*** (0.109)	-1.522*** (0.064)	-1.175*** (0.144)	-1.083*** (0.135)	-1.071*** (0.112)	-1.153*** (0.127)	-1.276*** (0.075)
Akan/Ewe * PD	-0.669*** (0.139)	-0.467*** (0.096)	-0.529*** (0.126)	-0.514*** (0.147)	-0.438** (0.141)	-0.526*** (0.125)	-0.472*** (0.128)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	5,128	5,109	5,067	5,169	5,113	5,096	4,958
R-squared	0.468	0.389	0.273	0.333	0.289	0.233	0.315
Variables	(8) Trust president	(9) Trust Parliament	(10) Trust ruling party	(11) Trust opposition party	(12) Trust police	(13) Trust courts	(14) Living conditions (absolute)
NPP partisan	1.057*** (0.081)	0.537*** (0.057)	1.086*** (0.082)	-0.492*** (0.088)	0.272*** (0.049)	0.163*** (0.028)	0.560*** (0.075)
Partisan divide (PD)	-1.904*** (0.165)	-0.982*** (0.049)	-1.897*** (0.107)	0.678*** (0.096)	-0.642*** (0.075)	-0.421*** (0.053)	-1.068*** (0.127)
Akan/Ewe * PD	-0.629*** (0.149)	-0.255*** (0.046)	-0.594*** (0.102)	0.464*** (0.088)	0.035 (0.122)	-0.140* (0.076)	-0.115 (0.091)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	5,166	5,096	5,157	5,080	5,179	5,098	5,217
R-squared	0.408	0.185	0.373	0.115	0.105	0.100	0.137

Notes: (a) The partisan divide variable is the interaction between the NPP partisan dummy and a dummy indicating which party is in power. (b) The estimations include the same set of individual-level controls as the baseline regressions, an unreported constant, and round- and region-specific dummies, and standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the regional level. (c) Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.10: Partisan identities and ethnicity

Variables	(1) Living conditions (relative)	(2) Economic conditions (present)	(3) Economic conditions (future)	(4) Corruption president	(5) Corruption MPs	(6) Corruption police	(7) Corruption judges
NPP partisan	0.297*** (0.058)	0.806*** (0.079)	0.592*** (0.075)	-0.163*** (0.020)	-0.120*** (0.013)	-0.046** (0.015)	-0.051*** (0.009)
Partisan divide (PD)	-0.411*** (0.064)	-1.353*** (0.120)	-0.902*** (0.210)	0.318*** (0.049)	0.247*** (0.042)	0.165*** (0.029)	0.151*** (0.023)
Akan/Ewe * PD	-0.296** (0.114)	-0.333** (0.104)	-0.512* (0.235)	0.122* (0.055)	0.052 (0.046)	0.027 (0.038)	0.062 (0.046)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	4,960	5,183	4,530	5,240	5,240	5,240	5,240
R-squared	0.095	0.207	0.289	0.158	0.110	0.026	0.055
Variables	(8) Fear of crime	(9) Unfair govt. treatment	(10) Freedom of association	(11) Freedom of press	(12) One-party rule	(13) One-man rule	(14) Electoral democracy
NPP partisan	-0.085 (0.048)	-0.341*** (0.051)	-0.235*** (0.053)	-0.094** (0.029)	0.177** (0.068)	0.045 (0.036)	-0.103* (0.048)
Partisan divide (PD)	0.185* (0.090)	0.487** (0.169)	0.184 (0.157)	-0.099 (0.112)	-0.220 (0.125)	-0.124 (0.107)	0.086 (0.074)
Akan/Ewe * PD	-0.021 (0.074)	0.270** (0.115)	0.369** (0.159)	-0.068 (0.139)	-0.263* (0.117)	-0.160 (0.158)	-0.067 (0.038)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	5,229	4,927	4,477	4,517	5,196	5,161	5,166
R-squared	0.039	0.104	0.040	0.076	0.040	0.040	0.033

Notes: (a) The partisan divide variable is the interaction between the NPP partisan dummy and a dummy indicating which party is in power. (b) The estimations include the same set of individual-level controls as the baseline regressions, an unreported constant, and round- and region-specific dummies, and standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the regional level. (c) Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure 1: Margin plots

Figure 1.1: Performance president, 95% CIs




Figure 1.2: Govt. satisfaction (econ.), 95% CIs




Figure 1.3: Govt. satisfaction (jobs), 95% CIs




Figure 1.4: Govt. satisfaction (education), 95%




Figure 1.5: Govt. satisfaction (health), 95% CIs





Figure 1.6: Gov. satisfaction (crime), 95% CIs



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Figure 1.7: Govt. satisfaction (corruption), 95% CIs




Figure 1.8: Trust (president), 95% CIs




Figure 1.9: Trust (Parliament), 95% CIs




Figure 1.10: Trust (ruling party), 95% CIs




Figure 1.11: Trust (opposition party), 95% CIs





Figure 1.12: Trust (police), 95% CIs



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Figure 1.13: Trust (courts), 95% CIs




Figure 1.14: Living conditions (absolute), 95% CIs




Figure 1.15: Living conditions (relative), 95% CIs




Figure 1.16: Econ. conditions (present), 95% CIs




Figure 1.17: Econ. conditions (future), 95% CIs





Figure 1.18: Corruption (president), 95% CIs



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Figure 1.19: Corruption (MPs), 95% CIs




Figure 1.20: Corruption (police), 95% CIs




Figure 1.21: Corruption (judges), 95% CIs




Figure 1.22: Fear of crime, 95% CIs




Figure 1.23: Unfair govt. treatment, 95% CIs





Figure 1.24: Freedom of association, 95% CIs



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Figure 1.25: Freedom of press, 95% CIs




Figure 1.26: One-party rule, 95% CIs




Figure 1.27: One-man rule, 95% CIs





Figure 1.28: Electoral democracy, 95% CIs



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